TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF TRADITIONAL ENVIRONMENTS



T D S R V O L U M E X X I I I N U M B E R I I S P R I N G 2 0 1 2

The International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments (IASTE) was established at the First International Symposium on Traditional Dwellings and Settlements held at Berkeley in April 1988. IASTE is an interdisciplinary forum where scholars from various disciplines and countries can exchange ideas, discuss methods and approaches, and share findings. As opposed to disciplinary associations, IASTE is a nonprofit organization concerned with the comparative and cross-cultural understanding of traditional habitat as an expression of informal cultural conventions. IASTE's purpose is to serve as an umbrella association for all scholars studying vernacular, indigenous, popular and traditional environments. Current activities of IASTE include the organization of biennial conferences on selected themes in traditional-environments research, the publication of edited books on selected themes, a public outreach program which includes supporting films and documentaries, and the publication of the Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Working Paper Series, which includes all papers presented at IASTE conferences and accepted for publication.

Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review is the official publication of IASTE. As a semi-annual refereed journal, *TDSR* acts as a forum for the exchange of ideas and a means to disseminate information and report on research activities. All articles submitted to *TDSR* are evaluated through a blind peer-review process. *TDSR* has been funded by grants from the Graham Foundation, the Getty Publication Program, the National Endowment for the Arts, the Center for Environmental Design Research, and the office of the Provost at the University of California at Berkeley.

IASTE membership is open to all who are interested in traditional environments and their related studies. In addition to receiving the Association's semi-annual journal, members are eligible to attend the biennial conference at reduced rates. Subscription to the journal is available only with membership in IASTE. Domestic annual order rates are as follows: Individual, $60; Institutional, $120; Corporations, $180. Foreign members add $15 for mailing. Libraries, museums, and academic organizations qualify as institutions. Subscriptions are payable in U.S. dollars only (by check drawn on a U.S. bank, U.S. money order, or international bank draft). Send inquiries to:

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COVER ILLUSTRATION: "THE PROBLEM: WHERE TO SETTLE THE IMMIGRANTS?" HOUSES IMAGINED AS A STRATEGY OF NATION BUILDING IN THE SHARON PLANNING PROPOSAL FOR ISRAEL. SOURCE: SHARON, *PHYSICAL PLANNING IN ISRAEL 1948–1953*.

Editor's Note

During this time of economic uncertainty, we are delighted that readers continue to support *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review.* This issue is particularly illustrative of the interdisciplinary approach of the International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments (IASTE). In it, a range of scholars — geographers, historians, architects and planners — present compelling work from across the globe, showing how questions of tradition, in its many forms, continue to have tremendous impact on how we interpret the built environment.

The issue begins with an examination of hyperrealism in China and the United States — a fascinating juxtaposition that allows a deep interrogation of questions of authenticity, reproduction, and cultural identity. The author, Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, looks in particular at the invocation of the past in China and at "Disneyfication" in the United States to uncover how two different cultures create a sense of authenticity that is, in essence, a mental construct. The next article, an adaptation of one of the best student papers at our 2010 conference, looks to the contradictions inherent to nationalist imaginaries in Israel and Palestine. Its author, Ron Smith points to the concept of the nation-state as both a space of utopian possibility and dystopic violence and repression. Following this, Mohamed Gamal Abdelmonem examines the complex idea of "home" in the neighborhoods of Old Cairo. His purpose is to argue for an understanding of flexible socio-spatial dwelling practices as a means to improve future housing and preservation efforts in Egypt and elsewhere. Our fourth feature article, by Yael Allweil, recounts the conflicts attendant on the development of early Israeli housing policies. She explains how repeated change in these policies in response to a series of perceived threats eventually created the basis for a contract between state and citizen that remains a core political principle in the country to this day. The issue concludes with a field report from Sarawak (Malaysian Borneo) by Ian Ewart examining how "traditional" architecture is rarely stable. In this case, the agent of change is the arrival of the globalized logging industry, which has introduced local people to new materials, building technologies, and cultural images.

Exciting plans are underway for our biennial conference, to be held this year in Portland, Oregon. I hope to see many of you there October 4–7 to examine "The Myth of Tradition."

Nezar AlSayyad

Hyperreal Monuments of the Mind: Traditional Chinese Architecture and Disneyland

THORSTEN BOTZ-BORNSTEIN

This article analyzes Chinese and American hyperrealism and its effects on self-perceptions and cultural identities. In their respective architectural traditions both American and Chinese ambitions to retrieve a psycho-social quality succeed in circumventing common requirements of authenticity. The past is present in China in the form of the Chinese language and letters. Meanwhile, in the United States, the "Disney" approach promotes the authenticity of the copy within the "real" sphere of American civilization. In paradoxical fashion both approaches thus attempt to find authenticity and identity in a process of imitation. A comparison of the two traditions shows how authenticity is never a stable "material" entity, but rather how all monuments are somehow "monuments of the mind."

In this article I analyze Chinese and American hyperrealism and its effect on the self-perceptions and cultural identities of both countries. I do this by concentrating on the phenomenon of architecture. Hyperreality represents an exalted or idealized reality. It is the state in which it is impossible to distinguish reality from fantasy, not because the fantasy is such a good imitation of reality, but because hyperreality produces images of something that never existed in the first place. Hyperreality creates its own standards of reality independently of any outside "real" condition. According to Jean Baudrillard, our contemporary world has been replaced by a copy within which we are fed by stimuli, and in which questions of "reality" or authenticity have become redundant. In particular, Baudrillard observed that hyperreality represents a significant paradigm of the American cultural condition. Umberto Eco, whose ideas will also be used in this essay, has described a similar concept of hyperreality as "false authenticity."

The state of hyperreality is common in technologically advanced cultures, where virtual reality has made the endless reproduction of fundamentally empty appearances pos-

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sible. However, it is also possible to speak of hyperreality in cultural or civilizational terms. In this article I pursue this theme in the context of traditional Chinese architecture and the architecture of Disneyland, as well as in terms of the development of "cultural space" as it is perceived in both China and the United States.

THE CHINESE CULTURE OF WRITING

Derk Bodde has contrasted European and Chinese approaches to culture by pointing out that the Chinese concept of civilization/culture is based on an idea of writing as a creator of civilization. As he explained,

> *. . . our word "civilization" goes back to a Latin root having to do with "citizen" and "city." The Chinese counterpart, actually a binome,* wen hua, *literally means "the transforming (i.e., civilizing) influence of writing." In other words, for us the essence of civilization is urbanization; for the Chinese it is the art of writing.*[1]

To a Western *civilization of urbanization*, Bodde thus opposes a Chinese *civilization of writing*. The position and function of writing in Chinese culture vaguely reflects the constellation that the present article attempts to explain. The past is present in China not in the form of material buildings, but in the form of a substance called writing. Simon Leys has also argued that the Chinese past is a past of words and not of bricks and stones.[2] In this world, letters *are* culture and not *signs of* culture. In particular, Leys detected a curious Chinese concept of "putting words in space," which he opposed to the Western idea of "putting words in time." Such a distinction supports the constellation mentioned by Bodde. According to Leys, "While, in general and by its nature, poetical expressions are successive unfolding in time, Chinese poetry makes an effort to organize words in space."[3]

The past is present in China in the form of the Chinese language and letters, both of which have remained practically unchanged for the last two thousand years.[4] And this particular concept of "culture as writing" has had a decisive effect on the character of Chinese architecture. Leys and F.W. Mote have both expressed amazement at the negligence with which the Chinese treat the material heritage of their past; thus, even though China has a long history and is heavily loaded with memories, it has remarkably few historical monuments to visit.[5] Leys has insisted that the disconcerting barrenness of the Chinese monumental landscape is not just the result of the destruction carried out during the Cultural Revolution; even in the beginning, the revolutionaries did not find much to destroy. He pointed out that the quasi-absence of monuments had already struck Western travelers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[6]

Europe, too, has known wars and destruction, but it has managed to maintain monuments dating from antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance. Meanwhile, in China — except for the few most famous items — the monumental past is practically absent. One of the reasons is a tradition of iconoclasm. However, another, as Mote noted, is that, while the West has an antique presence made of authentically ancient physical objects, China does not have those, "because of . . . a different attitude towards the way of achieving the enduring monument."[7]

True, there has been a tradition of antiquarianism in China, but, as Leys has pointed out, antiquarianism appeared very late in Chinese cultural history. Second, it remained essentially restricted to a very narrow category of objects. And third, its focus has been very much on calligraphy and painting — that is, on the exclusive prestige of the written word. In classical Chinese culture, the art of painting was nothing more than an extension of calligraphy because, Leys commented, it "had first to adopt the instruments and techniques of calligraphy before it could attract the attention of the aesthetes."[8] Even when connoisseurs and collectors extended their interests to bronzes and some categories of antiques, the value of these items was usually determined by the epigraphs. In other words, their interest in antiques was dependent upon writing.

This cultural characteristic has particular consequences for architecture: in China, many historical monuments are not real but hyperreal. An example of this "hyperreal history" is Suzhou's Great Pagoda, which passes as Suzhou's "Statue of Antiquity" **(FIG. 1)**. Mote submitted this structure to extensive analysis, claiming that "no building with such a pedigree would count for much as an authentic antiquity even in the United States, much less in Rome."[9] Though the Great Pagoda's origins are in the third century, in reality it is a twentieth-century construction. It has been constantly rebuilt over the centuries, and nothing that can be found in it is what a Westerner would call authentic. The point, according to Mote, is that

> *. . . Chinese civilization did not lodge its history in buildings. Even its most grandiose palace and city complexes stressed grand layout, the employment of space, and not buildings, which were added as a relatively impermanent superstructure. Chinese civilization seems not to have regarded its history as violated or abused when the historic monuments collapsed or burned, as long as they would be replaced and restored, and their functions regained. In short, we can say that the real past of Soochow is a past of the mind; its imperishable elements are moments of human experience.*[10]

Most recently, the architect Li Shiqiao wrote that in China, the "commodification of the immaterial idea is predicated on the crucial notion of the authenticity of the original," and

FIGURE 1. *The Beisi Pagoda (北寺塔), or North Temple Pagoda, located at Bao'en Temple in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, China. Courtesy of Bryan Ma.*

that this practice is both contemporary and traditional. As an example, he reported on the work of the Chinese architectural historian Liang Sicheng (1901–1972), who returned from China in the 1920s after his education at the University of Pennsylvania, and who

> *. . . was particularly disturbed by the way old relics were "renovated" at many sites he visited in China; he preferred old buildings to remain "old," but in practice they had been renovated into similar-looking new buildings. For several decades, Liang Sicheng struggled to introduce a notion of "historical authenticity" in China through the idea of architectural history. Although he remains a well-respected figure in Chinese architecture, his ideas have not been understood in practice and the impact of his advocacy has been limited.*[11]

Mote has summarized the situation by arguing that the Chinese past is not made of stone but of words: "China [has] kept the largest and longest-enduring of all mankind's documentations of the past. It [has] constantly scrutinized that past as recorded in words, and caused it to function in the life of its present."[12] The Chinese have thus built no Parthenon, but rather hyperreal monuments of the mind.

To illustrate this position, Mote cited the example of the Maple Bridge in Suzhou **(FIG. 2)**. This historic structure is not important as an *object*, but exists only as psycho-historical material or as a "poetic place" in literary history. Thus, official and historical "descriptions" of the bridge exist, but they consist most frequently of poems that capture "moments of

FIGURE 2. *Maple Bridge (Fong Qiao, 枫桥) in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, China. Courtesy of Wanchi Siu.*

experience or of reflection involving the bridge"; alternatively, they involve reference to earlier poems inspired in some indirect way by the bridge. The "historical reality" of the bridge does not seem to be important. In this sense, the bridge is a hyperreal phenomenon: "In all that psycho-historical material associated with the Maple Bridge, the bridge as an object is of little importance; we are not told of what material it is built, how big it is, or what it looks like."[13]

The conclusion to be drawn from such an analysis is that Suzhou is a city of ancient monuments, which contains almost no ancient buildings at all. The "duration" of the monument is thus spiritual rather than material. Any "authenticity" must be seen as hyperreal because the past, tradition, and culture were never present and real in the first place, but were made of words. Mote and Leys further hold that the buildings are "ideas," or items derived from the consciousness of those who know the poems. According to Mote, "The literary remains, merely sampled in the gazetteers, and more fully present in the libraries of scholars, are to Soochow as is the Forum to Rome. From them every educated Chinese could reconstruct a real Soochow in his mind, with cracks and the scars that mar old stones."[14]

For his part, Leys is convinced that, well before Confucius, the Chinese developed the idea that history cannot be transmitted through artifacts. It is instead only transmitted through the memory of posterior humans who rely on writing for such purposes. The formula "man only survives in man" means, in practical terms, that history survives only through the medium of the written word. Leys's thoughts were inspired by the French poet and writer Victor Segalen (1878–1919) who spent many years in China and was apparently the first European to reflect on the above problem in the Chinese context. Segalen observed that Chinese architecture is essentially made of perishable and fragile materials; as such, it embodies a sort of "in-built obsolescence," letting the buildings decay more rapidly so that they require frequent rebuilding. Segalen drew a philosophical conclusion from these concrete observations: that the Chinese eternity should not inhabit the building but only its builder.[15]

Leys's theory has since been confirmed by anthropologists, who point out that, in the case of contemporary Chinese replicas of historical buildings, even their materials and dimensions can change considerably. Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger provided the example of recent building activities in a small community in southern China where, in order to glorify the village and its lineage, the village government

> *. . . dismantled the main ancestral hall and erected an improved replica instead in its place — what the Chen ancestors presumably would have built had they the funds. The Chinese conception of architectural heritage does not entail preserving the actual materials that a building is composed of, and almost all of the original hall was discarded. The new replica is outfitted with more solid pillars, new beams fancifully painted with motifs from Chinese legends. . . .*[16]

A similar though not identical concept of historic authenticity underlies some works of traditional Japanese architecture. Thus, Emperor Temmu established the Ise Shrine (*ise-jingū*) in Mie around 680 AD as the primary Shinto shrine of imperial Japan. Though the present building is still considered the "original" by the Japanese, in reality the shrine has been ritually rebuilt every twenty years since the seventh century (FIG. 3). In a ceremony known as *shikinen sengu*, the main shrine buildings are destroyed and reconstructed on an adjacent site, leaving the neighboring site empty. The first

FIGURE 3. *Ise Shrine (Ise-jingu, 伊勢神宮) in Ise, Mie, Japan. Courtesy of Ajari.*

rebuilding took place under Temmu's wife, Empress Jito, and the most recent (the sixty-first) took place in 1993.

Periodic reconstruction is extremely expensive and can be viewed as an act of sacrifice. However, though the shrine is physically never more than twenty years old, the Japanese do not consider it a replica but an original building dating from the seventh century. For them, the shrine's identity is not based on building material; it is "produced" through the ceremonies that accompany destruction and reconstruction, as well as through Shinto tradition, which reserves a central position for the shrine. None of this could convince the international community, however:; not being "old enough," the Ise Shrine has not been placed on the UNESCO list of World Heritage Sites.[17] Two other shrines in Japan, Kamo no Wakeika-zuchi and Kamo no Mioya, are also rebuilt every twenty years. And it appears that in the past, other shrines maintained a rebuilding cycle of twenty years or longer.[18]

IDENTITY AND NATURE

Western common sense does not find these arguments convincing. There is the joke about the farmer who changed the handle of his axe twice and the head three times but still believed he had the same axe. No wonder many Western philosophers have called such conceptions absurd.

Since the time of the ancient Greeks, philosophers have considered this problem, which became famous as the "Ship of Theseus" paradox. The historian Plutarch first mentioned the condition of this hero's ship, which had become a sort of national monument the Greeks took great pains to repair over a long period of time — to the point that all the old planks were replaced by new ones.

The question whether the ship could still be considered the original would subsequently occupy some of the brightest European minds. Most outstanding perhaps was the Sophists' claim that the new ship could not be the real ship because, if we were to take the old planks and assemble them to build a second ship, we would be in the presence of two originals — a logical impossibility. The Sophists were pseudo-philosophers, but their claim was not pointless, and it would later be supported by Thomas Hobbes in his *De Corpore*.[19] It is also in agreement with basic principles about identity established by John Locke, who wrote that only *different* things can be in the same place at the same time, and that *one* thing can have only *one* origin.[20]

Leys and Mote have noted that in China, the negligence and destruction of historical buildings form a paradoxical relationship with the ambition to preserve the past. The point is that the Chinese — just like Japanese Shintoists — do not necessarily have another sort of logic, but rather another conception of the past. What matters is not the building material and its continuous existence but, according to David Lowenthal, the "genetic properties (maker, period, history) that distinguish the authentic from the fake."[21]

CHINESE HYPERREALITY

According to Shiqiao Li, China possesses a "powerful cultural force which is not always predicated on the unquestioned validity of the authentic form," because in this culture "the image plays a different role."[22] Leys and Mote have found that in China the negligence and destruction of historical buildings form a paradoxical relationship with the Confucian ambition to preserve the past. Here the tendency to transcend reality towards a cultural ideal contained in a tradition and mediated by writing represents a clear case of culture as hyperreality.

Westerners — or, more precisely, non-Chinese or non-Japanese people (Leys does not mention the Japanese, but points out that ancient Egyptians would have found the Chinese conception of history as unusual as present-day Europeans) — tend to see the past as a reality that can be either present (in the form of an authentic building, even if it is only a ruin) or absent (destroyed). Normally, in Western cultures, history needs to be recognized *as a reality*. According to Alois Riegl, monuments are not only supposed to be old, but they must *show* their age.[23] In Europe, many have thus argued that the patina on paintings is not a sign of decay but an artistic enhancement. And recently, the search for the "real" may have become an obsession. Indeed, some have likened material preservation to a "rampant cult," as ever greater resources are devoted to the salvaging and conservation of remnants of the past in Western and many non-Western countries.[24] Preservation efforts have even been extended from historic buildings and historic districts to larger entities such as historic valleys, states, and bio-regions.[25]

By contrast, the Chinese find "reality" not in the material reproduction of a building, but in the qualities and indications of it that they are able to reproduce in their consciousness. The Suzhou Maple Bridge was never meant to be more than an idea; thus, to Mote, it "was an item in the consciousness of all Chinese who ever knew the poem."[26] Much of the extraordinary iconoclastic character of the Cultural Revolution and similar Chinese movements — which Westerners, including Russians, often find unusually radical — can certainly be explained through this attitude. On the other hand, the Chinese inclination not to cling to material objects can be seen as notably refreshing and stimulating for present activities because it holds that old things must perish so that new ones can take their place. Yet looking more closely, there is no reason to believe that the Chinese have really freed their minds of the past: they might have abandoned the physical part of the object, but they most carefully preserve the felt continuity of history — that is, a nonmaterial past.

Such a nonmaterial concept of history can easily lead to the phenomenon of hyperreality. The hyperreal quality of Chinese history becomes particularly manifest in the historical records of the *Lantingxu*, or the "Preface of the Orchid Pavilion," a famous calligraphy by Wang Xizhi (307–365), whose story has been made accessible by Simon Leys, and

whose main points I relate here. Wang Xizhi is generally considered the greatest calligrapher of all ages, and the *Lantingxu* is one of the most commented upon calligraphies in Chinese history. But how was this work handed down? Legend states that during the first two hundred years of its existence it was kept by Wang's descendants and remained within the family; no mention was ever made of it, and seemingly, no one had the chance to see it. Two hundred and fifty years later, however, a monk made copies of it, and fifty years after that, Wang's calligraphic style aroused the enthusiasm of the Emperor Tang Taizong. As the original rubbings themselves had disappeared, new rubbings were taken from later engravings. Tang Taizong, who died in 649, then demanded that the "Orchid Pavilion" be buried with him in his grave at Zhaoling.

From then on, the prestige and influence of this calligraphy grew continuously. It was studied by calligraphers for centuries, almost sparking an interpretative tradition of its own, although nobody had ever seen the original. However, in 1965, the archaeologist Guo Moruo suggested that the calligraphy of the "Orchid Pavilion" as we know it through its Tang and Song copies must have originated at a much later date than during Wang Xizhi's reported lifetime. Guo also suggested that the text itself was probably not composed by Wang Xizhi. From these findings one might conclude that the sublime model which inspired the entire development of Chinese calligraphy may never have existed. The case clearly points to the hyperreality that can occur in a culture in which the material aspect of objects is of secondary importance.

"DISNEYFICATION"

Some people find that visiting China today is very much like participating in a game of "Fake or Real." New imitations of historical buildings are constructed everywhere, which is strangely at odds with the traditional Western view that "imitation is crime." As one blogger noted, the only way to distinguish genuine past architecture from an imitation is to find out if an entrance fee is required. And even when the building is advertized as "authentic" it might be fake by European standards.

Can this Chinese phenomenon be compared with the American approach of "Disneyfication"? Both traditions attempt to find, in paradoxical fashion, authenticity and identity in a process of imitation. Both are engaged in what Umberto Eco called a "hand-to-hand battle with history."[27] And their respective results are amazingly transparent in terms of motive.

Matthew Arnold once described Americans as desperate to find "a substitute for that real sense of elevation which human nature instinctly craves — a substitute which may do as well as the genuine article."[28] This can be opposed to a more conservative "European mind," in which imitation or even restoration is seen to express the point of view of the imitators or restorers rather than the efforts of the artist. Any appropriation of the original efforts by the imitators is thus "immoral."

Traditionally, in the Western consciousness, imitation has also been considered "bad" because of its link to the upward-striving merchant or middle classes, eager to imitate the aristocratic lifestyle. In the late eighteenth century, cheap copies of expensive paintings were almost mass-produced, and the infamous phenomenon of "kitsch" made its first appearance. However, once a bourgeois individual had established her social position as quasi-equivalent with that of the aristocrat, she was expected to discard such items and embrace more sophisticated aesthetic and ethical standards. In a word, she was asked to recognize the value of "real" things. This explains why, within the European mindset, reality and truth are immediately linked. The effect of this ethic can still be felt today. Thus, Eco's claim that "compulsive imitation prevails where wealth has no history" remains plausible for many people.[29]

Both American and Chinese ambitions to retrieve a psycho-social quality through imitation succeed in circumventing the usual requirements of authenticity. Eco, in his *Travels in Hyperreality*, highlighted one blatant American case: an imitation of the Venus de Milo in the Palace of Living Arts in Buena Park, Los Angeles. This work was quintessentially hyperreal because it transgressed the mechanics of simple imitation. The original sculpture, which has no arms, was created some time between 130 and 100 BC in Greece. However, the imitative version in Los Angeles has arms, for which the surprised visitor is given the justification that this is the "Venus de Milo brought to life as she was in the days when she posed for the unknown sculptor, in approximately 200 B.C."[30] Thus, the reproduction represents "reality" as it may have appeared to the artist while he was creating the sculpture. It retrieves a state anterior to — or more original than — anything presented by the original. It is through mechanisms like these that, in Eco's view, the completely real may be identified with the completely fake, allowing absolute unreality to be presented as real. The parallel with Wang Xizhi's "Orchid Pavilion" calligraphy is obvious. Here, reality is not simply a quality that *can be reproduced*, but is rather *the thing that is always already reproduced* (which is precisely the definition of hyperreality).

Daniel Boorstin has observed another aspect of the "collapsing of history" in American civilization, where a tradition of cultural continuity frequently renders history as homogenous. Boorstin argued that Americans see the founding fathers as their contemporaries, which "also explains why they see no wrong with re-creating life in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries in perfect replicas of the past sold in theme parks and 'historic' villages for tourists."[31] Eco offered another example: the reconstructed Oval Office of the President of the United States at Fortress Solitude in Austin, Texas **(FIG. 4)**. In Eco's view, the aim of this reconstruction is to supply a "sign" that will be immediately forgotten, because

FIGURE 4. *Oval Office replica in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum in Austin, Texas. Courtesy of Mary Hartneg.*

"the sign aims to be the thing, to abolish the distinction of the reference, the mechanism of replacement. Not the image of the thing but its plaster cast. Its double, in other words."[32] Again, this overlaps with Li Shiqiao's description of Chinese architectural copies:

> *There is also a celebration of copies; copies of iconic traditional Chinese and Western buildings as well as formal emulations of the postmodern are common in China. In many ways, these material resurrections of famous architecture in China are probably not always perceived as "false copies"; they acquire, in their materialization, a very strong sense of the real thing. The distinction between what is authentic and what is copied becomes blurred.*[33]

In these cases, both Chinese and Americans see their architecture in terms of universals instead of particulars — or rather, as *types* instead of *tokens*. America and China thus share a reconstructive mania.[34] Both have developed methods of producing a state of hyperreality in which imitations are seen as the "real" thing. In China, an endless process of copying is supposed to produce culture. Similarly, when analyzing American's imitative obsessions, Eco concluded the goal is "to establish reassurance through imitation."[35] This fully concurs with the Chinese situation. Both the Suzhou Pagoda and the peculiar reproduction of the Venus of Milo are samples of psycho-historical material; they are not "real" in the sense of historically transmitted material but in terms of historically transmitted ideas.

A large part of the Disney Corporation's contemporary success has been based on exactly this insight. According to Michael Steiner, Walt Disney realized very early on "that people prefer tidy replicas to the real thing."[36] American history was a primordial subject for Disney (he dreamed of transforming the frontier into a place where people might reenact the past). And yet the original Disneyland meticulously avoided *cultural* references in its depictions of history. Instead, it inscribed these depictions into a civilizational context by "whitewashing history to reenact a sanitized, mythical version of redemption in the wilderness."[37]

Typically, Disney attractions today transform history into flat and unhistorical manifestations by avoiding any form of cultural concreteness. In Disney's "Mystery Tours," villains are battled and defeated, proving that good prevails over evil. In Frontierland, the primitive cannibals rising on the riverbanks mimic the gestures of Indians who have already been beaten.

At the EPCOT theme park, a "world showcase" uses pavilions to present eleven nations and their histories **(FIG. 5)**. Yet, as W.F. van Wert pointed out, "The birth of the printing press is depicted [but] Gutenberg's name is suppressed. The lack of concrete data feels deliberate."[38] Likewise, the ancient Greeks are shown staging a play, but we don't know which one. Through such devices, EPCOT's offers a brief glimpse not into history, but into the future. We assist in a

> *. . . contentless narrative that hurries through the centuries, names no names, offers no dates, only to rise to a crescendo at the ride's end, revealing both the inadequacies of the past and the large corporation that is* already *seeing to our needs in the future, and, finally, a showroom or display to make us forgetful of the past and seduce us into the future.*[39]

FIGURE 5. *Italy Buildings in Epcot Theme Park, Orlando, Florida. Courtesy of Thomas Grim.*

According to van Wert, it all ends with the naming of AT&T, "as though the entire history of communication were but an anticipation, some sort of pagan awaiting of this global, multinational titan god with *American* for the first name."[40] After merely epidermal contact with history visitors are returned to the reality of American civilization, which is advertized as a utopian future. For Baudrillard, this is how Disneyland "erases time by synchronizing all the periods, all the cultures, in a single traveling motion, by juxtaposing them in a single scenario. Thus, it marks the beginning of real, punctual and unidimensional time, which is also without depth."[41]

Both the above-mentioned architectural works from Suzhou and Disney attractions can be experienced as spaces where history and locality have ceased to exist. In the Chinese case, history is abstract and spaceless because it is only present in the form of texts; at Disneyland, a sanitized history appears enhanced in the form of a wonderland to be consumed instead of "authentically" experienced. What these realities have in common is that they have been artificially reduced and aestheticized to remove those ethical components some critics deem necessary to qualify them as "real." Such critics believe that any truly historic building (even a ruin) conveys the sort of "immortality" that can reside only in a concrete artifact. No other way of preserving the afterlife of the past is accepted.

REALLY REAL VS. REALLY FAKE

What precisely distinguishes a real city from a fake city? Eco has explained that the difference between the real New Orleans and the fake one at Disneyland is that in the former, the historical infrastructure "has remained as it was, with its low houses, its cast-iron balconies and arcades, reasonably rusted and worn, its tilting buildings that mutually support one another, like buildings you see in Paris or Amsterdam, repainted perhaps, but not too much."[42] Meanwhile, in the latter, authenticity is established merely in the form of a civilizational concept **(FIG. 6)**. This means that in "real" places, authenticity installs itself in a rather complex fashion: it is produced through a critical process constantly comparing the present civilizational situation with a more historical culture, and vice versa. Disneyland and the environments it determines, on the other hand, according to Baudrillard, represent an "atemporal utopia by producing all the events, past or future, on simultaneous screens, and by inexorably mixing all the sequences as they would or will appear to a different civilization than ours."[43]

While in hyperreality there is no tension between history and past, a traditional Western mindset would be unhappy with creating "culture" in the Chinese sense of an absolute quality referring only to itself. Instead, it would strive to locate culture within an overall plan of (Platonic, scientific) civilization. Nor would it be satisfied with creating a Disneyland civilization that maintains no relation with real culture. It would recognize historical monuments as cultural artifacts only when they have been established through a (philosophical) discourse *as components of a civilization*.

Neither Chinese historical architecture (as is described by Leys and Mote) nor Disneyland are held to these standards. They are not concrete objects, but rather hyperreal arrangements. In the Chinese case, the sign refers to a mythical and cultural past of which the cultural sign is an integral part. It refers only to itself. At Disney attractions, the sign

FIGURE 6. *New Orleans Square in Disneyland Park, Anaheim, California. Courtesy of Joe Penniston.*

refers merely to the civilizational context *that it is supposed to establish* — which means, again, that it refers only to itself. This is why the real New Orleans eludes hyperreality while the fake one does not. Eco thus noted that the New Orleans wax museum avoids the circus feeling of cheap magic, and that "the explanatory panels have an undertone of skepticism and humor. When an episode is legendary, it is presented as such, and perhaps with the admission that it is more fun to reconstruct legend than history."[44] Eco clearly shows that the "sense of history" — that is, the act of *critically thinking about one's own history* — allows an escape from the temptations of hyperreality. The history of the real New Orleans is tragic, as are all histories and all acts of preservation. The real New Orleans is inscribed in a battle against time and history. The outcome will never be one-dimensional, but rather a dynamic play of living and present realities.

For the traditional point of view, "real" cities are cities that have managed to preserve their historical contexts. At the same time, some cities — Tokyo, for example — are perceived as neither real nor fake, but as *surreal*, because they are submitted to a process of hybridization that has taken place without regard to historical context.[45] It is certainly no coincidence that a non-Western city comes to mind as the prime example of such a "nonreal" place. Japanese Shintoism bears many similarities with Confucianism when it comes to the preservation of history. Still, in spite of the vast landscapes of simulacra that it contains, Tokyo is not a hyperreal city; it evokes an uncanny kind of urban reality that is surreal and strange without being simply fake.

