TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF TRADITIONAL ENVIRONMENTS



T D S R V O L U M E X X I I I N U M B E R I F A L L 2 0 1 1

The International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments (IASTE) was established at the First International Symposium on Traditional Dwellings and Settlements held at Berkeley in April 1988. IASTE is an interdisciplinary forum where scholars from various disciplines and countries can exchange ideas, discuss methods and approaches, and share findings. As opposed to disciplinary associations, IASTE is a nonprofit organization concerned with the comparative and cross-cultural understanding of traditional habitat as an expression of informal cultural conventions. IASTE's purpose is to serve as an umbrella association for all scholars studying vernacular, indigenous, popular and traditional environments. Current activities of IASTE include the organization of biennial conferences on selected themes in traditional-environments research, the publication of edited books on selected themes, a public outreach program which includes supporting films and documentaries, and the publication of the Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Working Paper Series, which includes all papers presented at IASTE conferences and accepted for publication.

Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review is the official publication of IASTE. As a semi-annual refereed journal, *TDSR* acts as a forum for the exchange of ideas and a means to disseminate information and report on research activities. All articles submitted to *TDSR* are evaluated through a blind peer-review process. *TDSR* has been funded by grants from the Graham Foundation, the Getty Publication Program, the National Endowment for the Arts, the Center for Environmental Design Research, and the office of the Provost at the University of California at Berkeley.

IASTE membership is open to all who are interested in traditional environments and their related studies. In addition to receiving the Association's semi-annual journal, members are eligible to attend the biennial conference at reduced rates. Subscription to the journal is available only with membership in IASTE. Domestic annual order rates are as follows: Individual, $60; Institutional, $120; Corporations, $180. Foreign members add $15 for mailing. Libraries, museums, and academic organizations qualify as institutions. Subscriptions are payable in U.S. dollars only (by check drawn on a U.S. bank, U.S. money order, or international bank draft). Send inquiries to:

IASTE
Center for Environmental Design Research
390 Wurster Hall
University of California
Berkeley, ca 94720-1839
Tel: 510.642.6801 Fax: 510.643.5571
E-mail: IASTE@berkeley.edu
http://iaste.berkeley.edu

TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

Journal of the International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments

Contents



COVER ILLUSTRATION: ANTICIPATING TRADITIONS OF THE MODERN. ILLUSTRATION OF THE FUTURE NEW YORK CITY DRAWN BY WILLIAM ROBINSON LEIGH, AND PUBLISHED WITH HUDSON MAXIM'S ARTICLE OF SCIENTIFIC PROPHECIES, "MAN'S MACHINE-MADE MILLENNIUM," *COSMOPOLITAN MAGAZINE*, NOVEMBER 1908.

Editor's Note

Now in its twenty-third year, *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review* continues to strive to bring outstanding interdisciplinary scholarship to an ever-growing audience. This issue follows from our conference in Beirut last December. For the first time, it includes three papers from members of the Berkeley community; while these authors share an academic home, their work employs different methods and emerges from different geographies. Further, this issue features three articles by Ph.D. candidates, demonstrating the promise of a new generation of scholars dedicated to the study of tradition and the built environment.

We are pleased to begin with two special articles by eminent scholars in their fields. Both build off keynote addresses from the 2010 conference on the theme "The Utopia of Tradition." First, Prof. Ghassan Hage, a social theorist, meditates on the normative ideals and intellectual histories of utopia. Drawing on anthropological inquiry into core ontological assumptions of modernity, he situates utopia as metonymic of the actual existing spaces in which we dwell. Following this reflection, Prof. Ananya Roy, an urban theorist, examines the paradigm of development as a millennial utopia. Uncovering the dialectics of power embedded in new economies of need, she argues that poverty is transformed into Benjamin's "profane illumination" through agonism.

In the next section, our authors look at nationalism and urban space in Turkey, utopic representations in literature and film, and the history of urbanization in Phnom Penh. First, Muna Güvenç, winner of the 2010 Jeffrey Cook Award for Best Student Paper, examines the development of Kurdish identity in Turkey in the absence of a Kurdish nation-state. Focusing on the city of Diyarbakır, her article illustrates how a sense of nationness is being built through everyday practices and collective urban place-making. Next, Nathaniel Robert Walker investigates tensions and anxieties around industrialism in the early twentieth century. Arguing for an "anticipatory tradition," he examines imaginary efforts to remake the city based on models of efficiency and central planning derived from the factory and the corporation. Finally, former IASTE Coordinator Sylvia Nam excavates the idioms and traditions of absence that have marked urbanization in Cambodia's capital. In particular, she traces the shift from a French provincial modernism to a vertical Asian one, as she illuminates how planners and developers continue to render this city as a tabula rasa ripe for intervention.

I would like to end this note by encouraging our readership to join us next October for the 2012 IASTE Conference in Portland, Oregon. With the theme "The Myth of Tradition," this biennial event has already attracted proposals from a diverse set of scholars working on exciting projects from around the globe.

Nezar AlSayyad

Dwelling in the Reality of Utopian Thought

GHASSAN HAGE

Throughout the history of modern Western thought, the concept of "utopia" has come to denote a detachment from, or lack of connection to, reality. To speak of utopias is to speak of ontologically nonexistent spaces, nonrealities. Indeed, the more seriously utopian one is the more in need of a "reality check" one is considered to be. The main ontological assumption lying behind this conception of utopia is what I will refer to as mono-realism: the idea that there is one, and only one, reality that our thought is or can be connected to. A relatively recent school of thought, building on a long anthropological tradition that questions the core ontological assumptions of modernity, has shown mono-realism to be one among those core assumptions. From it emerges the possibility that what we call "reality" is merely a dominant reality, and that there are always minor realities in which we are equally enmeshed. A further consequence of this is that thought, utopian thought included, even when not speaking to the dominant reality, is still emanating from and speaking to a reality; that utopia, rather than being a space inspired by an idealized past that has disappeared or a future-oriented imagining of a space that has no existence, is metonymic of minor and repressed spaces in which we already dwell in the present.

For a long time now — throughout the history of modern Western thought, and particularly the history of radical political thought where it has had a prominent presence — the concept of "utopia" has been clustered with an ensemble of terms that include "romantic," "vague," "dreamy," "idealistic" and "sentimental." What all those terms have in common is that they denote a detachment from, or lack of connection to, reality. Indeed, the term "unrealistic" easily belongs to the cluster. To speak of utopias is to speak of ontologically nonexistent spaces, nonrealities. Utopias can be inspired from an idealized past and a fantasized future. They can also attempt to negate at the level of fantasy negative features of the present. But they are not articulated to a present reality. Indeed, the more seriously utopian a utopia is, the more in need of a "reality check" it is considered to be.

Ghassan Hage *is the Future Generation Professor of Anthropology and Social Theory at the University of Melbourne, Australia.*

The main ontological assumption lying behind this conception of utopia is what I will refer to as mono-realism: the idea that there is one, and only one, reality that our thought is, or can be, connected to. The Marxist-inspired political division between materialism and idealism that dominated radical politics for so long is a good example of this mono-realism. The division presupposes the existence of one reality: either your thought speaks to "reality" and to the forces that emanate from it, and you are a materialist; or it doesn't, and you are an idealist. It is within this construct that utopian thought is seen as a variety of idealism.

A relatively recent school of thought, building on a long anthropological tradition that questions the core ontological assumptions of modernity, has shown mono-realism to be one among those core assumptions. Developed particularly around the works of Bruno Latour and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro on multi-naturalism, this approach invites us to think of ourselves as always inhabiting a multiplicity of intersecting spatialities and realities.[1] From this emerges the possibility that what we call "reality" is merely a dominant reality, and that there are always minor realities in which we are equally enmeshed. A further consequence of this is that thought, utopian thought included, even when not speaking to the dominant reality, is still emanating from and speaking to a reality; that utopia, rather than being a space inspired by an idealized past that has disappeared, or a future-oriented imagining of that which has no existence, is metonymic of minor and repressed spaces in which we already dwell in the present.

CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: FROM THE REALITIES OF THE OTHER TO OTHER REALITIES

Of all the social sciences, anthropology has undoubtedly been the most important in providing utopian thought with its raw materials. In the conclusion to a lecture given in Japan around the topic of "Anthropology in the face of the problems of the modern world," which succinctly summarized the ethos behind all his work, and perhaps the whole discipline, Claude Levi-Strauss argued the following:

> *Anthropologists are here to witness that the manner in which we live, the values that we believe in, are not the only possible ones; that other modes of life, other value systems have permitted, and continue to permit other human communities of finding happiness. Anthropology, thus invites us to temper our beliefs in our own importance, to respect other ways of living, and to put ourselves in question through the knowledge of other customs that astonish us, shock us or even make us repulsed* [author's translation].[2]

It is in such a project that we can see the foundational moment of critical anthropological thought. It is a thought that tells us that, regardless of what and who we are, we, as individuals and as a society, can dwell in the world in a completely different way from the way we dwell in it at any given moment. This is because the anthropological other is both our other and ourselves. The other has, and we can have, different (and perhaps "better") ways of conceiving sexual relations, kinship, our relation to plants, animals and the landscape, causality, sickness, etc. The affinity of critical anthropology with utopian thought becomes here quite pronounced, highlighting at the same time what is perhaps most far-reaching in what this critical anthropology is proposing.

This idea that anthropology shows us to be other to ourselves (that it provides, as Patrice Magnilier proposed, "a mirror image of ourselves in which we do not recognise ourselves"[3]) is more challenging than it might first appear. It was already demanding for the local imagination to cope with the accounts of world travelers who, well before anthropology came to existence, began to note the existence of cultures and customs of people who lived differently than we did. But anthropology began by saying much more than this. It told us that these radically different modes of being were relevant to us. They speak to us. And it is here that lies the complexity of the proposition. Anthropology not only notes the existence of other cultures, but it makes a proposition about us, our own modern culture and the spaces we inhabit: if the otherness of these cultures speaks to us, then there is something about us that is in a relation of affinity to what is being said, something about us that is already other. This can be summarized by the very simple but also paradoxically powerful formulation: we can be radically other than what we are. It is paradoxical because in the very idea of "we can be" other than what we are lies the idea that "we already have it in us" to be (or, more simply, "we already are") other than ourselves. Our otherness is always dwelling within us, and we are always dwelling in it: there is always more to us than we think, so to speak. Thus, anthropology always aims to connect the existence of other cultures elsewhere to the existence of otherness among us.

What does it mean to speak of the "existence of otherness" — of other cultural forms, of other modes of being — within and among us? This is perhaps one of the most productive problematics that anthropology has generated. Does this otherness exist in a virtual or potential state within social reality? And do anthropologists, like the shamans they study, bring that virtuality into being, allowing it to disrupt and haunt our dominant modes of dwelling in the world? Or does this otherness exist in the form of a psychological disposition or a mental structure that can be linked to the presumed "unity of human kind"? The multi-naturalism and radical perspectivism of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Bruno Latour opens up a way of thinking differently about this otherness. It allows us to think of it as articulated not to virtual but to actual realities — albeit minor ones — that are continuously present, even if they are overshadowed by more dominant ones.

From such a perspective the possibilities of another way of being in the world are no longer seen as necessarily belonging to some pure act of the imagination disconnected from the real. Instead, they can be seen as fully enmeshed in minor, "eclipsed," but nonetheless existing, realities that a critical anthropology helps bring to the fore. This can also be true of those "idealized forms of being" that constitute the affective and imaginary building blocks of many utopian projects (and that are of particular interest to us here): intense loving relations, organic forms of social solidarity, "romantic" relations of communion with nature, etc.

I will examine more fully the example of a particular socio-affective thought that is constitutive of many utopias: the idea of a noninstrumental relation to nature. I will show how we can see this utopian thought as speaking to a reality in which we are already enmeshed, rather than as an "idealist" or "romantic" vision fantasizing a reality that does not exist. Before I do so, however, I will delve further into what the notion of "reality" (and particularly what I have referred to as "minor reality") means from the perspective of "multiple realities" or "multi-naturalism."

FROM THE SUBJECTIVE POINT OF VIEW TO ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVISM

The notion of multi-naturalism emerges in Viveiros de Castro's work as a logical complement to his ethnographically derived conception of Amerindian perspectivism. The latter, he has argued, challenges not only the varieties of perspectives that we have "on reality" but the very idea we have of perspective as being a subjective/cultural perspective on a natural reality. Consequently, before seeking, as a clichéd anthropological formula would have it, to understand reality "from the natives' point of view," we need to work out first what the natives think a "point of view" is: their point of view on the point of view, as it were.[4] The alternative is to uncritically allow a Western conception of what a "point of view" is to prevail. However, Viveiros de Castro's target is really a dominant Western conception of the point of view. As I will briefly show, there are some versions of perspectivism within Western cultures that are, at least in some regard, closer to, and can act as a bridge to better understand, the Amerindian version.

Undoubtedly, the most popular way of understanding the notion of "point of view" in Western cultures is a subjectivist one. That is, a "point of view" is most often taken to mean a subjective take on what is either explicitly or implicitly posited as a single objective reality. This is the implicit assumption in statements such as "you have your point of view, and I have mine." And it is less implicit when people speak of having "different points of view" or a "different understanding" of "the situation." This idea is closely linked to an equally subjectivist notion of "interest" that is particularly dominant in the political sciences: people see "things" or "a conflict" (both implying a single "reality") according to their interests.

The most common opposition to this mono-realist objectivist view is a relativist "social constructionist" conception of multiple subjectivities. Here, there is no objective reality at all that matters; what matters are the multiple subjectivities that are themselves the only realities that matter. However, there are variations within this polarity. For example, not all "social constructionism" is a form of relativism and idealism. There are conceptions of subjective interest and perspective that end up with an objectivist conception of social construction. Here the idea of interest is seen as leading to selective interaction with particular elements of reality.

Recently, my wife was serving as host for an ecologist from Italy, and I took our guest to see the famous Sydney Opera House. Dropping her at the Botanic Garden, where one has a breathtaking view of it, I went for a swim. When I came back, my guest was very excited. She told me how many incredible species of birds she has managed to see while walking there. She did not once mention the Opera House; it was as if it had no presence for her. Clearly, she did not see what I was seeing there (and hoping she would see also). Her subjective interest made her perceive reality in a very different way. But her reality was not subjective: the birds and a world made out of birds were objective enough for both of us. Her subjective interest made her see reality and construct reality in a specific way; but in no way was this construction subjective.

In much the same way, we can say that an artist and a road engineer looking at a valley — one to paint it and the other to build a road through it — have different points of view and different perspectives on what they are looking at. They thus will see different things and have different takes on the present reality; but each of their social constructions of reality is objective enough. Here, to say reality is a social construction is no different from saying that a chair is a social construction as opposed to a tree. In no way is one saying that the chair is more or less objective than the tree by claiming it to be a social construction. We can see, therefore, that here the subjective interest, in interacting with reality, does not produce a subjective point of view. Rather, it positions one in a particular objective construction of reality.

This conception of perspectivism is closer, but still very far, from the multi-naturalist view. It is closer because it conceives of each person's reality as the product of *a relation* between oneself and one's surroundings, not something that is given. As we shall see, reality as a relation is crucial for multi-naturalism. However, for the latter, the relation is perceived to be between *the objective modes of existing, inhabiting, and relating to our surroundings with our body* rather than, as is the case above, the interaction between our subjective interest (as a painter or an engineer) and our surroundings.

The above perspectivism also differs from multi-naturalism because it still posits the existence of one and only one

reality that exists outside our interaction with it. Thus, in the example above, we who are not painters or road engineers and gazing on both have no trouble seeing that each are positioned in one dimension of reality that is nonetheless part of the one reality which we, the outsiders, are able to capture as *the* reality. For multi-naturalism there are only the multiplicity of realities produced by the multiple ways our body inhabits its surroundings.

This is, briefly, how multi-naturalism is conceived in the work of Viveiros de Castro. Building on a long tradition of Amerindian ethnographies and anthropologies where Levi-Strauss has pride of place, he presented a world where the animals and humans share the same soul: a kind of Kantian pre-social and pre-perspectival subjectivity. Consequently, in such a world, while humans and animals have different perspectives, this difference is not primarily between the soul/mind of the animals and the humans, since this is what they share. Rather, the different points of view emerge from the ways in which different bodies constitute different modes of relating to, inhabiting, and being enmeshed in their environments. If, generally speaking, Shamanism involves the capacity to move between the perspectives of humans, animals and things, Amerindian shamanism highlights the fact that such a move is not a move between different subjective interests, but is "defined as the ability shown by certain individuals to cross the corporial barriers between the species."[5] Consequently, in Amerindian perspectivism, "a perspective is not a representation, for representations are properties of the spirit, while the point of view is in the body."[6] As such, perspectivism should not be confused with relativism: "far from the subjectivist essentialism of relativism, perspectivism is a corporeal mannerism."[7]

Here, the body is not just flesh or socialized body but, Viveiros de Castro stressed, a "body with its affection." Affection here is used in Spinoza's sense: the body's "capacities to affect and be affected by other bodies."[8] As Katherine Swancutt has explained: "Bodily affects, in Viveiros de Castro's sense of the term, are not just physical characteristics, such as comportment, mannerisms or tastes consistently ascribed to a given subject, they are also 'forces,' 'energies' or 'talents' which are taught, acquired and refined over time."[9]

In being the site of a multiplicity of forces and energies, each body, whether human or animal, constitutes a multiplicity of bodily modes of engagement with its surroundings. It is this multiplicity of bodily engagements which in turn produces a multiplicity of realities or "natures" that the notion of multi-naturalism alludes to. What lies beyond those realities created out of the interaction between our bodily *habitus* and its surrounding is a nonaccessible, non-symbolically "capturable," all-encompassing element akin to what the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan called "the Real." Realities are our interaction with this Real, an interaction based on objective modes of bodily insertion in, and relation with, this Real — or what I will refer to as a plurality of modes of enmeshment in the Real.

THE CRITICAL AND POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF MULTIPLE REALITIES

Clearly, the multi-natural argument is a critical anthropological argument. That is, it is more than a "the Amazonians have their reality and we have our reality" argument. It does mean the latter, but it also means that their reality speaks to ours. It haunts us with the possibility that we, as well, live in multiple realities. Viveiros de Castro's perspectivism highlights the Amazonian's sense of multiplicity of natures structured around the multiplicity of bodies: the body of the human, the body of the jaguar, etc. In speaking to us, however, it *also* — and it is crucial not to think in either/or terms here — highlights the multiplicities that are within each and every body. If a reality is an encounter between the affective, postural, libidinal and physical potentiality of the body and the potentiality of the Real, to think of ourselves as inhabiting a multiplicity of realities is to recognize the multiplicity of the potentialities of the human body. That is, it is also to recognize the multiplicity of modes in which the body is enmeshed in its environment.

Let me give a quick personal example. I am hearing-impaired. I began losing my hearing in my twenties. Before losing my hearing, I had developed a "bad habit": I used to eavesdrop. I developed the habit following years of being taken, as a kid, by my parents to work and to lunches with people I had no capacity or interest to understand. I developed the *habitus* of an eavesdropper in that well after I stopped being subjected to the situation that led me to become an eavesdropper, I continued to have a strong disposition to eavesdrop on conversations around me, regardless of where I was.

From the multiple-realities angle I want to invite thinking with, eavesdropping was a mode of being enmeshed in my surroundings. Indeed, eavesdropping produces a very specific reality with very specific properties. Take, for instance, the fact that "in reality" the closer a sound is to you the more you hear it. This is not true of the reality in which one finds oneself as an eavesdropper, where the opposite is true. Sounds that are further from you start to become clearer than ones near you. There is no better proof that my disposition to eavesdrop created its own reality than the fact that the capacity was the very first thing I started losing when I started going deaf. And with the loss of my capacity to eavesdrop I lost the whole reality that came with it. I didn't lose a subjective point of view on reality; I lost a whole reality. If I had gone totally deaf I could probably also argue that I lost the whole reality, the whole world of sound, produced by the capacity to hearing. This is so, since one's hearing is a particular mode of bodily enmeshment in one's surroundings. Indeed, this goes for all of our senses. Each enmeshes us in our surroundings in a specific way, producing at the same time a reality specific to this mode of enmeshment. What we call our sensorial reality is really a fusion of separate realities produced by the body's sensory enmeshment in its surround-

ing. If we lose one of our senses we lose one reality — not a particular take on reality, or a particular dimension of reality.

It seems to me that the notion of humans as living continuously and concurrently in a multiplicity of realities provides an important consolidation of the critical anthropological ethos of "we can be other than what we are." This is how it goes: if we all live in a multiplicity of realities, and if the socio-historical path of our society and culture has made us dwell more in one reality than in others, this does not mean that we have simply stopped dwelling in those other realities. As such, we are continuously shadowed by realities in which we are dwelling, of which we are not fully aware, but which often induce in us a vague feeling, or a sense of their presence. It is here that critical anthropology transforms into a critical politics. "Being other than what we are" is not just conceptually possible; it is materially possible, since one is already dwelling in it.

Such a conception of multiple realities opens up the possibility to perceive domination not only as the product of a struggle within a reality but also the struggle between realities. This idea that dominant groups do not just dominate an already given reality but impose their reality is already present in social theory, most explicitly in the work of Pierre Bourdieu.[10] It is not surprising that Bourdieu, of all the social scientists working on modernity, gets very close to a multi-realist conception of the world. The reason is Bourdieu's thinking derives from Spinoza but also from an adaptation of Husserl's notion of *Umwelt*, a conception of the bodily *habitus* as always being part and parcel of the very social reality it helps give rise to. Behind Viveiros de Castro's multi-naturalism lies a similar conception of the body. Indeed, at one point, in explaining his conception of the body, Viveiros de Castro wrote:

> *What we are calling her "body," therefore, is not a distinctive physiology or a characteristic anatomy; it is an ensemble of manners and modes of being that constitute a* habitus*, an ethos, an ethogram* (author's translation).[11]

Bourdieu's different worlds are produced by different competing interests and orientations within an always modern conception of reality. As such, they are far from encompassing the possibility of radical alterity in the way it is present in Viveiros de Castro's work, and closer to the objectivist form of "social constructionism" mentioned above. Nonetheless, through his conception of *habitus*, Bourdieu sees interest as a bodily mode of existing in reality rather than as a "subjective" dimension of the self. Furthermore, by offering a conception of politics as a struggle between different realities, Bourdieu opens up a path for us to understand that what he calls symbolic violence is also a form of ontological violence: certain realities come to dominate others so much that they simply become "reality," foreclosing their history as a process of domination and equally foreclosing the very possibility of thinking reality as multiple. To use Gramscian language, there are processes in which certain forces become hegemonic within a reality, but there are also processes whereby a reality becomes hegemonic over other realities.

As suggested above, I want now to exemplify some of the dimensions of the utopian ecological imaginary and its relation to reality when seen through a multi-realist lens.

THE REALITY OF ECO-UTOPIAN THOUGHT

The ecological crisis, whether in the form of global warming, environmental degradation, or the overexploitation of both the human and the nonhuman elements constitutive of our planet, has generated a continuous stream of ecological utopian thought. In this thought, human relation to nature is imagined in a variety of ways other than the instrumental and exploitative mode of interaction that has come to dominate our lives. More often than not such utopian conceptions of human-nature relations are perceived as pure fantasy. If they are related to reality at all, it is a negative relation, in that utopia here is an attempt to negate the harsh ecological reality by transcending it in thought. One can be inclined to see it as embodying the very Marxist definition of ideology and "false consciousness": an attempt to transcend at the level of thought that which cannot be transcended at the level of practice.

Nonetheless, it should be equally clear that these ecological utopian ideas are also connected to another reality: the reality of the alternative primitivist tribal modes of inhabiting and relating to nature as they have been depicted by the accounts of travelers and anthropologists throughout Western history. The recent work of Phillipe Descola, *Par delà la Nature et la Culture*, yet to be translated to English, is perhaps the most important compilation and analysis of the multiple ways in which humans have conceived of their relationship to nature to date.[12] One can easily see how many of these alternative modes of inhabiting and conceiving the natural world, which began their lives in the West by being recorded by anthropologists and others, have now made their way to the ecological/utopian imaginary, whether in holistic intellectualized utopian constructs in the Tomas Moore tradition, or in partial utopian imaginaries in a variety of cultural forms: literature, dance, sculpture, etc. — and, perhaps most importantly today, science fiction films. The science fiction blockbuster *Avatar* abounds in such alternative imagining in its depiction of Na'vi culture. I will reflect on one particular imagined relation in the film: the ability of Na'vi riders to "plug" themselves into and bond with animals like the "Direhorse" and the "Mountain Banshee," such that they become together a type of fused integrated assemblage.

