TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

The International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments (IASTE) was established at the First International Symposium on Traditional Dwellings and Settlements held at Berkeley in April 1988. IASTE is an interdisciplinary forum where scholars from various disciplines and countries can exchange ideas, discuss methods and approaches, and share findings. As opposed to disciplinary associations, IASTE is a nonprofit organization concerned with the comparative and cross-cultural understanding of traditional habitat as an expression of informal cultural conventions. IASTE's purpose is to serve as an umbrella association for all scholars studying vernacular, indigenous, popular and traditional environments. Current activities of IASTE include the organization of biennial conferences on selected themes in traditional-environments research, the publication of edited books on selected themes, a public outreach program which includes supporting films and documentaries, and the publication of the Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Working Paper Series, which includes all papers presented at IASTE conferences and accepted for publication.

Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review is the official publication of IASTE. As a semi-annual refereed journal, *TDSR* acts as a forum for the exchange of ideas and a means to disseminate information and report on research activities. All articles submitted to *TDSR* are evaluated through a blind peer-review process. *TDSR* has been funded by grants from the Graham Foundation, the Getty Publication Program, the National Endowment for the Arts, the Center for Environmental Design Research, and the office of the Provost at the University of California at Berkeley.

IASTE membership is open to all who are interested in traditional environments and their related studies. In addition to receiving the Association's semi-annual journal, members are eligible to attend the biennial conference at reduced rates. Subscription to the journal is available only with membership in IASTE. Domestic annual order rates are as follows: Individual, $60; Institutional, $120; Corporations, $180. Foreign members add $15 for mailing. Libraries, museums, and academic organizations qualify as institutions. Subscriptions are payable in U.S. dollars only (by check drawn on a U.S. bank, U.S. money order, or international bank draft). Send inquiries to:

TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

Journal of the International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments

Contents

COVER ILLUSTRATION: HEKENG VILLAGE, NANJING COUNTY. PHOTO OF *TULOU* CLUSTER BY JING ZHENG.

Editor's Note

This issue of *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review* follows the successful completion of IASTE's 2012 conference in Portland, Oregon, on the theme of "The Myth of Tradition." We start this issue with a report on that event by Prof. Mrinalini Rajagopalan. The issue next includes articles by the winners of the Jeffrey Cook Award for Best Paper on the Subject of Traditional Settlements, which we again presented at the conference. The recipients were, in the Scholar category, Prof. Itohan Osayimwese of the Department of Art History at Ithaca College, and, in the Student category, Rick Miller of the Department of Geography at UCLA. Their original conference presentations have been revised into journal articles following an additional round of reviews. Osayimwese investigates the myth of authenticity during the colonial period. During the early twentieth century German officials and travelers celebrated the Bamum Kingdom of Cameroon as the paradisiacal "Africa" of the Western imagination. But she argues that representations of its building traditions, like the similarly mythologized narrative of Mousgoum architecture, should be understood not in relation to lived reality, but the conditions of its production — namely, the complicity of German ethnology in legitimating the colonial enterprise. Miller explores the narratives of differing communities surrounding a memorial to Chinggis Khaan in Inner Mongolia. In particular, he studies how the myths and politics of this monument continue to inform identity construction and local interethnic relations. The analysis examines a rich mix of sources, including recorded Mongolian stories, nineteenth-century traveler's journals, a Chinese conservation plan for the site, and his own visual analysis of architecture and landscape.

The issue next features a revised version of the 2012 conference paper by Sujin Eom, awarded an honorable mention in the Student category of the Cook Award. Eom explores the meanings of "Chineseness" in relation to overseas settlements in Yokohama and Incheon. She argues that although the development of these Chinese enclaves engaged with tropes of colonialism and modernism, they were not direct outcomes of "Western" influence, and thus they have produced alternative understandings of modernity in the region. Our fourth article, by Jing Zheng, is also based on a conference presentation. Her concern is the way the *tulou* of southern China have been misrepresented in heritage discourse as primarily defensive structures. In fact, the supposed "fortress" qualities of *tulou* were supplanted early on by their utility as a form of cooperative housing in a region with few flat building sites. She documents how their defensive weaknesses were then clearly demonstrated during the long period of the Chinese Civil War. Last, Mirjana Lozanovska, Iris Levin, and Maria Victoria Gantala provide a field report from Melbourne, Australia. The trio explore how post-World War II immigrants from southern Europe adapted traditional forms and processes of suburban housing there, an effort that not only created a new vernacular but eased adaptation to life in a new land.

There are substantial measures underway to increase access and readership to IASTE publications. I am happy to announce our partnership with both JSTOR and EBSCO, two well-known and well-respected aggregation services, to carry *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review.* This will likely bring revenue from royalties, while still allowing IASTE and *TDSR* authors to retain full editorial, copyright, and intellectual property control. In addition, since these databases are widely used at the undergraduate level across the country, our partnership with these services will bring the journal to libraries and students who may not now have access to it.

Finally, I would like to announce that the next IASTE conference will take place in Shanghai, China, in December 2014, hosted by Jiao Tong University. Its theme of "Whose Tradition?" will encompass ideas of ownership and agency. I hope you will respond to our upcoming call for papers and encourage your colleagues to do the same.

Nezar AlSayyad

IASTE 2012 Conference Report

Tradition as Prescription, Polemic, Possibility and Provocation

MRINALINI RAJAGOPALAN

IASTE's 2012 biennial conference, held in Portland, Oregon, marked the 25th anniversary of a robust debate on tradition and the built environment — a debate that was begun by the organization at its first conference, held in Berkeley in 1988. "What are traditional dwellings and settlements? How do they arise and why do they persist? How do we in academia study them and to what end?"[1] These were some of the questions that motivated IASTE's first meeting in 1988. Twenty-five years later, with a vastly changed membership, as well as a more international presence as a result of this journal and the association's biennial conferences, IASTE continues to grapple critically with the overlapping concepts of tradition and the built environment.

In this broad (and admittedly impressionistic) survey of the 2012 conference I will attempt to place IASTE's discourse into a broader epistemic landscape regarding tradition and its role in the built environment. Tradition has been both a seductive and sturdy trope in the study of the built environment. It has appeared sometimes as prescription (as in the study of early vernacular architecture); sometimes as polemic (as in the beginnings of postmodernism and its applications to architecture and urbanism); sometimes as possibility (as in the interdisciplinary turn toward understanding the built environment as social and cultural history); and sometimes as provocation (as seen in the more deconstructivist stance taken by IASTE in recent conferences, such as "The End of Tradition?" (2000), "Interrogating Tradition" (2008), and the 2012 conference, "The Myth of Tradition.") Through these four modalities — of prescription, polemic, possibility and provocation — tradition reveals itself to be that most generative type of episteme, a moving target which resists singular definition yet which is infinitely productive precisely because of its deeply contested meanings.

PRESCRIPTION

If it has been 25 years since IASTE's establishment, it has also been 48 years since the publication of Bernard Rudofsky's *Architecture without Architects*.[2] A passionate plea to consider nonpedigreed architecture mostly in the non-Western world, Rudofsky's exegesis was a thinly veiled attack on modernism, launched precisely at the moment of its denoue-

ment. From the ancient amphitheaters of highland Peru to the troglodytic dwellings of Sicily, this form of "traditional" architecture seemed to offer sudden and much needed succor from the cold, rational, grandiose narrative of modernism. Of course, in order for such "traditional" architecture to serve its purpose, it was important that its builders remain invisible and unnamed — the faceless mass of a happy, cooperative collective, instead of known individuals intervening in their environments. As Rudofsky wrote then, "There is much to learn from architecture before it became an expert's art."[3] What he meant was that there were no experts — indeed, no expertise — simply a naturalized response between man and the built environment.

Rudofsky's book appropriated tradition as prescription. Tradition would become the bromide for the follies of modernism, and the "traditional people" would provide the compass for the spiritual rejuvenation and recentering of modern man. But missing from this articulation of tradition as prescription was the agency of traditional peoples themselves. Concomitantly, the traditional environments they built could only be understood via the deterministic lens of climatic or topographical factors. Indeed, understanding the political motivations, historical contingencies, or cultural hierarchies embedded in traditional environments would have disturbed their potential as innocent prescriptions for the recalibration of modernism.

From its very beginning, IASTE has sought to overturn, or at the very least interrupt, this narrative of tradition as existing in an apolitical realm diametrically opposed to modernity. More pointedly, it has from its inception chosen to dismantle the notion that tradition can be a panacea for the anxieties of modernism, arguing that tradition and modernity are mutually constitutive in any realm of the imagination. This work of locating tradition centrally within the metanarratives of modernity (rather than at its periphery) continues today, and could be seen most vividly at the 2012 conference in the keynote presentation by Nasser Rabat. Rabat spoke, for example, of the Orientalist imagery rife in Frank Lloyd Wright's 1950s master plan for Baghdad. That proposal, by the veritable doyen of architectural modernism, contained a statue of Aladdin at its center, which epitomized a bizarrely eroticized imagination of the Middle East. Similarly, in her 2012 conference presentation, Patricia Morgado described how Diego Riviera's and Juan O'Gorman's appropriation of traditional Aztec and Mayan motifs lay at the heart of a Mexican domestic modernism.

If these examples can be dismissed as creatively frivolous attempts to temper a universal and placeless modernity with caricatures of place and culture, the Jeffrey Cook Award-winning paper by Itohan Osayimwese (included in revised form in this issue) brought up a more vexing history. Osayimwese's presentation focused on Hermann Frobenius's nineteenth-century catalog of African dwelling types as framed by a colonial gaze. Yet, as Osayimwese convincingly

illustrated, this ethnographic work in fact constructed the groups it purportedly documented via scientific and objective means. In other words, it was a taxonomy that served to lock in place the role of tradition as defined by the colonizer for the colonized. Although this work preceded Rudofsky's study by several decades, the question lingers: Was Rudofsky's mobilization of tradition as prescription really so different from Frobenius's colonial project of documentation?

POLEMIC

If it has been 25 years since IASTE's establishment, it has also been 40 years since the publication of Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steve Izenour's *Learning from Las Vegas*.[4] Perhaps the most well-recognized critique of the hegemony of modernism and its inability to recognize the value of the ugly, the ordinary, the vernacular, the undesigned, the disposable, and the commercial, Venturi and his colleagues sought to bring attention to the "stuff" that surrounds us in American cities. The authors sought not only a radical redefinition of what constitutes architecture, but more importantly, what constitutes architectural tradition.

One point of similarity between *Learning from Las Vegas* and *Architecture without Architects* is the attention each brought to the role of nonprofessionals in designing the built environment. Yet, unlike Rudofsky, who portrayed the creators of nonpedigreed architecture as simply reacting to their most basic needs, Venturi and his colleagues saw environments such as Las Vegas essentially as the creation of nonprofessionals asserting themselves through architecture. Here, all kinds of tradition (mostly low-brow) were deliberately mobilized to create an urbanscape that was directly consumerist and most effectively fashioned around the fantasy of the highway strip. Art historians like Hal Foster and architectural historians like Dell Upton have pointed out, however, that *Learning from Las Vegas* was never meant to be a prescription for architectural symbols or the establishment of new traditions. Indeed, its radical nature rested in its power to function as pure polemic — an open-ended argument that refused the metanarratives of modernism.[5]

For example, the argument submitted by Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour of a "duck" (a building that expresses its function through sculptural form) vs. a "decorated shed" (a plain building on which signs and ornaments are applied) exploded for the first time the myth that modernism could stand apart from symbolic associations or ornament. Indeed, the authors effectively pointed out that by rejecting the historicism of Neoclassical traditions and references to ornament, the modernists created their own palette of tradition. Reinforced concrete, ribbon windows, *pilotis* — these became the tradition of modernists, and modernist ducks were in the 1970s a dime a dozen in every city across the world. The Barbican in London could be the Boston City Hall; the Na-

tional Congress building in Brasilia could be the Secretariat in Chandigarh; the modernist housing blocks in Singapore could just as easily have been built in Cleveland, Ohio. What mattered was that these were ducks of modernism — easily recognizable symbols of that great movement that had so heroically rejected symbolism itself. Traditions had thus persisted despite themselves.

I thought about Venturi and Scott Brown's now legendary debate of ducks and their somewhat startling reappearance in our world as I listened to Rabat talk about the proliferation of architecture as a consummate signifier of itself in the new Middle East. From the exponentially exaggerated Burj al-Arab (which could also be the Burj Khalifa, the Petronas Towers, Taipei 101, or David Childs's new Freedom Tower in lower Manhattan) to Zaha Hadid's spectacular vision of the Performing Arts Center in Abu Dhabi (which could also be any number of Guggenheims from Bilbao to Abu Dhabi, or the Esplanade — lovingly known as the Durian — in Singapore, or the Bird's Nest Olympic Stadium in Beijing). Like the modernist ducks of the recent past, these new ducks proclaim the arrival of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Doha on the world stage of contemporary architecture. Despite their aspirations to the avant-garde, however, these new ducks are deeply embedded within a set of global traditions that have profoundly changed the nature of public space through the power of private capital.

The global traditions of the avant-garde and contemporaneity are not the only traditions that operate in the creation of new landscapes in cities such as Abu Dhabi or Beijing. As Rabat reminded us, these spectacular statements of architecture belie the brutalities of labor through which they are produced. The new global landscapes that feature the most fashionable starchitecture of the moment bear no imprint of the thousands of itinerant and unrepresented migrants who have taken these designs from drawing board to reality. Where, for example, is the body of the Indian immigrant worker in the gleaming architecture of Abu Dhabi or Dubai? Where is the space in Singapore for the tens of thousands of migrant workers whose unceasing labor has created the environments that are the city-state's passport to intelligibility in a global imaginary? Here again we see the eerie specter of traditions past. Are these new landscapes so different from colonial cities such as New Delhi, which sought to deny the troublesome body of a politically conscious Indian seeking self-determination? Or modernist cities like Brasilia which sought to erase the traces of the peasant turned construction worker, on whose back the city was built? The utility of tradition as polemic might thus lead us to the question: If the starchitecture of the contemporary moment are the ducks of our time, is the new Middle East the old colonial tabula rasa?

POSSIBILITY

If it has been 25 years since IASTE's establishment, it has also been 27 years since Spiro Kostof published *The History of Architecture*.[6] Rejecting the hegemonic narrative of architectural history as centered around the "master architect" and histories of "great men," Kostof urged the study of architecture as the intersection of complex vectors of social meaning (always in flux), technological innovation, economic change, political imprint, and symbolic appropriation. Kostof's dismantling of the master-architect myth bore similarities with Rudofsky's mission; but unlike the latter, Kostof offered the study of architecture as a range of possibilities. Among these were the possibility to understand the past but also the present; the possibility to understand the collective societies of the past but also the individual actor; the possibility to understand the numinous and indeed ephemeral traditions of the built environment but only via their persistent plurality. It is perhaps no small coincidence that IASTE germinated in Berkeley — in this fertile discursive milieu brought on and affected by the intellectual legacy left behind by Kostof. More importantly, IASTE was the product of a larger intellectual landscape where academic knowledge was never considered to lie beyond the need for social change. The most vivid example of this remains the Free Speech Movement of the 1960s, which fundamentally changed the nature of academic discussion at the university as well as the contours of specific disciplines at Berkeley such as Geography. Here then was the greatest tradition of discourse — its potential to move outside the merely pedagogical sphere and act as a catalyst for political and social change.

The notion of tradition as possibility also surfaced in some of the papers presented at the 2012 IASTE conference. In particular, I was stirred by the attention paid to the recent appropriation of public space from Tahrir Square to Zuccotti Park. Papers by Reim el-Zoghbi and Khaled Adham focusing on public space in Cairo during the Jasmine Revolution, and Aviva Rubin examining the spectacle of self-immolation as reawakened in Tunisia, remind us that the instabilities of regimes are always accompanied by the fragility of spatial symbolism — especially when the latter is controlled by the hegemonic apparatuses of dictatorships and militarized states.

Here, too, the specter of tradition looms large, particularly if we compare the appropriation of public space during the Arab Spring with the emergence of poststructuralism during the 1968 student riots of Paris. The political turmoil of that earlier period and the rise of intellectual traditions such as the Situationist International cannot be separated from one another. Theorists such as Guy DeBord and Henri LeFebvre, whose arguments arose from the study of the built environment during that moment of political crisis and dissent, centered the understanding of public space in their understanding of contemporary society. In the present moment, the forces unleashed by the Arab Spring evoke a

similar history, reminding us of our responsibility to revisit the built environment and its potential to radically change the contours of discourse. This then is tradition as possibility — the understanding that tradition may interrupt or even over- turn the most authoritarian regimes simply by appropriating and reinterpreting the spaces that reflect and reinforce these political frameworks.

PROVOCATION

Finally, I come to the concept of provocation. At this point I would like to turn to the next IASTE conference to be held in Shanghai in 2014. Its theme, "Whose Tradition?" returns us almost full circle to these early debates regarding tradi- tional environments. On the one hand, "Whose tradition?" may seem like an innocent reassertion of one of the original questions that framed IASTE's first meeting — i.e., "What are traditional dwellings and settlements?" On the other, the question of who defines or authors tradition is an attempt to place agency at the front and center of tradition. This central question also leads to others, such as: Who are the guardians or stewards of tradition? Who gets to discuss and manipulate tradition? Who benefits from tradition, and who becomes its victims? These are more than simply questions of author- ship. They are attempts to probe the enduring seduction of traditions as well as the unexpected agency of individuals, for if we have learned something over the past 25 years, it may be that the one cannot be understood without the other. "Whose tradition?" then, is first and foremost a provocation. It is meant to challenge still further any of us who wish to rest tradition upon a singular definition; to encourage us to resist the urge to let it slip into prescription; and to remind us that the study of tradition should always remain a provocation.

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Feature Articles

Architecture and the Myth of Authenticity During the German Colonial Period

ITOHAN OSAYIMWESE

It has been argued that at the beginning of the twentieth century German colonial officials and travelers created a myth about the Bamum Kingdom of Cameroon. Fed by innumerable invocations of the grandeur of Bamum architecture, this myth celebrated the kingdom as the long-sought paradisiacal "Africa" of the Western imagination. In this article I argue that the Bamum narrative did not exist in opposition to any identifiable reality or essential truth. Instead, I suggest that the Bamum narrative, like the similarly mythologized narrative of Mousgoum architecture, should be understood in relation to the ideological conditions of its production, including emerging tropes, theories, and methods of argumentation in German ethnology that were themselves complicit in colonialism.

One of the most frequently mentioned indigenous polities in the German colonial archive is the Bamum Kingdom of the Grasslands region of western Cameroon. The kingdom took its place in colonial discourse as a result of a widely narrated first encounter between colonial officials and the Bamum people in 1902, and because the Swiss-German Basel Mission Society established and maintained a station there from 1906 to 1916.[1] Knowledge about Bamum culture was disseminated through photographs and paintings created by German visitors, through their written descriptions, and through artifacts acquired from the Bamum people. Architecture featured prominently in all of these depictions, and thus contributed to the unique way in which the kingdom was portrayed. This article considers the significance of this focus on architecture in German knowledge of traditional West African cultures.

BAMUM IN CAMEROONIAN-GERMAN COLONIAL HISTORY

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After a slow start, the German colonial empire expanded to include Cameroon in August 1884. Representatives of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck signed treaties with

the leaders of African states along an area of coast as yet unclaimed by Britain and France.[2] Since the predominant aim was economic exploitation with minimal metropolitan investment, German influence spread inland only haltingly, requiring numerous small-scale military campaigns to subjugate African states that stood in the way of German interests. Consequently, the German administration did not reach Bamum territory until 1902.

Like a truly savvy political leader, the young ruler of the Bamum, Sultan Njoya, responded strategically to diplomatic intelligence by choosing to cooperate with rather than oppose what was clearly a stronger military power. Njoya may have also perceived that building an alliance with the Germans would further strengthen his own position and Bamum's dominance of the Grasslands.[3] In response, the German expedition and subsequent visitors accorded Njoya and his court a high degree of respect. German reports described Njoya's manner as elegant, educated, and proud yet humble.[4] This was in contradistinction to other regional leaders and to Africans in general. In the words of one visitor, "He is definitively one of the rare negroes who has a pronounced intellectual independence."[5]

Not only did Njoya present himself as befitted a king, but his realm was well organized and showed evidence of high levels of cultural achievement. Together, these impressions contributed to the development of what the art historian Christraud Geary has described as a German myth that celebrated Bamum as one of the lost "paradisiacal and wealthy kingdoms in the interior of Africa."[6] The most important ingredients of this myth were "historicity, wealth, Bamum superiority, and an emphasis on the exotic."[7]

MYTH, MYTHOLOGY, HYBRIDITY AND AUTHENTICITY IN ARCHITECTURE

The concept of "myth" certainly captures the constructed nature of Bamum culture and its portrayals. If the portrayal of Bamum was a myth, however, it did not operate in any simple sense of the term. There was no identifiable reality or essential truth against which the Bamum myth could be read. I propose that the Bamum narrative is more readily understood using Roland Barthes's concept of "mythology."[8] Barthes defined a mythology as a system of signs whose goal is to transform the historical intention behind its existence into a natural justification and thus a fact.[9] Rather than concealing, mythology distorts and impoverishes meaning. Unlike conventional myth, mythology is not fixed in any one object and is not "defined by the object of its message." Mythology does not, in fact, mark fixed cultural or ethnic meaning. According to Barthes, familiar definitions restrict myth to a primary level of signification, whereas mythology involves two levels. Thus, the usual arbitrariness of language (first-level signification) is channeled into a "semiological chain which preexisted it" (second-level signification), thus constraining meaning.[10]

A particularly apt example is Barthes's analysis of the cover of a French newsweekly showing a young black man in a French uniform saluting with eyes uplifted (possibly toward the French flag). The image can be read in at least two ways. First, it can be seen to generate complete meaning through first-level signification only — i.e., "the negro is giving the French salute."[11] Second, it can be read as part of a larger semiological system that combines a signifier (or several) already formed in the previous semiological chain ("the negro is giving the French salute") with the signified ("a purposeful mixture of Frenchness and militariness"[12]) and a third term ("the presence of the signifier through the signified"[13]). This leads to a distorted reading that must be deciphered by the mythologist. Is the image of the saluting negro a symbol of French imperialism? An alibi of French imperialism? Or "the very presence of French imperiality"?[14]

As "depoliticized speech" with a specific motivation, Barthes argued that mythology is fundamentally allied with the ideology of the bourgeoisie, who have refused to be named as a political and ideological fact, yet have universalized their ideology and representations.[15] Mythology specifically "transforms petit-bourgeois culture into universal nature"; and thus we come full circle to colonialism as an expression of European bourgeois culture and to Bamum-German relations in colonial Cameroon.[16] Colonialism, as Roland Barthes has shown, was a well-established subject of mythology.[17]

As I have argued elsewhere, German colonial administrators, missionaries, travelers and anthropologists actually co-produced the mythology of a great Bamum civilization together with the Bamum leadership and the artists and architects who worked for it.[18] Following a regional tradition of ethnic and cultural appropriation and integration, Njoya developed and applied an approach to visual and material culture that enabled the kingdom to enter into dialogue with multiple codes of representation, including European modes of representing the Other.[19] One notable example was Njoya's patronage of several unusual new buildings for royal use (**FIG.1**).[20] These structures were built from mud brick, stone, wood, thatch, and corrugated iron instead of the raffia palm ribs of previous palace buildings (**FIG.2**). Such new materials required new methods of construction, including arches and vaults, and a new, more subtractive approach to creating space. As Figure 1 suggests, however, the character of previous royal architecture was retained in some of these new buildings through a linear organization of space and the use of additive roof forms. These new multistory buildings challenged German expectations about African buildings, as captured in the anthropologist Georg Thilenius's description of African house-building: "If one does not consider the shelves, platforms, etc. mounted on interiors in the space between roof and wall as a foreshadowing of a second story, then, as the majority of cases show, all [African] houses are built with one story."[21] Thilenius noted exceptions to this rule in western Cameroon and Togo, where "two or more story buildings ap-

FIGURE 1. *"Foumban: the King's new palace, seen from the rear." This was one of the new structures created under Sultan Njoya, ca. 1908/1909. Source: Basel Mission Archives / Basel Mission Holdings, E-30.32.018.*

pear where material allows and a need exists." Indeed, ethnic groups to the north and west of the Grasslands, including the Batammaliba (Tamberma), the "Ssola" in northern Togo, the Somolo in the "Black Volta," and the Hausa in northern Nigeria, used mud-brick construction to build arched openings and multistory structures.[22] Njoya had certainly been exposed to some of these practices through travel, encounters with travelers, and Arabic texts, and he and his builders may have drawn on them in their designs for new royal structures.

Apart from these neologisms, encircling verandahs, deep eaves, and carved wood posts were among several elements present in the new structures as well as in previous royal Bamum architecture. Yet German commentators insisted on interpreting Njoya's new buildings as products of European influence. Marie Pauline Thorbecke, an artist who accompanied her geographer husband on an expedition to Cameroon in 1911–1912, compared these houses favorably to others she had seen in the colony. At the same time, she saw them as symptoms of a larger problem — the abandonment of old cultural forms, customs, and morals and the transformation of Bamum into a European "mimic state."[23] Thorbecke's ambivalence suggests that Njoya was trapped in a web of disingenuous colonial discourse that simultaneously promoted the assimilation of the colonized and argued that

FIGURE 2. *"4. The palace of Njoja and the Basel Mission Church." From a watercolor by Ernst Vollbehr, ca. 1912. Source: Basel Mission Archives / Basel Mission Holdings, QE-30.017.0008.*

by their very nature, the colonized were incapable of fully ab-
sorbing European modes of thinking and being.

Homi Bhabha has famously analyzed this discourse on
mimicry.[24] As he has pointed out, it opened up cracks in
the authority of colonial power because of its proximity to
mockery, and because it revealed the instability of cultural
difference. As a process that produced identity, mimicry
could also lead to the creation of entirely new transcultural
forms and subjectivities in the colonial contact zone. These
hybrids captured the symbiosis of the colonial experience
even under conditions of unequal power. Like mimicry, hy-
bridity could be advantageous or problematic depending on
the subject's position within the colonial order. Hybrid forms
could deprive colonial discourse of authority by undermining
its claim to its own authentic (and superior) forms and erod-
ing its attempt to fix certain cultural practices and forms as
authentically indigenous. It was necessary to have this power
to fix the authentic because a certain definition of the indig-
enous as static was imperative for the initial and continued
justification of colonization.

Were the hybrid forms of Njoya's new buildings pro-
duced as a result of the colonial encounter? Or were they
simply expressions of an ever-evolving "authentic" culture?
In order to explain the success of Njoya's unusual buildings
while maintaining a critical attitude toward mimicry, Thor-
becke conjured up the argument that despite their seemingly
hybrid exterior form, essential elements of Bamum culture
had been distilled into these buildings. Indeed, there was,
according to Thorbecke, something fundamentally African
(in a racial sense) about them:

> The way in which the brown wood walls of the upper
> floor rise out of the white plaster of the stone wall below
> . . . attests to a natural artistic instinct that the negro
> could never ever learn from whites, an instinct that lies
> in his blood through the inheritance of generations.[25]

This contradiction epitomizes architecture's role in
colonial-era ethnographic discourse: though it had the poten-
tial to liberate observers from overdetermined frameworks, it
often bolstered these selfsame positions.

Aware of the interpretive difficulties caused by his ac-
tions, Njoya claimed intellectual ownership of these build-
ings on multiple occasions.[26] And he appropriated and
extended this colonial logic to a crisis point by arguing that
these buildings were solely a product of his own intellect:

> The house was more beautiful than any other, and
> resembled a house of a 'White'. Yet, the king had never
> seen any of their houses at the time he built this one.
> The entire design was a product of his own imagination.[27]

Thus, Njoya was able to generate and maintain a repu-
tation as an indigenous innovator and progressive African

leader even as he sidestepped some of the limits imposed
by colonial discourse. Ultimately, the king and his court
developed an array of innovative cultural forms, from new
approaches to architecture to experiments in cartography,
scription, and clothing design, that belie any claims to a fixed
"authentic" Bamum culture.[28] By so doing, they actively in-
serted themselves into colonial discourses about mimicry and
hybridity and selectively challenged or embraced their prem-
ises and implications. And, together with colonial admirers
of Bamum culture, they transformed Bamum's rise to promi-
nence and Germany's suzerainty into a mutually agreeable
mythology.[29] As understood by German colonial observers,
both mimicry and hybridity implied authenticity — in the
form of a single, fixed, indigenous subjectivity expressed in
pure, unhybridized cultural forms. In the remainder of this
article, I illustrate the entrenchment of these ideas in German
approaches to African architecture during the colonial period.

LEO FROBENIUS AND AFRICAN ARCHITECTURE

At the beginning of the twentieth century the German eth-
nologist Leo Frobenius was arguably the consummate maker
of mythologies about Africa. Frobenius was a maverick who
started his career when German anthropology had abandoned
its liberal humanist roots to embrace racial and nationalist im-
peratives.[30] Going against the grain of then-current evolution-
ary thinking, Frobenius argued that culture originated in one
region, from which it was disseminated through "exchange,
imitation, or conquest."[31] Once customs, myths and artifacts
had arrived in a region, they cohered into autonomous cul-
tural units. Careful decoding could help ethnologists identify
Kulturkreisen (cultural complexes), or geographic areas with
shared "stylistically-defined and historically-related" cultural
features, and trace their transmission and transformation.[32]

Thus, Frobenius pioneered the integration of ethnology
with material-cultural analysis. He argued that material
culture was inextricably linked to materials available in any
particular region, and could therefore offer the ethnologist
important clues about cultural diffusion. Implicit in this ap-
proach was the idea of single (or multiple) ur-culture(s). Fro-
benius devoted significant intellectual and material resources
to identifying these ur-, primordial or authentic cultures.[33]

Africa as a whole, and West Africa in particular, played
this role for Frobenius. The area seemed less tainted by ex-
ternal influences and had been excluded from the purview of
Western historiography. Using what contemporary scholars
characterize as a combination of sound ethnological analysis
and rabid speculation, Frobenius formulated theories about
African ur-culture even before his first trip to the continent
in 1904. One of the more outlandish examples was his dec-
laration in January 1911 that he had found the lost continent
of Atlantis in the hinterland of German Togo.[34] Through a
merger of Greek myth and West African material-cultural

evidence, he formulated a global history that linked an ur-West African Atlantis to the Mediterranean.[35] What emerged was a wildly conjectural history that, like much of Frobenius's other work, bore the trappings of mythology.

Frobenius realized a life-long dream when he visited the Belgian Congo from 1904 to 1906. In 1907 he visited Gambia, French West Africa, and German Togo. During his expeditions, Frobenius visited numerous ethnic groups, observed their cultures, and collected myths, songs, photographs, drawings, artifacts, and other evidence. He saw all of these cultural forms as repositories to be mined in a quest for "true" human history.[36] Furthermore, he had been commissioned to collect artifacts by the museums in Berlin and Hamburg that funded his journeys. Indeed, Frobenius's finds form the cores of several important collections in Germany today.[37]

Architecture was of critical importance to Frobenius's *Kulturkreisen* theory, since, by its very nature, architecture was less mobile and less susceptible to change than other material-cultural forms.[38] Frobenius identified two ur-African cultures: the "telluric," "sedentary-agrarian culture south of the Sahara" ("Ethiopian" culture); and the "chthonic," "nomadic-hunting culture north of the Sahara" ("Hamitic" culture). He then associated each culture with distinct building types. Buildings on pilings were typical of the "Ethiopian" culture, while "silo buildings" were found in the "Hamitic culture." The two building types embodied different relationships between ethnic groups (and racial types) and their environments, and thus they expressed different worldviews: buildings on pilings emphasized a vertical link between heaven and earth, while silos were connected to the growth of roots within the earth and to earth-bound animal forms.[39] Frobenius devoted considerable resources to pinpointing the origins and diffusion of these building types and correlating them with specific ethnic groups and geographic locations (**FIG.3**).

It is clear that Frobenius's proclivity for Africa had multiple origins. On the practical side, he saw in the continent his own professional salvation. Intellectually, the ethnologist was convinced that Africans were "living documents of an otherwise unrecoverable universal human past" — though only traces of this past remained in contemporary African societies as a result of foreign contamination.[40] Although Frobenius's emphasis on preserving authentic cultural forms contained anti-imperialist elements, he never explicitly condemned the colonial system. He may have acquired a passion for past African cultures, but he nevertheless subscribed to one of colonialism's most pernicious tenets — the contemporary superiority of Europeans.[41] Frobenius thus formulated a new Barthesian-type mythology — one that valorized the victims of colonialism and their cultural artifacts even as it continued, in the words of Denis Dutton, to "perpetuate acts of imperialism, appropriation, and ethnocentric insensitivity . . . in the name of enlightened, magnanimous liberalism."[42] This new mythology was positioned (on the surface) in opposition to an older mythology that directly and unapologetically justified co-

22. The post bed.

23. The post granary.

24. The post dwelling house.

FIGURE 3. *(a,b,c). Telluric-Ethiopian Cultural Traits in Architecture. Source: Leo Frobenius, "Early African Culture as an Indication of Present Negro Potentialities,"* Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, *Vol.140 (November 1928), pp.153-65.*

lonialism through "racism, contempt for 'childish' artifacts," and evolutionist thinking.[43] Both mythologies, however, distorted precolonial developments as well as the historical facts and intentions behind European colonization of Africa.

It seems likely that Leo Frobenius developed his ideas about architecture through collaboration with his father, Hermann Frobenius.[44] After retiring from the army as a lieutenant colonel and "fortress-builder," Hermann Frobenius launched a new career writing about the architecture of Africa and Oceania.[45] His military engineering background enabled him to combine detailed technical analyses of buildings with an ethnographic theory influenced by his son. This method was captured in the title of his earliest known publication on the subject, *Afrikanischen Bautypen: eine etnographisch-archi-tektonische Studie [African Building Types: An Ethnographic-Architectural Study]*, (1894). Hermann clearly shared with his son a diffusionist theory of culture and a conviction that buildings were highly reliable sources of ethnographic data:

> *The functional building practices of the domicile and its comfortable arrangement characterize the way of life of the tribe. A certain form and certain fittings are typical of it; the tribe migrates with these when forced to leave its home, and where it gains a foothold again, where it finds a favorable grazing ground for its flocks, or where the ground promises to yield a rich harvest, there the tribe builds its huts in the accustomed form and manner. The tribe does not always find the same materials that were at hand in its previous homeland and differences in material may force it to make small alterations, but it will never invent an entirely new form.[46]*

Synthesizing existing ethnographic studies and travel narratives, Hermann Frobenius mapped the geographic distribution of building types in Africa through a detailed analysis of formal, structural and aesthetic elements, which he then correlated with ethnic and linguistic categories. In summary, he identified three basic types: 1) a "Bantu type" consisting of a tectonic frame with infill and cladding; 2) a "saddle roof" type in which space-enclosing components were built separately, connected to the ground, and then attached to each other and clad with clay; and 3) a "Sudan style" that combined both the frame-infill system and the "saddle roof" system. Likewise, he categorized floor plans as circular (generally Bantu and Sudan types) or rectilinear (generally saddle roof type).[47] Using these categories, Frobenius culled away elements created under foreign influence to reveal the formal, structural and material essences of the built structures of each group.[48] The dominant motifs of this approach were biological and cultural authenticity, hybridity, and displacement. These motifs appeared repeatedly in discussions about indigenous architecture in the German colonies.[49]

I want to suggest that the Bamum narrative emerged in this intellectual climate and was shaped by it both in form

and content.[50] Following the methods of the Frobeniuses, Bamum was interpreted by correlating material culture (including architecture) with geography and ethnicity in a search for authentic African forms and ur-African cultures. By most European accounts, visiting the capital of the Bamum Kingdom, Foumban, was like entering a fairyland. The basic elements of the tale were repeated frequently in military reports, ethnographic analyses, travel narratives, missionary field reports, fiction, etc. Those elements included a description of Foumban, which emphasized its scale, the fact that it was fortified, the legible (to European eyes) organization of its buildings and spaces according to function, and the grandeur of its buildings.[51] All of these qualities were presented in contradistinction to other African towns and villages. Anna Gehler achieved this contrast by describing the wild, untamed landscape before Foumban: "You must climb many mountains and drag yourself though many hot valleys. You must wade through rivers swarming with crocodiles and hippopotamuses, and in this manner you must continue onward."[52] Thus the journey to Foumban was figured using the trope of discovery had long been used in travel writing.