In hyperreality the link between fake and real is established in a completely different fashion. Disneyland is a perfect example. As in the Confucian mind, where a utopian future is derived from an idealized culture, Disney attractions suggest a utopian vision premised on the abstract principles of an ideal civilization. In this sense, Disneyland is more than a theme park. It appears as a concept whose architecture systematically supplants "authentic places" by creating abstract environments whose theme is not simply "city" but, more importantly, an optimistic vision of the future. Walt Disney suppressed this literal sense of history when he redefined New Orleans in terms of pure civilization. One contemporary report, described by Steiner, tells how Disney was convinced his reconstruction was superior to the original because it answered to higher civilizational standards. When New Orleans Square was unveiled in 1966 he was miffed by a compliment from the visiting mayor of New Orleans that it looked "just like home." "Well," was his reply, "it's a lot cleaner."[46]

Within the Chinese concept of architectural authenticity there is no place for such a "sense of history" either — just as there is no space for the tragic developments of life in any hyperreality. Yet absolute unreality is offered as real presence by following a diametrically opposite approach. The sign of the Maple Bridge in Suzhou indicates a psycho-historic and poetic place that is justified through literary history. It does not signify a real existing object, and, in this sense, it is its double. For the Chinese, the Maple Bridge is real precisely because it is *not* real — that is, because it is not "merely" an item of civilization, but of Chinese culture. This is not far from the creation of a utopian form of history, of a hyperreal place that can dispense with the original. Leys thus mentioned a Ming scholar from the sixteenth century who delivered the "record" of a garden called Wuyou, which means "the Garden-that-does-not-exist." The scholar noted that in Chinese history, "many famous gardens of the past have entirely disappeared and survive only on paper in literary descriptions. Why not skip the preliminary stage of actual existence and jump directly into the final state of literary existence which, after all, is the common end of all gardens?"[47]

Walt Disney himself might have called the Chinese *cultural* reality a fantasy, but he would have claimed that the "fantasy" of Disneyland is *real* because it is *only* a part of American civilization. An anecdote has it that somebody calling Disneyland "a nice fantasy" in his presence was informed by the master that "the fantasy isn't here." As he continued,

> *This is very real. The park is reality. The people are natural here; they're having a good time; they're communicating. This is what people really are. The fantasy is out there, outside the gates of Disneyland, where people have hatreds and prejudices. It's not really real!*[48]

Though both the Chinese strategy and the Disneyland approach run counter to certain common sensibilities of what is authentic and what is not, there are prominent qualities that distinguish both. Traditionally, the confusion of ethical and aesthetic categories leads to the production of kitsch — which is often the case in Disneyland, but cannot be located in Chinese architecture. In everyday language, the same constellation is expressed by saying that these buildings are "superficial." The Chinese approach is thus opposed to the American one in that it is based not on the aesthetic proclivities of the nouveau-riche, who *lack* culture, but on the learning of the Confucian scholar, who has an *abundance* of culture. Still, the Chinese reality made of letters contradicts some common-sensical criteria of authenticity. Within this logic, a cultural sign must have a certain amount of "depth" — that is, it should refer to a concrete and "real" point that can be located on the time-space grid of civilization. When it comes to the perception of architecture, "historical reality" is acknowledged as a quality flowing out of the interrelationship between culture and civilization. This is why, in Eco's words, "history will not be imitated."[49]

Defenders of both the Chinese and the "American" positions might claim that an absolute fake or any construction of hyperreality is exempt from those ethical requirements. In both cases, these requirements remain based on an unreflected conception of what is real and what is authentic. For the Chinese, anything that refers to the vast reservoir of Chinese culture is authentic enough because its relationship with this culture *makes* it authentic (just as the Japanese believe that the Ise Shrine's authenticity is produced through its anchoring in the traditional reenactment of authentic rituals). The opposite "Disney" position would be that the authenticity of the copy is derived from its well-established place within the "real" sphere of American civilization.

Both justifications are circular, which grants them a sort of self-evident character that few logical arguments can defy. Chinese history consists of words; it settles, through a self-referential gesture, within the very cultural context that it is supposed to create. The Disney aesthetic is also justified through a circular gesture: it exists as a civilizational phenomenon taken out of any historical or cultural context, thus managing to establish its own environment. As a fiction and artifice, Disneyland justifies its existence by referring to an American civilization writ large — a civilization that it actually helped to invent.

By and large, the classical Western approach to historical perception is Platonic; it proceeds from the "fake" appearance of things to "real" historical events — or to the vestiges of the events it wants to acknowledge, and which can clearly be established in terms of authentic time and authentic space. At the root of this attitude is, of course, the ambition to overcome the erosion of time, to aggressively fight decay and the laws of nature. The Chinese have realized that such efforts are in vain. However, as mentioned, far from abandoning history altogether, the Chinese only abandon history's material expressions.

To a Platonic mindset, the Chinese past made of words will seem elusive because it cannot be pinned down to something real. This is exactly the problem that critics of Confucianism tend to recite. Lu Xun, for example, defined the Chinese past as a perpetually elusive enemy, as an invisible, immaterial, but indestructible, shadow or ghost. But it is important to crystallize this paradox: the fluid Chinese concept of history can also appear as progressive and flexible because it does not insist on the literal preservation of material things, and because it is not attached to history as an object. And some will point to the positive impact of the dynamism resulting from such an attitude.

EVALUATING AUTHENTICITY

Today, many people find that having the "real thing" reserves them a place outside a dull consumer society excessively governed by materialist standards for which authenticity means nothing. In modern capitalism the desire to possess something unique and "real," which has not been mass-produced or commodified for consumption, has thus acquired elitist moral appeal. Authenticity brings with it the spiritual and aesthetic values of tradition, while imitation kills those values. However, the status of authenticity is not as homogenous as it appears to be. The purpose of the preceding reflections has not been to celebrate hyperreality of any kind, but rather to develop a critical stance toward both hyperreality and common concepts of authenticity. What is needed is a more reflected conception of what is real and what is authentic. Reality is not historical because it refers in a straightforward way to a historical fact (in which case it could still be an imitated reality or a psycho-historic fact that overlaps with the historical reality). On the contrary, any historical reality must have passed, both as a material item and as a cultural sign, through a filter of civilization.

Neither absolute fake nor the construction of hyperreality should be exempt from those ethical requirements. Thus, "Disneyland hyperreality" cannot be combated by insisting on the importance of material authenticity. It is here that the "Chinese way" of engaging abstract historical components within the concept of authenticity provides important insights. Authenticity is never a stable "material" entity; rather, in some way, all monuments are "monuments of the mind." "Disneyfication" exaggerates the hyperreal component, and some will always argue that the traditional Chinese way of viewing history is equally exaggerated. The only constructive way of dealing with the conundrum is to engage a critical discourse between both stances — that is, to compare present civilizational situations with a more historical culture, and vice versa.

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Geographies of Dis/Topia in the Nation-State: Israel, Palestine, and the Geographies Of Liberation

RON J. SMITH

Since the dawn of the twenty-first century there have been numerous calls to break with the tradition of nationalism. Even so, the state remains vital for those seeking liberation. Denied a representative form of government, safety, or autonomy, the colonized may embrace a vision of liberation in the form of a independent state. This article interrogates the dual image of the nation-state as both a space of utopian liberation and dystopic violence and repression. It focuses on the pernicious nature of the nation-state vision for peoples on both sides of the Palestinian/Israeli divide.

A utopia is necessarily, through its very definition, a placeless place: it cannot exist beyond the imaginaries of its proponents. The utopia embodies ideals — social, political, and otherwise — but can never be attained. Michel Foucault famously referred to a notion of heterotopia, a place that exists in space, but whose fantastic nature cannot be realized in any real location.[1] And Bendict Anderson has noted that nationalism requires such an idyllic vision of the unattainable in order to mobilize its adherents.[2]

The Zionist project for the creation of a Jewish state, culminating in 1948, relied both upon a utopian reordering of territory based on unrealistic claims about the nature of the land itself as savage and uninhabited and on the promise of movements for ethnic purity in the state and in labor.[3] The Israeli occupation of Palestine thus resulted in the creation of an ethnically Jewish state on territory inhabited by a largely non-Jewish, indigenous Palestinian population. Today this occupation has, however, created conditions that approach the original ideal's inverted dystopia as a result of spatial practices enacted through systems and organs of disempowerment, displacement and killing.

Globally, the colonial project created horrors for the colonized, engendering militant responses, both violent and nonviolent. This is no less the case today in Palestine. This contradiction was evident in Hannah Arendt's writings on the Eichmann trial in 1961, for

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even at that early date it was clear the Israeli state was predicated on the destruction of Palestinian aspirations.[4] Palestinians by and large seek a state to represent them, to protect them from harm and guarantee their safety. Like the Zionists, in envisioning this state, they, too, mobilize a utopian vision, seeing the state as an answer to the depredations of the Israeli occupation. So far, this state has been deferred; it is clear that no party can, or will, guarantee the aspirations of the Palestinians. At the same time, current conditions are not sustainable, and state-based solutions remain the only viable proposals for an end to the interminable hell that is the occupation.

This article seeks to understand the changing role of the state through the lens of subaltern geopolitics, an approach that represents a novel way of tackling questions of state-making in the contemporary era.[5] In this respect, the problems of Israel-Palestine offer a telling case study and a challenge to the political work carried out by the variously utopian and dystopian visions associated with the nation-state.

Starting from the Israeli perspective, the article critically reevaluates notions of the state in popular discourse by examining the nationalist narrative as represented by popular authors writing in the Israeli press. Because the official, popular, Israeli narrative relies on assumptions about the attitudes of individual Palestinians, it then puts this narrative in conversation with quotidian Palestinian narratives, gathered through 56 personal interviews throughout the West Bank and Gaza between 2006 and 2011.

It is precisely the problem of being a nation without a state that makes it necessary to look for Palestinian narratives through ethnography. In other words, there is no state-sanctioned voice of Palestine as such, and certainly none of the accouterments of the state such as news media, museums, and other publicly funded institutions of nation-building — let alone a national press corps. What exists in their stead is the Palestinian Authority, which, since its establishment — and particularly since the U.S.-sanctioned coup d'état of 2007 — has been the organ of the Fatah movement. Political parties may have their organs of propaganda and representation, but without a cohesive central state, these voices are drowned out by Israeli and Western representations of who Palestinians are, what they believe, and what they stand for. This is not to say there is no master Palestinian narrative — for there most certainly is. Rather, to understand the contemporary experience, it is vital to seek the voice of individuals to understand how the condition of occupation promotes a utopian vision of the state among the stateless.

APPROACHING NATIONALISM AS UTOPIAN VISION

An important chronology of events has led to the current dynamic of Israel and Palestine. The Levant, the lands of the eastern Mediterranean, were historically inhabited by a diverse population, and the territory of Palestine provided a central location for the migration and settlement of these peoples. For hundreds of years Palestine was ruled by the Ottoman Turks, until their empire fell at the end of World War I and control of the area passed to a British Mandate. By this time the Zionist movement had already begun a series of waves of immigration, known as *aliyah*. The first, begun in the 1880s, brought Eastern European Jews to Palestine in hopes of creating a Jewish state. But by the 1920s a series of major conflicts had broken out between the indigenous Arab majority and these newcomers. These incidents represented a clash of nationalisms, but they also had an anti-colonial character. Thus, both Zionists and Palestinians struggled against the British, while rank-and-file Palestinians struggled against what they saw as a Zionist nationalist invasion. The year 1947 marked the beginning of the establishment the Israeli state, which included the withdrawal of British forces in 1948 and culminated in the signing of the Rhodes Armistice in 1949. Then, in 1956, Israel embarked on a war of expansion, temporarily occupying Gaza and parts of the Sinai Desert before withdrawing to the 1948 borders. And in the years that followed Israel continued to expand as a result of a series of armed conflicts with its neighbors.

While Palestinian resistance has been present in some form since the beginning of the occupation, it culminated in the largely nonviolent outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987. This event ignited the popular imagination of the West and represented a significant step in the internationalization of the conflict. The Intifada ended with the signing of the Oslo Interim Accords in 1993, a series of temporary agreements which established the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza. While Oslo was hailed as a major step toward peace, it was also followed by an increase in the construction of Israeli settlements on occupied lands, and it was marked by continued Israeli military occupation and control of Palestinian resources and territory. In short, it did not bring any real sovereignty for Palestinians. Then, in 2000, the Oslo period came to an end with the beginning of the second Intifada and the Israeli "reoccupation" of the West Bank and Gaza.

Popular liberation struggles take a number of forms, but as James Blaut has adeptly demonstrated, their goal is intrinsically imbricated and conflated with nationalism. The situation is complex and riddled with contradictions: the current world system of nation-states is, in itself, a construction of Western European colonialism. In recent years many authors have foretold the end of nationalism, either through neoliberal globalization or internationalism, and they have focused on the contradictions in the very notion of national liberation. A number have already heralded the end of the nation-state through a process of "flattening" — the removal of restrictions to trade, ostensibly creating a liberal vision of economic equivalence punctuated by competitive advantage.[6] Others, in response, have described the collapse of the nation-state system as inevitable in the face of international grass-roots mobilization.[7]

These various analyses, while intended to be optimistic, may be a bit premature, and they ignore the revitalization of imperial militarism powered by American nationalism, for example.[8] Likewise, they cannot explain the pervasive call for state sovereignty within many social movements for liberation. Blaut is helpful in this regard, as he has explained the continuing importance of the state in the context of popular struggle.[9] Such analyses are significant because they emphasize how claims about the irrelevance of the state have been deeply exaggerated in academic discourse. Indeed, the events of 2011 in the Middle East, while serving as examples of international popular struggle, were also deeply rooted in attempts to seize control of individual nation-states — in Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen and Syria, Bahrain and beyond.

The notion of freedom can best be addressed through the experiences of those for whom it is so completely denied. Palestinians are such a population — denied citizenship and statehood, part of the Arab World, but distinct in identity. As one resident of the town of Bir Zeit explained to me: "There were three losers of the First World War — Armenians, Kurds, and Palestinians. None of us got a state."

Clearly, the state is the fundamental concern of geopolitics. Thus, the end goal of many nationalist movements is the creation of a state, a space and an apparatus that represents the struggling nation, a peer in a world of nation-states. Yet my research rejects the notion of states as monolithic entities, seeking instead to interrogate the notions of geopolitics through the lived experience of the subaltern. I thus return to the question of the state, but examine its conflation with freedom through the voices of those who have been denied both. Partha Chatterjee has described nationalism as a "derivative discourse," which may be problematized as a colonial notion and a distraction for those seeking true popular liberation.[10] However, this article considers the ways in which the state may be hybridized through what Vicente Rafael has called a process of "translation."[11] In this process, Frantz Fanon has argued, the foreign notion of the state may become something new in the hands of the colonized, representing an end to the violence of colonization.[12]

In the case of the occupied Palestinian territories, the Israeli presence has created a particular political, carceral, geography, which varies dramatically from place to place. One might think of this as creating "microgeographies of occupation." It is important to examine the practices of resistance to occupation. But rather than include an exhaustive analysis of all violent and nonviolent (or, more precisely, popular vs. armed[13]) practices, this article will examine the processes by which nationalism is *translated* into a local phenomenon. Nationalism thus becomes imbricated with notions of liberation and an overall strategy of *sumoud*, or "steadfastness." Seen this way, nationalism is the unifying feature of *sumoud*. Thus, while the occupation functions through separation and isolation of Palestinian enclaves, Palestinian resistance remains national in character, insisting on the identity, culture and space represented by the phrase *min al nahr ila al bahr*, "from the river to the sea."

Nationalism as a social movement must mobilize a vision of a utopian ideal. The binary of utopia/dystopia is thus far from unique to Zionism, and it is present in most discourse about colonies.[14] This is particularly true of Western colonialism, in which a utopian order is supposed to be established on the dystopian disorder of the native population.[15] In Zionism, the ideal is of a culturally homogeneous state, one that protects the Jewish people from the depredations of anti-Semitism. Israel, then, was created in the model of Western liberal democracies; but, like all colonies, it suffers from an intractable contradiction. In the case of Israel, this fundamental contradiction lies in this notion of a democratic, Jewish state. In a territory with an indigenous non-Jewish majority, the possibility of a democracy that only recognizes Jews as full citizens is an oxymoron.

In contemporary Zionism, the specter of the Holocaust is consistently mobilized both to justify and promote the nationalist cause. The ideal of Israel is thus as a safe haven for Jews, and Jews alone. But Zionist nationalism has traditionally also meant Ashkenazi nationalism, as the major parties have always been dominated by the Ashkenazi elite. Paradoxically, the Israeli definition of a Jew is racialized from a European notion of ethnicity.[16] This racialization papers over historical differences between communities, and it creates a white vision of the Jew, even though Ashkenazi Jews represent a minority of the Jewish population in Israel.[17] Israeli writers have acknowledged these racial and cultural cleavages in Israeli society.[18] And some have even suggested that the only force stronger than the fracturing forces of Israeli stratification is the existential threat that Israeli governments evoke in their portrayal of Palestinians.[19] This definition is empowered by the right of return for Jews, allowing anyone of Jewish descent to immigrate to Israel and attain citizenship through a process called *aliyah*, or "ascension."

Indeed, Israeli nationalism is rife with contradictions, as the Israeli state deploys a language of Western modernity to promote itself as the sole democracy in the Middle East — language that does much to support Israeli military and political actions. The deepest contradiction here is the paradox of liberal modernity in the face of the modern atrocities that mobilized international support for the Jewish state: those of the Holocaust in Europe.

The Israeli author Yitzhak Laor has examined in painstaking detail the problem of Israel defining itself through the Western lens and detaching itself from its neighbors, while attempting to mobilize fears of Western anti-Semitism to promote itself among Western powers. Laor has thus pointed out in his reading of numerous Israeli writers, notably Amos Oz, that the defining characteristic of the Israeli state is a yearning for ethnic purity. Clearly, this ethnic notion of statehood has its roots in the very origins of Zionism, a movement that maintained as its sole concern the establishment of

a Jewish state in Palestine. This ideal is complicated by the demographic problem — the realization that if true democracy is realized in Israel, eventually Jews will be outnumbered by non-Jews, destroying the possibility of a pure Jewish state.

In many ways Palestinian and Israeli visions of the state talk past one another, and there are significant differences in the portrayal of the future for each nation. As Ghazi Falah has pointed out, there is a refusal on the part of the Israeli leadership to create solid borders. The state is an ephemeral institution, harking back to Ratzel's vision of an organic being, needing to expand to survive. And so the territory of Israel has continued to expand, from its initial existence as a series of outposts in the first *aliyah* to a state-space encompassing the 1948 and 1967 territories.[20] In this sense, it is the ethnic makeup of the state which defines it.[21]

This expansive and organic vision may be contrasted with the prevalent Palestinian nationalist narrative.

> *Palestine to me is my life and everything. Everything related to me is Palestine. Its boundary is every speck of dirt from the Mediterranean sea until the [Jordan] river.*
>
> — H, Ras al-Tira

H, quoted above, lives in a small village surrounded by the Israeli wall in Area C of the West Bank. He speaks quite clearly to the primary vision of a Palestinian state: from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. The Palestinians with whom I spoke in the course of my research had a vision of a nationalism that demanded a Palestinian state as an entity rooted in geographic, not ethnic, boundaries. When I asked, "Where is Palestine?" the answer often was "*Min al nahr illa al bahr*" ("from the river to the ocean"). This phrase refers to the historical boundaries of Mandate-era Palestine. By comparison, in normal conversation, the 1967 boundaries are represented as a more immediate future.

Israelis interpret this geography as the embodiment of Gamal Abd Al-Nasser's alleged threat to "push them into the sea," a dystopic, millenarian recall of past genocides. However, what separates the Palestinian nationalist vision from that of the Israeli utopic state is that there is no attempt to define its ethnic makeup. It is merely a state where Palestinians can live in relative peace and freedom. This lack of ethnic demands on a future state is present in proclamations from Palestinian leaders that in the event of a Palestinian state coming into being on the 1967 borders, Jewish settlers who choose to remain will be granted Palestinian citizenship. This discrepancy is not merely a diplomatic flourish; not one of my respondents, regardless of political affiliation, expressed a vision of an ethnically pure Palestinian state.

> *Freedom to me is the disappearance of every Israeli in the world — Israelis, not Jews. Israelis are nationalists; nationalism is what they are doing, not religion, and they are using Judaism as a shield. Freedom can only be reached if every Israeli disappears. Our religion respects other religions, and we respect them too, and Jews are People of the Book. But what we have here are not Jews that take things from a religious perspective; they take them from a nationalist perspective, and they want to remove Arab nationalism and replace it with Israeli nationalism hidden by religion.*
>
> — M

Here M, a council member from a small village in the Qalqiliyah district, explicitly describes the problem as one of nationalism, not ethnic conflict. She takes pains to make clear that her anger is not directed toward Jews, but toward people who self-identify as Zionists and who take part in the Zionist project. This does not mean that the Palestinian vision of a collective state is of a perfect peace between Israeli Jews and locals — although some of my interviewees espoused this ideal in response to further questions. Rather, the demographic makeup of a future Palestine was just not a central concern to my participants. Theirs is no vision of an Islamic republic — or even an exclusively Arab republic. Partly, it is derived from the fact that the Palestinian population, itself, is far from homogenous. There are deep political and religious divisions within it, and Palestinian Arabs include Muslims, Christians, Jews, and members of other religions.

Certainly, there are deep divisions within Israeli society, too, but the national myth of Zionism primarily concerns the securing of a Jewish, Ashkenazi nation — even when non-European Jews make up the majority of the population. For many Palestinians, by contrast, the nation means freedom and safety, not homogeneity and ethnocracy. For them, the state represents freedom of movement, freedom from the biopower of a hostile state, and the safety to exist, to maintain lands, to live in peace.

The territories of the Zionist dream were originally imagined as the Wild West, a frontier, a settling of the East. This pioneering spirit was mirrored in the early architecture of Wall and Tower.[22] And this process of controlling space, attempting to tame territory to make way for immigration and the national ideal, continues to this day in the vertical domination of space through settler architecture.[23] Likewise, the early programs of claiming territory embraced a project of "making the desert bloom" through agricultural projects that were the forebears of modern Israeli agricultural industry. Much of this settlement practice was founded on ostensibly socialist ideals; yet, at their core, the majority of these settlements adhered to a notion of Hebrew labor, an attempt to promote the Jewish state through the exclusion of native workers.[24]

These early images of nation-building within Zionism clashed with the simultaneous destruction of Palestinian homes and communities, which reached a fever pitch coincident to the creation of the Israeli state. Perhaps the most

intricate documentation of this process is Walid Khalidi's *All That Remains*, a photographic tally of the villages and homes depopulated first by Zionist forces and then by Israelis. This wanton destruction of Palestinian society can explain how Palestinian liberation movements came to envision themselves through the anti-colonial rhetoric of the second half of the twentieth century. Images from Khalidi's book create the feeling of a place haunted. But the inhabitants and their descendants were not all killed; they live on in squalid refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and beyond. Meanwhile, their former settlements have been reinhabited or abandoned: mosques have become kosher fish and falafel restaurants for more recent immigrés; entire villages have been grown over by national parks or transformed into artist colonies (FIG. 1).[25] These refugees live in their own limbo, in vertical cinder-block shacks, the structure of their densely populated camps a commemoration of the homes from which they were driven, and to which they hope to someday return.[26]

Clearly, the notion that Palestine was an unpopulated territory was ludicrous during the last part of the nineteenth century. It is for this reason that many authors have attempted to parse the meaning of the quintessential phrase of the Zionist movement abroad: "A land without a people for a people without a land." While the exact origins of this phrase are debated, there can be no question that it helped define the actions of the new immigrants to Palestine. However, the main idea in the phrase is not that the land was completely unpopulated; rather, it concerns the definition of a valid "people."[27] This rhetoric is deeply ingrained in Zionist ideology, and it is imbricated with a similar notion, that Palestinians "were not using the land properly." This secondary notion has appeared in the discourse of my own extended family, who equate backwardness and a lack of respect for the land with the indigenous. Thus, the utopian vision of Palestine as the site of the future Jewish state set a stage for the development and resettlement projects of the Zionists, working hard to make the desert bloom.

However, this attitude also meant that from the time the Israeli state was established (and was subsequently recognized by the U.N. in 1949), the Palestinian population was governed under a state of emergency. Immediately recognized as a demographic threat and a potential fifth column, Palestinians in the 1948 territories lived under a regime of limited citizenship in the aftermath of a concerted campaign of ethnic cleansing.[28] My own mother, living in Haifa, described the process by which her family moved from one house to another — in her memory, at the behest of the British. These homes were built by Palestinians, lived in by Palestinians, but then used to provide shelter to Eastern European immigrants, who in turn gave quarter to paramilitary soldiers from the proto-Israeli Hagana whose goal was the creation of a Jewish state. In her own narrative, there was no consideration of the previous occupants of these homes. She said the Palestinians "just left," and her family replaced them.



FIGURE 1. *Mosque in Jaffa, 1948 territories, converted to a kosher fish and falafel restaurant. Note the stars of David on the signs and in the graffiti, signs of a neighborhood undergoing gentrification/Judaization.*

Certainly, her idealized memory was a result of her youth (she was eight years old when the state was established), but it was fortified by an Israeli master narrative that has never been contested except by the most radical historians.[29]

A CHRONOLOGY OF PLACE AND PLACELESSNESS

The defining voice of Zionism was that of Theodore Herzl, whose *Der Judenstadt* outlined plans for the creation of a Jewish state. A defining characteristic of Herzl's treatise was the absence of the native. A close reading of Herzl also belies the socialist presumption of early Zionism. Herzl was not proposing a classless utopia; his vision was the transplantation of European Jewish society as a whole to a new territory. This transplantation assumed the maintenance of class divisions, with working-class Jews expected to build their own homes and then homes for the elite. It was this wholesale transfer that made the final destination of Jewish migration less

important. By the time he wrote *Der Judenstadt*, Herzl was proposing either Argentina or Palestine as possible sites for this transplantation.

By attempting to ignore and discount the impact that environment has on society, Herzl, however, created an impossible utopia. Gershon Shafir has documented the results of this contradiction as it played out in the first waves of Jewish immigrants from Europe to Palestine, known respectively as the first and second *aliyah*.[30] The land of Palestine was no garden of Eden; life there was harsh, complicated for the early settlers by a lack of Western development. Under Ottoman rule it had been a backwater, and it remained so as the twentieth century began. This underdevelopment was not, however, a result of Palestinian barbarism; it was an effect of neglect by imperial powers who sought to control the region but not allow it to become equal to the core. Yet, after the initial wave of Zionists settled the territory, it became clear that Palestine was an inhabited country, and that the existing society would have deeply formative impacts on the society to come. It was from this reality that the construction of the Jewish state began, and with it, policies that resembled apartheid and other racially preferential colonial regimes.

What separates Israel and Palestine from other conflicts, however, is, in part, the seeming permanence of the occupation. For Palestinians, this began not in 1967 in the current occupied Palestinian territories, but in 1917 with the start of the British Mandate.[31] In this conceptualization, the occupying force simply changed hands to Israel in 1947/1948. It is significant that this timeline reflects the political disempowerment of the local Palestinian elite. Thus, the first Zionist settlers came in the 1880s, but the date at which the occupation began is set decades later.

Clearly, Palestinians indigenous to the region were unwilling to be removed in the interest of protecting Israeli notions of demographic perfection. And settler violence began right away, initiating the transformation of the Ottoman backwater into the maelstrom of violence that it is today. As part of this process, the displacement of Palestinians was unintentionally facilitated by the Ottomans. This was particularly the case in the aftermath of the Tanzimat reforms, wherein a new tally of Palestinian lands eroded traditional usufruct claims.[32]

As many Israeli historians have acknowledged, before 1948 there was great reluctance among orthodox Jewish rabbis and communities to promote the settlement of Palestine.[33] However, this reticence was eventually overcome, not by a reinterpretation of Jewish religious texts but through the insistence of the largely secular Zionist elite. And in the years since, various religious authorities have come to embrace the notion of settlement. Indeed, such authorities are now both its greatest proponents and the public face of the settler movement, often challenging any restriction placed on it (even though there is no serious desire to challenge the settlers from within the Israeli government). It is important to recognize, however, that Israeli settlers are not simply religious zealots. They include a large number of people motivated by secular, economic interest, who are seeking to take advantage of subsidies and lowered real estate costs in newly established towns and neighborhoods.

NATIVE AND SETTLER: 1948 AND 1967 AS IDENTITIES

Israel/Palestine is a land divided. Under the political and military control of the Israeli government and military, its major divisions can be distinguished both temporally and geographically. Temporally, the territory can be thought of as divided between lands incorporated into the state of Israel when it was established in 1948 and other areas. The former lands include the Naqab/Negev Desert in the south; the central coastal plain, including Tel Aviv, Haifa, and areas up to the Lebanese border at Rosh Haniqra/Ras an Naqoura; western Jerusalem and its environs; and al-Jalil/the Galilee in the inland north. In 1967, as a result of conquests in the Six Day War, Israel took control of the remainder of historical Palestine as well as the Sinai Desert and the Jilaan/Golan Heights. The Sinai Peninsula was subsequently returned to Egypt following the 1979 peace treaty, but the remaining territories continue to be under Israeli occupation. Of these, the Jilaan/Golan is not historically part of Palestine; it is Syrian territory under Israeli occupation. Thus, the area known as the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT) refers to Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem (even though the latter has been officially annexed by Israel, it is still considered under occupation).

This process of dispossession is not limited by chronology and geography. However, with regard to the 1948 territories, most Israeli critics consider it part of the guilt-ridden past. Thus, among liberal Israelis, the entirety of dispossession has been transposed to the West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestinian population remaining within the 1948 borders is thought of as living in comfort as a civilian minority. The lie of this transposition is betrayed by policies euphemistically referred to as gentrification (more accurately termed Judaization). This has meant the harassment and eviction of Palestinians from traditional Arab neighborhoods slowly converted to upscale Jewish ones in Akka, Jaffa and Haifa, and the ongoing struggles in the Naqab/Negev.[34]

While Palestinians living within the 1948 borders have been assimilated into Israeli society, their citizenship status is tenuous at best. The Israeli public still looks upon these Palestinians as a potential fifth column, and recent legislation has clarified their continuing outsider status. The recent documentary film *Slingshot HipHop* does much to detail the double standards and hardships that the 1948 community endures, even as citizens of the Jewish state.

In Palestine, place contributes in a very essential way to identity. For Palestinians, placed identities have direct, concrete effects. Whether one is a resident of the 1948 territories

FIGURE 2. *Part of a queue of Palestinian cars at Zaatara checkpoint. The poster on the road sign reads "The war is with the Arabs."*

or the 1967 territories has a dramatic impact on daily life. 1948 Palestinians are ostensibly citizens (while certainly not given equal treatment in practice to Jewish Israelis): they can vote in Knesset elections; they are governed by civil courts; and they have a greater freedom of movement. By contrast, 1967 Palestinians are denied entry to Jerusalem, live under direct military and civil occupation, are subject to harsh military law, and are actively prevented from political and economic life. This divide is further complicated by Israel's annexation of Jerusalem. Palestinians here are not full citizens of Israel, but they are by necessity allowed more freedom of movement. And further complicating these identities is the new "security" barrier, which creates a matrix of citizenship as a direct result of its route — cutting communities off from the rest of the West Bank, often marooning 1967 Palestinians on "the wrong side," with profound impacts on their freedoms **(FIG. 2)**.[35]

There is an equivalent geographical component to the notion of the Israeli settler. Clearly, all of what is now Israel was settled through the Zionist project, but the 1948 borders represent the division between "Israeli" and "settler." While settlers and their settlements are associated with religious fundamentalism, the historical record challenges this notion. Officially, it is residence in some of the territories that were overrun by the Israeli military in 1967 that is recognized as the rubric for whether one is or is not a settler. This is an important distinction, because although the first settlements appeared in al-Khalil, deep within the West Bank, in late 1967, they very soon began to appear around East Jerusalem. East Jerusalem, although it was captured like the rest of the West Bank and Gaza in the 1967 war, was annexed and officially "unified" by Israeli forces. This has allowed Israelis living in settlements there to avoid the label of settler, and to think of their developments as neighborhoods detached from the drama of the settler movement. Even so, these Jerusalem settlers are most certainly engaged in the settlement project. They receive subsidies, and they benefit from more affordable real estate, compared to Israelis living within the 1948 borders. Moreover, the construction of their homes has come as a direct result of the displacement of Palestinians from their homes and ancestral lands **(FIG. 3)**.

These Jerusalem-area settlements are heavily marketed throughout the country, and even abroad. There have been a number of cases of developers marketing homes here directly to American Jewish communities. Likewise, the English-language Israeli media is filled with advertisements for these new neighborhoods, often expounding their ethnically ho-

FIGURE 3. *A billboard outside a settlement advertising real estate. The Arabic writing has been plastered over on the road sign. The company promoting the homes is Amanah, one of the largest settler real estate corporations.*

FIGURE 4. *Encampment of family members evicted from their home by settlers in Sheikh Jarrah, Jerusalem.*

mogenous makeup. Again, the appeal in this case mobilizes the cloak of utopia, expounding the freedom of living in luxury, for a very good price, while it ignores the deepening conflict to which each of these new homes contributes.