Far from being the product of "pure fantasy," the idea of a deep connectivity and oneness with certain parts of the natural world was the subject of seminal work by Lucien Lévy-

Bruhl through his description of the mode of being he called "participation." This mode entails a less marked delineation between self and other and a radically different conception of the boundaries of being. One of the achievements of Lévy-Bruhl, in what perhaps constitutes a defining moment for anthropology, was his interpretation of the famous statement captured by the ethnographer Karl Von Steinen, in which the Amazonian Bororo tribespeople told Von Steinen "The Bororos are Araras" (referring to a local species of bird). Lévy-Bruhl confronted this "we are birds" statement by moving away from explanations that could easily be encompassed by Western thought, keeping it within its comfort zone — such as "what the Bororos really mean when they say they are birds is that they are so metaphorically." Lévy-Bruhl's attitude was more akin to "they say they are birds; if you are an anthropologist, either bring yourself to understand how one can exist in the world in such a way that they can credibly think they are birds or forget it."

In developing his conception of participation, Lévy-Bruhl was trying to describe (and show there were) *other* ways of existing in the world than the instrumental mode of being that dominates our lives. He thus differentiated between the "logical mentality," which depends on and creates a separation between self and other and is part of the instrumental/rational mode of inhabiting the world, and the "mystical mentality," which is part and parcel of the process of participation, where self and other exist in relative states of fusion. Crucially, however, in continuation with the arguments about the anthropological conception of otherness developed earlier, Frederic Keck recently explained that for Lévy-Bruhl: "The difference between 'primitive mentality' and 'civilized mentality' does not separate two historically and geographically separated modes of thinking as an evolutionist philosophy of history would have it — one whose presuppositions Lévy-Bruhl has always criticized — but two logical principles that direct the human mind in every society and in every individual (author's translation)."[13] From the reality of the other we always end up with the otherness of ourselves. As Lévy-Bruhl himself pointed out, "there is a mystical mentality that is more easily demarcated and therefore more easily observable among the 'primitives' than in our societies, but it is present in every human mind."[14] Lévy-Bruhl, therefore, was hardly arguing that the primitives are *inherently* more mystical than us, as some crude interpreters still like to read him. Nor was he saying that the primitives lived in a mystical world of which we know nothing. Rather — and especially as his later writings became less about "mentalities" and more about experience — the difference becomes precisely about which experiential reality, in the sense of which modality of enmeshment in the Real, comes to dominate over others.

That is, if we are to make him speak in the language of multiple realities, both we and the primitives are bodily enmeshed in our environment such that we produce and live in a multiplicity of realities. Among these are the realities associated with both the logical and the mystical mentalities that interested him. Crucially, being enmeshed and dwelling in the reality associated with the logical mentality that has become the dominant feature of our modernity has never stopped us from being enmeshed and dwelling in a multiplicity of other realities, including the reality of participation and the mystical mentality associated with it. Consequently — to go back to our original concern with utopia — the utopian idea of state of fusion, far from being "pure" fantasy, speaks to a reality where we actually do exist in a state of fusion with nature, and which we continue to inhabit, but which has been obscured by our capitalist modernity.

But there is more to Lévy-Bruhl's argument than the idea that we always already exist in spaces where our relation to nature is *other* than what it appears to be. Perhaps more important is the fact that Lévy-Bruhl helps us undermine any political and ethical polarity that we are tempted to create between a modernity associated with instrumental reason and a primitiveness associated with a state of participation and a mystical mentality. Indeed, he does not see instrumental reason as specific to modernity. Rather, he helps us think that what perhaps characterizes modernity most is the way we have increasingly come to see instrumental reason and the reality associated with it as the *only* possible mode of being and the only possible mode of reasoning. In this sense, rather than instrumental reason as such, Western modernity's greatest "achievement" has been to make us mono-realists, minimizing our awareness of the multiplicity of realities in which we exist, always grounding our utopian thought in the past or the future, rather than in the present, where it has always been grounded.

REFERENCE NOTES

1. B. Latour, *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); E. Viveiros de Castro, "Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Equivocation," *Tipiti: Journal of the Society for the Lowland South America*, Vol.2 (2004) pp.3–22; and E. Viveiros de Castro, *Métaphysiques Cannibales* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009).
2. C. Lévi-Strauss, *L'anthropologie face aux problèmes du monde moderne* (Paris: Seuil, 2011), p.51.
3. P. Magnilier, "La parenté des autres: Sur Métamorphoses de la parenté de Maurice Godelier," *Critique*, October 2005, pp.773–74.
4. Viveiros de Castro, "Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Equivocation."
5. Viveiros de Castro, *Métaphysiques Cannibales*, p.25.
6. Ibid., p.39.
7. Ibid., p.40.
8. Viveiros de Castro, "Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Equivocation," p.3.
9. K. Swancutt, "The Ontological Spiral: Virtuosity and Transparency in Mongolian Games," *Inner Asia*, 2007, p.237.
10. See P. Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); and P. Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations* (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2000).
11. Viveiros de Castro, *Métaphysiques Cannibales*, p.40.
12. P. Descola, *Par delà la Nature et la Culture* (Paris: Seuil, 2006).
13. F. Keck, *Lucien Lévy-Bruhl: entre philosophie et anthropologie: contradiction et participation* (Paris: CNRS éditions, 2008), p.7.
14. L. Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), p.131.


"INSPIRED
DUCT-TAPED
INGENUITY"
A.A.K.,
THE ECONOMIST

The Agonism of Utopia: Dialectics at a Standstill

ANANYA ROY

In this essay I discuss utopias as places in time, bold panoramas of the future that are necessarily incomplete. My concern is with utopias of the new millennium, specifically the utopia of development. Unlike the "stark utopia" of the free market, which dominated late-twentieth-century ideology, millennial utopias are haunted by the specter of poverty. However, poverty functions as both the primitive other and primal history of millennial capitalism. The new visibilities of poverty depict economies of need as those of entrepreneurialism, ingenuity and creativity. To uncover the agonism of this utopia it is necessary to trace the dialectics of power through which the modern economy is constituted, to transform poverty from an object of primitive alterity into what, following Walter Benjamin, can be understood as a "profane illumination."

> Ambiguity is the appearance of dialectic in images, the law of dialectics at a standstill. This standstill is utopia and the dialectical image therefore dream image.
>
> — *Walter Benjamin*[1]

In a 2004 photographic exhibition titled "Standing Still," Malaysian artist Simryn Gill presented images of "ambitious development projects . . . abandoned before completion." These are the "shells of what would have become large shopping centers or apartment blocks or private mansions or even mini towns," Gill wrote of the images (FIG. 1). Devoid of human figures, the photographs provided a powerful articulation of space and time, of what Gill called a "place in time": "A place in time, where, one might say, the past lies in ruins, unkempt and untended, and the future also somehow has been abandoned and has started to crumble. No way forward, no way back."[2]

Taken between 2000 and 2003 in Malaysia, Gill's photographs interrupted the fantastic teleology that is the East Asian miracle. Against the soaring heights of the phantasmagoria of the postcolonial city, this abandonment of the future is what, follow-

***Ananya Roy** is The Blum Center Distinguished Chair in Global Poverty and Practice and a Professor in the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of California at Berkeley.*

FIGURE 1. *Standing Still, 2000–2003; photograph from a series of 116. Courtesy of Simryn Gill and Tracy Williams Limited.*

ing Walter Benjamin, can be understood as a dialectical image — the site at which the dream image comes undone, the monuments of the bourgeoisie in ruins even before they have crumbled. As Susan Buck-Morss explained, "Because these decaying structures no longer hold sway over the collective imagination, it is possible to recognize them as the illusory dream images they always were."[3]

It is useful to read Gill's stark photographs in the context of what is today the making of the Asian "world-class" city.[4] Ambitious projects of postcolonial aspiration, cities across the wide swath of territory that is loosely designated as "Asia" are implicated in the making of economic futures. Imagined as an Asian century, this time of rapid urban growth is envisioned as a time of prosperity. Transformed from geography into history, it is Asia itself that has become utopia.

Take, for example, the city of Shenzhen, China's most famous Special Economic Zone. Located at the heart of the bustling Pearl River Delta, Shenzen has emerged as a symbol of Chinese entrepreneurialism, global ingenuity, and market reform. Shenzhen is the "world's workshop"; on its assembly lines are produced much of the world's electronic gadgets, those that fuel cosmopolitan lifestyles across the globe. But Shenzhen is also the stage for what, in Lefebvrian fashion, can be understood as an urban revolution, for what is being produced in Shenzhen today is space, urban space. Massive urban development projects have become the venue for state-led spatial restructuring. Everywhere there is construction; everywhere the new becomes old; everywhere factories and paddy fields give way to condominiums and malls; everywhere fast-speed infrastructure inhabits the city. Shenzhen is also a remaking of the future — or rather a bold assertion that the future lies on the horizons of Asia. In a city that has grown from about 25,000 people in 1980 to nearly 14 million in 2010, the theme of speed permeates all discourse. Widely prevalent is a temporal imagination, that of "Shenzhen speed." As Carolyn Cartier has noted, the use of this phrase to connote a rapidity of economic growth suggests that "no other place or time has experienced the transformations that have characterized this city."[5]

In previous work, I have argued that "places in time" like Shenzhen have to be understood not only as panoramas of an ascendant Asian hegemony, but also as bold experiments with urban futures.[6] They are the utopias of the new millennium. As Paul Virilio has noted, "no politics is possible at the scale of the speed of light"[7]; this, in turn, can be rephrased to suggest that no politics is possible in utopia. Gill's photographs of "standing still" present a powerful interruption of such utopia. They refuse the certainty of progress.

Following Walter Benjamin, I interpret Gill's photographs as an instance of the "law of dialectics at a standstill."[8] In his 1935 essay "Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century," Benjamin wrote: "Ambiguity is the appearance of dialectic in images, the law of dialectics at a standstill. This standstill is utopia and the dialectical image therefore dream image." And as Jennifer Robinson has noted, the methodology of a "dialectics at a standstill" makes possible an understanding of the phantasmagoria (of urban life) "as a site which potentially exposes the range of alternative future and past possibilities for organizing social life."[9]

I am interested in how attention to the time of utopia, to its standstill, reveals how the political constitutes utopia. If no politics is possible at the scale of the speed of light, then dialectics at a standstill renews the possibility of politics. There are many possible conceptions of the political that can attend an understanding of utopia. Following Chantal Mouffe, however, I am interested in the "agonism" of utopia: of how utopia is constituted through power, and how such founding acts of exclusion are fundamental to the making of the social world. Where there is "stifling consensus," there Mouffe has drawn attention to a surplus of meaning, to a multiplicity of conflict and struggle.[10] To use Mouffe to read the historical object that is utopia means to uncover the alterity that cannot be domesticated, the antagonism that cannot be absorbed by fantasies of harmony — for, after all, utopias, as ideal "places in time," must suppress, or at least manage, alterity and antagonism.

There are two aspects to Mouffe's concept of agonism that I consider to be of particular use in making sense of the constitutive character of utopia. The first is a surplus that cannot be contained within the panorama of utopia. Mouffe has drawn upon the writings of Jacques Derrida to designate this surplus as undecidability — a haunting, a ghostliness.

According to Derrida, "The undecidable remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost — but an essential ghost — in every decision, in every event of decision. Its ghostliness deconstructs from within any assurance of presence."[11] It is in this sense that all utopias are necessarily incomplete; that as *eu-topias*, or "good places," they are also "no places," or *u-topos*.

Second, Mouffe is concerned with "agonism," rather than "antagonism." She defines the latter as a struggle between enemies, the former as a struggle between mutually dependent adversaries. It is this relational ontology that I want to bring to bear on the discussion of utopia, for I hope it will allow something more than to trace the inevitable and often violent exclusions through which utopias are constituted. In the event of decision that is utopia, who or what is the adversary that must be conjured, confronted and concealed? If we consider one particular type of utopia — development, or the making of economic futures — then such a utopia is consituted through the exclusion of that which is marked as backward or primitive. Development as the sign of the market always exists in agonism (rather than antagonism) with the sphere of tradition. Indeed, it is only through the designation of tradition as the primitive past of the market that development can proceed. As Timothy Mitchell has noted, what is at stake here is the making of a specific object: the modern economy, as "self-contained, internally dynamic, and statistically measurable sphere of social action, scientific analysis, and political regulation." The birth of the economy, he has argued, made possible "new forms of value, new kinds of equivalence, new practices of calculation, new relations between human agency and the nonhuman, and new distinctions between what was real and the forms of its representation."[12] Development as utopia relies on this most natural and obvious object, the modern economy, the market. But it also relies on a founding act of exclusion: of the sociality that is tradition, of the history that is primitive. As a place in time, development, then, exists in this fraught relationship with past and future. This is the ghost lodged in utopia.

THE MILLENNIAL AND THE PRIMITIVE

The start of the new millennium has witnessed the renewal of development. If Mitchell, following Polanyi and Foucault, charts the birth of the modern economy (and its unique character of calculability) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, then today the economy is imagined and constructed as an all-encompassing global process. Instantiated at sites such as Shenzhen, this utopia of development is audacious. And in its audacity it is closely related to earlier utopian imaginations of the economy.

In 1989, at the height of free-market ideology and practice, Francis Fukuyama published an essay titled "The End of History and the Last Man." In it, he argued that "what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War . . . but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."[13] Fukuyama also went on to argue that "liberal principles in economics — the 'free market' have spread," producing "unprecedented levels of material prosperity" around the world.[14] Although Fukuyama himself was later to cast doubt on the "end of history" thesis, at the time the paradigm signified the audacious utopia of free-market, global capitalism.

Yet, by the start of the new millennium, this seemingly unshakeable utopianism had given way to a grave and widespread awareness of global suffering. Writing against Fukuyama, Derrida, in *Specters of Marx*, drew attention to worldwide poverty, the "obvious macroscopic fact" that "never before, in absolute figures, have so many men, women and children been subjugated, starved or exterminated on the earth."[15] If the free market can be understood as a "stark utopia" — Karl Polanyi's term — then now it was haunted by the specter of poverty.[16] A ghost had been lodged in utopia.

But this millennial concern with poverty is also utopian in its audacity and euphoria. If Fukuyama had proclaimed the end of history, interlocutors of millennial development now proclaim the end of poverty.[17] In previous work I have charted the remarkable emergence of this collective will to end poverty.[18] An unprecedented mobilization of global conscience, this millenial utopia has been fueled by the global social movements of the 1990s — in the villages of Chiapas, on the streets of Seattle, at the barricades of Cancun, at the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre. It has involved a remaking of the global institutions of development, from the launch of the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations to the incorporation of poverty alleviation as a key part of the mission of the World Bank. Organized against the stark utopia of the free market, this millennial utopia envisions a world where poverty will exist only in museums — a phrase often used by Muhammad Yunus, the 2006 recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.

If millennialism rejects the free market as an organizing paradigm — indeed, the language of market failure dominates millennial development — then what animates this new utopia? The answer to this question lies in the new visibilities of poverty. Of course, concern for poverty is not new. At various historical moments, poverty has emerged as a public issue. At each of these moments, a distinctive visibility has attended the public character of poverty debates. For example, in the late nineteenth century, amidst the flurry of urban modernization, poverty became suddenly visible. From Baudelaire's prose poetry to the photographs of Jacob Riis, fin-de-siecle culture was necessarily constituted through the "eyes of the poor," through that encounter with "how the other half lives." The visibility of poverty was enabled by new social technologies, including the survey. Maps of poverty — for example, those produced by social reformer Charles Booth in London — were at once a statistical and a

moral order, cataloging the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor. Osborne and Rose rightly noted that Booth's surveys of poverty should be seen as one of the great inventions of the social sciences, its role akin to that of the telescope in the natural sciences.[19]

In the new millennium, poverty is once again visible, and new social technologies, from Internet portals to celebrity campaigns to an industry of volunteerism, mediate its visibility. Particularly significant is that poverty has become visible as a global issue, as an urgent problem that transcends national borders and economies, and that can be taken up by global citizens. How, then, do we uncover the agonism of this millennial utopia? For this, it is necessary to return to Walter Benjamin.

In his examinations of modernity, Benjamin drew attention to how the modern constantly re-cites the past. If Guy Debord was to later analyze the spectacle of capitalism by pointing to its fog of amnesia, Benjamin's critique was quite different.[20] Interested in the enchantment that is modernity, Benjamin drew attention to how the making of modern spaces and forms involves at once the relentless pursuit of novelty as well as the constant re-citation of the past. It is through such citationary practices that the past is reconstituted as mythic time, as primal history. In her reading of Benjamin, Robinson sought to "establish the important role of the primitive in producing a certain phantasmagoria of urban life," the relationship between modernity and its "others."[21] As she noted, for Benjamin, "the relationship between 'antiquity,' or 'tradition' and the modern, was not one of progression, one following the other in 'homogenous, empty time;' but rather dynamic and potentially transformative." Indeed, by excavating mythic time, primal history, Benjamin was able to transform the enchantments of modernity into "profane illuminations," a "now of recognition."[22] This, of course, is the dialectical image, or dialectics at a standstill.

It is possible to argue, then, that what is distinctive about the utopia that is millennial development is not only the new visibilities of poverty, but also how poverty functions as both the primitive other and primal history of millennial capitalism. This iteration of the modern economy is in fact obsessed with the shadow economies of the poor, seeking to convert them into new frontiers of capital accumulation. It is this absorption of the primitive that makes possible the millennial utopia of global prosperity. Take, for example, the case of new imaginaries about Africa.

Fukuyama's stark utopia of the end of history required a geographical imagination of a flat world. The latter, a phrase coined by the *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman, suggests a "level playing-field" of economic competition where old geographical separations and historical divisions are irrelevant — one where Bangalore, India, can compete neck to neck with Silicon Valley, California.[23] This world, as imagined by Friedman, is one of mobile entrepreneurs, the instantaneous flows of capital and innovation, and an unprecedented time-space compression enabled by new technologies of information and transportation. But the millennial utopia of the end of poverty is concerned with market failure. It cannot imagine a flat world. Instead, it imagines a world full of spaces of underdevelopment and backwardness; and yet such primitivism is transformed into primal history, mythic time. Africa, once understood only in the language of crisis, as the heart of darkness, is now what James Ferguson has called a place-in-the-world.[24]

I turn here to images from popular culture, for they are illustrative, I think, of this new millennial imagination and its circulations. For example, a Louis Vuitton advertisement features the rock star and poverty warrior Bono as the explorer of Africa **(FIG. 2)**. Titled "Every Journey Begins in Africa," the advertisement is part of a much broader effort by Bono to reframe Africa as a "mesmerizing, entrepreneurial, dynamic continent."[25] This theme of entrepreneurialism is front and center in other scripts of Africa. Take, for example, a recent Benetton "global communication campaign." Featuring Senegalese singer Youssou N'Dour, it highlights a microcredit program in Senegal supported by Benetton. In it, N'Dour proudly states that "Africa doesn't want charity," only microfinance.[26] His declaration echoes a new set of "African" voices that seek to set Africa "free" — free from Western aid and state bureaucracies. This was the theme of George Ayittey's *Africa Unchained*: Africa is poor because it is not free.[27] The Benetton campaign's striking images promise freedom — economic freedom — transforming figures of African poverty into microentrepreneurs **(FIG. 3)**. They are the new "united colors of Benetton," a reconfigured global chic. But they are also, in the words of Alessandro Benetton, the "new face of Africa."[28] They embody the truth that is the Benetton campaign slogan: that "Africa Works."

In his important 2001 book *On the Postcolony*, Achille Mbembe noted that "Africa still constitutes one of the metaphors through which the West represents the origin of its own norms, develops a self-image"; Africa is that which is defined as "radically *other*, as all that the West is not."[29] But what is at stake in millennial utopias is how ontologies of difference come to be absorbed and assimilated into a master narrative of development. In the Louis Vuitton advertisement, the untamed landscapes of Africa are the site of exploration. In the Benetton advertisement, symbols of Africa's informal economy become symbols of global entrepreneurialism. Poverty, as economic primitivism, once again becomes primal history.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the popular sentiment that underpins many of the global poverty campaigns — that we are all Africans. For example, the July 2007 issue of *Vanity Fair* was dedicated to Africa and guest-edited by Bono. In it, readers were introduced to Africa not so much via Africans as through American celebrities who care about Africa: Oprah, George Clooney, Madonna, Bill Gates — each photographed in stunning fashion by Annie Leibovitz. Par-

FIGURE 2. *Every Journey Begins in Africa, advertisement for LVMH, 2010. Source: http://www.louisvuittonjourneys.com/africa/.*

ticularly striking was the theme that ran through the entire issue. It echoed an earlier media campaign of the U.S.-based charity Keep a Child Alive — "*I am African*" — that featured celebrities such as Gwenyth Paltrow and Richard Gere in an effort to draw attention to the ravages of HIV/AIDS on the continent.[30] In the *Vanity Fair* issue, DNA samples taken from the editors and celebrities were used to chart "individual ancestral paths from their starting point in East Africa." As editor Graydon Carter wrote: "It is quite moving to see that every person on the planet is linked to this African tribe, and that, as the saying goes, we are all African."[31]

POVERTY: "INSPIRED, DUCT-TAPED INGENUITY"

Earlier this year the Center for Architecture in New York hosted an exhibition titled "Jugaad Urbanism: Resourceful Strategies for Indian Cities." Curated by Kanu Agrawal, the collection of models, photographs, and video installations sought to highlight the "inspired, duct-taped ingenuity" of communities of poverty **(FIGS. 4, 5, 6)**. From tin-can canopies to frugal latrines **(FIGS. 7, 8)**, the exhibition was meant to capture how the poor "make do," and how such forms of making-do are a new idiom of urban ingenuity and entrepreneurialism:



FIGURE 3. *Africa Works, United Colors of Benetton, 2009. Source: http://www.benetton.com/africaworks-press/en/index.html.*

FIGURE 4. *Jugaad Urbanism, Center for Architecture, New York, 2011. Photograph by author.*

FIGURE 5. *Jugaad Urbanism, Center for Architecture, New York, 2011. Photograph by author.*



FIGURE 6. *Jugaad Urbanism, Center for Architecture, New York, 2011. Photograph by author.*

> *Set in the radically uneven urban landscapes of Delhi, Mumbai, Ahmedabad and Pune, India, Jugaad Urbanism explores how the energy of citizens "making-do" is translated by architects, urban planners, and governmental and nongovernmental entities into efficient and inventive strategies for sustainable urban growth. From energy generating spinning wheels to the extensive skywalks of Mumbai — the exhibition highlights how "jugaad" interventions (a term in Hindi used to describe an innovative, resourceful approach) are challenging traditional spatial hierarchies and mechanistic planning principles.*[32]

The Jugaad Urbanism exhibition is an example of a new global imaginary about poverty, which views the economies of the poor as economies of entrepreneurship and dynamic informality. Such, too, is the message of the Benetton campaign "Africa Works," discussed in the previous section. In this, as in the Jugaad Urbanism exhibition, strategies of improvisation devised under conditions of deprivation and vulnerability are reinterpreted as strategies of ingenuity — "inspired, duct-taped ingenuity." Writing shortly after the release of the film *Slumdog Millionaire*, India's leading journalist, Barkha Dutt, thus made note of "the energy, entrepreneurship and imagination of the slum kids." She likened this to "the *jugadu* spirit that is so typical of India."