Marie Pauline Thorbecke explained that, in actuality, all the great nineteenth-century expeditions had bypassed Bamum.[53] Its discovery was therefore understood as a consequence of the German colonial project. After describing the wondrous sights encountered on her arrival, Thorbecke launched quickly into a discussion of ethnic origins and dissemination: "The Bamum people are without a doubt on the highest cultural level of all the tribes of the Grasslands. . . ."[54] Ethnic and cultural commingling were her next topics: "Bamum culture is without question a mixture of elements of the West and East Mbam lands. . . . Culturally, the best and most important have been maintained from each of the two elements." Material culture provided the necessary evidence: "Settlements and house-building display the same type seen in the other Grassland territories in the Dschang and Bamenda district, except that they [Bamum] are consistently more beautiful and resplendent."[55] Close observation of building construction revealed its sophistication in comparison to other "negro huts." As the accompanying photograph illustrates, the walls of the Bamum house were first built on the ground out of raffia palm ribs **(FIG.4)**. Once completed, these were then raised and tied together, and a ceiling was constructed to support the heavy domed grass roof (cf. Frobenius's "saddle roof" category). Lastly, walls were daubed with red laterite. In the house of the patriarch of a compound, a long gallery with a saddle-shaped roof typically connected two such domed structures. This method produced buildings whose immense width and height amazed Thorbecke and other observers.[56]

These qualities were understandably pronounced in King Njoya's traditional palace complex. Like the houses of other Bamum dignitaries, carved wood posts supported the eaves of the roof. Between the eaves and the post was a polychromatic frieze whose patterning was created by in-

laying burned grass into a dried-grass background (REFER TO FIG.2). According to Thorbecke, these friezes were patterned with stylized animal figures, which in the case of Njoya's palace included an "age old but now recurring lizard motif."[57] Thus Njoya's palace was authentic because of the presumed antiquity of elements like the lizard motif. Here was the ethnological argument that cultural motifs recur and can thus be used to trace cultural mobility and origins. It was in part the fact that German visitors like Thorbecke placed so much value on recurrent cultural elements that made their absence in hybrid buildings like the two at the back of Njoya's palace so difficult to bear. This sense of loss merged easily into an accusation of mimicry.

ANOTHER PARADISE? MOUSGOUM ARCHITECTURE IN NORTHERN CAMEROON

Myth and authenticity featured in discourses about the architecture of several other ethnic groups under German colonial rule. The Mousgoum, who reside on the border between northern Cameroon and Chad, were one of these groups. As in the case of Bamum, Mousgoum architecture was regularly invoked in German colonial writing to produce effects that were at once similar but different. In his book *From Cameroon to Paris: Mousgoum Architecture in and out of Africa*, Steven Nelson has masterfully analyzed the quintessential Mousgoum house, the *teleuk* (plural, *teleukakay*), as a bearer of Mousgoum culture, from its representation in mid-nineteenth-century explorer's reports to its appearance in a twentieth-century film set and in travel guides and other ephemera from the colonial to the postindependence periods. The *teleuk* is a large parabolic clay dome structure that was first noticed by Europeans in the nineteenth century, fell out of favor from the 1930s until the mid-1990s, but has experienced a revival in recent years (FIG.5).[58] Nelson has argued that the *teleuk* was not always recognized as a singular embodiment of Mousgoum cultural identity in the way that it is today. Archival evidence indicates that the Mousgoum built rectangular and thatched-roof structures as well. Nelson has also argued that the emblematic status of the *teleuk* is a direct result of Mousgoum agency in molding their cultural identity in their engagement with modernity, and of Western intervention in historicizing the Mousgoum.[59]

This narrative of the Mousgoum, in which architecture played a critical role, certainly predated the German colonial

Aufn. von Mohn.

Musguweib (Schnabelweib, Kamerun).

Aufn. von Mohn.

Gehöft einer Musgufamilie (Kamerun).

FIGURE 5. *Mousgoum "castle." Source: Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon, Tafel 142.*

period. Heinrich Barth was perhaps the first European to formulate the terms of this narrative during his 1852 trip through northern Cameroon. Barth's dual role as an agent of British imperialism (the British government funded the expedition in order to open trade routes and discourage slavery) and newly minted geographer and "Africa researcher" must be remembered here, however.[60] His was therefore not a neutral, but an ideologically loaded, scientific agenda.[61] In 1897, well into the German colonial period, and in a manner that illustrates the intertextuality of ethnographic authority, Hermann Frobenius synthesized reports by Barth, Gustav Nachtigal, and other explorers and framed them in terms of the *Kulturkreis* outlook that he shared with his son Leo. As I show here, the Mousgoum were discussed in ways reminiscent of the (later) treatment of the Bamum.

Nelson has commented on the significance of the literary strategies Barth used to present his first view of Mousgoum buildings to his readership: "Having piqued his reader with the peculiar and the strange, the explorer then leads her or him into the ruins of the residence of Mousgoum chief Kabishme."[62] This strategy of building up anticipation in order to emphasize difference was also used in the mythology of Bamum. Barth's valorization of Mousgoum architecture was prefigured in and supplemented by descriptions of the people themselves as well as other aspects of their culture. Thus, one of Barth's first encounters with the Mousgoum

occurred when, in a strategic action calculated to protect his domain from attack, the Mousgoum chief, A'dishen, accompanied by a group of horsemen joined Barth's party. As the men approached, Barth observed that they were on horseback — a characteristic that he associated with higher-level cultural achievement. Without saddles and bridles, however, these Mousgoum horsemen had not taken full advantage of this tool to human progress. They ended up presenting a "most barbarous and savage spectacle."[63]

Barth proceeded to describe Mousgoum buildings, which he found extremely interesting in their form and mode of construction. In fact, in his description of the ruins of a Mousgoum homestead, Barth indulged in just the kind of speculative reconstruction of architectural form in relation to topography, regional history, and ethnicity that would later be institutionalized in the work of the Frobeniuses.[64] According to Barth, Mousgoum buildings showed such great care in their construction that they stood in for the culture as a whole and showed it to be more developed than the advanced culture of the long-lived Bornu state to the north. Relative to their more immediate neighbors, with whom they had a common origin, the Mousgoum have achieved "a higher state of civilization." The only things undermining this otherwise glowing picture were internecine warfare among Mousgoum groups and "fetish" worship.[65] There is, of course, little acknowledgement of the contingent nature of these interpreta-

tions, which were framed by particular attitudes toward race and human achievement, Western scientific training, and British imperialist ambitions — all of which were contained in existing chains of signification (horseback riding as a sign of "civilization," internecine warfare as the opposite, etc.) to constitute a mythology.

Hermann Frobenius maintained some of Barth's celebratory quality despite his more technical interests. He reported that Barth, Nachtigal and Vogel had all observed the dominant use of clay in Mousgoum buildings. Typically, these were round "huts" with conical thatched roofs, but the parabolic all-clay structures that would soon be transformed into icons of Mousgoum culture were present as well. Paraphrasing Barth, Frobenius described a four-cornered Mousgoum compound with ogival structures, "like the top half of our [German] artillery shells," at each corner.[66] Each conical building was around 2.5 meters (8.2 feet) in diameter, "a considerable span," and was approached by a projecting portal as high as 1.8 meters (5.9 feet).[67] In one case, an unwalled but roofed curvilinear space was connected to the conical building. For Barth and Frobenius alike, this arrangement suggested a seasonal use of Mousgoum spaces that had originated in an earlier split between Mousgoum winter and summer houses. Synthesizing Barth's descriptions with other reports, Frobenius argued that the ogival building with a vaulted roof (not the more common, round "hut" with a conical thatched roof) was the primordial Mousgoum winter house. He repeatedly acknowledged the speculative nature of Barth's thinking but confirmed its content. Accordingly, Barth was "not too far off" in his supposition that thatched roofs were a later arrival, and that earlier Mousgoum roofs were clay vaults. After all, as Frobenius reminded his readers, Mousgoum granaries proved familiarity with dome construction, and, "the termites, which, with their multiform domical and conical structures that rise to mighty heights and are to be found in all places in Africa, offer a model for such a use of the plastic soil."[68]

Comparisons to the architecture of related ethnic groups like the Logone and correlations with known histories of migration and conquest bolstered Frobenius's arguments.[69] Working backward from his hypothesis of an ur-Mousgoum form, he identified the cultural complex of the Mousgoum and confirmed that they, along with the Logone, Kotoko, Ketere-Ketere, etc., were the original inhabitants of this region. Thus, Frobenius invoked components of *Kulturkreis* theory and used a strategy of attaching value to architecture on the basis of the purported authenticity of specific elements.

Repeatedly invoked by commentators and engaged by the Mousgoum themselves, this narrative assumed an element of fact. Each successive visit by a German observer seemed to confirm and amplify the Mousgoum narrative. Thus, Captain Hans Dominic, who conducted the German military campaign to pacify the northern reaches of the colony from 1901 to 1903, described entering Mousgoum land as an

otherworldly experience: "It was as though one had arrived in another world."[70] Dominic glowingly described a strongly fortified compound with a series of "spacious, dome-shaped clay huts capped with straw, which were arranged in a circle and worked clean with great care."[71] Like Barth and Frobenius before him, Dominic negated cultural difference by emphasizing the familiar and evincing empathy in his description of the Mousgoum.[72] He spoke of the "heated beds" and "proper ovens" inside Mousgoum buildings, which made their interiors as admirable as their exteriors.[73] From architecture, Dominic then transitioned easily into a discussion about work habits and products, from which he hypothesized about the biological makeup of the people and projected a profound bond between architecture and civilization. Mousgoum men were "Herculean" because of their untiring work with the unproductive soil of the Logone. Their industrious character was embodied in the degree to which they processed their goods: their tobacco "was even fermented before it was smoked!"[74]

By 1914 the *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon [Encyclopedia of German Colonies]* had distilled the Mousgoum mythology to its essential components: the Mousgoum were to be admired because they cultivated useful crops like wheat, herded cattle, reared horses, "artfully decorated their clay huts," built "enormous" clay silos for food storage, and produced "higher-level" handicrafts. Furthermore, "their fields [were] even fertilized."[75] The degree of similarity between these and other descriptions of the Mousgoum by other German visitors from the period, like Ernst Heims and Gunther von Hagen, is astounding.[76]

Ultimately, however, what distinguished these depictions of Mousgoum from portrayals of Bamum was the degree to which the positive was counteracted by the negative: lip-boring was common among women, skin was scarified, and teeth were clipped. Furthermore, the Mousgoum did not clothe themselves adequately and did not organize themselves centrally even in the relatively large walled villages of Mousgoum and Mala. This strategy of counteracting positive with negative evaluations made it possible to continue to justify colonization while acknowledging cultural achievement. Though architecture seemed to suggest different possibilities, it only served to bolster, through complex machinations, the intellectual underpinnings and practical dynamics of the colonial project.

AN ENDURING MYTHOLOGY

In conclusion, there were some fundamental differences between the Bamum and the Mousgoum that produced divergent results out of a common framework for interpreting culture. The location of the Mousgoum in the far north put them almost outside the orbit of regular colonial activity. At the date of German incursion the Mousgoum were still pagans who were under constant threat from the Muslim Fulbe who dominated the region and regularly raided the Mous-

goum to obtain domestic slaves.[77] The Mousgoum therefore posed little threat to the German colonial administration, and their political position contrasted significantly with that of the powerful Bamum Kingdom to the south.[78] Likewise, the lack of centralized organization among distinct Mousgoum groups meant that the German colonial public could not project its imaginings onto a single individual who, like King Njoya, would engage with the terms of colonial discourse through architecture and other means.

Nevertheless, a comparison between Bamum and Mousgoum is apt.[79] As this article has shown, German colonial commentators paid close attention to Bamum and Mousgoum architecture, employed analogous tropes (discovery, technical and aesthetic accomplishment, purity and mobility of architectural forms, etc.), and used comparable argumentation strategies to make claims about architecture in relation to cultural origin, and about Africa's place in history. Lending further support to this comparison is the way in which claims about Bamum and Mousgoum culture have continued to resonate. As early as 1931 Foumban hosted two museums that promoted Bamum arts and crafts. One of them, the Palace Museum, was housed in Njoya's final hybrid building, built in 1917.[80] As Geary and Nelson have argued, the exis-tence of these museums illustrates the use of art as an element in modern Bamum identity formation.[81] Bamum works at major museums throughout the West also "speak" despite the ways in which their meanings have been constrained. Foumban itself, through Bamum agency as well as Western intervention, has also become an important tourist destination and capital of Cameroon's artisanal industry.[82]

Further to the north, the Mousgoum village of Pouss has similarly become the locus of a growing tourist economy. As Nelson has suggested, the rebirth of the *teleuk* in recent mural painting, in the official stamp of the Lamido of Pouss, and in the new construction of actual *teleukakay* not only illustrates Mousgoum industriousness in catering to the tourist market, but also their self-conscious reappropriation of cultural heritage. Mousgoum's contribution to a unified postindependence national identity is captured in the appearance of the *teleuk* on Cameroonian currency, where it has served as one of several symbols representing the diverse ethnicity of the nation.[83] Similarly, Bamum, Njoya, and his palace continue to form a mirror through which Cameroon's past and present, ethnic, regional, national and global identity can be refracted — as Patrice Nganang's poignant new novel *Der Schatten des Sultans [The Shadow of the Sultans]*, illustrates.[84]

REFERENCE NOTES

1. See P. Jenkins and C. Geary, "Photographs From Africa in the Basel Mission Archive," *African Arts*, Vol.18 No.4 (1985), p.60; and C. Geary, "Impressions of the African Past: Interpreting Ethnographic Photographs from Cameroon," *Visual Anthropology*, Vol.3 No.2/3 (1990), p.306. In addition to official reports, this encounter was elaborated upon repeatedly in both Bamum and colonial German publications. See, for example, A. Gehler, *Der Negerkoenig Ndschoya* (Basel: Verlag der Basler Missionbuchhandlung, 1913), online at http://sophieold.byu.edu; and Sultan Njoya, *Histoire et coutumes des Bamums*, P.H. Martin, trans. (Pl. A-E. Dakar, 1952); and C. Tardits, "The Kingdom of Bamum," in E. Beumers and H.-J. Koloss, eds., *Kings of Africa: Art and Authority in Central Africa* (Collection Museum Fuer Voelkerkunde Berlin; Maastricht, the Netherlands: Foundation Kings of Africa, 1992), pp.43–55.
2. R.A. Austen, *Middlemen of the Cameroon's Rivers: The Duala and Their Hinterland, c.1600–c.1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.96.
3. Geary, "Impressions of the African Past," p.300; and K. Schestokat, *German Women in Cameroon: Travelogues from Colonial Times* (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), p.57. Bamum was established in the sixteenth century but flourished in the nineteenth century through territorial expansion by virtue of military power.

4. Oberleutnant Hirtler, "Bericht des Oberleutnants Hirtler über eine Expedition nach Bamum," *Deutsches Kolonial Blatt*, Band.XIV No.18, p.491. Other markers of "civilization" were noted, including the fact that Njoya and his people were clothed and rode horses with saddles and bridles.
5. M.P. Thorbecke, "Bamum," in F. Thorbecke, ed., *Im Hochland von Mittel-Kamerun*, 1. Teil, Die Reise: Eindruecke und Beobachtungen, Abhandlungen des Hamburgischen Kolonialinstituts, Band XXI (Hamburg: L. Friederichsen & Co., 1914), p.20.
6. Geary, "Impressions of the African Past," p.300.
7. C. Geary, *Images from Bamum: German Colonial Photography at the Court of King Njoya, Cameroon, West Africa, 1902–1915* (Washington, D.C., Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988), p.38; and Geary, "Impressions of the African Past," p.307.
8. Barthes defined mythology as the *study* of a very particular type of speech known as myth. However, in order to differentiate the Barthesian myth from conventional definitions, I will use the term "mythology" to refer to Barthesian myth. See R. Barthes, *Mythologies* (London: Vintage Books, 2009), p.131.
9. Ibid., pp.154,168.
10. Ibid., p.137.
11. Ibid., p.140.
12. Ibid., p.139

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p.152.
15. Ibid., pp.153,163,169. I take ideology here to refer to the "body of ideas and practices which defends the status quo and actively promotes the values and interests of the dominant groups in society." See J. Storey, *An Introductory Guide to Cultural Theory and Popular Culture* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1993), p.78.
16. D. Dutton, "Mythologies of Tribal Art," *African Arts*, Vol.28 No.3 (1995), p.34. Cf. Barthes, *Mythologies*, pp.163–68.
17. Barthes, *Mythologies*, pp.139,169. Also see Dutton, "Mythologies of Tribal Art," p.34.
18. I. Osayimwese, "Architecture with a Mission: Bamum Autoethnography during the Period of German Colonialism," in N. Berman, K. Muehlhahn, and P. Nganang, eds., *African, Asian, and Oceanic Negotiations of German Colonialism: Interactions, Resistance, and Memory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming 2013).
19. On the role of art in political process before the German colonial period, see C. Geary, "Art and Political Process in the Kingdoms of Bali-Nyonga and Bamum (Cameroon Grassfields)," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol.22 No.1 (1988), pp.11–41.
20. Marie Pauline Thorbecke referred to two structures, one for Njoya and one for his mother, which were added to the

existing palace complex (Thorbecke, "Bamum," p.17; and Schestokat, *German Women in Cameroon*, p.60). The Basel Mission Picture Archive includes an image of a school with block walls and a thatched roof built between 1908 and 1914 (E-30.31.075). The king also commissioned an entirely new palace (as opposed to individual buildings within an older palace complex) circa 1917, which may be depicted in QE-30.025.0001. The Basel Mission Picture Archive includes a similar photograph described as Njoya's "palace on the sea" and "summer residence in Mantoum" (BMA E-30.32.019).

21. G. Thilenius, "Hausbau der Eingeborene," in H. Schnee, ed., *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon*, Vol.2 (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1920) p.46f, online at http://www.ub.bildarchiv-dkg.uni-frankfurt.de/Bildprojekt/Lexikon/lexikon.htm.

22. See BMA QD-30.029.0007; H. Frobenius, *Die Erdgebäude im Sudan* (Hamburg: Verlagsanstalt und Drückerei A.G. (vormals J.F. Richter), Königliche Hofbuchdrückerei, 1897), pp.21,27; L. Frobenius, *Das unbekannte Afrika* (Muenchen: Frobeniusinstitut, 1923), pp.95–97,102; L. Frobenius, *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas: Prolegomena zu einer historischen Gestaltlehre* (Zurich: Phaidon, 1933), p.613; and Thilenius, "Hausbau der Eingeborene," p.46f.

23. Thorbecke, "Bamum," p.18.

24. H. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), p.86.

25. Thorbecke, "Bamum," p.18.

26. Ibid.; and Njoya, *Histoire et Coutumes*, p.66. After a period of experimentation with European cultural elements, Njoya went to lengths to dissociate himself from them. See C. Geary, "Patterns from Without, Meaning from Within: European-Style Military Dress and German Colonial Politics in the Bamum Kingdom (Cameroon)," *AH Number 1* (Boston: African Studies Center, 1989).

27. Njoya, *Histoire et Coutumes*, p.65. It should be noted that Njoya made these particular claims after the fact — that is, upon writing *Histoire et Coutumes*.

28. Osayimwese, "Architecture with a Mission."

29. On Bamum's nineteenth-century history, see Njoya, *Histoire et Coutumes*; and C. Tardits, "The Kingdoms of Bamum," pp.43–45.

30. S. Marchand, "Priests among the Pygmies: Wilhelm Schmidt and the Counter-Reformation in Austrian Ethnology," in H.G. Penny and M. Bunzl, eds., *Worldly Provincialism: German Anthropology in the Age of Empire* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), p.296. Much of this discussion of Frobenius's life and career is drawn from S. Marchand, "Leo Frobenius and the Revolt Against the West," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.32 No.2 (1997), pp.153–70. Also see J. Jahn, *Leo Frobenius: The Demonic Child* (Austin: African and Afro-American Studies and Research Center, The University of Texas at Austin, 1974).

31. See Marchand, "Leo Frobenius," p.155.

32. See Marchand, "Leo Frobenius," p.158. Also, M. Nguepe, *Leo Frobenius als Kunst und Literturvermittler* (Berlin: dissertation.de - Verlag im Internet, 2006), p.115.

33. Marchand, "Leo Frobenius," p.155.

34. "German Discovers Atlantis in Africa," *The New York Times*, January 30, 1911.

35. Marchand, "Leo Frobenius," p.161.

36. As opposed to universal histories in the Hegelian manner (Marchand, "Leo Frobenius," p.154).

37. M. Oberhofer, "Zwischen, Tradition und Innovation. Die Geschichte der Bamum-Sammlung des Ethnologischen Museums Berlin," http://www.about-africa.de/kamerun-nigeria/108-tradition-innovation-geschichte-bamum-sammlung-berlin; - ZÜ-2009FT-11; 2009.

38. Cf. H. Frobenius, *Afrikanische Bautypen: eine ethnographisch-architektonische Studie* (Dachau: F. Mondrian, 1894), p.4.

39. See, for example, Frobenius, *Das unbekannte Afrika*, pp.81–92; Leo Frobenius, "Early African Culture as an Indication of Present Negro Potentialities," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol.140 (November 1928), pp.159–164; L. Frobenius, *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas*, p.215; and Nguepe, *Leo Frobenius als Kunst und Literturvermittler*, p.117.

40. Marchand, "Leo Frobenius," p.159.

41. On Frobenius's seemingly contradictory position on colonialism, see Jahn, *Leo Frobenius*, pp.17–18.

42. Dutton, "Mythologies of Tribal Art," p.34.

43. Ibid.

44. Cf. "German Discovers Atlantis in Africa," *The New York Times*, January 30, 1911. This article mentions Leo's collaboration with his father, Hermann.

45. Jahn, *Leo Frobenius*, p.6; and L. Wildenthal, *Else Frobenius: Erinnerungen einer Journalisten zwischen Kaiserreich und zweiten Weltkrieg* (Koeln: Boehlau, 2005), p.128.

46. Frobenius, *Afrikanische Bautypen*, p.4. All translations from Hermann Frobenius's works are by the author of the present article.

47. Ibid., pp.52,66.

48. Ibid., p.53.

49. See, for example, Thilenius, "Hausbau der Eingeborene," p.46f. C.G. Buettner had emphasized the connection between form, materials, geography and ethnicity as early as 1887 in "Ueber das erbauen von Haeusern fuer Europaer im inneren Afrikas," *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, Vol.1, p.18.

50. This thesis is supported by historical fact, since Bernhard Ankermann, who produced the earliest ethnographic description of Bamum and collected Bamum artifacts for the Berlin Ethnological Museum, publicly acknowledged his intellectual debt to Frobenius in 1904. See J. Zwernemann, "Leo Frobenius and Cultural Research in Africa," *Research Review from the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana*, Vol. 3 (1966–67), p.17; Marchand, "Priests among the Pygmies," p.296; and B. Ankermann, "Bericht über eine ethnographische Forschungsreise ins Grasland von Kamerun," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, Vol.42 No.2 (1910), pp.288–310.

51. C. Geary, "On the Savannah: Marie Pauline Thorbecke's Images from Cameroon, West Africa (1911–12)," *Art Journal*, Vol.49 No.2 (1990), pp.150–58; Gehler, *The Negro King Njoya*, pp.1–3; Passarge-Rathjens, "Bamum," in Schnee, ed., *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon*, Vol.1, p.126f; Schestokat, *German Women in Cameroon*, pp.55–63; Thorbecke, "Bamum," pp.15–21; and E. Vollbehr, *Bunte Leuchtende Welt: Die Lebensfahrt des Malers Ernst Vollbehr* (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein, 1935), pp.115–17.

52. Gehler, *The Negro King Njoya*, pp.1–3.

53. Thorbecke, "Bamum," p.18. Ankermann ("Bericht über eine ethnographische Forschungsreise ins Grasland von Kamerun," p.288) reported that in 1889 Eugen Zintgraff was the first European to visit the Grasslands.

54. One of the tropes of this discourse is the contrast between the indigenous peoples of the coastal and forested areas and the Grasslands polities. Other Grasslands cultures were accorded a similar treatment, but it appears less consistently in the colonial archive. See, for example, A. Seidel, *Deutschlands Kolonien: Koloniales Lesebuch fuer Schule und Haus* (Leipzig: Reprint Verlag, 1913), p.120.

55. Thorbecke, "Bamum," p.16.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p.17.

58. S. Nelson, "Writing Architecture: The Mousgoum Tòlék and Cultural Self-Fashioning at the New Fin de Siècle," *African Arts*, Vol.34 No.3 (Autumn 2001), p.39.

59. S. Nelson, *From Cameroon to Paris: Mousgoum Architecture in and out of Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

60. Ibid., pp.52–56.

61. It is now well accepted that scientific exploration was always ideologically driven. See, for example, M.L. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992).

62. Nelson, *From Cameroon to Paris*, p.57.

63. H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa: Being a Journal of an Expedition Undertaken Under the*

Auspices of H.B.M.'s Government, in the Years 1849–1855, Vol.3 (London: Longman, Borwn, Green, Longmans & Roberts, 1857), p.175.

64. Cf. Nelson, *From Cameroon to Paris,* pp.64–67.

65. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries,* p.179.

66. Frobenius, *Die Erdgebäude im Sudan,* p.25.

67. Ibid. Cf. Ernst Heims, who gives a dimension of 35 feet (height) for a *teleuk,* and 6 feet (long) by 5 feet (high) for its connecting passage. See E. Heims, "From Lake Chad to the Niger," in A. Friedrich, ed., *From Congo to the Niger and Nile: An Account of the German Central African Expedition of 1910–1911,* Vol.1 (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969 [1913]), p.125.

68. Frobenius, *Die Erdgebäude im Sudan,* p.25.

69. Ibid., p.26.

70. H. Dominic, *Vom Atlantik zum Tschadsee: Kriegs- und Forschungsfahrten in Kamerun* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler u. Sohn, 1904), p.261, online at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433082450705.

71. Ibid., p.261.

72. Nelson, *From Cameroon to Paris,* p.62.

73. Dominic, *Vom Atlantik zum Tschadsee,* p.261.

74. Ibid., p.262.

75. Passarge-Rathjens, "Musgu," in Schnee, ed., *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon,* Vol.2, p.602.

76. In 1910–1911 Ernst Heims described Mousgoum buildings as the "most curious houses" he had ever seen in Africa. The richly ornamented interiors and heated beds of "these primitive Musgums" defied logic. See Heims, "From Lake Chad to the Niger," pp.125–26; and Nelson, *From Cameroon to Paris,* p.22. Gunther von Hagen's description of the same date was downright celebratory: "The most wonderful things are the houses. If one comes hither down the river from the Logone sultanate and sees the buildings for the first time, one would believe that he has been placed in a fairyland." Nelson, *From Cameroon to Paris,* p.195, quoting G. von Hagen, "Einige Notizen über die Mousgoum," *Baessler Archiv* 2 (1911), pp.117–22.

77. H. Weiss, "The Illegal Trade in Slaves from German Northern Cameroon to British Northern Nigeria," *African Economic History,* Vol.28 (2000), pp.185,189.

78. The German colonial administration had barely penetrated Mousgoum territory before a November 1911 treaty divided the Mousgoum region between German Cameroon and French Chad. Indeed, the treaty divided Mousgoum territory equally between Germany and France and granted the two largest Mousgoum settlements to France (Passarge-Rathjens, "Musgu," p.602). Earlier, Captain Dominic had described his 1901 expedition as one of the first major German encounters with the Mousgoum (*Vom Atlantik zum Tschadsee,* pp.261–62).

79. In light of the significant interest in the Bamum and the Mousgoum displayed by other observers, it is surprising that they do not feature prominently in Leo Frobenius's work. Bamum architecture is depicted in two images in Frobenius's *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas* (1933). Frobenius credited the photograph to Ankermann, with whom he shared the *Kulturkreis* approach, and whose work on the Grasslands may have obviated further work by Frobenius. Similarly, Frobenius may not have been interested in investigating the Mousgoum precisely because they had already been "discovered." In his account of his 1910 expedition, Frobenius recounted a meeting with Duke Adolf Friedrich of Mecklenburg who was returning from exploring Lake Chad. During the encounter, Frobenius was informed that "the north-eastern boundaries of the French and German Cameroons had been thoroughly investigated ethnologically, so that the supplementary examination of South and West was an essential task which it was considered desirable should be undertaken by me." L. Frobenius, *Voice of Africa: Being an Account of the Travels of the German Inner African Exploration Expedition in the Years 1910–1912,* Vol.1, R. Blind, trans. (New York and London: Benjamin Blom, 1968 [first published 1913]), p.663.

80. S. Nelson, "Collection and Context in a Cameroonian Village," *Museum International,* Vol.59 No.3 (September 2007), p.23.

81. C. Geary, "Art, Politics, and the Transformation of Meaning: Bamum Art in the Twentieth Century," in M.J. Arnoldi, C.M. Geary, and K.L. Hardin, eds., *African Material Culture* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1996), p.298; and Nelson, "Collection and Context," p.29.

82. Geary, "Art, Politics, and the Transformaiton of Meaning," p.298; and M. DeLancey and H.M. Mokeba, *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1990), p.37. Foumban also hosted the Foumban Conference in July 1961, during which preliminary work on the constitution for the Federal Republic of Cameroon was accomplished (DeLancey and Mokeba, *Historical Dictionary,* p.97).

83. Nelson, "Writing Architecture," pp.46,49.

84. P. Nganang, *Der Schatten des Sultans* [*The Shadow of the Sultans*] (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer Verlag, 2012).

Unsettled Meaning: Memorializing Lost Mobility through a Monument in Ordos, Inner Mongolia

RICK MILLER

By narrating different meanings for a memorial to Chinggis Khaan, differing communities in the Ordos region of Inner Mongolia continue to construct their own identities as integral to the past and present of the landscape they and the monument occupy. To inform discussion of the present monument and the memorial processes that surround it, this article reviews textual references such as recorded Mongolian stories, nineteenth-century travelers' journals, and a contemporary Chinese conservation plan for the site. It also documents conversations with ethnic Mongols and Han from Inner Mongolia and Mongols from Mongolia, and it employs visual analysis of changes in local architecture and landscape over the past two decades. Distilling the myths and politics of the Ordos monument provides an intriguing picture not only of local interethnic relations but also of the entwinement of people, the architecture they construct and interpret, and the landscape they inhabit and claim.

The Mongol is born in the tent, but dies on the plain.

— Mongol proverb, reported by the Reverend Joseph Kler[1]

The mobility that is lost, but commemorated in a memorial, is that of Chinggis Khaan, whose death interrupted a life of peripatetic conquest. For centuries a memorial to the great Mongol leader took the form of a mobile encampment of eight white tents that annually traversed the landscape of the Ordos region in present-day Inner Mongolia. Indeed, the name Ordos, "encampment" or "tent palace," derives from their ritual presence in this place. Yet, synecdochically, the memorial lost its own mobility when, in a 1950s design by

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the Chinese government, the tents were settled through the construction of a fixed cenotaph. Since this time, rituals associated with the mobile tents have been adapted or reinvented. However, the legitimacy of the revised memorial is today questioned by local Mongols, who express a parallel sense of loss. During its history, the continuity of both the memorial's myths and materials have previously been interrupted and revived several times. Nevertheless, its present plight resonates with their own situation in a landscape that no longer supports the mobility of the pastoral nomadism by which they once constructed both their livelihoods and identity.

Contemporary conflicts over the interpretation of the memorial reflect the history of Ordos, long a landscape of dual and dueling forms of occupation. Before the ancestors of the current Mongol population arrived, the territory attracted earlier groups of pastoral nomads who used its pasturage in continuity with the steppe that stretched northward into Mongolia. Yet, competing for the land and its legacy, Han Chinese agriculturalists with roots in the settlements to the south also periodically domesticated this landscape with their furrowed fields. The struggle over the memorial to Chinggis Khaan thus precariously embodies the competing sensibilities of nomadism and sedentarization.

The deployment of any architectural form has political context and implications. In the architecture of monuments, however, the material manifestation is invested with intentional meaning. Where the political context is controversial (which is not infrequent, since monuments are often deployed as extensions of political arguments), the monument itself may thus become freighted with differing readings at crossed purposes. The history of the Chinggis Khaan cenotaph remains inchoate as the story unfolds, but this inexactitude of meaning has larger implications for how we comprehend even the recent interventions in Ordos. It reminds us that an architecture of messages can have differing and duplicitous meanings.

In discussing these issues, the article first relays the character of the Ordos landscape by recounting its use by nomads and sedentarists. A survey of mortuary practices will then contextualize the memorial complex of Chinggis Khaan that has come to occupy this place. A brief history of how this memorial became concretized through architectural rendition into a political implement next leads to consideration of how different parties have manipulated and continue to manipulate the monument's message to reflect their own political views. Finally, the article will conclude by analyzing the demands on the monument and its landscape in terms of sustaining future traditions.