Official settlements have also not been placed haphazardly around the West Bank; they serve political and military purposes. Thus, settlements in the Jerusalem district act as a ring around the city, attempting to separate it from the rest of the West Bank, with the intention of preventing any possible return of the city to Palestinians in a future peace deal. Over the past two years a battle has been fought over two of the last Palestinian neighborhoods, Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah, preventing the completion of this ring. As tensions increase between settlers and Palestinians in these neighborhoods, Palestinians are being driven out.[36]

While I was interviewing Palestinians living in Sheikh Jarrah, settlers came to a house from which a family had just been evicted. This was clearly a provocation, and the family, which now lives on the street in front of their home, was eating a traditional evening breakfast for Ramadan **(FIG. 4)**. As the settlers left the house, one of the members of the evicted family shouted: "You can't treat us like this. This is Jerusalem; this is not Hebron!" The implication was that Jerusalem is a shared city, and that settlers should not expect to get away with behavior that characterizes their efforts deeper in the West Bank. Yet, as recent events make clear, Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah will continue to be Hebronized. House by house, the neighborhoods are being annexed to build new settlements and a religious theme park.

In Palestine the power to name is also of immediate and practical importance. Naming is a clear demonstration of the power to define, commonly an integral part of the colonial project.[37] The father of Jerusalem deputy mayor Meron Benvenisti was directly involved in the renaming of originally Arab sites.[38] In Hebrew designations, biblical names are prevalent, seeking to create a connection to the ancient past — whether that past exists in the archeological record or only in the imagination of planners.

On roads throughout the West Bank, signs are maintained in Hebrew, English and Arabic. But what may be unclear to the Westerner is that the Arabic is almost always a transliteration of the Hebraized name, and that the traditional Arabic names have been ignored. Moreover, the very names of Arab villages may be omitted, with signs providing only the names of nearby settlements. Yet, for even this minimal placement of Arabic, the reaction of settlers and their governors is harsh. Many Arabic names are stickered over, often with settler slogans. And recently the Israeli minister of transportation advocated the removal of the last vestiges of Arabic names from all signs in Jerusalem.[39]

OCCUPATION IS A PLACE: LIMBO AS DYSTOPIA

It is important to define occupation as a condition, a state of existence. Occupation is the destruction of sovereignty in a territory and its administration by a foreign power. As such, it is commonly considered a military condition. Under such a condition, certain freedoms and operations of the local government are suspended; the government may even be dissolved and replaced by a military government established by the occupying power. Occupation is foreseen in international law as the result of military conquest, and is governed by international treaties and the Geneva Convention. However, the central underpinning of occupation is its temporary nature: occupation is a state of limbo, between annexation and withdrawal. It is not intended to last indefinitely. It is a middle-state designed to act as a placeholder until a final outcome is determined.

While acknowledged as a geopolitical condition, occupation has profound impacts on its subjects. This was clear in comments by one Balata resident:

> *Of course there's nothing harder than occupation. Anything you face, basic issues you face, could be solved, but occupation and these mental and emotional constraints can't disappear; they stay with you.*
>
> — I, Nablus

In 1975 the U.N. General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism. Many in Israel and elsewhere have challenged this declaration — and indeed, it is more precise to relate Zionism to colonialism, especially colonialism in the European mold. There are some particularities, however, that make Zionism and the actions of the Israeli state somewhat different from earlier colonialisms. The historian Ilan Pappé has maintained that Zionism is different from European colonialism because the latter was usually supported politically, financially and militarily by an already established state.[40] His analysis does not, however, eliminate the notion that Zionism is indeed a type of colonialism.

It is in the 1967 territories that it is most common to see utopia and dystopia in the same physical space. The city of al-Khalil (Hebron) in the south of the West Bank most exemplifies this condition.[41] It is characterized by multiple layers of dwelling, living, occupation and expulsion.[42] In this dystopic milieu, Palestinians live amidst military and settler violence and dispossession. Here, settlers on the frontier snatch homes and harass farmers, while the military looks on, intervening only to arrest Palestinians in the resulting fracas (FIG.5). Once settlements have been initiated by these forays, little by little they are incorporated into the infrastructural fabric of established Israeli cities. Eventually, in the larger settlements, there is little indication that one is crossing a border. And in Jerusalem there is an intentional integration of settlements as "neighborhoods," with no indication a visitor is crossing the hallowed "green line."

All Israeli governments since 1967 have supported the settlement project. While internal divisions have been present, the policy has always been unilateral expansion.[43] The 1967 occupied Palestinian territories, then, represent a living hell, not just for Palestinians, but also for liberal Israelis, who rarely venture into the Palestinian villages and towns there. My conversations with Israelis on the left revealed that the vast majority had never been to Nablus for a *kanafe*, or eaten *mussakhan* in Ein Arik, or seen *dabke*, the Palestinian dance, at the national theater in Ramallah. In effect, the loudest Israeli voices for a negotiated settlement have never seen the beauty of Palestinian culture; the OPT is simply a place of horror, guilt and violence. Yet it is vital to understand that dystopia, like hegemony, is never absolute; there is resistance in the maintenance of culture.[41]

The Palestinian territories are thus a crazy-making space, much like the areas of Vietnam represented in Francis Ford Coppola's *Apocalypse Now*, or in Lebanon as portrayed in Ari Folman's *Waltz with Bashir*, a 2008 animated feature film about the experience of an Israeli brigade in Lebanon. In



FIGURE 5. *Diagram of physical verticality in al-Khalil. Metal cargo containers are lifted in place over Palestinian homes. These containers become extensions of the settlements, and many homes below are taken over and occupied by settlers. From R.J. Smith, "Graduated Incarceration: The Israeli Occupation in Subaltern Geopolitical Perspective,"* Geoforum, *Vol.42 (2011).*

Gershom Goremburg's recent popular analysis of the aftermath of the 1967 war, Israeli expansion into the territories is seen as accidental, a response to the realities of the territory itself. However, here is how one respondent in my research explained the lived definition of occupation, a condition of life without the protection of a state.

> *Occupation is the enemy of human beings and human kind; every occupied person doesn't feel their human value. The ugliest picture of torture and miserable lives happens within an occupation, especially the Israeli occupation, one of the ugliest occupations in the world.*
>
> — K, Qalqiliyah district

For settlers, the 1967 OPT represent the Wild West. But much like the missing counterview in most Hollywood Westerns, they are a living hell for the indigenous inhabitants. The dystopic nature of the OPT results in part from the condition of occupation itself, a state of limbo between annexation and withdrawal. Here Palestinians live under a draconian and byzantine system of military laws, while rampaging settlers and soldiers are accountable to no one but military governors (and, rarely, the Israeli High Courts). All aspects of life for Palestinians are controlled, monitored and determined by the occupation. Meanwhile, Jewish Israelis in the same spaces benefit from subsidies and military protection and have recourse to the Israeli civilian court system.

SAFETY IN THE UTOPIAN STATE

> *No place in the world gives a person safety like his home or his country.*
>
> — H, Ras al-Tira

James Blaut has posited that nationalism takes a number of different forms, and that when a nationalist movement comes into being it is often in the context of a number of competing nationalisms.[45] Certainly, the current conflict involves a number of competing Palestinian configurations of nationalism — namely, Fatahwi secular nationalism, Islamism as expressed by groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and socialist nationalism as expressed by the numerous Communist parties. But a number of external nationalisms also have a stake in the game, including various Israeli Zionisms, U.S. and British nationalism, and (as became evident in May and June of 2010) Turkish nationalism. In that case, the Turkish government opposed Operation Cast Lead, and the Turkish state was vocal in its opposition to the killing of Turkish nationals (and one American) during the Israeli attack on the Freedom Flotilla.

Palestinian nationalist visions are tempered by the current condition of occupation, a condition that is present in all aspects of Palestinian life. There is no aspect of daily life which is not deeply affected by the Israeli occupation — be it public participation, family, work, or freedom from harm. In this context, as was revealed to me in interviews in 2009, the notion of the state is seen as a utopia, a vision within a particular space, that of historical Palestine.

> *Of course, I don't feel safe at all. I feel that at any point they'll displace us; I expect them to do anything they want to us. No safety at all, no stability. I can't even build a future for my children or even think of a future because, 24 hours a day, you're thinking of safety.*
>
> — K, Qalqiliyah district

K is the patriarch of a Bedouin clan that settled in the 1967 territories, caught between a Palestinian village and the ever-expanding settlement of Alfe Menashe. He has been threatened with eviction numerous times, and Israeli forces have even attempted to bribe him to leave his land. His response is one of steadfastness, or *sumoud*: he will not leave. Palestinians often refer to *sumoud*, a determination to remain regardless of the violence and pain inflicted upon them by the occupation. This notion is central to Palestinian resistance, and in this case it is concurrent with hope for a new state where personal safety will be guaranteed.

> *There is not one safe place in Palestine. In all of Palestine, from the river to the ocean, not just Qalqiliyah or Nablus, or Jaffa or Haifa, no place is safe. And when I'm in my home, or at my work, a civilian can shoot me. At the crossings maybe a soldier can say this guy had a knife and shoot me. There isn't a place that's safe at all.*
>
> — M, Qalqiliyah district

The state holds a particular importance for Palestinians living under occupation, which is related in part to the deprivation that occupation produces. Occupation deprives Palestinians of basic notions inherent to well-being, including a sense of safety, a sense of sovereignty, a sense of permanence, etc. The state, then, embodies these denied emotions and represents a potential sea change in the lives of ordinary Palestinians. At the same time, this utopian vision must be considered in the context of the current, colonial reality. In this regard, it is the very impossibility of the state that makes it so important in the lives of Palestinians practicing *sumoud* against the occupation and policies designed to promote transfer.

> *My goals for the future? To literally wake up and not find the name Israel or something called occupation. To find all the oppression against the Palestinian people gone, to have our rights the same as normal human beings around the world.*
>
> — I, refugee from Nablus district

The vast majority of sketch maps produced by my respondents revealed a notion of the state as the entirety of his-



FIGURE 6. *Participant's sketch map of Azzun Atmeh village, surrounded by gates guarded by lions (Israeli soldiers).*



FIGURE 7. *Participant's sketch map of Ras al-Tira village, surrounded by walls, gates and fences.*

torical Palestine. The exception were maps made by those living in isolated enclaves created by the Israeli security wall. In these cases, the sketch maps were on a far smaller scale, and indicated the extent of personal mobility in practical terms, illustrating the direct impacts of occupation (FIGS. 6,7).

When I asked why the state held such importance for Palestinians, several respondents expounded on its importance as the only guarantor of safety. The state represents freedom from arbitrary harm, as is exacted upon them by occupation forces.

> *I don't feel safe, not one moment, not even in this moment with you here. You saw the lack of safety when you were with me when we were passing through the gate with the camera and their [the Israeli soldiers'] questioning of what you're taking pictures of, and their taunting manner. Even if I'm sitting here drinking coffee or tea, or going to sleep, I'm expecting at any moment the door of my home will be broken down by an Israeli soldier for searches, or because someone touched the fence, or someone entered, or anything.*
>
> — H, Ras al-Tira

In essence, while avoiding any attempt to place Palestinian nationalism chronologically, there is no doubt about its relevance and importance to Palestinians currently living under Israeli occupation.

> *Freedom is to be free in your country. Doing what you want, going to where you want without restrictions.*
>
> — K

K used the term *baladak*, "your country." More precisely, it signifies the land of your country, as opposed to *watanak*, which would refer to one's country as a political unit or state. As I mentioned, K is on the front lines of resistance to settlement expansion in the West Bank, squeezed by the planned expansion of the settlement of Alfe Menashe and on the wrong side of the wall. Subject to harsh limitations of movement, for him it is freedom of movement itself that is the embodiment of freedom. But K is explicit in his explanation of where freedom takes place: it is the freedom to move in your own country.

Another respondent had a slightly different view of freedom.

> *It has two meanings. One is personal and one is general. Personally, to be able to roam freely, to visit and walk around without being asked anything. Being able to come and go where and when I please and at any time I please without permits or gates or walls — access to water, access to roads. Generally speaking, freedom is independence, love for the country, love for the land, valuing the state, and liberty to roam.*
>
> — A

A, the council head of Azzun Atme village, thus differentiates between what he calls a personal and a general definition of freedom. On a personal level, it is freedom of movement — one of the most basic freedoms denied to Palestinians throughout the West Bank (and in the wall-produced enclaves, in particular). In some sense, his general definition mirrors this aspect, but it also includes independence. What he means is collective sovereignty and patriotism, or *wataniyye*.

The Arabic used here presents an interesting take on nationalism. There are two words used to describe a love for the nation: *wataniyye* and *baladiyye*. While *'ard* is a common term for land, *balad* can also be used to describe a particular village or area. But it has a second meaning, referring to the territory of the nation. A made a point in the interview of referring to both notions, that of *baladiyye* and *wataniyye*, separately. He also made reference to national independence and valuing the state: *al-astiqal wa qiyam dawle*. These notions are intertwined, but they are not identical. The state is an important goal, but the land holds a significance beyond the state itself.

Interviewer: What does Palestine mean to you?

Palestine is my country; it is the land that I love; it is the word I love. It is my very presence; it is the prettiest country; it is the prettiest home. However, with all that we bear and our sumoud *in Azzun Atmeh, I feel there is a smaller Palestine and a bigger Palestine. The smaller Palestine is my home, my land behind this wall; the bigger Palestine is the village of Azzun Atmeh. And the even bigger Palestine to me is from the sea to the river.*

— A, Council Head, Azzun Atmeh

Here, A develops concentric geographies of the state, from the immediate to the ideal. His notion of the state is defined by the various spatial practices of occupation. The smallest is his home, which is divided from the village of Azzun Atmeh by the wall and a settler road. The next in scale is Azzun Atmeh, separated from the rest of the West Bank by two walls and two checkpoints. And finally the largest entity is the entirety of the Palestinian state.

Freedom to me is that I can go to Yaffa, Haifa and Akka in leisure, without seeing a single Israeli soldier.

— M

In M's analysis, freedom is denied by the Israelis by their prevention of West Bank Palestinians traveling to the entirety of the 1948 territories. The deprivations imposed by the occupation define freedom for its subjects. While M specifically named the major cities in the 1948 territories, she herself is hemmed in by two Israeli walls and checkpoints, making entrance to or exit from her enclave exceedingly difficult. This architecture of dispossession encloses the space of her village, and allows settlement expansion to continue unabated on all four sides.

A Palestinian state to me is a dream, with the full borders of '67, with Jerusalem, not missing one centimeter. The settlements are Israel's problem, not Palestine. I ask of the people, the world, to follow through with the borders of '67. . . .

— K

THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AS ANTI-NATIONAL DYSTOPIA

Much of the international media coverage of Palestine and Israel revolves around notions of conflicting states — the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel — in negotiations for an eventual peace. This portrayal is deeply problematic given the deeply uneven power balance between the Israeli government and Palestinians. But it is also problematic because the PA by no means represents a state; rather, it is a constructed apparition, a reflection of these uneven relations. In an interview I conducted in the Qalqiliyah district with M, a local farmer and construction worker, I asked if the state was important to him. His immediate response was, in English, "Not really. . . ." M then began to describe life under Israeli occupation within the pseudo-state of the PA.

His response was not an indication that a potential state was of no importance; it was, rather, a pragmatic description of his life as it currently stands. The PA does nothing to protect him from the depredations of Israeli forces; therefore, the state is meaningless. His lackadaisical response reflected his anger and his disappointment with the state in its current form. And his interpretation of my question as a reference to the contemporary condition, rather than to a future possibility, can be interpreted as emerging from a worldview dominated by the immediate, disillusioned repeatedly by claims of liberation under the ruling parties.

As one of a lucky few with permission to work in 1948 Israel, he is also in constant contact with Israelis and Palestinian-Israelis on the other side of the 1948 borders. Yet his constant passage from the 1967 OPT to the 1948 territories exposes him to constant surveillance, and to exploitation with impunity by his employers. Much as the West has learned of the dystopic nature of sweatshop labor from offshoring, a similar dystopia has emerged in the struggles of everyday Palestinians to earn money to buy food and other necessities. No matter how committed to the struggle, the economic realities of occupation force workers to labor for their oppressors.

The occupation used to be better than this. I used to be here in Qalqiliyah able to drive my car straight to Tel Aviv. This is gone. Before 1986 we used to drive our cars to Tel Aviv, to Haifa, to Gaza. But then came the Intifada, and this authority; they closed [the roads with checkpoints], and I can't go anywhere. So then the [direct] occupation, to us, was better. The authority [PA] here isn't for freedom; they're here to protect Israel's security.

— M, Qalqiliyah district

Theses comments reveal the intersections of identity, geography and nationalism on the individual relationship to the nation.

In regards to work inside Israel, every morning I need to be at work at 7 AM. Everyday I leave at 3:30 AM, meaning about three hours before my work. Why? Because the military checkpoints delay us. I should leave to work at 6:30 so I can get there at 7. But I have to throw away three hours — gone. And when I come back, they delay us again an hour, so I have four hours just lost.

— M

The Palestinian Authority was recognized by Israel as a representative body for Palestinians as a result of the Oslo peace accords in 1993. Many saw its creation as a step toward the eventual recognition of a Palestinian state. In practice, however, the establishment of the PA represented a step backward from statehood. The PA represents a safety valve, a token, much in keeping with Fanon's analysis of the strategies of cooptation that colonial powers use to avert real independence. The PA has no real power in the 1967 territories; it essentially manages the internal affairs of Palestinians, under the command and control of the Israeli occupation forces. This impotent authority is seen by many as the betrayal of a decades-long struggle for liberation, and it is the subject of popular derision.

So what is this state? What are the components? It doesn't have borders, sky; it doesn't have anything. . . . This isn't the state that we were hoping for — after all our losses in the first Intifada, after all the lives that were lost, to get an authority like this, a useless one. We didn't dream of this kind of state, so a state like this we don't want.

— M

In informal conversation, many Palestinians refer to the PA as Salata Filistiniyya, a play on the Arabic name for the PA, Al Sulta Filistiniyya. "Salata" here indicates the mixed-up state of affairs — tossed, like a salad. And in recent years, the PA has acted ever more overtly to undermine Palestinian national aspirations, as evident in its vote against international condemnation of the recent Israeli attacks on Gaza.

As a result of this condition, a small but persistent call has risen among Palestinian organizers and academics for the PA to be dissolved. They believe this would force Israel to accept responsibility for Palestinians and admit its illegal occupation of the 1967 territories.[46] In essence, the call for dissolution is an attempt to expose the contradictory condition of the PA. In its absence, critics argue, a return to direct military governance would force a final decision on the state of the territories. This would bring an end to limbo: either official complete annexation, with the accompanying citizenship rights in Israel, or complete withdrawal from the territories, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

THE "PEACE PROCESS": A ROAD TO NOWHERE

Ever since the British arrival in Palestine and the creation of the Mandate in 1917 there has been a seemingly endless series of peace proposals. An end to conflict is seemingly sought by all sides — the intention being to end hostilities and achieve a lasting peace. The early proposals were made by independent commissions, such as the Peel commission, which issued statements and sought approval from both sides. Deeply problematic from the inception, these proposals invariably divided the territory between the conflicting parties. Yet all these proposals created disproportionately sized territories for the immigrating Jewish population in comparison to the existing demographic makeup of the territory. In response, the Zionist leadership finally approved the division of the territory, but explained that this was simply an interim step until Israel could enlarge itself to more respectable dimensions.[47]

From 1967 until now everyday their [the Israelis'] aggression adds up. With every attempt of peace that's proposed [they bring] more aggression in order to prevent it.

— H, Ras al-Tira

Since 1993 much international aid and attention has been focused on the peace process, a series of negotiations and documents intended to end hostility between Israel and the Palestinians. The difficulty here, as initially identified by Edward Said, among others, is that negotiation is a process that happens between equals, and the power differential between the two sides in Israel/Palestine is so great there is little hope of attaining a just, permanent peace. Furthermore, Israel has consistently violated international law in its maintenance of the occupation and the expansion of settlements. What has resulted is the perpetuation of a state in which each side accuses the other of violating the already skewed terms of the Oslo agreements, while Israel maintains the terms it finds useful in the administration of the territories. Of note, the Oslo agreements were originally intended to be interim agreements only; they were never intended to be a final resolution, and were contingent on continuing progress toward disengagement and peace.

Perhaps the most visible application of the Oslo agreements has been the territorial division of the West Bank into sectors A, B and C. These divisions denote areas under PA administration, joint PA/Israeli administration, and Israeli administration, respectively. While Area A essentially contains only segments of the largest Palestinian cities on the West Bank, the rest of the territory is divided into B and C, areas that ostensibly are under joint control of Israel and the PA. Of course, all of the West Bank, even Area A, is under the control of the Israeli military authority. These administrative divisions therefore do little to create local sovereignty. Instead, Israel uses them to justify settlement expansion and to strangle the Palestinian villages that lie in the way.

THE PROMISE OF A NEW UTOPIA

In imagining an end to conflict and the creation of a future Palestinian state, there are two competing proposals: a one-state and a two-state solution. Both offer visions for moving away from the current impasse in terms of concrete realities. Yet any attempt to implement either proposal currently suffers from a lack of will on the part of both the Israeli and interim Palestinian governments. Neither body seems able to move toward any solution, with the default condition being continued Israeli territorial expansion, continued settlement, and renewed attacks on Palestinian citizens of Israel.

I would argue that from the Palestinian perspective both the one-state and the two-state solutions are equally dystopian. The two-state solution seems to condone apartheid separation and discrimination against Palestinians within the eventual Jewish-only state. Meanwhile, a single-state solution would depend heavily on the will of the Israeli state to follow through with full citizenship, equality, and reparations for victims of Israeli expansion.

Both solutions thus seem equally fruitless. But as the Palestinian organizer Omar Barghouti explained to me in the summer of 2009, no one expected the apartheid regime in South Africa to fall when it did. While Barghouti claims the fall of that regime was a direct result of boycott, divestment, and eventually sanctions, the point is that the utopian is necessary for progress. Such dreams represent the only hope for an escape from the dystopia of the colonial present.[48]

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

The Practice of Home in Old Cairo: Towards Socio-Spatial Models of Sustainable Living

MOHAMED GAMAL ABDELMONEM

The article investigates the practice of home as an everyday system for sustainable living in Old Cairo. The idea of home in this historic urban space has long involved fluid socio-spatial associations and made efficient use of space-activity-time dynamics. As in the past, the individual's sense of home may extend beyond or shrink within the physical boundaries of a particular house, as spatial settings are produced and consumed according to time of day, gender association, or special events. The article argues that architects working in this context must understand the dynamics of this complex traditional system if they are to develop locally informed, genuine designs that build on everyday spatial practices. Work by the architect Salah Zaki Said and by the Historic Cities Program of the Aga Khan Trust for Culture is described to illustrate the potential of such engagement, especially as it contrasts to more abstract architectural proposals.

> *Man's relation to locales, and through locales to spaces, inheres in his dwelling. The relationship between man and space is none other than dwelling, thought essentially.*
> — Martin Heidegger[1]

In its October 2009 issue, the *Journal of Architectural Education* featured an article by the New York architects Reese Campbell and Demetrios Comodromos that proposed a radical vision for the future of the *hawari* (alleyway communities) of Old Cairo: a "speculative skyscraper that verticalizes the complex interrelationship of informal social networks and urban/civic form."[2] Campbell and Comodromos's proposal followed from the architectural historian Stefano Bianca's theory that traditional Islamic urban form took shape around prototypical patterns of behavior.[3] Based on this work, Campbell and Comodromos may

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have been aware of the complex association between spatial organization and social and behavioral patterns in Old Cairo. However, their design reduced the community to a spatial and morphological abstraction, in a layered stratum of services and land uses that ascended in social significance to the mosque at the top.[4] They then claimed the design would "simulate the complex social interactions and norms present within the medieval fabric of Islamic Cairo," utilizing accepted characteristics that had been "reinforced in the subconscious of the population over centuries."[5]

Campbell and Comodromos's claims notwithstanding, their plan for a vertical arrangement of services — mapping street patterns and irregular plot shapes onto the external form of a skyscraper — involved questionable decisions regarding the socio-spatial complexity of Old Cairo's everyday life.[6] In this sense, their proposal recalled Zygmunt Bauman's notion of liquid modernity, in which a distant authority (the architect, in this case) decides the destiny of people living thousands of miles away — sometimes without ever having visited them.[7] Perhaps, work like this may contribute to design theory, but it is equally representative of a contemporary practice in which the architect is increasingly isolated from the dynamics and peculiarities of context.[8] Such intellectual interventions also must be scrutinized with regard to practicality. In this case, one might ask: Is it even relevant to life in Old Cairo, with its inherited practices; or does it belong more to the architects than to the setting?

The thesis by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, quoted above, appears precisely relevant in this case. For Heidegger, the relationship between man and space was about the act of dwelling. He saw this as a process of making spaces that reflected man's understanding of his position in the world — a comprehensive act, loaded with inherent relationships between man, locale, and produced space.[9] Architects, in Heidegger's view, were principally concerned with mathematical space (physical settings), while the act of building (making space) was similarly of little interest.[10] It was the understanding of locale that was key to man's process of dwelling.

Old Cairo is a place that reflects these concerns intimately. The medieval core of a city dating to 696 AD, it is comprised of a group of *hawari* (sing. *harah*) — predominantly residential communities formed around narrow, nonstraight alleyways and incorporating a limited amount of commercial activity. Each *harah* is characterized by the spatial order of its shared public space — the alleyway — as bounded by its entrances/gates and lined by attached lowrise houses. But it is also defined by a distinct social structure, cultural identity, and shared responsibility for local security **(FIGS.1,2)**. Each *harah* represents a community — that is, in Richard Jenkins terms, "a powerful everyday notion in terms of which people organise their lives and understand the places and settlement in which they live and the quality of their relationship." It is thus a "collectivity" that is more than "the sum of its individuals."[11]

FIGURE 1. *Haret al-Darb al-Asfar, a typical Cairene* harah *defined by the surrounding continuity of houses: "A path closed by masonry."*



FIGURE 2. *The zones of Old Cairo and its* hawari *today.*

The typical relationship between socio-spatial setting and architecture in Old Cairo has further been described by Stephen Kern as comprising a "path" that is "closed by masonry." "The Egyptians conceived of space as a narrow path down which the individual soul moves to arrive at the end before ancestral judges. Their most distinctive constructions are not buildings but paths enclosed by masonry."[12] As Kern observed, the value of individual buildings is overshadowed by their role as a boundary to the main space of activity and social life, the alley.

In Old Cairo it would thus be naive to suggest that everyday life could be easily analyzed either qualitatively or quantitatively, or that its complexity could be abstracted into a simple form or arrangement of services based on a visual or stylistic taxonomy. Indeed, sociologists and anthropologists have undertaken intensive investigations in Old Cairo and on its periphery to understand the working of its communities.[13] Likewise, patterns of living and their architectural manifestations have yet to be fully mapped due to their complex synchronization. Typically, this emphasizes commercial and industrial life in the mornings and family and communal social life in the afternoons and evenings.[14] In this sense, Old Cairo suggests Peter Saunders and Peter Williams's notion of home as an intertwined "socio-spatial system" that is "not reducible either to the social unit of the household or to the physical unit of the house, for it is the active and reproduced fusion of the two."[15]

Building on intensive historical investigation, fieldwork, interviews with residents and architects, and the spatial analysis of everyday social activities, this article records and analyzes the notion and practice of home in Old Cairo as a traditionally rooted practice of everyday sustainable living. It then advocates a practice of architecture that responds to the local understanding of home, and that challenges the standard premises of spatial and morphological design. The article develops two main strands of thought: it discusses the notion and practice of home in Old Cairo in an attempt to interrogate its socio-spatial complexity and significance and sustained sufficiency; and it reviews the practice of architecture in Old Cairo in order to evaluate the value of contemporary interventions. In conclusion, it proposes a form of architecture as socio-spatial practice that can be informed by the everyday practices of home in Old Cairo.

ARCHITECTURE AND THE PRACTICE OF HOME: ARE THEY RELEVANT?

The study of the contemporary home has always been problematic — in terms of what is meant by the term, what its boundaries are, and how it is defined.[16] Home is one of those humanistic ideas that corresponds better to the concerns of environmental psychology and social investigation than to professional design discourse or the need for physical determinacy. As studied in different volumes, the sense of home has been associated with personal perceptions of safety, security, comfort and passion.[17] It thus implies the maintenance of a stronghold territory, in which certain measures of control and defense are continuously at work. This fits with sociological investigations of human territoriality as "the relationship between an individual/group of people and particular physical settings that is characterized by a feeling of possessiveness, [and] attempts to control the appearance and the use of space."[18] According to Elia Petridou, however, home also connotes a place more than a space.[19] And from this perspective, experience, memory, feeling, interaction and context are more relevant than form, size, or precise dimension. Home is, hence, an everyday notion that is, according to Henri Lefebvre, at the center of human life, architecture, and urban experience.[20]

From the perspective of the present investigation, home must be seen as an ambiguous term that retains different meanings within different contexts. Its inclusive meaning may reflect the physical parameters of a residential space (house, dwelling); place (neighborhood, town); environment (domestic life); or social determination (community). Indeed, from the tenth century, the English word "home" has been used to describe a broad range of notions, from a village or a collection of dwellings to the intimacy of a single household.[21] However, in Arabic it has other associations that are applicable within the context of Old Cairo. "Home," in Arabic, is *bayt*, a term whose proper meaning is a covered shelter where one may spend the night.[22] In Arab cultures the concept of home thus stems from the need for security: it describes a place where people may feel safe during the hours of darkness. This original connotation further emphasizes how the concept is not bounded by specific physical forms; rather, it may be applied to a room, a house, a community, or even a city.

Residents in Old Cairo, mostly, refer to the *harah* as their home. They can change places within it, but they can never leave. "The *harah* is my home; we are born here and we shall die," one resident asserted.[23] The *harah* is seen as a stronghold territory that is defensible and secure against external intrusion. Historically, any additional building in it thus required the agreement — or, more precisely, the nonobjection — of its residents to be constructed. Typically, a new building could also only be used for the activity for which it was designed.[24]

The perception of the *harah* as home represents a long-rooted practice in Old Cairo, according to which the individual house and its locality are merged into a larger shared territory. Using the terminology of Saunders and Williams, it is "a crucial locale" in the sense of a "setting through which basic forms of social relations and social institutions are constituted and reproduced."[25] This sense of home implies a dynamic arena that responds to contextual socio-cultural changes and is not bound by particular functions. According to Mary Douglas: "It is a localizable idea. Home is located in space but it is not necessarily a fixed space and does not need bricks and mortar. It can be a wagon, a caravan, a boat, or a tent."[26]

From the opposite point of view, however, the *harah* can be understood as a product of architectural decision-making — a social phenomenon built out of physical forms. The *hawari* of Old Cairo are thus like any other urban structure, built house by house, building by building. This sense of physical place is what allows the history of the community to be linked to its buildings, and every inhabitant's memory to be indelibly inscribed in space. This association is particularly powerful given the strange ability of spatial memory to conjure up a dense web of images, particularly in association with areas adjacent to one's house.[27] Architects tend to see their role as being to devise innovative forms, and they often play down the importance of context and its everyday power. At least this is what one might take away from the proposal by Campbell and Comodromos, mentioned above: even when the *harah* is the context, architects tend to advocate highly artistic and intellectual products.