> *Jugadu . . . was originally the word for a marvellous invention — a hybrid automotive that welds the body of a jeep with the engine of a water pump and looks like a tractor. Today it has come to be our shorthand for spunkiness — a, we-will-get-the-job-done attitude no matter how bad the odds are.*[33]

FIGURE 7 (ABOVE). *Jugaad Urbanism, Center for Architecture, New York, 2011. Photograph by author.*
FIGURE 8 (LEFT). *Jugaad Urbanism, Center for Architecture, New York, 2011.*

In my previous work I have argued that such valorizations of economies of poverty are now commonplace. Take, for example, the global architect Rem Koolhaas, whose work has been discussed at length in this journal.[34] Koolhaas has interpreted the urbanism of Lagos as a "culture of make-do."[35] In his encounter with Lagos, part of Harvard's Project on the City, Koolhaas was taken with the inventiveness of its residents as they survive the travails of the megacity. He saw such experimental responses as generating "ingenious, critical alternative systems," a type of "self-organization" creating "intense emancipatory zones."[36] It is not surprising, then, that Koolhaas drew the following conclusion: "Lagos is not catching up with us. Rather, we may be catching up with Lagos."

In this way, the seemingly "alien and distant" megacity becomes the platform for a "neo-organicist" analysis of urbanism.[37] As Matthew Gandy has noted, such imaginations turn on the premise of "ontological difference," the African megacity situated outside the currents of world history.[38] There is a lot that can be said about the personage of the star architect and the project of the Third World megacity. But what is of interest here is the emphasis on self-organizing economies of entrepreneurialism and how this may lead to an understanding of poverty as ingenuity. Such "inspired, duct-taped ingenuity," I am suggesting, is the new millennial utopia.

Perhaps the most influential articulation of such a paradigm comes in the work of the policy guru Hernando de Soto. Against apocalyptic renderings such as those of Mike Davis of a "planet of slums" where a "surplus humanity" is warehoused in spaces of despair, de Soto presents the Third World slum as the place of "heroic entrepreneurs."[39] As he wrote: "Marx would probably be shocked to find how in developing countries much of the teeming mass does not consist of oppressed legal proletarians but of oppressed extralegal small entrepreneurs with a sizeable amount of assets." What is important about de Soto's ideas is that he is not just providing a new global imaginary about poverty; this imaginary also makes possible the conversion of economies of poverty into frontiers of capital accumulation. De Soto has argued such

economies are rich in assets, albeit in the defective form of dead capital. The "mystery of capital" is how such dormant and defective assets can be transformed into liquid capital.

It is necesssary to uncover how such millennial utopias produce consensus. For example, De Soto's authoritative narrative rests on a particular understanding of capital, one that conceptualizes capital not as the social relations of production but as a "representational process."

> *In the West . . . every parcel of land, every building, every piece of equipment, or store of inventories is represented in a property document that is the visible sign of a vast hidden process that connects all these assets to the rest of the economy . . . [and] can be used as collateral for credit. . . . Third World and former communist nations do not have this representational process. As a result, most of them are undercapitalized. . . . The enterprises of the poor are very much like corporations that cannot issue shares or bonds to obtain new investment and finance. Without representations, their assets are dead capital. . . . The poor inhabitants of these nations — five-sixths of humanity — do have things, but they lack the process to represent their property and create capital. . . . This is the mystery of capital.*[40]

In my work on millennial development I have designated these efforts to convert economies of poverty into frontiers of capital accumulation as poverty capitalism.[41] In particular, I have drawn upon the case of microfinance to illustrate this process. Microfinance, the provision of financial services to the poor, is a highly popular poverty-alleviation tool, widely discussed and applied. As a global phenomenon, microfinance can be traced to the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. Founded by Muhammad Yunus in 1983, it pioneered a simple model of credit whereby small groups of poor women were able to secure small loans at reasonable rates of interest. The model was meant to serve as an alternative to both formal systems of banking that demanded collateral, thereby excluding the poor, and informal systems of finance that preyed on the poor. Premised on the idea that the poor are inherently entrepreneurial, the Grameen Bank bet on the generation of income and the smooth repayment of such loans. Women were seen as particularly important conduits of microfinance loans, with their altruistic propensity to utilize income for social development through such avenues as the schooling of children, improved household nutrition, or investment in a home. Today microfinance is a global poverty panacea, deployed by countless organizations and campaigns that seek to combat poverty. In recognition of such efforts, Yunus and the Grameen Bank were awarded the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. The prize committee credited them with the creation of "economic and social development from below." "Lasting peace," the committee noted, "cannot be achieved unless large population groups find ways in which to break out of poverty. Micro-credit is one such means."[42]

But microfinance is also an instance of "bottom billion capitalism," a set of dispersed but coherent efforts to construct, and make productive, a global economy where the world's bottom billion — the billion or so people living under conditions of poverty — are integrated into circuits of capital accumulation. This is what Bill Gates has called "creative capitalism": "an attempt to stretch the reach of market forces so that more companies can benefit from doing work that makes more people better off. We need new ways to bring far more people into the system — capitalism — that has done so much good in the world."[43] Gates's millennial utopia is striking and seductive, for he is able to position poverty not only as the primitive other (and primal history) of the modern economy but also as its future. "There are markets all over the world that businesses have missed," he has asserted, and the poor constitute a particularly important and lucrative market, a "billion bootstraps."[44]

I am interested in the making of millennial capitalism through such conversions of poverty into profit, or poverty capital. Microfinance is an especially intriguing case because it is a peculiar type of poverty capital; the commodity that is being produced, traded and valued is debt. The practices of calculation at work in microfinance are less a valuation of the labor of the poor or of the assets of the poor and more an assessment of the capacity to enact repayment. Not surprisingly, the microfinance mantra is that "the poor always pay back."[45] This is the speculative arbitrage that underlies microfinance: a calculation about the social habits of the poor and how they can be capitalized through the practices of financial discipline imposed by microfinance institutions. De Soto is thus wrong, for what is at stake here is not a valuation of the assets of the poor but instead the inscription of value to an essence, to a primitive essence.

At a World Bank-sponsored microfinance training workshop, one economist described microfinance as "the mystical and transcendental practice of monetizing the promise of a poor woman who has never before touched money." In another account, a microfinance consultant noted that microfinance can function "in places where Americans are scared to drink the water." Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff have thus argued that millennial capitalism is "magical" because it seems to have the capacity to yield wealth "purely through exchange . . . as if entirely independent of human manufacture."[46] Key to such exchange is how the primitive and the primal are transformed into the phantasmagoria that is the future — that is utopia. Microfinance, then, is not the primitive past of modern finance capital; rather, it is the face of the future. Finance capital itself needs the tricks and techniques of microfinance — the "mystical and transcendental practice of monetizing the promise of a poor woman who has never before touched money," "in places where Americans are scared to drink the water."

FUTURES

I started this essay with Benjamin's methodology of dialectics at a standstill. I argued that standstill disrupts and interrupts utopias of global prosperity; that such "places in time" serve as the ghost lodged in the events of utopia. I have focused my attention on millennial utopias for they seem to defy such disruption. Appropriating and assimilating economic primitivism, such utopias transform primal history into futures of speculation and accumulation. How then can we uncover the agonism of these utopias? This, I believe, is the task before us: to deconstruct the striking and seductive global imaginaries of creative capitalism and *jugaad* urbanism. To do so requires, as this journal has been doing for many years, a re-conceptualization of tradition. Neither primitive essence nor primal history, tradition must be understood as alterity, the constructed "other" of modernity. In the context of the utopia that is millennial development, tradition is many things: the latent entrepreneurship of the slum; the inspired, duct-taped *jugaad* ingenuity of the poor; the cultural habits of the poor that ensure that they repay microfinance loans. Tradition has thus become the process through which the modern economy comes to be enchanted. Tradition is the magicality of millennial capitalism. It is necessary then to render tradition political, to reinscribe the slum, the improvisation, the informality, the domesticity — and indeed Africa — as acts of power and expropriation. This is the agonism of utopia. Only then can alternative futures be imagined and undertaken.

REFERENCE NOTES

1. W. Benjamin, "Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century: Expose of 1935," in *The Arcades Project*, H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin, trans., R. Tiedeman, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999 [1935]), p.10.
2. S. Gill, "Matrix 210: Standing Still," exhibition at the University of California, Berkeley, Art Museum, 2004, http://www.bampfa.berkeley.edu/images/art/matrix/210/MATRIX_210_Simryn_Gill.pdf.
3. S. Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1989), p.159.
4. A. Roy and A. Ong, eds., *Worlding Cities: Asia Experiments and the Art of Being Global* (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2011).
5. C. Cartier, "Transnational Urbanism in the Reform-Era Chinese City: Landscapes from Shenzhen," *Urban Studies*, Vol.39 (2002), pp.1513–36.
6. Roy and Ong, *Worlding Cities*.
7. P. Virilio, *Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light*, M. Degener, trans. (New York: Continuum, 2005 [original French publication 1991]), p.43.
8. Benjamin, "Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century," p.10.
9. J. Robinson, "In the Tracks of Comparative Urbanism: Difference, Urban Modernity and the Primitive," *Urban Geography*, Vol.25 No.8 (2004), p.715.
10. C. Mouffe, *On the Political: Thinking in Action* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p.66.
11. Jacques Derrida, in C. Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000), p.77.
12. T. Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp.4,5.
13. F. Fukuyama, "The End of History?' *The National Interest*, Vol.16 (1989), p.4.
14. F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992), p.xiii.
15. J. Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International* (New York: Routledge 1994), p.106.
16. K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 [1944]), p.3.
17. J. Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).
18. A. Roy, *Poverty Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development* (New York: Routledge, 2010).
19. T. Osborne and N. Rose, "Spatial Phenomenotechnics: Making Space with Charles Booth and Patrick Geddes," *Environment and Planning D*, Vol.22 No.2 (2004), pp.209–28.
20. G. Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, D. Nicholson-Smith, trans. (New York: Zone Books, 1995 [1967]).
21. Robinson, "In the Tracks of Comparative Urbanism," p.711.
22. Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing*, p.219.
23. T. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005).
24. J. Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006), p.6.
25. Bono, "Guest Editor's Letter: Message 2U," *Vanity Fair*, July 2007, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/2007/07/bono200707, p.32.
26. Benetton, "MFI Started by Youssou N'Dour Featured in Benetton's Latest Global Communication Campaign," February 13, 2008, available at http://www.benetton.com/africaworks-press/en/press_information/1_1.html.
27. G. Ayittey, *Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
28. Benetton, "MFI Started by Youssou N'Dour Featured in Benetton's Latest Global Communication Campaign."
29. A. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley: University of California Press 2001), p.2.
30. Http://www.keepachildalive.org/i_am_african/i_am_african.html.
31. G. Carter, "Editor's Letter: Annie Get Your Passport," *Vanity Fair*, July 2007, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/2007/07/graydon200707, p.28.
32. Http://cfa.aiany.org/index.php?section=upcoming&expid=136.
33. B. Dutt, "Why Isn't India Saying 'Jai Ho'?" *Hindustan Times*, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/Why-isn-t-India-saying-Jai-ho/Article1-372854.aspx [accessed March 1, 2009].
34. A. Roy, "Slumdog Cities: Rethinking Subaltern Urbanism," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol.35 No.2 (2011), pp.223–38.
35. O. Enwezor, "Terminal Modernity: Rem Koolhaas' Discourse on Entropy," in V. Patteeuw, ed., *What is OMA: Considering Rem Koolhaas and the Office for Metropolitan Architecture* (Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2003), p.116.
36. J. Godlewski, "Alien and Distant: Rem Koolhaas on Film in Lagos, Nigeria," *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, Vol.XXI No.II (2010), pp.7–20.
37. M. Gandy, "Learning from Lagos," *New Left Review*, Vol.33 (2005), pp.37–53; and Godlewski, "Alien and Distant."
38. M. Gandy, "Planning, Anti-Planning and the Infrastructure Crisis Facing Metropolitan Lagos," *Urban Studies*, Vol.43 No.2 (2006), pp.371–96.

39. M. Davis, "Planet of Slums: Urban Involution and the Informal Proletariat," *New Left Review*, Vol.26 (2004), pp.5–34; and H. De Soto, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p.216.
40. De Soto, *The Mystery of Capital*, pp.6–7.
41. Roy, *Poverty Capital*.
42. O.D. Mjøs, "Presentation Speech: Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony," 2006, available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/presentation-speech.html [accessed January 7, 2007].
43. B. Gates, "How to Fix Capitalism," Time, July 31, 2008, p.23.
44. Ibid., p.27.
45. A. Dowla and D. Barua, *The Poor Always Pay Back: The Grameen II Story* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2006).
46. J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, "Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming," *Public Culture*, Vol.12 No.2 (2000), pp.291–343.

Constructing Narratives of Kurdish Nationalism in the Urban Space of Diyarbakır, Turkey

MUNA GÜVENÇ

This article analyzes the making and remaking of Kurdish national identity in the absence of a Kurdish nation-state — specifically, the use of urban space to register claims to national belonging. Looking at Diyarbakır, the largest Kurdish city in Turkey, the article examines the political and social interaction between civil society and pro-Kurdish political parties to shed light on the invention of a "new" Kurdish identity and the dynamics of Kurdish nationalism there. It suggests that Kurdish nationhood "as a political and cultural form" is being institutionalized in Diyarbakır through the everyday practices of its residents, as pro-Kurdish parties prompt an agenda and vocabulary of Kurdish nationalism that recalls a traumatic past and imagines a common future. The article argues that Kurdish nationalism in Diyarbakır is being built through the urban experience of collectivity in diverse socio-spatial and political encounters, rather than solely through top-down interventions.

"Before, I didn't know that I was a Kurd. We were all Turks. As I have lived here, now I know that I am a Kurd. Kurd is my identity." These were the words of Havin, a twenty-year-old university student who I interviewed in Diyarbakır, Turkey, in 2007.[1] "I don't expect the municipality to collect the garbage or do any other service for us, but I want my Kurdish identity back; this is all I expect from the municipality."

During field visits to Diyarbakır between 2007 and 2011, I increasingly heard two comments from those I interviewed: "We want our own Kurdishness"; and "We want to live our own culture and speak our own language." Havin, who migrated to the city from a rural area to pursue a university education, was one such resident who wanted her "Kurdishness" back. But what may be most critical about her case, as well as those of many like her, is the rationale that has inspired her, in the absence of a Kurdish state, to "know" and "claim" she is a Kurd.[2]

***Muna Güvenç** is a Ph.D. Candidate in Architecture with a designated emphasis in Global Metropolitan Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.* *An earlier version of this article was awarded the Jeffrey Cook Best Student Paper prize at the 2010 IASTE conference.*



FIGURE 1. *Political map of Turkey. Based on http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/turkey_admin_2006.jpg.*

This article seeks to analyze the making and remaking of Kurdish national identity in the absence of a Kurdish nation-state. In the context of Diyarbakır, the largest Kurdish city in Turkey, it examines the political and social interaction between civil society and the succession of pro-Kurdish political parties in order to shed light on increasing Kurdish nationalism in Turkey.[3] With a population of more than 1.5 million, Diyarbakır is located near the headwaters of the Tigris River in southeast Turkey **(FIG. 1)**.[4] Records show that settlement on the site in ancient Mesopotamia extends back to 3500 BCE. Exhibiting multiple histories, the city came under Hurrian, Hititian, Assyrian and Urartian rule, before being incorporated within the territory of the Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman empires.[5] In the early twentieth century Diyarbakır was established as a province of the Republic of Turkey, and subsequently became a site of modern nation-state building based on processes of Turkification. Government actions included bans on the use of the Kurdish language, the changing of village and street names from Kurdish to Turkish, and the forced displacement of Kurds.

Following the 1965 census, the Turkish government outlawed the publication of information about ethnicity and language across the country. However, it is presently estimated that Kurds constitute a majority (90 percent) of the population in Diyarbakır.[6] Since 1984 and the beginning of armed conflict between the state of Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, Partiya Karkêran Kurdistan), the city has been a crucial site of contestation between pro-Kurdish parties and the Turkish state.[7] Beginning in the 1990s Diyarbakır also experienced intensive urbanization and consequent political mobilization, which has led to a concentrated discourse of Kurdish nationalism, making the city a center for the movement in Turkey.

This article tries to understand the ways nationalism and national belonging are articulated in the absence of a nation-state. Focusing on urban space, it argues that Kurdish nationalism is being built in Diyarbakır through the urban experience of collectivity in diverse socio-spatial and political encounters. Rather than through top-down interventions, this has involved everyday practices of residents that recall a traumatic past and imagine a common future.

MAKINGS OF NATIONAL ATTACHMENT VIA URBAN SPACE

The relationship between urban space and nation-building has been studied at length.[8] However, most prior research has focused on the construction of national identity and the invention of national tradition as a top-to-bottom practice in the presence and through the active intervention of nation-states. Much less work has been done on the creation of national identity in the absence of a nation-state.[9]

Recently, in the context of debates on the future of statehood, theorists have questioned state-centered models of political space as the basis for national identity and begun to develop new understandings of the politics of space.[10] One reason is that, while effective in examining the structure of the state and its institutions, state-centered understandings remain inadequate to explain diverse political mechanisms and reciprocal socio-political practices. In particular, they

fall short when it comes to explaining the everyday dimensions of political space.

Most critiques of state-centered theory are devoted to rejecting its tendency to treat the state as an "isolated unit of analysis" — an organic, fixed entity and a cohesive actor driving society. As such, they argue against views of state and society as freestanding objects or domains.[11] In understanding major political and social transformation, such scholarship has instead focused on the reciprocal relations between state and society. In general, it has offered "new theoretical directions" integrating the political practices of state and society, where "the line separating the state from society is not given, but can be redetermined in different political contexts."[12]

Similarly, in their analysis of political mobilization and social change, Cedric De Leon, Manali Desai and Cihan Tuğal have focused attention on the critical role played by political parties.[13] In their view, rather than "absorbing or rechanneling popular pressure," parties may help constitute social formations.[14] They theorized the process of "political articulation" as one by which party activities naturalize class, ethnic and racial formation as a basis for social division by integrating disparate interests and identities into coherent sociopolitical blocks.[15]

Inspired by these critiques of state-centered models, I argue that the construction of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey is not merely a civil-society project; nor does it depend solely on top-down political and ideological intervention. Rather, the very making of Kurdish nationalism lies in the "articulating" role of the pro-Kurdish political party, where the party cultivates and shapes a new sense of imagined Kurdish identity via urban practices.[16] Channeling the activity of NGOs, civil society, and political society, the pro-Kurdish party has brought the "constituents of the social" together and articulated social formations with a new Kurdish nationalist discourse.[17]

Following Lisa Wedeen and Rogers Brubaker, I also take the position that the nation, "as a practical category and as a contingent event," is something "whose significance lies in its ability to reproduce the vocabularies of imagined community and popular sovereignty."[18] With this in mind, I argue that Kurdish nationhood "as a political and cultural form" may be institutionalized in the streets of Diyarbakır.[19] It emerges in the everyday practices of city residents — in parks, protests, hunger strikes, marches, funeral gatherings, house meetings, and so on — as the pro-Kurdish party prompts the agenda and character of social discourse.

In the sections that follow I first examine the rise of pro-Kurdish parties and pro-Kurdish mayors who have played a pivotal role in constructing the pathway toward Kurdish nationalism and channeling the movement in Diyarbakır. I then examine the practices of pro-Kurdish party members, mayors, activists, NGOs, and civil society in the city. These have been aimed both at (de)nationalizing (from Turkishness) and (re) nationalizing (Kurdification) attributes of urban space.[20] From here I move to an examination of specific urban parks, installed between 2008 and 2010 by pro-Kurdish mayors, which produce narratives of collective pain and suffering, a traumatic past, and the imagined future of Kurdistan. In the final section, I examine these narratives as representatives of "nationness," as it is discussed and practiced among citizens in the everyday life of Diyarbakır.[21]

TOWARD A POLITICS OF KURDISH NATIONALISM IN TURKEY

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey began a process of modern nation-state building through the invention of "Turkish identity" and practices aimed at homogenizing the population. While the assimilation and integration of some other Balkan and Caucasian ethnic minorities was settled smoothly, attempts to assimilate the Kurds encountered continuing resistance. In fact, between 1923 and 1980, around twenty organized revolts by Kurds against the state took place, all of which were quickly suppressed, with the exception of the longest, in 1938 in the Dersim area, which lasted seven months.[22] In the first 23 years of the Turkish Republic, state elites paid specific attention to the issuance and endorsement of reports calling for the absolute rejection of a distinct Kurdish identity.[23] Among the strategies that emerged to enforce these were the dislocation of the Kurdish population, increased efforts to force assimilation (i.e., changing village and street names from Kurdish into Turkish), and bans on the use of the Kurdish language.[24]

Beginning in the early 1980s, the rise of a regional Kurdish national movement along with armed conflict between the PKK and the state placed the "Kurdish question" at the center of Turkish politics.[25] In subsequent years, during a period of continual low-intensity conflict, Kurdish-dominated eastern and southeastern Turkey suffered from extensive internal displacement and forced migration. Indeed, under the "State of Emergency" (1987–2002), around one million Kurds were evicted from their rural villages and forced to migrate.[26] By the 1990s, following a dramatic escalation of violence by armed militias and intracommunal tensions, many more Kurds were obliged to flee their homes, primarily to urban centers like Adana, Diyarbakır, Istanbul and Mersin, where they sought shelter in chaotic urban shantytowns. Further, urban residence in itself, while making Kurdishness more visible, marginalized and politicized Kurdish society, leading to new political landscapes not only in the southeast region, but across the country.

The 1990s also marked a historical turning point in the development of the Kurdish nationalist movement. In June 1990 the first legally recognized Kurdish political party in Turkey, the People's Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP), explicitly committed itself to the advancement of Kurdish rights.[27] It was represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey with 22 deputies. After changing its name to the Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DEP), however, it was

closed by the Turkish constitutional court in 1993, and thirteen of its deputies were imprisoned. But in the years that followed, as each successive Kurdish party was outlawed by the Turkish constitutional court, a new party would succeed it. Thus, right after the closure of the Democracy Party in 1993, the People's Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi HADEP) was founded in 1994. It was closed by the court in 2003, but in the interim the Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP) had been founded in 1997. This was subsequently replaced by the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) in 2005. And when the DTP was closed by the court in 2009, party officials immediately founded the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), the current pro-Kurdish political party.

Diyarbakır, the central city for Kurdish politics, was also dramatically transformed in the 1990s, as large numbers of internally displaced people migrated there in a very short period of time. Diyarbakır experienced rapid urbanization and sociopolitical polarization, as Kurdish society was socially and politically marginalized and institutionalized. However, the formation of political parties and the electoral participation of pro-Kurdish voters provided a critical new institutional base for the development of Kurdish movement. As Nicole Watts has noted, it transformed the conflict from rural to urban, and "expanded the realm of Kurdish movement into mainstream political arenas."[28]

Elaborating on the relationship between political parties and social life, De Leon, Desai and Tuğal have argued that political parties do not merely reflect social divisions; rather, they actively construct them. Indeed, parties "are often central to the constitution of the social because they give a specific logic to the reproduction of social formations."[29] Moreover, "without this or a substituting articulating logic, constitutions of the 'social,' the heterogeneous terrain of social relations, do not necessarily hold together."[30]

In keeping with this analysis, since the late 1990s, pro-Kurdish party mayors in the cities of southeastern Turkey have played a major role in strengthening the discourse of Kurdish nationalism, uplifting the grassroots and channeling the political agenda of the Kurdish movement. They have established a vast network between different civil-society organizations (i.e., human rights organizations and various NGOs), and linked civil society to the political sphere through parliamentary and extra-parliamentary practices. For the most part, since 1999, when the pro-Kurdish parties began to take over local municipalities, they have played a pivotal role in setting the new Kurdish nationalist vocabulary and founding a diverse Kurdish identity discourse.

The critical urban practices of the pro-Kurdish mayors have thus created new opportunities to establish the agenda of Kurdish nationalism, not only in the closed rooms of politics, but in the streets of Diyarbakır. Since their arrival, Diyarbakır has been marked by the dominance of its Kurdish activist population, the strength of the pro-Kurdish parties, and widely publicized Kurdish nationalist aspirations.