ORDOS TOPOGRAPHY AND TOPONYMY

The Ordos plateau lies within the northerly clockwise circumambulation of the Yellow River — an appellation that reflects the river's accumulation of yellow-tinged silt as it loops through the loess-lands that bound Ordos. The land itself is a mound of ancient compacted sand that forces the river to pass around it, through the softer yellow soils to its west, arching north and east before dropping southward again.[2] Along its southern edge, the plateau is delineated less by geology than by atmospheric conditions and the cultural response to them. Thus, as one nineteenth-century visitor noted, "In the south of the sandy regions of southern Ordos the country rises higher. . . . On looking upon it from the plains of the Ordos, it has the aspect of a flat swelling. . . . On our maps, a range, Lu-guan-lin or Bo-yui-shan, is marked, but in reality it does not exist."[3] An iteration of the Great Wall system also traces the southern boundary of the plateau, leaving Ordos outside China for much of its history (FIGS.1,2). Complementing this iconic bulwark's military function, the wall also appears to sketch the line of the climatologist's 400-milimeter isohyet onto the landscape. Thus, according to one geographer, the Great Wall, "represents a reasonable average of the shifting line marking the practicable limits of permanent agriculture without extensive irrigation."[4] Ordos lies on the dry side.

Situated thus, the mode of production in Ordos has toggled between pastoralism and agriculture, with each side having a historical argument for their competing and overlapping claims. Under various dynasties, as executed through local administrators, Han peasants were either encouraged — mostly during the Sui (581–619) and Tang (618–907) dynasties — or dissuaded from settling. The Qing (1644–1911) established an exclusion zone that did not allow Han Chinese beyond a set distance from the wall. The distance varied in policy, but was generally 50 *li*, or about 32 kilometers — though early in the Qing reign men were allowed to farm the plateau during summer months, while women were forbidden for concern that their presence would encourage permanent settlement.[5]

By the time of the late Qing, however, outside observers (primarily missionaries diligently noting the subtle social relations of the people they wished to convert) recognized a complex economy in which Han settlers not only held agrarian tenancy, but did so through the auspices of regional Mongol lords. With Mongol subjects disinclined to work the land, the lords, seeking to finance lavish debts by extracting more valuable commodities from their territories, not only encouraged the influx of Han, but did so by abandoning their own restrictions against converting pasturage to sown land.[6] Major George Pereira, on his expedition by horse-cart from Beijing to Burma, remarked of Ordos that "Chinese emigrants are constantly arriving, some only staying for the season to work in the fields, attracted by higher wages."[7] Though climatically the land favors nomadic pastoralism, political reality could marshal a technological solution — irrigation — to enforce at least a toehold for agrarian development. And with the river circumscribing the land, wells did not need to be drilled that deep.

FIGURE 1 (LEFT). *Ordos (on left) is overlooked from its southern rim at Erlangshan (二郎山). View is eastward along a wall system that periodically demarcated China's edge. Photo by author, 2000.*

FIGURE 2. (BELOW) *Whereas nomads occupied Ordos pragmatically, interlopers have been unsettled by the lack of landscape features. Source: R.S. Clark and A. de Carle Sowerby,* Through Shên-kan: The Account of the Clark Expedition in North China, 1908–9 *(London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912).*

The multiethnic populating of Ordos parallels the recent history of Inner Mongolia as a whole. Since its integration into the Chinese state in 1949, the autonomous region's count of nearly four million ethnic Mongols has continually surpassed the entirety of the population of the independent country of Mongolia.[8] But, when compared to almost nineteen million ethnic Han Chinese residents, this population also places Mongols definitively in the minority within Inner Mongolia, a territory designated as their titular autonomous region. In municipalized Ordos the divergence in percentages is more extreme still.[9]

On the one hand, the economies of each ethnic group are more diverse than might be indicative of a simple divide between pastoralism and settled agriculture. In the past decade Ordos has been transformed by the discovery and extraction of energy resources; and just as coal and oil profits have fueled the development of a metropolis on land that only a few years earlier had been open steppe, there are mixes of people in industries like coal mining and natural gas drilling. But the distribution of population densities (Han and Hui are clustered far more compactly than their Mongol counterparts) still leaves large portions of Ordos as pastoral rangeland. And it is this open Mongol territory that is being encroached upon dually by agriculture and industry (mostly coal mines and the electric plants that feed on the coal).

In its western reaches, beyond the 250-milimeter isohyet, Ordos is drier and sandier still. What little there is of grassland has had large divots ripped out, opening the lid of the plateau to the coal contained within. In previous models of energy production, the coal would be extracted and exported to sites of use: power plants in the heavy-industry zones of urban conglomerations. However, with the efficiency gains in ultra-high-voltage power transmission, a technology which China leads in developing, the new model sends only the electricity, via high-tension transmission lines, to urban and industrial centers halfway across the country. Further reducing transport logistics, the power plants are erected directly above the source coal seams. Western Ordos, now not only pocked by sulfurous coal pits, is thus also accumulating above-ground constructions through the building boom in coal-fired power plants. One after another of these edifices line the recently re-engineered State Highway 109, which crosses the plateau latitudinally west to east, from Yinchuan (in Ningxia) to Dongsheng (the parent city from which the new Ordos downtown arises). Each coal mine and power plant defends its vast property with multistory and often opaque fencing, mimicking the sprawling blocks of a blank city. The new wealth and influx of jobs these industries provide has spurred yet another cycle of the construction boom. Whereas the former model dictated that coal was carried to the cities, now coal effectively draws cities to the steppe.

Where the control of land is under dispute, the map may become a primary battlefront. Yet, if the political preoccupation with naming places has been less of an issue in this region,

it is simply because China has mostly won this battle. In particular, the use of "inner" to qualify Inner Mongolia reflects a Sino-centric worldview. In the frontier zone, the term is associated with forms of enclosure, whether the Great Wall or merely local walls or fences. In this regard, in "The Barbed Walls of China," D.M. Williams noted the contrast between a nomadic distrust of fixed enclosure and sedentarists' physical security and philosophical (Confucian) assurance in hierarchically concentric barriers — such as those enfolding an emperor in the Forbidden City, surrounded again by the city walls of Beijing, and ultimately by a nation-defining Great Wall.[10] Caroline Humphrey has also noted that, as quotidian cultural practice, "[the] terms 'inside the gate' (*kou-li*) and 'outside the gate' (*kou-wai*)" foretell a geographic sensibility that necessarily affects any cultured perception of landscape.[11] The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region is thus not only now a part of China, it is contrasted with Outer Mongolia — the sovereign Republic of Mongolia — as being both further from Beijing and beyond the modern political boundary of China.[12] This geographic anachronism is clearer still on maps, where Inner Mongolia wraps much of the perimeter of "Outer" Mongolia (**FIG.3**).

For its part, Mongolian terminology for the geographic regions clarifies its derivation, but further confuses these power-relations. The *övör* in Övör-Mongol can be translated either as "Inner" or as "South" Mongolia, to differing effect by contrasting political entities.[13] "Inner" is a Sino-centric concept that places the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region firmly within the nationalizing project of the P.R.C., whereas "South" shifts the locus to return the region to an expression, whether culturally hegemonic or outright irredentist, of a greater Mongolia.[14] *Övör*, in actuality, however, reflects the meaning "in front of." In this regard, the Mongolian cartographic sensibility stems from inhabiting a landscape in which south-facing (the sunny side of a hill) is the frontal direction. From a given position, something placed to the south — especially land or territory — is "toward the front" or "in front." "East" and "left" are therefore synonyms, as are "west" and "right." Likewise, territory is commonly divided politically into left and right "banners" — respectively, east and west. The Mongolian landscape is thus inherently an embodied spatiality — but not a solipsistic one, for "front" is a universal direction. This terminology becomes especially pervasive from the domestic perspective, as the orientation of the dwelling opens southward. The undifferentiated, round walls of the *ger* are broken only by the frontality of the doorway, invariably facing southward as compass to an entire cosmography.

At the regional and national scale, meanwhile, Chinese onomasticism inscribes the land. Ming-era (1368–1644) frontier outposts, built to reinforce the recent displacement of Mongolian Yuan rule from China (1271–1368), resorted to naming schemes that denoted the recapturing of the borderlands. As the Scheut missionary Henry Serruys discovered, "a goodly number of names comprise a word (i.e., a character) patently referring to the Mongols . . . close to a quarter of

FIGURE 3. *Ordos, as located in Inner Asia. Source: Matt Zebrowski/ UCLA Cartographer.*

the names." But "what is more, many convey a derogatory and demeaning connotation."[15] These names occasionally referred to historical encounters in which "barbarians" were routed or defeated, but more often they were normative titles, rallying Ming troops with allusions to future stability. In rare instances, such titles were both inscribed on the map (through naming) and engraved on the land itself. In particular, Serruys cited "what is called Ch'in-hu-shan 擒胡山 'Mountain where the Barbarians were captured,' and an inscription . . . carved on a boulder to commemorate a decisive victory over the Mongols" (though he noted a "misspelling" — a dropping of the radical in the ch'in 擒 character).[16]

Landscape terminologies further extend confusion in the cross-cultural context of Ordos. Even where a Chinese term aligns with more neutral, topographical features for labeling, "misspellings" (or mischaracterizations) have confused the landscape vocabulary. "In half a dozen or so cases, [Serruys] found hu 'barbarian' written 湖 'lake'. . . but one does not 'fight, defeat, repel' a lake!"[17] Likewise, Williams discussed the "contrasting use of the Chinese term 'huang' (waste) . . . because the Chinese phoneme 'huang' can mean both 'yellow' and 'desert.' From [a Han informant's] perspective, local rangelands are both aesthetically unpleasing and agriculturally useless."[18] By contrast, he noted, Mongols see white sand as infertile but yellow sand as sustentative of vegetation for pastoral browse and graze.[19]

Indeed, the very word Ordos subverts the government agenda, for here toponymic derivation redefines both the land and its contest. As Pereira wrote in 1911, "The word Ordos is unknown to the Chinese, but is used by the Mongols."[20] From the Mongolian root, *orda* is an encampment or tent (mobile palace) of the camp commander. The Ordos plateau received this toponym in recognition of hosting an encampment of

eight white tents, the *naiman chagaan* (or *tsagaan*) *ordon*. Mythologized as a mobile palace of Chinggis Khaan in his lifetime (though more likely assembled to house his associative objects well after his passing), they kept his vigil in death.[21]

REST IN PEACE OR REST IN PIECES: BODIES AND LANDSCAPE

The present landscape is affected by the past through intentional uses of memory. More than a passive or latent nostalgia for events that occurred in a place, memory functions to give its enactors a political and cultural stake in a landscape. Monuments, while draped in sentimental memory, concurrently stimulate functional memory; they are actual stakes marking off the landscape and establishing a territorial claim. However, such regimes of signification have their limits, particularly when the various lineages that are drawn together to compose meaning in a monument remain unaligned with each other. However, the people for whom the monument is recognizable may have alternate purposes in making it so, recognizing the monument to differing ends.

Any discussion of memory and the sites to which it refers must address Pierre Nora's claim that "if we still dwelled among our memories, there would be no need to consecrate sites embodying them."[22] Nora was writing from within a stable political establishment that had long since recognized its inclusivities: a state filled with national monuments, that no longer imposed itself as exclusive of factional identities and their markers. Whereas Nora juxtaposed memory as a popular form that must struggle for relevance against the imposition of authoritative history, the construction and retention of monuments is rarely an unprompted act, nor one taken by

the politically dispossessed within a society. The situation for China's Mongols — retaining some ethnic distinction from Han, Hui, and other categorical ethnicities dwelling within the bounds of Inner Mongolia, yet simultaneously expected to fulfill their minority position within the region and the greater Chinese state — makes their reading of the landscape a continuous struggle to compose and retain self-identity.[23]

To highlight just one such example, the "Jindandao Incident" (1891) in northern Inner Mongolia, the official state interpretation masked violence by ethnic Han against local Mongols by promoting a narrative of proletarian (Han) resistance to feudalism. Here, the massacred were presented not as Mongols per se, but as corrupt functionaries of an unjust system.[24] Stabilizing the message in a monument to the Jindandao Incident meant not only forgetting the previous context (in this case, interethnic violence), but also imposing an un-remembering of any path to an alternate signification. In removing access to alternative readings, political authorities intended to alleviate the possibility of future interethnic retribution, but they conversely heightened the potential for new clashes. They did this by, first, implementing heavy-handed mechanisms of control, and, second, by eradicating the very venues where public memory (thus reconciliation) might occur.

The dead do retain some weapons for remaining relevant in the struggles of the living. Inscription into physical monuments might be dictated by the politically dominant, but inscription into cultural memory depends on the complicity of those doing the remembering. Unlike officially imposed history, myths circulate as samizdats whispered between the disenfranchised. And myths rearrange the messages of monuments, telling alternate stories and thereby maintaining the political engagement of each party competing over the landscape. The dead thus continue to affect the living who remember them; and, in parallel, landscapes of the dead influence those of the living.

In a May 17, 2005, lecture at the Scott Polar Research Institute on Eveny reindeer herders (who live just north of Mongolia), Piers Vitebsky noted that landscapes of the dead must be avoided., even when no body is present. There, the passed are not past, and memories of persons outweigh their physical presence. In Ordos, accounts written by the Reverend Joseph Kler similarly refer to an avoidance of landscapes that involve burial. Though not trained for ethnographic study, the Scheut missionary (Congregatio Immaculati Cordis Mariæ, or CICM) spent the early twentieth century among Ordos Mongols, writing observations of their quotidian culture. One account, of hunting, starts with locals retelling the exploits of Chinggis Khaan. The stories are at once timeless — as if the Khaan's escapades had just occurred — while also serving as the Mongols' marker of their ancestors' earliest occupancy of this terrain.[25] But there are also the places in Ordos that Mongols had ceased to inhabit. According to Kler: "in the Ordos everybody is at liberty to hunt whensoever he pleases, and wheresoever, except in certain spots where historical personages are buried."[26]

In other words, the dead are not simply dead; they must be socially made dead by the living through rituals and practices of burial and memorial.[27] In discussing the Eveny, Vitebsky introduced an interpretation of death practices as a completion of the life cycle, raising a further consideration (one that Vitebsky denied for the Eveny) that serves the broader, nomadic context. The stillness of death contrasts with the continuously peripatetic character of life for the mobile pastoralist. Death interrupts mobility at both the immediate scale of daily life and at the still wider scale of life's migrations. A nomad's spirit, constrained within its deceased body, experiences a rare permanency of place.

An array of mortuary practices are historically available in Mongolian culture for disposing of the body and liberating the spirit to again roam the landscape.[28] Through the diverse influences of Tibetan Lamaism, Chinese Confucianism, Soviet secularism, and Western cosmopolitanism, a core set of customs to which Mongols adhere may yet be recoverable. Kler took particular interest in rituals related to death, noting that "the Mongol proverb runs: 'the Mongol is born in the tent, but dies on the plain.'"[29] With this, the Catholic missionary recorded three practices available for the treatment of the dead by Ordos Mongols. Earthen burial was permitted, but it was associated with customs of the Han (and to the north, the Russians).[30] Sky burial — the placement of the intact or dismembered body on open ground for devouring by wild animals or birds — was another common form; it was contiguous with Tibetan Lamaism, but likely originated much earlier. The scarcity of sufficient fuel on the steppe would seem to have barred cremation, but this was a third alternative offered by Kler. In the place where the ashes were scattered a small cairn would be erected; however, if desired by the family or the final will of the deceased, the ashes might alternatively be removed from Ordos, to be interred in a Tibetan monastery in Gansu or elsewhere. A number of these traditions have been elaborated upon in the observations of Humphrey, though she added yet another possibility that reverses Kler's proverb — by not only allowing a Mongol to die in the tent, but to ceremonially abandon the body to the tent, while dually abandoning the tent to the plain.[31]

A powerful figure in his lifetime, Chinggis Khaan's potency has only grown in death. Key to this potency is how his body may have been disposed of after his death in 1227. This question has remained central to the identity of Ordos, pulling China and Mongolia into contestations of cultural inheritance. A presumption that the Khaan's corpse would have been laid to rest in the landscape of his birth, in what is now Khentii Aimag, is beyond conjecture for Mongols with whom I spoke in the Mongolian Republic. In addition to the adversarial politics, cultural knowledge supplements this attitude. As Humphrey has written, ethnographically, the place of one's birth can never be totally separated from the person: "if someone is ill or dispirited, he should privately go and roll in the earth at this place, a sacred act of becoming physically

part of it, 'as if one belonged to that land', as one Mongol confided."[32] That Chinggis's body would have returned to his home landscape after death may be a retrospective projection of contemporary rivalry, but it is one that is clear to Mongolia's Mongols. The Mongols of China are in a more tenuous position; they must reify the presencing of Chinggis's body in order to acquire their identity from the Ordos memorial, yet they must combat his coöptation by China into a Chinese personage. Uradyn Erden Bulag has contended that general Chinese interest in the mausoleum has been amplified by local Mongols only in recent decades, since the halt of the Cultural Revolution, because the connection of Ordos to Chinggis provides a platform from which local Mongols can assert a place for themselves within both the Chinese and Mongolian cultural spheres.[33]

Identifying where Chinggis's body ultimately rests has been a pastime for archaeologists and historians, each with disparate interpretations of the few texts in existence on the subject, all recorded well after the Khaan's death. Conjectures include various places of burial in the land of his birth along the Onon River. Ancient cemeteries, palace ruins, and former battlegrounds all tantalize modern adventurers relying on old tales and new technologies. Other prospects hold that he was cremated; but this only leads to further speculation on the whereabouts of his ashes. A silver funerary urn containing ashen remains once traveled with his tent-memorial as recently as 1966, but was lost when Mongol Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution sacked the memorial.

However, redefining what constitutes a body may alter perceptions of what the Ordos monument means. Thus, Humphrey has argued that objects of personal affiliation and use may be bound up in the creation of personhood.[34] Items exemplifying Chinggis Khaan's masculinity — his boots or sash — and items displaying his warrior ability — his bow or sword — may indeed have interred his personhood in Ordos.[35] If the site did contain personal articles of the Khaan, or even his ashes, such artifacts might stand in for the body, thus elevating the structure to mausoleum status.[36]

Bound up in this definition of what constitutes a body is also a definition of what comprises a site for remembering the (absent or present) body. Memorial, monument, mausoleum or cenotaph — each idiom contains partial applicability for the site of Chinggis Khaan's commemoration.

Reviewing the applicability of these terms and concepts, the Ordos assemblage is certainly a memorial, as would be any physical structure built for the purpose of remembering a person, place, event or cultural phenomenon. But "memorial" does not guarantee material incarnation. While the Ordos memorial does rely on a set of rituals, practices and events, solely calling it such does not assure acknowledgement of its material presence.

A monument suggests a real construction over a figurative one; but monuments also suggest something fixed in place and built to withstand a significant passage of time.

While the earlier, tent-based manifestation of the memorial was indeed a material construction (or many of them, both in the multiplicity of tents and the multiple moments of their re-erection during the yearly festivals), to rely on calling the form of commemoration a Chinggis Khaan "monument" is to favor the most recent, static incarnation over the earlier, mobile assemblage.

Today the nature of the structure that serves the memory of Chinggis Khaan is frequently translated from the Chinese as "mausoleum." But a mausoleum contains a body. More to the point may be the term "cenotaph," which suggests displacement of the body from the site of commemoration. However, I would argue that it is precisely the liminal position, of a not-quite-present yet not-definitively-absent body, that most powerfully potentializes both the site and the legacy of the Khaan.

A liminally positioned body is not inherently vested with authority, but the architecture of its monument compensates for the ambiguity of its place. In this very sense, David Atkinson and Denis Cosgrove introduced a "discourse of . . . embodiment," in their analysis of the Vittorio Emanuele II monument in Rome. For them, the Italian structure represented opposite, though crossed relationships between memory and bodies.[37] Toward one purpose, the body of the king for whom the monument was named remains absent (caught in the political web of his day, the body of Vittorio Emanuele II lies in state in the Pantheon). Yet, identifying, but not presenting, the king is one function of his edifice. Inversely, however, the site was also made a national memorial through the presencing of another body, that of a soldier who died fighting in a war against foreign adversaries (at the 1917 battle of Monte Grappa), but whose name remains absent, lost. His service to the state became a sacrifice that displaced his body from any individual identity, thus making it a nationalized body. Such lacunae — cenotaphs lacking bodies yet tombs with bodies that lack identity — become the most powerful monuments to gather in national landscapes of memory.

Edwin Lutyens's design for the cenotaph in Whitehall, which quickly became an ur-type for cenotaphs throughout the British Commonwealth (Belfast, Auckland, Hong Kong, and Bermuda have facsimiles), similarly memorializes soldiers lost in foreign wars — though not at the site of their loss. Rather, it commands from its position fronting the Whitehall offices where the war-makers gathered to order soldiers into battle, sometimes to their deaths.[38] Transcending geography, the cenotaph thus connects domestic places of decision-making to the distant places that result.

The other model of a transcendent monument, the tomb for an unknown soldier, features a body, but makes its claim to universality through a stripping away of individual identity. The unknown soldier was first displaced from himself in his lifetime — stripped of personhood by assignment of rank, serial number, and uniform dress. He was then displaced from his home landscape to fight a foreign war, and displaced

again from his identity by death in the melee of the battlefield — stripped of name, rank, and serial number. Finally, he was displaced from the landscape of his death — repatriated from the foreign battlefield to an interment site in the capital of his home country (a city in which he resides in death, but which he may never have visited in life).[39] As a person whose death is both tragically senseless and patriotically heroic, the soldier becomes not just ascendant to national representation, but transcendent.

A touchstone for tying meaning in monuments to specific location is provided by Nuala Johnson's observation that "the space which these monuments occupy is not just an incidental material backdrop but in fact inscribes the statues with meaning."[40] Furthermore, as Michael Rowlands and Christopher Tilley have written, "the significance of the monuments and the activities that took place in and around them was dialectically related to their landscape settings: the land itself, its forms and features, gave power and significance to the monument and vice versa."[41] But I disagree. The social and physical spaces in which monuments and memorials are activated can be distanced from the places inhabited by their adherents. With their remove from actual landscapes, such monuments not only lose no efficacy; they gain potency. Through distance and invisibility from actual landscapes, memory markers assume presence and hyper-visibility in the cultural landscape.

The Khaan's body may or may not have returned below the land, but his myth stretches out over the landscape, touching down at the myriad points where the anecdotal tale of his life intersects specific places. But it would be false to claim that the Khaan *is* the land.[42] In the sense defined by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, the system that gives rise to "collective bodies of a State" is different from the "potential (puissance) of a vortical body in a nomad space."[43] A terrain that is persistently host to the omnipresence of the Khaan's spirit, but absent any specific location of his corpse, is the height of potency because of its ever-displaced potentiality.

DISCONTINUITIES OF MATERIAL AND PLACE

As the proliferation of potential burial sites of Chinggis's body has subsumed significant portions of the map, so too a number of coeval cenotaphs for his commemoration have arisen over a diverging geographic spread. These places range from ones integrally related to the warrior, to others that remain only tangentially tied to the Khaan through intricate knots of his mythologizing. Capture is made *en passant* (catching a ghost by its tail) — or with respect to the warrior-nomad, just as in chess, the capture of territory is tied to the trail over which the Khaan has passed.

The story meant to legitimate Yekejuu (Ejin Horo-qi) as the location of his cenotaph tells of his penultimate ride through the region on a campaign against the Tunguts,

where Chinggis's "horsewhip fell onto the ground all of a sudden. When his guards were about to pick it up for him, he stopped them and said: 'This must has [sic] a reason, I see this place is a very nice place . . . a place for shattered nations to be rebuild and for lives to be enjoyed, bury me here after my death.'"[44] Within a year the Khaan would return through this region, but now as a corpse borne upon a palanquin. As Sain-Jirgal and Sharaldai further noted:

> Also according to the "Golden History," a chronicle book of the Mongols by a Mongol of 17th century: "(after the Khan's death,) shirts, yurts and socks (of the Khan) were buried there (Ordos) and a false announcement was given (to the Mongols) that (the Khan was buried there)." So it is possible that the belongings of the Khan were buried in Ordos, posing as the real tomb (the custom of the Mongols was/is, the remains of a person is buried underground without any sign, even a tombstone) to meet the Mongols' need to worship the Khan and then a few years later, the Eight White Ordon were set up around the place by the decree of Khubilai Khan.[45]

While little evidence exists to corroborate that the memorial dates to the era of Khubilai (much less to Chinggis), the oral traditions that accompany the *ordon* acknowledge their wandering not only across Ordos, but also away from this place. Alleged transits across Outer Mongolia in the fifteenth century and regions just north of Ordos in the mid-seventeenth century are less acknowledged as disruptions to the continuity of place. Discontinuities in the material manifestation of the *ordon* and the treasures they enshrine must also be assumed. By the late twentieth century, following the ransacking of the shrine by Mongol Red Guards, nearly all its objects were replaced. However, even well before the Cultural Revolution, the provenance of the sacred objects was questionable. Thus a visitor in the 1890s, shown a silver coffin or urn said to house the Khaan's ashen remains, noted its seemingly recent fabrication. Other treasures he was shown appeared to be "copies of relics, such as the saddle and sword, which are preserved in the camps of different Ordos tribes."[46]

Twentieth-century disruptions in continuity of material and of place — mostly during the Nationalist (KMT)-Communist Civil War (which was itself interrupted by Japan's Kwantung invasion) — provide a further tumultuous history for the memorial, but one that never entirely severs its importance. In the midst of the Chinese Civil War, the Kwantung army thrust westward toward Ordos, intending to seize the sepulcher of Chinggis Khaan to leverage local Mongol support for a puppet Mengjiang state. But the Guomindang (KMT) commandeered the memorial first, and, with it, withdrew from Inner Mongolia.

For the remainder of the Japanese occupation of Inner Mongolia, the memorial resided with the KMT in Gansu. Unable to seize the mobile monument in its now hyper-

FIGURE 4. *The cover of a now obsolete ticket booklet, in Mongolian (using Uighur vertical script), English, and Mandarin. Source: Genghis Khan Mausoleum, 2000.*

mobilized form, however, the Japanese commanding colonel, Kanagawa Kosaku, did oversee the construction of an alternate Chinggis memorial. This was fixed in location at Ulaan-hot, a former administrative capital for Mengjiang on the Manchukuo border, setting a precedent for the later Chinese structure in Ordos.[47]

Sain-Jirgal and Sharaldai have reported that through the end of the Japanese occupation, and even after, the Ordos memorial remained a temporary visitor in Gansu, and that the quadrennial festival associated with it continued according to the ritual calendar, with the arrival of Mongol pilgrims and the in-gathering of the *ordon* in this non-Ordos landscape. Eventually, Japan's military machine ground to a halt in 1945. But from Yan'an, less than one hundred miles from Yekejuu, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) regrouped and eventually forced back the Nationalists. In 1949 the KMT fled further west with the Chinggis memorial, to the Kumbum monastery in Khokh Nuur ("Blue Lake," a rare Mongolian toponym to persist). The memorial remained there for another five years, but the visit of the KMT to this site was brief. Three weeks after their arrival there, they were relieved of their Ordos treasure by the conquering PLA. Eventually, the Chinese Communist Party then returned the eight white tents to Ordos, and also ensured that the memorial would not wander again.[48]

The concrete memorial erected at Yekejuu in 1956 physically replaced the mobile *naiman chagaan ordon* and compacted their geography **(FIG. 4)**. Once dispersed across hundreds of kilometers of Ordos steppe, all rituals of the memorial are now consolidated at a single site. The original memorials — eight white tents (or possibly six white tents housing eight sacred objects) — were each normally resident at their own pasture or hillock. But at the prescribed time of the memo-

rial ceremony, the individual tent-shrines would converge on the primary site at Yekejuu. While the origins of the mobile monument remain difficult to discern in the retrospectively ascribed mythology, more recent histories, such as that by Peter Andrews, have been assembled primarily from the accounts of British political agents, Russian explorers, and various religious missionaries to Ordos.[49]

Through an interpretive architectural history, Andrews was able to genealogically trace the *chomchog* tent forms used prior to 1956. Differentiated from the typical *ger*, *chomchog* not only exhibited a greater formal presence, but did so from a speciated architectural lineage. Whereas a typical *ger* would be cylindrical, rising to a conical roof, the *chomchog* would have flatter, more orthogonal walls which would rise through bent roof struts to reach a crowning apex. While both yurt forms demanded that one stoop to pass through a pre-hung doorframe, such elements of the *chomchog* as the "knee-bend" roof struts synecdochically invoked the genuflection demanded of visitors paying respects to the Khaan. Re-creations of the *chomchog* inhabit the interior of the current concrete monument **(FIG. 5)**.

Accepting that all sites are invented, the concrete cenotaph — due in part to its recent history, discontinuous set of practices, and commercially oriented development, but also to its political insensitivity — seems particularly false to the memorial process. But the evidence presented does not bear out such a story. Evidentially, the material has been refabricated in multiple known and (likely) many unknown instances. And practices have been multiply disrupted, deviating with each reïnvocation of history. Commercialization, though not a motive in past disruptions, may be the dominant theme in the current iteration of the cenotaph. But it is not the only intent of those who continue to hold the image of the Khaan

FIGURE 5. *Within the sedentary monument, simulacra of the mobile* chomchog *are ready to receive homage. Photo by author 2009. The inset of a previously extant* chomchog *is from Sain-Jirgal and Sharaldai,* Altan ordon nai dailga [The Offering Ceremonies of the Golden Ordon], *1983.*

as a marker to the place. For various visitors, the experience is held according to differing purposes.

Aside from three saddles hidden from the Red Guards in September 1966, the refabrications are recent. But the embedded sentiments are unrestricted by material incarnation: "'This shrine is ours,' Mukhulain Banzranjav, the shrine caretaker, said recently. 'The state doesn't own them — we do. We have taken care of the Eight Sacred Relics for centuries, and we won't give them away.'"[50]

Such comments beg the question whether material culture is necessary to the symbolic structures of identity. A simple logic that determines that inauthentic materiality leads to an equally inauthentic cultural identification may not be appropriate to ethnographic understanding where myth, perception, and the nearly imperceptible accumulate into a kaleidoscopic picture that only partially reflects reality, and where reality itself is open to determination by the memorial's adherents. That the relics, simulacra of simulacra, continue to be refabricated may even lend credibility to their materiality as an important focus, regardless of the discontinuities in the historical fabric. Indeed, this is what symbols do. Traditions, though possibly invented, or at least reformulated in the recent past, still hold meaning. In one sense, this is ensured by their very enactment. But, more importantly, traditions are persuasive when they closely adhere to the power source from which their symbology is drawn; they ring hollow when they have become detached from actual power or are pursued solely as invented ritual.[52] The memorial, then, functions at dual levels — as a monument when presenting the tenacity

of Mongols in the landscape of Ordos, but also as a reminder that control is no longer by their own determination.

The recent history of the Chinggis memorial reads like a series of controlled experiments in the destruction of authenticity. If the mobile, tented *ordon* are taken as authentic forms and Ordos as their original position, the first experiment retained the forms, but exiled the memorial from its origin. A second experiment then posited returning the memorial to Ordos, but replacing the previous memorial with a sedentary fabrication (the 1956 version), and then (after the Cultural Revolution) reforging the destroyed sacred items.

Following the displacement of the first experiment, the pilgrimage by Mongols continued. But this alone could not rule out the importance of landscape as a contributor to its meaning, for a sense of the memorial being in the wrong place was apparent even to its PLA captors in Qinghai. The second experiment has also been inconclusive, for though the monument is now fixed and its component items retain no material authenticity, Mongols continue to visit it here too.

The displacement of the first experiment, correctable with the return of the memorial to its associated landscape, left only a ghost trail behind of the places the monument had once been. But this was nevertheless a trail that could be reconstructed: both the material and its symbolic qualities remained nearly unscathed by the distances traveled. The destruction of the second experiment, however, has involved a different scenario, one that reminds us that this is no experiment. If the items had merely been dispersed, they might eventually be returned. But the greater likelihood is that the destruction and replacement has been irreversible. Possibly, in time, patina will lend legitimacy to the refashioned material. And yet, even as it stands now, after the imposed history, Mongols continue to visit the memorial, and from it they continue to build an identity.

An evaluation by the Cultural Heritage Conservation Center of Tsinghua University has sought to determine the role and relevance of both the tangible monument and its intangible impact on China's cultural terrain. The center's 2007 report (a late formality, since the monument had already been inscribed on the Nationally Protected Monuments list in 1986) began by considering the materiality of the monument. But, perhaps because this lacked sufficient material-historical significance, it soon turned to the landscape (as a remnant of authentic context), the people (a dispossessed Mongol tribe called the Darkhad who had served as guardians to the *ordon*), and periodic ceremonies as being equally constitutive of its meaning.

Though the study attempted sensitivity in defining Mongol interest in the monument and its trappings, it did little to consider self-reflexively why the state or its non-Mongol population should care about it. Conveyed as a scientific study of a Chinese heritage site, the report adequately ascertained physical, environmental, and even cultural hazards. But it left unacknowledged the future threats posed by the monument — for there are dangers that Chinggis Khaan's memorial continues to pose to the political landscape of Inner Asia.

AMONG THE RELICS, A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD

In a side hall within the monument, a vitrine now encases its treasures (or, more accurately, the simulacra of simulacra of such items). Among these relics, a double-edged sword makes a palpable metaphor not only for the entombed items, but for the entire monumentalizing project. To wield control of such a monument places the Chinese authority in a precarious position, for an instrumentalized symbol can cut its master with either blade if not wielded carefully. A symbolic implement may turn from an emblem of power into a target of vulnerability when deployed without legitimacy. Thus, the now singular positioning of the Khaan's relics at Yekejuu has become an obvious place for protesters to rally, not only over conditions of the monument itself, but for any perceived slight to the populace the monument is made to represent. Remaking Mongols as Chinese citizens means that the monument becomes a surrogate on their behalf, particularly toward perceived injustice.

Indications of this volatile potential have already surfaced. In architectural telephony, a mini-simulacra of the Chinggis monument became the target of controversy outside of Ordos when the government-financed China Travel Service added a reproduction (at 1/15 scale) of the Khaan's cenotaph to its Florida Splendid China attraction (Jinxiu Zhonghua 锦绣中华). Mimicking a theme park in Shenzhen, the Kissimmee, Florida, franchise attempted to compress China's architectural highlights on a single site suitable for a one-day visit two miles west of Disney World. This replica cenotaph would have been insignificant had not its symbolism been turned against the Chinese government. Protests over the park by "Citizens Against Backyard Communism" and other provocatively named groups were primarily motivated by higher-profile issues, like China's policy on Tibet and Taiwan (coincidentally, the park was sited where purpose-built Splendid China Boulevard intersected a pre-existing Formosa Gardens Boulevard). Thus, as one protester, Kenneth R. Timmerman, fumed, "the Committee against Communist Chinese Propaganda in Clearwater, Florida . . . has written park management repeatedly, requesting they change exhibits that refer to minorities and to the occupied countries of Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and East Turkestan as if they were happy parts of China. In addition to the Potala Palace, the group objects to the inclusion of replicas of the Mausoleum of Ghengis Khan."[52] After a decade of operation, the Florida Splendid China closed at the end of 2003. A 2007 aerial photo revealed that most of its structures had been abandoned in place, including the Potala, but the Ordos model had vanished (FIG.6).