In his article "The Social Construction of Space," Peter Blundell Jones criticized twentieth-century architectural practices as being increasingly incompatible with everyday building. As he wrote, their "influence on works of high-architecture seems generally to be drifting ever further from everyday building as they become increasingly the vehicles for displays of individual virtuosity demanded by a market in images, and less and less concerned with habitation."[28] According to Jim Kemeny, by the end of the century the design of buildings (homes, in particular) had become largely disconnected from the social, political and economic needs of their inhabitants. Architectural design instead had become principally concerned with spatial and economic aspects of the unit of accommodation — the house — and its environmental performance.[29] In other words, in modern society, house and household are comprehensible and convenient terms of analysis, while the notion of home is more challenging and unpredictable.

Over the past three decades, however, researchers have also started to study the socio-spatial organization of the home as an integrated whole. They have thus begun to argue that sociological and anthropological insight is required to understand and design residential environments properly.[30] The human ecologist Roderick Lawrence, for example, has studied the development of eating habits, food preparation, and dining rituals, which he saw as fundamental to home organization, as agents of change in English and Australian houses.[31] It has now been commonly accepted that a house's different

zones may be purposefully reproduced from one setting to another as a way to reproduce distinct domestic patterns and cultures of living. Amos Rapoport has demonstrated that the frontage of a house may be naturally extended as a semi-private space that becomes an inseparable part of the home.[32] And Christopher Alexander has recognized two key issues that mark a successful home: its ability to express the uniqueness of each family and family member, and its ability to connect its inhabitants with other people and the society at large.[33]

TOWARDS A METHODOLOGY FOR OLD CAIRO: SOCIAL SPHERES AND PART-TIME SPACES

Home cannot be understood except in terms of journeys and daily trips to and from it, and in terms of it being a point of reference for everyday life.[34] Due to the complexity and interconnectedness of the *hawari* of Old Cairo, notions of space alone thus have very limited applicability when it comes to understanding how people manage their daily social and spatial activities.[35] The fieldwork underlying this article, therefore, conceived of the practice of home in Old Cairo as involving an interactive combination of three elements: human action and behavior, spatial order, and temporal arrangement. Based on collected data, interviews and observation, the research thus sought to link social and anthropological analysis to an understanding of the spatial order of *hawari* communities. It built on the notion of a "social sphere" as "a relational domain that reads social interaction within particular spatial settings during particular moments in time." This notion has been extensively, but implicitly, used to describe human activities, habitual practices, and rituals.[36] However, in this case it allowed researchers to explicitly consider situations in which private and public activities become interconnected and overlap. In this sense, the research recalls Richard Sennett's analysis of the workspace as a place where people act out of a psychology of privacy in reaction to the predominantly public patterns of the modern world.[37] In general, the presence of the private within public life affects both the perception and organization of social space.[38]

In terms of method, the research involved a survey of contemporary houses and the periodic observation of outdoor social, commercial and cultural activities. Field investigation further included nonstructured interviews with residents, as well as with shopkeepers and workers. These interviews took place within everyday settings: in the shop, along the sides of the alley, and in the house. To verify whether activities and rituals were of longstanding, the research included documentary investigation dating back to 1800, a time when the urban structure of Old Cairo was fully formed. Patterns of activities and everyday life in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were traced through the accounts of contemporary historians such as Edward William Lane, Clot Bey, and the diaries of Gerard De Nerval — accounts which were verified through comparison to contemporary local accounts by residents such as Abdul-Rahman Al-Jabarti.[39] Images and descriptions taken from these historic narratives were then compared to observations of the contemporary spaces and houses in Old Cairo to draw a socio-spatial model of enduring everyday patterns of activity.

Fieldwork and narratives of residents' daily lives revealed five principal activities in the *harawi* of Old Cairo: sleeping, eating, socializing (indoor/outdoor), entertainment, and work. While socializing and entertainment were found to be fluid practices which could be merged, the other three remained consistent in terms of setting (time and space). With the exception of work, which might also take place outside the *harah*, all the above activities were found to occur predominantly in what I call the territory of home. Following the natural diversity of social groups, the pattern of activities varied depending on the social hierarchy and spatial organization within which the activities were arranged. For example, the research found that, among ordinary men, meals (the act of eating) often took place in the alley in zones dominated by popular culture, while families of higher social standing tended to eat in private dining spaces within their individual houses. However, on certain occasions, all community members shared meals and activities that could shift between private living spaces and shared alley space. This system of living was also explicitly described in the narratives of Lane, Clot-Bey, and in the early-twentieth-century accounts of Stanley Lane-Poole; it is also referred to frequently in Naguib Mahfouz's trilogy (volume one, *Palace Walk*, in particular).[40]

Based on the interviews and investigated narratives, a diagram was developed to display synchronized activity-space-time relationships based on the occurrence of certain activities, or time-space occupations, and whether they were dominated by males or females **(FIG.3)**. This classification of living patterns was based on several variables: the type of activity (work, entertainment, socializing, meals, sleeping); the nature of space (extended public [the city], local public [shared alley], semi-private [space in front of the house], semi-public [guest space inside the house], private [domestic family space], and sacred [sleeping space]); and the time of day and year (night, evening, day, weekend, season and occasion). The diagram shows in dark gray the dominant everyday activities that were observed, at what time, and who participated in them (males or females) **(FIG.4)**. This investigation was particularly helpful in highlighting the social-spatial traffic and the spaces of greatest social significance. For example, it showed that evenings are dominated by social activities that take place in the alley space with friends and neighbors — a finding which challenges the preconception that there is an association between evening and the use of private space. Similarly, it showed how the private spaces of houses open up considerably and merge with the alley at times of special occasions and festivities.

On the other hand, each activity in the *hawari* of Old Cairo appeared to take place only within a relevant social do-



FIGURE 3. *Daily routine in al-Darb al-Asfar, Gammaliyyah Quarter. Daily practice as determined through the three elements of social spheres: human (work-family), spatial (private-public), and temporal (daily time scale). The diagram shows the active social spheres of both males and females in the* harah.

main. This, however, might shift during the day, extending to occupy certain spaces for a short time, before moving to other locations. The interchangeable nature of private and public activities within the same space introduced another concept — "part-time spaces" — according to which particular locales might be quickly transformed to suit different purposes. To allow this, spaces and their elements and components need to be mobile, flexible, and easily changeable. The notion of part-time space, in this sense, reflects the dynamic nature of social activity spheres that develop and transcend boundaries and thresholds. Thus, what may be prohibited in the evening (e.g., visits to women's quarters) may be allowed in the morning, as the location of boundaries and thresholds changed according to accepted social practice. Such a system necessitates flexible and mobile furniture, such as light mattresses, cushions, and tables that allow for easy and quick readjustment, a strategy inherited from earlier generations.[41]

SUSTAINABLE LIVING, CONTINUITY, AND THE NOTION OF CHANGE IN OLD CAIRO

At the heart of sustainable living patterns is the fact that change is inevitable in human life, both culturally and socially. This study defined sustainable living as the ability of a community to manage its resources and available spatial settings to elaborate new systems and organizations that respond to changing needs and the challenge of time. During the process of change, complex constructs (such as home) may be decomposed to its preliminary elements, then reconfigured and reorganized in new forms suitable to emerging needs and demands. This process may be slow, unnoticeable, and in constant flux.

In the context of Old Cairo, *hawari* communities developed, over centuries, the sustainable notion of a collective home, in which boundaries between individual houses were seen as less significant than the collective territory. While the



FIGURE 4. *The structure of the practice of home in Old Cairo. The interdisciplinary methodology as developed in the form of socio-spatial models.*

FIGURE 5. *Video stills of collective community participation during the transport of wedding furniture to the bride's house (May 2007, al-Gammaliyyah).*

boundaries of this shared home were historically barricaded and closed with gates, in the contemporary context borders are more likely to be determined by patterns of activity and by points at which behavior and reactions change. This implies a territory that is built mentally and practiced socially in the minds of its holders.[42] Relaxed communications between men and women, accepted modes of dress, and mutual support during hard times are, for example, all basic principles of this agreement that were described by interviewees during fieldwork **(FIG.5)**. According to two residents, noncompliance with this code invited a tough response, and could result in collective exclusion of an individual and his/her family.[43]

Practices developed over time, hence, become regularities, which may define transitions from one social sphere to another. This condition may be apparent in the way women and men dress, how freedom of movement and interaction is circumscribed, and how they present themselves in the public sphere. According to one expert in the social dynamics of *hawari* neighborhoods, Dina Shehayyeb:

> *Within old Cairo, the boundary of home is determined by the way women, in particular, are dressed. They move freely with their home-style informal clothes, within the area they consider a home. Crossing this envisaged boundary requires the dress code and behavior to change. These boundaries, however, are not physically or spatially distinguished. Rather, they are marked cognitively based on a particular social reference, such as a coffee house, where strangers monitor every passer-by, especially women.*[44]

On the other hand, these practices and regularities maintain an unbreakable link with the past. It could even be argued that they have worked against change because they represent a system resistant to compromise. However, the sense of a home territory in Old Cairo could likewise be seen as determined by Pierre Bourdieu's system of objective potentialities. Thus, knowledge of the absolute possibility of people's reaction to an action might control a person's momentary decision-making.[45] According to Bourdieu, such a "socially constituted system" of "cognitive realities and structures" controls what people do in successive situations during everyday life.[46] One older resident expressed the power of such a local system of objective reality this way: "Young men have to respect our morals and traditions. They know what is acceptable and what is not. If they deliberately cross the limits, we [senior members] stop them, and all the community takes an action against them."[47]

Activity patterns are also affected by the potentials inherent in different spatial layouts. Thus, in comparison with the relatively large traditional courtyard-centered house, the contemporary compact apartment does not afford the luxury of a large multipurpose space. In one such apartment, a resident mentioned that each space therefore had to accommodate several activities according to a strategy of programmed succession and temporary possession. This, however, accorded to inherited customs and living styles. Historically, bedrooms in Old Cairo might have been used in several ways: at night solely for sleeping, but during the day to host other activities such as guests, entertainment, weaving and trade **(FIG.6)**.[48] Especially in the houses of the lower social orders, women's areas might thus be used to receive male guests during the day, a practice not generally acceptable in more high-profile houses.[49]

According to this principle, the living room in a contemporary one-bedroom apartment might be used to accommodate studying by children in the afternoon, sleeping at night, eating during meal times, and family entertainment in the evening. In addition to this synchronization of usage, some domestic activities might need to move to outdoor spaces while remaining integral to a family's sense of home. Evelyn Early has described such a pattern of active social spheres in one family, where the wife assumes control over the house space, as her castle, where she "spends free time with her women neighbours, and feels content, not neglected," while the husband "comes home only to eat and change his clothes."[50] In this extended version of home, men typically meet, socialize, and sometimes eat with their male neighbors within the alley.[51]



A.



B.

FIGURE 6. *Spatial comparison between A) a harem Qa'a (bayt al-Suhaimy, eighteenth century), and B) a contemporary apartment (Building #6 Zuqaq al-Darb al-Asfar in the same* harah*): similar in spatial order, different in size.*

NEGOTIATING CONTROL IN THE COMMUNAL SPACE

The social theorist Max Weber has asserted that it is only in praxis (acts, courses of action, and interaction) that it is possible to trace the essence of a community, group or society.[52] Praxis thus involves in the very activities of everyday life that local actors see as holding no significance of any sort. Michel De Certeau has also written of the association between spatial practices and the quality of space.[53] By investigating simple activities and the way space is organized to accommodate them, it is possible to trace the way the public space is utilized to suit basic social needs and the essence of community.

Eating meals, drinking coffee, and smoking *sheisha* (a waterpipe) are typical activities performed on a daily basis in the alleyways of Old Cairo. Most of those interviewed in the alleyways (men) said they took their meals (mainly breakfast and sometimes dinner) in front of their shops, workshops or houses. A movable dining/drinking table, previously stored away, would be set up to allow this to take place without interrupting public movements. Outdoor space could thus be adapted to provide a sufficient alternative to missing indoor social spaces, which might formerly have been used to host similar activities. Interestingly, the extended sense of home allowed the intrinsic qualities of a private atmosphere to be maintained in open outdoor space. As part of the fieldwork, interviews with men took place in their social venue, the alley, while those with women were conducted in the private space of the home by a female research assistant. On several occasions, however, passersby volunteered to participate in

FIGURE 7. *Human-product conflict in the alleys. The flow of products through the alleys during the day sometimes interrupts human traffic.*

the discussions and interviews in the alleys. If they were also residents of the *harah*, they believed in their right of intervention once a conversation was taking place there.

In general, the researchers observed a complex pattern of space use in alleys throughout the day. In the morning, the alley would be overwhelmed by industrial activities and workers. Their impact was evident through the noise of machinery, gatherings in front of shops, and the flow of products (FIG.7). However, the dominance of work activities receded in the evenings and on holidays, when local residents took control of the space. Thus, even though work hours might extend into the evening at most shops, the claim of industrial activities on the space was no longer exclusive. Instead, the alley became a venue for interpersonal communication and negotiation.

The research on the use of alley space also revealed that male residents tended to spend a great deal of time in the public space in the evening. In addition, during events such as weddings and funerals special arrangements were made for the entire community to be mobilized, and for the public sphere to be transformed to serve the needs of a particular family. Rituals on these occasions required a physical capacity beyond the capacity of individual apartments, requiring that private space be extended into the alley and into neighbors' houses. These uses of outdoor space were particularly associated with the character of many *harawi* as lower-income communities. Among the city's upper-middle-class population, such events might take place in specially designated but costly indoor spaces such as hotels, community centers, or social clubs.[54]

Such merging of spaces both reinforces the notion of a collective home and supports social integrity and cohesion. However, in architectural terms, it challenges the assumed conventional spatial order of contemporary houses, derived principally from the expectation that each residential unit will be independent and self-sufficient. As such, the architectural image and physical characteristics of Old Cairo have little to reveal to architects or outsiders about the actual practices of daily life. For its inhabitants, these are structured around individual, mutual and collective social interaction, restrained habits and behaviors, and historically rooted traditions and moral values (FIG.8). In comparison, the spatial layouts and house forms are marginal to the constitution of a sense of home. To a large extent the research found that in Old Cairo today the system of living is able to adapt to spatial limitations through a system of synchronized activities, part-time spaces, and merged venues.



FIGURE 8. *Typical section of a Cairene alley, showing a multilayered arrangement of social interaction at higher levels, while public traffic dominates at the ground level.*

PRACTICING ARCHITECTURE IN HOME TERRITORIES

In *Remaking the Modern: Space, Relocation, and the Politics of Identity in a Global Cairo,* Farha Ghannam provided a revealing anecdote about the relevance of formal architectural design to places such as the *harawi* of Old Cairo:

> *People dismissed my question as irrelevant when I asked about having an architect who might help in designing the new additions [of a house]. "What for?" was the answer. "The contractor and the builder (*usta*) know what should be done." It is this continuity and rupture between the plans of the state and the practices of the people that I have been trying to emphasize.*[55]

Architecture, unlike other design activities, is a situated process determined by a specific site and a certain socio-cultural context. As such, it cannot be isolated or limited in terms of influence. Moreover, according to Thomas Dutton, architecture "is never capable of completely reproducing its own existence, for it is a primary medium for dominant institutions to manifest forms and images through which their power will be communicated and legitimate."[56]

Architecture is also not like social sciences, which limit their scope of inquiry to constructing subjectivity; rather, according to Susan Bickford, the creation of the built environment involves the generation and entrenchment of a form of intersubjectivity.[57] To practice architecture is thus to elaborate an environment that governs such social interaction and communication. Linda Hutcheon has argued that by "its very nature as the shaper of public space, the act of designing and building is an unavoidable social act."[58] Hutcheon has further argued that architecture reinstates a dialogue with the social and ideological context in which it is produced and lived. Successful architecture, accordingly, requires that the practitioner understand the nature of the environment and give proper consideration to the everyday lives and social norms of potential occupants.

With few exceptions, most architects during the twentieth century did not take these issues into consideration in the design of buildings/houses in Old Cairo. Of course, not all of them took such highly intellectual or theoretical positions as Campbell and Comodromos. But their work still demonstrated a separation between architecture as a profession and people's practice of home.

Today, if building regulations were to be strictly adhered to in Old Cairo, as architects might advocate, there would be great disruption to the practice of home and local system of living. For example, according to the chief housing engineer in the planning department of Hai-Wasat (the district in Old Cairo), regulations enacted over the past two decades would require new buildings to contain a garage at ground level, despite the fact that the area's alleyways could scarcely accommodate the passage of even a small car. One response to such problems is for people to use fake drawings to gain needed permits, and then build something entirely different. New regulations imposed by the National Organization for Urban Harmony (NOUH), formed in 2000, have further restricted the possibility of innovation and creativity. Concerned primarily with image, they have introduced strong restrictions on building facades, in an attempt to mandate typical openings, styles and materials.[59]

A prevalent complaint among architects interviewed as part of the research was the lack of interest in their services in Old Cairo. They claimed residents typically saw no need for professional intervention if it was bound by regulations and design standards. In an area that retained a continuity of building tradition based on informal processes, the contractor/builder was assumed to be the expert and major player. Indeed, as one architect asserted, for many "the presence of an architect is a problem-making not a problem-solving strategy. Architects limit the margins of any freedom that such people currently enjoy through the formal processes of design, strict adherence to the regulations, and prevention of illegal building activities."[60]

However, some architects who have worked successfully in Old Cairo have developed sensitivity to issues of context and the shared notion of home. Despite critical issues of professionalism and building standards, they have developed alternative methods that are flexible enough to be informed by local customs, rituals, and sustainable systems of living. I turn now to two such examples of architectural practice in Old Cairo: Salah Zaki Said's rehabilitation of old homes in the medieval city, and the extended project in al-Darb al-Ahmar led by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture.

THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIO-SPATIAL PRACTICE IN OLD CAIRO

The emergence of socio-spatial practices in Old Cairo owes much to the prominent architect Salah Zaki Said, whose work during the 1990s reflected, for the first time, consideration for a sense of home that combined physical characteristics with lived experience. Said tried to integrate these concepts in practice by establishing a socially responsive architecture, whose main purpose was to ensure outcomes that reflected the pattern of people's lives in local traditional contexts — or, as he called it, "the lived space."

> *The study of domestic architecture is actually the only way to relate to everyday life of the people. Naturally we can tell about the customs and habits of the people easily by studying the nature and organization of living spaces in domestic architecture. . . . We need to give stress to and find out about the roots of Egyptian architecture, not only by studying large monuments but also by studying people's habitat and domestic architecture in general.*[61]

The house of Sokkar in the Bab al-Wazir area of Old Cairo was rehabilitated by Said's team in 1995.[62] And later this project was extended to include four more houses in the same area. The making of home in this case involved making useful lived space, facilitating people's activities in a secure and safe environment that conserved the cultural value of existing buildings. In this work, Said conceived of the value of home as composed of two principal features: social elements (its residents) and economic value (its cost).[63]

Said started the work at Bab al-Wazir by analyzing patterns of everyday life and routine. This, in turn, informed a comprehensive analysis of people's daily needs. The team's response to this information was to develop a spatial layout that responded to these patterns (FIG. 9). Said's major contribution, then, was to resolve structural problems, rather than impose a predetermined design style. His loyalty to the practice of architecture as lived experience led him to work at the fundamental and organizational levels to restore the building as a useful component of the shared home.

Said's work was pioneering in the emergence of an architecture of home in Old Cairo wherein the agenda stemmed from local everyday routine. This practice of making homes, as a consequence, supported Said's approach to the preservation of cultural history in the form of valuable buildings as lived history. Said understood the intrinsic nature of traditional communities in Old Cairo and the association between private and public spheres.

SPATIAL PRACTICE FOR OLD CAIRO

Departing from the comprehensive approach toward design services favored by many architects, the al-Darb al-Ahmar rehabilitation project led by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC) aimed to empower local inhabitants by supporting them financially and technically to restore the structural safety of houses and reorganize their living spaces to better suit their needs. The case of several houses in Darb Shoughlan provides a good illustration of the project's goals. Bayt no. 5 in Haret El-Ezzy, for example, was replanned, with some spaces omitted or merged, and others added.[64] Realizing the strong association between the houses and residents, community and inhabitants, the project used traditional social ties as a resource for positive change. This strategy was intended to embody the essence of place, identity and culture, based on everyday patterns and interaction. According to the project documents: "Preserved and respected for their intrinsic qualities, the monuments, old buildings and traditional open spaces must be integrated into the everyday life of the residents and reconnected to the complex, multidimensional social and cultural character of the area."[65]

As part of the author's fieldwork, the everyday situation in one of the project sites in al-Darb al-Ahmar, could be portrayed as follows:



A. *B.*

FIGURE 9. *A. Floor plans of Bayt Sokkar, a reflection of the traditional living style. B. Exterior of the building. Photo by Bassma Reda.*

> *A family living in a single room, their immediate neighbours live in two bedrooms and both share the same kitchen which lies outside their apartment. The only clean water source is in the alleyway among many livestock. One bathroom in bad condition exists at every level and is shared by a few families. The sanitary services have collapsed, and waste water is running into the street. The building is deteriorating due to the flow of waste-water that attacks ground-level load-bearing walls. Residents have no other place to move and don't have enough cash for the repairs.*[66]

In such situations architects must liberate themselves from the constraints of design standards at the same time they must reject the clearance option and work toward the production of feasible homes.[67] The spatial order in such multifamily living units is frequently confused, and the idea of home is blurred. For example, intersecting patterns of movement may hinder the privacy of supposedly private paths (bedroom-bath, living-kitchen). In one house targeted by the AKTC, the logical reordering of such a confused system involved planning each unit to comprise living/sleeping space(s) augmented by two basic service spaces: a kitchen and a bathroom (FIG.10).

Reflecting typical arrangements in Old Cairo's communities and accepting the absence of a complete suite of social spaces in each house, the architects engaged in the AKTC effort, however, could also capitalize on the inherited social organization to make use of alley space as a haven for public and social activities. Such professional adjustment represented a creative strategy to deal with an unconventional and loaded situation. But it required comprehensive knowledge about everyday patterns of activities, family structures, and shared as well as individual needs in Old Cairo. Based on gathered information, every level in the house was ultimately replanned to suit residents' needs and to provide each family with their required level of privacy, while capitalizing on the *harah* for semiprivate activities.

Critics of such practices could raise issues of stylistic quality, architectural image, and the collective character of the home. In this regard, the buildings, although not noteworthy as individual works of architecture, are of historical significance for two reasons: their simple facade treatments are representative of an important type of Cairene architecture; and they establish a coordinated order through such elements as modular patterns, entrances with stone arches, and ground-floor sandstone walls (FIGS.11,12).[68] But what mattered to the residents was the flow of indoor-outdoor activities they allowed. Even personal safety and the hygienic quality of the environment were secondary concerns to social cohesion and the presence of a supportive and secure community. Such priorities were ultimately a professional obstacle for the architects, who saw little creative benefit to rehabilitating and reproducing homes without also being able to have a stylistic impact.[69] For this reason, critical analysis of the final product remains problematic because of an inability to agree on appropriate criteria of evaluation.

PRACTISING ARCHITECTURE AND THE PRACTICE OF HOME IN OLD CAIRO

During the Egyptian Revolution in January and February 2011 police were largely absent from the streets of Cairo. However, during this time communities across Egypt mobilized to form *lijan sha'biyyah* (public patrols), whose job was to guard residential areas against attack by criminals and gangs. These public patrols were a creative and immediate response to a sudden collapse of the national system of security. It was surprising how quickly the patrols were formed and how efficiently they managed to maintain security across a nation of more than 85 million people. The practice of collective defense of a shared home was clearly still present in the collective memory of Egyptians, and in reviving it, they were merely recalling a deeply rooted tradition at a time of need. In the absence of former determinants of social hierarchy, everyone had a role to play in ensuring local security, with businessmen, doctors and intellectuals attending to their duties and shifts.

The question this article has raised is how such practices can be addressed by the architect during the design process. One important step will be to acknowledge the centrality of home and everyday shared practices to the way we use and organize space. This knowledge is central to the development of meaningful design.

Through the constant practice of home, we produce and consume the spaces in which we live. This happens through the frequent rearrangement, merger, and division of available space. By looking closely at the pattern of daily activities and the way furniture is synchronized, architects may discover the practice of contemporary home. In Old Cairo this revealed the notion of part-time arrangement, an efficient system of space management that is at work on a daily basis. The research showed the system of part-time usage to be especially practical when spaces are not sufficient to accommodate all activities at one time. In these examples, space and time essentially became associated within the organization of the social sphere.

An understanding of part-time spaces could be beneficial to the design of new high-density residential environments. Acknowledging the flexibility of the social sphere could liberate architects from restricting spatial requirements and enable them to design shared social venues, multipurpose spaces accommodating the temporal synchronization of daily activities. This could be an especially important strategy in designing residential communities for working families or households where work is accomplished in the home.

This article has asserted that the *hawari* of Old Cairo provide a comprehensive and historical construct of the idea



FIGURE 10. *Stages of professional intervention, al-Darb al-Ahmar project. Documentation, analysis of existing uses and problems, and development of proposals based on residents' needs and possibilities. Courtesy of Aga Khan Trust for Culture, 2009.*

of home, represented and manifested in the dynamics of everyday life and its socio-spatial associations. To remain positive agents of change, architects need to learn the history and processes by which Cairene homes have evolved in response to everyday needs. Present professional knowledge is lacking in terms of making lived spaces that are peculiar to a traditional context such as the old city. A new architecture of home in Old Cairo, thus, needs to embrace a collaborative socio-spatial practice, in which architects learn the dynamics of local contexts and help provide effective responses to daily needs. In this sense, creativity and innovation in architecture might be more strategic and more responsive.

FIGURE 11. *Renovated building facade in Atfet Hozayen, al-Darb al-Ahmar. The photo shows the clear modular style and the retained ground-floor stone-arch entrance. Courtesy of Aga Khan Trust for Culture, 2009.*

FIGURE 12. *Al-Darb al-Ahmar project. 15,17 Atfet Hozayen, before and after renovation and stabilization. The historic Ayyubid wall is on the left. Courtesy of Aga Khan Trust for Culture, 2009.*

REFERENCE NOTES

Several quotes used in this article were extracted from transcribed interviews with residents, architects or officials conducted by the author and associated researchers from 2006 to 2009. These are referenced in standard format as follows: [Interviewee code. Number of Interview. Year of Interview]. [R] refers to residents, while [I] refers to intellectuals (a category that includes officials, architects, academics, and social workers). A complete report of this fieldwork is available as Mohamed M. Gamal Abdelmonem, "The Architecture of Home: An Investigation of the Practice of Home in the Context of the Hawari of Old Cairo, 1800–2009," Ph.D. diss., Sheffield School of Architecture, June 2010.

1. M. Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1951), in D.F. Krell, ed., *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings* (London: Routledge, 1993).
2. R. Campbell and D. Comodromos, "Urban Morphology + the Social Vernacular: A Speculative Skyscraper for Islamic Medieval Cairo," *Journal of Architectural Education*, Vol.63 No.1 (October 2009), pp.6–13.
3. S. Bianca, *Urban Form in the Arab World* (Zurich: VDF, 2000); and Campbell and Comodromos, "Urban Morphology + The Social Vernacular," p.7. Egyptian architects and historians have criticized Bianca's theory for its abstraction of medieval Islamic urbanism into a few morphological typologies.
4. These included a mechanical substation, burial chambers, and hospitals below ground; and a *madrassa* (school), green bridge, housing, and mosques above.
5. Campbell and Comodromos, "Urban Morphology + The Social Vernacular," pp.9–10.
6. An approach based on the postmodern abstraction of the past was highly noticeable in the article, with the authors using the term "vernacular" several times when speaking of their design rationale.
7. Z. Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p.11. Bauman's concept of distant authority refers to "the end of the era of mutual engagement: between the supervisors and the supervised, capital and labour, leaders and their followers, armies at war."
8. Here I do not suggest that architects should not target change; rather, I incline towards Schneider and Till's view of the architect as an agent of change in the framework of architecture as "spatial agency." Change should not be driven by the architect's personal bias as much as by concern for the real needs of the users. For more, see T. Schneider and J. Till, "Beyond Discourse: Notes on Spatial Agency," *Footprint*, No.4 (Spring 2009), pp.97–111.
9. Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking."
10. Ibid.
11. R. Jenkins, *Social Identity*, second ed. (London: Routledge, 2004), p.109.
12. S. Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space: 1880–1918*, second ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p.139.
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Israeli Housing and Nation Building: Establishment of the State-Citizen Contract, 1948–1953

YAEL ALLWEIL

This article examines the formation and consolidation of a housing-based social contract between state and citizens during the first years of Israeli national sovereignty. Calls for a renewal of this contract, including demands for equal access to housing, underlay the mass social unrest in the country during the summer of 2011. Initially, the creation of Israel in 1948 brought a housing "big bang" to Israel-Palestine. Mass Jewish migration both demanded vast housing solutions and brought a mass loss of housing among the Palestinian population. The year 1948 also marked a watershed in the use of housing as a nation-building strategy within the Zionist movement, transforming it from an effort based on accumulating self-governing subjects to one obliged to house newly empowered citizens within a citizen-legitimized political framework. The article shows how these conditions ultimately led to the articulation of a state-citizen contract that included a "housing regime" aimed at transforming immigrants into proper citizens. Despite the centrality of the interests of the state in these activities, however, the article also explores how housing programs were planned and produced in direct response to continuing demands by citizens. The consolidation of "regime" and "subjects" as the opposing ends of modern governance, as suggested by Foucault, was thus deeply contested. The article studies three different housing schemes developed during Israel's first five years, a period curiously little studied in architectural terms.

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The mass social unrest which erupted in Israel in the summer of 2011 involved claims for a renewal of the contract between the Israeli state and its citizens. The protest focused explicitly on housing as the crux of this contract — namely, the state's responsibility to house its citizens, and the citizenry's commitment to the state via the active participation of residency. How has housing become the central and decisive component of the relationship between state and citizen in Israel, capable of drawing hundreds of thousands into the streets? By examining the three state housing policies developed during Israel's first five years and the popular response to them, this article traces the transformation of Israeli nation-building after independence from a process based on staking a claim to the land to one based on providing decent housing for new citizens.

The advent of the modern nation-state marked a shift in the basis of governance from the divinely legitimized authority of kings to the rule of institutions "in the name of the people."[1] As Michel Foucault has shown, the shift from absolutist-state to nation-state required the development of institutional frameworks for governing modern subjects.[2] Within this context, housing the common citizen became a key basis by which nation-states could legitimize their rule.[3] Indeed, in some instances today the provision of housing may be even more important than the administration of courts or parliament as a locus for nation building.[4]

My larger research, from which this article is drawn, has explored the relationship between nation, citizens and housing using a historical examination of Zionism as a regime of housing.[5] In Israel, housing has been the cornerstone of the nation-building project, based on rerooting Jews in the homeland and producing loyal citizen-subjects. Above all, Zionism's task to materialize a national home where none existed for millennia has involved connecting subjects and homeland in order to form a sovereign political entity legitimated by these people. This task has been addressed by associating national home and individual housing.[6] It has also been addressed by having the state assume a mediating role in the relationship between citizens and homeland.[7]

In historical terms, Israeli sovereignty marked the consolidation of Zionist nation building into a state housing regime that was used to manage the relationship between the young nation-state and its citizens. This article explores the initial fragility of this sovereignty and the impact of the governed — the masses of postindependence immigrants — on the actions of the state as they materialized in housing. Much has been written about the mass housing efforts and the planning project of the "long 1950s" in Israel. But little attention has been paid to the first five years of primarily temporary and ad-hoc architecture and planning, a fermenting ground for future definitions of the Israeli "good house."[8]

During its first years of independence the Israeli state faced what it perceived as three different threats to its sovereignty. It addressed these with three different housing policies over the course of five years — an exceptional number of planning schemes in such a short period. This rapid turnover attested both to the extent of the governmental crisis as well as to the perceived value of housing as a means to address it.