THE GROUND OF URBAN POLITICS IN DIYARBAKIR

On September 20, 2010, thousands of Kurds marched from Cegerxwin Cultural Center to Koşuyolu Park in Diyarbakır to show their support for a school boycott campaign. The campaign, seeking to restore education in the Kurdish language, was organized by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in collaboration with civil-society organizations such as TZP Kurdi (the Movement for Kurdish Language and Education). The campaign called on Kurdish-speaking citizens of Turkey's southeast region to hold their children out of school between September 20 and 25 (the first week of the school year). A week before the march, posters were placed on billboards by municipalities in Diyarbakır arguing for the right to education in these students' mother tongue (Kurdish). The official state reaction didn't arrive until later, but on September 16 the Diyarbakır court ordered the removal of the posters in the city. According to the court: "It has been decided that the statements in the banners are similar to the discourse of the PKK's supportive base, its sympathizers, and it is like a call for society to digest, accept and apply the organization's beliefs and thoughts."[31]

The protest against the state and the state's response, the court's order to remove the posters, is just one case among many showing the contentious relation between the Turkish state and Diyarbakır's pro-Kurdish mayors and party officials. In the case of Diyarbakır, spatial and temporal power over urban space has emerged as a critical feature of inclusion and exclusion practices. This is not only true with regard to the central power of the Turkish state, but also of the actions of multiple state agencies toward each other. Hence, as Henri Lefebvre has explained:

> *. . . each new form of state, each new form of political power, introduces its own particular way of portioning space, its own particular administrative classification of discourses about space and about things and people in space. Each such form commands space, as it were, to serve its purposes.*[32]

For pro-Kurdish municipalities, therefore, urban space is a key aspect in articulating Kurdish identity, conditioning freedom, and producing counter-narratives to those of the Turkish state. However, both municipalities and NGOs have encountered many obstacles to such practices, created by the state-appointed governorship and the military. These agents of the national state often intervene by banning organizations, militarizing land, and prohibiting citizens from using specific urban sites.[33] While an examination of these obstacles is important in cutting across boundaries between state and society, I have had to limit my scope of analysis here to understanding the practices of Kurdish nationalism in Diyarbakır.

Despite these barriers, the critical role of urban space in Diyarbakır is clear. As acted upon by pro-Kurdish mayors, it does not merely work to express power; it also constitutes the

grounds of social uprising, mobilization, and, more particularly, the makings of national attachments, as a main site of contestation and meaning-production for Kurdish identity.

(DE)NATIONALIZING THE CITY: BUILDING THE FRONTIER

During the early Republican period, Turkey, like many new nation-states and postcolonial governments, adopted modern architecture and urbanism as a form of expression. National independence meant embracing an image tied to "progressive" political ideals. By the mid-1930s, as elsewhere in Europe, in Turkey this initial embrace of modernity was replaced by a heavy emphasis on "nationalism," and thus by a subsequent rise of Turkification and its influence on architecture.[34] However, the development of such homogenizing practices of Turkification was also tied to political circumstances of Europe in the late 1930s. The development of such homogenizing practices of Turkification was also tied to an increasing number of revolts by Kurds in the southeast of the country. The result was a shift from "modern" to "national" architecture.

The rise of nationalism was further evident in the proliferation of images and emblems of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Turkish Republic. Beginning in the late 1930s and early 1940s (and particularly after his death in 1938), monuments, busts, and equestrian statues of Atatürk, along with plates inscribed with his epithets, appeared widely in the cities of Turkey. In addition to the new monuments, it also became common during this "nationalist climate" to rename streets and boulevards as Atatürk, Gazi [Veteran], or Cumhuriyet [Republic].[35] These architectural and urban practices, whose effect is still apparent, extended to Diyarbakır. However, unlike other cities in Turkey, statues of Atatürk are no longer common in Diyarbakır today, nor will one encounter many of his slogans endorsing Turkish nationalism. One reason is the activism of pro-Kurdish party officials and mayors, who have sought to transform urban space as a means of constructing Kurdish identity. This first necessitated erasing Turkish nationalist elements from urban space, a process I call (de)nationalizing the city. Only then could the (re)nationalization of the city begin.[36]

The removal of Turkish nationalist symbols from urban space has not always gone smoothly, as conflicts have arisen between the mayors, the state-appointed governor, and state laws. Frequently, the pro-Kurdish party and local mayors have been exposed to juridical and bureaucratic pressure.[37] At times, administrators from the pro-Kurdish parties and Kurdish activists have been taken to court, fined, and even jailed for their actions. However, between 1999 and 2011, pro-Kurdish mayors continuously and purposefully employed urban space to promote practices of "Kurdification." Particularly in 2004, following implementation of the new "Local Administrations Law," pro-Kurdish municipalities, as well as other

FIGURE 2. Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene *[How Happy Is the One Who Can Say He Is a Turk]. The sign proclaiming this slogan of Atatürk in Diyarbakır is veiled by a large ornamental tree. Photo by author, July 2009.*

municipalities in Turkey, gained increased access to resources they needed to intervene in the public realm.

As a result, in Diyarbakır today the only public proclamation of one of the most well-known of Atatürk's sayings, "Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene" ["How Happy Is the One Who Can Say He Is a Turk"], is veiled by a large ornamental tree **(FIG. 2)**. Beginning in the 1990s, the city's streets, boulevards, and urban parks instead began to bear the names of well-known pro-Kurdish authors, poets, activists and politicians. Among the most prominent examples are Musa Anter Boulevard (Musa Anter was a Kurdish activist killed in Diyarbakır in 1992); Ahmet Arif Boulevard (Ahmet Arif was a famous Kurdish poet); and Ayşe Şan Park (Ayşe Şan, a renowned Kurdish singer, died in 1996). Furthermore, some social mechanisms (e.g., festivals, funerals and prayers) have been critical tools for the removal of state authority from the city. While reappropriating the use of urban space, such practices have also blunted the application of counter-narratives by the Turkish state.

A particularly important instance of the latter occurred on April 15, 2011, when, instead of going to mosques, some 2,000 Kurdish Muslims attended Friday prayer in Dağkapı Square as a way to protest the state's mandate to use Turkish during sermons **(FIG. 3)**. The protest, referred to as Civil Friday Prayer, was organized by the pro-Kurdish party (BDP) and by civil-society organizations as an act of civil disobedience.[38]

The choice of Dağkapı Square was spectacular. Located at the entrance to the city's historical quarters and market, the square had been remade in 1931 after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. At that time, the governor of Diyarbakır had decided to demolish a section of the city's surrounding wall because "the city could not breathe."[39] Subsequently, like many other public spaces in Turkey, Dağkapı Square came to be adorned with a clock tower and a statue of Atatürk **(FIG. 4)**. Installed on the western side of square, the statue depicts Atatürk holding children under his arms. It

FIGURE 3. *Aerial view of Dağkapı Square. Source: Google Maps.*

FIGURE 4. *Clock tower and sculpture of Atatürk at Dağkapı Square. Photo by author, March 2011.*

has since attracted considerable attention and criticism from Kurdish residents of the city. Indeed, in January 2011 it was burned by protesters, only to be immediately replaced. And in April 2011, during a protest for imprisoned pro-Kurdish politicians and activists, the face of Atatürk was covered with the poster of Abdullah Öcalan, founder of the PKK, who has been in jail since 1999.

The statue is not the only prominent representation of Atatürk on display in the square. At one end, a massive mural painted on the side of an eleven-story building shows Atatürk in military apparel. An inscription below reads: "Those from Diyarbakır, Van, Erzurum, Istanbul, Thrace, and Macedonia are the children of the same race, the veins of the same one" (FIG.5). And at the other end, a picture of Atatürk surveys the square from atop the citadel, with a Turkish flag to its right (FIG.6). All three of these monumental emblems stand as powerful reminders of a Turkish nation-state imbued by Kemalist doctrine.

On April 15, as the crowd was gathering in the square for the Civil Friday Prayer, however, a municipal officer standing at the back voiced to me the notion that Kurdish historical figures might someday also be represented in the city.[40] "We are planning to install the sculpture of Sheik Said right in the middle of this square, and there is another project for Salahaddin Ayyubi, pride of our nation," he said.[41] Shortly after the sit-in in front of the Atatürk statue, the Civil Friday Prayer then began, under tight police surveillance. Demanding cultural freedom and the right to use the mother tongue, the entire sermon was conducted in Kurdish (FIG.7). Transforming Dağkapı Square into an arena of prayer, the event not only provided a religious challenge to the Kemalist secular nation-state, but it was also an act of eradicating state power. In defiance of state emblems (the statue and images of Atatürk and the police ringing the square), the protest proclaimed the existence of Kurdish identity. Furthermore, it enacted a "civil" form of national solidarity, in which the crowd was united in opposition to the state.

I will now turn to an examination of how the pro-Kurdish BDP Party (successor of the DTP) has utilized urban parks

FIGURE 5. *Mural of Atatürk in military apparel. Photo by author, March 2011.*

FIGURE 6. *The image of Atatürk, installed atop the citadel, with a Turkish flag to its right, surveys Dağkapı Square. Photo by author, March 2011.*

to represent Kurdish identity and facilitate free speech. In the everyday life of Diyarbakır, urban parks are sites of political debate, where issues of identity, the "Kurdish question," and culture can be negotiated. They provide the occasion for a broad range of discursive construction and interaction among Kurdish citizens. In urban parks, residents exchange opinions, argue about recent developments in the country, criticize politicians, and discuss questions such as "what shall the pro-Kurdish party or the central government do?"

Today there are more than two hundred urban parks in Diyarbakır, ranging in size from 1,500 to 60,000 square meters. More than 80 percent of these have been opened since the election of pro-Kurdish mayors in the city. For instance, the Kayapınar municipality, which was only established in 2004,

FIGURE 7. *Crowds conducting Civil Friday Prayer at Dağkapı Square. In the background are the clock tower and the picture of Atatürk atop the citadel. Photo by author, April 2011.*

opened 43 parks between 2004 and May 2010 alone.[42] Today, urban parks are one of the central nodes for everyday politics in the city. They are where elected pro-Kurdish mayors politicize and construct a "new" imagined Kurdish identity. Associated with particular uses — such as gathering before and after marches, protesting state actions, commemorating past Kurdish rebellions and activists, and organizing public sermons and festivals (i.e., "Newroz") — they have become a key ingredient in the manufacture of a new Kurdish tradition and the making and remaking of Kurdishness.

MAKING KURDISH NATIONAL ATTACHMENTS VIA URBAN PARKS

Traumatizing the Past. The first park I will discuss, Koşuyolu Park, has been a center for hunger strikes, proclamations, anti-state marches, and funeral demonstrations (FIG. 8). It is located in the Bağlar district in Diyarbakır, where many people who have been forced to migrate to the city reside. The foundation of the park was laid in 1996, and it was completed in 1999 by the pro-Kurdish municipality. Since then, Koşuyolu Park has been a destination point for almost all the marches in the city opposing state agendas. These marches, organized collectively by party officials and civil-society organizations, generally begin in front of the party building, with the gathering of a crowd, continue through the streets of Bağlar, where Diyarbakır's prison is located, and end at Koşuyolu Park. Such events are usually accompanied by a press release from party officials which emphasizes a vocabulary of "Kurdish rights" and the "diversity of Kurdish culture and nation."

Koşuyolu Park is also distinctive because it seeks to memorialize state oppression and violence through monuments that recall an array of historical events. In this way it allows the pro-Kurdish party to prominently "interpellate" the subject of the oppressed Kurd.[43] Building on Louis Althusser's concept, De Leon, Desai and Tuğal have defined "interpellation" as "a process of imaginary identification with a cause (and parties, institutions, and leaders associated with that cause), which gives coherence and unity to the multifaceted and potentially contradictory or politically meaningless life histories and experiences of individuals."[44] First, in 2002, in an act which sought to strengthen the discourse of Kurdish rights, the pro-Kurdish municipality erected a "Human Rights Monument" in the park, presenting the articles of a "Human Right Declaration" on an ornamented tablet (FIG. 9). Then in 2008 another memorial, the "Right to Life" (Yaşam Hakkı), was installed by the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality. On September 12, the dedication of this memorial was accompanied by a large public ceremony, which included the participation of children, activists, and pro-Kurdish party members.

FIGURE 8. *Aerial view of Koşuyolu Park. Source: Google Maps.*

FIGURE 9. *"Human Rights Declaration" depicted on a tablet, at Koşuyolu Park. Photo by author, July 2009.*

"Right to Life" commemorates seven children (out of eleven total people) killed when a bomb exploded along the wall of Koşuyolu Park on September 12, 2006.[45] During city council meetings right after the blast, the memorial was given its name by Osman Baydemir, mayor of Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality. Located at the entrance to the park, "Right to Life" comprises three separate artworks: a cast-metal sculpture and two wall panels facing each other (FIG. 10).

One of the wall panels features sculptures in relief of the wounded heads of people killed by the blast. Scattered over the surface of the panel, the heads frame the handwritten names of the children, carved as if on the pages of a book. Beneath, two white pigeons represent "the hope for the peace," according to Fırat Erdoğan, sculptor of the wall panels (FIG. 11).[46]

FIGURE 10. *The "Right to Life" monument. At left, the cast metal sculpture; at right, the wall panel depicting victims of the bomb blast. Photo by author, July 2009.*

FIGURE 11. *The wall panel depicting victims of the bomb blast. Photo by author, July 2009.*

FIGURE 12. *Second wall panel of the "Right to life." Photo by author, July 2009.*

According to Erdoğan, the opposing wall features an eye, "crying for the Kurdish society," carved "over integrated Kurds performing a traditional dance" (FIG. 12). This panel thus does not simply narrate pain and hope, but represents the united Kurdish nation in solidarity. The upper portion of the panel bears a sun, representing "hope and peace for the future." "I added the figure of the sun because I didn't want to end this memorial solely with the representations of pain," Erdoğan said. "Hence, the sun is also an important symbol for the Kurdish culture."

The cast-metal sculpture between the two panels depicts "the dead body of a mother in pain trying to reach eternity and free her children from torture," according to the artist Genco Cebe, who produced it, and who was living across the park when the bomb exploded (REFER TO FIG.10).[47] This is the representation of the "frozen moments of violence," he said. "I couldn't stop myself designing the first draft of this memorial when I saw the mother, whose legs were ruptured by the blast, creeping on the ground and looking for her children."

"Right to Life" was installed at the very place where the bomb blast occurred. As such, it represents an explicit narrative of death and has become a powerful acknowledgment of the perpetuation of oppression and violence against Kurds. Mehmet Demir, a father of four children who died in the blast, said in an interview: "I die five times, each time I pass in the front of the park."[48] While building a discourse of Kurdish identity among citizens of the Diyarbakır through an imagined "future of hope and peace," "Right to Life" thus also embodies a critical memory that helps establish the sense of a (collective) traumatic history.

Bringing the Culture Back In. Etienne Balibar has remarked that "a social formation only reproduces itself as a nation to the extent that [it can operate]. . . through a network of apparatuses and daily practices."[49] In fact, national attachments of Kurdishness are made and remade in the city through everyday practices, facilitated by a network of activists, citizens, and pro-Kurdish party officials. These practices attempt to reestablish old traditions of Kurdishness with an emphasis on diversity and oppression.

Ayşe Şan Park, located between the Kayapınar and Bağlar districts in Diyarbakır, is an example of how such a sense of Kurdish culture may be represented in urban space (FIG.13). The park covers 7,500 square meters and includes a free-speech square and a café, along with walking paths, children's play areas, ornamental pools, waterfalls, and a maze of plants.

FIGURE 13. *Aerial view of Ayşe Şan Park. Source: Google Maps.*

FIGURE 14. *A black-and-white photo of Ayşe Şan, installed on the roof of a cafe in the park. Photo by author, July 2009.*

However, the park's primary symbolic importance lies in its recognition of the Kurdish language via the commemoration of the *dengbej* singer Ayşe Şan, who died on December 18, 1996. Events organized within the park also aim to honor the *dengbej* culture via Ayşe Şan. In Kurdish culture, *dengbej* meetings, at which local artists and poets sing about such concepts as love, aspiration, nationalism and war, are a way of producing and transforming oral history. Yet, as memorialized in the park, the figure of Ayşe Şan is represented not just as a *dengbej* singer, but as a symbol of Kurdish activism and resistance, challenging the oppressed subject of Kurdish identity. With a black-and-white portrait of Ayşe Şan installed on the roof of its café narrating Kurdish culture, the park thus invokes a discourse of Kurdish nationalism (FIG.14).

The park was opened on December 18, 2008, the twelfth anniversary of Ayşe Şan's death. Hundreds of people attended, including local mayors, Kurdish activists, and representatives of civil-society organizations. The event was thus typical of the practice by which the pro-Kurdish party brings members of NGOs and civil-society organizations together in different contexts to mold a sense of popular "grievance."[50] Hence, the opening of the park was also publicized months in advance, allowing merchants, coffeehouse workers, and common citizens in the streets to talk through the summer of 2008 about Ayşe Şan, her songs, and her life.

Before the opening ceremony, on December 16, 2008, an introductory meeting for the commemoration of Ayşe Şan events was staged at the Burhan Karadeniz Cinema by a joint organization of the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality and the Mesopotamian Cultural Center (MKM). Participants included Mayor Osman Baydemir, DTP Diyarbakır Provincial Chairman Nejdet Atalay, and Bağlar Mayor Yurdusev Özsökmenler. A group of Kurdish women activists and artists also spoke about Ayşe Şan's Kurdish identity, her exile, and her symbolic role in the Kurdish movement. In one speech, the Kurd-

ish artist Silan Dora described Ayşe Şan as follows: "Ayşe Şan is revolutionary. She is the voice and the heart of the people whose language is banned." Mayor Osman Baydemir noted:

> *Ayşe Şan, with her identity as a woman, represents the resistance to exist. She suffered greatly. In her residences in Istanbul, Germany, Baghdad, Hawler [Erbil] and Izmir, she amassed her agony. There was no doubt that, one day that exile would come to the end. Today is that day.*[51]

Throughout the speeches, the figure of Ayşe Şan was presented as embedded in a discourse of oppression and Kurdish identity, a symbol of Kurdish suffering. During another panel, organized by the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, the Bağlar municipality, and the Mesopotamia Culture Center (Mezopotamya Kültür Merkezi), one speaker, the author Zeynep Yas, said, "Ayşe Şan is smashed into bits like the territory of Kurds."

It is important to note that Ayşe Şan Park, like many other parks in Diyarbakır, is not only visited by BDP supporters, but by Kurds who are not affiliated with the party. Indeed, the park prominently embraces all visitors with its "Kurdish" environment. This is how one person I interviewed there, who identify himself "as an apolitical, pious persona" unaffiliated with the party, expressed his interaction with urban Kurdish identity in the park:

> *I come to Ayşe Şan on a regular basis, almost every night. Sometimes we come here with my sisters in-law and brothers. We love it here because we listen to Kurdish music, sit in a traditional way on mattresses and divans. Ayşe Şan is ours! I like it here because this place reminds me I am Kurdish.*[52]

Through such urban practices the articulating logic of the pro-Kurdish party succeeds in bringing different segments of society together. In fact, the "Kurdish culture" injected into the park by the pro-Kurdish party is a critical factor in bringing a pious person and a BDP supporter together.

Imagining the Kurdish Nation. Medya Park, located in Kayapınar (Peyas), Diyarbakır, is another park which has highlighted the politically contentious subject of Kurdishness (FIG. 15). Constructed by the Kayapınar municipality, it created immediate conflict between the municipality and the state-appointed governorship because of the shape of its ornamental pool, designed to resemble an imagined map of Kurdistan (FIG. 16). In fact, during construction, the governorship of Diyarbakır forbid the park from being opened, and filed suit against the Kayapınar municipality for promoting seperatist ideals. After settling several lawsuits and distorting the shape of the pool, the park was finally opened on June 5, 2007, with an event attended by many pro-Kurdish members of parliament, party officials, and representatives of civil-society organizations. Once again, the opening speeches were heavily publicized and built on ideas of Kurdish identity and freedom. Furthermore, even though the shape of the pool was changed, residents of Diyarbakır still refer to it as having the shape of a map of Kurdistan, an indication of its continued symbolism.[53]

FIGURE 15. *Aerial view of Medya Park. At right, ornamental pool in the distorted shape of imagined map of Kurdistan. Source: Google Maps.*

However, what has made Medya Park most distinctive is not the shape of its pool, but the connotation of its name. The Medes, an ancient horde alive during the sixth century BCE, were the possible ancestors of present-day Kurds.[54] Thus, for some, the name "Media" ("Medya" in Turkish) seems also to connote the territory of the Medes, therefore the territory of the Kurds.

In fact, the Medes are already present in contemporary accounts of Kurdish history, especially political ones. Recently in Diyarbakır, ground has been broken for a one-hundred-acre entertainment center named "Medland." Plans call for it to be completed by mid-2012 and for it to include recreational

FIGURE 16. *The ornamental pool at Medya Park. Photo by author, April 2011.*

FIGURE 17. *Nameplate for the park reads: "The Municipality of Kayapinar . . . Park." Note: The name "Rosna" was given to this park on October 7, 2008, according to ruling 64 by the parliament of Kayapinar municipality. The name was rejected by ruling 7194 of Diyarbakır governorship on October 19, 2008. Photo by author, April 2011.*

areas and sport facilities as well as a lunapark representing diverse Kurdish symbols. Another example is that of MED TV, the name of the unofficial television station of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Broadcasting from Europe, it is well known for its views on an independent Kurdistan. The PKK anthem, sung by guerillas, also contains the words, "We are the sons of the Medes. . . . Our god is Kurdistan."[55] However, since the name "Medya" directly translates in Turkish as "media" (the means of mass communication), no other opposition or legal action was taken against the opening of the park other than that provided by the design of its ornamental pool.

Infusing Resistance. Giving parks Kurdish names and/or names that commemorate particular events in Kurdish history is another practice that has infused Kurdish resistance into urban space. In 2008 the Yenisehir, Bağlar, and Kayapınar municipalities attempted to give Kurdish names to several parks within their jurisdictions, including Beybun, Silan, Berfin, Rojda and Rosna parks. But since the use of the Kurdish language is banned in public, the names were rejected by the state-appointed governorship. In response, however, the municipalities developed a strategy of "unnamed parks," and installed blank nameplates at the entrances to each, with notes explaining the obstacles imposed on the use of Kurdish iconography. In fact, the blank nameplates themselves hold the Kurdish names in their explanatory texts **(FIG. 17)**. During an opening ceremony in December 2008, the mayor of Kayapınar municipality, Zulkuf Karatekin, highlighted the conflict between different government authorities that led to the rejection of the Kurdish names as follows: "While one [government authority] broadcasts a Kurdish channel on one of the state's television channels, another bans the use of Kurdish in public space. How democratic is it?"[56]

However, not all the rejected names for the parks were Kurdish; nor did state officials prohibit all the names proposed for the parks. For instance, the name "33 Bullets" was rejected because it made the state an object of accusation and antagonism.[57] However, another park was opened without opposition, even though it was named Ceylan Önkol, after a Kurdish girl who was killed by a mortar shell while grazing sheep in Lice, Diyarbakır province, in October 2009 **(FIG. 18)**.[58] Önkol's death drew considerable attention from the municipality, local media, and human rights organizations. An official investigation concluded that she had detonated an unexploded device left in the area at a previous time. But local groups and human rights organizations, blaming state officials, asserted that such a device had to be fired from somewhere, and therefore must have purposefully targeted her.[59] Accordingly, with the organized collaboration of the BDP and human rights organizations, thousands in Diyarbakır participated in marches protesting state military practices in southeastern Turkey. The campaign, which began in October 2009, emphasized the state's violation of the "right to live" and culminated in the opening of the park to honor Ceylan Önkol in June 2010.

As part of the opening ceremony, the Kayapınar mayor, Zulkuf Karatekin, sent a note from prison, where he was being detained for membership in the KCK (Koma Civaken Kurdistan), an umbrella organization which includes the militant Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).[60] It stated, "We are opening this park in honor of every child who has been killed by the state's violation of right to live." And after the opening speeches there was a sit-in at the park — not for Ceylan Önkol, but to protest the arrests of pro-Kurdish politicians. The opening ceremony for the park thus once again merged two different events — the death of Ceylan Önkol and the arrests of politicians — into the narratives of collective violence, death and "tyranny."