In general terms, controversy over the Kissimmee park paralleled that surrounding construction of the Shenzhen Splendid China park.[53] As James Hevia has explained:

> The miniature offers a transcendental perspective akin to what Benedict Anderson calls the "bird's-eye view"

of modern mapmaking. However, whereas Anderson notes the importance of boundaries in modern maps as demarcations of an "exclusive sovereignty wedged between other sovereignties" that become fixed in the process of colonial expansion, Splendid China does not pretend to this cartographic convention. Its boundary serves to demarcate the space of representation, within which the nation can be rendered as a total concept, a timeless essence, as something not determined by what it excludes or what it abuts up to and against. The boundary of the model becomes in this sense inwardly referential, detached from what lies outside itself, timeless because it assumes the eternal verity of the idea of "China" as a bounded entity. This boundedness offers the conditions of [what Geoffrey Bennington calls] "total surveyability. . . ." "At the centre, the nation narrates itself as the nation," uncomplicated by the difference instituted at its margins. Note, therefore, the unproblematic inclusion of the characteristic housing styles and landscape of a number of "national minority" peoples.[54]

Eventually, Splendid China's appropriation of Mongolian architecture served as the trigger that caused Oyunbilig, executive director of an Inner Mongolian independence lobby, to reassert Sain-Jirgal and Sharaldai's (1983) history of the shrine through the English translation that I have referred to in this article.

Protests have a distinctive history in Ordos, for it may have been the unique formation of resistance groups in the late nineteenth century that instigated this very competition for Chinggis's inheritance.[55] Henry Serruys, the CICM scholar, building upon the work of his confrère Joseph van Hecken, has compiled an archive of letters received in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by Bishop Alphons Bermijn and Reverend Antoine Mostaert, successive heads-of-mission at Bor-Balgas (present-day Chenchuanzhen 城川镇), in the Otog Front Banner of Ordos.

FIGURE 6. *Model of the Ordos monument at the Splendid China theme park in Kissimee, Florida. From http://caccp.freedomsherald.org (accessed April 27, 2010).*

The letter campaign was believed to have begun with Ordos Mongols in the 1850s before spreading to other steppe regions.[56] The letters articulated the complex political realities of Mongol and Han interactions with each other and with China's elites (Qing functionaries, either Manchu or Mongol) over land rights and usage. The subject of protest in these letters was often the tenancy of specific tracts by Han agriculturalists. However, the object of protest was not Han farmers so much as Mongol princelings who were disturbing the steppe economy for self-benefit through policies of taxation, debt clearance, and lucrative cash-crop farming.[57]

"Revolutionary circles" of Mongol tribesmen composed the letters. But what made them curious was that Mongol subjects should appeal to Chinese officials concerning mistreatment of steppe land by Mongol lords (employing Han laborers). Moreover, the officials were functionaries of the Qing, who, though sedentary in their position atop the imperial hierarchy, promoted a myth of themselves as warrior-nomads of the Manchurian plains. The Qing outwardly exalted Mongol-Yuan rule as a model by which non-Han conquerors could administer China. Yet surreptitiously they maneuvered to limit the potential of their Mongol vassals from reorganizing into a restless force — one that might threaten their own monopoly on power. By a delicate, trilateral maneuver, Qing officials invested financially in architectural constructions for Tibetan Buddhism in order to disrupt Tibetan religio-political alliances with Mongol princes. Concurrently, Qing officers invested symbolically in ceremonious gatherings to forge stronger bonds with the Mongol aristocracy, retaining their assistance as middle-lords and local governors over Han and other Chinese peoples.[58]

The historical context of the Qing in this period, however, is of an embattled dynasty in its waning days, one that had endured calamities both natural and political throughout the late nineteenth century. Defeat by foreign militaries as well as domestic revolts by the Taiping (1851) and Dungan Muslims (1860s to 1870s) also set a low tolerance for dissent. Thus, even though the Ordos protest letters were careful to include honorifics in their address and extremes of humility in their requests, petitioners rarely gained redress for their grievances. Moreover, the letters motivated a covert backlash, as unofficially sanctioned "counter-circles" were launched to suffocate dissent through violence and terror.[59]

Though the protests letters did little to alleviate conditions at the time, they did eventually succeed in reconstituting communication and organization among the nomads. In existential threat to sedentarists, herders unfastened state control of land literally, by removing or altering landmarks. "When the multitude formed circles and came together . . . we decided to go around everywhere (to inspect) the old landmarks on the borders with other banners and (on the boundary) of the land given out to the Chinese set up (new landmarks)."[60] Another time, it was "discussed and decided by the multitude of our circles . . . to re-erect all the border

marks of places where the border of the territory of our banner touches upon other territories, and we have reset them all around the banner, but quite intentionally in one or two spots no border marks have been set up."[61]

Today, however, the steppe is irrevocably territorialized — and nowhere is this condition more evident than at the Chinggis Khaan monument itself. Fencing surrounds the site, demarcating territory beyond the control of the very Mongols the monument is said to represent. The discontented are physically distanced as the monument recedes behind ever more expansive cordons and perimeters.

Yet, at the same time, if its operators were to cease constructing more spacious enclosures, the entire enterprise could be left vulnerable to a collapse of meaning (**FIG.7**). Any lapse in demonstrating the importance of these relics might translate into a perceived lapse in leadership. To retain relevance, and thus authority, the monument demands constant attention and investment. As a result, over the past two decades its expansion has subsumed ever larger portions of the landscape. Implicit in this reading is not just the authority of the cenotaph, but also that of its operators, the state sponsors of territorialization. Yet, without a continuous supply of significant new historical material, the physical expansion of the site takes shape solely in the hollow task of

FIGURE 7. *Views recede to ever more distant bounds, imposing monumental emptiness on the steppe landscape. Photo by author, 2009.*

revising its encompassing fences, gateways and paths at ever greater distances from the monument itself.[62]

In the gap between my first visit in 1991 and a subsequent stop in 2000, the tri-domed cenotaph was mostly unchanged but is surroundings had been completely revised, with an informal collection of visitor structures demolished in favor of formalized approach paths and a triumphal gateway arch. Subtle cues linking the current landscape to that of the Khaan's era, such as a stupa, piled-stone *ovoo*, flagpoles, incense cauldrons, and the like had also been added or highlighted by a new layout of pathways. By 2009, however, the cenotaph itself had been expanded with an added hall, revised paintings (including murals of the great Khaan's life), and updates or additions to the ancient relics. Outside, the gateway of 2000 was no longer an entry, having been outdistanced by a new, circumscribing fence and entry pavilion — this one with turnstiles activated by laser-scanned admission tickets (FIG.8). Other outlying structures have since been constructed for galleries and interpretive displays, populated by yet more murals and simulacra of ancient relics.

Blunting this first edge of the symbolic sword, however — by suppressing protest through distance — only heightens the severity of the second edge. Sequestration of the actual relics from access by their devotees may jeopardize Mongol complicity in investing this site with meaning and thus undermine any authority it may hold whatsoever. So long as stakeholders benefit from belief in the relics, all are willing to suspend consideration of the symbols' inventedness — investment in instrumentalized symbols being proportionate to their usefulness. However, if authorities exert their control irresponsibly, the symbols may no longer be granted meaning, resulting in a loss of complicity by the governed.

Should the simulacra of simulacra become dissociated from the Khaan's spirit, they would cease to impart associative authority to the state. By rendering the reliquary meaningless, Chinese officials would forfeit the tool by which they control the myth of Chinggis. With the Khaan's spirit sundered from its material incarceration, his specter could indeed return to potency. A ghost of the Khaan, liberated and transcendent in the minds of his followers, might spread across the landscape of Ordos and the steppe beyond, proving ever more dangerous to the maintenance of political order.

IN CONCLUSION: EXTRAPOLATING ACROSS THE LANDSCAPE

In an introduction to an edited volume hinging on Alois Riegl's essay "The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and its Origin," Kurt Forster wrote, "the deliberate memorial — Riegl called it the 'intentional monument' — is exposed to a kind of historic double jeopardy: memory is all that sustains its meaning but its physical form will have to survive the vagaries of changing perceptions and values."[63] The existing

FIGURE 8. *An expensive new entry integrates gates and fencing into an assemblage of exclusions. Photo by author, 2009.*

form of the Ordos monument, distinct as it is, however, misses the vitality of the living monument. And it may be for this reason that the solidified version of the Chinggis cenotaph is never quite enough.

While the main monument has suffered multiple attempts at reconstruction and repair, even the surrounding region has been revised over the last two decades. Most recently, the addition of an outlying theme park was meant both to express and to capitalize on the importance of the Yekejuu site. Tourist camps, a set of commercial structures, a petrol station, and now even a toll plaza to enter a new freeway (where not even a paved road existed a decade earlier), also degrade the centrality of a monument once isolated on the steppe (FIG.9). Furthermore, the recently built, centrally planned Ordos city may soon send its sprawl across the landscape in the direction of the monument. At the same time, by periodically aggrandizing the site with still further built forms, those who control and build the site implicitly acknowledge that no amount of construction will entirely convey the site's actual cultural impact. The monument's relevance remains mobile even in its most solid, most sedentary form — endlessly avoiding being pinned in place or in composition.

What the monument may best represent is an unintended identity for Mongol and Han Chinese alike. The Chinggis memorial, now sedentarized after centuries of mobility, identifies the contemporary relationship of nomadism within the larger, sedentarist society. Mongols have retained a self-image of pastoral nomadism, but this identity survives largely in a mythic sense of the past. Yet the discontinuities between the present and the past, between contemporary practice and mythic self-identity are possibly what drive the potency of the memorial's cultural impact. It is within this framework that Mongol and Han Chinese will continue to negotiate their respective ownership of cultural legacy in the material of the monument and the space of the landscape.

FIGURE 9. *Ordos infrastructure, clad in theme-park aesthetics, stretches anticipation for the sedentarized monument across the landscape. Photo by author, 2009.*

REFERENCE NOTES

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2. J. Hong, P. Zhang, D. Zheng, and F. Wang, "The Ordos Plateau of China," in J.X. Kasperson, R.E. Kasperson, and B.L. Turner II, eds., *Regions at Risk: Comparisons of Threatened Environments* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995).

3. M. Obrucheff, "Explorations in Mongolia," *The Geographical Journal*, Vol.5 No.3 (1895), p.264; as noted in W.R. Carles, "Problems in Exploration II: Ordos," *The Geographical Journal*, Vol.33 No.6 (1909), p.673.

4. R. Murphey, "An Ecological History of Central Asian Nomadism," in G. Seaman, R.P. Feynman, Etnograficheskii institut (Akademiia nauk SSSR), and Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History, eds., *Ecology and Empire: Nomads in the Cultural Evolution of the Old World* (Los Angeles: Ethnographics/USC, 1989), pp.51–52.

5. Hong et al., "The Ordos Plateau of China."

6. H. Serruys, "Documents from Ordos on the 'Revolutionary Circles': Part I," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol.97 No.4 (1977), p.488.

7. G. Pereira, "A Journey across the Ordos," *The Geographical Journal*, Vol.37 No.3 (1911), pp.260–61.

8. Local officials point out that the People's Republic actually joined Inner Mongolia, because Inner Mongolia established itself in 1947, two years earlier than the P.R.C.

9. Hong et al., "The Ordos Plateau of China." Based on 1989 data, urban areas were 88 percent Han compared to 12 percent Mongol, but that ratio has become even more lopsided since the development of both existing and new urban zones since 2001. See U.E. Bulag, "From Yeke-juu League to Ordos Municipality: Settler Colonialism and Alter/Native Urbanization in Inner Mongolia," *Provincial China*, Vol.7 No.2 (2002), pp.196–234.

10. D.M. Williams, "The Barbed Walls of China: A Contemporary Grassland Drama," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol.55 No.3 (1996), pp.674,669. On the irony of Beijing's plan having initially been set by the Mongolian-born Khubilai Khaan — a figure who transits between the nomadic and sedentary occupation of urban space — see N.S. Steinhardt, "The Plan of Khubilai Khan's Imperial City," *Artibus Asiae*, Vol.44 No.2/3 (1983), p.137.

11. C. Humphrey, "Landscape Conflicts in Inner Mongolia," in B. Bender and M. Winer, *Contested Landscapes: Movement, Exile and Place* (Oxford: Berg, 2001), pp.59–60.

12. This simplification is not to reify borders set by intricate and historical assertions of power, but it does acknowledge present conditions. Despite the rhetoric of irredentists, Inner and Outer Mongolia have each had their political machinations for purposely remaining exclusive of the other. Inner Mongolians had opportunities to contemplate secession from Chinese rule when centralized controls were weakened during the collapse of the Qing, the political and military crises of the Republic, and the Civil War years. But Inner Mongolian elites found Chinese suzerainty preferable to competing in Outer Mongolian politics. Dislodging Han workers from Mongol lands also meant risking the cultural and economic autonomy by which Mongol leaders themselves benefitted. Secession from China would thus have left the local princes even more isolated and vulnerable, since the elites in Ulaanbaatar, struggling to retain their own authority, were unlikely to have welcomed a greater, but decentered Mongolian state. Instead, Inner Mongolia thrived in a parallel political system in uneasy coalition with a KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan, resulting in the October 1931 Law of Mongolian Leagues, Banners, and Tribes (*Menggu mengbuqi xuzhifa*) for non-Han counties of Inner Mongolia. See J. Leibold, *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier and Its Indigenes Became Chinese* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.59. For Ordos, this in-between condition lasted until being returned to the national political system through municipalization in 2001 (see

Bulag, "From Yeke-juu League to Ordos Municipality," pp.196–234). A more subtle understanding of Inner Mongolians' negotiation between politics and culture is set forth in Uradyn Erden Bulag's self-reflexive introduction to *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp.1–26; the Mongol-Chinese author is himself Ordos born.

13. B. Huhbator, "The History and the Political Character of the Name of 'Nei Menggu' (Inner Mongolia)," *Inner Asia*, Vol.6 No.1 (2004), pp.61–80.

14. Romanization of the Sinicized name should render 内蒙古 as Nei-Menggu, but official transliteration of "Inner Mongolia" now hybridizes Mandarin and Mongolian into the portmanteau Nei-Mongol.

15. H. Serruys, "Place Names along China's Northern Frontier," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, Vol.45 No.2 (1982), pp.271–72.

16. Ibid., pp.273–74.

17. Ibid., p.272.

18. Williams, "The Barbed Walls of China," p.678.

19. In another nomadic context, herders have been shown to be able to scan sand colors for their absorption indices, a pragmatic need for passive heating or cooling when selecting campsites and resting places for livestock. See T. Banning and I. Köhler-Rollefson, "Ethnographic Lessons for the Pastoral Past: Camp Locations and Material Remains Near Beidha, Southern Jordan," in O. Bar-Yosef and A. Khazanov, eds., *Pastoralism in the Levant: Archaeological Materials in Anthropological Perspectives* (Madison, WI: Prehistory Press, 1992), p.186.

20. Pereira, "A Journey across the Ordos," p.263. In "From Yeke-juu League to Ordos Municipality," Bulag lamented that the region's name, though consolidated in Chinese policy as the official label for the municipality, will soon lack meaning. Transliteration renders Ordos as E'erduosi (鄂尔多斯), but the common abbreviation retains only the initial phoneme in an acronym; E'erduosi City thus reduces to E'shi (鄂市).

21. B.-O. Bold, "The Death and Burial of Chinggis Khaan," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.19 No.1 (2000), pp.95–115.

22. P. Nora and L.D. Kritzman, *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, [1984–92]), p.2.

23. China, through its *Zhonghua minzu* policy, recognizes 55 minority ethnicities, plus majority Han, as composing the Chinese nation. I use the word "Han" when referring to the ethnic group within China, reserving "Chinese" for all citizens in the People's Republic, the (Mandarin) language, or the related culture. The first difficulty in this, however, is that references,

particularly those that precede modern China, do not make this distinction. In their context, Chinese means the non-Mongolian inhabitants. This anticipates my second dilemma: identifying Han and Mongol citizens of China as constituent of a "Chinese" people adheres to a nationalizing politics promoted within the Han-dominant government, but does not necessarily reflect the sentiments of those so categorized. On the contentiousness of *Zhonghua minzu* among the designated minorities, see D. Gladney, *Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). Ethnic categorization is further complicated because people in geographic proximity inevitably have crossed bloodlines and tangled histories. Owen Lattimore, in "Inner Mongolian Nationalism and the Pan-Mongolian Idea: Recollections and Reflections," *Journal of the Anglo-Mongolian Society*, Vol.6 No.1 (1980), pp.5–21, provides an anecdote of categorical mutability. This involves meeting "Mongolian bandits" (herdsmen disenfranchised from their land who survive by petty theft, but who are descended from Han workmen who themselves had been exiled to the steppe) and their half-hearted pursuers, "Chinese soldiers" in the employ of Beijing, who are themselves former Mongolian nomads, who have long since been settled and Sinicized.

24. Huhbator, "The History and the Political Character of the Name of 'Nei Menggu' (Inner Mongolia)"; but also see note 14, above.

25. J. Kler, "Hunting Customs of the Ordos Mongols," *Primitive Man*, Vol.14 No.3 (July 1941), p.38. Whereas "official" biographies, often based on such problematic accounts as the *Secret History*, attempt to reconstruct the life of the Khaan, it is the fragments retold by local followers that reimbue the landscape with his presence.

26. Kler, "Hunting Customs of the Ordos Mongols," p.41.

27. G. Feeley-Harnik, "Finding Memories in Madagascar," in S. Küchler and W.S. Melion, *Images of Memory: On Remembering and Representation* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), p.125.

28. According to Caroline Humphrey: "A Mongolian landscape seethes with entities which are attributed with anything from a hazy idea of energy to clearly visualized and named spirits. . . . It is not possible to discern a coherent cosmology in all this." C. Humphrey, "Chiefly and Shamanist Landscapes in Mongolia," in E. Hirsch and M. O'Hanlon, eds., *The Anthropology of Landscape: Perspectives on Place and Space* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.141.

29. Kler, "Sickness, Death and Burial," p.29.

30. Prior to Mongol occupancy of this

landscape, Xiongnu and Turkic tribes buried their elite using chambers, tumuli, and other elaborate constructions.

31. C. Humphrey, "Rituals of Death as a Context for Understanding Personal Property in Socialist Mongolia," *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol.8 No.1 (2002), p.76.

32. Ibid., p.69.

33. U.E. Bulag, "Municipalization and Ethnopolitics in Inner Mongolia," in O. Bruun and L. Narangoa, *Mongols from Country to City: Floating Boundaries, Pastoralism, and City Life in the Mongol Lands* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2006), p.70.

34. Humphrey, "Rituals of Death," pp.65,68,86 n3.

35. Embalming practices of neighboring cultures appeared to have been unknown to Mongols at this time. That they might have transported bodies seems less plausible then than that they might have transported relatively more stable relics — either the items that denoted his personhood, or his ashes, if Chinggis were cremated. According to a textual reference, the palanquin carrying the Khaan's corpse became immobilized in the Munu Mountains, on the rim overlooking Ordos, which likely portended to his entourage that they hasten the disposal of the body in the surrounding landscape. The mobilization of Chinggis's personal articles to represent his body may have arisen from this situation of metaphoric, corporeal, and palanquin immobility. See P. Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp.141–44.

36. "Reliquary" may be yet another term to consider here. A faction of Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhism relies on the relic-cult. This may account for some of the relevance of the site for contemporary Mongols, but not for the initiation of the *naiman chagaan ordon* in the pre-Buddhist eras of the great Khaans or Yuan, nor that of the current structure.

37. D. Atkinson and D. Cosgrove, "Urban Rhetoric and Embodied Identities: City, Nation, and Empire at the Vittorio Emanuele II Monument in Rome, 1870–1945," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol.88 No.1 (1998), p.30.

38. S. Pile, Real Cities: Modernity, Space, and the Phantasmagorias of City Life (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2005).

39. On memorial landscapes of a nation's capital, see J.F. Meyer, "The Changing Meaning of the National Mall," in *Myths in Stone: Religious Dimensions of Washington, D.C.* (Berkeley: UC Press, 2001); and K. Savage, "A Monument to a Deceased Project," in K. Savage, *Monument Wars: Washington D.C., the National Mall, and the Transformation of the Memorial Landscape* (Berkeley: UC Press, 2009).

40. N. Johnson, "Cast in Stone: Monuments, Geography, and Nationalism," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol.13, No.1 (1995), p.51.

41. M. Rowlands and C. Tilley, "Monuments and Memorials," in C. Tilley, ed., *Handbook of Material Culture* (London: SAGE, 2006), p.506.

42. Linkages of body and land here are opposed to the feudal European practices of ruling bodies-of-state, as suggested by Ernst Kantorowicz in *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); and Carlo Ginzburg in *Wooden Eyes: Nine Reflections on Distance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp.64–66. Body-doubling did occur, but to spiritual ends rather than investments in power. The Khaan's duplicate in clothing was buried not for his apotheosistic placement among the divine spirits, but rather either to dupe his own spirit, fool evil spirits who might chase him, or divert the spirits of looters seeking his tomb. See A. Campi, "Review of *Genghis Khan, Life, Death, and Resurrection* by John Man," in *Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibet Current Situation*, Vol.15 No.1 (2004), pp.66–78. Joseph Kler, in "Sickness, Death and Burial," p.29, described a body-double who "takes upon himself the evil, accepts the destiny of the king, dresses up in the best raiment of the king, mounts the king's horse, and gallops away" to distract and draw evil spirits away from a sick regent. If the ruler died, Kler continued, duplicates were made not of his body, but of architectural elements he might recognize — a straw replica of his doorway, for instance — and then burned so his spirit would be tricked into believing his residence was no more. The spirit would then depart, leaving undisturbed the survivors in his household.

43. G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, "1227: Treatise on Nomadology — the War Machine," in G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p.366.

44. Sain-Jirgal and Sharaldai, *Altan ordon nai dailga [The offering Ceremonies of the Golden Ordon]* (1983), translated by Oyunbilig (1997), available at http://members.tripod.com/mongolian_page/white.txt (retrieved April 21, 2007).

45. Ibid.

46. Carles, "Problems in Exploration II: Ordos," p.677.

47. Completed in 1944, the Ulaanhot memorial, damaged in the Cultural Revolution, was rebuilt or altered between 1983 and 1987. Designs for the Ulaanhot and eventual Ordos monuments might each take compositional inspiration from the periodically agglomerated *ordon* at Yekejuu. One might alternatively draw cues from the other (though which borrows from which is difficult to disentangle amid their staggered construction and reconstruction cycles). Both, however, are stylistically consistent with an architectural aesthetic designated to ethnic minorities.

48. Sain-Jirgal and Sharaldai, *Altan ordon nai dailga*. Likewise, Almaz Khan has asserted an affinity of the early Chinese Communist Party for the Khaan memorial, stemming from Mao's personal dedication to the *ordon* as they passed through Yan'an. An entourage bearing the relics, retreating from Japanese occupation, filed through the Communists' own base of retreat. Just southeast of Yekejuu, Yan'an sits in a valley that serves as a transit corridor between Ordos and Gansu. See A. Khan, "Chinggis Khan: From Imperial Ancestor to Ethnic Hero," in S. Harrell, *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), pp.248–77.

49. P.A. Andrews, "The Tents of Chinggis Qan at Ejen Qoriy-a and Their Authenticity," *Journal of the Anglo-Mongolian Society*, Vol.7 No.2 (1981), pp.1–49.

50. G. Borjigin, Radio Free Asia (February 17, 2005) http://www.rfa.org/english/news/social/china_mongolian-20050217.html retrieved March 20, 2007.

51. E.J. Hobsbawm and T.O. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.237.

52. K.R. Timmerman, World Tibet Network News (March 27, 1999), available at http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/1999/3/27_3.html (retrieved March 20, 2007). Verbally picketing diminutive dioramas may seem mirthful, but Timmerman subsequently ran in the 2000 Maryland Republican primary for U.S. Senate on a platform of hawkish interventionism. See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/politics/elections/2000/states/md/senate/ (retrieved May 24, 2007).

53. See A. Anagnost, *National Past-Times: Narrative, Representation, and Power in Modern China* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), pp.162–63.

54. J. Hevia, "World Heritage, National Culture, and the Restoration of Chengde," *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique*, Vol.9 No.1 (2001), pp.220–21. The Anderson quotes are from B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Editions/NLB, 1983), pp.172,184–85. The Bennington quotes are from G. Bennington, "Postal Politics and the Institution of the Nation," in H. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990), p.121.

55. Invoking pan-Mongol nationalism, restive Ordos Mongols called upon the military of Outer Mongolia to protect the *ordon* after the Qing collapsed. But this alerted local Han forces of the nascent Chinese Republic to the value of such a memorial in forging a national identity from composite local elements. See U.E. Bulag, *Collaborative Nationalism: The Politics of Friendship on China's Mongolian Frontier* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), pp.37–38.

56. Serruys, "Documents from Ordos on the 'Revolutionary Circles': Part I," (1977); and Henry Serruys, "Documents from Ordos on the 'Revolutionary Circles': part II," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol.98 No.1 (1978), pp.1–19.

57. Serruys, "Documents from Ordos on the 'Revolutionary Circles': Part I," p.485.

58. Hevia, "World Heritage, National Culture, and the Restoration of Chengde," pp.219–43.

59. Serruys, "Documents from Ordos on the 'Revolutionary Circles': Part I," pp. 485–86.

60. Ibid., p.493; parentheses in source.

61. Ibid., p.492.

62. Late-nineteenth-century references note that fences around the gathering site were rebuilt or replaced when weathered and dilapidated. As permanent constructions, they joined platforms for the ordon, establishing a precedent for the now sedentary monument. See Andrews, "The Tents of Chinggis Qan at Ejen Qoriy-a and Their Authenticity," pp.7–8.

63. K.W. Forster, "Monument/Memory and the Mortality of Architecture," Oppositions, Vol.25 (1982), p.6; and A. Riegl, same volume, pp.21–51.

The Specter of Modernity: Open Ports and the Making of Chinatowns in Japan and South Korea

SUJIN EOM

This article examines multifaceted dimensions of modernity by looking at how disparate meanings of "Chineseness" have emerged in relation to Chinese settlements in Yokohama and Incheon, and how these changed meanings have aligned with the formation of modernities in Japan and Korea in the course of the twentieth century. It further delves into how modernities in the two nation-states came to be recognized and manifested in the built environment of these two Chinatowns. Although the formation and development of the Chinatowns of Yokohama and Incheon were inseparable from the broader, global context of colonialism and modernism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the fact that they were not necessarily direct outcomes of "Western" colonialism provides a new point of reference within the discussion of modernity. Arguing that the equation of modernity with the West has served as a normative model for contemporary urbanisms in East Asia, this article seeks an alternative way of understanding modernities.

Chinatowns in North America, especially those in the American West, have been described as "a site of negation and definition."[1] In particular, Chinatowns have been defined by what they seemed to lack: modernity. The typical qualities ascribed to their built environments, such as narrow alleys, multifamily housing, and unsanitary living conditions, have typically been attributed to "culture" and to an obsession with tradition — all of which has been contrasted with a Euro-American self-image of progress and improvement. Not only has this image of Chinatown helped reinforce a supposed American modern identity, but American authorities have also cast Chinatowns as a threat — as though Chinese culture could, like a virus in Western germ theory, spread, infiltrate, and, in the

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
FIGURE 1. *Locations of Incheon and Yokohama. Source: Google Maps.*

end, contaminate the purity of American culture. As such, Chinatowns have seemed to function as the periphery, or the outside, of the modern.

In contrast to Chinatowns in the West (which were often represented as an antipode to "what American communities ought to be like"[2]), Chinese settlements established in late-nineteenth-century East Asian open ports such as Yokohama, Japan, and Incheon, South Korea, were understood as gateways to modernity. This picture not only complicates the way Chinatowns have been discussed and represented in the West, but it brings into question the very notion of modernity itself. In this alternative picture, Chinatown, or the East, is not portrayed as the victim of Western modernity; nor is it assigned passive status in the narrative of modernity. Rather, histories of Chinese settlements in East Asia reveal how a space known as Chinatown actively engaged in and spurred the rise of modernity in East Asia.

This article highlights the multifaceted dimensions of modernity by looking at how disparate meanings of "Chineseness" have emerged around Chinese settlements in Yokohama and Incheon, and how these changed meanings have aligned with the making of modern self-images in both Japan and Korea **(FIGS.1,2A,B)**. It further delves into how modernities in the two nation-states came to be recognized and manifested in the built environment of these Chinatowns. Although their formation and development were inseparable from the broader, global context of colonialism and modernism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the fact that they were not necessarily direct outcomes of "Western"

FIGURE 2A,B. *Aerial view of Yokohama (A), and Incheon (B) Chinatowns. Image based on Google Maps.*

colonialism provides an alternative point of reference for the discussion of modernity. This comparative perspective also helps enable understanding of the otherwise ungraspable multifaceted problems of modernity.

BETWEEN INCOMPLETE AND CRIPPLED MODERNITIES

In *All That Is Solid Melts into Air,* Marshall Berman defined modernity as a body of experience which differed distinctively from that of the nonmodern period, due primarily to the impact of urban space newly transformed by processes of modernization. Thus, at the beginning of the nineteenth century Goethe's famous protagonist Faust incarnated the exemplary modern man with his insatiable desire for development, progress and transformation. But, later on in the century, the new Baudelairean urban space of Paris vividly exhibited how modernity was actually being experienced at the socio-spatial level. This new urban space, often created through drastic transformations known as Haussmannization, not only enabled the simultaneity of disparate temporality, but also facilitated the encounter of people of different classes, who had previously lived in isolation from one another. As envisioned by Berman, what made the modern experience possible were the physical processes of modernization.

What would modernity have looked like without this transformed urban condition? What would modernity have meant in the absence of it? Would modernity have even been possible? To examine this question, Berman cited the example of St. Petersburg, where the fruit of modernization had yet to come. He situated nineteenth-century Russia as "an archetype of the emerging twentieth-century Third World."[3] And he pointed to the urban experience of St. Petersburg as "warped and weird modernity," which signified the imitative nature of non-Western modernity.[4]

But was Russian modernity really a perverted variation of Western modernity? Can modernity even be equated with the West? Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini have questioned the taken-for-granted epistemological grounds of the discourse of modernity. Specifically, they have sought to expose how the modernity of the non-West was projected as merely "reactive formations or resistances to Euro-American capitalism."[5] Berman's description of Russian modernity tends to situate the West as universal and the Rest as its perverted imitator. Yet, as Paul Rabinow has shown in his investigation of French urban planning both in the metropôle and colonies, Western modernization was inseparable from the colonial enterprise, which subjugated the East politically, economically and symbolically.[6] The impact of French urbanists and their experimental modern visions was not only evident in the transformation of what Rabinow termed the social environment; it also allowed a symbolic separation between the universal (the West) and the particular (the East), and the subsequent subjugation of the latter to the former.

The scholarly tendency to privilege the West as a universal norm is not unfamiliar in East Asia. Discussions of modernity in Korea are often dominated by references to its "perverted" nature. And since Korea was colonized by Japan, which was obviously not part of the West, Korean modernity has often been seen as is doubly "warped." This line of argument not only invokes the assumption that a "pure" modernity was invented and implemented in the West, but it also negates the experience of people engaged in making their own history. As Baek Yung Kim has observed, such a discussion tends to promote the perspective that Korean modernity is a distortion or deviation from "normal" modernity.[7] And by defining Korean modernity as "crippled," it fails to pay attention to contradictions within the modern city, and within the modern itself.

Interestingly, discussions of Japanese modernity have also often been framed in terms of its "incompleteness." Although Japan succeeded in accomplishing its own modernization as early as the late nineteenth century (and thus was able to situate itself as "the West of Asia"), post-World War II Japan was afflicted by the memory of the war and its own imperial past. Postwar social theorists such as Masao Maruyama pointed to Japanese ultra-nationalism and the enthroning of the emperor as evidence of the incompleteness of Japanese modernity and modernization. But, as many scholars have acknowledged, even Maruyama was influenced in these years by an underlying equation of modernity with the West. In other words, as the historian Harry Harootunian has written, the discourse of incomplete modernity presupposes "a normative model against which its sameness or difference might be measured."[8] And that model is the West.

Considering these positions, there is clearly a need to move beyond the Western-oriented characterizations of "crippledness" or "incompleteness" that have dominated discourse on modernity in the East — and that have particularly haunted the discussion of Korean and Japanese modernities. In this article I will attempt to show how the formation and development of East Asian modernities, understood not as a perverted form of modernity but as its inherently constitutive outside, can be used to challenge the taken-for-granted notion of Western modernity. As Ong has observed, this alternative take on modernity is by no means intended simply to reveal the difference between the West and the non-West.[9] Rather, it aims to debunk the myth of what has been understood to be modern and attend to the boundaries drawn by its discourse — whether they be nations, races, ethnicities, or spaces.

But why are Chinatowns significant here? How do the histories of East Asian Chinatowns speak to a discussion of modernity? The answer involves the unique modern experience of East Asia, where Korea was colonized by Japan, and where, as Keun-Cha Yoon has argued, Japan formulated its modern identity through colonial contempt for and differentiation from the populations of neighboring Asian countries, mainly Korea and China.[10] East Asian Chinatowns thus occupy a historically symbolic space where the traditional Asian world order faced a crisis, and where this caused a drastic break with old views of the world.

TREATY PORTS AND THE OPENING OF NATIONS

Despite the rhetoric that Yokohama and Incheon presently employ to promote their image as historic open ports, it is ironic that these once small fishing villages were "opened" not by choice but by force. In both cases, violent intervention by foreign powers led to the imposition of unequal treaties. The port of Yokohama was opened as a result of such an agreement between Tokugawa Japan and the United States in 1859. Incheon was opened as a result of a similar treaty between Chosun Korea and Meiji Japan in 1876. Both agreements stipulated that settlement areas would be created where foreigners could live and trade beyond the jurisdiction of the host country's government.

In Japan, the practice of confining foreigners to a limited geography was of long standing. In the late seventeenth century Nagasaki became Japan's first international city, with cultural quarantines called *dejima* for Dutch merchants and *tojinyashiki* for Chinese ones. The Tokugawa government established these areas specifically to prevent foreigners from living with — and thus having "free intercourse" with — the local population. The Japanese themselves were not allowed to go into these foreign residential areas without government permission. Korea likewise had a tradition of foreign settlement, established as early as the fifteenth century in Busan, the largest port city on the peninsula. Only in areas there known as *waegwan* in Korean or *waikan* in Japanese could Japanese merchants and delegates from Tsushima Island trade with Chosun merchants and conduct official business.

Such premodern residential enclaves for foreigners, however, should be differentiated from the invention of treaty ports and their foreign settlements in the nineteenth century. While older foreign settlements had been strictly controlled and managed by the host countries, the treaty ports in nineteenth-century East Asia were fundamentally the outcome of unequal relations, mostly with the West, that guaranteed foreigners extraterritorial rights. This system was first established in Shanghai in 1843 as a result of the Treaty of Nanking, which resolved the first Opium War between Great Britain and imperial China. But the treaty-port system soon spread to other port cities, including those in Japan in the 1850s and Korea in the 1870s.