The first threat to Israel's sovereignty was perceived to be Israel's "enemy" citizenry, Arab-Palestinians who had not been "swept away" during the 1948 war. Israel's first housing policy, geared to this threat, included harnessing pioneer immigrants to settle vacated Arab-Palestinian houses and lands in primarily agricultural border areas. The second perceived threat was posed by the Jewish Agency (JA) and Jewish National Fund (JNF), whose continued involvement in postindependence settlement threatened to create a state within a state and subject Israel to the sovereignty of world Jewry. This threat was addressed through the *maabara* housing policy, which removed immigrants from JA-controlled reception camps and settled them on the land in temporary single-family dwellings, with the goal of cementing their allegiance to state and country. The third perceived threat was that of the immigrants themselves, who refused the state's definition of proper housing and proper citizenship, thereby rejecting the regime and threatening the very legitimacy of the state. This threat was eventually addressed by means of a plan to disperse the masses across the country and accept the immigrants' understanding of a proper housing regime as comprising permanent, well-serviced dwellings for all. It was the development of this housing-based social contract that fundamentally stabilized political order in the country through the succeeding years of nation building.

Why did the state of Israel move toward the provision of housing for all as a means to enforce its sovereignty? What and whom did those housing schemes serve? And why, despite the obvious failure of two housing policies in three years, did Israeli leaders still consider housing an effective means to address governmental crisis? This article will address these questions via study of the housing policies during Israel's first five years of independence. This study is important because it spreads the fan of this historical period to locate the step-by-step consolidation of the Israeli housing regime, which ultimately set the terms for the contract between state and citizen that prevails to this day.

NATION BUILDING IN THE AGE OF SOVEREIGNTY: ACCESS TO LAND, CITIZENRY AND PLANNING

The Zionist nation-building project changed dramatically following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Most importantly, statehood removed previous restrictions on Jewish immigration and access to land. The U.N. resolution of November 29, 1947, on the partition of Palestine initially declared the division of its lands into separate Jewish and Arab-Palestinian states.[9] However, its immediate consequence

was to confer a Jewish legal right to parts of the "ancestral homeland" by virtue of the establishment of a nation. This form of landownership, through the instrument of the nation, was dramatically different from pre-statehood landownership by individual legal monetary right. By default, then, the U.N. resolution implied the creation of a housing regime dramatically different from that of pre-statehood Zionist settlement.

The attempt by the U.N. to partition Palestine to settle competing claims to it as a homeland quickly fell apart. The result was civil war in British Mandate Palestine, and eventually the 1948 war between the new state of Israel and its Arab neighbors. During this war Israel enlarged its territory at the expense of areas designated for the Arab-Palestinian state and nationalized these as parts of the Jewish homeland. Furthermore, the war forced large numbers of Arab-Palestinians from their lands and homes.[10] Access to land, a paralyzing issue for prestate Zionism, was thereby removed as a problem in the new state of Israel.

Another significant consequence of Israeli independence was control over state borders and the ability to take in immigrants without international restrictions.[11] Masses of Jewish immigrants flocked to the country following independence, doubling Israel's population in three years (1948–1951).[12] Israeli leaders, especially Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, identified these new immigrants as citizens: both a legitimating factor for Israel's sovereignty and a source of manpower for nation-building. This relationship between immigration, citizenship, and nation-building had already been tested in the pre-independence controversy surrounding Jewish immigration — for example, through the capture of the ship *Jewish State*, carrying 2,664 illegal immigrants, by the British in 1947.[13]

Facing the burden of caring for so many homeless new citizens, some called for restrictions on immigration. However, early national leaders such as Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir insisted that Israel should admit every Jew willing to immigrate, since housing the Jewish people was the state's raison d'être.[14] Israel's Declaration of Independence thus tied political independence to immigration and housing. The connection was inscribed in a formal law, the Law of Return, enacted in July 1950, which acknowledged the right of every Jew to immigrate and become an Israeli citizen.[15]

Statehood, by necessity, introduced comprehensive planning to Zionist efforts to house immigrant Jews. Planning had first been conducted for the JA and JNF during the British Mandate, primarily by the architect Richard Kauffmann. But these early efforts had not included a national or even regional component, being limited to the realm of the settlement (as evident in the *kibbutz* movement).[16] According to Rachel Kallus and Hubert Law-Yone, "While Zionism aspired to produce a new space fit for a new society — a new environment for the 'new Jew' — the shape of this environment or the model by which it would be designed were never given any thought."[17]

Within the new Israeli state, the Governmental Planning Administration, which operated under the Ministry of Labor, was initially formed in March 1949 and put in charge of master planning, general planning, and housing.[18] The architect Arieh Sharon, a *kibbutz* member, Bauhaus graduate, and designer of David Gen-Gurion's house in Tel Aviv, was appointed head of the department.[19] The very idea of planning at the time required facing the challenges posed by mass immigration and the need to assert control over state lands. Initially, it thus required housing incoming citizens while staking a claim to land and securing national borders; however, as this article will show, these goals changed rapidly as perceptions changed with regard to the most pressing threats to national sovereignty.

FIRST HOUSING POLICY: AGRICULTURAL-BORDER SETTLEMENT

The first Israeli housing policy, enacted during the year-long 1948 war, was directed primarily at staking a claim to land. It identified the state-citizen contract as based on access to the homeland, the same principle that had guided nation building prior to statehood.[20] During and immediately after the 1948 war, the main threat to this contract was perceived to be the same as before statehood: Palestinian claims to the same homeland. Therefore, the same policies were proposed to address it — namely, a regime posited on claiming land through rural settlement and agricultural cultivation. As during the early years of Zionist settlement, immigrants, as future citizens, were expected to settle along the borders as pioneers and contribute to this goal.[21] The only physical, economic and cultural planning for the absorption of immigrants therefore took place in the context of securing the nation's borders.[22]

In July 1949 Prime Minister Ben-Gurion outlined the government's course of action toward agricultural settlement in the four upcoming years. Planning guidelines included settling 150,000 immigrants in 500 new settlements, forming a "belt" of border settlements that would play a key role in border defense and help safeguard state sovereignty over territory.[23] Government guidelines also specified that these settlements would engage in intensive agricultural production to supply food to a growing population.[24] The "Plan for Rural Settlement" of March 1949 additionally stated that the government would act to direct immigration to villages and rural settlements.[25] The first round of national planning thus aimed to continue the framework of pioneer Zionist rural settlement. As such, it reflected an ethos of rooting oneself in the homeland via toil on the land, and it maintained the Zionist tradition of using settlements to establish political borders.[26]

After the war, this policy was further directed at Palestinians who had not been "swept away," and who remained

within Israel's borders as potentially hostile citizens. While most of Israel's Jewish population was located at the center of the country, most of its Arab-Palestinian population was located at its periphery. This postwar condition was enforced by a military regime that restricted movement by the remaining Arab-Palestinian population.[27] As a result of the war, some 400 Arab-Palestinian agricultural villages had also been emptied of their inhabitants, as had numerous Arab-Palestinian houses in the country's main cities.[28] Settlement on the country's periphery among the "enemy" Arab-Palestinian population as well as in vacated Arab-Palestinian housing was therefore defined as part of the pioneer enterprise.

As part of this initial planning effort, housing was provided to immigrants based on the principle of self-help, a core principle of Jewish nationalism premised on the idea of self-governance. Self-housing and settlement based on limited, provisional support by the settling agencies had been employed by Zionist pioneers since the 1910s. This continued to be the main housing policy after independence, posited on the above-mentioned definition of immigrants as pioneer citizens. The self-help housing options available to immigrants upon arrival in Israel included housing vacated by Palestinians and core housing provided by the state. The latter often took the form of building materials (primarily timber and concrete blocks) for autoconstruction of basic dwellings which might later be expanded through the initiative of the immigrants themselves.

THE PIVOTAL CASE OF THE RAMLA DISTRICT

Ramla was a pivotal case of Israel's first housing policy, which has now pretty much been forgotten by scholars.[29] Ramla was a border district not only because it adjoined the Jordanian-held West Bank, but because its two main population hubs, Ramla and Lydda, were important Arab-Palestinian cities until 1948. The Ramla area had been designated in the U.N. partition plan as part of the Palestinian state, and its conquest by Israeli forces was a major event of the 1948 war.[30] However, after the war, the area still contained a significant Arab population, composed both of remaining residents and internal refugees, and it was considered an internal border zone. While located at the geographical center of the country, the Ramla district was thus allocated a significant number of "pioneer" settlements and new residents. The state housing regime combined all three initial strategies to curb the Arab-Palestinian threat in the Ramla district: settlement in vacated housing, border *moshav* settlements, and urban subsistence farms.

Most scholarly attention to the mass housing of immigrants has focused on the northern and southern districts of the country.[31] But data presented by Haim Darin-Drabkin has indicated that the population growth in the Ramla district by 1955 exceeded all other areas of Israel. Indeed, it amounted to 2,143.5 percent, significantly surpassing any other part of the country as a site of immigrant settlement (FIG. 1). Comparatively, the population of the Jezreel district



FIGURE 1. *Data concerning population growth and the number and type of new settlements formed in the Ramla district, 1948–1955. Highlight boxes by author. Source: H. Darin-Drabkin,* Housing in Israel: Economic & Sociological Aspects *(Tel Aviv: Gadish Books, 1957) pp.224-52.*

FIGURE 2. *New immigrants from Bulgaria living in a room in a vacated house in Jaffa. Photograph by Fritz Cohen. Source: NPC, reprinted by permission.*

FIGURE 3. *New immigrants from Yemen moving into vacated houses at Aqir, 1949. Photograph by Hugo Mendelson. Source: NPC, reprinted by permission.*

grew by 181 percent, that of the Beer-Sheba district grew by 1,779 percent, and that of the Tel Aviv district grew by 87.2 percent.[32] The Ramla district can therefore be identified as the most significant area for immigrant settlement during the early years of Israeli sovereignty. Moreover, the majority of the new settlements there were based on agriculture, the activity best suited to forming new citizens and protecting the nation's borders, as defined by state leaders.[33]

Immigrants were settled in the Ramla district in one of two areas: the internal urban border with Israel's Arab citizenry and the external rural border with Jordan. In pursuit of these goals, the state housing regime initially directed immigrants to reinhabit vacated houses in the old city of Ramla. Some 6,000 Jewish immigrants eventually moved into this area, often dividing up houses between several families. Thereafter, the Ramla district was settled using two other dwelling types: subsistence farms right outside the old city and agricultural immigrant *moshav* settlements.[34]

Vacated Housing. Some 600,000 Palestinians were displaced from homes and settlements during the war, and these vacated properties became a significant resource to house Jewish immigrants.[35] The state housing regime encouraged immigrants to install themselves in these properties, and some 124,000 immigrants employed this strategy between May 1948 and December 1949.[36] However, the reuse of vacated housing initially came as a result of actions taken by the immigrants themselves, prior to the institution of state control. It was thus largely unplanned, as can be seen by the initial demolition of some properties by the authorities to prevent Arab-Palestinians from returning to them.[37]

Since vacated housing was essentially up for grabs, immigrants who arrived in the first few months after independence found better quality, or at least intact, properties to occupy. Immigrants arriving shortly thereafter found houses of lesser quality or houses that had been partially destroyed during the war. Moreover, the pace of immigration and the extent of housing need soon led to the subdividing of houses to serve several families, each occupying a room **(FIGS. 2, 3)**.[38]

The legal status of vacated property was first addressed by the Deserted Areas Order issued by the interim government on May 16, 1948.[39] The order declared all property left by its owners as state property. Vacated housing was thereafter managed by the Amidar governmental company, which charged rent to immigrants who settled in it.[40] However, by December 1949, vacated Arab housing was no longer available, and the state housing regime was forced to develop other solutions to house the continuing flood of immigrants.

Immigrant Moshav Settlements. In February 1949 a special meeting of the *moshav* movement was convened in Ramla to propose the absorption of immigrants in *moshav* settlements under the slogan "from the camps to the village."[41] Later known as the Ramla Convention, the meeting included the Israeli leaders David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol, who accepted the call of the *moshavim* enthusiastically.[42] The *moshav* framework was a cooperative model for family-based agricultural farms which seemed more appropriate than the *kibbutz* for immigrants who were Zionists but not necessarily Communists.[43] *Moshav* settlements were to circle the towns of Ramla and Lydda and protect the area from infiltration across the Jordanian border.

One such *moshav* was Tirat Yehuda, founded in 1949 on lands of the former Palestinian village of Al-Tira. Al-Tira lands had been nationalized by the state, and in order to ensure that Arab refugees would not be able to return and claim the village, the state sold them (along with other lands) to the JNF, whose founding edicts determined that all lands under its control be used for Jewish settlement.[44]

Tirat Yehuda's plan, prepared by the Settlement Department of the JA, included 35 agricultural farms and 22 subsistence farms **(FIG. 4)**. The plan followed design principles



FIGURE 4. *Tirat Yehuda plan, 1951–1954. Remains of the village of Al-Tira at the top right-hand corner of area scheme. Source: ILA, reprinted by permission.*

formulated for the JA by the architect Richard Kauffman, developed as part of the JA's involvement in the planning of agricultural *kibbutz* and *moshav* settlements in the 1920s. Tirat Yehuda was thus organized around a core of public services (school, clinic, meeting hall), surrounded by houses and farms. Behind each member-family's house lay its agricultural fields, with the plots and houses in the inner core, east of the public buildings, being designated as subsistence farms for professionals living in the *moshav* — such as the doctor, the teacher, and the agronomist. The Tirat Yehuda plan was submitted in 1951 and approved in 1954, after all its houses were already standing and its fields cultivated.[45]

The pioneer-settlers of Tirat Yehuda initially occupied the vacated stone and earth houses of Al-Tira **(FIG. 5)**. They were employed by the JA in road construction until new houses and fields were laid out. Then, in 1950, the JA supplied them with concrete blocks for autoconstruction of permanent housing. Core houses were 4 by 8 meters with a roof of concrete tiles, but additions were soon made to them from scrap materials to provide spaces for storage, kitchens, and workshops.

The border location of Tirat Yehuda meant an everyday reality of attacks by infiltrators across the Jordanian border. These attacks generally amounted to sabotage and the theft of crops. The most lethal attack on Tirat Yehuda, in June 1953, included shooting and throwing a grenade into one of the houses, resulting in the death of one resident **(FIG. 6)**.[46] In the eyes of the state, the activities of the Tirat Yehuda immigrants — building their own homes, securing the border, and cultivating the homeland — marked them as well-formed citizens.

FIGURE 5. *Moshav Tirat Yehuda, 1949. Photograph by Zoltan Kluger. Source: NPC, reprinted by permission.*

FIGURE 6. *Tirat Yehuda house after the attack. Photograph by Brauner Teddy, June 10, 1953. Source: NPC, reprinted by permission.*



FIGURE 7. *Ramla public housing plan 3/57/5 of 1967, prepared to meet the 1964 law of public housing registration. The plan regulates the 1964 condition of original shacks (in right plan) and new structures (in contour). It is important to note that the plan was outlined long after the neighborhood had been populated, for the purpose of registration. The housing preceded the planning by some fifteen years. Highlight box by author. Source: ILA.*

Urban Subsistence Farms. The internal border of the Ramla district — namely, the Arab city of Ramla itself — was addressed by planning several new Jewish neighborhoods to surround and contain it. The first of these (and a laboratory for the Ramla urban plan) was the Amidar Shacks neighborhood, erected right outside the Arab city in early 1950. It combined urban housing and land cultivation in the form of self-help subsistence farms **(FIG.7)**. The neighborhood included some fifty wooden shacks, each serving two families. Accordiong to this plan, each family was allocated a living space of 8 by 4.2 meters (34 square meters) and a plot of land 18 by 40 meters (0.07 hectares). The half-shack was considered core housing, and included two rooms and a water tap. Since the neighborhood was not connected to a sewage system, toilets were located at the far side of the plots, served by septic tanks **(FIG.8)**. The shacks were assembled on site from timber purchased from Finland.[47]

The small plots represented the fulfillment of the Zionist dream. They provided each immigrant family with a subsistence farm and a main source of livelihood during the decade-long austerity period instated by the Israeli government from 1949 to 1959.[48] People who had access to land

FIGURE 8. *One of the shacks still standing at Massada Street, no. 35. Note the small structure serving as toilet at the very back of the plot. Photo collage by author.*

and to some agricultural skill could support themselves by growing vegetables and raising livestock. Soon families also began to expand their living space on these plots by means of autoconstruction, adding structures to accommodate additional family members, married children, and small production workshops.

By means of core housing and access to land the Israeli housing regime offered the new citizens the prospect of becoming pioneers and "good subjects." However, in exchange they were required to contribute to the national goal of border defense.

THE HOUSING CRISIS IN IMMIGRANT CAMPS: VIOLATION OF THE STATE-CITIZEN CONTRACT

The direction of most resources and planning efforts to "pioneer settlements" in order to stake a claim to the land and curb the perceived Palestinian threat came at the expense of providing the masses of new citizens with appropriate housing solutions.[49] It thus quickly became apparent that Israel's first planning policy was primarily designed to address yesterday's challenges — namely, the pre-statehood challenge of access and domain over land. By comparison, the plan largely ignored the new reality of nation building: the immense challenge of housing, which involved setting new terms for the state-citizen contract.

In the years immediately following independence a vast influx of immigrants quickly created a severe housing crisis, which escalated with each new immigration wave. As vacated Arab housing filled up by May 1949, border agricultural settlements became the only housing solution offered to immigrants, and many refused to settle in these "and be cannon fodder."[50] However, even had all immigrants been enthusiastic to perform their role as pioneers, the pace of border settlement formation would not have been enough to match the pace of immigration. While ten to fifteen new agricultural settlements were founded monthly, totaling 147 new immigrant *moshav* settlements between January 1949 and May 1952, these only housed 50,000 immigrants, a fraction of the approximately 700,000 immigrants who arrived during that time.[51]

The state and the JA subsequently sought to provide immigrants with an interim solution by converting former British Army camps to immigrant camps. Of the 100,000 immigrants who arrived in the first eight months after independence (i.e., by January 1949), about one in four (28,000 immigrants) were ultimately housed in these interim camps, while the rest managed to find permanent housing in new or existing settlements or in vacated Arab residences.[52] With the rapid influx of immigrants, however, more and more immigrants encountered difficulties finding housing. By the end of 1949 some 90,000 immigrants lived in seven camps throughout the country. Then, after all former British army camps filled, new camps had to be formed rapidly with no appropriate infrastructure in locations far from sources of employment.[53]

The camps provided a very cheap answer to the immediate housing problem: each large barrack hall could accommodate fifty immigrants. But an immigrant's living space was limited to his or her bed, with no division by family, age or gender **(FIG. 9A,B)**. The food provided was also poor, as were the sanitation facilities. Camp barracks thus came to house hundreds of thousands for several months under conditions of an "overnight shelter." But the camp existed as a territory unto itself: disconnected from the rest of the country, aimless snd unemployed immigrants frquently became frustrated and depressed. Given these miserable living conditions, it is hardly surprising that years later immigrants would still lament their time at the reception camps, recounting the extreme cold, the muddy, unpaved paths, the soup kitchens, and the crowding.[54]

At the time responsibility for the housing of immigrants was divided between the JA and the state. This seemed

FIGURE 9A,B. *Immigrants in the Sha'ar Aliya reception camp, 1949. Photographs by Zoltan Kluger. Source: NPC, reprinted by permission.*

logical, as it utilized the comparative advantages of the two bodies. The state's capacity to conduct planning made it responsible for developing permanent housing solutions. However, it suffered from an acute shortage of foreign currency, leading to a severe austerity regime. As a result, the JA, funded by world Jewry, assumed responsibility for the case of immigrants while they remained in the camps. This support was intended to be short-term — for the brief period until immigrants were permanently housed in agricultural settlements where they would be able to provide for themselves.

Immigrants remaining in the reception camps, however, did not accept this protracted temporariness with a pioneer spirit of endurance. Dr. Giora Yoseftal, head of the JA absorption department, described camp conditions as explosive, embodying a continuing threat of civil unrest.[55] Pinhas Lavon, head of the Histadrut workers union, described the situation as putting the young state at risk of a counter-revolution. He viewed the immigrant camp conditions as deeply wrong, robbing immigrants of their ability and right to participate in the process of nation building.[56] And Mordechai Bentov, the minister of labor and construction, worried about institutions other than the state catering to the immigrants and thereby challenging state sovereignty.[57] The housing crisis was therefore both objective (i.e., involving hundreds of thousands of homeless citizens) and ideological, reflecting on Israel's self-definition as the "home for the Jewish people."[58] Both Yoseftal and Lavon identified improper housing as actively responsible for these two threats to state sovereignty and its very raison d'être.

As the crisis of the immigrant reception camps deepened, Israeli leaders started to identify world Jewry as a threat to its independence and sovereignty. This was shocking, as the JA and JNF had until then been considered part and parcel of the drive for Israeli sovereignty. Levi Eshkol articulated the threat as follows: "Damned is this system of immigrant camps! I want to kill this system of [JA] clerical administration. . . . *Someone invented this system to destroy us.*"[59] Yet, while state leaders were fully aware of the state's failure to meet its housing responsibility for the immigrants, thereby violating the state-citizen contract, no housing action was taken. It wasn't until the JA actively attempted to assume the state's role and house immigrants on JNF lands that the state itself initiated a new housing policy.

JNF HOUSING: THE THREAT OF A STATE WITHIN A STATE

Control of the immigrant population in the camps, as well as control of JNF lands, enabled the Jewish Agency to initiate settlements without approval or permission by the state. In response to the immigrant camp crisis, Josef Weitz, director of the JNF, initiated a new settlement type upon JNF lands, the work village.[60] Work villages, as the name suggests, were premised on supplying immigrants with work rather than charity. They also provided detached housing, thereby granting immigrants access to the status and ethos of Israeli pioneer.

The formation of work villages began in the summer of 1949. During late 1949 and the early months of 1950, 37 work villages of 120 families each were established by the JNF: fifteen in the frontier area of the Jerusalem corridor, twelve in the Arab-populated Galilee, and the rest on the Gilboa, Carmel, and Menashe mountains.[61] Housing in the villages consisted of tents and wooden shacks. But unlike the state-sanctioned immigrant-pioneer settlements, self-help housing in the JNF work camps did not come with land for subsistence cultivation; land here was to be cultivated collectively in the framework of public works **(FIGS. 10, 11)**.

FIGURE 10 (TOP). *Immigrants employed in public works, Eshtaol work village, 1950. Eshtaol housing in the background. Photograph by Werner Brown. Source: JNF, reprinted by permission.*
FIGURE 11 (BOTTOM). *Shoeva work village, 1950. Photograph by Kurt Meirowitz. Source: JNF archive, reprinted by permission*

The work village framework thus did not count on the immigrants' ability to provide for themselves.[62]

State leaders regarded the work village as a blunt violation of sovereignty, an act of a state within a state that bypassed the proper authority of the Israeli government, rendering it irrelevant. Moreover, by offering immigrants a way out of the camps, the JNF pointed to the state as ultimately responsible for the immigrants' grim situation. It became further evident to state leaders that the consequences of civil unrest could take down the elected government, while these consequences could not touch the nonelected organizations of world Jewry.

The work village thus brought the tension between the Israeli state and the JA to overt confrontation over the issue of state dependence on, or independence from, world Jewry. This conflict of sovereignty and dependency had originated in the pre-Zionist *haluka* system and extended into the present.[63] World Zionist organizations, primarily the WZO and its Eretz Israeli Office, had led the settlement mechanisms of nation building prior to national independence.[64] They were now asked to step back and let the state apparatus assume its governmental mandate over national territory and citizenry.

The WZO, however, had no intention to transfer its property and institutions to state control; rather, it insisted on maintaining control over JNF lands and over settling institutions like the JA.[65] By 1950, therefore, Israel's housing policy was forced to divert itself from the Arab-Palestinian threat to addressing world Jewry's involvement in immigrant housing and citizen/subject formation.[66] Who was responsible for the immigrants, and when were they transformed from members of the Jewish people to Israeli nationals?

Israeli sovereignty and independence from the institutions of world Jewry would eventually be negotiated via housing of immigrants as citizens.

SECOND STATE HOUSING POLICY: *MAABARA* TEMPORARY HOUSING

The state responded to the challenge posed by the JNF by initiating a new policy that would replace both the immigrant camps and the JNF work villages: the *maabara*. The goal of the *maabara* program (Hebrew for "transitory"; plural, *maabarot*) was to offer new immigrants temporary, single-family detached housing in the place of the barrack halls, and sustain them through employment rather than through charity and soup kitchens.[67]

The first *maabara* opened in Ksalon in the Jerusalem Mountains in May 1950. It was founded on the lands of the vacated Arab village of Kasla, associated with the biblical town of Ksalon. On May 23, 1950, the newspaper *Davar* reported that the temporary settlement there housed 120 families, whose breadwinners were employed in forestry and paid daily wages. However, as a temporary settlement, the report pointed out that Ksalon included no subsistence farms.[68]

By May 1952, 113 *maabarot* had been constructed across the country, housing some 250,000 immigrants.[69] While they were proclaimed to be a new housing and settlement form, they were, in effect, work villages. Indeed, there were many similarities between the two programs; the main difference, of course, involved ownership of the land on which they were built.

Despite its derivative qualities, the *maabara* did represent a revolutionary turning point in government attitudes toward the problem of absorbing the waves of new immigrants, as all researchers in the field have pointed out. However, to date scholars have largely focused their analysis on the issue of employment and on a comparison between conditions in them and in the immigrant camps.[70] By contrast, I contend that their true significance lies in the realm of housing — and particularly in relation to differences between their purpose and the purpose of *moshav* border settlements. By directly addressing the demands by immigrants for housing, the *maabara* signified a transformation in the terms of the Israeli state-citizen contract from access to land to access to housing. This transformation cemented "housing the persecuted Jewish people" and Zionist subject formation as the twin raisons d'être of Israeli sovereignty, and therefore of the state as a housing regime.[71]

The decision by the state to deal with the housing shortage in stages by forming *maabara* settlements, rather than by keeping immigrants in camps until permanent housing could be constructed, was ultimately very costly. Indeed, it doubled the state's financial investment in housing. However, the decision to invest in *maabarot* was intended to give immigrants some form of "proper" shelter to meet their demands and ensure their acquiescence to a new state-citizen contract. Between the years 1949 and 1951, 44,309 temporary dwelling units were erected — among them wooden shacks, tents, and tin huts — which came to house 25 percent of Israel's population by 1952.[72] Moreover, the *maabarot's* building block was the individual shack, which broke the masses of immigrants down into family units, an arrangement that served the interests of the immigrants and the state alike.

In hindsight, Ksalon can now be recognized as an experiment in temporary dwellings. As can be seen from photographs of the time, it included a variety of structures scattered upon the landscape: family-size tents, small tin and asbestos shacks, and several wooden shacks on poles (FIGS. 12, 13). The hasty formation of *maabara* settlements left little consideration for planning. Thus, while space was by no means an issue, their dwellings were frequently erected close together, generating acute problems of density in addition to poor housing conditions.

In addition, as mentioned, no land was allocated to these dwellings, as was the case with their counterparts in the immigrant *moshav* framework of the first housing policy. Nor were they framed as self-help housing. Because *maabara* dwellers were not expected to live as border-pioneers, their

FIGURE 12. *Ksalon: employment of dwellers in stone-clearing, 1950. Photograph by Werner Brown. Source: JNF archive, reprinted by permission.*



FIGURE 13. *Ksalon Maabara, December 1950. Photograph by Werner Brown. Source: JNF archive, reprinted by permission.*

temporary dwellings were located next to existing towns, villages, *moshavot*, *moshavim* and *kibbutzim* across the country. The aim was to employ the immigrants in the economies of these settlements — and, no less importantly, to use the interaction with veteran citizens to acculturate them to a pioneer life of self-governance and self-subsistence.[73]

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND SECOND VIOLATION OF THE STATE-CITIZEN CONTRACT

As might have been expected, however, the very temporariness of *maabara* dwellings rapidly led to the deterioration of these built environments. This developed into a humanitarian crisis during the rough winter of 1950–51, during which the cheaply constructed dwellings leaked, were blown over by wind, flooded, and filled with mud. Sanitary facilities were also disgraceful and degrading, and health services were insufficient.[74] Indeed, the harsh winter placed more than 65,000 *maabara* residents in dire conditions and resulted in the evacuation of 10,000 of them to nearby settlements (FIG. 14). There, many immigrant children first encountered "a shower with warm running water, a white private toilet right next to the housing, and electricity."[75]

Despite recognition of these conditions and persistent promises to improve them, a year later nothing had been done by state housing authorities to ensure that the winter of 1951 would be any different. As a result, *maabarot* settlements across the country fermented with unrest. In addition to inadequate facilities, *maabara* dwellers experienced constant shortages of food. They could not bypass the government's austerity measures by producing their own food, as could residents of *kibbutz* and *moshav* settlements or residents of subsistence-farm housing as in Ramla. Eventually, an alleged theft of food from *kibbutz* fields by a resident of the Emek Hefer Maabara led in November 1952 to a civil rebellion against the police, which quickly spread across the country.[76] Protesters from dozens of *maabarot* took this as their the cue to demand that the government attend to their needs, primarily for better housing and an adequate level of services.[77]

At the time immigrants could not help but notice the stark difference between their *maabara* housing and *kibbutz* or *moshav* permanent housing. They couldn't care less that, as pioneers, those veteran citizens had once also endured harsh conditions. They did not associate their harsh living conditions with the "sacrifice of pioneer life," and they did not read the divide between them and the veterans, made explicit in housing, as one they would eventually be able to bridge. Rather, as Sephardi Jews, many immigrants viewed their housing conditions as representing deep racial discrimination, relegating them forever to the status of second-class citizens. They saw no hope of climbing the social ladder.[78]

Of course, the immigrants' perceptions had solid grounds; strong racial sentiments did exist within the veteran

FIGURE 14. *Rosh Ha'ayin Maabara, February 1951. Photograph by Eldan David. Source: NPC, reprinted by permission.*

public against the predominantly Sephardi immigrants.[79] Works examining Israel's first decade generally describe the state's mass housing project as directed primarily at the immigrants in an attempt to form them as proper citizen-subjects or exclude them from loci of power. And this is today seen to have given rise to the social categories that still inform Israeli society.

The literature universally condemns immigrant housing in Israel in the 1950s as "bad housing." Both the temporary *maabara* tent towns and the permanent *shikun* mass housing blocks of the 1960s are cited as material evidence of discrimination against the mostly Sephardi immigrants.[80] Both scholarly accounts and popular discourse consider immigrant housing to have been a violent act toward the new citizens, intended to keep them outside good-subject circles and centers of power.[81] Ella Shohat's essay "Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Jewish Victims" is particularly notable. It invokes Edward Said's "*j'accuse*" of Zionism written a decade earlier to frame its analysis of the 1950s immigrant absorption process as colonial.[82]

Despite these critiques, it is possible to see three reasons why the *maabarot* embodied an important dwelling solution in Israel's housing history. First, it pointed to a realization by the state that its legitimization lay in its citizenry, and that failure to care for them might lead to a loss of sovereignty. Second, it signified a realization that housing was a basic demand placed on the state by its immigrants-citizens. Third, the temporary nature and poor dwelling conditions of the *maabara*, housing newcomers who were not considered to be founders of the state, established housing as a facet of social class. By making visible the political and ethnic divide in Israel two decades before it emerged explicitly in the political arena, the *maabara* pointed to housing as the arena in which social phenomena were manifest, and in some cases formed.

THIRD HOUSING POLICY: POPULATION DISPERSAL IN PERMANENT SELF-HELP HOUSING

The civil unrest unleashed by the *maabarot* policy marked it as a failure in the state's attempt to form the immigrants as pioneers, willing to endure any hardship for the goal of access to the homeland. This social unrest also brought to the attention of the state a deep transformation in the citizenry's perception of the state-citizen contract — from one based on individual access to the homeland to one based on the provision of proper housing. Indeed, mass demand for proper housing cemented housing as a civil right for each and every citizen and a state responsibility. As such, it came to be perceived as the concrete materialization of the state's proclaimed raison d'être.