FIGURE 18. *The view of Ceylan Önkol Park in Kayapinar district, Diyarbakır. Photo by author, April 2011.*

"NATIONNESS" IN EVERYDAY PRACTICES OF THE CITY

In the urban parks discussed above — Koşuyolu, Medya, Ayşe Şan, Ceylan Önkol, and the unnamed parks — the narratives of past experiences and historical figures are immanently rendered into the present experience of Kurdish trauma and oppression.

However, it is crucial to understand how the making of Kurdish nationalism via urban parks is less a matter of the physical mass of the parks than the narratives embedded in them. As discussed by Brubaker, events associated with these parks enact a sense of "nationness" as a contingent event. This crystallizes and spreads through the everyday practices of citizens, and takes shape as "collective or individual action" that manifests a sense of community.[61] For instance, even though the municipality was forced to distort the shape of the ornamental pool in Medya Park, it is still referred to everyday in Diyarbakır as representing a "map of Kurdistan." It is further instilled with a memory of political contention between the mayor and the governor. And despite the fact that they were never officially recorded, people still use the proposed Kurdish names for the unnamed parks in everyday practice.[62] The blank nameplates thus continually remind citizens of the ban on the use of "their" language, Kurdish.

The emotional experience of these narratives is also not limited to the parks, their opening ceremonies, or the panels of public figures convened to discuss them. Rather, it merges with the everyday practices of the urban, during which the narratives are discussed, interrogated and appropriated by citizens. The significance of Ceylan Önkol, "violations of human rights" by the state, the ban on Kurdish names, and the bombing that killed the children at Koşuyolu Park, like so many other events, are reported in local newspapers, presented on billboards, and, more importantly, conveyed from one person to the next in the everyday life of Diyarbakır via sermons, panels, *dengbej* meetings, funerals, mourning gatherings, Friday prayers, and even street conversations. Each narrative, each memory of oppression, spreads through the everyday practices of individuals, sets the experiences of "nationness," and creates a sense of belonging in which citizens imagine themselves as a "political" community, regardless of knowing each other.[63]

An important instance of these processes occurred on September 28, 2010. On this anniversary of Ceylan Önkol's death, protest marches were held both in Diyarbakır and Istanbul, which were attended by thousands of citizens holding pictures of the dead girl and carrying banners which read, "State the murderer of Ceylan Önkol." However, thousands of those in attendance were there not just to remember Ceylan Önkol but to express a Kurdish "right to live." As one activist from Istanbul, Zeynep Tanbay, noted: "The massacres in which all other Kurdish children have lost their lives have to come to an end. We will pursue the perpetrators of these deaths. Ceylan's eyes are still looking at us."[64]

These words from a Kurdish activist from Istanbul, far from Önkol's hometown, suggest that discursive practices such as public protests and street converstations are critical to constructing national identity. In the words of Lisa Wedeen, they "produc[e] shared conditions," in which "a community of anonymous fellow citizens can imagine itself into existence."[65]

WHAT MAKES A KURD?

This article has attempted to analyze the making and remaking of Kurdish national identity in the absence of a Kurdish nation-state. Examining the case of Diyarbakır, I have argued that the articulation practices of the pro-Kurdish party are significant because they prompt the agenda and vocabulary of Kurdish nationalism. In this vein, I have looked at the urban practices of the pro-Kurdish party, which construct grievances, channel the work of NGOs and civil-society organizations, bring different segments of the "social" together, and give coherence to the Kurdish nationalist movement.

In this light, I have examined the processes first of (de) nationalizing (from Turkishness), and second of (re)nationalizing (Kurdification). And I argued that the pro-Kurdish party prominently "interpellates" the subject of the "oppressed Kurd," creating an important element with which to build Kurdish nationalist discourse.[66] I then focused on urban parks in Diyarbakır, installed by pro-Kurdish mayors, and their roles in "traumatizing the past," "bringing the culture back in," "infusing resistance," and "imagining the Kurdish nation." In each park, nationalist discourse is built through narratives of a traumatic past, the oppressed Kurd, and an imagined future, which are prominently appropriated into space and publicized in everyday practices among Kurdish citizens.

Further, I have suggested that the sense of Kurdish nationalism is not constructed via the physical mass of the urban parks themselves, but emerges from the narratives embedded in them. I examined these narratives as representing "nationness," and argued that nationhood "as a political and cultural form" is thus institutionalized through everyday life in the streets of Diyarbakır.[67] This happens among citizens, in their everyday practices — in parks, protests, prayers, hunger strikes, marches, funeral gatherings, house meetings, and so on — where the pro-Kurdish political party prompts the agenda and character of Kurdish nationalist discourse.

What makes a Kurd a Kurd, I suggest, is thus the everyday experience of urban space, which transforms citizens and enables them to practice as a community and reinvent their identity and culture. Rather than the distanced experiences of imposed egalitarian structures or solely top-down interventions, I suggest that everyday practices of urban space and the urban experience of collectivity within socio-spatial and political encounters engender a sense of national identity and nationalism.

REFERENCE NOTES

The initial research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the Al-Falah program at the Center For Middle Eastern Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. The author thanks Nezar AlSayyad, Ananya Roy, and David Moffat for their thought-provoking comments.

1. From a discussion with a group of university students at Dicle University, July 14, 2007.
2. In fact, the Kurdish people are probably the only community of more than 20 million people without their own nation-state; their present total population is estimated at between 20 and 30 million. See G. Chaliand, ed., *A People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan* (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1993).
3. As I discuss later, pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey have repeatedly been closed by constitutional court orders. However, as each party has been closed, another, with a new name, has been founded by party officials in its place. For practical purposes, then, I will use the phrase "pro-Kurdish party" interchangeably with the actual names of pro-Kurdish parties to refer to the succession of parties holding a pro-Kurdish identity.
4. Based on the 2010 census. According to the census, more than half of Diyarbakır's population lives in the city center.
5. E. Isli and S. Beysanoglu, *Diyarbakir Muze Sehir* (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlari, 1999).
6. See S. Mutlu, "Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.28 (1996), pp.517–41.
7. In Diyarbakır there are eighteen district municipalities (Bağlar, Bismil, Eğil, Lice, Kayapinar, Yenişehir, Sur, Ergani, Silvan, Çınar, Dicle, Dicle/Kaygısız Beldesi, Kocaköy, Özekli, Kulp, Ağaçlı Beldesi, Hani, Kuyular) and one central Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality. All have elected mayors from the pro-Kurdish BDP party. In addition, there is one governor, who is appointed by the state of Turkey. Thus, it is critical to note that, while pro-Kurdish mayors, NGOs, and civil-society organizations occupy one end of the political spectrum, a state-appointed governorship and a large military presence occupies the other. The diverse political practices that play out between these actors in the urban space of Diyarbakır reveals the city as a site of contestation.
8. See, for example, S. Bozdogan, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001); A. Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space, and Political Cultures in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2000); and L. Vale, *Architecture, Power, and National Identity* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2008 [1992]).
9. Furthermore, most of this work has relied on state-centered understandings, and has viewed states as the prime actors of social and urban transformation. In fact, state-centered literature, which emerged as a rejection of society-centered, pluralist, and class/capital theoretical accounts, has defined the state as an organization exercising "its autonomy in its own right and in pursuit of its own interests," where the political outcomes are strongly tied to state power. See L. Wedeen, *Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
10. For instance, in her work on Yemen, Lisa Wedeen demonstrated that experiences of national belonging and identity can be generated by everyday practices of collective vulnerability rather than by state institutions and their representations, or through industrialization. She argued that "national solidarities and identities are not necessarily formed through top-down interventions, because they are not made once and for all." More particularly, she remarked that "national identity is not given by, nor are people born with, national attachment; rather, it can be made and remade through different sets

of practices." See also J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (New York: Routledge, 1995); J. Ferguson and A. Gupta, "Spatializing States: Towards an Ethnography of Neo-liberal Governmentality," *American Ethnologist*, Vol.29 No.4 (2002), pp.981–1002; N. Brenner, *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Wedeen, *Peripheral Visions*.

11. See J. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); T. Mitchell "Society, Economy, and the State Effect," in G. Steinmetz, ed., *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp.76–97; and B. Jessop, *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

12. C. Tuğal, "The Urban Dynamism of Islamic Hegemony: Absorbing Squatter Creativity in Istanbul," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol.29 No.3, (2009), pp.423–37.

13. C. De Leon, M. Desai, and C. Tuğal, "Political Articulation: Parties and the Constitution of Cleavages in the United States, India, and Turkey," *Sociological Theory*, Vol.27 No.3 (2009), pp.193–216.

14. Ibid, p.194.

15. Ibid, p.195.

16. See reference note 3 above.

17. The terminology here derives from De Leon et al., "Political Articulation."

18. Wedeen, *Peripheral Visions*, pp.92–93; and R. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The first quote is from Brubaker, the second from Wedeen.

19. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p.16.

20. See Nicole Watts's presentation "Pro-Kurdish Mayors in As-If Democracy: Symbolic Politics in Diyarbakir," available at http://www.institutkurde.org/en/conferences/kurdish_studies_irbil_2006/?intervenant=Nicole%20F%20WATTS [accessed July 15, 2010].

21. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p.16

22. In addition to Dersim, another significant revolt was the Sheik Said revolt, which continued for four-and-a-half months. The length of the remaining revolts was between two days and two months. See I. Bozdağ, Kürt İsyanları (Truva Yayıncılık, 2004).

23. There were eleven publicly known investigation-research reports on the Kurdish issue between 1923 and the end of the single-party era in 1946. The term "assimilation" was used for the first time in 1935 in a report prepared by Umum Müfettişi Abidin Özmen. See M. Yegen, "The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.34 No.4 (1999), pp.555–68.

24. J. Jongerden, "Crafting Space, Making People: The Spatial Design of Nation in Modern Turkey," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, 2010, available at http://ejts.revues.org/ index4014.html [accessed July 10, 2010]. Also see K. Oktem, "Incorporating the Time and Space of the Ethnic 'Other': Nationalism and Space in Southeast Turkey in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol.10 No.4 (2004), pp.559–78.

25. It is critical to note that the PKK has been active since 1978, began its armed struggle in 1984, and still continues to have at least 5,000 members under arms. See A. Marcus, *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence* (New York: New York University Press, 2007).

26. The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCRI) has estimated the number of IDPs to be between 380,000 and 1 million. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has cited a figure of 2 million. The Turkish Human Rights Foundation (THRF), Human Rights Association (HRA), and Göç-Der have used estimates of between 3 and 4 million in their reports and declarations.

27. See M. Somer, "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.58 No.2 (2004), pp.245–53; and N. Watts, "Activists in Office: Pro-Kurdish Contentious Politics in Turkey," *Ethnopolitics*, Vol.5 No.2 (2006), pp.125–44.

28. N. Watts, "Re-Considering State-Society Dynamics in Turkey's Kurdish Southeast," *European Journal of Turkish Studies* (2009), available at http://ejts.revues.org/ index4014.html [accessed July 10, 2010].

29. De Leon et al., "Political Articulation," p.194.

30. Ibid.

31. "Turkish Court Orders Removal of School Boycott Posters," http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=local-court-orders-seizure-of-banners-calling-to-boycott-schools-2010-09-16 [accessed September 28, 2010].

32. H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p.281.

33. It is also important to note that, at the national level, the legislative body, military, government and political parties also practice their divergent positions within different alliances and divisions. For instance, while one part of the state, the government, appears to align itself with a project called the "Kurdish initiative," which promises Kurdish rights (i.e., allowing the use of Kurdish language in public spaces), another state institution — the legislative body — has sentenced Kurdish mayors for condoning the use of Kurdish language. This paradoxical condition of the municipality cuts across the set boundary between Kurdish society and the state of Turkey by both destabilizing and reconceptualizing state and society relations.

34. See Bozdogan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, pp.240–41.

35. The word *gazi* simply means "war veteran" in Turkish. In Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is commonly referred to as "Gazi."

36. N. Watts, "Pro-Kurdish Mayors."

37. See also N. Watts, *Activists in Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), pp.94–121.

38. This project of civil disobedience was launched by the BDP in collaboration with the Democratic Society Congress, an umbrella organization of Kurdish leaders and groups (Demokratik Toplum Kongresi) at the end of March 2011. It sought the immediate release of thousands of Kurdish politicians, the right to educate children in Kurdish, an end to military operations against the PKK, and the abolition of the 10 percent rule for parliamentary elections in Turkey, which has prevented pro-Kurdish parties from entering Parliament. In furtherance of the civil disobedience campaign, Kurdish activists in Diyarbakır, as well as several other cities, staged protests in front of government offices, occupied parks and roads, and erected tents where protesters could gather.

39. The present historical city was built inside defensive walls and bordered by the Tigris, with the Karacadag Mountains in the distance. The origins of the walls are unknown; however, it is assumed they were the work of the Hurris in the third century BCE. See S. Diken, *Sırrını Surlarına Fısıldayan Şehir: Diyarbakır* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002), pp.40–42,87–93. Also see S. Beysanoglu, *Diyarbakir Tarihi, Vol. III: Cumhuriyet Donemi, Diyarbakir* (Diyarbakır: Buyuksehir Belediyesi Yayinlari, 2001), pp.1035–37.

40. From a brief discussion with officers of the Diyarbakır Municipality before the prayer at Dağkapı Square on April 15, 2011.

41. Sheikh Said (1866–1925) was the leader of one of the most prominent Kurdish revolts during the Republican period. In September 1925 he and his followers were hung in Diyarbakır around Dağkapı Square. Salahaddin Ayyubi (1138–1193) was a famous Kurdish warrior and founder of the Islamic Ayyubid dynasty. His sultanate included Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, the Hejaz, and Yemen.

42. Http://www.Diyarbakirkayapinar.bel.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=44&Itemid=61 [accessed August 10, 2010].

43. De Leon et al., "Political Articulation," p.198.

44. Ibid.

45. It is important to note that, while state officials marked this as an act of terrorism, pro-Kurdish party and civil-society organizations claimed it to be an act of state-orchestrated violence. During the opening ceremony the mayor of the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, Osman Baydemir, noted, "We made this monument not for antagonism and revenge, but for commemorating the ones who are the youngest, most children and civil society." See his speech at http://www.haber7.com/haber/20080912/Diyarbakır-Yasam-Hakki-Aniti-acildi.php [accessed July 15, 2010].
46. Interview with Firat Erdoğan in Diyarbakır, April 18, 2011.
47. Interview with Genco Cebe in Diyarbakır, April 9, 2011.
48. Interview with Mehmet Demir, http://www.yuksekovahaber.com/haber/kosuyolu-magduru-konustu-37243.htm [accessed September 29, 2010].
49. E. Balibar, "The Nation Form: History and Ideology," in E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1991), p.93.
50. De Leon et al., "Political Articulation," p.194.
51. See http://www.ajansdogu.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=9641 [accessed September 21, 2010].
52. From an open-ended interview conducted with fifteen people in Ayşe Şan Park, July 2, 2009.
53. From a discussion with a group of merchants, July 1, 2009, in Diyarbakır, and from open-ended interviews with ten people in a coffee house in Diyarbakır, July 3, 2009.
54. See K. McKiernan, *The Kurds: A People in Search of Their Homeland* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006).
55. Ibid.
56. Http://www.Diyarbakırkayapinar.bel.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=298&Itemid=2 [accessed December 21, 2008].
57. Jongerden, "Crafting Space, Making People," p.14.
58. Http://www.Diyarbakırkayapinar.bel.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=362&Itemid=2 [accessed July 11, 2010].
59. Http://www.kurdish-info.eu/News-sid-Human-Rights-Association-Press-Statement-on-Ceylan-Onkol-13950.html [accessed July 10, 2010].
60. On December 24, 2009, more than eighty members of the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), mayors in Diyarbakır, human rights defenders, and members of NGOs were arrested across Turkey. They were detained for membership in the KCK (Koma Civaken Kurdistan), the umbrella organization that includes the militant Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
61. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p.19.
62. From a discussion with visitors of "Beybun Park" and "Şilan Park," June 29, 2009.
63. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991 [1983]).
64. Protest march for the death of Önkol, http://www.xebatkar.com/news_detail.php?id=4868 [accessed September 29, 2010].
65. See Wedeen, *Peripheral Visions*, p.101.
66. De Leon et al., "Political Articulation," pp.192–94.
67. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p.16.

Sister Cities: Corporate Destiny in the Metropolis Utopias of King Camp Gillette, Thea Von Harbou, and Fritz Lang

NATHANIEL ROBERT WALKER

By the start of the twentieth century, many cultural, political and economic critics were torn by a profound ambiguity regarding the growing power of industrialism. While they were dismayed by the traumatic consequences of "progress" on "traditional" social and economic networks, they were also inspired by the raw productivity of corporate industry. Eventually, many alleviated their internal tension by exercising a faith that a better world, even a perfect world, could result if the "factory model" were civilized and harnessed to the common good by ethical and efficient business practices, and then elevated to its rightful, indeed inevitable, supreme authority — empowering it to resolve any systemic conflicts by remaking society, especially urban society, in the harmoniously operated image of incorporated industry. Their visions of the corporate future are here characterized as part of an "anticipatory tradition" in which modernity is imagined as the predestined replacement of unjust, inefficient, and otherwise outmoded social and economic structures.

In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, speculation about the future of human society, and about the future of the buildings and cities that would provide a stage for that society, seems to have been issued everywhere, from all quarters. In addition to the usual cast of novelists, patent salesmen and politicians, prophetic visions were also crafted by titans of industry, clergymen and artists, and were offered to the public in forms as serious as revolutionary manifestoes and as frivolous as promotional trading cards packaged with margarine or humorous postcards from cities "in the future" (FIG.1). Indeed, such a copious amount of speculation was produced and consumed during this time that it became for a while the most popular form of literature in the United States.[1] Its impor-

Nathaniel Robert Walker *is a Ph.D. Candidate in the History of Art and Architecture Department at Brown University in Providence, RI.*

FIGURE 1. *Postcard, ca. 1909, revealing a view of future Boston.*

tance in Europe is attested to merely with the names of Jules Verne, H.G. Wells, and Albert Robida.

Perhaps thinking about the future and offering opinions regarding its emerging form — as if one could, with great concentration, just make out its basic outline through a dense but not wholly impenetrable curtain **(FIG. 2)** — was a natural coping response to the overwhelming waves of change that had swept through Paris, New York, Cairo, Tokyo, Istanbul, London, and countless other places over the proceeding century. Indeed, entire cities and landscapes had been born, remade and destroyed as industrial manufacturing and transport systems, new ways of building and tearing down, and many other technological phenomena developed at an unprecedented scale and with unheard-of speed — all under the diminishing influence of traditional authorities such as religion and the family.[2] Social, economic and political life was, in the language used by Anthony Giddens in his 1991 book *The Consequences of Modernity*, being "disembedded" from its previously local, human-scaled contexts.[3] This uprooting was often experienced as destabilizing, even violent.

Of course, fervent speculation about the trajectory of these "modernizing" processes was not only a potential source of comfort for those on the receiving end of these changes. "Making sense of it all" also serviced a need for rationalization among societies that were actively supporting the painful growth of industry at the expense of other people, particularly in the context of empire. Imagining and/or promising ideal future developments as compensation for the dislocating, destructive effects of industry placed those effects in the context of a larger narrative with a story arc culminating in a "happy" ending. In the United States, for example, the rise of industry both corresponded and coordinated with westward expansion and the subjugation of the


LE
VINGTIÈME
SIÈCLE
PREMIÈRE PARTIE
I
Trois lycéennes.
De quelques noms de baptême nouveaux.
En omnibus à 250 mètres au-dessus de la Seine.
Le mois de septembre 1952 touchait à sa fin. L'été avait été magnifique; le soleil, calmant ses ardeurs de messidor, dégageait maintenant ces tièdes et caressantes effluves des belles journées d'automne aux splendeurs dorées.
L'aéronef omnibus B, qui fait le service de la gare centrale des Tubes — boulevard Montmartre — au très aristocratique faubourg Saint-Germain-en-Laye, suivait, à l'altitude réglementaire de deux cent cinquante mètres, la ligne onduleuse des boulevards prolongés.

FIGURE 2. *A curtain is slowly drawn back to reveal a towering city of the future, much to the astonishment of a bourgeois, nineteenth-century gentleman in search of distant but attainable insight. From Albert Robida,* Le Vingtième Siècle [The Twentieth Century] *(Paris: 1883). Image used by permission of the Maison d'Ailleurs: Museum of Science-Fiction, Utopia, and Extraordinary Journeys; Yverdon-les-Bains, Switzerland.*

FIGURE 3. *"Morning of a New Day," Henry François Farny, 1907. Note the steam engine and the group of Native Americans, here separated by an uncrossable chasm. The Indians are traveling on horseback across the mountains in the dead of winter, with their children in tow, in the opposite direction of the train. Most likely, viewers are meant to understand that they are fleeing west, away from "civilization" and into the obscurity of the past. Permanent Art Collection, National Cowboy and Western Heritage Museum. Used by permission.*

"savage," who was often depicted in art and popular culture as momentarily frozen, "stupefied" by the sight of industrial technology, before turning to flee into the oblivion of history — where old, "traditional" ways of life belonged **(FIG. 3)**.[4] Such painful triumphs of "progress" were framed by many Americans, often with some sincere ambivalence, as tragic but inevitable incidents along the inexorable path of national destiny. Meanwhile, in Europe, as Jane M. Jacobs related in her 2004 essay "Tradition is (Not) Modern: Deterritorializing Globalization," a similarly hard and fast line was often drawn between the old, receding world of "tradition" and the contemporary or future ascendance of "modernity," in order to cast the favorable light of destiny upon "scientific" colonial powers and their role as enlightening agents in the otherwise dark, ignorant, backward world.[5]

But even while such binary dichotomies as old/new and traditional/progressive served as convenient tools for validating the suppression of "others," they exacerbated anxieties on the home front, where the rise of industry and its attendant imperative to remake whole landscapes was not proceeding in the clean, orderly fashion its imperial spokesmen may have suggested to Indian audiences. The incompatibility, real or imagined, of the "traditional" and the "modern," and the belief that the ultimate outcome of their collision was a foregone conclusion, left many "industrialized" people feeling that they had been left behind or were in imminent danger of being so.

DIVINATION METHODS

Unsurprisingly, the future that was imagined and predicted in the face of such complex and asymmetrical "progress" was celebrated by some as promising while lamented by others as apocalyptic. In both cases, however, these rhetorically tuned visions of tomorrow usually had a great deal in common, embedded in what I.F. Clarke identified as a "pattern of expectation."[6] Indeed, this pattern might be fairly described as an evolving "tradition of anticipation" — an example, perhaps, of what Nezar AlSayyad has called "traditions of the modern," which ironically defy the modernist binaries of old/new, traditional/modern, local/global by transmitting across cultural and national lines as adaptable but essentially coherent, collaboratively delineated, self-reinforcing structures of meaning — as deterritorialized traditions, but traditions nonetheless.[7] The transnational *fin-de-siècle* "modern tradition" of anticipation was marked by a surprisingly consistent body of recurring themes and tropes extrapolated from the rise of industry and its dependent and enabling technologies. These were conceived, quite naturally, as the imagined fulfillment in one way or another of every trend then understood, rightly or wrongly, as gaining momentum in the recent past and immediate present. In this important sense such extrapolation was not, of course, primarily "a static legacy of the past," but rather, as AlSayyad has also suggested of traditions generally, "a model for the dynamic reinterpretation of the present."[8] Furthermore, it was an alchemical formula for projecting one's agency into an uncertain future.