As a nineteenth-century version of today's free-trade zones, treaty ports embodied "a practice that granted most foreigners nearly complete immunity from both local laws and jurisdiction."[11] They were justified by such nineteenth-century concepts as the "white man's burden," and supported by certain belief that "'free trade' was a God-given right that *required* societies to trade freely with one another."[12] Along with China, Japan and Korea had held to the principle of national isolation for centuries before the 1850s and 1870s, respectively. Therefore, the opening of their ports not only brought a sudden influx of information, people, goods and so on, but also signaled the incorporation of these two closed-off countries into the nineteenth-century global order. Indeed, this forced incorporation was mediated by the symbolic event of opening new markets in the two port cities.

It was not until it was faced by armed threat that Tokugawa Japan finally — and unwillingly — signed the Treaty of Kanagawa, or the Treaty of Amity and Friendship, with the United States in 1854. After decades of resistance, this event was recorded in Japanese history as *kaikoku* (開国: the opening of a country) because of the political, economic and cultural changes it eventually brought to Japanese society. The Treaty of Kanagawa, however, did not specifically include provisions for commerce. These followed in the subsequent Treaty of Amity and Commerce, or the "Harris Treaty" (named after the U.S. diplomat who negotiated it), signed in 1858. The terms of this treaty were later mirrored in separate agreements between the Tokugawa shogunate and France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Russia. These treaties specified that major Japanese port cities including Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagasaki would be opened to foreigners, who would be allowed to live and trade there with extraterritorial rights and according to low import duties specified by international standards. Accordingly, the once small town of Yokohama was soon filled with Tokugawa officials and foreigners, who soon displaced the local population.[13]

Chinese were not included as foreigners in these initial treaty port agreements because Japan and China had no formal treaty relations until 1871. Instead, the Chinese came to Yokohama with Western merchants from Shanghai or Hong Kong, where Western merchants had already established connections with them. The Chinese in Yokohama mainly served as managers — or compradors — in European- or American-funded factories where Japanese women occupied the bottom rung. Since Chinese were nontreaty nationals, there was initially no designated settlement for them. However, as the original areas for foreign settlement were soon insufficient, new spaces for residence and commerce needed to be created. The solution, beginning in 1862, was to transform nearby paddies into residential areas. It was from this moment that the Chinese in Yokohama started to form an enclave, which remains the center of Chinatown today.

Incheon's Chinatown emerged from a slightly different situation, but it also involved coercion. In 1882 the "Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade Treaty" between Qing China and Chosun Korea prescribed the extraterritorial rights of Qing subjects within the Chosun's designated territory. The treaty was, in fact, a political necessity for the Qing. China was a rival with Japan in Korea, and the Japanese had already forced the Chosun to sign an unequal treaty in 1876, guaranteeing access to three ports there, including Incheon. In subsequent years, under the military protection of the Qing, Chinese fleeing political chaos and frequent war in their own country could settle in Korea in an officially designated area of extraterritorial jurisdiction now known as Incheon Chinatown (**fig.3**). Due to the geographic proxim-

FIGURE 3. *Map of the foreign settlements of Incheon (1893). Courtesy of the Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies.*

ity of China and Korea, people of Chinese descent had lived in Korea long before the treaty-port system came into being in the late nineteenth century.[14] However, as Woo Yong Jeon has noted, it was only after the opening of the Korean ports that the Chinese came to be seen as a separate ethnic community with a national consciousness. This was largely due to the military protection they enjoyed from the Qing government.[15]

The opening of the ports in both Yokohama and Incheon were thus directly related to treaties that compelled acceptance of a foreign presence in formerly sovereign territory. It also meant the forced integration of Japan and Korea into the global economy and international political order. However, there was a key difference in the outcome of these conditions in the two cities. Whereas the treaty-port status of Incheon was ended when the entire Korean peninsula was violently converted to a Japanese colony in 1910, Yokohama "regained its sovereignty" in 1899. Yokohama's opening may thus be interpreted as a significant watershed for the modernization of Japan, which soon became "the West of Asia." But Incheon's treaty-port status was merely the precursor to an even graver subjugation. These different experiences eventually provided different points of reference with regard to their respective national self-understandings of the modern.

It is undeniable that the treaty-port system played a role in forging a modern national consciousness in both Japan and Korea. However, the opening of ports should not be overemphasized in the discussion of Asian modernities. The notion that the modernization of the East was only made possible through Western contact undermines the actual history

of international relations and cultural contexts in the region. As Carolyn Cartier has pointed out, it is only Western ethnocentrism and imperialism that defines "a modern era" in Asia in accordance with "significant contact with the West."[16] Thus, arguably, the rise of the modern in Japan and Korea only came *after* the abolishment of the treaty-port system. In other words, notwithstanding the broader historical conditions of late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the formation and development of the modernities of the two countries were due in large part to what Cartier has called "the situated complexities of regional realities and transformations."[17] And if, as Harootunian has written, modernity refers to an act of "destroying the culture of reference to reterritorialize society," the Chinese and Chinatowns provide a problem space for both Japanese and Korean modernities.[18]

THE CHINESE PROBLEM AND CHINATOWNS

The Sino-Japanese War in 1894, which took place in Korea, brought the drastic transformation not only of East Asian territoriality but also of the traditional sense of order in the region. A consequence of its attempt to curb Japanese expansion, the Qing's defeat in this ground-breaking war (in which Japan prevailed over its much larger neighbor) caused imperial China to lose its traditional power over the Chosun. Moreover, Japan acquired Taiwan as a colony, further weakening the Sinocentric system that had long dominated the regional epistemology.

The conditions of the war and Japan's victory, and its subsequent victory over Russia in 1904, also brought attention to the idea of national character and concern for differences between the Chinese and Japanese "mentality." Under the banner of scientific knowledge, new definitions of race caused the meaning of being Japanese or Chinese to change. And while Yokohama Chinatown (then called Nankinmachi) had been imbued before the 1890s with the "familiarity and intimacy" the Japanese felt for the Chinese, the Sino-Japanese War aroused an unprecedented sense of ethnic consciousness.[19] A new contempt for the Chinese was exacerbated among the Japanese by mass-media reports and by scholarly discussions that divided the world into two categories, civilization versus savagery, and that referred to the Japanese as representative of the former and the Chinese as representative of the latter.[20] As Keun-Cha Yoon has pointed out, contempt toward the Chinese and other Asians became the foundation of the Japanese modern self-image, which ultimately led Japan to aspire to become the ruling power in East Asia.[21]

In colonized Korea, modern newspapers and novels accepted Japanese colonial propaganda derived from racial knowledge-production and social-evolution theory.[22] As Timothy Mitchell has described it in another context, "the colonial order was able to penetrate and colonise local discourse."[23] Thus, Koreans internalized the structure of meanings erected by Japanese colonialism. In particular, they targeted the Chinese in Korea for a new form of nationalist resentment. As Japanese colonial development accelerated in the 1910–20s, Chinese laborers arrived en masse to work at construction sites, factories, and the like. These immigrants had much different interests than the Chinese merchants and farmers who had come there in the 1880–90s. Among other things, they were seen as a problem because they were willing to take any job away from native Koreans, and they were often sent to bust unions of Korean laborers.[24] Newspaper articles and columns that reported on crimes committed by the Chinese further confirmed Koreans' belief in national and racial hierarchies, and exacerbated contempt for the Chinese (**FIG.4**).

This colonial production of racial knowledge was transformed into nationalist identity in the two countries after World War II. The promotion of a sense of racial unity was central to the nation-making projects in both Japan and Korea during this period. But it also led to concern and anxiety over the definition of foreign-ness. The exclusion of foreigners in the creation of postwar nationalism took various institutional forms. As Tessa Suzuki-Morris has noted, former colonial subjects residing in Japan — approximately 700,000 Koreans and Taiwanese — were deprived of citizenships, and were categorized as foreigners without political rights.[25] In other words, according to Komagome Takeshi, they were "unilaterally excluded in the course of reestablishing the Japanese nation state."[26] As John Lie has pointed out, a discourse of Japaneseness proliferated in the late 1960s as a "response to the question of Japanese identity" following the loss of the coun-

FIGURE 4. *Published in Korea during the colonial era, Kim Dong In's novel* Potato *describes an ill-destined Korean heroine whose life was destroyed by an immoral but wealthy Chinese man. Image from its film version made in 1987. Source:* The Kyunghyang Shinmun, *March 11, 1988.*

try's prewar worldview and its rapid postwar Americanization.[27] Shorn of reflections on "empire," a postwar discussion of Nihonjinron, the theory of Japanese uniqueness, could only develop by forgetting the imperial past and the role played by former colonial subjects.

In postwar Korea, the Chinese problem, which had originated in the colonial era, was exacerbated by the national and ideological division of the country into South and North. The establishment of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) in 1949 further jeopardized the legal status of Chinese residing in South Korea. In order to stay, Chinese residents had to naturalize as citizens of the Republic of China (R.O.C.: Taiwan), which they mostly (as former residents of Shandong in the north) had never visited. Furthermore, the Alien Landownership Law, enacted in 1961 under President Park Jung Hee, an ardent anti-Communist, prohibited foreigners — namely, Chinese — from owning real property larger than 660 square meters for residential use and 165 square meters for business use (**FIG.5**).[28] Since the Chinese were mainly employed in agriculture and the restaurant business, this law greatly hindered their economic survival. Just as the self-image of South Korea cannot be understood without considering the effect of the establishment of North Korea at the end of the World War II, so the effort to build a modern nation-state in postwar South Korea cannot be understood without taking into account the presence of the Chinese.

NEW IMAGININGS OF CHINATOWNS AND OPEN PORTS, AND THE REDISCOVERED MODERN

Postwar nationalism in Japan took a new turn in the 1970s after Japan normalized diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. and accepted it as the only legitimate China. Although this

FIGURE 5. *"Your money is mine." Depicted as greedy and sly, as in this editorial cartoon, the Chinese were undoubtedly the main target of the Alien Landownership Law. Source:* The Donga Ilbo, *August 30, 1967. Reprinted by permission.*

meant abandoning diplomatic ties with the R.O.C., it brought new attention to the Yokohama Chinese and to Chinatown. Coinciding with an increase in the purchasing power of Japan's rising middle class and a new interest in Chinese food, the normalization of political ties with the P.R.C. translated into a prominent cultural phenomenon in the late 1970s called "the panda boom."

Compared with the previous decades, the 1970s were a significant period for Yokohama Chinatown. During the 1960s the area had mainly served as a site for Western-style bars that catered to U.S. soldiers and sailors. But in the 1970s Yokohama Chinatown witnessed a drastic increase in the number of Chinese restaurants and Chinese-themed shops.[29] As one Yokohama Chinatown-born resident recalled:

> *This neighborhood became a place for tourists, not for the people who live here. I don't think it is totally bad. Tourists vitalized the neighborhood, for sure. The community feels more confident about their culture and neighborhood. Up to the 1970s, Japanese looked down on this neighborhood because it was a dirty and dangerous place. Now this is the place in which people want to come to enjoy themselves and even date. On the one hand, the Chinese community was able to elevate their social status. On the other hand, this neighborhood became a place for tourists, not for people to live in.*

> *When I was young, we always biked on the street. After the eighties, people started to build a traditional temple, gates, and so on. Many houses and even Japanese restaurants were replaced with Chinese restaurants. There are no places for people living in this neighborhood, especially for kids, to hang out and take a rest.[30]*

In this resident's eyes, Chinatown was transformed from a dangerous place in the 1960s to a sanitized "little China" in the 1970s. Once called "blood town" by Japanese society and known for its deteriorated condition, Chinatown now came to be seen as a historical resource that would help Yokohama forge a new multicultural and cosmopolitan identity (**FIGS. 6, 7**). The city government contributed to this effort


FIGURE 6. *Yokohama Chinatown. Photo by author, February 2009.*

FIGURE 7. *Reconstructed several times, this Chinese temple has become a symbol of Yokohama Chinatown. Photo by author, February 2009.*

FIGURE 8. *Minato Mirai 21. Photo by author, February 2009.*

by establishing the Chukagai (Chinatown) -Motomachi Development Association to promote both Chinatown and Motomachi, a luxurious shopping district adjacent to it. It also publicized Chinatown as a tourist destination whose annual visitor count exceeded that of Tokyo Disneyland.

This remaking of Chinatown was closely bound up with attempts to market Yokohama as a world-class city. In the early 1980s the city government initiated a series of large urban developments, beginning with the Minato Mirai 21 [Future of the Port 21] district. This project consisted of convention centers, hotels, museums and offices on reclaimed land (**FIG.8**). The Chinatown subway station (Chukagai-Motomachi station, to be more accurate) was subsequently constructed in 2004 to connect to the Minato Mirai station.

Incheon's Chinatown, too, has gone through a period of change in the recent decades. According to one third-generation Chinese resident who went to the Incheon Overseas Chinese School:

We used to call the neighborhood xijie, *which means "West Street" in Chinese. There were about fifty classmates in my Chinese high school in Incheon and only five of them lived in the neighborhood. Thus, my*

memories of the neighborhood are not so different from memories that "ordinary" people might have about their childhood and alma mater. Today, people call the place "Chinatown." It was when I was in high school that I heard the word for the first time. It made me feel strange. Later, I experienced the similar feeling but in a much stronger way at the sight of the changed neighborhood when I came back after graduation.[31]

As these comments indicate, the word "Chinatown" was originally not used by residents, only by outsiders, to distinguish the neighborhood (**FIG.9**). The change of name was closely bound up with the new political atmosphere of East Asia in the early 1990s.

South Korea only normalized diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. in 1992. Before then, China had been perceived as a Communist enemy, an ally of the North. Normalization caused the almost "brotherly" relationship between South Korea and the R.O.C. to be terminated. But, just as during Japan's "panda boom" after 1972, interest in trade with the P.R.C. boomed after diplomatic normalization. Incheon Chinatown also came to public attention as an attractive new tourist destination (**FIG.10**). However, it was not until the

Asian financial crisis of 1997 that a discussion of remaking this deteriorated space began in earnest.

Following the IMF bailout of Korea in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, media speculation about Incheon Chinatown as a possible new center for overseas Chinese trade and investment prompted city officials to designate it a "special tourist zone" in June 2001. Incheon Chinatown is now the one and only historic Chinatown in South Korea. It is also located in a city with a history of having been a gateway to modernity at the turn of the twentieth century. As a result, it has come to signify Incheon's cosmopolitan significance as a city where "foreign" ideas, technologies, and people may comingle without interference (FIG. 11).

As self-proclaimed centers of cosmopolitanism, Yokohama and Incheon share many things — not only in terms of their histories, but also in terms of how those histories

have been used to situate the cities as the gateways to modernity. In promoting their attractiveness, both Yokohama and Incheon emphasize their pedigrees as open ports and the sites of foreign and Chinese settlements during the nineteenth century. To project their status as the first modern cities in their respective nations, they further link themselves to the development of such "technological firsts" in their countries as railroads, the telegraph, and modern postal service. As the "opening" of its port is understood as providing a watershed moment in Japan's modernization, so too has Yokohama Chinatown now been crowned a gateway to Japan's globalization. Similarly, Incheon's history of having been an open port has translated into claims that the city was Korea's first, leading, and only "free port," where modernity was introduced by Westerners as well as by the Chinese. At the center of the reinterpretation of these Chinatowns, therefore, is the new myth of the open port, which has unfortunately trivialized the cost the two countries had to pay for the processes which created them.

Interestingly, the open-port rhetoric in the two cities has also been used to transform the notion of Chineseness in the two countries. With the rise of global investment and tour-

ism, being Chinese has now taken on another meaning, often equated with capital. Reflecting this new reality, the Alien Landownership Law, originally enacted in South Korea in the 1960s to limit Chinese economic activity, was revised in 1998 after the Asian financial crisis to accommodate foreign investment, including that by overseas Chinese. Far from its former image as an impoverished Communist enemy, the rise of the P.R.C. as a leading business partner has now enabled a discourse that defines the Chinese as important investors and friendly tourists, whom South Korea and Japan should welcome through the reconstruction of old Chinatowns.

THE SPECTER OF MODERNITY: BEYOND THE INCOMPLETE AND CRIPPLED MODERN

"Seoul needs Chinatown," announced Oh Se-Hoon, the mayor of Seoul, in January 2008.[32] His statement was intended to solicit support from Seoul residents for the construction of a new Chinatown in an existing residential area of the city. Plans for this development had already caused much debate among citizens, and had encountered opposition from

FIGURE 12. *"Modern & Green Chinatown." A construction fence erected at Ilsan Chinatown in South Korea. Photo by author, May 2012.*

residents. But Mayor Oh contended that the new Chinatown would provide an opportunity to reposition Seoul as an international city by attracting more than twelve million foreign tourists. Although plans for this new Seoul Chinatown have yet to be realized, his statement still deserves attention. Why is Chinatown needed in Seoul? What does Chinatown even mean (**FIG.12**)?

In *Colonising Egypt*, Timothy Mitchell questioned the Western philosophic tradition exemplified by the Cartesian notion of self and of an external reality. He contended there is no such thing as a preexistent reality that precedes the self; the self is always defined in its relation to the other. Similarly, colonialism is always constituted by what it excludes, just as colonial European quarters (modernity) only acquired meaning through the nearby presence of native quarters (tradition). According to Mitchell, this accounts for "the need for the Oriental."[33] In other words, Orientalists need the Orient for ontological reasons. This view accords with Gwendolyn Wright's writing on "dual cities." These were not just manifestations of colonial power but embodiments of the very logic of colonialism, the evidence by which its regime of truth and structure of meanings was sustained.[34] Thus, according to Mitchell, the Arab town, was never excluded by colonialism, as ironic as it may sound. Rather, it was incorporated into the colonial city, which was divided into two, "one part becoming an exhibition and the other, in the same spirit, a museum."[35]

By the very same logic, what seems to be included is in fact often excluded by seemingly inclusive practices. What is important in the discussion of colonialism and modernity is the act of dividing, segmenting and rearranging spaces in order to imprint meanings on them. Thus, in Yokohama, the glory of being an open port is exemplified by the modern buildings of the Minato Mirai 21, which serve as an exhibition — but only because Chinatown may be frozen in the distant past nearby in the form of museum. This juxtaposi-

tion of two imaginaries exhibits the dual mission of colonial urbanism as modernization and historic preservation.

Modernities discerned in Japan and South Korea are by no means a perverted form of modernity, but are constitutive of the modern itself. In the related context of such Southeast Asian countries as Malaysia, Eric C. Thompson has described how the *kampung* has served as a site of "simultaneously nostalgic and derogatory imaginaries" created by the contemporary discourse of Malaysia's modern urbanism.[36] Similarly, Japan and Korea have developed their modern identities by engaging with definitions of disparate otherness. The historically accumulated and culturally situated contexts of the Chinese in Japan and Korea show how the two nascent nation-states defined and developed their modernities in dialogue with their constitutive other, which was newly defined at the turn of the twentieth century. As Harootunian has pointed out, "the very incompleteness" of Japan's modernity is a reminder of the very nature of modernity itself. In similar fashion, the crippledness of Korean modernity should be understood to exhibit the violence and contingency of modernity itself.

Implicit to the narrative of either incomplete modernity or crippled modernity, according to Harootunian, is "a normative model against which its sameness or difference might be measured."[37] In East Asia, this normative model — or "the implicit and ubiquitous presence of the West," in the words of Naoki Sakai — functions as the point of counter-reference to identify and measure their modernization.[38] The equation of modernity with the West thus serves as a normative model of contemporary urbanisms in East Asia, where history and science are mobilized to establish and fulfill norms and forms provided by the model from without. Furthermore, practices that celebrate the two open cities as being the first "modern" cities in their respective nations tend to trivialize and even nullify other experiences that do not fit into what they refer to as normative modernity.

This article has examined how modernity has been constituted in specific East Asian contexts by looking at the formation and development of the Chinese problem and Chinatowns in the region. Reflecting on Asian modernities (which are by no means a subcategory of the Western modern), I have attempted to show how ideas of Chineseness and Chinatown have engaged in the making of modernities in East Asia. The opening of ports in the nineteenth century was a historically significant experience, positive or negative, within the two countries. Though involuntary, it was obviously an experience of "becoming part of global system" or of global history. Although historic conditions, such as the dispersion of the capitalist mode of production prompted by Euro-American-Japanese colonialism in the nineteenth century, enabled the simultaneity of disparate entities, the case of the East Asian Chinatowns reminds us that modernity is not a pregiven. Rather, it is an acquired meaning derived through the concrete materiality of regional realities.

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36. E.C. Thompson, "Rural Villages as Socially Urban Spaces in Malaysia," *Urban Studies*, Vol.41 No.12 (2004), p.2357
37. Harootunian, *History's Disquiet*, p.112.
38. N. Sakai, "The Dislocation of the West and the Status of the Humanities," in N. Sakai and Y. Hanawa, eds., *Specters of the West and the Politics of Translation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2001), p.78.

The State Army, the Guerrillas, and the Civilian Militias: Politics and the Myth of the *Tulou*, 1927—1949

JING ZHENG

This article questions the myth of the *tulou* as a "defensive" architectural tradition, with a focus on the period of the Chinese Civil War. By examining the evolution of the building form, changing political circumstances, and the social struggles of local communities, it argues that although the *tulou* construction tradition was constantly transmitted, the building form was adapted to different uses through history, and therefore constituted very different architectural traditions over time. This is why so-called "*tulou* fortresses" were no longer favored as defensive positions in twentieth-century warfare.

Myths are statements invented with cultural, social or political intentions. As time goes by, some statements may be selected and carried down as facts. These usually embody appealing and oversimplified views that neglect subtle but influential changes in history. Generally, they fail to explain emerging and contradictory facts, and this is part of how they become myths.

Tulou are large, multistory residential structures, a traditional building form developed in southeastern China. Since the 1980s, in heritage-preservation and other discussions, they have frequently been portrayed as fortresses. In fact, *tulou* built in the twentieth century and during many past periods were not constructed for defense purposes at all. It is often assumed the Hakka ethnic group of Fujian created such fortress-like structures for common defense in a hostile environment. According to many accounts, this practice started around the fifteenth century and lasted into the late twentieth century. However, this article argues that although the tradition of building *tulou* was constantly transmitted, by the early twentieth century the structures had long since been adapted to different uses. The contemporary notion of "*tulou* fortresses" is thus a myth.

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
FIGURE 1. *The appearance of typical* tulou.

The article focuses on *tulou* built between 1927 and 1949, the period of the Chinese Civil War. These were the most tumultuous decades in the past few centuries in areas where *tulou* were built. During this time three military powers coexisted and contested for domination of the region: the state army (also known as the White army) commanded by the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang); the guerrillas (also known as the Red guerrillas) commanded by the Chinese Communist Party; and civilian militias commanded by local landlords. According to my survey and to government records, during this period of warfare, none of these military forces saw any advantage to defending *tulou*. Indeed, although the building type may once have offered limited strategic potential, there is little evidence that *tulou* were ever deliberately built and utilized as fortresses.

This article asks why, if *tulou* were fortresses built by local people using vernacular techniques, neither external nor local forces were interested in seizing and controlling them during periods of war. Based on an examination of the evolution of *tulou* structures and communities, governmental archives, and the memories of those alive at the time, it suggests two correlated answers. First, despite sharing basic structural features with early *tulou*, *tulou* built in the early twentieth century had changed functionally to serve primarily as a form of cooperative housing. Second, in these later *tulou*, many of the defensive features of older structures had been gradually eliminated as a way to simplify them and reduce the cost of construction. Moreover, since these buildings were vulnerable to modern artillery, they were no longer considered worthy for military powers to occupy or construct. As a result, *tulou* communities sought security through political negotiations with the various military forces in the region, rather than by relying on the physical strength of the *tulou* as a defensive structure.

THE MYTH OF THE *TULOU*

In the rugged areas of western Fujian Province, China, there stand more than two thousand multistory, fortress-like buildings known today as *tulou*. Made of earth and timber, with simple geometric layouts, they are clustered along river valleys or are built in the mountains **(FIG.1)**. Usually, each *tulou* is about 3,000 square meters in area and 10 meters in height, consisting of up to 200 identical rooms **(FIG.2)**. Since the 1980s the picturesque landscape of *tulou* settlements has fascinated tourists from China and abroad. In 2008, 46 selected *tulou* were inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List for the stated reason that they "represent the particular values of defensive functions."[1]

The geometric and solid appearance of *tulou* certainly resemble those of defensive structures elsewhere in the world. And in descriptive literature they are sometimes associated with medieval European castles and fortifications — or even with prisons such as Jeremy Bentham's panopticon. The layout of a *tulou* is simple and rational, usually comprising a rectangular or circular earth-and-timber structure surrounding a large central courtyard. Rooms of identical form and size are vertically aligned around this central open space on three or four stories, connected by communal corridors and staircases. The large volume of the *tulou's* outer wall is made of solid rammed earth, with a thickness ranging from 1.2 to 2 meters. There are few openings in this wall; windows are small and only open out on the third floor and above **(FIG.3)**.

Tulou have been regarded as fortresses since they were first described in contemporary literature.[2] An illustration by the architectural historian Huang Hanmin provides one of the most elaborate demonstrations of their supposed defensive systems **(FIG.4)**. As shown by Huang, the building had a solid outer wall for passive defense, the base of which was reinforced to prevent attackers from digging through it or undermining it. Windows on the lower floors were narrow and used as firing posts, while those on higher floors were

FIGURE 2. *A) General area of* tulou *construction. B)* Tulou *area and the administrations.*

wider so defenders could throw stones down on attackers if they attempted to scale the walls. Gates provided the weakest point in this defensive perimeter. To protect them against battering rams, their door planks were made of thick wood and equipped with strong latches. A water channel was even provided above each door to protect it with a curtain of water, if attackers tried to set it aflame.[3]

This vivid portrayal of the *tulou* as a primarily defensive structure, however, is imaginary. As confirmation of Huang's analysis, there is little evidence that *tulou* were ever used in battle. On the contrary, statistics reveal that few *tulou* were constructed during the most tumultuous periods of the twentieth century — namely, the late Qing imperial period until 1911, the Warlord period (1912–1926), and the

period of the Chinese Civil War (1927–1949). Construction accelerated, however, during periods of relative social stability (1949–1983) **(FIG.5)**. In other words, *tulou* were favored more during peaceful periods than during times of war.[4]

These statistics contradict the prevailing view of *tulou* as "fortresses," and show it to be a myth. In fact, as the dominant architectural form in the region, few existing *tulou* were ever constructed to shelter a community from military attack.[5] If *tulou* had all the defensive properties Huang ascribed to them, why weren't they built when security was a concern? To answer this question, I will first examine the nature of *tulou* communities and the challenges they faced during this period.

FIGURE 3. *Floor plan, facade and section of a typical* tulou.

FIGURE 4. *Drawing illustrating the defensive system of a* tulou. *By Guo Yucheng, in H. Huang,* Fujian Tulou: Zhongguo Chuantong Minju De Guibao *(Beijing: Shenghuo, du shu, xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2009), p.226.*

FIGURE 5. *Statistical breakdown of* tulou *construction during the twentieth century by year, with the Civil War period of 1927–1949 highlighted.*

THREE COEXISTING MILITARY FORCES

In China, the first half of the twentieth century saw the alternating ascendency of four political regimes. In 1912 the establishment of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) heralded the end of the imperial Qing dynasty. Without strong military support, however, the R.O.C. government was weak, and the new country soon became fragmented, with different areas coming under the control of regional warlords. In the 1920s the Chinese Nationalist Party cooperated with the Chinese Communist Party to fight against the power of these warlords in northern China. The campaign was known as the Northern Expedition, and by 1927 the Chinese Nationalist Party, under Chiang Kai-Shek, had managed to reunify

China and transform it into a one-party "democratic" state. Around the same time, however, the political division and struggle for power between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party led to the onset of the Chinese Civil War. This conflict was divided into two stages, separated by the Japanese invasion from 1937 to 1945, during which the two parties cooperated for the sake of the "national interest." The Civil War ended in 1949 when the Communists prevailed and established the Peoples Republic of China (P.R.C.) on the mainland, while the Nationalist Party retreated to the nearby island of Taiwan.

Tulou are concentrated along the mountainous boundary between two political administrations: Yongding Country and Nanjing County. Yongding County was a part of the Communist Party's short-lived "Western Fujian Soviet Base" from 1929 to 1934. At this time the Nationalist Party and its state army desperately wanted to nip the rising threat of the rival Communists in the bud, and Yongding became a major battleground. By contrast, neighboring Nanjing County was in a rear area under secure control of the Nationalist Party. The border region of these two counties, where many *tulou* were located, inevitably suffered from battles during these years.[6] From 1927 to 1949 three military forces coexisted and fought each other in this area. They were the state army of the Nationalist Party, the Red guerrillas of the Communist Party, and the civilian militias of local landlords.[7]

The Nationalist Party first established local governments in these two counties in late 1926, and they were followed in this effort a few months later by the Communist Party.[8] Prior to this time, the area had been ruled by the military governments of various warlords. Though often keen to present themselves as revolutionaries, the warlords had less interest in political reform than in extorting riches from the populace. Under their rule, government positions were such a profitable commodity that they were sold with great frequency.[9] From 1912 to 1926, 33 men served as the county head of Yongding, an average of 2.2 office holders per year.[10] And in 1925 alone, six men held the position. Rather than serving the populace or simply seeking to raise their own social status, the buyers utilized the position to profit from the collection of exorbitant taxes and fees. One ruse was to collude with local military forces to perform shows of "suppressing bandits." Local militiamen would disguise themselves as bandits and harass isolated communities so the government could collect additional levies for policing. Afterwards, the state officials would split the levies with the "bandits."[11]

These local military units, which sometimes constituted more organized civilian militias, were largely commanded by powerful local figures such as landlords and gentry.[12] Since China's late imperial period, such literate, rich and powerful men had served as intermediaries between the state government and local communities.[13] Sometimes these figures became so powerful that state officials had to rely on them to govern.[14] For example, in 1928 the civilian militia of Zhang

Heshan virtually ruled all of Nanjing County. Zhang controlled such vital activities as setting up tax outposts, building and running military factories, training army officers, and even issuing bank notes! Instead of suppressing Zhang, the new Nationalist state government initially had to rely on him to manage local affairs and wage war against the Communists. It supplied Zhang's civilian militia with weapons and empowered him to govern the area for several years before finally seizing back control and executing him.[15]

Indeed, powerful civilian militias often posed an intractable challenge to state governments. These vested interests blocked needed progress in such areas as land reform, education, and women's rights. On the other hand, the civilian militias could also provide political, financial and military support to the newly established local Nationalist governments. Most importantly, they could be the Nationalist Party's allies against the Communists, who in the eyes of the state government posed an even more radical and aggressive threat.

The Communists set up their branches in Yongding and Nanjing in 1927, and, as mentioned, established a short-lived rural soviet regime from 1927 to 1934.[16] During most of the Civil War period, however, the Communists fought as guerrillas. Their goals included "suppressing the landlords, redistributing land, and empowering the peasants' association," and encouraging uprisings against vested interests.[17] Most of the guerrillas were village volunteers, recruited from among the landless poor. Li Jinzhou was one such recruit. Born in a remote *tulou* in 1913, he was orphaned at the age of eleven and immediately sold to another town. Almost two years later his uncle raised enough money to redeem him. When guerrillas arrived in his village on a recruiting drive in 1934, Li immediately volunteered.[18]

Without a means of conscription or sufficient funds to provide adequate compensation, it was difficult for the Communist guerrillas to recruit new members. They basically had to knock at every door. Thus records indicate that in 1935 Captain Li Mingkang visited ten villages only to recruit thirty troops.[19] Another captain, Chen Mushu, was luckier, however, thanks to his social network. He recruited 38 men from his home village and another twenty from a neighboring village.[20]

During this period, the guerrillas also experienced severe financial difficulties. In 1934 every new guerrilla received a one-off payment of three silver dollars — which was almost nothing, considering that the average salary of a contemporary factory worker in Shanghai was about twenty silver dollars per month.[21] When the orphan Li Jinzhou, mentioned above, was recruited as a guerrilla, he was allotted a uniform, a gun, and some bullets. The number of bullets, however, was so small that Li was taught to fill his bullet bag with stalk and bamboo pieces for bravado.[22]

To supply themselves, the guerrillas attacked the landlords. Thus, in the autumn of 1935 records report that Li Jinzhou's team laid siege to a *tulou* in Nanjing. After it surrendered, the guerillas released all their captives and carried

away such daily necessities as rice, money, animals, sheets, quilts, and even mosquito nets. The guerillas wouldn't take anything heavy or slow — for example, a walking buffalo — lest they be caught during their retreat.[23] Sometimes the guerrillas kidnapped landlords for ransom. In 1934 Captain Li Mingkang received 400 silver dollars and 500 kilograms of millet from one such kidnapping.[24] At the time, that amount of millet could be exchanged for a pig weighing about 85 kilograms at the local bazaar.[25]

The guerrillas continuously harassed landlords for provisions. For them, this was "killing two birds with one stone": they not only punished the evil exploiters, but also gained provisions. Such a policy was also in accordance with their propaganda, "to eat at the rich's home and take their food."[26] Such a form of "class struggle" was very different from that practiced in the 1950s, when the Communists executed landlords and redistributed their possessions. However, during the Civil War the landlords provided such an inexhaustible treasury for the Communist guerrillas that most were kept alive as a source of supply.[27] For example, in December 1936 government records relate how a guerrilla team led by Captain Jiang Maosheng struck the underguarded *tulou* of landlord Jian Changshi. They rushed directly to the fourth floor, unlocked all the doors, took cash, twenty guns, and one thousand bullets, then fled right away.[28] Merely a month later, on the eve of Chinese New Year, another guerrilla team led by Captain Zheng Guiqin robbed the same *tulou* for provisions, using the exact same tactics.[29]

Harassment by the Communist guerrillas drove landlords to ally themselves with the Nationalists and seek protection from the state army. In 1928 the head of Yongding County called together local landlords for a discussion on "suppressing the Communist bandits." He encouraged all the landlords to arm themselves and form a civilian militia union to fight the guerrillas, with himself as the commander-in-chief. In return, he promised them government support in terms of military training and weapons. Within months, the number of registered civilian militia troops grew to more than one thousand.[30]

The civilian militias did not always just serve as hatchet men for the state government; they might also protect local communities against external harassment. For instance, in 1926 farmers of three *tulou* villages in Nanjing County rose up against the military government there after it sought to apply exorbitant levies. The ruling warlord, Zhang Yi, sent an army to quell the rebellion, and it burned more than 3,000 rooms, took numerous possessions, and arrested 44 villagers — eighteen of whom it executed. The landlords and gentry in the villages felt obliged to organize and fight back. They recruited more than 800 farmers as a united civilian militia and trained them as professional soldiers. After several months of battle, the civilian militia managed to defeat the state army and drive away the warlord.[31]

Commanded by rich landlords, the civilian militia were usually composed of farmers or paid soldiers.[32] Most of these men were *tulou* residents. It is very important to note that at this time *tulou* were collective houses, each accommodating hundreds of people. They were undivided real property owned and occupied by groups of shareholders. Due to the nature and historical context of such communities, shareholders in a single *tulou* might consist of both powerful landlords and landless farmers. This intermingling of social classes within *tulou* made the contests between the three co-existing military forces complicated and fascinating.