A new housing solution had to be formulated to address this crisis — the third in four years. This time, the state aimed to formulate more than a temporary plan; it sought a regime that would provide immigrants with the permanent, good-quality housing that they demanded. The attempt to transform immigrants into pioneers was also no longer part of the effort. This new, third policy would become known primarily for producing a national master plan, known as the Sharon plan after its head planner, the architect Arieh Sharon.

The Sharon plan took time to develop and is therefore hard to date. It is clear, however, that the process of creating it began parallel to, rather than after, the two previous policies (agricultural settlement and *maabara*). The plan's main principle, population dispersal, was indeed embedded in border agricultural settlements as well as in the *maabarot*, which were formed adjacent to existing settlements across the country, as noted above.

The Sharon plan was first presented to the public in February 1950 in the framework of a public exhibition at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art, which was aimed to make the public more "planning-minded" **(FIG. 15)**.[83] The exhibition included a series of posters outlining in a popular way the challenges identified by the planners and describing their operational principles. The plan was well underway at the time but had not yet been completed and approved by the government. It was eventually published in Hebrew in 1951 under the title "Physical Planning in Israel 1948–1953."[84] In that document Sharon stated that his team had "tried very hard to gain the support of public opinion for our national planning," and that the effort was "fully backed" by the powerful prime minister, Ben-Gurion.[85] This important statement expressed the perception that the public was a sovereign force that should be convinced to approve it.



FIGURE 15. *Model housing exhibition, 1950s. Note the expectancy of regular citizens to read and understand architectural plans. Source: NPC. Courtesy of Zvi Elhyani, Israel Architecture Archive.*

FIGURE 16. *"The problem: where to settle the immigrants?" Houses included in the Sharon planning proposal highlighted in boxes by author. Source: Sharon,* Physical Planning in Israel, 1948–1953.

FIGURE 17. *The Popular Housing Enterprise, designated for "veteran" citizens, Ministry of Labor brochure, 1951. The brochure, issued by the Ministry of Labor, specifies eligibility for the "popular housing" enterprise, which included primarily veteran immigrants living in insufficient housing conditions. Source: Israeli State Archive.*

Much has been written about the Sharon master plan in terms of population dispersal and the formation of "development towns" on Israel's periphery.[86] My concern is with a little-explored dimension of it — one for which it is nonetheless greatly critiqued — housing. In particular, it should be noted that the housing solutions proposed by it were largely two-story, four-unit houses, similar to those being built at the time for nonimmigrants. This contrasts strongly with the usual association of the Sharon plan in Israeli history with the degrading new housing typology of mass housing blocks.

The Sharon team defined its challenge as follows: "1,000 immigrants arrive each day — one dwelling unit has to be erected every two minutes. Should the new houses be built in the existing, already densely populated cities — or should housing and development be directed into new towns?"[87] This question made no reference to architecture or the nature of the dwelling units themselves. Neither did it propose a new housing type for immigrants. Its focus, as scholars have noted, was on the whereabouts of housing — i.e., on population dispersal. With no proposals for a new permanent housing type or form, the Sharon plan relied instead on the available model, constructed until then for the use of veteran citizens (FIGS. 16, 17).

As Zvi Efrat has pointed out, "development town" planning as reflected in the Sharon plan essentially proposed replicating *kibbutz* campus planning.[88] This can be seen in relation to the Beersheba neighborhood A, a pivotal case of development town planning, constructed between 1951 and 1953 north of Beersheba's old town (FIG. 18A, B). As a reflection of this *kibbutz* model, it featured a curvilinear layout, a central open area designated for public buildings, "green wedges," and simple small houses on large parcels of land.[89]

Efrat has defined the development town as a paradoxical combination of *kibbutz* rural planning and mass housing blocks, reflecting how the continued pace of change in housing eventually led to the association of the Sharon plan with mass housing-block dwellings in popular discourse as well as

FIGURE 18A,B. *First neighborhood unit (A) of the new Beersheba. Source:* Physical Planning in Israel 1948–1953, *Sharon archive.*

scholarship.[90] But the Sharon plan and Beersheba neighborhood A attest that development town housing was initially a replication of "proper" pioneer core housing. Thus, the housing in Neighborhood A actually comprised two-story buildings each containing four one-bedroom apartments of 26–32 square meters.[91] These houses were further allocated large parcels of land in anticipation of their future expansion by residents according to the principle of self-help.[92]

The permanent housing plan thus led to the gradual housing of *maabara* dwellers through the 1950s in units similar to veteran citizen housing **(FIG.19)**. Social unrest was accordingly curbed. It was only later, in the mid-1960s, that the housing typology constructed to serve immigrants changed dramatically to include the distinct architecture of "Unité" mass housing blocks, termed *shikun* in Hebrew

FIGURE 19. *From* maabara *to permanent housing. David Maabara dwellers moving to permanent housing constructed for them, 1960. Photograph by Moshe Pridan. Source: NPC, reprinted by permission.*

FIGURE 20. *Quarter Kilometer housing block, Beer Sheba (Architects Yaski and Alexandroni, 1962). Panorama taken 2007 by Eran Tawil Tamir. Source: arsitectura.com.*

(FIG.20).[93] Records show the Sharon master plan initially included permanent immigrant housing identical to housing built for "veteran" citizens at the time.

The reasons for the later change in immigrant housing forms cannot be covered within the scope of this article; however, the consequences of this change should be mentioned. Mass, anonymous *shikun* housing allocated to immigrants of the 1960s in development periphery towns generated great frustration and a sense of discrimination and degradation. This type of housing demarcated immigrants from veterans, defining them as second-class citizens. As in the case of *maabarot* a decade earlier, housing, the emblem of the state-citizen contract, materialized social differences and exclusions years before these came to the surface in 1977, when a dramatic change took place in the Israeli political regime.[94]

CONSOLIDATION OF A HOUSING-BASED STATE-CITIZEN CONTRACT

The establishment of state sovereignty opened the way for Israel to conduct national planning. However, as this article has attempted to show, it was not planning but the need to find housing solutions for the masses of new citizens that proved decisive in defining the state-citizen contract. Moreover, citizens' discontent with the housing solutions they were initially offered, as well as with the very definition of proper housing for a proper citizen, led to two dramatic changes in housing policy during Israel's first five years. The involvement of new citizens in formulating the state-citizen contract, and thus the nation-building project, was therefore far greater than has previously been theorized. When citizens did not self-govern according to the regime's standards of "proper" ideals and behavior, their "deviant" self-governance repeatedly forced the regime to change the course of its housing policies. Thus, while the regime and its bureaucrats developed and executed housing policies, these were soon challenged and revised as a consequence of popular demands.

The contribution of this article to the study of nation building in Israel and its architectural history has been threefold. First, it has shown how housing policies were used to respond to multiple perceived threats to Israel's sovereignty. These not only included the Arab-Palestinian threat already identified in the scholarly literature but also the threats posed by the JA and the "reluctant pioneer" citizenry. Second, it has mapped out three distinct waves of housing policy in a five-year period and pointed to the central role of housing in the negotiation of power relations and sovereignty within Israel's nation-building project. Third, it has exposed pivotal cases ignored by existing scholarship, such as the housing laboratories of Ramla, the work village, and the first *maabara* of Ksalon. It has thus attempted to unsettle accepted truisms regarding housing in the much studied cases of the Sharon master plan and the Beersheba A neighborhood. In addition, the article has contributed to the study of housing policy as a force in nation building by showing how, in the case of Israel, it played an important role in legitimizing government power among the masses of new immigrants and helping form their identity as Israeli citizens.

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29. Scholarship on the mass absorption of immigrants has focused primarily on the third housing policy discussed below. For more, see section 7 of Allweil, "Building a Home-Land."
30. Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War*.
31. Shadar, "The Influence of the Ministry of Construction and Housing"; Efrat, *The Israeli Project; and Darin-Drabkin, Housing in Israel*.
32. Darin-Drabkin, *Housing in Israel*, pp.224–52.
33. Y. Goldstein, *Eshkol — Biography* (Tel Aviv: Keter, 2003).
34. Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
35. Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*; and Eshkol, *The Hardships of Settlement*, pp.270–73.
36. Lissak, ed., *Studies in the Social History of Israel*. In legal terms, all vacated Arab houses were confiscated by the state and managed by the Amidar government company, to which immigrants were required to pay rent. See further discussion ahead.
37. A. Azulai, *Civil Imagination* (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2010); and D. Monteresku, "The Symbolic History of the Hyphen: Urban Alterity before Jaffa and Tel Aviv," *Zmanim*, 16 (2009).
38. Naor, "The Maabarot"; and Lissak, ed., *Studies in the Social History of Israel*.
39. The temporary government ruled the country until the first national elections, on January 25, 1949.
40. Amidar was later entrusted with the construction of new permanent housing for immigrants, a task it did not manage to perform quickly enough to meet demands. Lissak, ed., *Studies in the Social History of Israel*.
41. Ibid.
42. Goldstein, *Eshkol — Biography*. It should be noted that directing immigrants to *moshavim* rather than *kibbutzim* was also a political statement on the part of Ben-Gurion. *Kibbutzim* were supporters of the Mapam party rather than Ben-Gurion's Mapai party. Allocation of land, resources and population to undergo subject formation in the other party's stronghold had significant political implications in internal politics.
43. Y. Koren, *The Gathering of Israel in Its Settlement: The History of Immigrant Moshavim in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1964).
44. U. Davis and W. Lehn, "And the Fund Still Lives: The Role of the Jewish National Fund in the Determination of Israel's Land Policies," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.7 No.4 (1978).
45. Israel Land Administration, Tirat Yehuda file.
46. "Infiltrators Attacked a Moshav Near Lydda," *Davar*, June 10, 1953.
47. Most wooden shacks were purchased as precut timber in a barter agreement with the Finish government. Israeli State Archive, shacks file.
48. D. Giladi, "From Austerity to Economic Growth," in R.B. Noberger, ed., *Israel's First Decade* (Milton Keynes, U.K.: Open University, 2002).
49. Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
50. N. Meishar, "Leaving the Castle," in Cohen and Amir, eds., *Living Forms*.
51. A. Kamp, "The Face of the Border Like the Face of Janus," *Theory and Criticism*, 16 (2000); and Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
52. Ibid.

53. Partial leaving of the camp for employment only was often restricted. Naor, "The Maabarot."
54. See, for example, Meishar, "Leaving the Castle."
55. Jewish Agency board meeting protocols, March 29, 1949, CZA.
56. Lavon Institute archive, protocols of the Mapai party meeting of April 22, 1949, file 1-49/24.
57. M. Bentov, *Public Housing in Israel: Lecture at the University of California, Berkeley* (Jerusalem: Ministry of Housing, 1969), p.10.
58. Israeli declaration of Independence, available online at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israel.
59. Eshkol, protocol of the state-JA coordination committee, 1950. Quoted in Y. Sleifer, "Urban Settlement 1948–1963," in M. Tuvia and M. Bone, eds., *Construction of the Land* (HaKibbutz HaMeuchad, 1999). Emphasis added.
60. J. Weitz, *The Struggle for the Land* (N. Taverski, 1950).
61. Lissak, ed., *Studies in the Social History of Israel*; Naor, "The Maabarot"; and Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
62. Israel State Archive, Work Village file. Very little scholarly work exists regarding the work village; it has largely been forgotten as a housing and settlement form.
63. The *haluka* was a system of financial support for Jews living in the Holy Land by diaspora Jews. It was perceived by Zionists as the exact opposite of Jewish sovereignty.
64. For a detailed account of the World Zionist Organization's settlement activities since 1908, see Allweil, "Building a Home-Land."
65. Lissak, ed., *Studies in the Social History of Israel*.
66. Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
67. Eshkol, quoted in Greicer and Gonen, "Design of the State's Early Settlement Map."
68. The lack of access to the land for subsistence farms in the *maabara* has been overlooked by scholars, but it was a cardinal issue, as will be discussed in depth below. "The First Maabara for Immigrants Employed in Forestry was Established," *Davar*, May 23, 1950. Ksalon Maabara file, Israeli State Archive.
69. D. Hacohen, "The Direct Absorption Program for Mass Immigration in the 1950s and Its Consequences," *Reviews of Israel's Independence*, 1 (1991).
70. While housing was the thing at stake in both immigrant reception camps and the *maabara*, scholarship on these housing forms tends to focus on issues like employment, education, ethnicity and political ideology. See, for example, Lissak, ed., *Studies in the Social History of Israel*; M. Kachinski, "The Ma'abarot," in Naor, ed., *Immigrants and Ma'abarot*; Darin-Drabkin, *Housing in Israel*; and S. Svirsky, "Not Retrograde but Retrograded: Mizrahi and Ashkenazi in Israel: Sociological Analysis and Conversations with Activists," Books for Research and Criticism, 1981.
71. The division between the two forms of temporary immigrant settlements is made evident in the archives. While information on the work camps is archived by the JNF at the Central Zionist Archive, information on the *maabara* settlements is archived in the Israeli State Archive.
72. Darin-Drabkin, *Housing in Israel*; and Shadar, "The Influence of the Ministry of Construction and Housing."
73. Eshkol, *The Hardships of Settlement*.
74. Lissak, ed., *Studies in the Social History of Israel*.
75. S. Fogelman, "In the Emek Hefer Maabara in 1952 Occurred the First Civil Rebellion in Israel, Buried in the Pages of History," *Haaretz*, January 22, 2010.
76. "105 Maabara Dwellers Arrested," *Maariv*, October 27, 1952.
77. Fogelman, "In the Emek Hefer Maabara in 1952."
78. E. Shohat, "Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Jewish Victims," *Social Text*, No.19/20 (1988).
79. For discussion of racial discrimination in access to housing see: Kamp, "The Face of the Border Like the Face of Janus"; Kallus and Law-Yone, "National Home/Personal Home"; and Efrat, *The Israeli Project*.
80. Yacobi, "The Mizrahi Dwelling Machine."
81. Shohat, "Sephardim in Israel"; O. Yiftachel, "'Ethnocracy': The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine," *Constellations*, Vol.6 No.3 (1999); H. Yacobi, *Constructing a Sense of Place: Architecture and the Zionist Discourse* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004); Kallus and Law-Yone, "National Home/Personal Home"; and O. Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
82. Shohat, "Sephardim in Israel"; and E. Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims," *Social Text*, No.1 (1979).
83. Efrat, *The Israeli Project*, Sharon archive.
84. A. Sharon, *Physical Planning in Israel 1948–1953* (Government Printer, 1951).
85. Ibid.
86. Kallus and Law-Yone, "National Home/Personal Home"; Efrat, *The Israeli Project*; Yacobi, "The Mizrahi Dwelling Machine"; and many others.
87. Sharon, *Physical Planning in Israel 1948–1953*.
88. Efrat, *The Israeli Project*; Yacobi, "The Mizrahi Dwelling Machine"; and many others.
89. Shadar, "The Influence of the Ministry of Construction and Housing."
90. Efrat, *The Israeli Project*.
91. D. Zaslewski, *Immigrant Housing in Israel: Construction, Planning and Development* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1954).
92. Ibid; Sharon, *Physical Planning in Israel 1948–1953*.
93. Shadar, "The Influence of the Ministry of Construction and Housing."
94. Kallus and Law-Yone, "National Home/Personal Home"; and Yacobi, *Constructing a Sense of Place*.

Field Report

Social and Material Influences on the Kelabit Dwelt Environment

IAN J. EWART

Relations with the environment are key to the ways rural people pursue dwelling practices. But the complex processes of globalization now challenge the isolation of such groups, affecting their perception and use of the environment. One place this can be seen is the Kelabit Highlands of northern Sarawak (Malaysian Borneo), where the recent arrival of commercial logging has allowed local people to make wider connections via the logging roads. In the Kelabit Highlands, cultural and historic traditions are being reconstituted in light of new material relations with a dynamic environment, bringing changes to customs of house building.

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The Kelabit people are one of the smaller ethnic groups in Borneo, numbering perhaps 5,000 individuals, many of whom migrate between their traditional interior homeland in Sarawak (Malaysian Borneo) and larger industrial towns on the coast. While contacts between the Kelabit and the wider world have historically been sporadic, in the last fifty years or so these have increased enormously, especially since the arrival of commercial logging. The logistics of logging require a network of dirt roads, which have gradually penetrated the Kelabit Highlands since around 2005. Travel for local people has therefore become much easier, both locally and further afield, providing access to a greater range of resources and creating the conditions for a vibrant exchange of ideas and the introduction of new materials.

In this report I suggest that adopting the concept of a dynamic environment allows us to more successfully engage with ideas about the relation between materials and the world we live in. Material change can be viewed as a response to new environments rather than diminished affinity to a "natural" environment. In this sense, ongoing devel-

opment and engagement with an extended environment have brought changes to Kelabit material culture — especially, as discussed here, in their houses.

I begin by adopting a historic perspective, describing some of the key events and customs of traditional Kelabit society and how these helped shape traditional notions of house building. I then move forward to the present day to describe the impact of recent social trends on modern Kelabit housing, including the innovative adoption of new materials. Focusing on conditions in the village of Pa' Dalih, the report draws on data gathered during ethnographic fieldwork in the highlands of northern Borneo from 2008–2010, as well as archival research in Borneo and the U.K. **(FIG. 1)**.[1]

A HISTORY OF CHANGING TRADITIONS

In recent years the Kelabit Highlands has been a place of enormous social and physical change, which has drastically altered traditional lifestyles and relations between local people and their immediate environment. Access to new materials, migration to work in paid labor, demographic change within villages, use of modern tools, attitudes toward traditional materials, and evolving perceptions of the forest are all immediate and ongoing issues for the residents of the village of Pa' Dalih. Yet, while the process of change may appear rapid and unsettling today, the history of the region offers earlier examples of external influences that have altered local social life.

Engagement with the interior populations of northern Borneo dates to the late nineteenth century. The adventurous James Brooke (the first "White Rajah of Sarawak") and his nephew and successor Charles Brooke were the first Westerners to exploit contacts with these peoples, including, by about 1890, the Kelabit.[2] They introduced a series of reforms to persuade local people to maintain peaceful relations, including a determined assault on the practice of headhunting, frequent government-sponsored raids, and the sponsorship of formal peace treaties between local tribes. In 1908 the region was fully incorporated into the British colonial sphere after a famous peace treaty in Pa' Mein between the Kelabit and neighboring tribes. The treaty was instigated by the district resident, R.S. Douglas, the first European to visit the Kelabit highland plateau[3]; it was ratified at a ceremony hosted by the chief Ballang Maran, "a notorious headhunter."[4] Some 700 to 800 people gathered in his longhouse, a pig was slaughtered, and the chiefs exchanged blood, swearing to abide by the terms of the treaty.[5]

As the influence of colonial rule spread to the Bornean interior, it brought a sense of accessibility to an assortment of administrators, explorers and missionaries, some of whom left descriptions of Kelabit longhouse life. Among these were reports by the seminal Torres Strait Expedition in 1898–99[6]; A.B. Ward, a government official, in 1903[7]; R.S. Douglas before the 1908 peace treaty[8]; and in 1922, by Eric Mjoberg, curator of the Sarawak Museum.[9]

Until the 1930s the relationship between the Kelabit and the wider world was primarily one of extraction. Goods were taken from the forest as tax payments, while explorers and representatives of the newly created Sarawak National Museum collected cultural objects. Some objects did make their way in the opposite direction into Kelabit households —



FIGURE 1. *The village of Pa' Dalih in 2010. In the center is the football pitch, with the school at the bottom left and the church on the opposite side. The main longhouse is beyond the church. Irrigated padi fields are on the right. Photo by author.*

in particular, large *belanai* ("dragon jars") and various metal items — but the vast majority of Kelabit material culture was indigenous and relatively local.[10] But this began to change in the period leading up to World War II; instead of being a place from which the outside world procured, the Kelabit Highlands became a place into which it could impart new ideas and materials. The earliest efforts to bring new ideas to the region were unsuccessful attempts by missionaries to establish Christian outposts there in the 1930s.[11] Indigenous religious practices were animistic, and the behavior of birds, in particular, was seen as ominous, causing work to be halted and farms and houses to be moved.[12] With the eventual adoption of Christian practices, however, this link to the surrounding forest was fractured, and the relationship between the Kelabit and the forest became, as it is today, more prosaic and no longer filled with spiritual significance.

While the Kelabit were coming to terms with a new religious environment in the 1940s, they also came face to face with a very different group of Christians, in the form of British and Australian paratroopers, who used the Kelabit Highlands as a base for guerrilla action against the occupying Japanese. Along with military personnel came new materials: corrugated tin sheets, wire rope, steel nails, sheets of plywood, saws, hammers, and other metal tools — all of which were rare or new to the Kelabit. Unlike the preceding fifty years of external contact, the Kelabit were now confronted with these things in a direct and explicit way, one that demonstrated new potentials and that offered alternatives to the materials on which they had hitherto depended.

The formation of the Malaysian nation in 1962 and the subsequent military "Confrontation" with Indonesia brought another batch of troops to the Kelabit Highlands, this time to patrol the nearby international border. Those living closest to the border were resettled in the village of Bario, which grew to become the Kelabit capital. And instead of the makeshift logistics of the World War II guerilla campaign, this engagement involved a large-scale military presence based in the village of Pa' Mein — which received regular supplies of cement, corrugated metal sheets, tools, nails, petrol, generators, chainsaws, clothing, and, of course, guns. At the end of the Confrontation, when the troops were withdrawn, remaining supplies were distributed locally, introducing these materials into circulation in significant quantities for the first time. Kelabit engineering was profoundly changed by the new possibilities: bamboo bridges were replaced with ones using wire rope, for example, and new forms of housing began to emerge **(FIG. 2)**.

FIGURE 2. *An early wire-rope bridge in the Kelabit highlands, 1962.* © *Sarawak Museum.*

THE TRADITIONAL KELABIT LONGHOUSE

Although they contain some information on traditional dwellings, reports from early visitors to the highlands were as concerned with the difficulties of the terrain as they were with describing the place itself. For a government official or private explorer in the early twentieth century, a visit to the region required travel along unpredictable rivers and over grueling mountains, and took from three weeks to three months.[13] As Major Tom Harrisson wrote in 1949: "the extent and scope of different influences on the Kelabit highlands are complicated by the substantial efforts required to get there."[14]

Some of these early visitors did, however, describe the mix of structures in a typical village, which consisted of small bamboo and thatch field huts, dominated physically and socially by a central longhouse.[15] From the outside, the longhouse was an imposing, closed structure, raised three to four meters off the ground on sturdy poles, sunk into the ground or supported on large flat stones.[16] It was roofed with a thick thatch that extended down almost to floor level, and beneath this broad expanse, walls of wooden planks or split bamboo were held together with rattan **(FIG. 3)**.

The longhouse was typically entered by means of a large log with steps chopped out, which provided access to the main public space, the *tawa* **(FIG. 4)**.[17] Peering down the smoky gloom of this common hall, which might be 100 meters long and five meters wide, it would have been hard not to be impressed by the sheer size of the longhouse structure. On one side of the *tawa* was a full-length wooden wall that shielded the family area (*dalim*) from view and concentrated attention along its length **(FIG. 5)**. The busy, open *tawa* was where visitors slept, people chatted with neighbors, children played, possessions were stored and displayed, and household objects were made and repaired. Hanging from the rafters above would have been all manner of baskets, nets and trophies — the odd skull or two, antlers, tusks, and the like **(FIG. 6)**. Overhead could also have been seen the horizontal laths supporting the roofing thatch, worn thin after

FIGURE 3. *A traditional Kelabit longhouse, 1940s.* © *Sarawak Museum.*



FIGURE 4. *"Pre 1945 Kelabit longhouse." Drawing by Robert Lian-Saging, from the collection of the Sarawak Museum.*

FIGURE 5. *Interior of a Kelabit longhouse, 1947. View down the* tawa. *Note the thatched roof and full-length dividing wall on the left. © Sarawak Museum.*

FIGURE 6. *Storage and maintenance of objects in the* tawa, *1947. © Sarawak Museum.*

a few years of heavy rains and pierced in places by shafts of sunlight — patched up but still serviceable. To make sure torrential rains were shed quickly, the roof was typically quite steep, the eaves low and the ridge quite high, allowing plenty of overhead storage space.

The Kelabit longhouse was typically divided into family units, with each section delimited by its floorboards. These were cut to about the same length, three or four meters, but varied in width, some being up to a meter wide. The surface of each, rubbed smoothed by years of use, revealed clues to its method of production. Metal tools were rare in the 1930s, and saws did not arrive until the 1950s, so an adze was used to make them.[18] It would take a man about two weeks to hack through the length of a large trunk to free one plank from the center — perhaps a meter wide and three meters long.[19] The plank would then be smoothed with a wide-bladed adze, leaving a characteristic fish-scale pattern. A typical household would need about ten of these planks, or else it would need to rely on much less durable split-bamboo flooring.[20]

Behind the central full-length wall, each *dalim* (family area) was separated from the next only by low dividers. Running behind them was another open passageway, which allowed people to walk from one end of the longhouse to the other in this area as well as in the much wider and more public *tawa*. The open-plan family areas, with their low walls and connecting walkway, led Harrisson to comment, "to the Kelabit, privacy is unknown and unwanted."[21] His Britishness may have led to an exaggerated sense of the importance of personal space, but this is a peculiarly Kelabit form of architecture; other Bornean longhouses tend to have a long open public space (like the *tawa*), and behind the central wall, a series of separate family spaces.

THE TRADITIONAL MATERIAL ENVIRONMENT

The historic Kelabit longhouse was not a fully permanent structure, since life required movement for three principal reasons: agriculture, animistic beliefs, and intertribal violence.

Kelabit agriculture was dominated by swidden-farming of forest fields (*late lu'un*) planted with hill rice and vegetables. Each year a new area would be cleared, burned and planted, leaving the forest around the village a mosaic of regrowth. A longhouse would be located where the villagers could exploit the immediately surrounding area, and then, after three or four seasons, it would be dismantled and moved a few miles.[22]

Religious beliefs were a second reason for moving. In the pre-Christian era, Kelabit relations with the environment were dominated by animistic beliefs that offered guidance on the timing of daily and seasonal activities.[23] Even if a longhouse had just been built, belief in the power of forest spirits was such that it might be moved after only a few months. According to Ramy Bulan, "Before they turned to Christianity in the early 1940s, bad omens, fear of spirits and curses pronounced on the longhouse, or quarrels between residents caused whole villages to move or split."[24]

Finally, the village could be moved as a result of violent neighbors. Reducing tribal violence, especially through a ban on headhunting, was a key tenet of British colonial governance. Yet traditional features of the longhouse, built in response to potential violence, remained in place long afterwards — for example, raising it on stilts and providing entrance via an easily retracted log ladder. As with the needs of swidden farming and animistic beliefs, the threat of violence made easy dismantling and reconstruction of the longhouse a priority. Materials had to satisfy one of two fundamental characteristics: either they had to be easily obtained from the forest at the new site, or they had to be portable.

Since the longhouse might be moved every few years, it was engineered without heavy-duty components and long-term fixings. In line with cultural practices, it was as robust and durable as required, but it had to be easy to break down and carry away.[25] Materials were chosen accordingly. The thatched roof lasted perhaps five years with careful maintenance, but it offered protection to walls and floors — elements which could be transported and reused. Floorboards were laid and left unfixed. Walls were made of smaller planks tied with rattan to allow them to be dismantled — or of split bamboo, which could be discarded. Structural components, made from local hardwoods, lasted about ten years, and the best were saved and reused. However, stones, such as those used around the hearth or as post pads, could normally be left behind and new ones collected from a riverbank close to the new site.

The traditional Kelabit longhouse was thus literally a product of its environment. As such, it echoed sentiments expressed by Paul Cloke and Owain Jones (following Martin Heidegger and Tim Ingold[26]) in describing habitation from a "dwelling" perspective: "Dwelling is about the rich intimate ongoing togetherness of beings and things which make up landscapes and places, and which bind together nature and culture over time."[27] For the Kelabit, connections to the outside world were circumscribed by the terrain and the dangers of travel across tribal boundaries, which limited their exposure to, and use of, external resources. Their houses were the accumulated result of practices of engagement with the immediately surrounding forest, requiring skills and experience that enabled material transformation.

Henry Glassie (writing in the "folkloristic" tradition[28]) has accorded great significance to this type of direct physical connection to the environment, and adopted a Marxist view of its contrast to industrial technologies.[29] In a refrain familiar within vernacular architecture studies, he argued that a mastery of local resources was a key to successful housing:

> *In the shift from local to imported materials, there is a loss in environmental efficiency and a loss in beauty. There is a gain in permanence, which is compensation for a loss of skill and social connection. The loss in pleasure taken from a job well done, and the burden of the need for cash, must be set against the prestige that is supposed to accrue to the one who purchases expensive objects.*[30]

An alternative view, however, would be to consider the environment a shifting concept for both the observer and the local people. Rather than lamenting the loss of tradition, this allows us to accept that changes to housing (as demonstrated by the adoption of new materials, for example) come in response to new perceptions of the environment. For the Kelabit, as their landscape and their environment have changed, the ability to build a suitable house might thus be seen to require a renegotiation with what it means to dwell in a chosen area.

THE DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT

Remote regions tenuously linked to the wider world, such as the Kelabit Highlands of the 1940s, are now virtually nonexistent; the world has become globally connected, allowing mass-produced commodities to flow from one continent to another. As Anna Tsing has pointed out, expanding global connections can be chaotic and uncertain — providing a very different picture than that of the simple, homogenous, global capitalism first described by authors such at George Ritzer.[31] The same messy creation of new relations is going on in the Kelabit Highlands, altering connections between its inhabitants and the wider world. These connections can be traced in the changing materials used in house construction and the different position of the forest in everyday life.

Within the last decade the expansion of commercial logging in Sarawak has enabled a widespread system of connection and communication using a network of logging roads. Composed of wide dirt tracks bulldozed through the forest to gain access to licensed logging areas, this network has provided a crude infrastructure linking the rural interior with more industrialized coastal towns, especially Miri (**FIG.7**).[32] In 2010, with the imminent arrival of logging in the Kelabit Highlands, great efforts were being made to avoid the destruction widespread in other areas. Many Kelabit villages were marking and mapping their "cultural sites" (stone monuments, pre-Christian cemeteries, etc.), as loggers are not meant to disturb them — and even if they do, there is still a moral obligation owed to the locals.[33] Similarly, in response to the pollution of river systems by soil erosion, logging licenses are contingent on protecting sources of water used by rural villages. The Sarawak Department of Health is responsible for clean water supplies, and officially validates village sources and bans logging in their vicinity.

These measures may be enough to prevent substantial logging in the immediate area of Kelabit villages. But the paradox is that even if the residents of a settlement like Pa' Dalih want to prevent such logging, they still want the logging roads. The roads provide access by four-wheel-drive

FIGURE 7. *The logging road going from Pa' Dalih to Pa' Mada and on to Bario. Photo by author.*

truck or jacked-up scooter; they make sourcing building materials from the forest easier; and they provide fairly reliable access to Miri, now a major source of materials (as well as jobs, higher education, and medical care).