It should perhaps be no surprise that predictions about the high-tech future, whether positive or negative, were made



FIGURE 4. *"That great city of the future will be one enormous edifice." Illustration of the future New York City drawn by William Robinson Leigh, and published with Hudson Maxim's article of scientific prophecies, "Man's Machine-Made Millennium,"* Cosmopolitan Magazine*, November 1908.*

by the "rational," "methodical" means of extrapolation. The inventor, chemist, and would-be prophet Hudson Maxim provided an archetypical example of such sooth-saying science in a 1908 article "Man's Machine-Made Millennium," in which he argued that "No man is able to foretell the future except from his knowledge of the present. . . . Every atom in existence follows a course mathematically exact. . . . There is no haphazard in nature. . . . Our lives are part and parcel of the great cosmic procession." While he admitted that knowledge of the present was such that only imperfect understandings of its trajectory could be ascertained, he also declared "there is much we can predict with degree of assurance. It is safe to predict that man's advancement from now on will be vastly more rapid than it is has ever been before."[9] He defined this advance as scientific and technological, and predicted that the future would be a definitively urban one, in which farmers would abandon the countryside to gather in towns, and the individual towers of New York would be traded in for a single whirring, glowing edifice where all the benefits of science would be applied to engineer, with eugenic precision, a perfect society **(FIG. 4)**.[10]

For Maxim and for countless others, the future would be, for better or for worse, *more* technological and *more* industrial, characterized by the increasing expansion of the scientifically crafted factory model of production into the political, social, cultural, and even biological realms of human society. In the words of Howard Segal, this was not merely to "be a sheer proliferation of machines and structures but an increasing use of technology in establishing and maintaining an entire society."[11] And this, it was understood, would happen most powerfully and most visibly in cities, where buildings and public spaces were expected to transform into both the products of and sites for mass production, and where civil authorities were expected to grow increasingly dependent on that great doctrine of progress, Scientific Management. This would not only be bureaucratic practice, but also government policy, bearing particular weight on the "modern" means and ends of de-localized, centrally planned, and rigidly structured urban societies.

INDUSTRY AS THE SOLUTION TO INDUSTRIALISM

A number of the least optimistic assessors of the future made dire warnings of impending disaster and apocalypse, and then followed up by proposing helpful solutions. Often, and importantly, these solutions were designed to tap into the power of the same technological trends that had caused, or were expected to cause, all the trouble in the first place. One such constructively critical vision was created by King Camp Gillette, a man whose ideas and beliefs are largely forgotten to us now, even though his name was, and still is, among the most commonly recognized in the world **(FIG. 5)**. As his biographer Russell B. Adams Jr. related, Gillette was born in 1855 in small-town Wisconsin to an inventor father who lost everything in the Chicago Fire of 1871.[12] From that point onward, young Gillette was forced to look after himself, or so the legend goes, and endured a long series of ups and downs as a competent but not terribly successful inventor until 1895, when he had an epiphany while shaving. For many weeks he had been dwelling upon a bit of advice given him by a business mentor: the key to perpetual profits lay in inventing something that would be used for a short time and then thrown away, only to be replaced and used up again.[13] In a flash of genius, Gillette invented the disposable safety razor, and today his brand, which still bears his name, is worth more than $20 billion.[14]

But what many do not know is that this man, whose trademarked visage beamed out from packaging and ad-

FIGURE 5. *Portrait of King Camp Gillette. From K.C. Gillette,* World Corporation, *1910.*

vertisements as a veritable poster-child of industrial capitalism, was a hardcore political and cultural revolutionary. In 1894 he published a book entitled *The Human Drift* which outlined in detail his belief that the traditional structures of democracy were being slowly crushed by the tyrannical power of modern industry, and that the only way to prevent the calamity of a hostile corporate takeover on a national or global scale was to overthrow the existing world order and preemptively replace it with what he called a United Trust. This trust would be a single, all-powerful corporation that specialized in absolutely everything — the monopoly to end all monopolies. Its role would be to provide the whole population with meaningful employment and every necessity of life from the cradle to the grave. The trust's character and destiny would be controlled by its legions of employees, whose right to vote in company matters lay in their status as stockholders — this would be the new citizenship. Every company and government in the United States would be destroyed by this giant. All of their former employees and citizens would be folded into the corporate monolith's swelling ranks until nothing and nobody else was left. At last the wasteful, brutal competition of the capitalist era would be replaced by cooperation, and corporate industrialism would be guided to achieve its full potential as the compassionate but supremely powerful liberator of humanity: "United Intelligence, Material Equality."[15]

In Gillette's utopia the key word was "corporation" (**FIG. 6**). This was for good reason: to accommodate the massive manufacturing and distribution systems that industrialization had brought to bear since the Civil War, and to finance the enormous communications and transport systems that made them operable, American companies had been steadily growing in size and complexity, culminating in the rise of incorporation as the dominant mode of operating in the industrial economy, nationwide. As Alan Trachtenberg recounted in his book *The Incorporation of America*, what began as a way of partnering private companies with government money for public infrastructure projects eventually mutated into a system that empowered private capitalists to leverage vast amounts of resources with limited personal liability. This helped create regionally or nationally scaled companies with totally uninhibited appetites for growth. That growth was both horizontal, in the conquest of competing companies and the creation of new markets, and vertical, in the acquisition of raw materials and the elimination of middlemen.[16]



FIGURE 6. *An illustration revealing incorporation personified, even deified, as an athletic Herculean figure gazing at the globe in the palm of his hand. This is certainly no burdened Atlas. From K.C. Gillette,* World Corporation, *1910.*

For such organizations, size itself became an asset — a way of doing business — and steady expansion from the close of the Civil War to the eve of the 1929 crash led to a country in which two hundred corporations held nearly 60 percent of capital assets, including land, buildings and machinery.[17] "The system of corporate life," railroad executive Charles Francis Adams Jr. wrote in 1869, is "a new power, for which our language contains no name."[18]

For reformers such as Gillette, the awe inspired by these changes was naturally marked by a deep ambivalence concerning the destruction of countless livelihoods tied to smaller, localized networks of commerce. Yet it was not atypical that in 1894 Gillette turned to corporate industrialism itself for the solution to his grim forecast of national collapse. Many of those who criticized machines for bringing wretchedness to the processes of production, or who attacked corporations for failing to sufficiently care for their vast armies of laborers, argued that the problem lay not in the machines or the industrial processes per se, or even in the power of corporations, but rather in the clumsy, ham-fisted practices of immoral businessmen and incompetent managers. Henry George, a reformer whose 1877 book *Progress and Poverty* had sold two million copies by the start of the twentieth century, wrote in 1883 that the "greater employment of machinery" and "greater division of labor" resulted in "evils" for the working masses, "degrading men into the position of mere feeders of machines." But his proposals to alleviate these problems and restore the balance between laborers and their management were nonetheless tied to a commitment to maintain machines as a wholesome part of an ideal, reformed "corporate industrial world."[19] Such reform, it was argued, would not only be good for the workers but also for the capitalists. Frederick W. Taylor, the Pennsylvania foreman and originator of Scientific Management — the principles of which amounted to, in the words of Trachtenberg, "the absolute subordination of 'living labor' to the machine" — argued that his workers were the happiest of all workers, for factories run under his principles were the most efficient and rewarding, as everyone and everything was in its right place.[20]

Taylorism, along with the closely related concepts of Fordism, proved to be powerful tools in the imaginations of those who desired to reform the industrial corporate model without losing its power to generate wealth. These thinkers saw the megalithic strength of incorporation not as a force to be diminished or otherwise limited, but as an inspiration, as a potential ally that only needed to be civilized, to be transformed from a dictatorial tyrant into something that was at once both paternalistic and productive.[21] Furthermore, many of them believed that in the end the overwhelming strength of corporate power could not be successfully resisted — its ascendance was inevitable, so it could only be improved, and this only with great effort.

Gib Prettyman, in his 2001 article "Gilded Age Utopias of Incorporation," argued that many of the most passionate late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century advocates of reform understood incorporation as a crucial link between the present and the future, between imperfect existing commercial culture and utopian possibility. From Edward Bellamy to King Camp Gillette, from Laurence Gronlund to Charles Caryl, many thinkers held "joint stock companies, trusts, syndicates, or other versions of commercial incorporation at the center of their utopian imaginations."[22] They possessed a "vivid perception of incorporation's revolutionary power," and saw in it not only the mechanism for transformation but also the power for total and permanent transformation of the sort that would, for the first time, bring true unity to the world.[23]

Kenneth Roemer, in "Technology, Corporation, and Utopia: Gillette's Unity Regained," elucidated the at times perplexing, at times intuitive Victorian logic that the painful friction caused by modernity's intrusive and abusive relationship with traditional life could be best resolved by eliminating the latter as a step toward pacifying the former — removing the last vestiges of the inevitably doomed past to accelerate industry's final transition to something balanced and whole and less volatile.[24] The truth was inescapable, the conclusion predestined: as one of the enlightened future characters from Bellamy's influential 1888 utopian novel *Looking Backward, 2000–1887* explained to his Victorian audience: "Oppressive and intolerable as was the regime of the great consolidations of capital, even its victims, while they cursed it, were forced to admit the prodigious increase of efficiency which has been imparted to the national industries, the vast economies effected by concentration of managements and unity of organization."[25]

And so Gillette, feeling that the ascendancy of the corporate model in the economic, social and political spheres was as promising as it was inevitable and dangerous, sought to control and perfect it rather than fight or even mitigate it. As he wrote in 1910:

> *Corporations will continue to form, absorb, expand, and grow, and no power of man can prevent it. [They] are the actual builders of a cooperative system which is eliminating competition, and in a practical business way reaching results which socialists have vainly tried to attain through legislation and agitation for centuries. To complete the industrial evolution, and establish a system of equity, only requires . . . support of "World Corporation."*[26]

THE MODEL CITY AS MODEL FACTORY, AND VICE-VERSA

Gillette's vision of the future America under an all-powerful monopoly, published three times from 1894 to 1924 — and three times changing its name, from the United Trust to the World Corporation and finally to the People's Corporation — was an archetypical extrapolation of late-nineteenth-century



FIGURE 7. *The cover of Gillette's* World Corporation, *published by the New England News Company in 1910. The pyramid is used by Gillette as a symbol of the stable power of corporate hierarchy as social hierarchy.*

cultural, political and economic trends taken to their furthest extremes **(FIG.7)**. As his imaginary company expanded in all directions, every town and city would be completely abandoned; the entire population of North America would be, to use Gibbens's term again, "disembedded" and relocated to the United Trust's corporate headquarters in an enormous new city near Buffalo in upstate New York **(FIG.8)**. This mega-city, powered by Niagara Falls, would be called Metropolis — an old name, the etymology of which leads to the ancient Greek for "Mother City." There, the rational efficiency of industrial processes under Scientific Management, so potent in the factory, would be injected into every sphere of human life.

Because factories were made more efficient when machine parts were standardized and made interchangeable, the whole new world built by the United Trust would also have standard, interchangeable parts. As Gillette wrote in 1894:



FIGURE 8. *Gillette's illustration of population centers in the United States before and after the rise of the World Corporation and the establishment of its Central City of Metropolis near Buffalo, New York. From that new "Mother City," the great monopoly would exploit the continent for resources and recreation. From K.C. Gillette,* World Corporation, *1910.*

> *These four great materials, structural steel, fire-brick, glass, and tiling would constitute the most important industries on which the building of "Metropolis" would depend. . . . In "Metropolis" there would be upward of a hundred million rooms; and, of these rooms, hundreds of thousands would be exactly the same in dimensions.*[27]

An urban plan for the city published by Gillette in *The Human Drift* showed an unmitigated, gearbox-like orthogonal grid of pedestrian pathways punctuated by round apartment towers, and interspersed with schools, amusement buildings, and communal kitchens (FIG.9). These mass-produced, essentially prefabricated homes and civic structures would be entirely devoid of ornament save colored porcelain tile applied as a hygienic waterproof cladding. The buildings would be climate controlled, scaled to defy any existing design tradition outside the world of commercial highrises and mammoth factories, and hooked up to a vast underground world containing multiple levels for the citywide passage of energy, water, food, vehicles and pedestrians. These tidily hidden urban networks would serve, in perfect humming efficiency, the countless family apartments as well as the fountain-filled, skylit communal dining atriums that made up the core of each hive-like tower (FIG.10). In form and function, this city would be the ultimate industrial product — not merely a collection of "machines for living," but a factory for living.

Gillette dispersed his steel, glass, brick, and glazed-tile towers in a park-like landscape, where the fireproof buildings, constructed explicitly in line with emerging skyscraper technologies in New York and Chicago, were equally dispersed for air and light in a clearly egalitarian spirit (FIG.11).[28] It was an urban planning paradigm that offered the most obvious — and perhaps single-minded — solution to the slums and overcrowding that so plagued the noxious and congested industrial city. But, as such, its formal and functional genetic material would continue to crop up through much of the twentieth century, not least in Le Corbusier's famous Contemporary City scheme, proposed a little less than three decades later (FIG.12). It is worth noting that Le Corbusier's vision resonated with Gillette's for reasons that go considerably deeper than the fact they were both composed of a repetitive grid of high-tech, industrial-grade towers connected by mechanized transport systems. The Contemporary City also revealed a belief that corporate industry could be a suitable model for social life — segregated, as it was, according to rank in the capitalist hierarchy, like a giant office block or factory. It mirrored in its urban form "the inequalities in the realm of production."[29]

Additionally, the schemes of both Gillette and Le Corbusier imagined a flat plane that would define their city's respective sites (although Le Corbusier acknowledged the idealism of this feature), obscuring every contour and crevice in the land. Such monumental abstractions almost seem calculated to defy preindustrial building practices as much as possible for maximum visual effect, to hammer home these cities' status as utopias, as places that would have been



FIGURE 9. *Plan and elevation of Metropolis, revealing the design and layout of the city's endless residential quarters. The lettered buildings in the plan are A) schools; B) recreational facilities; and C) food storage and preparation centers. Gillette rather ingeniously arranged the structures so that every apartment building is centrally located in a set of three "necessary buildings," and each necessary building is centrally located to six apartment buildings. From K.C. Gillette,* The Human Drift, *1894.*



FIGURE 10. *Section of one of Metropolis' residential beehive towers, featuring apartment stacks, an inner skylit atrium courtyard, and a glass-covered communal dining hall with fountain. Also shown are the stratified layers of the urban platform that makes up the base of Metropolis — each level is reserved for, in descending order, C) pedestrian transport; B) mechanized transport; and A) sewage, water, hot and cold air, and electrical systems. From K.C. Gillette,* The Human Drift, *1894.*

impossible to imagine, let alone build, before the power of applied science shattered tradition and demanded a new way of living. Indeed, both Gillette's Metropolis and Le Corbusier's Contemporary City seemed bound to elucidate, even to honor, the technologies that were supposed to make them plausible and desirable. They were scaled so much in favor of industrial processes and machines that human bodies seem strangely out of place among their towering masses, and no natural form or process seems to leave its mark on their design or construction. As such, they reveal another old/new binary along the lines discussed by Jane M. Jacobs:



FIGURE 11. *Part of a Metropolis apartment tower in the "process of construction," designed and built "upon the general plan of modern office buildings." From K.C. Gillette,* The Human Drift, *1894.*



FIGURE 12. *A drawing of Le Corbusier's scheme for a "Contemporary City," as developed for the Plan Voisin of 1925. It reveals a grid of supersized glass-and-steel towers set in a perfectly flat, parklike landscape serviceable exclusively by mechanized transport. Image © 2011 Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York/ADAGP, Paris/FLC, used by permission.*

the "natural" vs. the "synthetic." And they call to mind the architectural visionary Hugh Ferriss's sublime 1929 paean to the scientific city of the future: "Building like crystals. Walls of translucent glass. . . . No Gothic branch; no acanthus leaf: no recollection of the plant world. A mineral kingdom. . . . Forms as cold as ice. . . ."[30]

To Gillette, such a world was the culmination of industrial corporate progress. It manifested the full power of Ford and Taylor and Carnegie finally tamed and then fully unleashed — a harmonized, pacified world remade by industry into an image of industry. Where once citizens enjoyed the *Rights of Man*, now stockholders would earn a return on their investment; where once a national Congress was made up of an electoral body that was at least diverse in interests and inclinations, now a corporate board of directors would sit united by corporate priorities and values. Indeed, the whole American map — the whole continental landscape — would be united.[31]

To kickstart his company, Gillette chartered it in Arizona and then leveraged some of his razor-blade fortune to offer Theodore Roosevelt a million-dollar advance to take the presidency of World Corporation. The offer was reported in the *New York Times* on September 25, 1910, and Roosevelt turned him down. Afterwards, Gillette's vision languished, even as his enormous fortune grew. His books never produced the legions of supporters for which he longed, and his Metropolis passed back into the obscurity from which it had hardly emerged.

METROPOLIS AS DYSTOPIA, REFORMED

Of course, not everyone believed that the march of industrial incorporation — inevitable or not — would lead to social harmony, to utopia. Indeed, a small minority of visionary reformers, such as William Morris, wanted to soften or scale back the influence of industry, even abolish it altogether.[32] A number of others believed corporate growth was indeed irresistible, but that it was naïve to believe paradise would be the result. Some offered satirical views of tomorrow in which technology and the power of industry were seen to shine with great promise only to sicken and collapse into a nightmare as the universal and non-negotiable failures of human nature intervened, and as the newfound power of machines and massive capital were used to exacerbate the darkest and most persistent problems of human society.

The mysterious author Compte Didier de Chousy, for example — whose true identity remains unknown to this day — published in 1883 a book entitled *Ignis*, which told the sordid and sensational tale of a group of capitalists who form a massive company to tap the heat at the earth's core, using it to power not only electric generators and steam-powered transport, but also to construct and operate an enormous mass-produced glass-and-steel city named Industria.[33] At the core



FIGURE 13. *An automaton mired in serfdom on a mechanized farm, servicing the city of Industria in the dystopian world of* Ignis. *This drawing was published when the novel was serialized in the journal* La Science Illustrée, *Vol.18, 1896, p.93. Courtesy of the Maison d'Ailleurs: Museum of Science-Fiction, Utopia, and Extraordinary Journeys; Yverdon-les-Bains, Switzerland.*

of the venture toils a robotic underclass designed to replace the African slaves who had proven too effective at resisting the company's abuse. These metal "atmophytes" are subject to grueling, serf-like labor in underground factories and farm fields, and eventually grow tired of their cruel overlords (FIG.13). Taking advantage of a weakness in the corporate leadership caused by a religious dispute, they rise up and destroy the city of Industria, shattering its crystal villas and razing its locomotive-shaped temple. The whole venture is consumed by the fire of its own making.

Deep anxieties about the failures of imperfect human beings and their imperfect creations virtually define pessimistic, satirical visions such as *Ignis*. They also stand them in stark opposition to schemes such as that of Gillette, who acknowledged the failure of the current system, yet insisted it could be reformed and redirected to produce an ideal society. Yet even the most critical of these future visions shared with Gillette's Metropolis a fatalistic assumption that tomorrow would be increasingly mechanized — that more and more realms of human experience would be recast in the mold

FIGURE 14. *The high-tech skyscraper city of* Metropolis *from the 1927 film by Thea von Harbou and Fritz Lang; pictured at the center is the tall headquarters of the corporate elite that run the city. Copyright F.W. Murnau Foundation/Transit Film, Stiftung Deutsche Kinemathek: Museum for Film and Television. Used by permission.*

of the factory, where efficiency was a code of conduct, and Scientific Management the law of the land. One such vision, which at first seems to share the pessimistic view of *Ignis* but ultimately aligned with the optimism of *The Human Drift*, was released to the public two years after the publication of Gillette's *The People's Corporation*. It also offered a Metropolis, a "Mother City," run by a corporate oligarchy and built to industrial specifications. Yet it suggested that the desired transformation of capital into a paternalistic caretaker could be a long time coming.

Ostensibly set in the year 2000, the 1926 German film *Metropolis*, written by Thea von Harbou and directed by her husband, Fritz Lang, took audiences to a dystopian world where a pampered corporate elite rules their urban empire from a huge tower powerfully evocative of centralized command-and-control **(FIG.14)**. The glowing city's thirsty power grid is serviced by a permanent underclass — a proletariat imprisoned in subterranean tenements and subjected to brutally exhausting and dangerous labor conditions, made all the worse by incompetent middle management **(FIG.15)**. In a scene powerfully reminiscent of reformer Henry George's claim in 1883 that mechanized labor "degraded men into the position of mere feeders of machines," the protagonist of the film — a young member of the corporate elite — witnesses a terrible accident in which a machine overheats and burns its attendants. The trauma of seeing this disaster induces in the hero a poetic vision of the machine as a temple to the pagan god Moloch, who consumes workers as fiery sacrifices. "She wanted living men for food," von Harbou wrote of the machine-city of Metropolis.[34]

Like Gillette's city of the future, and even Chousy's Industria, this Metropolis had enormous underground chambers for infrastructure and industrial services. Like Gillette's city, this Metropolis took the high-tech architectural trends of New York and Chicago and extrapolated them to bombastic proportions.[35] But unlike Gillette, Lang and von Harbou filled this future cityscape with a society haunted by the present. Instead of a unified utopia, this Metropolis was the stage

FIGURE 15. *The very tall but otherwise low-tech subterranean tenements inhabited by the laboring underclass of Harbou's* Metropolis*; the pedestrian scale and humble, seemingly organic building materials convey the "primitive" conditions of this neighborhood, casting it in sharp contrast with the motorcar- and aeroplane-filled canyons of the shining city above. Copyright F. W. Murnau Foundation/Transit Film, Stiftung Deutsche Kinemathek: Museum for Film and Television. Used by permission.*



FIGURE 16. *"A Vision of the Machine Age," drawn by Mstislav Dobuzhinsky (here M.V. Dobujinsky) and published with Edward Allen Jewel's essay "Machines, Machines! The Futurist's Cry,"* New York Times Sunday Magazine*, December 11, 1927.*

for a soap opera of luxurious excess and murderous ineptitude: an industrial morality tale. Its sublime, over-the-top grandeur was powerfully rendered by the Russian-Lithuanian expatriate artist M.V. Dobuzhinsky as a Piranesian conflation of a sacrificial temple on the scale of Teotihuacán with the industrial, the urban, and the Imperial Roman (FIG.16). His drawing was published with a December 11, 1927, *New York Times* piece entitled "'Machines, Machines!' The Futurist's Cry," in which the author, Edward Allen Jewell, specifically contrasted the dire notes of Lang's film with the swaggering, belligerent optimism of the Italian Futurist manifesto, and suggested "Out of the age of the machine may arise incalculable benefits, if also it may seem an age that threatens to exact a price."[36]

But at the end of *Metropolis*, von Harbou's narrative pulls out of its apocalyptic downward spiral to conclude in such a way that it falls more or less in line with the optimistic ideas of reformers like King Camp Gillette. The young protagonist of the film manages to drag the class-combatants of his factory town — all of whom, including its wealthy capitalist leaders, had been suffering as a result of poor management

FIGURE 17. *The film* Metropolis *reaches its climax, as capital and labor are reconciled thanks to the protagonist's ability and willingness to act as the "heart mediating between the brain and the hands." Copyright F. W. Murnau Foundation/Transit Film, Stiftung Deutsche Kinemathek: Museum for Film and Television. Used by permission.*

practices and senseless mob violence — to the portal of an ancient cathedral and there reconcile his shaken corporate peers to their put-upon workers (FIG.17). He becomes, as the film famously attests, "the heart mediating between the brain and the hands." This resolution was and remains characterized by many film and cultural critics, particularly on the political left, as kitsch, naïve, and insufficiently kind to the "brainless" underclass — and was even recanted later by Lang himself, who in 1965 said he had come to understand that "the problem" with industrial societies "is social, not moral."[37] But von Harbou's ending fell perfectly in line with many ideas that had long been circulating among those who wanted to purge the ills of industrial society not by destroying the power of capital, but by reforming its behavior — by paternalizing and leveraging the power of industrialism itself to make social progress without impeding material progress. This, according to Henry George in 1877, meant a reconciliation in industrial societies of "social law with moral law."[38] This meant kinder management, which for Taylor went hand in hand with more efficient management. Thus it meant, ultimately, the fulfillment, rather than the abolition or hindrance, of industrial, corporate evolution.

EVERYTHING IN ITS RIGHT PLACE

Such imagined corporate urban utopias of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, whether breathlessly exuberant as in the case of Gillette, skeptical as in the case of Chousy, or cautiously optimistic as in the case of Lang and von Harbou, were embedded in an anticipatory tradition which included

among its practitioners not only utopian novelists and filmmakers but also influential architects such as Le Corbusier, as well as world-famous global capitalists and reform-minded politicians and activists (FIG. 18). Its diverse but interrelated body of visions held in common many assumptions about the "inevitable" character of the social, economic and physical future, most clearly expressed by the industrial, high-technology city managed by a bureaucracy of authorities whose priorities and principles corresponded with the needs of mass production.