FROM FORTRESSES TO COOPERATIVE HOUSES

The architectural form of the *tulou* is believed to have emerged in the seventeenth century when the region experienced a tumultuous transition between the Ming and Qing dynasties. Nanjing and Yongding at the time were newly founded counties on mountainous barrens inhabited by mostly penniless immigrants and outlaws.[33] It is likely that local people first adapted army fortifications and fortresses to defend themselves against sporadic bandit attacks. The need for defense must have been widespread in the region at the time, because in addition to *tulou* [earthen multistoried buildings], there were other similar fortress-like structures such as the *tuwei* [earthen enclosure], *tucheng* [earthen city], *tubao* [earthen castle], and *tuzhai* [earthen stockade].[34]

Unlike the castles of medieval European feudal nobility, these buildings were communal properties, built and owned by their residents. For example, Ji'an Lou was one of the earliest recorded *tulou*. Its construction began in 1600 and was finished in 1643, one year before the Qing dynasty replaced the Ming. A declaration of January 20, 1644 (in the Chinese calendar), revealed that Ji'an Lou was built to serve an alliance of several local communities. The members of the alliance came from seven branches of the Tong lineage and three other villages. To organize for their common defense, one man was elected as leader of the alliance, and three others were elected as his associates. Two members of the local literate elite, with state degrees and official positions, were then invited to co-supervise the defending organization — and, more importantly, ensure government support. Since the members of the alliance had diverse backgrounds, they vowed together in front of the local deities to remain loyal to it. According to the declaration, those who disobeyed were either subject to a light fine of about one kilogram of gunpowder, or a heavier punishment of being taken to court.[35]

The *tulou* of Ji'an Lou was clearly designed for defensive purposes. It was located at the peak of a hill near the crossing of three transportation routes. The hill was inconspicuous, shaped like the back of a turtle, but it provided a defensible position overlooking the surrounding area, in

proximity to local sources of livelihood. The three-storied, circular structure had a diameter of about 42 meters and a height of 9 meters. It was divided into 28 units to accommodate the alliance members and included an oval pool of about 50 square meters in its central courtyard to supply water during a siege. The top half of Ji'an Lou's outer wall was made of rammed earth, while its bottom half was reinforced with stone (**FIG.6**).[36] In fact, *tulou* in this early stage in their development used more stone than those built later, a feature which obviously made them stronger as defensive bastions. Some structures, such as Shengping Lou, built in 1601, were entirely built of stone (**FIG.7**).


FIGURE 6. *The ruin of Ji'an Lou. Source: Y. Lin, "Fujian Tulou Zuizaode Fangwei Mengyue: <Ji'an Lou Huimeng Liyue Xu>,"* Fujian Wenbo, *No.3 (2010), p.77.*

FIGURE 7. *The ruin of Shengping Lou.*

In the history of warfare, stronger materials and structures usually emerged to counter the advent of more powerful offensive weapons. For example, in Europe the Romans initially built fortifications as simple wood or earth structures. But later, with the development of siege weapons such as the trebuchet, medieval castles adopted stone walls and other reinforcements such as moats, curtain walls, and gatehouses.

Tulou buildings followed the opposite path. They were originally built with stone, but this material was later replaced by earth. Compared to stone structures, earthen ones were cheaper and easier to build, and they provided a more reasonable alternative when the need for defense diminished. From the late seventeenth century on, the Qing dynasty oversaw a period of economic prosperity that lasted for more than three centuries. Chinese rural society was stabilized under the Qing, and even in the remote areas where most *tulou* were located, defense was no longer a severe problem.

With the change in social conditions, however, the construction tradition of *tulou* did not fade away. Rather, communities chose to adapt what had originally served them for defense to the new challenge of housing a rapidly increasing population. There was a practical reason for this: as an architectural form *tulou* proved to be an effective and affordable solution to housing a large population on limited land area.

The typical traditional Chinese house is a single-story courtyard structure. However, by piling living space up vertically, *tulou* saved large areas for other productive purposes and avoided the need to level large areas of ground in hilly regions. *Tulou* construction materials, such as earth, timber and stone, could also be obtained locally. And, most importantly, the simplified solution allowed unskilled laborers — in most cases the shareholders themselves — to manage its construction.

For these reasons the tradition of *tulou* building was carried down through the centuries, remaining the dominant local architectural form even after its relevance as a defensive structure had faded. Thus, by the nineteenth century, *tulou* were seen largely as an efficient means of collective housing. By this time *tulou* were also being built, occupied and managed as cooperative communities.[37] And in most cases, the residents of *tulou* identified themselves as unit-proprietors.[38]

Just as the members of earlier defensive *tulou* alliances had made a declaration of support to one another, the unit-proprietors of later *tulou* made contracts to ensure their group's economic and social cooperation. Chaoyuan Lou is one such case. It was built upon a circular *tulou* ruin in the twentieth century. While the builders of Ji'an Lou, mentioned above, had been primarily interested in providing for common defense, the Chaoyuan Lou housing cooperative had other principal concerns. To begin, it was strictly administered by its shareholders, who participated as individual families. The criteria for inclusion were a candidate family's potential contribution to the cooperative, its social affiliations inside the community, and (last but not least) its investment in terms of labor or resources in building the structure.

To ensure fairness, after Chaoyuan Lou was complete, all shareholders drew lots to distribute the units. Beyond the contract clarifying distribution of ownership, an additional agreement not only detailed the payment methods available to shareholders but also regulated their rights and obligations. For example, proprietors had to take responsibility for the maintenance of their units; the unit property could only be transferred through inheritance; and no proprietors were allowed to tear down their units or assign the use of them to people outside the cooperative. Interestingly, one thing that was not mentioned in the agreement was defensive organization.[39]

The contract and agreement of Chaoyuan Lou also signalled how complicated the composition of a *tulou* community might be. As I will show in the following sections, this would became a headache for both the Nationalist state government and the Communist guerrillas. A single *tulou* cooperative might consist of shareholders with various backgrounds; yet despite such diversity, the cooperative was organized on democratic principles. And because no unit could be physically torn down, the unity of each building and cooperative was in a way unbreakable. Because units could only be inherited and never traded, the status of different families might also diverge substantially over time. After a few decades or generations this might lead to considerable social and economic difference among residents of the same *tulou*. Some might become rich landlords; some might be powerful gentry; and some might be landless tenants working for the first two groups.

THE FADING OF DEFENSIVE FUNCTION

Despite being carried down through the years as a traditional building type, the defensive design features of the *tulou* soon faded. Changes became evident both in terms of the selection of sites and the elimination of design elements from later structures. With the arrival of artillery on rural battlefields in the twentieth century, the vulnerability of *tulou* became particularly obvious. And by the 1950s they had lost nearly all defensive characteristics, and were simply viewed as a form of collective housing.

By the nineteenth century, *tulou* were already being built on sites that were less suitable from a military perspective. Sites were preferred that were cheaper to obtain, would make construction easier, and were more conveniently located for daily life. The land area needed for a *tulou* was usually several thousand square meters, and sites of this scale were very difficult to obtain in mountainous areas.[40] Indeed, stories were told about the tremendous sacrifices sometimes made to buy them. In the 1930s the price of the area needed for one grant seedling was normally one silver dollar. And several stories recount how the buyers of *tulou* sites were asked to physically cover them with silver dollars. This expense, of course, did not include the cost of flattening the land. Indeed, for this reason, *tulou* communities in the twentieth century preferred

FIGURE 8. *Hekeng Village, Nanjing county, a* tulou *cluster on a flat, low site.*

to build on flat, accessible ground near creeks, regardless of the disadvantages of such sites in terms of defense (**FIG.8**).[41]

Eryi Lou, built in 1770, has been considered the finest example of a defensive *tulou*. Its outer earthen wall was about 2.5 meters thick. Three gates were installed in it, each with a door made from a double layer of wooden planks coated with iron. Each door also featured a cross latch backing these planks, to fortify it against the force of battering rams. For provision, in case of a siege, wells and food storage areas were included inside the building. But its most special design feature was its defensive circulation system. A continuous, hidden corridor was built between all its fourth-floor rooms and its outer wall. At a width of 0.8 meter, this corridor darkened the adjoining rooms and blocked ventilation, but provided direct access to any point on the wall during an attack. Inside, every unit also included a vertically aligned opening for lifting food, bullets, or even people from floor to floor, if needed. And, if a siege worsened, residents could seek reinforcements by means of a secret underground passage.[42]

It is important to note that Eryi Lou was a unique structure. Most of its defensive elements were barely evident in other *tulou*. In fact, some built in the twentieth century didn't even have a complete doorframe. Moreover, as elaborate a defensive building as Eryi Lou may have been, it still

did not prove as efficient as other structures. For example, Yanyi Wei was a *tuwei* [earthen enclosure building] finished in 1677. It was considered a better fortress than a *tulou* in terms of layout, facade, materials, and defensive elements. A rectangular-shaped building, it had several angular gun platforms that could be used to screen the curtain walls from flanking fire. And its enclosing earthen wall was about two meters thick, coated with half-meter-thick bricks. Even its windows were framed by bricks to provide better protection.[43]

From earliest times *tulou* residents were aware that their residences were "strong enough to defend against bandits, but not strong enough against soldiers." And, fortunately, most assaults launched against *tulou* were relatively weak. These included those by poorly equipped bands of guerrillas during the Civil War. For example, one night in the early 1930s, after laying siege to a *tulou* for four days, a team of guerrillas attempted to use ladders to climb into its third-floor windows. When the residents discovered their attempt, however, they answered by pouring boiling porridge (which was stickier and hotter than boiling water) onto the attackers' heads. The guerrillas later had to approach the building under a table covered with wet quilts. It was only three days later that the guerrillas managed to gain entry by digging a tunnel up to its wall and detonating a coffin filled with 150 kilograms of homemade explosives.[44]

FIGURE 9. *Bunker built by the state army in the 1930s. Source: "Wusheng Jiaofei Huiyi Jiesu — Shen Bao, Shanghai, June 16, 1933," in Y. Chen and P. Jiang, eds.,* Lao Xinwen (1931–1939) *(Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chuban She, 2003), p.69.*

By the early twentieth century, cannons and heavy artillery had arrived on the battlefields of rural China.[45] Although their defensive value had obviously been surpassed much earlier, this made *tulou* extremely vulnerable to organized military attack. Nevertheless, for *tulou* built well into the twentieth century the fortress-like elements of early *tulou* held other benefits related to their use for cooperative housing. The thick earthen wall remained because it provided structural stability. The presence of only a few slit openings on the lower floors accorded with the use of these rooms as kitchens and storage areas. Meanwhile, the design of upper-floor windows, which were wide on the inside and narrower outside, increased the stability of the wall and provided better control over lighting.

During the Civil War, neither the state army nor the guerrillas were interested in occupying *tulou*. It was not wise for any military force to try to hold them during warfare. The state army found it pointless to garrison such vulnerable structures, which could easily be laid siege to; it preferred modern defensive works in the towns or along major routes of travel.[46] Indeed, by 1935 it had built 224 steel-and-concrete bunkers and numerous gun towers at strategically important locations in Yongding County **(FIG.9)**.[47] On the other hand, the guerrillas were not strong enough to engage in the defense of a *tulou*. Without the possibility of reinforcement, their supplies could easily be cut off by a siege. Thus, in all their attacks on *tulou* they sought rather to seize provisions and retreat as soon as possible. Even when Chairman Mao Zedong visited Yongding for recuperation in 1929, he chose to command local guerrillas from a small earthen house rather than from a large *tulou*.[48]

This points to another characteristic weakness of *tulou*. From the point of view of an outsider, the greatest danger

in occupying them came not from external siege or attack, but from internal betrayal. Each *tulou* resident belonged to a closed community defined by the physical structure of the building. This meant that residents had to live as a collective and react to outside force as a single unit. By opening the gate to attackers, the action of any single resident could betray the security of everyone inside. This clearly made these structures more suitable as an instrument of security for local people than as a base for outside military units. It was thus also not surprising that, during warfare, *tulou* residents used their unity as a bargaining chip to gain offers of protection from different military forces.

THE POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES OF *TULOU* COMMUNITIES

Although *tulou* were vulnerable to artillery and costly to garrison, the great number of residents in each building still made them a valuable resource. Although neither the state army nor the guerrillas were interested in occupying them, neither wanted their adversary to control their resident populations. Hence, *tulou* communities negotiated with both sides for better offers with regard to military support and other benefits. By promising alliances, they managed to secure their possessions and protect themselves against both warring parties.

During the Civil War, the region was dominated alternately by different forces, and any community without military backing would inevitably invite raids from all sides. In addition to bandits (either authentic or disguised), battles between the state army and the guerrillas caused great damage. More than one hundred battles were fought between the state army, the guerrillas, and the civilian militias between August 1930, when the Communists renewed their campaigns in Yongding and Nanjing, to the end of the war in September 1949. At least two thousand combatants were killed in these battles.[49]

The state army, in particular, was merciless toward the guerrillas and their allies. For instance, they burned the Communist-allied Keling village thirteen times, executed 57 villagers, and dispersed many more. As a result, the village population decreased from 1,201 in 1930 to 496 in 1949.[50] The guerrillas acted little better, and continually harassed local communities. In addition to robbing and extorting supplies and money from landlords, they sought to undermine the state army by destroying bridges and roads, looting army transportation, cutting electric wires, and killing state officials.[51] As a result, local people could draw little distinction between the two sides, and were largely unable to distinguish the "protective and just" power from the "aggressive and evil" one.[52] Thus, when the guerrillas arrived in the remote village of Banliao in 1934 to "liberate the landless farmers from their miserable lives," villagers fled into the woods, thinking that any outsiders, regardless of their political propaganda, were bandits and evil-doers.[53]

Military confrontations between the state army and the guerrillas took place frequently over the two decades of the Civil War, except during the anti-Japanese period from 1937–1945 when both sides sent troops to the northern frontier to fight the foreign invader. At the beginning of the Civil War there was a large gap in terms of strength between the state army and the guerrillas. In 1926 a division of the regular state army was garrisoned in Yongding and a regiment was garrisoned in Nanjing — a total of some ten thousand soldiers. By comparison, in 1927 the Communists only managed to recruit an "Iron-Blood Regiment" in Yongding of about 1,500 troops.[54] And in state-controlled Nanjing County, the Communists only managed to establish a "farmers self-defense team" of fifty men.[55]

From November 1930 to October 1934 Director-General Chiang Kai-Shek of the Nationalist Party, in command of the state army, launched five continuous encirclement campaigns against the Communists in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian. When these efforts ended, the main body of Communists were forced to retreat, and eventually marched some 25,000 *li* (about 8,000 miles) to northwestern China, a journey known as "the Long March." The three following years were extremely arduous for the remaining guerrillas. During most of this period they fought against the state army with only a few hundred troops.[56] However, the balance of strength was overturned during the anti-Japanese war.[57] Thus, when the Civil War continued in 1946, the Communist guerrillas were much stronger and were widely supported by the rural population, while the state army had been much reduced in size. Indeed, by this time the Nationalists were forced to rely largely on civilian militias to fight the guerrillas.[58]

These civilian militias had long been a force that incoming powers had competed to recruit. In 1934 the Yongding government attempted to incorporate all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45 into an "official" civilian militia. The estimated number of these troops was 27,600.[59] The civilian militias had an ambiguous relationship with the state government, and could be incorporated into the state army when it needed to be expanded. Likewise, when the army was downsized, militiamen might be given weapons and asked to take over the duties of regular troops under certain conditions.[60] The Communists' strategy against these forces was to "unite the good ones, compete for the middle ones, and attack the bad ones."[61] They colluded with "the good ones" to fight with them, competed for "the middle ones" who were hesitant, and executed "the bad ones" who refused to cooperate. Sometimes "the middle ones" could be even more useful than the "good ones." Indeed, the guerrillas called them "the men with white skins but red hearts," because they could pretend to work with the state army, but were really loyal to the guerrillas.[62]

The leaders of the civilian militias were mostly opportunists who worked with both sides but were loyal to neither. Shen Qingxiang, "the Stone Man," was one such powerful civilian militia leader known for his cruelty and sneakiness. When the Communists were establishing their base near Shen's home in Yongding in 1929, he surrendered and handed over all his weapons and troops. He was immediately assigned to be a commander of a Red defensive group. Seven months later, however, when the state army won battles against the guerrillas, "the Stone Man" defected without a second thought.[63] Most civilian militia leaders defected for practical and security considerations, and few held clear political views.[64]

Every defection cost — and in most cases, it cost lives. In particular, defectors were often expected to spy on or betray their former allies. The case of Lin Kaihuai, a rich and powerful commander of a civilian militia in Jinshan town, was typical. In August 1934 the guerrilla captain Huang Qingwang learned of a personal dispute between Lin and the head of Jinshan. Huang decided to take advantage of the situation and successfully raised an armed conflict. As a result, however, a government official was killed, and Lin had to flee. Huang provided a warm welcome and protection for Lin and made him a weapons supplier and informant for the guerrillas. Three months later, however, during the "White Terror" period when the guerrillas were in an inferior position, Lin decided to defect. As a gift, he incited rebellions among the guerrillas and induced ten of them to surrender, before leading the state army to the remaining force to massacre them.[65] Dozens of people died because of Lin's defection.

As the traditional protectors and representatives of *tulou* communities, the leaders of the civilian militias often made decisions for their protégés. But this situation changed a few years after the Civil War began, when the state government and the guerrillas sought support directly from villagers. To reach complete agreement on political matters was difficult for most *tulou* communities because of their complicated social composition. Among the hundreds of residents of a *tulou* might simultaneously be landlords commanding the civilian militias, officials or soldiers working for the state government, and tenant farmers counting on the Communists to remake their lives. Due to the physical restriction of the *tulou*, however, each community could only present itself as a single unit and work with one force at a time.

Disputes among residents were frequent and sometimes even led to fierce internal fighting. The novel *Shan'ao shang de tulou [The Tulou up on the Hill]* narrates such a dispute. In it, three siblings of the Huang family take different political sides. The eldest brother, Song, is a conservative farmer whose only dream is to build a new *tulou*. As had his father, Song believes the local civilian militia will protect the community from outside attacks. But Song's younger brother, Bo, steals the family savings and loses them in gambling. He then flees into the mountains and becomes a guerrilla. Meanwhile, the youngest sister, Su, runs away from home because she is in love with a married man in the community. Unlike Bo, however, she chooses to join the state army. At the end of the story, Su is persuaded by Bo to defect. And the siblings are reunited in the new *tulou* Song has built, as

a united force of the civilian militia and the state army fires cannons at them.[66]

In reality, all three forces realized the best way to gain support from *tulou* communities was not through cannon balls and bullets, but by exploiting internal conflicts between members of the cooperative. The Communists called this strategy "political mobilization." For example, in 1935 they laid siege to a *tulou* jointly guarded by a civilian militia and the state army. But instead of attacking the building directly, they sang an adapted folk song in an effort to induce those inside to capitulate:

> *Our brothers in the White Army,*
> *Come quickly, come to the Red Army.*
> *The warlords of Guomindang,*
> *they are not human beings.*
> *They extort our brothers.*
> *If you became a state army soldier,*
> *all you earned would be taken back as fines,*
> *and nothing will be left.*
> *Your captains live happy and comfortable lives.*
> *They drink wine and eat meats.*
> *Poor you, the soldiers,*
> *drink thin porridges every day.*
> *Come quickly, come to the Red Army,*
> *Here the captains and soldiers are equal.*[67]

In the end, the garrison surrendered, and a few even defected to the guerrillas.

Sometimes *tulou* residents also betrayed their cooperative for personal profit. In 1934 the guerrilla captain Huang Qingwang accidentally learned of a domestic dispute between a landlord's jealous wife and his concubine. Huang induced the wife to punish her husband by colluding with the guerrillas and lowering a rope out of a third-floor window during the night. The guerrillas then snuck into the *tulou*, and took away cash, clothes and rice. Afterwards, the guerrillas divided up what they had taken with the woman, taking seventy percent for themselves and leaving thirty percent for her.[68]

A *tulou* building was a collective house of a group of hundreds of people. To construct and live in one was a communal decision based on mutual trust. It took several years for shareholders to construct a *tulou*, and they and their descendants then had to live their whole lives there with the other shareholders. Therefore, in a troubled period, when few people could be trusted, forming a new *tulou* community involved great risk. That is why, if necessary, *tulou* communities frequently preferred to squeeze into their old buildings and wait until the end of warfare to initiate any new construction.

CONSTRUCTION OF A MYTH

In summary, the statement that all *tulou* were constructed as fortresses is a myth. Most *tulou* were built to provide affordable collective housing in rural areas. As such, they embodied little defensive intent, and featured few defensive design elements. The enclosed physical form of the *tulou* did, however, reinforce a democratic and closed social structure. This tradition relied on mutual trust among the residents of each building. During troubled periods, when such trust was absent — as during the Chinese Civil War — *tulou* structures were vulnerable to attack by outside forces, and therefore few were constructed.

A closer look at the history of *tulou* construction in Nanjing and Yongding Counties during the 22 years of the Civil War helps demonstrate this point (FIG.10). In general, because it was a major battlefield, few *tulou* were built in the troubled frontier area of Yongding, in comparison to Nanjing, which was safely behind Nationalist lines. However, the number of *tulou* constructed in Yongding did increase in 1929 when the establishment of the Communists' Soviet Base brought a temporary peace. Likewise, it increased from 1937 to 1945 when the adversaries formed a temporary alliance to fight against the Japanese invaders. It also increased after 1949 when the Communists drove the Nationalist Party away and established a secure new regime. In Nanjing, however, *tulou* construction was concentrated in the years

FIGURE 10.

A comparison of tulou *construction in Nanjing and Yongding counties (1927–1949).*

1931–1937, when it was in the rear of the state army's efforts to encircle the Communists in Yongding.

The myth of the *tulou* as fortresses owes much to historians' failure to consider the architectural details and social contexts of local communities. The change of primary function for *tulou* structures came as a consequence of historical changes in social and political conditions. When population pressure replaced the need for defense as the fundamental challenge facing local communities, *tulou* construction evolved to become a very different architectural tradition. Such changes in tradition may only be revealed when similar challenges — in this case, the need for common defensive — are met with a rather different reaction. It is therefore important to track changes in tradition by identifying specific moments in history, and by determining the challenges people confront, struggle with, and solve through the structures they build. Only by doing this can we avoid being misled by myths.

REFERENCE NOTES

The research and writing of this paper were supported by grants from Fulbright-RGC and the Hong Kong UGC Project "The Historical Anthropology of Chinese Society" (AoE/H-01/08). The author would also like to thank Prof. Ho Puay-Peng for his support of this research.

1. "Fujian *Tulou*," http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1113/ (accessed July 31, 2012).
2. Refer to H. Huang, *Fujian Tulou* (Taipei: Hansheng zazhi she, 1994); J. Lin, *Tulou: Ninggu De Yinyue He Liti De Shipian* (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chuban she, 2006); D. Hu, *Yongding Kejia Tulou Yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chuban she, 2006); and H. Huang, *Fujian Tulou: Zhongguo Chuantong Minju De Guibao* (Beijing: Sheng huo, du shu, xin zhi san lian shu dian, 2009).
3. Huang, *Fujian Tulou* (1994), pp.57–68; and Huang, *Fujian Tulou* (2009), pp.213–26.
4. The statistical basis for this argument is gleaned from official surveys carried out in Nanjing and Yongding from 1988 to 2007, supplemented by my own investigation. The survey covered 492 *tulou* built during the twentieth century in eight townships. They are Chuanchang, Shuyang, Kuiyang and Meilin townships in Nanjing County, and Hukeng, Gaotou, Guzhu and Daxi townships in Yongding County.
5. As Ron Knapp has also pointed out, "turmoil certainly was not often a factor" of *tulou* construction, and "in historical periods when security was not a concern, villagers still built *tulou* as 'less fortified dwellings.'" R.G. Knapp, *China's Living Houses: Folk Beliefs, Symbols, and Household Ornamentation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), pp.259–61.
6. Q. Su, "Yongding Renmin Geming Douzheng Shi Dashiji (1923–1949)," *Yongding Wenshi Ziliao*, Vol.2 (1983), pp.1–37.
7. For the situation in Yongding, see "Junshi," in *Yongding Xianzhi*, Vol.28 (1994). For the situation in Nanjing, see "Junshi," in *Nanjing Xianzhi*, Vol.32 (1997).
8. For the history of Communist Party in Yongding, see "Zhonggong Yongding Difang Zuzhi," in *Yongding Xianzhi*, Vol.21 (1994). For the history of Guomindang in Yongding, see "Dangpai Qunti," in *Yongding Xianzhi*, Vol.23 (1994). For the history in Nanjing, see "Dangpai," in *Nanjing Xianzhi*, Vol.24 (1997).
9. See Y. Zhang and R. Qian, "The Ins and Outs of Suppressing Bandits by County Magistrates in Qing Dynasty — Centered on the Stories of Three County Magistrates Suppressing Bandits in Guangdong Province," *Historiography Research in Anhui*, No.3 (2010), pp.13–22.
10. "Zhengquan and Zhengxie," in *Yongding Xianzhi*, Vol.22 (1994).
11. There are many studies of collusion between the state government and landlords. For example, P. Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); and Zhang and Qian, "The Ins and Outs of Suppressing Bandits by County Magistrates in Qing Dynasty," pp.13–22. Many works of fiction dealing with this period in China also mention the situation, such as the Chinese movie *Let the Bullets Fly* (2011), directed by Jiang Wen.
12. For a historical origin of Civil Corps in Chinese rural society during the nineteenth century, see P.A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). For the composition of civilian militias in *tulou* areas during the twentieth century, see "Junshi," in *Yongding Xianzhi* (1994); and "Junshi," in *Nanjing Xianzhi* (1997).
13. In his study of Chinese rural society from 1900 to 1942, Duara suggested two kinds of brokers: the protection broker, and the entrepreneurial broker who profited from local society. Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State*, p.2.
14. Few scholarly research efforts have addressed this topic in *tulou* areas; however, according to government records, the situation should have been similar to that in neighboring Guangdong Province. For the situation in Guangdong, see X. Zhou, "Minchu Guangdong Jun Zhengfu Jianli De Gonghe Zhidu Jiqi Shibai," *Modern Chinese History Studies*, No.6 (1992), pp.103–20; and J. Qiu, "Local Government and Social Control in the Late Qing Dynasty and the Early Republic Period," *Journal of Sun Yatsen University* (Social Science Edition), Vol.41 No.6 (2001), pp.46–58.
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17. Ibid.
18. X. Li, "Lao Hongjun Li Jinzhou," *Nanjing Wenshi Ziliao*, Vol.28, (2005), pp.181–91.
19. C. Zhang, "Qingqing Zhushan Hun — Ji Lieshi Li Mingkang," *Nanjing Wenshi Ziliao*, Vol.29 (2006), pp.57–66.
20. X. Xie, "Dashan Fengbei — Ji Lieshi Chen Mushu," *Nanjing Wenshi Ziliao*, Vol.29 (2006), pp.37–46.
21. Li, "Lao Hongjun Li Jinzhou."
22. Ibid., pp.182–83. In the late 1920s the guerrillas lacked modern weapons. The governmental record of the uprising showed that during the period from 1927 to 1935 many guerrillas and farmers used choppers, shotguns, and self-made explosives to fight the state army. See "Junshi," in *Yongding Xianzhi* (1994); and "Junshi," in *Nanjing Xianzhi* (1997).
23. Li, "Lao Hongjun Li Jinzhou."
24. Zhang, "Qingqing Zhushan Hun — Ji Lieshi Li Mingkang."
25. Because of price inflation, millet was the common medium of exchange used locally during the Civil War period. From 1930 to 1936, 100 kilograms of millet could be exchanged in the local bazaar for 17 kilograms of pork, 26.8 kilograms of kerosene, 300 kilograms of charcoal, or 580 kilograms of sugarcane. According to "Wujia," in *Nanjing Xianzhi*, Vol.16 (1997).
26. "Zhonggong Yongding Difang Zuzhi," in *Yongding Xianzhi* (1994).
27. Ibid. In the 1950s, the socialist period, landlords and gentry were usually killed as a result of class struggles. During the Civil War, however, the guerrillas preferred to keep the landlords alive as a source for daily necessities.

28. W. Jiang, "Lao Hongjun Jiang Maosheng De Huiyi," *Nanjing Wenshi Ziliao*, Vol.30 (2006), p.24.

29. Q. Wen, "Zheng Guiqin Fu Silingyuan Chongfan Nanjing," *Nanjing Wenshi Ziliao*, Vol.28 (2005), pp.18–24.

30. "Junshi," in *Yongding Xianzhi* (1994).

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32. "Junshi," in *Nanjing Xianzhi* (1997).

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39. The contract was engraved on the wall at the entrance hall when the cooperative redecorated the building in 2006. It was titled "Chaoyua Lou shiji," and was followed by an agreement among the shareholders.

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44. Li, "Lao Hongjun Li Jinzhou."

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48. H. Liao, "Mao Zedong Zai Yonding Jinfeng Dashan," *The Red Lands*, Vol.2 (2009), pp.46–47.

49. "Junshi," in *Nanjing Xianzhi* (1997).

50. Ibid.

51. "Zhonggong Yongding Difang Zuzhi," in *Yongding Xianzhi* (1994); and "Dangpai," in *Nanjing Xianzhi* (1997).

52. See, for example, Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State*.

53. Li, "Lao Hongjun Li Jinzhou."

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55. "Junshi," in *Nanjing Xianzhi* (1997).

56. Ibid.; and "Junshi," in *Yongding Xianzhi* (1994).

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59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Zhang, "Ji Lieshi Li Mingkang."

62. "Zhonggong Yongding Difang Zuzhi," in *Yongding Xianzhi* (1994).

63. J. Huang and Y. Lu, "Tufei Tou Shibaogong," *Yongding Wenshi Ziliao*, Vol.6 (1982), pp.95–96.

64. For example, landlords Chen Changxi and Zeng Qingchu were seeking an opportunity to defect to the Guomindang not long after they had surrendered to the guerrillas in October 1936. The reason the landlords gave the battalion colonel of the state army, to whom they defected, was that the guerrillas didn't give them enough benefits, freedom and security. Xie, "Dashan Fengbei — Ji Lieshi Chen Mushu."

65. L. Xin, "Tiaotiao Fenghuo Lu," *Nanjing Wenshi Ziliao*, Vol.28 (2005), pp.68–81.

66. B. He, *Shan'ao Shang De Tulou* (Fuzhou: Haixia wenyi chuban she, 2009).

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All images are by the author unless otherwise noted.

Field Report

Is the Migrant House in Australia an Australian Vernacular Architecture?

MIRJANA LOZANOVSKA, IRIS LEVIN, AND
MARIA VICTORIA GANTALA

This report seeks to understand the meaning of the migrant house in Melbourne, Australia. Following a discussion of the Australian vernacular house, it asks what it is that makes the migrant house a unique category, different from other, nonmigrant houses in Australia. Reporting on research on seventeen migrant houses in the suburbs of Melbourne, it then shows how three architectural elements — the facade, the terrace, and the back yard — differentiate these houses from other examples of the Australian vernacular. Finally, it argues that, through their different "migrant aesthetics," the three architectural elements illustrate how socio-spatial features have facilitated and eased the adaptation of migrants to life in Australia.

Much has been written in the past two decades on the concept of the migrant home. The subject has been discussed extensively in disciplines ranging from sociology and anthropology to geography and urban studies. For example, notions of the fixed nature of home have been contested to propose that the home is dynamic and mobile;[1] the migrant home has been linked to ideas of transnationalism and belonging;[2] and it has been interpreted through the lens of materiality.[3] However, the migrant house as an architectural typology remains a vague concept that has mostly been discussed anecdotally. Exceptions may be found in the work of Mirjana Lozanovska and others.[4] But writing on the migrant house has tended to define it by highlighting ethnic "markers" or "identifiers" which generalize and reduce its meaning to its most apparent visual features.

In Australia, despite a long history of migrant settlement, the migrant house has been almost completely excluded from architectural discourse, including the extensive literature on the Australian house as a form of vernacular architecture. Our research attempts to open up categories of vernacular architecture to incorporate the migrant house into this discourse. Through a careful study of seventeen migrant houses in Melbourne,

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we tried to understand what it is that makes the migrant house (and not the home) a unique category, different from other, nonmigrant houses. Specifically, using methods of socio-spatial analysis, we examined three architectural elements frequently cited in scholarly literature and public discourse as indicative of the migrant house in Australia: the facade, the terrace, and the back yard.

Each of these architectural elements represents a long-established stereotype in the popular imagination in Australia. However, we carefully investigated the factual basis for these impressions and considered the social significance and meaning of each element in migrant lives. Our research revealed that these architectural elements, while appearing in some migrant houses, are not always present. Nevertheless, each plays a special role in migrant life and its spatial character carries meanings that have facilitated the adjustment of migrants to life in a new country. Together (in their various manifestations), they construct the migrant house as an Australian vernacular — not because of their architectural qualities or their materials, but because of the significance they hold for the migrants.

THE AUSTRALIAN VERNACULAR HOUSE

In his introduction to *The Encyclopedia of Vernacular Architecture of the World*, Paul Oliver explained that a number of attempts have been made to define vernacular architecture, but that all of them have been unsuccessful because the term encompasses an immense range of building types, forms, traditions, uses and contexts.[5] In another context, however, Oliver observed that a distinction can be made between formal, architect-designed dwellings, and informal, nonarchitect-designed ones.[6] In a similar vein, Amos Rapoport has referred to vernacular buildings as a "folk tradition," which is "the direct and unselfconscious translation into physical form of a culture, its needs and values — as well as the desires, dreams, and passions of people."[7] Rapoport then listed a number of characteristics of vernacular building: lack of theoretical or aesthetic pretensions; working with the site and microclimate; respect for other people and their houses, and hence for the total environment; and working within an idiom with variations within a given order.[8] Most commonly, however, vernacular architecture simply means dwellings (as the majority of buildings in the world are dwellings). And in most of the world, dwellings are still built by their owners, by communities that pool resources, or by local specialized builders and craftsmen.[9]

According to the philosopher Ivan Illich, the vernacular "is homemade, homespun, homegrown, not destined for the market-place."[10] One becomes a vernacular builder the same way one becomes a vernacular speaker — by growing up, living, and dwelling in a particular place at a particular time. As so defined, however, Carl Mitcham has contended that the vernacular house is vanishing as a result of changes

in science and technology and their relationship to housing production. It has likewise often been assumed that the vernacular must be native or unique to a specific place, produced without the need for imported components and processes, and possibly built by the individuals who occupy it.[11] But as culture and tradition become less place-rooted and more information-based, these particular attributes, too, need to be reassessed. All things considered, the vernacular should today be understood with a focus on its dynamic nature, as change is inherent to vernacular traditions.[12] And when examining the vernacular, it is important to show and understand how traditions change and adapt to cultural and environmental challenges.