By the 1970s the three factors that had once led to the movement of longhouses had effectively disappeared: Christianity had replaced animistic beliefs; intertribal violence had been stamped out; and agricultural practices had changed from transient swidden farming to permanent fields of irrigated padi rice.[34] Consequently, the choice of materials had also changed, favoring durability over portability. In addition to the now ubiquitous use of metal sheeting for roofs, the use of concrete (made by mixing Miri cement with local sand and stones) is now widespread. Thus, the traditional method of supporting structural posts on large stones has given way to concrete foundations combined with the use of *belian* — a nonlocal hardwood **(FIG. 8)**. Whereas local hardwoods might last ten years, *belian* lasts twenty or thirty, but it needs to be brought in from outside the Kelabit Highlands. The nearest source is 30 kilometers to the southwest, where the lowland Kelabit live alongside a group of traditionally nomadic Penan.[35] The wood is harvested and prepared by the Penan, and it is typically brought to villages like Pa' Dalih in pieces that are four to five inches square, at lengths of up to twelve feet.[36] Access to *belian* is now not as difficult as it once was, since the logging roads connect Pa' Dalih with Long Peluan (from where the wood can be sourced), and large quantities can be brought in on a four-wheel-drive truck.

As a result of these influences, the traditional environment of the Kelabit has been extended and socially reconfigured. In an effort to prove cultural continuity, and hence protect and maintain control of the surrounding forest, new emphasis has been placed on history and on reclaiming the past. Yet, although the forest remains vital as a place from which to gather food, it has lost much of its spiritual significance. The forest is also no longer as important as a source of raw materials — with the exception of an escalating desire for hardwood.

FIGURE 8. *Nonlocal* belian *hardwood foundation post, cemented in and bolted to locally sourced hardwood upper structure. New house construction, Pa' Dalih, 2009. Photo by author.*

FIGURE 9. *A Chinese hardware store in Miri used by the villagers of Pa' Dalih. Photo by author.*

The reality underlying these changes is that the resource environment is no longer just the local forest with its wood, sand and stones. The airstrip at Bario stocks up local stores, while the logging roads connect Pa' Dalih to regional resources such as *belian*, and further afield to Miri, where a four-wheel-drive truck can be loaded up with half a ton of whatever the world has to offer (FIG.9). Conversely, local materials such as rattan and bamboo, once absolutely vital to the village, are now of only peripheral importance, and are usually used only as stop-gaps. Globalization for the Kelabit is facilitated by fragile links to the coast, fed by the desire to make things more durable, and by a proliferation of information and ideas that provide this inventive people with new ways of engaging with their dynamic, lived environment.

THE KELABIT LONGHOUSE TODAY

These fundamental changes to environmental relations have influenced the type of longhouse we see today. Looking down on in Pa' Dalih from one of the surrounding slopes, its buildings are now more numerous and more varied than they would have been seventy years ago (REFER TO FIG.1). There are actually three longhouses (the main longhouse, the short longhouse, and the short-short longhouse) and fifteen or twenty other buildings, including a large school and Christian church, all now centered around a football pitch instead of the main longhouse.

The original longhouse, built in the 1970s, has been expanded over the years, a reminder of the change in Kelabit attitudes from portability to permanence. From the outside, facing the center of the village, it is now dominated by a modern-looking *tawa* structure, with planed plank walls, glass louvered windows, and a metal roof (FIG.10). Behind this, the

FIGURE 10. *Front of Pa' Dalih main longhouse in 2010, showing recently constructed* tawa. *Photo by author.*



FIGURE 11. *Rear of the Pa' Dalih main longhouse in 2010, now entirely used as a* dalim, *built in the 1970s. Photo by author.*

original structure is entirely devoted to *dalim*, taking the form of a series of family hearths arranged down its length. Meanwhile, additional new *tawas* have been attached outward as a series of separate and largely unconnected buildings **(FIG. 11)**.

Since the modern *tawa* was built in 2001, its style has become relatively common — incorporating increased size, machine-cut wooden walls and floors, louvered glass windows, and separate sleeping rooms (*telong*). Many of these features are repeated in other buildings around the village, to the extent that one might consider this to be a new Kelabit tradition. That perception is illusory, however, since the changes which have led to this type of design have been rapid and are ongoing. The trend today is for the size of buildings to increase: the new *tawas* (public areas) bulge out and dominate the old-style *dalims* (family/cooking areas) **(FIG. 12)**. Walls are also getting bigger, and (thanks to the dividing up of interior space) more numerous, meaning that much greater amounts of wood are required.

Despite these changes, there remains what Roxana Waterson, in her survey and analysis of Southeast Asian architecture, has called "a persistence of features."[37] In particular, she cited a dominance of roof over walls and a raising of the entire structure on piles. Similarly, current Kelabit longhouse structures maintain some of the architectural and so-



FIGURE 12. *Plan of the main longhouse in Pa' Dalih, 2009. Drawing by author.*

cial essences of their traditional predecessors. The *tawa* may be separate, but it is still used for display and as a space for hosting visitors. The raised floor may no longer be required as a defensive feature, but it is still useful for storing possessions and creating a space for animals.

Inside, the appearance of the *dalim* is reminiscent of the traditional longhouse. It is still characterized by rough plank walls, wide floorboards, and an atmosphere heavy with smoke from many fires. But the heat is stifling, beating down from the metal roof close above, blackened by soot; and the rafters are no longer decorated with the hanging odds and ends of everyday life, supporting instead a few fluorescent strip lights, with wires straggling beneath them (FIG. 13). New materials have provided new sensations of dwelling. The use of roofing sheets was one of the first changes to the construction longhouses, and it is still probably one of the most significant. Metal roof sheets offer a very different set of properties than the thatch that went before them. They are large, hard and heavy; they get very hot and radiate heat inside; and when it rains (and it rains often, and heavily), the sound is like thunderous applause, drowning out conversation.

Yet, talking to older residents about thatched roofs leads to animated and lengthy conversations about how dirty they once were; how anything stored in the rafters would become infested with insects and covered with soot; and how sections of thatch were constantly having to be repaired or replaced. By contrast, complaints about the heat and noise from metal roofs are muted, the prevailing attitude being one of resignation. It seems time saved in reduced maintenance is worth the discomfort. Only recently, in the construction of new buildings, are these issues being addressed — through the addition of extra insulation, or by installing an intermediary suspended plywood ceiling.

Adopting new materials has been a considered decision by the Kelabit. Recalling Glassie, quoted above, they reflect a change in the mode of acquisition — from the need for skill in selecting and manipulating thatch from the forest to an ability to provide sufficient cash for metal sheets. In the context of contemporary rural Kelabit culture, itinerant wage labor means the lived environment now includes aspects of the industrialized world. And the use of metal sheets for roofing has been one of the most significant changes to architectural traditions that has resulted.

It is one, however, that Waterson, as a scholar of the region, regards as enforced and alien. For her, local materials were better suited to local environmental conditions. She has cited a range of examples in Asia of local environmental adaptation, including structural flexibility to cope with earthquakes, increased ventilation through bamboo floors, raised floors to reduce mosquito attacks, and so on.[38] But in general terms she has regarded the use of metal sheeting for roofs as less effective than older methods, even if (agreeing with Glassie) it may be more prestigious. That, however, is not the case here. Metal sheets are a better fit to the Kelabit environment, which includes (among other things) distant places of work as well as local farms, sporadic electricity, the reality of rat and insect infestation, and (soon) widespread telecommunication and connections to the Internet. Materials are part of a lived environment; they help create a specific setting and form the basis for an ongoing exploration of the world by the people who experience it.

FIGURE 13. *Longhouse interior in 2009, view of the* dalim. *Photo by author.*

FIGURE 14. *Ganang's innovative new house under construction, 2009. The roof shape is inspired by tourist images of Alpine lodges. Photo by author.*

MODERN HOUSING

Today the trend in Pa' Dalih, and indeed in many local villages, is toward individual houses rather than a communal longhouse. One example is a house being built by Ganang, an experienced builder keen to try new materials and techniques **(FIG. 14)**. While I use this house as a way of describing the trend toward individual houses, I do so without suggesting that it represents a typical Kelabit house. Indeed, it would be difficult to say what is "typical," since many traditionally common features are now being challenged — even some that have only emerged fairly recently. Ganang's house, for example, does not employ posts with the usual substructure of *belian* (imported hardwood) joined to an upper structure of local wood **(REFER TO FIG. 8)**. Instead, Ganang formed raised concrete blocks with protruding steel plates, onto which he bolted locally available posts, making the use of imported *belian* redundant. Instead of raising the floor and using the underneath as storage, he also poured a concrete slab to provide a lower floor. He did this using a mixture made from bags of cement from Miri and local river sand and stones.

The roof of Ganang's house is made of prepainted tin sheets, also from Miri, set at a steeper angle than usual. He had seen a poster advertising tourism to the Swiss Alps and been taken by the shape of Alpine lodges, using them as the inspiration for his design.[39] When discussing this feature later in the company of others, he added that he was also trying to reproduce the steep-roofed designs of the traditional thatched longhouse.

As Pierre Lemonnier has argued, technological choices are determined as much by cultural tradition as by physical attributes.[40] While material nature presents itself as the source of numerous technical possibilities, the choices people make are generally restricted. Materials are not chosen on the basis of physical properties removed from their place in social tradition, but depend on preexisting ideas and customs. Materials come from an environment, and it is from that environment that possibilities emerge. And yet, given the same ecological circumstances, different cultures choose to deal with the same problems differently — what Lemonnier refers to as "arbitrary choices." He is therefore equally critical of an ecological approach (that technical choices depend on what is locally available) as of an economic approach (that choices are made as a logical balance between effort and rewards). Choices are made as a result of a combination of these considerations, mixed with more whimsical factors derived from the social and historical background of the people doing the choosing.

The example of the reuse of drink cans as "building bricks" in Santo Domingo illustrates this balancing.[41] The proliferation of discarded cans has there provided local people with a potential new technical choice; but to successfully employ it, it first had to be proved materially and socially. This use of cast-off items should not be construed as a case where "Westernization" has reduced local people to scavenging waste heaps — environmental destruction having removed the option of natural resources.[42] Instead, the reuse of drink cans is entirely consistent with traditional forms of resource exploitation, as described by Waterson and Glassie: it embodies abundance, not scarcity. The difference is in conceptualizing the waste heaps as being as much a part of the "natural environment" as the forests in Borneo.

So it is for the Kelabit: choices are based on emerging concepts of durability, as well as on cost and availability. However, in giving primacy to one material property, other characteristics become less important and can be compromised. Metal roofing is now expected to last as long as the house, and not just a few months; but metal sheets are poor insulators, unlike thatched roofs. Concerns with durability and maintenance are thus replaced with concerns about noise and heat insulation.

Having accepted this compromise for thirty years or so, the Kelabit, ever resourceful and innovative, have recently gained access to new materials which have the potential to resolve it. To cope with the heat generated by the metal roof in the blazing sun, Ganang is experimenting in his new house with fiberglass insulation fixed to the underside of the roofing sheets. And since his novel steep roof has raised its height, he can also leave large areas of the upper gables open, like large triangular windows near the ridge. Protected by the overhanging roof, the openings will allow wind to pass straight through, hopefully taking the warmest and smokiest air with it. Many villagers doubt that the fiberglass insulation will work, believing it will become an ideal nesting place for all manner of pests. Instead, most prefer the idea of installing a suspended plywood ceiling, as was being done in the new *tawa* in the main longhouse.

Christian Coiffier described the irreconcilable move by rural residents of Papua New Guinea toward an urban way of life, concluding, "It would seem one cannot be both a bush man and a town man."[43] I suggest that the bush man never existed, and neither does the town man. Both are categories on an illusory line of relative modernity. The relationship between people and the world is now, and always will be, fundamentally unstable. Ingold has referred to this as the "flow of life" — a continual and mutually creative engagement with the lived environment.[44]

All of the newer houses in Pa' Dalih include various novel materials, and Ganang's, as one of the newest, is a good example of changing relations with a dynamic environment. The bulk of the house is still made of locally sourced hardwoods; but with the addition of metal plates, cement, painted roof panels, insulation, tinted windows, and the concept of a Swiss chalet, it is representative of how Kelabit housing is increasingly made up of a radically different set of relations, and represents a change even from the more recent longhouses.

CHANGING ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS

Relations between the Kelabit and their environment have been radically altered by the imposition of colonial governance, the introduction of Christianity, the extensive adoption of wet rice farming, and influx of new materials and ideas since World War II. This continues today through the impact of an extensive network of logging roads that link remote villages such as Pa' Dalih to their neighbors and to large coastal towns. In the midst of these influences, the forest has changed from being a resource for subsistence, moral guidance, and materials of production, to being a local source for some food and raw materials, and a repository of cultural history. Meanwhile, the environment that the Kelabit inhabit has grown beyond the local; it now extends to the regional, and is becoming ever more global.

Social changes such as these must be seen in tandem with the material changes they bring, as reflected in new forms of housing in the Kelabit Highlands. Villages are no longer centered around the longhouse, constructed to be easily dismantled and periodically moved. And as the concept of the village has changed to one of permanent settlement, notions of structural durability have gained prominence, entailing a new set of material responses to the requirements of constructing a place to dwell. However, new materials come with new environmental relations: metal roofs become hot and noisy; concrete allows for a permanent ground floor; *belian* hardwood and metal bolts reduce maintenance. Sitting in a house in the heat or rain today is a different physical and social experience than was sitting in the traditional house with its insulating thatch.

The trend to individual houses, apparently at the expense of the longhouse, and the desire for durability means that the incorporation of new materials has become engrained into Kelabit society. The social implications of a move away from communal living cannot be discussed in any detail here, but as might be expected, new house shapes are influencing daily routines and interactions. New relations created by the extension of the dwelling environment beyond local forest areas, stretched along logging roads and on to the coast, create an indefinable social and material mix: messy globalism in action.[45] This is not the imposition of an overwhelming external culture.[46] Nor is it a heroic battle against nature.[47] It implies the discretionary adoption of new potentials in the context of a dynamic environment.

In this instance we should not lament the introduction of new materials as the death knell of vernacular architec-

ture.[48] Rather, we should recognize the intimate relationship between the environment and the people who use it as something not limited to the apparently "natural" world of forest materials. The Kelabit who used the resources of the forest in such a successful way prior to extensive contact are precursors to the modern Kelabit doing the same in their environment. New forms of buildings depend on a combination of possibilities that emerge from the development and introduction of new materials and existing socio-environmental relations, accreted into the local population over current and previous generations. That this requires the Kelabit to be able to deal with chainsaws, petrol, and metal sheets instead of parangs, bamboo and rattan is of no consequence. Dwelling in an environment is a fundamental human activity, and as this example of Kelabit house building shows, this involves continual process of exploration, engagement, and mutual creation.

REFERENCE NOTES

Thanks are due to the Kelabit people for their hospitality and patience, especially the villagers of Pa' Dalih. Fieldwork was carried out as part of my doctoral studies at the University of Oxford, where my supervisors, Chris Gosden and Inge Daniels, have both been inspirational and highly influential in my thinking; I gratefully acknowledge their assistance and guidance. Thanks are also due to two anonymous reviewers who helped to improve the argument. My studies were funded by a U.K. ESRC studentship, and my introduction to the Kelabit came through participation in the U.K. AHRC-funded "Cultured Rainforest Project." This report was written while I was employed by the School of Construction Management and Engineering at the University of Reading, where Rachael Luck has been supportive and ready to discuss ideas. I am also indebted to the State Planning Unit of Sarawak for permission to undertake fieldwork, and the staff at the Sarawak National Museum, and the National Library, for helping me search for and use archival objects, photographs and documents.

1. A more detailed description of Kelabit history, and the basis of this summary, can be found in I.J. Ewart, "The Documented History of the Kelabits of Northern Sarawak," *Sarawak Museum Journal*, Vol.66 No.87 (2009), pp.229–58.
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11. An account, from the perspective of the early Christian missionaries, is given in S. Lees, *Drunk before Dawn* (Southampton: Camelot, 1979).
12. Some of these practices are described in E. Banks, "Some Megalithic Remains from the Kelabit Country in Sarawak, with Some Notes on the Kelabits Themselves," *Sarawak Museum Journal*, Vol.4 No.5 (1937), pp.411–37; R.S. Douglas, "An Expedition," pp.146–48; and T. Harrisson, "The Kelabits of Borneo," *The Geographical Magazine*, Vol.24 No.1 (1951), pp.32–39.
13. Travel in the Kelabit region was described by the Torres Strait Expedition of 1898–99 (Haddon, *Headhunters*, pp.131–213); in 1903 by Ward (*Outlines of Sarawak History 1839–1917*, p.86); Hose's 1904 expedition, scuppered when his boat was damaged in rough waters (Hose, *The Field-Book of a Jungle Wallah*, p.190); Moulton in 1911 (J.C. Moulton, "An Expedition to Mount Batu Lawi," *Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol.63 (1912), pp.1–104); Schneeberger's trip in 1939 (W.F. Schneeberger, "The Kerayan-Kelabit Highlands of Central North-East Borneo," *The Geographical Review*, Vol.35 No.4 (1945), p.545); and Harrisson's World War II activities (T. Harrisson, "Explorations in Central Borneo," *The Geographical Magazine*, Vol.64 (1949)).
14. Harrisson, "Explorations in Central Borneo," p.133.
15. Descriptions taken from R.S. Douglas, "A Journey"; C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo: A Description of Their Physical, Moral and Intellectual Condition with Some of Their Ethnic Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1912); T. Harrisson, *World Within: A Borneo Story* (London: Cresset Press, 1959); M. Janowski, "The Forest, Source of Life: The Kelabit of Sarawak," The British Museum, occasional paper no.143 (2003); R. Lian-Saging, "An Ethno-History of the Kelabit Tribe of Sarawak: A Brief Look at the Kelabit Tribe Before World War II and After," unpublished BA thesis, University of Malaya, 1976–77); and the photographic collection of the Sarawak National Museum.
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17. Lian-Saging, "An Ethno-History of the Kelabit Tribe of Sarawak."
18. A tool something like an axe, but with the blade set at right angles to, instead of in-line with, the shaft.
19. As described by Ngalun Paran, aged around eighty, from the village of Pa' Mada, approximately six kilometers from my base at Pa' Dalih.
20. R. Bulan, in "Boundaries, Territorial Domains, and Kelabit Customary Practices: Discovering the Hidden Landscape," *Borneo Research Bulletin*, Vol.34 (2003), p.21, wrote that there was a shift from split-bamboo floors to wooden planks around 1900. This is supported by the evidence from Douglas's visit in 1908, when several hundred people gathered in one longhouse; bamboo would have struggled to support such a weight, so it is most likely that by then the longhouse (at Pa' Mein) would have had wooden floors.
21. T. Harrisson, "The Kelabit Peoples of Upland Borneo," *Sarawak Gazette*, Vol.72 (1946), p.21.
22. M. Janowski, "The Motivating Forces behind Recent Changes in the Wet Rice Agricultural System in the Kelabit Highlands," *Sarawak Gazette*, Vol.64 (1988), pp.9–21.

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24. Bulan, "Boundaries, Territorial Domains, and Kelabit Customary Practices," p.21.
25. This may be why Kelabit houses were sometimes seen as "flimsy" (Moulton, "An Expedition to Mount Batu Lawi," p.55); and of "a very uncertain construction" (Banks, "Some Megalithic Remains from the Kelabit Country in Sarawak," p.432).
26. See T. Ingold, *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill* (London: Routledge, 2000), especially Chapter 10, "Building, Dwelling, Living: How Animals and People Make Themselves at Home in the World," pp.172–88.
27. P. Cloke and O. Jones, "Dwelling, Place and Landscape: An Orchard in Somerset," *Environment and Planning A*, Vol.33 (2001), pp.649–66. Heidegger's original model of dwelling was more complex, including relations of mortality and divinity. See M. Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," in D.F. Krell, ed., *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings* (New York: Harper Collins, 1977), pp.343–64.
28. P. Oliver, ed., *Encyclopedia of Vernacular Architecture of the World* (*EVAW*) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.40.
29. H. Glassie, *Vernacular Architecture* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), p.31.
30. Ibid., pp.28–29.
31. G. Ritzer, *The McDonalisation of Society* (London: Pine Forge Press, 1993); D. Miller, *Material Culture and Mass Consumption* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); and A.L. Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
32. Miri, the nearest large industrial town, is located on the coast, about a ten-hour truck drive away. However, access to it depends on logging companies maintaining the roads, which are liable to collapse in frequent, heavy rains. Generally, the companies are willing to do this as long as they are active in an area, but once their license is complete, they leave, and their roads are abandoned to the elements.
33. Noticed and recorded in Banks, "Some Megalithic Remains from the Kelabit Country in Sarawak," pp.411–37.
34. M. Janowski, "The Motivating Forces behind Recent Changes in the Wet Rice Agricultural System."
35. There has been substantial political effort to force the Penan to settle and begin farming. Many suggest this has to do with the Malaysian government's desire to effectively divide up the land for logging licenses. To accomplish this, they need to deal with local people within a fixed area, rather than with people wandering over large areas of the forest, as the Penan are wont to do. See M. Colchester, *Pirates, Squatters and Poachers: The Political Ecology of Dispossession of the Native Peoples of Sarawak* (London: Survival International, 1992); and Bulan, "Boundaries, Territorial Domains, and Kelabit Customary Practices," pp.18–61.
36. Since the area was part of a British colony until the 1960s, most Kelabit measurements are in imperial units.
37. R. Waterson, *The Living House: An Anthropology of Architecture in South-East Asia* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1997), pp.1,76.
38. Ibid., pp.74–88.
39. Several villagers remarked independently on the beauty of the Swiss Alps. It seems this is seen as the epitome of attractive countryside, with its snow-peaked mountains, abundant forests, and fast-flowing rivers.
40. P. Lemonnier, "Introduction," in P. Lemonnier, ed., *Technological Choices: Transformation in Material Cultures Since the Neolithic* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp.1–36.
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42. Ibid., p.122. Westernization is portrayed in this example, and generally throughout the book, as an "impacting external culture": aggressive, imposing and uncompromising.
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44. T. Ingold, *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description* (New York and London: Routledge, 2011).
45. Tsing, *Friction*.
46. Waterson, *The Living House*, p.46.
47. Glassie, *Vernacular Architecture*, pp.32–35.
48. Oliver, ed., *EVAW*, p.261.

Book Reviews



The Courtyard House: From Cultural Reference to Universal Relevance. Edited by Nasser O. Rabat. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010. Published in association with the Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture. 290 pp., 119 b&w illus.

This volume, edited by Nasser Rabat, is the most ambitious book on the subject of the courtyard house to date. This introverted yet Janus-faced building type has existed for thousands of years and is known in most parts of the world — in this book from Cuernavaca to Kabul. Its study is important both because of its manifestation in disparate cultural areas and its non-Western origins. This makes the form an ideal subject for moving beyond regionally limited analytic frameworks, and toward the transcultural stances required when employing architecture to question values previously accepted as universal.

The essays in the book are divided into three sections and use a variety of methodologies to explore the complexities of the typology. They show the courtyard house to be both universal, because of its wide distribution, and a potential forum for resistance to the universalizing tendencies of global modernity.

The first section comprises four essays that tackle historical and sociological paradigms of the form within one restricted cultural region. Jateen Lad provides a detailed socio-spatial analysis of the meanings of seclusion in the harem courts of the Topkapi palace. Marcus Schadl and Manu Sobti offer separate studies of the transformation and memory-based transmission of the Afghan courtyard house. The common denominator in their chapters is the investigation of response and reaction to the conditions of modernity. And, Asiya Chowdhury critiques a nineteenth-century English writer's understanding of Cairene houses to draw attention to the importance of carefully contextualizing the historical accounts of outsiders.

The second section contains six essays that explore the tensions between place-based identities and modernist ideals in a variety of cultural settings. Alfred B. Hwangbo examines the origins, transformation, decline, and subsequent revival of the traditional Korean courtyard house. In particular, he explores a distinctive but endangered hybrid transitional phase: an L-shaped adaptation found in the expanding extramural industrial suburbs of historic Korean cities during Japanese occupation. Monique Eleb describes her detailed, long-term research on French-planned low-cost housing for migrant workers in Casablanca between 1912 and 1956. Her chapter provides the locus for a deeper examination of conflicting histories of the modernization of Moroccan society. And Anoma Pieris probes the reasons for, and the outcomes of, the fascination with the typology by two renowned postindependence Sri Lankan architects, Geoffrey Bawa and Minette de Silva. The complex questions she raises about links between postcolonial place-based identities and modernization resonate in different ways throughout the book.

Vernacular courtyard houses can accommodate transformation, but their authentic development has been thwarted by imitation of modernist ideals. Looking at both social and environmental rationales, John Reynolds presents part of an extensive comparative study on the patio houses of Spain and Mexico, and their adaptation for modern lifestyles. Rafi Samizay questions the interface of the courtyard house with mass housing, and ways the change from extended to nuclear families have affected the logic of domestic space

in Herat and Kabul. And the section closes with Reinhard Goethert's exploration of the relationship of shared or multi-unit courtyard accommodation to in-migration in developing cities across multiple cultures.

So how might traditional forms be given a legitimate continuity, in design as well as interpretation, without falling victim to the twin gunmen, pastiche and nostalgia? Moving beyond the oft-repeated trope that tradition and modernity are irreconcilable and that modernization has destroyed forever the human scale that defined the original typology, the final section contains three essays by practicing architects in the Arab world whose work reclaims the courtyard house from past miasmas and reincorporates it into functional contemporary living. For Hashim Sarkis, the threshold of meanings implicit in the attributes of the courtyard — its privacy and its qualities of enclosure, for example — signal nodes of place that address not the object but the absence of object. However, for Wael Al-Masri, nostalgia-driven appropriations of the type — for example, the house museum — fail to address the problem of an authentic continuation of tradition. His critique of its use as a historical and cultural symbol rather than a viable architectural type addresses the rupture between contemporary Arab societies and the heritage of coherence embodied in the extended family. Finally, for Kevin Mitchell, two new courtyard duplexes for faculty on the campus of the American University at Sharjah provide an opportunity to gracefully reintegrate form and function.

By extending the range of discourse and deepening the methodological frame, the essays in *The Courtyard House* move its subject squarely into the global arena. There it stands out as a building type significant for its role as an identity marker set apart from the so-called Western tradition. In using architecture to interpret history we still have a responsibility to history, and there is always more work to be done on that front. But the fluid parameters of this book pave the way for more cross-cultural comparisons. They also help open up current debates on the place of traditional architecture in the formation of modernist identities. In the eastern Mediterranean, in particular, this is a topic ripe for serious exploration.

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Buildings, Landscapes and Memory: Case Studies in Historic Preservation. Daniel Bluestone. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011. 302 pp., b&w and color illus.



Daniel Bluestone's *Buildings, Landscapes and Memory* traces the preservation movement in the United States from the early nineteenth century to the present day through ten provocative case studies arranged in rough chronological order. These case studies include not only individual architectural works and historic sites but also a variety of manmade and natural landscapes (from the Palisades along the Hudson River near New York City to the Fresno Sanitary Landfill in California), and they show how the places understood to merit preservation have changed drastically over time. At the center of this inquiry are the narratives harnessed by advocates for the preservation of places.

Bluestone argues that the preservation movement in America emerged from the desire to cultivate a shared memory, history and politics in the first decades of the nineteenth century. The triumphal tour made by the Marquis de Lafayette (in 1824–25), the subject of Chapter 1, provides evidence of citizens' interest at the time in preserving places associated with the Revolutionary War. But Bluestone is also careful to show how a parallel but sometimes competing interest in recognizing the nation's achievements since the war challenged some of these preservation efforts. While nationalism provided the larger context for Lafayette's tour, Bluestone's careful research, which makes use of a variety of primary and secondary sources as well as archival material, ultimately demonstrates the local character of preservation efforts, a theme that is carried throughout the book.

The text often acquires a personal tone, a reminder of Bluestone's role as an advocate for community preservation, cultural landscapes, and public history. This is especially palpable in the chapters that focus on Charlottesville, Virginia, where Bluestone lives and works. Chapter 3 explores the way the narrative surrounding Thomas Jefferson's celebrated design for the University of Virginia, where Bluestone directs the Historic Preservation Program at the School of Architecture, has both preserved an architectural masterpiece and limited architectural innovation. And in Chapter 9 Bluestone traces the history of Court Square in downtown Charlottesville to show that its current form represents an "invented tradition" in which a noble colonial past is created to cultivate heritage tourism. As Bluestone demonstrates,

the "colonial" lantern lights and brick streets and sidewalks installed there in 2004 obscure the square's more authentic, but also more complicated, accretive history. The goal of "preservation" is thus shown to have less to do with historical variety than with economic benefit.

The destruction as well as preservation of places is central to Bluestone's account, and several chapters pay attention to this theme. The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial in St. Louis, the subject of Chapter 6, resulted in the clearing of a significant swath of that city's riverfront district to establish a park honoring Jefferson, the Louisiana Purchase, and westward expansion. In this case, the project's boosters argued that the act of remembering required the demolition of the buildings that comprised a decaying residential and industrial district. Bluestone's analysis positions this project not only in relation to historic preservation but also the related disciplines of architectural history, urban planning, and landscape design — each of which shaped public perception and official attitudes toward the memorial. And although the book is thoughtfully illustrated throughout, the black-and-white period photos included in this chapter bring a particular richness to this case study. The success of the final project, which includes Eero Saarinen's colossal sweeping stainless steel arch (1961–66) set within a park designed by Dan Kiley (1957), raises questions about whether new monuments can convey history more effectively than old buildings.

Although the narratives and understandings of history that contributed to the demolition of The Mecca apartment building in Chicago to make way for Ludwig Mies van der Rohe's celebrated Crown Hall (1950–56) at IIT have little to do with the St. Louis project, this example again points to the power of myths to shape the built environment. In both of these chapters, Bluestone draws attention to the importance of understanding the origins, motivations and legacy of the narratives used to argue for the preservation of some places and the destruction of others.

Bluestone devotes two chapters to places that less obviously fall under the purview of historic preservation, a discipline that has been concerned largely with sites valued for their historic or political associations or their architectural merits. In Chapter 10 the author's analysis of Virginia's historic highway marker program explores some of the ways the automobile and an ever expanding network of roads has changed the way Americans engage with historical sites. More provocatively, the author concludes the book by arguing that the alignment of historic preservation interests with efforts to transform environmentally toxic sites into public parks presents an enormous — and unfulfilled — opportunity to educate the public about the social, economic and political forces that created these industrial landscapes.

A great strength of Bluestone's account is its ability to position the particulars of individual case studies within the larger discourse of historic preservation, and to make this relevant for a broad audience. This audience, for example, might include those interested in history, urban planning, architectural history, and landscape urbanism. One is left with a greater appreciation of the way in which historic preservation, in all of its complexities, has contributed to the shaping of modern America and how the field might engage with the challenges facing the nation's postindustrial landscape. ■

Lucy M. Maulsby
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Mediterranean Crossroads: Marseille and Modern Architecture. Sheila Crane. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 352 pp., 104 b&w photos, 13 color plates.



Marseille is a city that people either love or hate. (It is also a city that provokes more than its fair share of clichés, but that is another story.) Those who hate Marseille lament its seediness, dilapidated housing projects, and lack of stereotypical "French" culture. For those who love Marseille, these very same shortcomings are transformed into advantages: it is exciting, cosmopolitan, and decidedly less prissy than other French cities. Marseille may not always be charming, but it is undeniably authentic. Whichever camp one falls into, *Mediterranean Crossroads: Marseille and Modern Architecture* provides a detailed etiology of our reactions.

This book traces the architectural and spatial evolution of Marseille from the 1920s through the post-World War II building boom. Its six chapters divide this time span roughly in half, with the war itself marking the midpoint. Chapters One and Two focus on ideas of and plans for Marseille as a modern metropolis in the interwar period. Here the work of the Bauhaus photographer/filmmaker László Moholy–Nagy, the urban planner Jacques Gréber, and the art and architecture critic Siegfried Giedion are usefully brought together for a discussion of Marseille's distinctive transporter bridge (a mobile platform ferry) as, simultaneously, an "iconic exemplar of modern spatial transparency" and a harbinger of the future ruins of modern architecture in Marseille. Crane is always careful to measure the gap between the mythic identity of Marseille, how that identity was understood and articulated by planners, and the intersection (and occasional clash) of their ideas with lived realities on the ground. As these first chapters quickly make clear, this is urban history of the most

ambitious, and ultimately most satisfying, sort. It is deeply informed by cultural theory (Walter Benjamin figures prominently) and politics (particularly the politics of colonialism and immigration), and it is built on a broad foundation of primary sources, including films, photographs, postcards, paintings, historical maps, drawings, and sketches. Appropriately, Le Corbusier serves as a sort of touchstone throughout the work, beginning with his initial visit to Marseille in 1915, an encounter that was brief but which would led to a much fuller engagement with the city through his Unité d'Habitation (completed in 1952).