In *The Poverty of Historicism*, Karl Popper argued that a dogmatic faith in the inexorable, uncompromising, globally predestined rise of "modernity" transformed its adherents into the "midwives" of history.[39] Most of the contributors to the modern "tradition of anticipation" seem to fall wholly or partly into this category: unable to change the ultimate course of events, about which they more or less agreed with each other, they merely worked in subtly different ways to make the changes as painless as possible by suggesting improvements, or perhaps by criticizing unresolved problems. But there was never any question of an alternative paradigm for human society. The Machine Age was preordained. Centrally important to such conceptions of past and ongoing history as a process of unfolding modernist destiny is Jane M. Jacobs's "vibrating couplet" of modernity's conceptualization of the premodern — this is the either/or, before/after binary of evolutionary paradigm shift, the two mirroring sides of which are "both co-dependent and mutually exclusive."[40] The "modern" requires that the foil of "tradition" exist, and be vanquished, or at least on the wane, in order to position itself as modern. The power of this conceptual binary was not, and is not, limited to the interior of cinemas or the sketchpads of utopian dreamers. In the fields of architecture and urban planning this understanding of "modernity" begs the designer to take for granted, on authority, the unstoppable and irreversible eclipse of even vaguely preindustrial, human-scaled communities, and to understand their own "traditions of the modern," not as traditions, but as their alternative: "honest" and "natural" expressions of present conditions, or even of the emerging future.

Whether the "obsolete" human-scaled cities of the "past" were to be totally abandoned, as in the case of Gillette, or buried deep underground, as in the case of von Harbou and Lang, the early-twentieth-century technological visionary believed that the vacuum they left would be amply filled by the mechanized, incorporated city of tomorrow. There, industrial-grade managers, operating under the protective arm of "limited liability," could at last fully adopt and implement the principles not only of efficient factory regulation, but also of good government, which were increasingly understood as one and the same: reformed practices for rational, productive, profitable, and equitable human resource management, in every sense of that ambiguous and problematic term.



FIGURE 18. *This final example is an obscure political pamphlet published in 1938 in Seattle, Washington, by an unknown group that described itself only as "The Neopolitans." Like Gillette, the group called for a corporate model of political, economic and social reform, executed in a new model city of high-tech skyscrapers on an egalitarian urban grid. The urban plan, however, seems more evocative of Lang's and von Harbou's* Metropolis*: a series of highrises radiate out from a domineering central tower, where total control is wielded by a benevolent corporate elite. Courtesy of the John Hay Library, Brown University.*

REFERENCE NOTES

1. K.M. Roemer, *The Obsolete Necessity: America in Utopian Writings, 1888–1900* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1976), p.3.
2. Ibid., p.5.
3. A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), p.108. For a discussion of Giddens's arguments, see also J.M. Jacobs, "Tradition Is (Not) Modern: Deterritorializing Globalization," in N. AlSayyad, ed., *The End of Tradition?* (London: Routledge, 2004), p.30.
4. A. Boime, *The Magisterial Gaze: Manifest Destiny and American Landscape Painting c. 1830–1865* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), p.57.
5. It is worth noting that the propagandistic nature of much progressive discourse has not been lost on the "colonized," and that the perception of this rhetorical weapon continues to affect cross-cultural perceptions. Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes, argued in a recent opinion piece published by CNN: "According to [an] American narrative — which Muslims perceive as arrogant and dismissive — human society naturally and inevitably evolves through the stages that the West has gone through [including banishing religion from the public sphere and elevating individual freedoms]. . . . From this assumed perspective, Muslim society is seen as simply behind . . . [and] this narrative [is used] to justify America . . . actually violating democratic principles in relation to the Muslim world." S. Kull, "Why Muslims Are Still Mad at America," CNN Global Public Square, September 5, 2011, available at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/05/why-muslims-are-still-mad-at-america/?hpt=hp_t2 [accessed October 31, 2011].
6. I.F. Clarke, *The Pattern of Expectation, 1644–2001* (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
7. N. AlSayyad, "The End of Tradition, Or the Tradition of Endings?," in AlSayyad, ed., *The End of Tradition?*, pp.11–12.
8. N. AlSayyad and J.-P. Bourdier, eds., *Dwellings, Settlements and Tradition: Cross-Cultural Perspectives* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), p.3.
9. H. Maxim, "Man's Machine-Made Millenium" (New York: International Magazine Co., 1908), p.570.
10. Ibid., pp.569,570,576.
11. H. Segal, *Technological Utopianism in American Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p.21.
12. R.B. Adams, Jr., *King C. Gillette: The Man and His Wonderful Shaving Device* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).
13. K.C. Gillette, *The Human Drift* (Boston: New Era Publishing, 1894); Facsimile Edition, K.M. Roemer, intro. (Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1976), p.v.
14. In 2005 the Gillette Company was incorporated into Proctor & Gamble in a $57 billion stock deal that created the world's largest consumer-goods company, and in 2008 *Bloomberg Businessweek* estimated the Gillette brand's stand-alone value at more than $22 billion. See *Bloomberg Businessweek*, "The Top 100 Brands," September 18, 2008: http://images.businessweek.com/ss/08/09/0918_best_brands/15.htm [accessed August 28, 2011].
15. Gillette, *The Human Drift*, frontispiece.
16. A. Trachtenberg, *The Incorporation of America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p.5.
17. Ibid., p.4; and S.D. Cashman, *America in the Gilded Age* (New York: New York University Press, 1984), pp.47–48.
18. As quoted in Trachtenberg, *The Incorporation of America*, p.3.
19. Ibid., p.44.
20. Ibid., p.69.
21. G. Prettyman, "Gilded Age Utopias of Incorporation," *Utopian Studies*, Vol.12 No.1 (Winter 2001), pp.19–40.
22. Ibid., p.19.
23. Ibid., p.22.
24. K. Roemer, "Technology, Corporation, and Utopia: Gillette's Unity Regained," *Technology and Culture*, Vol.6 No.3 (July 1985) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).
25. E. Bellamy, *Looking Backward, 2000–1887*, J.L. Thomas, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), p.126, as cited in Prettyman, "Gilded Age Utopias of Incorporation," p.22.
26. K.C. Gillette, *World Corporation* (Boston: The New England News Company, 1910), p.9.
27. Gillette, *The Human Drift*, pp.90–91.
28. K.H. Roemer, "Building the Utopian Face of King Camp Gillette," in N.R. Walker, ed., *Building Expectation: Past and Present Visions of the Architectural Future* (exhibition catalog) (Providence: David Winton Bell Gallery, 2011), p.9.
29. R. Fishman, *Urban Utopias in the 20th Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), p.230.
30. H. Ferriss, *The Metropolis of Tomorrow* (New York: I. Washburn, 1929), p.124.
31. Roemer, "Technology, Corporation, and Utopia."
32. C. Pursell, *The Machine in America: A Social History of Technology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p.63.
33. Compte Didier de Chousy, *Ignis: The Central Fire*, B. Stableford, trans. and intro. (Encino, CA: Black Coat Press, 2009).
34. T. von Harbou, *Metropolis* (Boston: Gregg Press, 1975), p.23.
35. D. Neumann, "The Urbanistic Vision of Fritz Lang's Metropolis," in T.W. Kniesche and S. Brockmann, eds., *Dancing on the Volcano: Essays on the Culture of the Weimar Republic* (Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1994), pp.146–47.
36. E.A. Jewell, "'Machines, Machines!' The Futurist's Cry," *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, December 11, 1927, p.SM13.
37. P. McGilligan, *Fritz Lang: The Nature of the Beast* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp.27–28. H.G. Wells also attacked the film's plot, albeit for different reasons. He said the movie's highrise urban vision was "stale old stuff," and was too similar to the stratified dystopian factory-city in his own *When the Sleeper Wakes*, published in 1897. These attacks reveal that Wells missed the point: *Metropolis* was a sensational morality tale speaking to the social potential of reformed corporate power, not a "scientific" technological prophecy, nor a doomed dystopia such as those offered by *When the Sleeper Wakes* or *Ignis*. See Neumann, "The Urbanistic Vision of Fritz Lang's Metropolis," pp.147-48; and D. Neumann, "Before and After Metropolis: Film and Architecture in Search of the Modern City," in D. Neumann, ed., *Film Architecture: From Metropolis to Blade Runner* (Munich and New York: Prestel-Verlag, 1996), p.35.
38. Trachtenberg, *The Incorporation of America*, p.5.
39. K. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (London: Routledge Press, 1993), p.44.
40. Jacobs, "Tradition Is (Not) Modern," p.33.

Phnom Penh: From the Politics of Ruin to the Possibilities of Return

SYLVIA NAM

This article describes the various imaginaries and practices that underlie the contemporary building boom in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. One such imaginary is of a city of absence. In part, this relates to a discourse of the city in ruin, the result of material-historical processes that destroyed Phnom Penh's urban fabric and society in the 1970s. Yet idioms of ruin and absence have been markedly resilient in Phnom Penh; indeed, they were widely appropriated during the colonial and postcolonial eras to justify experiments in city-making and urban-planning interventions. The article thus aims to relate these older representations of absence to contemporary invocations of the city as tabula rasa — but an explicitly Asian one. Such representations, which organize perceptions of the city and govern the logics of its space, are key to current planning experiments that are seeking to remake it as the city of the future. With Phnom Penh an emerging space of circulation and a field of intervention, these efforts include a shift to building vertically, with highrise towers, in a town once acclaimed for its French provincial charm.

Cambodia's capital city, Phnom Penh, is located on a floodplain at the confluence of three rivers: the Tonle Mekong, the Tonle Sap, and the Tonle Bassac (*tonle* is "river" in Khmer) (FIG. 1). This joining of waters created a city of four faces, or *les quatre bas* — what in Khmer is known as Krong Chaktomuk.[1] Thus situated, trade has been central to the city's origins.[2] It has also ensured its commercial and economic future.[3] However, future-talk in Phnom Penh today is less focused on the economy of trade than the economy of space, in anticipation of a building boom that will vastly alter its landscape.

With bets placed on its distinctly "Asian" future, investors from South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and China have poured into the city in the past fifteen years. They view Phnom Penh as the Ho Chi Minh City of fifteen years ago, the Bangkok of twenty-five

***Sylvia Nam** is a Ph.D. Candidate in City and Regional Planning at the University of California, Berkeley. She was IASTE Coordinator in 2007–2008.*

FIGURE 1. *Historic aerial view of Phnom Penh at the intersection of Tonle Bassac and Tonle Sap. Source: H.G. Ross and D. Collins,* Building Cambodia: New Khmer Architecture 1953–1970 *(Bangkok: The Key Publisher, 2006), p.57. Photo by Vann Molyvann.*

years ago, and the Seoul of forty years ago. Foreign investors today occupy key sectors of Cambodia's economy, backing the most ambitious projects in development, banking, insurance, commodity manufacturing, and natural-resource extraction.

Key to these activities is real estate speculation in the capital. Phnom Penh has no master plan.[4] And it has no formal valuation of property. Yet, development proceeds apace, based on aspirations for the city of the future. As a postconflict site and a frontier of capitalism, Phnom Penh today boasts one of the most expensive property markets in Southeast Asia **(FIG. 2)**.

In this article I seek to illuminate these forces by providing a brief genealogy of the city's urbanism, which has had a long and troubled association with modernism. Phnom Penh was a key site of experimentation in what Paul Rabinow has called the "norms and forms" of the modern condition.[5]



FIGURE 2. *Average property prices in cities across the global South. Data from Global Property Guide, 2009.*

Within French colonial urbanism, Gwendolyn Wright has also identified the city as a privileged experimental terrain and a laboratory of modernity.[6] More recently, according to Aihwa Ong, the metropolis continues to be a "milieu of experimentation" in global urban modernity.[7]

The historicization I present is both partial and selective. For example, I do not focus on specifically Khmer concepts of power and space, which emphasize the core-periphery nature of authority, difference, and hierarchy.[8] My purpose is to illustrate the role of Phnom Penh as a locus of experimentation and to describe the perceptions that have been used to justify interventions in its landscape. These perceptions continue to hold critical implications for how the city is being remade.

DECAY AND REBIRTH

Phnom Penh is the "great metropolis" or the "primate city" of Cambodia.[9] Primacy is a feature found throughout Southeast Asia, where urban culture is heavily concentrated in the capital city of each country.[10] Contemporary Phnom Penh is also principally Haussmannesque in orientation, which is most obvious in terms of the major boulevards that intersect its geometric grid (FIG. 3).[11]

The city's layout is a legacy of the high modernism of colonial and postindependence urbanism.[12] This movement (and its related technology of urban planning) was rooted in an ideology and practice of rational order, which was explicitly visual and aligned with modernism's faith in progress and efficiency. Yet, in Phnom Penh, the high modernism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was primarily aesthetic, rather than structural or social.

Historically, Phnom Penh's colonial urban form was forged through two major efforts in planning. The first came in the 1890s under Daniel Fabré; the second was carried out under Ernest Hébrard in the 1920s. During both periods, French administrators sought to legislate new patterns of space in response to what they perceived to be the disorder of the capital and its social structure.[13] In part, this perception involved the city's ethnic heterogeneity. Ethnic districts, first created in the 1880s, were codified in the 1920s.[14] French colonial urban regimes were also tax regimes. In the 1890s they allowed the French to gain access to the city's rentier wealth. And taxes on rice funded the beautification of the city in the 1920s.[15]



FIGURE 3. *Phnom Penh in 1958 (A), and 1968 (B). Expansion of the city during the postcolonial period extended the colonial spatial order outlined by Ernest Hébrard in 1925. The "urban" areas of the city are marked in black. The pace of urbanization over a ten-year period is notable. Boeung Kak is the area being surrounded by development at the top center. The Front de Bassac waterfront is at the middle right. Source: V. Molyvann,* Modern Khmer Cities *(Phnom Penh: Reyum, 2003), pp.158–59.*

When the French initially arrived in Phnom Penh in 1860, they did not see it as worthy of being a capital.[16] Moreover, they saw the Kingdom of Cambodia as "only a shadow of its former self."[17] In response to these imaginaries (in which the city was defined negatively as a set of absences or deficiencies), they sought to modernize Phnom Penh's appearance. This was articulated as a rebirth, with architecture central to the making of a "real" capital. Under French guidance, new buildings would be built with the permanence of concrete to replace a city of thatch and bamboo. The rebirth was also explicitly spatial, enacted through the culture and politics of urban design.

The project of Cambodian rebirth was also temporal, created through the power-knowledge construction of a history based on continuity and linearity. The historian David Chandler has argued that the greatest gift the French bestowed on Indochina was its history.[18] But this gift was not benign. Colonial scholars narrated Cambodian history as an arc — one that peaked in the tenth and eleventh centuries during the golden age of Angkor, when great mortuary temple complexes served as the center of a Khmer Empire that dominated much of mainland Southeast Asia. This was followed by a precipitous and protracted period of decline, from which it was the job of French scholars and colonial administrators to reclaim it. According to Chandler, "The history of Angkor, after all, was deciphered, restored, and bequeathed to them by their colonial masters. Why had so many forgotten it?"[19]

Far from being forgotten, the weight of antiquity has since been a key element of Cambodian identity. The role of the past is apparent in the country's flag, which has the unusual distinction of featuring a monument of ancient built heritage: Angkor Wat. Indeed, the fear of disappearance has been an enduring theme of modern Cambodian nationalism. The same can be said for authenticity, which under the French became a hegemonic discourse that was both material and visual.[20]

This colonially constructed history was predicated on what Benedict Anderson (borrowing from Walter Benjamin) has referred to as "homogenous, empty time" — made linear and continuous, flattened of its heterogeneity and internal contradictions, and treated as a timeless essence.[21] Yet, such recitation of Cambodia's former greatness — and the constant reference to it as an achievement and a loss — was not exclusively about the reconstruction of the past; it was also about the regulation of the present. That is, the past was made performative, to cast shadows on the present. According to Edward Said, history was a central component of the colonial project, its purpose being to tell of "modern orientals [who] were degraded remnants of a former greatness."[22] Orientalism's citationary structure, for Derek Gregory, involved truth claims designed to produce the effects they named.[23] This "gift" of history, then, was a form of what Gayatri Spivak has termed "epistemic violence," knowledge that could not be separated from the structure of imperialism under which it was produced.[24]

In urban design and architecture, the aesthetics of space were also based on the cult of history, evidenced through "invented traditions" of culture. As Eric Hobsbawm has noted, such traditions are created not only in reference to the past, but to a suitable past.[25] A key element of this aesthetic in Cambodia was a "national style" that allowed a specific reconfiguration of history and authenticity. As Penny Edwards has argued, this desire for authenticity in the redesign of Phnom Penh was based on French fears about a vanishing Khmer race and an influx of foreign, non-Khmer elements in the city.[26] But Rabinow has argued that this desire was also part of the project of modernity that motivated the French in their search for legitimacy and greatness, as well as tradition and progress.[27] In the early twentieth century, key institutions of Cambodian culture — the Pali School, Musée Khmer, School of Fine Arts, Royal Library, and several elite schools added to Phnom Penh's Cambodian quarter — were thus founded and designed wholly, or in part, by French architects and savants.[28]

Architecture and urbanism were clearly important instruments of the French colonial project in Cambodia. Shirine Hamadeh has argued that visual culture was the most accessible technology of French policy in its reproduction of order in North Africa.[29] And Wright has showed how France was explicit in cultivating a "national" style in its Indochina colonies, as well as in Madagascar and Morocco, reflecting a conscious effort to combine modernist forms with "traditional" motifs. This stylized aesthetic divided cities as never before, even if the division was made to appear natural and coherent.[30] Thus, in Phnom Penh, French architects were keen to adapt tradition in the service of spectacle in their retrofit of the Royal Palace. Following the demolition of its original wooden structures, the present palace, which opened in 1870, was rebuilt in concrete. Yet, despite the hybrid origins of its design, the new building eventually came to symbolize the essence of the monarchy and the nation.[31] Thus, a century later, following the depredations of the Khmer Rouge, its sense of timeless essence was embraced with nostalgia by Milton Osborne: ". . . as a whole there was no doubting the city's Cambodian character, something that had as much to do with the pace of life as with the distinctive architecture of the royal palace or the bright yellow, green, and blue tiles on the roofs of the dozens of Buddhist pagodas."[32]

As a general practice, modernity and urbanism were elaborated in the colonies to be transferred back to the metropole.[33] But the order worked in reverse with regard to Phnom Penh. Experiments to create a Cambodian national style took place at World Fairs in France — specifically the 1906 and 1922 colonial exhibitions in Marseille and the 1889 and 1931 expositions in Paris. Developed by French architects and engineers for a Parisian and an international audience, the style was then transcribed back onto the face of Phnom Penh.[34] These fairs also made recognizable specific idioms of visuality. As Edwards has written, the colonial period "saw a redefinition of Khmer culture and its emergence into the public sphere of the

modern nation."[35] According to Rabinow, this was prompted in part by French imperial desire, which sought to reconstitute the power of Paris on the margins of empire.[36]

With the consolidation of French interests in Indochina, Phnom Penh was first designated the administrative center of the colony in 1867.[37] But it was not until the 1890s, when fiscal and legislative mechanisms were put in place, that the French were able to exert rule over the city and centralize control of it.[38] In particular, this involved making space legible to increase land values and capitalize rents.[39] According to the governor general of Indochina, the reforms of the late nineteenth century were designed "to enhance our prestige, and that of Norodom [Cambodia's king, 1860–1904], in the eyes of his subjects and of foreigners, by making Phnom Penh a real capital."[40] For Panivong Norindr, this indicated how Indochina was an "elaborate fiction," made material through architecture and other visual mediums.[41] But for experts in geography and architecture, it was also a "rational creation of France," in which France sought to give "her dominion a viable form, a solid geographical cohesion."[42] This involved technologies like the map, the census, and the museum, which, according to Anderson, "profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion — the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry."[43]

Reforms in 1884 also redirected customs, taxes and concessions into French hands, providing the financing necessary to rebuild the city.[44] In a speech inaugurating the municipality of Phnom Penh in 1884, the governor of Indochina, Charles Thomson, specifically linked these colonial mechanisms to a desire for renewal. Presciently, he claimed, "I have seen how the longing has become more pronounced . . . for a new state of things and a coming revival."[45] More importantly, the reforms marked the first effort to create a regime of private property. According to the first article of the convention colonial officials forced the king to sign with the French protectorate: "The territory of Cambodia, up to today the exclusive property of the Crown, is declared property of the State."[46] Thus a system based on temporary land grants and rental agreements that had proved profitable for the king was replaced by a real estate market that allowed the purchase and transfer of urban property.[47] This regime was further codified in an 1897 ordinance: "The government reserves the right to alienate and to assign all the free lands of the kingdom. The buyers and the grantees will enjoy full property rights over the land sold or assigned to them."[48]

As a result of this opening of its territory, the city underwent a construction boom overseen by the new municipality.[49] And during subsequent years key institutions of French administration were built. These included a school to cultivate elite native administrators to collect taxes and dispense justice for an expanding bureaucracy.[50] They included military barracks for a standing army. And they included key institutions to facilitate the transfer and movement of money and goods — among which were a treasury, a post office, and offices for the newly established municipality.

According to Edwards, these buildings, a number of which still survive, "completed the capital's transformation from a rambling morass into a highly segregated and hierarchal city."[51] The build-up of administrative capacity during this period reflected the rationality of "colonial governmentality," by which "power comes to be directed at the destruction and reconstruction of colonial space so as to produce not so much extractive-effects on colonial bodies as governing-effects on colonial conduct."[52] Yet this construction of order — the creation of bureaucracy and the formation of institutions of power — had less to do with what Michel Foucault has described as governmentality, or the art of government (with the population as its target and welfare as its purpose[53]), than with the active construction of French sovereignty over Cambodian territory. Eventually, therefore, what the French could not create in the form of industry and commerce they sought through the taxation of the population.[54] As Chandler has pointed out, by the early twentieth century the country was an "efficient revenue-producing machine."[55] At the same time, the French made no efforts to modernize Cambodia's economy.[56]

Later policies for colonial cities were also forged with the anxieties and problems of France in mind. According to Wright, these included "poor sanitation, economic stagnation, class and ethnic antagonisms, fears about immorality and aesthetic squalor."[57] And both Wright and Rabinow have argued that the colonial environment was a laboratory to elaborate technologies of architecture, urban planning, and public health to address problems not of the colonized but of the colonizer.[58] Thus the anxieties of modern city planning and the role of Phnom Penh as an experimental site brought only superficial change.

In the 1920s, as the first director of the Service d'Urbanisme de l'Indochine, Ernest Hébrard led the master-planning of the cities of Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Saigon and Dalat.[59] In his own words, he came from a tradition of town planners for whom the colonies were "experimental grounds."[60] Colonial cities were tabulas rasas, far removed from the dead weight of metropolitan bureaucracy, with their scale idealized for easy manipulation.[61] True to modernist form, Hébrard also deplored what he saw as the physical expression of disorder.[62] He sought the city's rationalization through the expansion of the grid as well as the regulation of race. Accordingly, his "Plan d'Extension de la Ville de Pnom-Penh" was an attempt to organize the city along ethnic lines to deal with its confusing array of races and nationalities.[63]

Nezar AlSayyad has argued that colonial urbanism was an expression of dominance through institutions of knowledge, planning, and urban form.[64] But dominance was also based on representational power. Thus, to cite Timothy Mitchell, the appearance of order was linked to the order of appearance.[65] Through forms of visual production (including artistic production[66]) the French sought to constitute stability

FIGURE 4. *Street life in 1950, with Psar Thmei, the city's Art Deco central market, opened in 1937, in the background. The city's celebrated neatness was also one of emptiness. Photo by Associated Press, June 27, 1950.*

and create the appearance of coherence in Phnom Penh, even in its absence **(FIG. 4)**.

Whatever the power of representation and its disciplinary capacity, however, power thus deployed (and the order of the city that emerges) must be understood as delinked from the actual management of local society and economy. Nevertheless, such practices were crucial to the construction of colonial Phnom Penh. Through them, the idiom of rebirth was made a productive, with the city serving as the translation ground for an assembled aesthetics of power and culture.