An extensive body of literature exists on the Australian house, including a significant amount on nonarchitect-designed dwellings.[13] In general, the term "Australian house" refers to a kind of house built since the first British settlement, in 1788.[14] The first British house in Australia was actually imported from London by Arthur Phillip, the commander of the First Fleet and the first governor of the new settlement. It was erected on the eastern side of Sydney Cove on January 29, 1788.[15] Ever since, many authors have tried to enumerate the historical styles of Australian domestic architecture. These lists have tried to specify the formal styles that have influenced the work of established architects (though different authors have sometimes named the styles differently).[16] Some literature has further discussed aspects of building methods, the arrangement of rooms, decor and furnishing, exteriors and gardens, and specific architectural elements such as terraces, fencing, or cast-iron railings.[17]

Within this body of literature, the nonarchitect-designed Australian house has generally been considered a form of vernacular architecture.[18] According to Ian Evans, "[in Australia] vernacular housing, the architecture of necessity, coexisted with the formality of the Georgian and Regency styles, and with the variety of styles that appeared during Victoria's lengthy reign; Italianate, Gothic, High Victorian and Federation."[19] Concurring, Robert Irving has asserted, "[e]ven the most unstylish vernacular eighteenth-century houses gained from the reservoir of Georgian style."[20] Comments such as these indicate some of the contradictions inherent in any definition of vernacular architecture. Yet, in contrast to Oliver, who excluded from the definition what has often been termed twentieth-century vernacular (that is, suburban development — and in particular, suburban houses built in the towns and cities of the developed world since the Second World War), we argue that the suburban house is a distinct vernacular form in Australia. It is also a well-defined and well-known form, since the majority of housing in Australian cities is suburban.[21]

In Australia, the aspiration to live in a detached house in the suburbs is referred to as the Great Australian Dream. It has been discussed extensively since the Second World War; but it was also discussed before that time.[22] Thus, Robin Boyd, in his historical account of Australian domestic archi-

tecture, explained how British settlers brought with them an English taste for privacy, a taste which influenced subsequent generations of homebuilding. But, in contrast to English towns and cities, land seemed to be limitless in Australia, and so "[t]he nation was built on the principle that for every family there should be a separate house and for every person there should be a separate room."[23] It seems that from its inception, Australian culture has always been obsessed with its houses and their identity.[24]

Driven by growing population and prosperity during the first decades after the Second World War, suburban living became a common way of life for Australians. Magazines such as *Home Beautiful* flourished to promote this idea, while government policies favored homebuyers.[25] Yet, because of housing scarcity, many young couples pursuing this dream had no choice but to build their own homes. Perhaps a quarter of all houses constructed in the decade after the Second World War were owner built. Indeed, since the 1950s, about one-third of all housing in Australia has been self-built (the peak coming in 1954 when it represented more than 40 percent of the country's total).[26] At this time, building one's home became part of the life-cycle of many young Australians — as it did for many of the immigrants flooding into the country.[27] The cream-brick-veneer house, in particular, came to be identified as that era's archetypal form.[28]

During the postwar suburban boom of the 1950s and 1960s Melbourne provided a classic case of the trend among Australian cities to expand outward and not upward. Unlike cities in other nations (Britain, for example), more and more suburbs were built on Melbourne's periphery, facilitated by a surge in automobile ownership.[29] In addition to self-developed housing, some of this construction was the work of developers — thus some of it may not meet the academic definition of the vernacular. Nevertheless, most of it was not designed by architects, and so it conforms to the distinction between architect-designed and nonarchitect-designed dwellings. As we have argued elsewhere, the Australian suburban house, whatever its origins, represents a vernacular tradition.[30]

What seems to have been ignored by mainstream discussion of this vast expansion of Australian vernacular housing is the special status of the migrant house. Many authors have acknowledged that the roots of most formal architectural styles in Australia originated in England (although some came from other British colonies, other European countries such as Italy, or North America). But they have failed to mention how immigrants, who mostly arrived from such countries as Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia after the Second World War, brought previous knowledge of building methods and materials, their own decorative styles and aesthetics, and divergent everyday life practices. Thus, the impact of migration, the ways of life of the new migrants, and their tastes and traditions derived from cultures other than those of the British Isles are barely noted in most discussions of the Australian vernacular house.[31]

There are a few exceptions. One is the study guide *Housing in Australia* from the 1980s. But its social perspective exemplifies values associated with the height of Australia's multicultural policies.[32] *A Pictorial Guide to Identifying Australian Architecture: Styles and Terms from 1788*, by Richard Apperly, Robert Irving, and Peter Reynolds, is another volume that provides some recognition. Specifically, it contains a two-page spread describing a style called "Late Twentieth-Century Immigrants' Nostalgic."[33] However, this animated description of the migrant house, with its balustrades and arches, is directly preceded by two pages on another style, "Late Twentieth-Century Australian Nostalgic," which refers to a resurgence of "colonial" styles associated with earlier homestead architecture. By making this distinction between "Australian" and "Immigrant" architecture, the authors unwittingly reveal the unspoken foundation of an Australian aesthetic constituted prior to and against a so-called immigrant aesthetic.[34] As generated by the heritage movement in Australia in its classification of buildings of the first half of the twentieth-century, this involves the association of "good taste" with an aesthetic heritage that originated primarily in England, and secondarily with house styles imported in the 1920s from America.

A critical issue here is the idea of "migrant aesthetics." This came to public attention most notably through the case of Earlwood, an inner-west suburb of Sydney, where postwar migration led to the transformation of older houses. This social trend caused a number of hybrid styles to appear — in particular, one described as "Mediterraneanization."[35] Older residents of the area, however, objected to these transformations as "inappropriate" and "unsympathetic," and they formed a historical society to maintain the "heritage," cultural uniqueness, and authenticity of their neighborhood.

The case of Earlwood shows how fear and resentment could cause the migrant house to be perceived as unattractive and undesirable. In reality, many houses in which migrants lived could barely be differentiated from the typology of other houses built in Australia. Nevertheless, in Australian culture they came to be perceived as very different from the norm. For the migrants, the house was an important mode of assimilation. It represented a new way of life, as evoked in Robin Boyd's "pioneering cult" and as intrinsically determined by the suburban paradigm.[36] Yet writings on immigration and housing at the time routinely expressed fear that immigrants would compete for housing and drive up prices.[37] Fear may also have developed concerning the emergence of a different Australia, one produced through a proliferation of diverse aesthetic values and ways of life. All of this made the notion of the Australian house contested terrain in relation to immigration.[38]

Outside Australia, literature on the impact of migration on vernacular housing has taken a number of forms. James Michael Buckley and William Littmann, exploring migrant housing in the small Latino town of Parlier in California's Central Valley, contended that investigating migrant ver-

nacular architecture is challenging because it often involves circumstances that are changing and subjects who fear researchers and officials visiting their homes and asking questions.[39] Yet, in another context, Lynne Dearborn discussed how Hmong immigrants in Milwaukee have transformed old dwellings to support their cultural needs. She argued that Milwaukee's decayed urban fabric provided an example of how landscapes support various modes of inhabitation by different cultural groups.[40]

Another important study is that by Sarah Lynn Lopez of remittance houses in villages in northern Mexico.[41] Built with money sent by migrants to the U.S., these houses have challenged traditional methods of building. In the past, housing in these village was constructed by nonprofessionals, and the whole community participated in the process. But contemporary remittance houses require professional knowledge, materials, and methods imported from the U.S. Their aesthetic, strongly influenced by American suburban houses, also contrasts profoundly with an otherwise dense, one-story continuous vernacular built fabric. Moreover, the houses embody an inherent contradiction in the migrants' bifurcated lives. While they are able to build extravagant houses in Mexico, they cannot afford to live in them, because, if they were to leave the U.S., they would no longer be able to pay for and maintain them.

Another relevant study is that by Christien Klaufus of new houses in the canton of Cuenca, Ecuador, also built by transnational migrants with remittance money from the U.S.[42] She observed how these opulent structures, which involve architects as well as other professionals in their design and construction, created tension with the local community, which perceived them to be in "bad taste" — especially in relation to the local vernacular, which is perceived to be more suitable and appropriate to the place. Nevertheless, Klaufus considered these migrant houses to be part of the local popular architecture. And she argued that the distinction made by Oliver — that only architecture without architects can be considered vernacular — should be abandoned.[43] Sometimes architects are involved in house-design processes in otherwise unplanned environments, and it is difficult to draw a clear line between two kinds of architecture, Klaufus observed. Strictly speaking, these remittance houses were not vernacular; yet she called for a more flexible view of popular architecture, one that might include professional involvement, to advance discussion on the merits and drawbacks of new popular styles.[44]

MELBOURNE AS A RESEARCH SITE

From the time white settlement began, Australia has been an immigrant society and a product of conscious social engineering.[45] Since the first settlers and convicts arrived at the end of the eighteenth century, most immigrants to Australia have come from the British Isles. During the 1880s, fear that a flood of immigrants would lower working conditions and wages combined with attitudes of racism and xenophobia to produce a system of immigration controls. It also brought a policy known as White Australia, which prohibited immigration from non-British countries.

The Second World War provoked a reversal of these policies as postwar leaders realized that without a larger population, the country would appear underdeveloped and vulnerable.[46] The postwar government thus began a drive to expand the population through propaganda, policies of assisted passage, and other incentives.[47] Initially, many of the new migrants were displaced persons from European refugee camps. But the effort was later expanded to reach out to the populations of southern Europe. Initially, the Australian government insisted that the new migrants assimilate to Australian culture. But by the late 1960s this policy became increasingly untenable, as many non-British migrants refused to give up their culture and language.[48] Finally, in 1972 a new policy of multiculturalism was declared, and support was given to efforts by ethnic minorities to preserve their cultural identities.

Recently, the 2006 Census revealed that those born overseas form around 29 percent of the total Australian population.[49] Government statistics further reveal that Melbourne and its surroundings have provided a major gateway for immigrants, with 35 percent of its residents in 2006 born overseas.[50] During the postwar decades, the major source of migrants to Melbourne was southern Europe, with Italy, Greece and Malta, and later Yugoslavia, supplying the largest numbers.[51] As already mentioned, there was a severe housing shortage after the war. Thus, like native Australians, many of the new migrants assumed the task of building their own homes.[52] As a result, southern European migrants had a prominent impact on the new suburban landscapes of Melbourne.

This report draws on two different research projects in the Melbourne area. The first explored houses of migrants who had emigrated to the city from Italy during the 1950s and 1960s.[53] Conducted at the beginning of 2008, it examined ten houses mostly spread around the eastern and northern middle suburbs of the city. The second project explored a migrant enclave in one of Melbourne's northern inner suburbs. Conducted in 2009, it examined seven houses of migrants from southern Europe who arrived in Australia during the 1950s and 1960s.[54] Similar methods were used in the two research projects. These included in-depth interviews with the residents of the houses, tours of the houses and their yards, and photographic and architectural documentation.

Findings from both projects raise questions about the migrant house in relation to present uses of the term in Australia. In the following sections we will discuss several supposed characteristics of the migrant house and consider their validity as "markers" or "signifiers." We will also show how these elements preserve special meanings for migrants,

as they intertwine with stories of migration, belonging, and memories to facilitate everyday life and mediate between homeland and host land.

We should note that our use of the term "migrant house" includes only housing commissioned, owned or built during the 1950s and 1960s by migrants from non-British countries. Our choice limits investigation to migration after Australia had already established itself as a British nation.[55] It also reflects the reality that housing built before that era mainly conformed to the mainstream of British-influenced architecture.

STORIES OF MIGRATION FOLDED IN PHYSICAL FORMS

Stereotypically, suburban Australian houses usually considered to be nonmigrant are modest in form, of only one story, and faced with cream brick. They do not have front verandas, and many feature floor plans composed of two identical blocks, one protruding more than the other, as in the accompanying image (FIG. 1). These cream-brick-veneer structures were commonly built by Australia-born suburbanites pursuing their Great Australian Dream during the 1950s and the 1960s.[56]

After leaving their initial inner-city dwellings, many migrants soon conformed to this practice of building their own suburban dream homes.[57] But writing about the migrant house has typically focused on differentiating it from its nonmigrant counterpart. Thus Apperly, Irving and Reynolds explained that when southern European immigrants were in a position to build houses for themselves, they wanted them to express two things: "the fact that they had 'made' it in a new country and a recollection of the culture from which they had come." Part of this strategy involved making loose references to the architecture of southern Europe:

The typical house was two-storied and symmetrical, with a central external stair and veranda edged with bulbous Baroque balusters of precast concrete. The front elevation featured walls of buff or brown face brickwork pierced by large arched openings.[58]

As this passage makes clear, general appearance was more important than specificity of detail. Allan Willingham has agreed, providing an account of what he dubbed "The Mediterranean Idiom":

The Mediterranean idiom or sub-style in housing in Melbourne is characterized firstly by the heavily modified facades of suburban housing in the inner suburbs, and then by the grandiose pseudo-Italianate villas erected on standard building lots in the outer suburbs in the late twentieth century.[59]

Such comments expressed a common view among architectural critics and the general public.[60] This was that houses of southern European migrants could be easily identified by a number of characteristic architectural elements (FIG. 2).

From the migrant perspective, however, it is important to note how the process of building the house may perhaps have held greater significance than its appearance. As was the case with many "native" Australian households at the time, most of the construction was done by the principal male householder. But, in the case of migrants, what help was needed (for example, when pouring concrete floors) was provided by the community.[61] Julia Church has described how such occasions became a kind of festivity for Italian migrants in Melbourne. On Saturday and Sunday everybody came to the house, and while the men worked together from sunrise to sunset, the hostess, assisted by other wives, cooked, served,

FIGURE 1. *The stereotypical image of the nonmigrant "cream-brick-veneer house," 2012. Photograph by Iris Levin.*

FIGURE 2. *The stereotypical image of the Australian "migrant house," 2009. Photograph by Iris Levin.*

and kept everything in order. The following weekend the participants would gather again to help another family.

Most of the northern Italians worked as laborers for Italian contractors, so they had some practical knowledge of construction.[62] Thus the situation in some ways resembled vernacular methods of building in villages in northern Mexico as described by Lopez, where the whole community would participate in the building process without the help of professionals.[63] However, in contrast to Mexican (and other) vernacular dwelling traditions, the migrant house in Australia has never been recognized as part of the vocabulary of Australian architecture, vernacular or otherwise.

Lozanovska's publications on the migrant house have discussed how particular elements — such as grand scale, ornamentation of eagles and lions, geometric order, and control of nature — have been perceived by the host culture. Lozanovska has also examined how the house provides a spatial enclave for practices of other cultures and the mixture of cultures and languages.[64] Yet the migrant house has hardly ever been studied in detail as a typological form. And its links to architectural references overseas have never been adequately explored or verified.

THE FACADE

In Melbourne, the facade has long been a symbol of the migrant house. It is popularly considered an emblem of migrant domestic architecture — probably because it is the most recognizable feature of the house and can be viewed from the street by passersby.

It is typically believed that houses of southern European migrants can easily be identified by certain characteristic facade elements. However, the majority of houses examined in this research did not include these elements, as described above. None had "large arched openings," and not all of them were grand or two-storied (eleven out of seventeen). Rather, our research revealed that relatively minor adjustments and additions to a facade could communicate a similar message. Through what we called "migrant aesthetics," these houses distinguished themselves as a sub-category of the Australian typology as a whole.

One example is Laura's house, built in 1956 by her late husband in one of Melbourne's middle-ring eastern suburbs.[65] It has a timber structure, an orange brick-veneer, and rectangular windows. Laura, who migrated from Italy in the early 1950s, believes her house is a "real" Australian house because at the time of its construction such houses were fashionable. She and her husband actually saw the same house elsewhere, and built a copy with the help of the Italian community (FIG.3). But when the house was completed, they also constructed a low wall around their lot with a black wrought-iron gate. The wall is made of bluestone that Laura's husband brought from the inner-city construction site where he worked as a laborer (FIG.4).[66] According to Laura, the use of bluestone for such a wall was a common practice in northern Italy.

Another example of the migrant aesthetic is Otto's house, built in the mid-1960s in one of Melbourne's middle-ring eastern suburbs. Otto, who emigrated from Italy, was a carpenter (he is now retired) who built a number of other houses before his own (FIG.5). His house conforms to


FIGURE 3. *Building permit for Laura's house, 1956. Source: Laura's private collection.*

the common stereotype of southern European houses: it is double-storied and is faced with orange bricks. Although it is not symmetrical, a staircase leads to a front terrace, and both the staircase and the terrace are surrounded by a white wrought-iron balustrade. A further typical feature is the concrete floor near the entrance, which occupies the space where a lawn edged with roses might typically be found in Anglo-Australian houses.[67]

Unlike the case of Earlwood in Sydney, where local residents resisted the transformation of houses by southern European immigrants (and dubbed them "Mediterranean-ized"[68]), such house features have not generated as much reaction in Melbourne. In Otto's case this may be because his was a new suburb, and neither his nor the neighboring houses involved the transformation of an existing structure.

Many participants in our studies also noted that relationships in the neighborhood have always been good, regardless of an individual's ethnic origins. But Otto also explained that many houses on his street were owned by southern European migrants like himself.

One striking difference between migrant and nonmi-grant houses, which Apperly, Irving, and Reynolds also mentioned, is the color of their bricks.[69] The cream-brick-veneer suburban house has been adored in popular culture as well as in academic discourse.[70] Many migrants built their houses using orange or darker brown bricks as a facade material. In the migrant enclave examined, seven houses used an orange or brown shade of brick, while the only house with a cream brick veneer was built by a nonmigrant household.

A third house in our study, however, provided an example of how the facade of a migrant house may bear no relation to the stereotype. In an established middle-ring suburb, Loretta's house is faced with weatherboards and has a classic Anglo-Australian front yard of flower beds, rose bushes, and a paved footpath that corresponds perfectly with its setting (FIG. 6). She and her late husband purchased this house more than sixty years ago and have never remodeled it. This house defies all stereotypes concerning the migrant house: it does not use brick veneer; it is only one story high; and it does not have any arches, balustrades or ironwork.

As revealed by the research, the meaning of the facade in the migrant house is clearly complex. In some cases it is indeed a signifier of migrant identity, but in others this is not the case. Of course, "pseudo-Italian villas," as described vividly by Willingham, do exist in Melbourne's suburbs.[71] But do they really represent Italian villas? This question has never been explored adequately, and yet the migrant house has been so labeled and stamped. In any case, such houses present only extreme examples of what is usually a modest suburban house that tries to assimilate into the landscape but

at the same time distinguish itself through subtle exterior modifications. As Fiona Allon has argued, it was through "Mediterraneanized" houses that "[the migrant] residents evoke[d] their translated identities and multiple belongings"; thus, they were an essential part of the settlement process.[72] As will become evident in the discussion of Loretta's back yard, however, expressions of the migrant aesthetic are often hidden in the rear of the house.

THE TERRACE

The terrace is another architectural element described as typical of the migrant house. Apperly, Irving and Reynolds identified the "verandah, edged with bulbous Baroque balusters of precast concrete" as one of the most important features of the migrant house.[73] The terrace is also often characterized as employing concrete expanses (sometimes replacing the front lawn) and tile or terrazzo paving.

Most of the houses explored in our research did have a front and/or a back terrace, whose use is incorporated into the social/familial activities of its residents. One example is Tanya's house, located in one of Melbourne's northern middle-ring suburbs. Tanya, who emigrated from Italy, bought this house in the early 1970s and renovated it to create a more habitable dwelling. Before, she claimed, "it was a pigsty!" and stated that all the changes were made by necessity, rather than for the sake of beautification. For example, soon after purchasing the house she and her husband changed the wooden window frames to aluminum and replaced the weatherboard siding with bricks. The reason was to reduce maintenance. But they also chose to employ building practices that were familiar to them from Italy. After moving into the house, the couple also built a terrace, just next to the native bottlebrush in the front garden, of which Tanya is very proud. When their two boys were young, the family would use the terrace for family dinners and gatherings (**FIGS.7,8**).

Otto's house has a similar front terrace, which is not bordered by "bulbous Baroque balusters of precast concrete," but by a white wrought-iron railing. His terrace also serves as a location for outdoor furniture to facilitate the occasional moment outdoors (**REFER TO FIG.5**).

A front terrace appears in almost all the houses in the migrant enclave in the inner-city suburb. The only non-migrant house is the one without a terrace. For example, Giovanni's house, built in 1967, has a typical terrazzo terrace fenced with a white wrought-iron railing, similar to Otto's. To enter the house, a visitor must approach on a concrete footpath and climb three terrazzo steps to the front terrace (**FIG.9**). Giovanni emigrated from Sicily in 1951, and after owning another house in an adjacent suburb, he bought his current house in 1975.

A neighboring house has a similar terrace, with the same terrazzo floor and white iron railing. Built in 1965, it

FIGURE 9. *Giovanni's front terrace, 2009. Photograph by Mirjana Lozanovska.*

FIGURES 10 AND 11.
The front terrace and back veranda of George's house, 2009. Note the close proximity to the neighboring house. Photographs by Mirjana Lozanovska.

is owned by George, who emigrated in 1951 from a village in Cyprus, Greece **(FIGS.10,11)**. The adjoining terraces allow George and Giovanni to be in close proximity to each other, spatially and visually. In contrast, Australian houses built with British tastes emphasize privacy.[74] But migrants from southern Europe have generally wanted their houses to engender links with neighbors and encourage social encounter **(FIG.12)**. As can be seen in the accompanying photos, the house contains many semi-private spaces, such as terraces and verandas, which make the experience of living there a less isolated, more communal experience.

Bruno's house provides quite a different example. Bruno and Anna live in a double-storied Victorian terrace house in an inner-city suburb. Although the house has a distinguished British architectural style and its front facade has not been remodeled in any way, Bruno and Anna have created a small front yard with pots of flowers, brown tiles, and two lemon trees **(FIGS.13,14)**. The appearance of the house is

Victorian, but it is hard to miss these Italian-inspired adaptations at the front entrance.[75] Bruno explains that when he purchased his house, many fellow immigrants from Italy lived in the area, but they have all since moved to the suburbs.

> *Yeah, first Italians in two-story house over there, another one across here, another one in what they called from Trieste one, another one over there . . . we stay here, first and last.*

In summary our research revealed that the meaning of the terrace in the migrant house is embedded in its semi-public nature. Being open and inviting to the public gaze, it allows neighbors and pedestrians access to the lives of the residents. The separation between private and public, strictly kept in Anglo-Australian houses, is blurred in the migrant house through spaces that bridge the public and the private.


FIGURE 12. *A typical architectural scheme of one of the migrant enclave's houses, 2009. Note the number of semi-open spaces around the house. Drawn by Maria Victoria Gantala.*

This feature may be influenced by the southern-European lifestyle that migrants brought with them, which encourages social interaction in the street and around the home as a part of everyday life.[76] By contrast, Philip Drew has described the Anglo-Australian interpretation of the veranda as "a kind of no-man's-land, a place for the uninvited, and a border zone or interval separating the house and its intimate private activities from the public realm of the street."[77] The terrace and veranda of the migrant house offer a very different experience. They are conceived of and constructed as spaces of interaction with neighbors and pedestrians, encouraging, rather than hindering, contact with people outside the house/household.

THE BACK YARD

Another element typically thought to distinguish the migrant house from its nonmigrant counterpart is the character of its back yard. This element has not been discussed as much as the two previous ones in architectural accounts. This may derive from the fact that migrant houses built in the 1950s and 1960s are similar to nonmigrant houses in terms of their position on suburban lots. Both have quite large back and front yards (especially compared to houses in more recent Melbournian suburban developments). Nevertheless, the quality of the back yards in migrant houses has been a noted feature of more general public discourse.[78]

Gardens have been an important feature in the formation of an Anglo-Australian national identity. They were initially invoked as part of the colonization process, seen as involving the cultivation of a hostile land.[79] Then, around 1880, the lawnmower was introduced to Australia, and suddenly the lawn became a standard feature of the Australian home.[80] South European immigrants, by contrast, are thought to use their yards differently — to cultivate vegetables, raise farm animals, and grow other produce, as they did in the villages in which they were born. Thus, at the same time that the

back yards of Anglo-Australians were moving away from productive functions, southern European migrants reintroduced such practices. This eventually became a mark of distinction between local Australians and immigrants.[81]

Unlike facades and terraces, migrant back yards in suburban Australia have been the subject of considerable academic exploration. Helen Armstrong, for example, has examined different types of gardens created by different migrant groups in Australia, including Mediterranean Europeans, eastern Europeans, migrants from the Middle East, and migrants from Asian countries.[82] Likewise, Lesley Head, Pat Muir, and Eva Hampel have explored the suburban back-yard gardens of three contemporary migrant groups (Macedonians, Vietnamese, and British-born) and a group of first-generation Australians whose parents were both born overseas.[83] This latter work highlighted the differences between the back yards of the three immigrant groups by seeking to explain them with reference to the rural background of some of them. Similarly, George Morgan, Cristina Rocha, and Scott Poynting have looked at migration stories and examined the ways that migrants use their gardens in the Fairfield municipality of western Sydney as sites of cultural practice. They asserted that many migrant gardens are places in which creative labor is expended to symbolize connections not only to a homeland, but also to Australia and other cultures.[84] The examples below support these accounts.

Tanya, who emigrated from a village in the Veneto region in northern Italy, owns a big farm sixty kilometers from Melbourne, but she also maintains a large back yard with chickens, ducks, and a vegetable garden. A small winery is set up in the granny-flat; her son produces salami in the small basement; and she would also like to keep bees, produce honey, and prepare different kinds of jams (FIGS.15,16). Likewise, Loretta has a garden in her back yard, which she has cared for since her husband passed away 25 years ago (FIG.17). Both Tanya and Loretta also have a barbecue, a symbol of "Australian" culture, in their back

FIGURES 15 AND 16. *Tanya's backyard with chickens and vegetable garden, 2008. Photographs by Iris Levin.*

yards, however. In support of the observations of Morgan, Rocha and Poynting, Tanya emphasizes the "Australian" nature of her garden alongside its "Italian" nature:

> You see those, the plants were brought here from Captain Cook, they [are] called banksia and this is bottle-brush. Those there, sometimes they put them in the stamps. Yeah, that's a real Australian. Very original. They were here. [This] banksia . . . [is] probably 80 years old. Now they are dry, but you should see when they are green — they are beautiful.[85]

Laura and her husband paved their back yard with stones, "just like in Toscana," her husband's region of origin, because it reminded him of home. In her garden, Laura followed an Italian custom and planted the azalea flower.

Michaela's house, built in 1967, is located in the migrant enclave. Coming from a village in Italy, she too tends a vegetable garden, where she has lemon, mandarin and persimmon trees. However, her husband, who passed away nineteen years ago, built a concrete barbeque (**FIG.18**). Michaela makes tomato sauce, wine and salami, which she stores in her basement.

Our research revealed that the back yard typically plays a very important role in the lives of migrants, since it enables them to re-create familiar landscapes, restore familiar smells and tastes, and continue cooking practices that employ familiar plants and animals. This was clearly the case with Tanya and Michaela. As Armstrong claimed, creating a garden in the host country is an early stage of accepting the new country, making the unfamiliar familiar.[86] On the other hand, one of the most important characteristics of the back yard is

FIGURE 17. *Loretta's vegetable garden, 2008. Photograph by Iris Levin.*

FIGURE 18. *Michaela's concrete barbecue, 2009. Photograph by Maria Victoria Gantala.*

that it is hidden from the public view. This means that the migrant house can look like any other "ordinary" suburban home from the street. It is only when one goes out back that the house reveals its "migrant identity." The stories of Tanya, Laura, Loretta and Michaela reveal diverse everyday practices evident in garden and backyard creativity. This suburban creativity simultaneously produces symbols of homeland blended with symbols of Australia.[87]

UNRAVELLING THE VERNACULAR MIGRANT HOUSE

This report has explored the migrant house in Australia and raised the question of whether it can be understood as an Australian vernacular. The research examined houses of seventeen migrants from southern Europe who arrived in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s and built (or purchased) their own homes in suburban Melbourne. Through an analysis of three architectural elements typically associated with the migrant house — the facade, the terrace, and the back yard — we have argued that the migrant house is commonly thought to be identifiable through typical "signifiers."[88] However, in our examination, we found that some of these signifiers do not appear at all in our sample of houses, and some appeared in only a few and were not evident in the majority.

We have argued that behind these superficial stereotypes lies a contested relationship between immigrants from southern Europe and Anglo-Australian locals. Migrants to Australia in the 1950s and 1960s found a very British nation, with a strong assimilation policy, which resisted influences from other cultures. Nonetheless, they insisted on preserving their culture through their language, food, sport and homes. At the same time, local Australians wanted to distinguish themselves from these immigrants and their different "southern European" aesthetics.

We believe these conditions led both directly and indirectly to the development of a "migrant aesthetics." But it is one whose meaning is far more subtle than has typically been represented. In a different context, Ozlem Savas has described how the owners of Turkish homes in Vienna created a collective sense of home based on shared aesthetic practices and discourses.[89] Likewise, southern European migrants to Melbourne created an architectural language made up from a stock of architectural markers. In particular, the three architectural elements investigated here fulfilled the need for socio-spatial spaces that might facilitate and ease adaptation to life in Australia.

As we have discussed, each element plays a different role in the migrant house. The facade, the most obvious "marker" of the migrant house, rarely includes all the elements thought to characterize it. Yet one or two of these are usually present to hint at this character. We found brick color to be one of the most common markers in many of the houses examined. The facade was the primary tool that helped migrants dif-

ferentiate themselves from the Australian majority. It helped them belong to their community and feel part of a big crowd of "others." Yet it also served to unify them against the assimilation demands of the dominant culture, even if the marks of this attitude were often very subtle and restrained.

The role of the terrace as a marker was more utilitarian and cultural. Our research showed how the terrace and veranda have provided migrants with spaces that are neither private nor public, but somewhere in between. They represent a desire among southern European migrants to replicate the everyday social life of their homelands, where families lived in close proximity to one another and were involved in each other's everyday lives. The front terrace and the back veranda enable migrants to be part of a bigger community that extends beyond the walls of their house. Being able to greet the neighbor from the veranda was imperative to the life of this community, just as being able to greet pedestrians while sitting on the terrace acknowledged the importance of street life, even in a suburban landscape.

The back yard was also more utilitarian and cultural, serving the need for traditional food production and developing a collective social practice. But beyond this, as a space hidden from the public view, it also allowed for privacy and comfort, while enhancing the feeling of being at home.[90] The back yard is the space where migrants felt free to do whatever they liked. But that does not mean the migrant aesthetic is more apparent there. On the contrary, these back yards facilitated a mix of migrant and Australian references.[91] This was evident in our research through the presence of barbecues in the back yards belonging to Loretta, Tanya and Michaela.

These three architectural elements signify a scale of migrant aesthetics, on which they occupy different positions. If the facade is at the most obvious, visible end, the back yard occupies the least visible, most subtle end.

Considering the lack of academic literature on the migrant house in Australia, this study shows how unreliable these three architectural elements may be as indicators of it. The facade may include some of the elements typically associated with the migrant house, or none at all. The terrace is indeed a typical marker of the migrant house. The back yard, although hidden, is different from what is stereotypically imagined to be the Australian norm, but it is also different from what is imagined to be a migrant one.

Is this house an Australian vernacular? It is almost impossible to define the vernacular house.[92] Thus, it is perhaps necessary to adopt Klaufus's flexible definition that allows some houses built by professionals to also be included in the vernacular category. This is the case for some of the migrant houses explored here. Others, however, were built with the support of the migrant community, who all contributed their skills.

It is clear these migrant houses are very different from Third World vernacular houses built in an unplanned environment. Nevertheless, we assert that the meaning of the vernacular should be broadened to include different forms of

local housing. This is especially the case with suburban housing built in postwar Australian suburbs because it comprises a large portion of Australian housing, and because much of it was owner built. The vernacular should be understood through its dynamic nature.[93] And in Australia, suburban housing in the 1950s and 1960s is made up of both nonmigrant and migrant houses. Hence, we believe that the migrant house is a unique form of vernacular housing in Australia.

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Book Reviews

Third World Modernism: Architecture, Development and Identity. Edited by Duanfang Lu.
New York: Routledge, 2011. Xi + 292 pp., illus., maps.

Speaking from a decidedly global point of view, *Third World Modernism* is an eye-opening
interrogation of the persistent assumptions within the modernist architectural canon.
Edited by Duanfang Lu, senior lecturer in the Faculty of Architecture, Design and Plan-
ning at the University of Sydney, it presents research from a diverse set of scholars focus-
ing on different contexts worldwide. The book expands upon themes articulated in Lu's
Remaking Chinese Urban Form (Routledge, 2006) — namely, Third World modernity,
nationalism, and developmentalist aspirations. Individual chapters cover buildings and
exhibitions in contexts as varied as India, Peru, 1950s Turkey, and post-independence
Nigeria. As a whole, this volume is a valuable and necessary contribution to the fields of
architectural history and theory, but it also adds to scholarship in a number of different
area studies. Though it may not be the first edited volume, as it claims, to map multiple
positions on architectural modernism across the developing world, it does present some of
the most thorough, well-illustrated, and theoretically rich research to date. In this sense,
it is less a groundbreaking text than one which consolidates and refines research that has
emerged over the past two decades on the built environment in the developing world. It
serves as an exemplar of this kind of scholarly work and raises important questions which
will surely provoke further research.

The book opens with an informative introduction by Lu that clearly expresses the
volume's intent: to recognize not only the existence of other modernities, but also the *"le-
gitimacies of different knowledges"* in order to "enfranchise other spatial rationalities" (p.24).
Heretofore, the hegemonic modernist canon has been infused with Eurocentric biases
toward homogenization, decontextualization, and universalist claims, yielding an abstract,
"sterile and faceless" architecture" (p.8). This dominant discourse has assumed a rigidly
dualistic narrative, making a sharp contrast between traditional and modern space. The
chapters here challenge this presumption, and instead detail how modernist architecture
was "adopted, modified, interpreted, and contested in different parts of the world" (p.1).

The modernist project, in fact, was one rife with hybridization, recalibration and lo-
calization. In this regard, the ten case studies that constitute the bulk of this book provide
a more inclusive history, one which convincingly demonstrates how mid-twentieth-centu-
ry architecture in the Third World operated in ways that were heterogeneous, hybridized,
responsive, collaborative, and more sustainable than has been conventionally represented.
Lu puts forth a new framework for understanding this architecture, "based on a radical
transformative imagining of epistemological diversity in architectural production" (p.20).
The intention is not just to add to discourses of "multiple modernities" and "critical re-
gionalism," but to move beyond these in a bold way.