The second half of the book focuses on the destruction and reconstruction of downtown Marseille, large areas of which were dynamited during World War II by German military engineers. As the titles of Chapters Three and Four ("Urban Gynecology and Engineered Destruction" and "Spectacles of Ruin") suggest, the local ramifications of war and occupation were considerable. However, the reader never loses sight of Marseille's unique role as an imperial link between the *métropole* and the colonies. This was a designation that existed for more than a century before the war, and would persist for many decades after. By framing Marseille as a "city in the world," Crane is able to draw not only other European cities into her discussion, but also make important connections to sites in North Africa, including Casablanca, Bizerte, and especially Algiers, which was a *département* of France at the time. (Oran, with its European majority, would have perhaps provided an even better example of Marseille's southern face in this Mediterranean crossroads.) More information on the economic underpinnings of the colonial project, including the impact of specific types of colonial trade on urban planning, would have rounded out the discussion on colonialism. However, the author should be commended for maintaining a consistently broad scope that stretches well into West Africa.

Long ignored by scholars of modern architecture, Marseille constitutes a sort of "absent presence" in our understanding of how European and Mediterranean cities evolved in the twentieth century. This book should effectively bring Marseille out of the historiographic shadows. While not an introductory volume (and far from jargon-free), it more than proves the argument that "Marseille was a significant terrain for architectural experimentation from the late 1920s through the end of the post-war rebuilding." If anything, this claim doesn't go far enough. Marseille was not simply a "significant terrain," judging from the evidence presented; it was a veritable breeding ground for modern architecture from the earliest stages, attracting the attention of some of the most important urban theorists, artists, and architects of the period.

Although it would have been beyond the scope of her study, I couldn't help but wish that the author had brought her analysis up to the present. The challenges facing Marseille today — immigration, a degraded downtown, increasingly isolated *banlieus* — are traceable in part to the choices made by the urban planners and architects of the last century. And once again, remedies for social ills are often taking the form of spatial transformations from the top down: the commercial development of the Rue de la République to offset the seemingly irredeemable Canebière, a new tramway to link St. Pierre with la Joliette. But that discussion will have to wait for a similarly erudite treatment of the evolution over the *longue durée* of France's oldest city (to finish with another cliché). ■

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African Identity in Post-Apartheid Public Architecture: White Skin, Black Masks. Jonathan Noble. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011. 314 pp., 135 b&w illus.



Since 1994, post-apartheid South Africa has been a much-looked-to example of a society that has somehow succeeded without traumatic social turmoil to make the transition from a racist, authoritarian *ancien regime* to a constitutional multiracial democracy. As one commentator recently noted, the country has come to be seen as a valuable cultural laboratory in which to observe the ways "the Manichean opposition of colonizer and colonized" might evolve once historically oppressive power structures disappear. This book explores the role that architecture in general, and public buildings in particular, might have played in this process, by comparing five major projects consciously designed to express this new socio-political order. All these designs were the subject of high-profile public architectural competitions (something that in itself was unusual in the old South Africa). They range from government buildings created to administer the nine newly created provinces to iconic, centrally located "national" sites, such as the Constitutional Court in Johannesburg, and Freedom Park outside Pretoria. While interested in the architectural qualities of each project, Noble is equally focused on the cultural values and political processes that gave rise to them in order to determine how successful visionary architectural design might be at mediating significant socio-political change. He takes architectural projects that have been evaluated elsewhere as discreet objects and considers them as part of the post-apartheid state's larger project of fashioning a new national-cultural identity.

Noble's investigation is framed by a cultural-critical framework derived from Frantz Fanon's famous essay "Black

Skin, White Masks," notably Fanon's argument that colonial societies founded on confrontations of culture, power and modernity tend to nurture artificially static, overdetermined subjectivities and identities. Noble juxtaposes Fanon's well-known dialectic of the "natural" skin/"less-than-natural" mask with architectural discourse's preoccupation with the building skin (whether decorated or minimal) as a primary site of meaning, in order to launch an inquiry into how architecture actually mediates "authenticity" and "identity." This is of primary importance because, as we read, almost every artist, architect, administrator, politician, and cultural commentator involved in these projects believed that the buildings they were creating needed to explicitly break with the past and project a new kind of identity that was not just "post-apartheid" but also "post-colonial" (and for most of these actors this meant, in some sense, "African"). While it is debatable whether the white Republic of South Africa really was a "colonial" society, Noble elides this question by suggesting that Fanon's arguments (which date from the 1960s) can be used to recuperate a productive, optimistic attitude towards contemporary understandings of subjectivity. As he clarifies in his elegant conclusion, he is less interested in the skin/mask coupling as an architectural metaphor than in using it heuristically to explore how architecture can, through hybrid forms of representation, authenticate a new kind of socio-political identity that is multifarious, contingent, and open ended. At stake here is how — or indeed whether — architecture, per se, can promote "positive plurality."

Presenting his case studies — the first designed in 1995, the last only recently completed — more or less chronologically, Noble offers them as milestones in a rapidly evolving arc of discourse and practice. This arc reveals how much easier it is to talk about such utopian (and today increasingly rare) architectural aspirations than it is to physically realize them. First, there is the fundamental tension between notions of subjectivity (and by extension, identity), which resist and subvert dominant narratives and the project of nation-building, which privileges notions of origins, continuity, social cohesion, and the linear passage of time. Equally critical are the realities of architectural culture and production. Repeatedly, competition briefs were framed in ways that left questions of architectural expression and meaning undefined in the hope that entrants would somehow provide this. Often this vacuum was filled by the taken-for-granted value systems and discipline-based assumptions of those charged with developing these projects. Most of these actors belonged to the intelligentsia-in-waiting that had developed by 1994, whose notions of culture and identity remained subtly tethered to the previous system, either because they trained under, or were reacting to, its supposedly oppressive technocratic modernity. Although some of the projects discussed are fine pieces of architectural (and landscape) design, this reader was struck as much by the continuities as by the discontinuities between them and pre-1994 projects of similar scale and ambition — not only in terms of design and construction, but also of the imagery and rhetoric latent in their production. Particularly striking is the recurrent resort to a Lefebvrian "realistic illusion" that regional landscape and preindustrial craft practices were phenomena that, without explanation, could provide the key to architectural identity and authenticity — something that Herbert Baker first proposed one hundred years ago, albeit from a more Eurocentric perspective. Over the period discussed, however, such intellectual maneuvers evolve into a more critical, informed and inventive engagement with various non-Western material practices, cultural narratives, and symbolic frameworks to fabricate an alternatively modern architecture of "appropriation and inclusion."

Overall, Noble's narrative suggests that both "the stubborn loop of professional autonomy" and excessive faith in participatory design processes limit the architectural exemplification of "positive plurality." Instead, he suggests that the buildings most successful in fulfilling such ambitions are those in which the penetrating design intelligence of individual architects and artists was matched by rigorous, enlightened and inclusive imagination on the part of those administering the projects. (To this one might add that these buildings also tend to be those whose site and program lend themselves to such "exemplification.") Still, such definitions of architectural quality — with which I basically agree — remain rooted in a reflexive-educated way of thinking that invests architectural *form* with an overdetermined symbolic-representational value, something that the author himself questions. Unfortunately, Noble's preoccupation with Fanon's arguments and his exhaustive documentation of how the different competition entries were parsed to generate the final built projects leave little room for sustained discussion of anthropological, cultural-geographical, or indeed architectural theories about how built environments develop and convey meanings. Also regrettable is the lack of engagement with the wealth of critical writing about the built environment and social transformation in South Africa over the last couple of decades. (This would have revealed, among other things, that the equation of "roundness" in architecture with African-ness has been around for decades.) These reservations aside, the book's careful unpacking of the formal undecidability that results when political ideology becomes entangled with architectural production gives it a relevance and value that transcend its South African setting. Noble offers a well-illustrated, thoughtful account of how cultural "authenticity," whether manifested through political subjectivity or built environments, is always *under construction*, fashioned through the interplay of a heterogeneous array of actors, narratives and mechanisms. ■

Jeremy Foster
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Women and the Everyday City: Public Space in San Francisco, 1890–1915. Jessica Ellen Sewell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 272 pp., 74 b&w photos.



"The women question," cultural historian Kathy Peiss wrote in a 1991 article for *American Literary History*, "encapsulated for nineteenth-century Americans deep uncertainties about women's social roles and gender identity. Whatever one's position on this question, she continues, "the debate rested on the perception of transgression, the sense that boundaries had been crossed: women had entered the public sphere."

In the past twenty years, such debates and transformations have been the subject of a number of publications in women's history, and scholars of nineteenth-century cultural life have written widely on the roles, experiences and perceptions of women in what Peiss called "extradomestic" urban space. Jessica Sewell's *Women and the Everyday City: Public Space in San Francisco, 1890–1915*, re-examines the relationship between women and the public sphere, but does so by framing it through questions about the built environment. If space is, as Sewell contends, "expressive as well as constitutive of . . . culture and society," can a "spatially focused mode of social inquiry" better illustrate the changing roles and perceptions of women at the turn of the twentieth century? Can attention paid to the ways women used and experienced various public spaces in San Francisco add to the scholarly conversation about the transformation of nineteenth-century gender ideologies by positing space as central to their maintenance?

To explore these questions, Sewell parses turn-of-the-century San Francisco into four overlapping landscapes. Focusing on how women of various classes used, experienced, and were imagined within these spaces, Sewell devotes separate chapters to the circulatory spaces of the street and the streetcar, the landscape of shopping, the landscape of dining, and spaces of amusement and entertainment. Then, in her final and strongest chapter, Sewell argues that the transformations she documents in each of these landscapes paved the way for women's use of these spaces as they fought for suffrage in the campaign of 1911. As women utilized streets, street cars, restaurants, tearooms, vaudeville houses, and shop windows as arenas for political discourse, they "engaged familiar spaces of consumption but radically shifted their roles within these spaces" (165). Only because these spaces were part of the everyday lives of women were suffragists able to reshape them to communicate a vision in which women could participate more inclusively in the American public sphere.

There is much to be commended in Sewell's book. While her reliance on only three diaries (each of which is assumed to be representative of more collective experiences of women from various classes) leads to some precarious generalizations about the "experienced landscape" of downtown San Francisco, her attempts to illustrate the social world from the perspectives of multiple classes adds depth to her work and complicates the construct of gender as a unified category. Her class-inflected analysis is particularly illuminating when it comes to the landscape of public dining. Here she argues that elite women's money not only made more of the city accessible to them, but also allowed them to drink more freely in public without compromising their morality, thus enabling them to conflate the experience of dining with that of tourism and thrill. Furthermore, Sewell's commitment to documenting how the downtown landscape was built, represented and experienced provides a comprehensive picture of the social world of turn-of-the-century San Francisco, populated with a variety of actors whose experiences often conflicted with how the public spaces of the city were imagined in manuals, novels, advertisements, and the like.

However, it is in Sewell's attempts to get at the relationships and contradictions between how the public landscape of San Francisco was lived and represented that her analysis falters. Drawing upon the Lefebvrian concepts of perceived, lived and conceived space, Sewell's introduction outlines a three-pronged approach to understanding the "multifaceted interaction among [gender] ideology, experience and the built environment." She thus divides the city into "the imagined landscape," "the experienced landscape," and the "built landscape" (xiv). However, this model, which Sewell promises will illuminate interactions, is primarily useful as a structure through which she organizes each chapter into separate "imagined," "experienced" and "built" components. Sewell's attempt to synthesize these three landscapes to support her original contention — that a study of built environment (and how it was used and imagined) can add to scholarly discussions about changing gender roles at the turn-of-the-century — is not entirely convincing. As a result, the first four chapters of *Women and the Everyday City*, while illustrative of the physical and social world of women's consumption, read as analytically flat.

Rewardingly, Sewell's final chapter, in which she abandons the three-landscape model, allows her own analytical voice to come through. Here, her discussion of public "spaces of suffrage" leaves the reader wishing she had devoted more space to exploring the relationships between women as consumers and women as political actors — between the physical public and the social and political public sphere. In the early chapters of the book, as Sewell guides the reader through the imagined, experienced and built landscapes of circulation, shopping, dining and amusement, the reader

may wonder why the rich picture she paints matters. Unfortunately, the payoff comes only at the book's close; and here, it appears as an afterthought, when it might have served as an useful analytical question throughout.

While Sewell provides us with a wealth of important information about the gendered landscape of turn-of-the-century San Francisco, her uneasy use of the three-landscape model hinders her ability to do much with this information until the book's final chapter. *Women and the Everyday City* might have been a stronger book had its author taken a freer and more creative approach to the rich material she set out to explore. ■

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Extreme City: Climate Change and the Transformation of the Waterscape. Edited by Lorenzo Fabian and Paola Viganò. Venice: Università Iuav di Venezia, 2010. 289 pp., ill. Available for download at http://issuu.com/extremecities/docs/extremecity.



This book gathers the main contributions to an intensive international learning program held in April 2010 at the IUAV University of Venice-Italy. In response to climate change, and through the lens of extreme water spaces worldwide, forty architecture graduate students from institutes across Europe worked together to develop sustainable design strategies for the drainage basin of Venice lagoon. They sought to answer the question: How will it be possible to plan a future city in this most vulnerable of territories?

To explain its underlying hypothesis, the volume begins with an introductory essay by one of its editors, Paola Viganò. According to Viganò, the environmental emergency of climate change and subsequent sea-level rise offers an opportunity to renew the structure of the Venice region. Toward this end, the program concentrated on its most fragile lands: its "extreme" waterscapes — a network of water bodies and the urban areas in immediate contact with them, which will continue to be affected by climate changes. However, Viganò writes that the study of the contemporary urban condition in this area requires understanding all the elements that constitute its hydrological system, with the goal of identifying key areas of transition. The hope underlying the program, therefore, was that this focus would also enable a reading of phenomena in other parts of the territory with greater clarity.

According to Viganò, the "conditio sine qua non" for restructuring this territory is acceptance of an interdisciplinary approach, involving urbanism, landscape architecture, water management, and environmental and hydraulic engineering. Only such a joint effort will allow the design of integrated spatial devices capable of resisting or adapting to environmental change.

To face this complexity, Viganò's essay explains that the program adopted a method of "research by design." A deeper explanation of this method would have been useful. Despite her claim that this represented the most pertinent way to engage both theory and design in an interdisciplinary context, this reader could only guess that "research by design" is an empirical inductive process. Its goal seemed to be to take advantage of considerations developed through the projects of the program participants and the contributions of the lecturers from the schools partnering in it (IUAV University of Venice, UPC Barcelona, TU Delft, and KU Leuven).

Following Viganò's essay the book contains a section of theoretical material, bringing together two different subjects. The first set of material concerns contemporary water conflicts. It is introduced by a brief essay from Bernardo Secchi, and includes insightful and well-written pieces on Palestinian waterways and the shrinking of Lake Aral. The second subject is climate change itself. Here the book provides a brief review of the literature and an explanation of the possible responses: mitigation, adaptation, resistance, resilience. This discussion is useful, well structured, and would have been worth developing at greater length.

The next section examines three extreme territories in Europe: the Delta region of Holland, the Barcelona metropolitan area, and the Venice area. Each case is presented through a theoretical frame with one or more design visions. Sybrand Tjallingii and Viviana Ferrario deserve credit for presenting insightful rereadings of the problems affecting the Delta and Venice areas, respectively. The lowest common denominator of analysis between the two cases appears to be a new synergy between spatial structure and natural water elements.

This sequence of theoretical contributions is followed by an essay by the volume's other editor, Lorenzo Fabian, describing the particular situation of the drainage basin of the Venice lagoon. This essay also serves as an introduction to the students' proposals for restructuring this territory. These are grouped by area: the dry plain, the low wet plain, the coastline, and the lagoon. Besides prompting the production of engaging graphics, these contributions reveal the value of Viganò's initial paradigm: thinking in the long term, representing time, and imagining an alternative future.

The final section of the book enlarges the perspective, describing two further case studies — one in Baltimore in the U.S. and the other in Bangkok, Thailand. And its last

chapter, by the so-called "concept group" of the workshop, jumps to an overall theoretical conclusion, which in some ways repeats previously introduced concepts about the value of an integrated approach. But what really emerges here is a vision for the future role of the architect: as a negotiator between adaptation and mitigation, he or she may take a stand and show possible ways forward.

To sum up, this book could have benefitted from a better explanation of its structure. A few of its essays are also weakly argued. Nevertheless, it makes a substantial contribution to the development of a joint approach among the different disciplines involved in urban design. In addition, its overriding premise that climate change, normally considered a threat, may also be an activator for sustainable new development, is explored both in theory and in practice.

The book is enjoyable to read, with an astonishing visual richness. Maps and diagrams have been wisely elaborated by the authors based on well-documented sources, and have great communicative power. In only a few cases could this material have benefited from further work. Despite the changing nature of the profession and the need for new design approaches, this book provides confirmation that the architect's imagination and drawing skills remain a valuable resource. ■

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Non West Modernist Past: On Architecture and Modernities. Edited by William S.W. Lim and Jiat-Hwee Chang. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2012. 224 pp., ill.



Although research on architectural modernism outside the "West" has been rapidly expanding in the past two decades, *Non West Modernist Past* is the first book that offers a critical overview and assessment of this emerging scholarship. The product of a conference organized by the Architectural Association Asia and the Singapore Institute of Architects in early 2011, this edited volume includes contributions by leading scholars from the fields of architecture, sociology, art history, and cultural studies. It raises many potent questions not only about the writing of architectural historiographies and construction of the canon, but also more generally about the relationship between architectural modernism and modernity as well as their varied entanglements with colonialism, nationalism and globalization.

The title of the book provocatively conjoins three geographical and historical terms: "Non West," which refers to all territories outside Europe and North America; "Modernist," which refers to a general attitude oriented towards the future predicated on continuous human progress; and "Past," which distinguishes modernist architecture of the earlier periods from that of the present. While as a concept, "Non Western Modernist Past" may invite contested interpretations, it is precisely the editors' aim to use the title to foreground an existing condition in the discipline of architectural history. They argue that modernism outside the "West" has long been "doubly marginalized" by architectural historians and scholars in area studies. The coupling of "Non West" and "Modernist," then, is an adroit heuristic move to invite projections of an "alternative disciplinary reality" in which the heterogeneous nature of modernism and its uneven career in "Non Western" contexts are emphasized.

The book is organized into three parts. The first, "Interrogating Modernism and Modernities," includes five theoretical essays: by Anthony King, Mark Crinson, Leon van Schaik, Duanfang Lu, and Fernando Luiz Lara. Each author provides a critical reassessment of the use of key terms, categories, and underlying concepts in the historiographies of modernism. These include, for example, the ideas of internationalism, critical regionalism, and the structural couplets of "center" and "peripheries," metropoles and colonies, and "First" and "Third' Worlds, etc. The second part, "(Dis)locating Modernism in the World," consists of eight case studies of "Non West" modernism that encompass India, Turkey, China, Singapore, Indonesia, Brazil and North Africa. The third part, "Reflecting/Refracting Modernism," includes three commentary pieces by Randolf S. David, C.J. Wan-Ling Wee, and Chua Beng Huat, who reflect on the key concerns in the previous chapters, particularly those centering on the ideas of multiplicity, heterogeneity and mobility in architectural modernism.

Like many edited volumes, the central challenge here is to unite a multitude of case studies across diverse geographies under a cogent conceptual frame that also avoids generalization. This balance is especially crucial given the book's emphasis on attending to the historicity and specificity of local contexts while retaining the use of the meta-geographical categories of the "West" and "Non West." The editors, William Lim and Jiat-Hwee Chang, have done an excellent job in elucidating these inherent problematics in an introductory essay. Lim and Chang carefully decipher three approaches adopted by the contributors in their effort to challenge the conventional Euro-American-centered architectural historiography. These include the expansion of the spatial and temporal frame for the study of modernism in both the "West" and the "Non West," the examination of the socio-political conditions behind the production of architecture, and attention to the role of agency, professional practice, and other nuanced processes that shape the making of the built environment.

Notwithstanding their different theoretical positions, the essays in the book collectively illustrate what Lim and Chang call "hetero-modernisms" — a term that describes "the diverse modernisms in complex relationships with the uneven process of modernization and varied modernities around the world beyond the West."

Non West Modernist Past offers a number of innovative entry points to reconceptualize the histories of modernism. First, the juxtaposition of selective "Non West" modernist projects enables a diachronic investigation into how modernism has entered different geopolitical spaces at particular historical junctures. In doing so, this arrangement highlights both modernism's "universal" character as well as its susceptibility to appropriation in particular ways. Second, the attention to the circulation of architectural ideas and the indigenous agents involved in modernist schemes provides a basis for remapping the production of knowledge that departs from the long-established "diffusionist" model. Finally, by revealing certain contradictory ascriptions to modernism and modernity, some of the essays open up questions about the intellectual positions of the contributors themselves. The most notable contradiction is between a widely shared goal to unsettle the "universalizing" master narrative in Euro-American-centric historiographies and a polemic call to support "global values" for the advent of a more just society in the modern present. Within *Non West Modernist Past*, such "global values" allude to the promotion of democratic aspirations and the elimination of social inequalities and uneven development — all elements belonging to what Anthony King refers to as "social modernity" or "the global society in which we all live."

These contradictory ascriptions to modernism and its associated "universal values" point back to the tricky conception of "Non West modernism" itself. It seems these contested ascriptions, many of which have in one way or another become synonymous with the "West," could have been deciphered more carefully in some of the chapters. As Crinson has noted, modernism is itself full of paradoxes and cannot be easily subsumed under the "derogative impulses of nation-states or of capitalism." When it first emerged in architecture in the early twentieth century, modernism operated as a form of critical discourse and was endowed with an ethical aspiration toward social betterment. These multiple associations have not been lost in recent writings on the subject. Hilde Heynen, for example, has pointed out that the historical reality and complexity of modernism can only be grasped by examining the cultural, political and social dimensions that together constitute the foundation of the Modern Movement. What is potentially problematic with the conception of "Non West modernism" is the tendency to fixate the meanings of the "Modern" and its association with a generic "West" in order to qualify its Other, thus combining many of modernism's own contradictions into a dominant, hegemonic "Western ideology." Given the rich material of the contributions, it might have been interesting to explicitly frame the varied conceptions of the "West" as a key point of discussion within the volume.

On the whole, most of the chapters here avoid this kind of generalization, and instead allow the case studies to speak to the adaptability of modernism as discourse and practice. Notable examples include Abidin Kusno's excellent study of the contested ideals associated with different phases of modernization in postcolonial Indonesia and Zeynep Mennon's insightful analysis of the Turkish state's attempt to promote modernist architecture to advance a particular political agenda. Indeed, examining the competing values of the "modern" and reflecting on what scholars have chosen to critique, embrace and omit also brings up the question of ethics and the purpose of critique itself. As Chua contends in his commentary, while it is important to recognize multiplicity and pluralism, tolerance of "difference" can also become a ploy for not addressing concrete injustice and inequalities. This is also to suggest that without an appeal to some common interests and commitments — or "universal values," so to speak — any intellectual dialogue about "difference" can only go so far.

Lim and Chang's notion of "hetero-modernism" is certainly an intriguing frame for rethinking the histories of modernism. However, the editors could have engaged more directly with the question of what this reevaluation can actually do. For example, in what possible directions can a "more socially and politically situated understanding of modernism" advance the debate and inform current practice? As Lim himself expresses in a polemical prologue to the book, the reexamination of "Non West modernism" should lead to the building of a more "humane, just and ecologically sustainable modernity." And yet, there remains much work to be done to link the critical historical perspectives raised by this volume and the ongoing processes of advancing a desired "social modernity" in the present.

While these are not easy questions to answer, *Non West Modernist Past* is without a doubt a major contribution to the field and represents a significant milestone in advancing scholarship in the study of architectural modernism. I applaud the efforts of the editors and recommend this volume not only to those interested in the histories of the built environment, but to all who are concerned with the ongoing construction of knowledge across geographical and disciplinary boundaries. ■

Cecilia Chu
University of California, Berkeley

Conferences and Events

UPCOMING CONFERENCES AND SYMPOSIA

***"The Re/theorisation of Heritage Studies,"* Gothenburg, Sweden**, June 5–8, 2012. The inaugural conference of the Association of Critical Heritage Studies will develop current theoretical debates on the nature and meaning of heritage from the perspective of the "broad church" of current heritage studies. Sponsored by the University of Gothenburg. For more information, please visit www.science.gu.se/heritageconference2012.

***"Belonging: Cultural Topographies of Identity,"* Dublin, Ireland**, June 8–9, 2012. This conference will focus on the ways belonging is produced, maintained and transposed across a wide range of cultural and intellectual discourses and creative modes. Hosted by University College, Dublin. For more information, please visit http://www.ucd.ie/sll/Research/Conferences/conferences.html.

***"Rethinking Urban Inclusion: Spaces, Mobilisations, Interventions,"* Coimbra, Portugal**, June 28–30, 2012. This interdisciplinary conference on urban policies and spatial activism is sponsored by the Center for Social Studies of the University of Coimbra as part of a series of events, "Cities Are Us," focusing on situated urban struggles, emerging forms of urban government, and the possibilities of practices for more equitable cities. For more information, please visit http://www.ces.uc.pt/eventos/citiesareus/pages/pt/call-for-papers.php or http://www.ces.uc.pt/eventos/citiesareus/pages/pt/outline.php.

***"Media and the Public Sphere,"* Lyon, France**, July 2–3, 2012. This conference will examine the transformations brought about in the last years by the social, economic, political and media changes. Hosted by the Center for Research in Communication. For more information, please visit http://centrucomunicare.ro/conference2012.html.

***"The Arts in Society,"* Liverpool, U.K.**, July 23–25, 2012. The annual Arts Conference seeks to bring together practitioners, academics and educators to discuss the role of the arts in contemporary society. Held at Art and Design Academy, Liverpool John Moores University. For more information, please visit http://artsinsociety.com/conference-2012/.

***"South Italy, Sicily, and the Mediterranean,"* Melbourne, Australia**, July 17–21, 2012. This conference will focus on the movement of people and interactions of culture in the Mediterranean region of southern Italy and Sicily from antiquity until the present. Hosted by La Trobe University. For more information: please visit http://www.latrobe.edu.au/humanities/about/events/cultural-interactions-conference.

***"Transformations of the Sacred in Europe and Beyond,"* Potsdam, Germany**, September 3–5, 2012. This conference will examine transformations in religious practice and belief — in particular, long-standing religious traditions, believing without belonging, popular religion, posttraditional spirituality, and implicit religion. Hosted by the University of Potsdam. For more information, please visit http://www.uni-potsdam.de/esa-religion/index.html.

***"Spaces and Flows Conference 2012,"* Detroit, MI**, October 11–12, 2012. Addressing the theme "Transforming Cities and Communities in Contemporary Times," this conference seeks to critically engage the contemporary and ongoing spatial, social, ideological and political transformations in a transnational, global and neoliberal world. Hosted by Wayne State University. For more information, please visit http://spacesandflows.com/conference-2012/.

***"Architecture and its Image,"* Boston, MA**, October 19–20, 2012. The second annual PhilArch Conference seeks to philosophically engage with the character of architecture. Hosted by Boston University's Department of Philosophy. For more information, please visit http://philarch.wordpress.com/.

***"Myth and Interdisciplinarity,"* Madrid, Spain**, October 29–30, 2012. This conference will analyze the reasons behind the pervasiveness of myths across literature and the arts from 1900 to the present. Hosted by the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. For more information, please contact Antonella Lipscomb at conference@asteria-association.org.

***"Contemporary Architecture and Urbanism in the Mediterranean and Middle East,"* Istanbul, Turkey**, November 21–23, 2012. This conference will examine contemporary forms of architecture, city-building, and place-making throughout the Mediterranean and Middle East. Sponsored by Yildiz Technical University. For more information, please visit http://caummeyildiz.blogspot.com/.

***"Middle-Class Housing in Perspective: From Post-War Construction to Post-Millenial Urban Landscape,"* Milan, Italy**, November 22–23, 2012. This symposium will investigate the shaping of the residential buildings and complexes built for the middle classes during the second half of the twentieth century in different urban and national contexts, with special focus on how they are being transformed by and/or are resistant to the present urban condition. Hosted by the Politecnico di Milano, School of Architecture and Society. For more information, please visit http://www.middleclasshousinginperspective.net/.

***"Tourism in the Global South: Landscapes, Identities, and Development,"* Lisbon, Portugal**, January 24–25, 2013. This conference will examine tourism impacts in the Global South, focusing on the construction and transformation of landscapes through tourism, on issues of identity friction and cultural change, and on the responsibility of tourism in the areas of poverty reduction and sustainable development. Hosted by the University of Lisbon. For more information, please visit http://www.wix.com/tptceg/13#!conference.

CALLS FOR PAPERS

"Remarkable Buildings and Common Spaces in XXth and XXIst Century: Dialogue between Architecture and Anthropology." The *Journal des Anthropologies* is seeking French or English submissions that address the themes of "norms and representations," "designed and lived spaces," and "anthropology in architecture." This issue has three objectives: 1) promoting a dispassionate anthropological reading of norms and representations that are influencing contemporary architectural designs; 2) understanding relations or distances between designed and lived spaces; and 3) understanding how architects use anthropological data. Summaries (5,000 characters) should be sent by email before September 1, 2012, to both Catherine Deschamps (cathdes@club-internet.fr) and Bruno Proth (bprothiste@free.fr), with a copy to the editor of *Journal des Anthropologies* (jda@revues.org).

***"Urban Change in Iran,"* University College London**, November 8–9, 2012. The organizing committee invites submission of papers, exhibition displays, and related proposals. The conference aims to bring together knowledge of the dynamics of urban change and urban management in the contemporary Iranian built environment within a broad historical and regional context. The conference will host a mixture of formal presentations; workshops on national, regional and global aspects of urban change, history and culture; and an exhibition display of publications about and projects for Iran and neighboring countries. For more details about guiding questions, registration, or submission of abstracts please follow the conference link at www.urban-change-in-iran.org.

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Provide a one-paragraph abstract of no more than 100 words. This abstract should explain the content and structure of the paper and summarize its major findings. The abstract should be followed by a short introduction. The introduction will appear without a subheading at the beginning of the paper.

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> In his study of vernacular dwellings in Egypt, Edgar Regis asserted that climate was a major factor in the shaping of roof forms. Henri Lacompte, on the other hand, has argued that in the case of Upper Egypt this deterministic view is irrelevant.[1]
>
> An eminent architectural historian once wrote, "The roof form in general is the most indicative feature of the housing styles of North Africa."[2] Clearly, however, the matter of how these forms have evolved is a complex subject. A thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.[3]
>
> In my research I discovered that local people have differing notions about the origins of the roof forms on the dwellings they inhabit.[4]

The reference notes, collected at the end of the text (not at the bottom of each page), would read as follows:

> 1. E. Regis, *Egyptian Dwellings* (Cairo: University Press, 1979), p.179; and H. Lacompte, "New Study Stirs Old Debate," *Smithsonian*, Vol.11 No.2 (December 1983), pp.24–34.
> 2. B. Smithson, "Characteristic Roof Forms," in H. Jones, ed., *Architecture of North Africa* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p.123.
> 3. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see J. Idris, *Roofs and Man* (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 1984).
> 4. In my interviews I found that the local people understood the full meaning of my question only when I used a more formal Egyptian word for "roof" than that in common usage.

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