After the informative introductory chapter by Lu, the book is divided into three parts:
"The Will of the Age," "Building the Nation," and "Entangled Modernities." Each chapter
in these sections, in its own way, contests the conventional understanding that periph-
eral modernisms are merely compensatory measures for the "temporal lag" between
them and the ostensibly original Western avant-garde. These were distinctive, inventive
modernities, which mixed universal tenets with local particularities. Part I features es-

says by Daniela Sandler, Aziz Chaouni, and Sharif S. Kahatt emphasizing the adjustments, contestations, and cultural hybridizations involved in the production of space in Brazil, Morocco and Peru. These examples contest linear-diffusion models of modernist architecture and challenge the location of design agency. Similarly, in Part II, Inbal Ben-Asher Gitler, Anoma Pieris, and Elâ Kaçel investigate the diverse methods employed by Third World countries to express particular ethnic and national identities. They illustrate how architecture became a means for combining modernism with indigenous "relational knowledge networks" and integrating locality to question the ideology of the purported International Style.

While it could be argued the essays in the first two parts of the book present contextualized evidence from prior research, cogently problematizing modernist discourse, it is the final section which presents the most provocative insights. Essays by Farhan Sirajul Karim, Jiat-Hwee Chang, Vandana Baweja, and an epilogue by Vikramādityā Prakash contemplate the notion of "Entangled Modernities." Incorporating ideas from Bruno Latour's actor-network theory (ANT) and emerging concepts from the field of art history like Partha Mitter's "cosmopolitan modernism," these chapters transgress the established core-periphery model of the world to propose an alternative that emphasizes networks, connection and mobility. In an impressive chapter, Chang explores the roles played by nonhuman actants and technoscientific knowledge in the production of tropical architecture. Moving productively away from flawed conceptions opposing global and local forces, Chang's analysis of the Tropical Building Section of the Building Research Station in Britain and similar research centers demonstrates how they were constituted and interconnected dialogically via a network. Knowledge on topics such as building standards produced "locally" at the peripheries could thus circulate to other sites without distortion. As Chang concludes, "tropical architecture is only global insofar as an existing socio-technical infrastructure is in place" (p.228).

This book succeeds on several fronts. However, in its focus on various geographies during the middle decades of the twentieth century, it perhaps does not make the connection to the current moment of architectural pedagogy and production explicit enough. This book is a strong argument against the dominance of the Western modernist canon, but one might question if this is the central force to be contested that it once was. Are the guiding voices of modern architectural discourse necessarily still Gropius, Hitchcock, Fry, Frampton, the Smithsons, and CIAM? There is an implied assumption by the authors in this volume that they are contributing to a history of the present — that their case studies say something about the implicit suppositions of architects working today. Lu states in the introduction that today "modernist design is defined as the only 'valid' knowledge taught in design studios everywhere" (p.24). This itself seems like a universalizing statement, and subsequent essays, immersed in their own historical complexities, exhibit a tendency to proceed with this supposition and use it to substantiate their "epistemological implications." While it may be true that the modernist canon has left its mark, the notion that there is a unified modern agenda suppressing different understandings of building practice at times seems overstated.

Contemporary architectural discourse is incredibly fragmented and varies tremendously between different schools and offices globally. Though it is clearly beyond the scope of this project, it would have been interesting if these essays could have expanded their focus to topics contemporary designers are more consciously grappling with: sustainable design, material experimentation, parametric and GIS modeling, virtual mapping and data collection, and the overwhelming influence of the market. These were tendencies which were emerging and existed side by side in the Third World contexts highlighted in this book. Making visible the connection between these historical moments and the present would have made this text more engaging to a broader audience of scholars, students and practitioners.

This aside, *Third World Modernism* is a book which makes tremendous strides toward imagining a multivalent history of architecture sensitive to the particularities of place and the rich diversity of actors that produce it. The several examples of fine-grained historical research not only fill a void in the literature on the built environment, but systematically disassemble the certainties and centralities undergirding disciplinary readings of modernism. One hopes that other scholars will follow this lead and continue to produce high-quality work on the architecture informed by these legitimate yet different systems of knowledge.

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The Dynamics of Heritage: History, Memory and the Highlands Clearances. Laurence Gourievidis. Farnham and Burlington, VT: Ashgate (Heritage, Culture and Identity Series), 2010. Xxiv, 232 pp., illus., map.

Laurence Gourievidis's *The Dynamics of Heritage* is concerned with the Scottish Highlands and the emotive subject of the so-called "Highland Clearances" as remembered, represented and presented in Scotland's local, regional and national museums. While this is a book about museums and curatorial practices, as the subtitle — *History, Memory and the Highlands Clearances* — suggests, its central concern, of cultural memory and present-day interpretations of the past, is one common to the work of many IASTE members.

The "Highland Clearances" refers to the forced removal of traditional small tenants by landowners from Highland estates in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Against the wild, romantic image of the Highlands, from Lowland Scotland to South West England, the Clearances fit within a wider early-modern British socioeconomic history of land enclosures, agricultural "Improvement" driven by Enlightenment rational-empiricism, the Industrial Revolution, rural flight, and urban growth. However, the Highlands and the Clearances stand out from this wider context as something extraordinary in the popular imagination, and they are a greater cause of local anger and bitterness in the present-day Highlands than elsewhere in Britain. There are many reasons for this distinction accorded to the north of Scotland, and many historical and heritage studies dedicated to delineating them. One reason often presented is that elsewhere in Britain the removal of tenants by landowners was a straight-forward "them and us" class struggle, but in the Highlands removals frequently represented the personal betrayal of a patriarch within a clan culture. This fits with the worldwide image of the Highlands as a site of clannish, mountain romance. Another reason is simply that removals in the Highlands continued through to the late nineteenth century, only just beyond living memory, whereas enclosures in southern England date back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and as such have long slipped from collective memories. Whatever the case, as Gourievidis outlines, since the actual events took place, the memorial fires for the Clearances have been kept alive, well tended by arts, literature, and popular culture.

The Dynamics of Heritage tackles these issues from the perspective of the museum: How do Scottish museums approach their presentation of this complex cultural legacy? Highland history and Highland heritage are well-ploughed academic fields, and it is not easy to find an original insight or new contribution to our understanding. However, to his credit, Gourvievidis manages to achieve this by placing his analysis and field studies of Scottish museums deep within the specific context of cultural theory and the work of French theorists of memory and identity such as Pierre Nora and Paul Ricoeur and, in English, David Lowenthal. While distinguishing the study, such a strong theoretical content also puts the book beyond the interests of most readers. However, for those interested in such things, the opening discussion on current theories and debates about cultural memory and how they relate to museums and curatorial practices is outstanding, well written, and well balanced. Indeed, taken on its own, the first chapter is an excellent introduction to the field of memory and the questions facing museum curators: the construction of narratives through artifacts, texts and images.

Following a good account of popular "Highlandism" in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (a potted history of Scottish museums), subsequent chapters take us through the author's field studies of contemporary Scottish museums, including the data he gathered administering questionnaires to their curators. There is a noticeable contrast between the theoretical overview presented in the first chapter and the much more pedestrian discussion presented in these later chapters. One begins to suspect that the first chapter is a literature review from a Ph.D. And, taking the book as a whole, it is a pity that the excellent theoretical discussion of that first chapter was not woven into the later chapters, rather than left in splendid isolation at the beginning.

In brief, Gourievidis is highly critical of Scotland's national museums for sidestepping the issue of the Clearances. This is well-placed criticism with regard to well-funded and expert-staffed national institutions. But he is also critical of local Highland museums, where he found it "odd and strangely lacking that no museum should provide a systematic display on crafting and its background." This critique is not well placed. If they are lacking curatorial rigor, to me, it seems churlish for an academic deeply versed in emergent theories of curatorship to wander the Highlands criticizing local museums with very little funding and run by small but dedicated staff and committed volunteers (I don't know current figures, but in recent times more than 90 percent of the Scottish government's museums budget has gone to the central "national museums"). The author regrets the local museums' populist and commercial attitudes. Well, he should try running a museum in an old chapel in a small village in northwest Scotland. His disappointment with these small, local ventures shows an academic other-worldliness that begins to undermine the academic excellence at the start

of the book. It will also strike IASTE members as odd and strangely lacking that many of the museums discussed are in fact reconstructions of traditional dwellings and settlements, and yet the author has little to say on buildings or the built environment, focusing instead on small artifacts and, mostly, information-board displays and text.

Things improve considerably when, in the final chapter, Gourievidis turns his attention to government heritage policy and the Scottish government's National Cultural Charter. Here, his theoretical analysis and sharp criticism find a just target — where an awareness and articulation of the complexities and nuances of heritage and cultural memory can reasonably be expected (if not, as he shows, always found).

Overall, if in need of some grounding in the realities of running small, local museums, *The Dynamics of Heritage* presents an excellent academic analysis of the theoretical concerns that underpin our (re)presentations of the past, which will prove a useful case study for other researchers.

Daniel Maudlin
University of Plymouth, U.K.

This Ecstatic Nation: The American Landscape and the Aesthetics of Patriotism. Terre Ryan. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011. Xv + 171 pp., illus.

Terre Ryan's *This Ecstatic Nation* combines personal narrative of travels through landscapes of the American West with selective historical and political analysis, what she calls an "ecocritical memoir." Ryan's landscapes are not the ones well traversed by many writers before her — mountains, high plains, deserts and canyons. Instead, her account turns to Western landscapes deeply implicated in the economic and political dominance of the United States: Nevada's test sites, Oregon's timber forests, and Wyoming's coal, oil and gas ranges. She proposes that these landscapes embody "manifest destiny aesthetics," in which grand wilderness vistas, theoretically prized as essential to a patriotic identity, are subjugated to economic and political expediency with deleterious aesthetic and environmental effects. All the while, according to Ryan, our collective economic and political interests have attempted to recast the activities in these landscapes within the frame of the nineteenth-century American sublime, using media, marketing, and rhetorical pronouncement.

The American West that Ryan writes about — vast reaches of land clearcut, surface-mined, pocked by weapons, and disfigured with the detritus of energy production — inevitably raise disquieting questions about where American environmental values actually lie. Indeed, integral to American exceptionalism is the vaunted image of Yellowstone or Yosemite, whose preservation, as Ken Burns has exhorted us, is "America's best idea." Ryan is a writer, and she is in her element when turning a phrase that captures the discomfort we all feel when confronting the discrepancy between our yearning to be light upon the land and our utter dependence on the grinding, relentless consumption of earthly resources. As she admits in her chapter on Oregon's tonsured woodlands: "Every night I bed down in a glen of forest products" (p.62).

This book began as a dissertation in the Department of English at the University of Nevada, Reno. And Ryan's disquisition leans heavily on the interweaving of quotes from an array of disciplines that have examined, often more incisively, landscapes of the American West and their images. But the full texts in art history, environmental history, geography, American studies, and political science that she draws from

give a more complicated view of these landscapes, and the forces operating upon them, than Ryan presents here. Her selection of quotes has more to do with reinforcing her understandably alarmed aesthetic reactions to these places than explicating their complexities.

This is fine enough as an introduction perhaps, but Ryan's chapters halt at gratingly obvious conclusions intended to finger ambivalence in environmental values and actions. For example: "Many SUV ads of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century have been contemporary versions of expansionist-era landscape paintings" (p.111). Similarly, the book includes digressions into tenuously relevant material whose main purpose seems to be to support predictable and predetermined conclusions. Thus, when Ryan reports that the condom machine in a gas station near the Nevada nuclear test site was made in Korea, it leads to a gloss on the casualties of the Korean War, with the smirky payoff "we managed to refrain from dropping nuclear bombs."

Those with a deeper knowledge of this material may appreciate the difference between such a bludgeoning "ecocritical" stance and the work of artists like Trevor Paglan or Terry Tempest Williams, who have approached these same landscapes with breathtaking, nuanced precision. They have also opened out, rather than confined, our understanding of them. If shared outrage is the goal, others have already shown the wisdom of letting clarity of fact, observation and insight take us there, rather than leading us on a forced march of indignation.

The last chapter of *This Ecstatic Nation* proposes a renewed "green patriotism" which would reject "acts of environmental violence" and the attendant need to obscure them through a parallel visual rhetoric of America the Beautiful. Aesthetics can, indeed, form a lever of power — too often a duplicitous one. But the fact remains that the extreme landscapes this book surveys have their origins in a consumption economy and global industrial capitalism.

As the book points out, manifest destiny aesthetics are there to soothe us after the deed is done; they do not instigate it. Yet the resource-hungry cities where most of us live (or will live in the near future) are hardly mentioned here — and only then in contrast to the wide, open American West. An American landscape unsullied by the effects of our needs and wants requires engagement in the realpolitik of resources, not a paean to patriotism, green or otherwise.

Ryan is a good writer, but she comes to her subject from a primarily literary background. Readers who find this material engaging might be encouraged to move beyond her commentary to the more thorough and realistic appraisals contained in the same sources she uses.

Louise Mozingo
University of California, Berkeley

City and Soul in Divided Societies. Scott A. Bollens. London and New York: Routledge, 2012. 278 pp., b&w illus.

Scott A. Bollens has published extensively over the last two decades on the topic of "polarized cities," and he was one of the first to advance comparative research on ethno-nationally contested urban space. *City and Soul in Divided Societies* is an important addition and summary of his formerly published work. It opens with a revealing personal note and reflection about Bollens's private life and academic career. He writes that the current book is an attempt to give "a first-person account of conducting interview-based ethnography in ethnic and nationalist polarized cities" (p.5). Indeed, this book reflects a more personal ethic than his earlier, more academically oriented work. He then dedicates a chapter to the "Soul in the City: Epic Cultures and Urban Fault-Lines." Here he reflects on one of the themes that has cut across his work in general: that "life in polarized cities constitutes a different normal, where urban separations overlap cultural fault-lines and where long memories fit into tight spaces" (p.13). This assertion provides a recurring position that is detailed throughout the remainder of the text.

The core of the book is divided into ten chapters focusing on nine cities. Over a period from 1994 in Jerusalem to 2010 in Beirut, Bollens conducted site visits and in-depth interviews in each of these, meeting almost 250 local planners, policy-makers, and academics. The first eight cities and conflicts presented have been reviewed and analyzed in Bollens's earlier work. They present case studies of ethno-national conflict and its relation to the city in Sarajevo, Johannesburg, Belfast, Nicosia, Basque County (Spain), Mostar (Bosnia), Barcelona, and Jerusalem. Beirut is the latest addition to this expanding group of selected sites. Here, Bollens gives an in-depth account of the city's history, current urban condition, and ethno-national fault lines. One of the strengths of this book is its ability to capture nuanced contextual factors within brief capsules, mixing discussion of local views, major events, governmental structures, and urban policies. This provides the reader with a swift but flavored overview of the past of each city under investigation — at the time of Bollens's research there.

Other strengths of the book are its reader-friendly format and the personal voice of the author. For those who haven't had the opportunity to read Bollens's earlier work, *City and*

Soul in Divided Societies will give a thought-provoking snapshot of the main storyline he has developed, which concerns features that distinguish polarized cities. The last two chapters, where he attempts to create a comparative framework and provide some policy recommendations, then offer more practical ideas for experienced planners and decision-makers. In this section of "Synthesis," five additional cities are also introduced: two positive lessons — Montreal and Brussels; and three negative cases — Baghdad and Kirkuk (Iraq), and Mitrovica (Kosovo). The comparison of the different case studies is achieved by comparing the nine aforementioned cities, plus the five new ones, based on four main themes: unresolved or active conflict; suspend violence; movement towards peace; and stable/sustainable.

One absence in Bollens's work is reference to the colonial past and present in some of the cities examined. Especially in the Middle East, these cities have colonial legacies that are relevant in several ways to their development, as well as to power relations within them and their relation of the nation state. There is also an emotional string connected to the rich descriptions in the book, which is sometimes a bit nostalgic, but which has the effect of connecting the reader to the pain and suffering of the conflict. Indeed, it occasionally feels as if the conflict itself is the main point of investigation rather than its impact on planning and development. This is also reflected in the attempt to "compare across conflicts" rather than cities.

The relevance of this book goes beyond understanding ethno-nationally polarized urban space. The different cities described provide important case studies, and they have fundamental value in terms of understanding the wider spatial, social and political conflicts emerging in an increasing number of cities worldwide. Bollens touches on this issue throughout the book, suggesting the relevance of the extreme cases he has investigated to a wide range of urban contexts.

Jonathan Rokem
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Living Over the Store: Architecture and Local Urban Life. Howard Davis. London and New York: Routledge, 2012. Vii + 256 pp., illus.

Howard Davis's study of shop/houses, or buildings in which the first floor is devoted to commercial space and the upper floors to residential, is geographically sweeping yet fundamentally an argument for a small, neighborhood-oriented building type. *Living Over the Store* takes a multicultural approach to a hybrid building and demonstrates the commonalities across time and space. Davis uses the shop/house's decline as an insight into deteriorating urban fabric and its possible resurgence as an indication of a "resilient urbanism." Davis takes one small building that houses one family's work and living spaces and expands it to a view of livable cities.

The first part of the book approaches the shop/house geographically, with chapters devoted to the building type in Asia, Rome, and southern Europe; northern and western Europe; and England and America. The commonalities across these cultures are striking, but are perhaps best demonstrated in the section of sixty color plates. These images, arranged to emphasize the shared features of these buildings, include both historic and contemporary images, and the color adds to the liveliness of the street scenes depicted. Throughout, the images are excellent, with black-and-white photographs and a profusion of plans augmenting the analysis. Davis's global tour shows different uses of courtyards, placements of stairs, and relationships between living space and shop — yet the mixed use is the same.

In the next sections, Davis interweaves cultures as he discusses contextual aspects of the shop/house, ranging from the family to the neighborhood, from simple commerce to urban economics. The preindustrial custom of an entire family working together might be outmoded, but recent moves to integrate child-rearing with parents' work lives indicate that a unified life is still desired. But perhaps the greatest benefit of shop/houses is to the neighborhood, which profits not only from small shops conveniently located, but also from residents who have a presence in the community. Davis shares Jane Jacobs's concern for activity on the street and maintains that these small shops facilitate that. He also admires Christopher Alexander's analysis of the beneficial spatial relationships that shop/houses reinforce.

Davis then looks at shop/houses in a larger context, that of the city, arguing that they tend to appear on streets that are not predominantly residential or overwhelmingly commercial, but rather on streets that funnel pedestrian traffic from one to the other. He also argues for the fundamental flexibility of shop/houses, being both economically flexible in their role as "business-incubator" spaces and spatially flexible, ranging from the traditional to the architect-designed. His analysis of the architecture of shop/houses includes certain common features: narrow frontages, physical dominance of the shopfront at street level, fluid relationships between shops and dwellings, location of kitchens convenient to both, and facades that are stylistically open at the shop level and closed at the residential level. His analysis serves as a blueprint for contemporary designs of shop/houses, whose construction Davis emphatically encourages.

In the third part of the book, Davis discusses the decline of this building form, as well as its resurgence. The reasons for its disappearance are many: the functional separation of the city is as much due to industrialization and Enlightenment desires for order and uniformity as to modernist precepts. But gradually the Western city separated home from work. In the twentieth century this separation was reinforced by zoning codes, building regulations, financing attitudes, and urban-renewal theories. One aspect of the shop/house that led to its demise is its very hybridity; hard to categorize and rarely studied, the small mixed-use building seems somehow impure. Today several factors stand in the way of construction of shop/houses: a reliance on known, easily defined building types; a preference for large projects; and the fragmentation of urban space reinforced in land-use plans.

In the face of these forces discouraging the mixed-use shop/house, Davis argues for shop/houses as a way to facilitate walkable, friendly neighborhoods where residents shop locally and know their merchants, and where merchants raise their families in a mixed-class setting. He cites several examples of new designs of shop/houses that work well with their settings and offer a variety of residential arrangements. Many of the new examples are in Oregon, as the book increasingly focuses on the United States in its latter chapters. But one hopes such creative and pleasing designs could be found throughout the world. Ultimately, Davis's book is an argument for a better city — one that facilitates walkability, face-to-face interactions, and a vibrant street scene. The shop/house, as Howard Davis so persuasively reminds us, could be an important ingredient in that urban mix.

Alison K. Hoagland
Michigan Technological University

Architecture of Thought. Andrzej Piotrowski. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012. 350 pp., 61 b&w illus., 16 color plates.

[Architects] are always in the service of something more powerful than them — usually (institutional and abstract) and formless until embodiment.

— Andrew Ballentine

By what means does architecture participate in the construction of ideologies? And what are the various forces contributing to that process? While earlier architectural criticism has examined the uneasy relationship between Albert Speer and fascist aspirations, less attention has been paid to similar agendas in non-Western cultures. In *Architecture of Thought*, Andrzej Piotrowski takes on this ambitious project.

The book is organized chronologically, beginning with the ninth-century Middle Byzantine period and extending to the mid-twentieth century, a span of more than seven hundred years. Furthermore, its scope takes in multiple continents and ideological modalities. On this vast canvas, architecture is examined as a cultural practice — which is to say, part of everyday material culture. In this instance, however, the discourse is associated with defining reality itself — not an easy task.[1]

Piotrowski defines ideology not only as a body of doctrine, but also as the way in which people tend to think — as a *Weltanschauung*, or philosophy of human life and the universe. In Piotrowski's view, before ideological programs or knowledge systems are made explicit, they are imaginings, perceptions. Thus visual constructs can be regarded as ways of testing new modes of thought. This is somewhat of a chicken/egg situation, but the numerous case studies selected effectively support his argument.

Because *Architecture of Thought* describes a process of emergence, its objectives are both theoretical and methodological. Yet scholarly research is primarily logocentric, coming into conflict with the fact that the actual experience of architecture is physical — in other words, nonverbal. Furthermore, non-Western *Weltanschauungs* often encompass nonrational subjectivities, which defy logocentric analysis. Thus Piotrowski argues convincingly that traditional research methods tend to hamper, if not actually exclude, serious discussion of the topic.[2] As a means to circumvent inherited logocentric methodologies, he employs three strategies.

First, Piotrowski tries to analyze architecture in parallel with other contemporaneous forms of cultural production, such as art, images, religious ornamentation, sculpture, apparel, advertisements, and pop culture. Such visual ordering systems reveal something about every culture's philosophies. Piotrowski does, however, observe that this notion is more complex than simply saying that a culture's architecture or advertising only reflect its dominant thoughts and ideologies.

His second strategy is to analyze material culture over time. In this way the emergence of thought can be traced vis-à-vis a series of iterative design negotiations. Design processes make nascent concepts accessible. For example, during a period of non-iconoclastic strictures, the challenge for ninth-century Byzantine ecclesiastics was how to represent the nonrepresentable. Builders resolved this dilemma through the simple stage-crafting of materials: spatial layering, volume, and light. When these representational spaces resonated with the cultural imagination of the time, the process allowed for new realities to become accessible. In other words, new designs make new ways of thinking possible.

This leads to Piotrowski's third strategy, by which digital modeling programs are employed to re-create the atmosphere of pre-electrified architectural spaces while serving as a demonstration of concept. By drawing on simulated lighting effects (both sun- and candle light), the renderings strive to capture the ineffable experience of physical space in all its materiality. Through these rendered examples, he hopes the perceptual experience of architecture, rather than being tightly bound by textual analysis, will rely on visuality and indeterminacy, and thus allow for multiple interpretations. In such an open-ended environment, Piotrowski argues that many ideologies can exist in the same physical space. This is an important observation when studying premodern cultures.

One of this book's strongest chapters concerns Mesoamerican epistemologies. The research here traces how religion was hybrid, as various Native American beliefs later mixed with Catholicism — what the author terms "syncretism." Syncretism as a way of thinking becomes symptomatic on a subconscious level, allowing multiple modalities of thought to coexist without intersecting theologically. For example, a Catholic Baroque ceiling might replicate Mayan bas-relief patterns. According to Piotrowski, "The [Spanish] colonizers attempted to exploit what they considered to be the language of indigenous forms, but actually limited their engagement to what they could control." Originally, of course, the Spaniards did not expect to incorporate pagan art or design; they were only looking to spread a message (whether of Christ or the Word). In contrast, the early Mesoamerican *Weltanschauung* could comfortably enfold unorthodox or alien beliefs. For Mesoamericans, complexity, ambiguity and contradiction were inherently meaningful.

Yet the problem remains that there is no way to test the historical "accuracy" of these observations when scholars are forced to rely solely on the accounts of the Spanish colonialists.[3] If architecture, similar to *Weltanschauung*, operates sub-

consciously, how can historians chart the causal operations of the sublime? Existent European chronicles were unable to capture what cannot be described in words. Further, non-Western subjectivities were deemed inconsequential, and thus ignored altogether. Because the Mayans had no written language, and did not privilege texts as an important way to represent the world and all of its experiences, it is difficult to know with certainty what they were feeling or thinking.

Moreover, Piotrowski is advancing the notion that architecture not only reflects and embodies ideologies, but, in a less ordered way, also tests out new modes of thought. The history of architecture can be seen then to trace philosophical shifts. While this overall thesis is well documented, the analysis sidesteps the importance of economic and political forces, which clearly contribute as well. Throughout the first three chapters, the Roman Catholic Church is framed merely as a theology. Yet the Church's influence during colonialism was concurrently an economic and political project. It acted as a totalizing entity, organizing virtually all aspects of Spanish society, in Europe and the New World.

The book concludes with a discussion of the architect Le Corbusier's use of advertising as a technique to promote the design ideology of modernism, a topic that has been discussed by other historians. This chapter would have fit more seamlessly with the rest of the book if it had linked back to ecclesiastical architecture. An alternative strategy, and perhaps one ultimately more interesting, would have been to refocus the analytical lens and chart Le Corbusier's internal philosophical shift during the 1950s. A close examination of Le Corbusier surpassing his need for rationalism with the design of La Chapelle Notre-Dame-du-Haut de Ronchamp (1954) could have provided a most satisfying conclusion. Or would this approach once again challenge the logocentric methodologies of architectural historians? Either way, *Architecture of Thought* is an important and provocative reflection on the intertwined relationship between ideology and material culture.

Thérèse F. Tierney
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1. This conception of discourse is largely derived from the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Discourse, according to Foucault (1977, 1980, 2003), is related to power as it operates by rules of exclusion.
2. As Piotrowski explains it, Erwin Panofsky's *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism* is a particularly good example. "[It] exemplifies the epistemologically self-sufficient character of such approaches. Since the appearance of the book, Gothic architecture has been frequently interpreted as the material outcome of Scholasticism. The scholarly method that Panofsky uses itself frequently follows the scholastic mode of thought. The way in Panofsky constructs his argument parallels principles of Scholasticism — manifesatio and concordia." In summary, Piotrowski argues, the way Panofsky approached his object of inquiry predetermined his conclusions.
3. A central problem in cultural studies is the diversity of patterns of rationality among cultures, historical periods, and stages of personal development; yet the Spanish accounts do not acknowledge this.

Conferences and Events

"2013 CityAge Summit — The Global Metropolis," **New York, NY:** June 18–19, 2013. Sponsored by CityAge Media, this conference will gather business, government, and civic society leaders from the world's cities to discuss issues of city building/rebuilding in the twenty-first century. For more information: http://www.cityage.tv/nyc/.

"LONDONICITY 2013," **London, U.K.:** June 27–29, 2013. The Third Annual London Studies Conference aims to analyze, celebrate and critique London through a wide range of disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives. The event examines notions of London as a "global city" and will be convened in association with New York University in London. For more information: http://www.thelondonconference.com/.

"Cities on the Move: Mobilities and Sensibilities," **Cape Town, South Africa:** July 3–5, 2013. Organized by the University of the Western Cape, this conference will explore city sensibilities of the everyday, approaching the city as a social construction and as a social imaginary in contrast to empiricist research that treats urban places as more or less fixed, technical objects. For more information: http://www.millenniumconferences.co.za/cities/index.php.

"CIPA 2013 Symposium: Recording, Documentation and Cooperation for Cultural Heritage," **Strasbourg, France:** September 2–6, 2013. The International Committee for Documentation of Cultural Heritage (CIPA) will convene this international symposium featuring key figures in cultural heritage documentation and conservation from around the world. For more information: http://www.cipa2013.org/.

"Filling the Gaps: World Heritage and the Twentieth Century," **Chandigarh, India:** October 3–4, 2013. This conference, organized by the School of Planning and Architecture at Chitkara University, aims to promote an understanding of the significance of twentieth-century heritage — not only its physical and visual attributes, but also its historical, cultural and social dimensions within the World Heritage regime. There will be particular emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. For more information: http://icomos-isc20c.org/id15.html.

"Media City — Spectacular/Ordinary/Contested," **Helsinki, Finland:** May 15–17, 2013. Organized by the University of Helsinki, this interdisciplinary symposium investigated the effects of advanced telecommunications and commodified media in contemporary cities. For more information: http://www.helsinki.fi/collegium/events/mediacity2013/index.htm.

"Landscape and Imagination," **Paris, France:** May 2–4, 2013. Sponsored by the Ecole Nationale Supérieure d'Architecture de Paris la Villette, this conference aimed to use imaginative resources to explore sustainable solutions to practical landscape challenges through educational innovations that stress individual and collective responsibility for the transformation, management and use of landscapes. For more information: http://www.paris-lavillette.archi.fr/landim/spip.php?rubrique9.

"The Historic Center and the Next City: Envisioning Heritage Evolution," **Savannah, GA:** May 1–4, 2013. The Sixteenth Annual International Scientific Symposium, co-hosted by the Savannah College of Art and Design, focused on the evolution of historic urban centers and how they may provide inspiration for the future of cities around the world. For more information: http://www.usicomos.org/symposium.

"Gender Matters," **Berkeley, CA:** April 13, 2013. This symposium, part of the 40th Anniversary of the Organization of Women Architects and Design Professionals, brought together historians, architects, planners, landscape architects, designers, and scholars to discuss how to infuse architecture with a sense of urgency and social responsibility as a way to engage urban citizenship on both a local and global scale. For more information: http://www.owa-usa.org.

"Tourism and the Shifting Values of Cultural Heritage: Visiting Pasts, Developing Futures," **Taipei, Taiwan:** April 5–9. This international conference was sponsored by the University of Birmingham-Ironbridge Institute and the National Taiwan University, in association with UNESCO UNITWIN Network–Tourism, Culture, Development (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) and the Centre for Tourism and Cultural Change, U.K. It examined the tensions and opportunities in valuing and protecting cultural heritage and mobilizing it for development. For information visit: ironbridge@contacts.bham.ac.uk.

"Modernism in Architecture and Urbanism: East, West . . . and Across the World," **Suzhou, China:** October 2012. This conference, hosted by Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, examined Modernism's lasting, or fading, influence on India, China, and other rapidly urbanizing areas of the world. For more information: www.masterplanningthefuture.org.

CALLS FOR PAPERS

"Cities in Europe, Cities in the World," **Lisbon, Portugal:** September 3–4, 2014. The Twelfth International Conference on Urban History, sponsored by the European Association for Urban History, will explore the circulation of knowledge and urban spatial practices from a comparative perspective. For more information: http://www.eauh2014.fcsh.unl.pt/index.php?conference=conference&schedConf=eauh2014.

"67th Society of Architectural Historians Conference," **Austin, TX:** April 9–13, 2014. Deadline: June 1, 2013. The conference is organized around 30 thematic sessions or open sessions that cover topics across all time periods and architectural styles. SAH encourages submissions from architectural, landscape, and urban historians; museum curators; preservationists; independent scholars; architects; and members of partner organizations. For more information: http://www.sah.org/conferences-and-programs/2014-conference---austin.

"INTER[SECTIONS]: A Conference on Architecture, City and Cinema," **Porto, Portugal:** September 11–13, 2013. Deadline June 15, 2013. This multidisciplinary international conference at the School of Architecture, University of Porto, will focus on relations between urban space, architecture, and the moving image. The event is organized around the following topics: Urban Cinema, City Symphonies, Space and Politics in Cinema, Spatial Identity on Screen, Spatial Narratives, and Architect(ure)s in Film. For more information, please visit: http://www.rupturasilenciosa.com/INTERSECTIONS.

Guide for Preparation of Manuscripts

1. GENERAL
The editors invite readers to submit manuscripts. Please send three copies of each manuscript, with one copy to include all original illustrations. Place the title of the manuscript, the author's name and a 50-word biographical sketch on a separate cover page. The title only should appear again on the first page of text. Manuscripts are circulated for review without identifying the author. Manuscripts are evaluated by a blind peer-review process.

2. LENGTH AND FORMAT
Manuscripts should not exceed 25 standard 8.5" x 11" [a4] double-spaced typewritten pages (about 7500 words). Leave generous margins.

3. APPROACH TO READER
Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the journal, papers should be written for an academic audience that may have either a general or a specific interest in your topic. Papers should present a clear narrative structure. They should not be compendiums of field notes. Please define specialized or technical terminology where appropriate.

4. ABSTRACT AND INTRODUCTION
Provide a one-paragraph abstract of no more than 100 words. This abstract should explain the content and structure of the paper and summarize its major findings. The abstract should be followed by a short introduction. The introduction will appear without a subheading at the beginning of the paper.

5. SUBHEADINGS
Please divide the main body of the paper with a single progression of subheadings. There need be no more than four or five of these, but they should describe the paper's main sections and reinforce the reader's sense of progress through the text.

Sample Progression: The Role of the Longhouse in Iban Culture. The Longhouse as a Building Form. Transformation of the Longhouse at the New Year. The Impact of Modern Technology. Conclusion: Endangered Form or Form in Transition?

Do not use any numbering system in subheadings. Use secondary subheadings only when absolutely essential for format or clarity.

6. REFERENCES
Do not use a general bibliography format. Use a system of numbered reference notes as indicated below.

A condensed section of text might read as follows:

In his study of vernacular dwellings in Egypt, Edgar Regis asserted that climate was a major factor in the shaping of roof forms. Henri Lacompte, on the other hand, has argued that in the case of Upper Egypt this deterministic view is irrelevant.[1]
An eminent architectural historian once wrote, "The roof form in general is the most indicative feature of the housing styles of North Africa."[2] Clearly, however, the matter of how these forms have evolved is a complex subject. A thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.[3]
In my research I discovered that local people have differing notions about the origins of the roof forms on the dwellings they inhabit.[4]

The reference notes, collected at the end of the text (not at the bottom of each page), would read as follows:

1. E. Regis, *Egyptian Dwellings* (Cairo: University Press, 1979), p.179; and H. Lacompte, "New Study Stirs Old Debate," *Smithsonian*, Vol.11 No.2 (December 1983), pp.24–34.
2. B. Smithson, "Characteristic Roof Forms," in H. Jones, ed., *Architecture of North Africa* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p.123.
3. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see J. Idris, *Roofs and Man* (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 1984).
4. In my interviews I found that the local people understood the full meaning of my question only when I used a more formal Egyptian word for "roof" than that in common usage.

7. DIAGRAMS, DRAWINGS AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Illustrations will be essential for most papers in the journal, however, each paper can only be accompanied by a maximum of 20 illustrations. For purposes of reproduction, please provide images as line drawings (velox, actual size), b&w photos (5" x 7" or 8"x 10" glossies), or digitized computer files. Color prints and drawings, slides, and photocopies are not acceptable.

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