Phnom Penh's rebirth therefore was not only animated by a particular imagination of absence, but it was linked to anxieties about the "moral degeneracy and physical deterioration" of France.[67] Through a nexus of culture and empire, French strategies of representation facilitated the transplantation of strategic discourses of disappearance and decline.[68]

FIGURE 5. *Phnom Penh circa 1986. Street unknown. Photo courtesy of Paul Joseph.*

FIGURE 6. *In January 1979 Vietnamese troops expel the Khmer Rouge from Phnom Penh. Psar Thmei is in the background. Source:* Time Magazine, *"The Rise and Fall of the Khmer Rouge." Photo by Bettmann/Corbis.*

EMERGENCE

Following the end of French colonial rule in 1953 Phnom Penh entered a "golden age" of postindependence urbanism. Today, representations of this period, encompassing the late 1950s and 1960s, starkly contrast with those of Phnom Penh as a city of ruins in the 1970s and 1980s **(FIG. 5)**. Tradition and authenticity were the crucial urban coordinates of this brief golden age. However, they also served as justifications for the city's dismantling under the Khmer Rouge.

Postindependence urbanism in Cambodia was an explicitly modernist project that sought to articulate its legacy in built form. By contrast, the Khmer Rouge's project was temporal and Arcadian. But Khmer Rouge control of Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 left an equal, if not greater, legacy on Phnom Penh **(FIG. 6)**. Representations of the latter period underscore the city's exit from history in 1975, and its reentry

as a postconflict site only after an internationally brokered peace accord in 1993.

While the Khmer Rouge underwrote much of Phnom Penh's spectrality and decay by emptying it of its population, years of war had already done much to destroy it.[69] As noted by Sophie Clement-Charpentier, civil war (1970–1975) ruined the physical fabric of Phnom Penh before the Khmer Rouge destroyed its social fabric.[70] Both forms of ruin, constituted through the material violence of ideology and the deliberate dismantling of urban life, continue to haunt the city through new imaginaries of absence today.

The cosmopolitanism and visual order of Phnom Penh in the 1960s allowed the city to be heralded as "prettiest capital in Southeast Asia."[71] But these qualities were as fragile as the political landscape on which they rested. Under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (generally translated as the People's Socialist Community) associated nation-building with city-building. And the accomplishments of the period have been celebrated in Anglophone accounts as visionary, based on an elegance of hybrid forms, vernacular Khmer techniques, and monumental proportions.[72] Phnom Penh, in particular, was allowed to flourish in new ways that accorded with the calculus of high modernism — making society legible by linking modernity, and thus legitimacy, to symbolic order.

That this order was dismantled in less than fifteen years, however, signaled both the fragility of the vision as well as the urban condition. The predominant ideology of the Sangkum was Buddhist socialism.[73] According to Sihanouk, modernity would be created within the ethics of Buddhism.[74] This included plans for the wholesale modernization of the nation through the development of infrastructure, agriculture, education, health, industry, tourism, culture and urbanism. Though many of these plans were never implemented, experiments in urban planning gave a new legibility to Phonm Penh through public architecture. Under the patronage of Sihanouk and employing the designs of the famed architect Vann Molyvann, an emerging urban elite took to conceiving, defining and building "modern Khmer culture" based on forms recognized as both Cambodian and modern, thus establishing themselves as visionaries of a postindependence modernity.[75]

As Ingrid Muan has argued, however, postindependence forms of visual production carried traces of the colonial regime. Colonial rule had established institutions of "Cambodian arts" that taught correct forms of practice, according to which students could be trained to produce "authentic" art objects.[76] Under these conditions, even modern architecture could not escape notions of tradition, but rather became an articulation of it.[77] The aestheticization of space during this period also reflected, in the words of David Harvey, an "aestheticization of politics," as social forces attempted to articulate traditional symbols from the past into the future.[78]

The coherence of this urban vision began to unravel long before the arrival of the Khmer Rouge in 1975. By September 1972, some 700,000 refugees had crowded into Phnom Penh. This urban influx had begun in the 1950s.[79] But it peaked in the early 1970s as the U.S. engaged in a massive cross-border bombing campaign. The attacks targeted the use of Cambodian territory as staging areas for North Vietnamese troops and supplies moving to battlegrounds in the south.[80] From 1971 to 1972 the U.S. dropped more than half a billion tons of bombs on the Cambodian countryside, devastating many populated areas.[81] The eventual internal displacement of nearly two million people corresponded to the number who sought refuge in Cambodia's cities.[82]

By April 1975, as the civil war between the Khmer Rouge and the Lon Nol government that had overthrown Sihanouk in 1970 also reached its climax, an estimated two to three million residents and refugees crowded into Phnom Penh.[83] The influx changed the character of the city's population from a coterie loyal to Sihanouk to an urban peasantry seeking safety from the fighting in the surrounding countryside (FIG.7). Meanwhile, insurgents brought a slow strangulation of the city, periodically depriving it of needed food and supplies. In the end, the city itself became a sort of refugee camp where scarcity prompted the dismantling of its very fabric to obtain building materials and other resources.[84]

Saigon's fall to Communist forces on April 30, 1975, is generally heralded as marking the end of the Second Indochina War (1960–1975). But the Khmer Rouge's entry into Phnom Penh a few weeks earlier, on April 17, had already signaled the end of the first phase of Cambodia's civil war. The arrival of the Khmer Rouge was taken, at least momentarily, to mean the liberation of the city from corrupt military rule; and initially it offered the prospect for a return to normalcy. But the Khmer Rouge's view of culture was based on a linear conception of history, which required a return to a precolonial past to renew the body politic. And where the high modernism of the postindependence period had privileged the urban terrain of Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge set out to reconfigure the town and country divide by privileging the latter.

Conceiving of Phnom Penh as a site of imperialism and impurity, the Khmer Rouge began their campaign to rewrite history with the erasure of its urban body politic. Over the course of several days in April 1975, they emptied the city of its inhabitants. Long-time residents and refugees alike were forcibly marched out to the countryside, which would be the new site of modernity. For Marx, cities transformed peasants into citizens and rescued society from "the idiocy of rural life."[85] This calculus of progress was radically inverted by the Khmer Rouge, who sought to turn all citizens into peasants.[86]

Changing the name of the country to Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge sought to transform Cambodia into an agrarian autarky. Henceforth, the uneducated peasant would become the idealized subject of a self-sufficient utopia. Khmer Rouge policies also called for the abolition of money, markets, and private property to overturn the existing coordinates of society and economy. Yet during these years of

FIGURE 7. *The city of refugees. These refugees are seeking shelter in the shell of the Cambodiana Hotel, part of the 1960s waterfront development undertaken by Sihanouk. Photo by Neal Ulevich, Associated Press, March 11, 1975.*

radical collectivization, an estimated one million people died from starvation and internal purges.[87] This corresponded to a total 1970 population of only just more than 7 million.[88]

The Khmer Rouge governed through terror as well as "necropolitics." According to Achille Mbembe, "necropolitics" is a regime of sovereignty based on the principle of excess, with death made to no longer matter.[89] The regime's desire to reinstate the "real" Cambodia and emancipate the country from structures of dependency and the degeneracy of the colonial condition required terror to realize the teleos of history.[90] Yet, ironically, the very cult of history that prompted the regime to seek to return to an economy of primitive accumulation was itself a legacy of the colonial encounter.

Despite the violence done to Phnom Penh during the years of Khmer Rouge rule, the last decade has seen the city rebound. Indeed, its very status as a postconflict site is now heralded for its productive potential, which has been leveraged through contemporary investment practices.

Accompanying the present boom, however, is nostalgia for the city's postindependence modernism and the brief coherence of that vision. According to one recent account:

> *Previously a French colonial outpost, the Cambodian capital was catapulted into an acclaimed city that bustled energy through wider international contact. Visionary Cambodian architects took the lead and were largely responsible for the look of a place that soon became the envy of Cambodia's Southeast Asia neighbors — by the mid-1960s Phnom Penh was dubbed "the belle of Southeast Asia."*[91]

But, as argued above, the celebrated beauty of this city of the late 1950s and 60s was based on the aestheticization of space and politics. It also produced a specific form of disavowal. Underlying this beauty was an urban condition that alienated and radicalized young Cambodian students, who turned to the Khmer Rouge, disenchanted with the very forms of modernity now wistfully remembered.

As I show below, the present nostalgia is also an ethical claim against new experimental forms of contemporary planning and urban growth. As the frenetic rebuilding of Phnom Penh proceeds, it thus embodies both reaction to contemporary urbanism and longing for the lost coherence of an imagined past.

SPECULATING ON THE FUTURE

Controversial projects abound in Phnom Penh today. Cambodia's topography mirrors the shape of "a crude bowl."[92] Combined with the city's location on a delta, this has made the management of land synonymous with the management of water.[93] Given these topographic conditions, land reclamation has been, and continues to be, fundamental to the production of new urban space.

New land was first made available in Phnom Penh through the drainage and infill of its *boeungs*, or catchment areas, between 1928 and 1935.[94] The interior canals of the city were also filled in at this time. Among these were Quai Piquet (today Street 108) and Quai de Verneville (Street 106) in the European quarter, which were transformed into prominent boulevards, lined with ministerial buildings, banking headquarters, and shophouses. Great expanses of land were also created through the building of dikes beginning in the 1940s and continuing into the early 1970s.[95] Indeed, the present city's major boulevards — Preah Sihanouk, Monivong, and Mao Tse Tung — were once embankments that marked its former boundaries.[96] Other prominent proj-

ects on former swampland and *boeungs* have included the Front du Bassac development of the 1960s and the present reclamation of Boeung Kak (FIG. 8).

The creation of new land at Boeung Kak, in the center of the city, illustrates many of the forces now shaping Phonm Penh's speculative reconstruction. The area occupied by this lake once belonged to the municipality.[97] However, it was privatized as part of a massive selloff of state assets that began during the 1997 national elections, and has continued by various means, including transfers of ownership to quasi-public entities, the creation of concessionary rights, and outright sales.[98] It is unclear how many times "ownership" of the 133-hectare lake has changed hands according to these mechanisms. But in February 2007 it was finally sold to the private Cambodian developer Shukaku, whose connections to the ruling Cambodian People's Party has allowed it to push through a highly controversial development scheme.

The shallow lake is located in one of the most favorable sites in the city.[99] Indeed, it was identified by planning documents in 2007 as a future enclave for the offices of international businesses.[100] The first stage of the Shukaku plan includes the filling in of a majority of its 133 hectares and the geotechnical stabilization of the resulting terrain. After this, Shukaku likely will function as a broker, selling construction rights to foreign developers. Long-term, the plan calls for the creation of a green belt with new recreational, commercial and residential facilities.

The major controversy surrounding the plan involves the eviction of an estimated four thousand families who have been living around the margins of the lake (the actual number of people living legally or illegally there is unknown).[101] The insecurity of these residents' tenure was identified years ago, and their eviction has been a constant possibility.[102] Nevertheless, it is now interpreted as indicative of the im-

A

B

FIGURE 8. *A) Boeung Kak lake in August 2008. B) Photo taken from the same location in August 2009. The informal houses in the background have been replaced by fill, and the lake has been cleared of vegetation. Photos by author.*

pact of the recent speculative boom on the city's poor.[103] In particular, human rights advocates claim the site belongs to those who live on it. Yet, foreign experts earlier decried the physical plight of the area, calling it a "cesspit," and "one of the most dirty places in the city."[104]

Much of this dilemma has to do with the history of the site. The edges of Boeung Kak were originally developed by the Popular Revolutionary Committee of Phnom Penh in the 1980s as public green space with recreational amenities.[105] However, the prospect of the first democratic elections following the fall of the Khmer Rouge, in 1993, not only signaled coming peace but precipitated a wave of squatting throughout the city. Indeed, such activity was encouraged by office-seekers as part of their patronage campaigns.[106] Land around Boeung Kak was first invaded by squatters in 1991; but there was a dramatic increase in the number of people living there by the 1997 elections. By 2000, it was estimated three thousand families were living "illegally" in the area.[107] As Beng Hong Socheat Khemro has argued, their presence was tolerated because their landlords were commanders in the military and police, and occupation of the land was legitimized by such connections to authority.[108]

The Front du Bassac reveals another speculative face of Phnom Penh. Built on reclaimed land on the banks of the Tonle Bassac beginning in the 1960s, it was designed to become "the new urban center of Phnom Penh."[109] As an urban-planning centerpiece during Phnom Pen's modernist "golden age," it soon became the site of key institutions of public life and culture, including Chaktomuk Hall, the Preah Suramarit Theater, municipal housing (what is now the Phnom Penh Center office block and the still-inhabited Grey Building), and public parks surrounding the Independence Monument.[110]

The Front du Bassac remains present in renderings of the city's future. Yet new proposals for development in the area indicate how the terms of engagement have changed. One of these targets is a site further south along the Bassac riverfront near the Russian Embassy on Sothearos Boulevard. The project, the International Finance Complex (IFC), by Seoul-based GS Engineering and Construction, was originally valued at $1 billion and scaled to include several fifty-story skyscrapers.[111] Due to market conditions, in 2009 it had to reduced in scope.[112] And it is now unclear if it will materialize at all. But such plans, based on speculative expectations, have driven up land prices across the city.[113]

Such speculation is practiced by various segments of the population. While resources vary considerably, its practitioners negotiate risk, compete for desirable assets, and construct markets of opportunity. Among the platforms they use are regional circuits of capital and expertise such as the Korean one behind the IFC project. These circuits have been forged as part of the legacy of recent urban development in Asia, where cities have been developed at breakneck speed in places that were agrarian hinterland only a generation ago. Such circuits indicate how urban practices in the region no longer refer to the city of EuroAmerica, but to an Asian city of the future.[114]

The imagination and discourse of this new urbanism are made intelligible through specific "Asian" idioms of growth and possibility (FIG. 9). Consistent with this mode of thinking, Phnom Penh has been cast as possessing near-certain potential to repeat the spectacular growth trajectory of such other Asian capitals as Bangkok, Saigon and Seoul. This is not a case of global urban mimicry, where a single template moves from West to the East in teleological form. Rather, the structures and circuits of urban referencing provoke a rethinking of relationships between centers, peripheries and frontiers, as well as the productivities associated with them. It has also been based on massive, multibillion-dollar projects that were conceived at a time when foreign ownership was officially banned (though these rules have relaxed since 2009), and where ownership rules over land continue to be complex and diffuse.

FIGURE 9. *The city's upwards expansion. Photo by Sylyvann Borei.*

FIGURE 10. *A train sits idle at Phnom Penh's railway station, built in 1932 during the city's colonial expansion. In the background is Canadia Bank's new headquarters. Photo by Chea Phal.*

Such forms of investment have been a distinctive feature of the Asian regional economy since the 1980s.[115] Of the $1.1 billion in foreign investment approved by the Cambodian government in 2007, $991 million came from within Asia (FIG. 10). This amounted to approximately 90 percent of total foreign investment that year. The principal countries of origin were Malaysia ($226 million), Thailand ($168 million), Vietnam ($138 million), China ($137 million), and South Korea ($86 million). The amounts pledged from each country may vary considerably from year to year; nevertheless, the top sources of foreign investment in Cambodia over the last decade have all been Asian. And even though the total figure for 2007 may be unimpressive in global terms, in relative terms, foreign investment in Cambodia increased five-fold from 2000 to 2007, from $185 million to $1.1 billion. The country's GDP growth shows why: it averaged a growth rate of 9.5 percent per year from 2000 to 2007, the fastest in Asia after China (its average 9.9 percent per year).[117]

Fundamental to such investment trends have been ethnic-based transnational networks.[116] In this regard, the Korean networks discussed here comprise only one of the circuits of inter-Asian urbanism by which flows of money and expertise reach Cambodia. But their relational practices and speculative techniques reveal a dialectical process that may be mutually beneficial for two countries not normally associated with each other. In Phnom Penh, Korean developers are presently involved in planning and building a number of highrises and satellite cities. Most prominent are Gold Tower 42, developed by Yon Woo, and CamKo City, a satellite community on the urban periphery. As indicated by its name, Gold Tower will be 42 stories tall. It will occupy a corner of one of the city's most congested intersections, at Monivong and Sihanouk Boulevards (FIG. 11).

Projects such as these and the International Finance Complex (IFC) on the southern waterfront of Tonle Bassac,

FIGURE 11. *Gold Tower 42 in July 2010. The developer, Yon Woo, has called itself the "symbolic global developer" for Phnom Penh. The project is financed by DaeHan Real Estate Investment Trust, whose parent company is the Military Mutual Aid Association, one of the largest pension funds in South Korea. Photo by author.*

are disproportionately vertical, in contrast to the layout and scale of the city. The tallest existing building in the vicinity of the proposed Gold Tower is the five-story Suzuki showroom, which sits diagonally across the intersection from it. As to why Koreans insist on building at such high densities, as one developer put it, "We saw Seoul emerge from ruin. We hope to see it in Phnom Penh."[118]

INTER-ASIAN CIRCUITS

In part, such distinctively Asian forces of development illuminate the machinations of regional cosmopolitanism in an economy of representations. Such an economy clearly privileges spaces in the city that cohere to Asian norms — norms themselves lauded as foundational to economic development. It also relies on modernist imaginaries of absence. As I have shown, these have a long history in Phnom Penh. But they have now been put to use in the service of a distinctly Asian notion of a postconflict tabula rasa.

Cities like Seoul, Tokyo and Saigon — former postconflict sites themselves due to wars and occupations — were reassembled by shedding the weight of history and building anew. Such inter-Asian referencing also defines continuity of form, in which Asian modes of urbanism are identifiable laterally across disparate cities, uprooted and implanted on emerging frontiers in the region. The frontier in this case is proximal rather than distant, and allows for a level of flexibility inhered in commonalities of being Asian (FIG. 12).

Such urbanism is also made possible by market logics and historical conflations underlying the rhetoric of an "Asian miracle." In actuality, this construction has relied as much on myth as material fact. It was also largely reconfigured by the financial crises of the late 1990s. Yet it remains an important regulating myth precisely because it unhinged the even larger myth of what constitutes paradigmatic economic growth. One of its most significant features is that all ostensible Asian miracles have been produced under authoritarian rather than democratic political regimes. Thus, what the Asian miracle has principally confounded is the prescription that successful economic development must be predicated on uniform political — i.e., democratic — development. In each case of successful, if not miraculous, economic development in Asia, democracy was neither the vehicle of capitalism, nor was capitalism facilitated by democracy.

Prominent Asian cities are thus precedents, subject to citation in Phnom Penh — a condition which surfaced constantly in interviews I conducted with Korean real estate developers, American venture capitalists, and local Cambodians.[119] In these accounts, Cambodia occupies a place on a continuum of Asian economic development, a position that predicts the promise of the city's future. In essence, then, while the comparison between contemporary Cambodia and Vietnam in the 1990s, Thailand in the 1980s, and South Korea in the 1970s evades the burden of history, it exudes a productive and transversal appeal in practices and imaginations of convergence and the possibility of building a destroyed city anew.

Implicit in such practices are narratives of high returns, not only through the elite capture of land, but the promise of 100 percent profits and 60 percent rates of return. Such claims, subjective as they may be, soon become absorbed by the myths of rentier wealth, making it difficult to distill fact from fiction. Predictions of potential wealth are also validated by the presence of multinational firms, which drive up the price of property because they represent a sign of stability. Yet the metaphor driving Phnom Penh's current growth is one that captures both the political economy of Asian urbanism and helps solicit consensus around the inevitability of growth that is both aspirational and inspirational. Cambodia's economy and Phnom Penh's urban growth are thus positioned within evolutionary and linear time, where development will unfold under the auspices of progress as the city of ruin is remade for the future.

FIGURE 12. *A view of the city with Mao Tse Toung Boulevard center. Photo by Marie Seng.*

REFERENCE NOTES

1. M. Igout, *Phnom Penh: Then and Now* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1993), p.1; and C. Madrolle, *Vers Angkor: Saigon-Phnom Penh, Cochinchine-Cambodge* (Paris: Hachette, 1925).
2. D. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p.79; and W.E. Willmott, "History and Sociology of the Chinese in Cambodia Prior to the French Protectorate," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, Vol.7 No.1 (March 1966), p.23.
3. Igout, *Phnom Penh*, p.2.
4. R. Chhay and E. Huybrechts, *Master Plan of Phnom Penh by 2020*, http://www.phnompenh.gov.kh/english/Master_Plans/Master_Plan_By2020.htm.
5. P. Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
6. G. Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p.297.
7. A. Ong, "Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global," in A. Ong and A. Roy, eds., *Worlding Cities, or the Art of Being Global* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), p.23.
8. See P. Edwards, *Cambodge: Cultivation of a Nation, 1860–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), especially Chapter 1; Chandler, *History of Cambodia*, p.90; Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994); and A. Ong, "Center, Periphery, and Hierarchy: Gender in Southeast Asia," in S. Morgen, ed., *Gender and Anthropology: Critical Reviews for Research and Teaching* (Washington D.C.: American Anthropological Association, 1989).
9. N. Ginsburg, "The Great City of Southeast Asia," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.60 No.5 (1955), p.455.
10. H.-D. Evers and R. Korff, *Southeast Asian Urbanism: The Meanings and Power of Social Space* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2000).
11. The city is comprised of eight urban and rural khan, or districts. The rural districts are often described as the suburbs, while the urban ones are considered to compose the city proper.
12. J. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1998), p.88; and D. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry Into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p.35.
13. G. Müller, *Colonial Cambodia's "Bad Frenchmen": The Rise of French Rule and the Life of Thomas Caraman, 1840–87* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp.63–64.
14. Igout, *Phnom Penh*, p.6.
15. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p.160.
16. Igout, *Phnom Penh*, p.6.
17. Ibid., p.3.
18. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p.16.
19. Ibid., p.2.
20. Edwards, *Cambodge*, pp.7,12.
21. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1991 [1983]), p.24.
22. E. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), pp.232–33.
23. D. Gregory, *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p.18.
24. G. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg, eds., *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988).
25. E. Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.1.
26. Edwards, *Cambodge*, p.48.
27. Rabinow, *French Modern*.
28. Edwards, *Cambodge*, pp.59–60.
29. S. Hamadeh, "Creating the Traditional City: A French Project," in N. AlSayyad, ed., *Forms of Dominance: On the Architecture and Urbanism of the Colonial Enterprise* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), pp.246–47.
30. Wright, *The Politics of Design*, p.11.
31. Edwards, *Cambodge*, p.45.
32. M. Osborne, *Before Kampuchea: Preludes to Tragedy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979) p.103.
33. G. Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Towards a History of a Vanishing Present* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); and Rabinow, *French Modern*.
34. Edwards, *Cambodge*, pp.29,37–38.
35. Ibid., p.8.
36. Rabinow, *French Modern*.
37. Willmott, "History and Sociology of the Chinese in Cambodia," p.26n33. Edwards dates this to 1867 in *Cambodge*, p.56.
38. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p.143.
39. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*; and S. Thion, *Watching Cambodia: Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1993), pp.29–30.
40. In an 1889 speech cited in Edwards, *Cambodge*, p.47.
41. P. Norindr, *Phantasmatic Indochina: French Colonial Ideology in Architecture, Film, and Literature* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), p.1
42. P. Gourou, *Land Utilization in French Indochina [L'utilisation du sol en Indochine Française]* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), p.7.
43. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p.164.
44. W.E. Willmott, *The Chinese in Cambodia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1967), p.45,69; and Müller, *Colonial Cambodia's "Bad Frenchmen,"* p.187.
45. Cited in Müller, *Colonial Cambodia's "Bad Frenchmen,"* p.190.
46. Cited in Müller, *Colonial Cambodia's "Bad Frenchmen,"* p.65. Thion, in *Watching Cambodia*, p.29, noted that Article 9 of the same 1884 convention stated: "the land of the kingdom up until today the exclusive property of the Crown, will no longer be inalienable. The French and Cambodian authorities will proceed to establish private property in Cambodia."
47. Müller, *Colonial Cambodia's "Bad Frenchmen,"* pp.63,66.
48. Thion, *Watching Cambodia*, cited on p.29.
49. Igout, *Phnom Penh*, p.8.
50. Müller, *Colonial Cambodia's "Bad Frenchmen,"* pp.87–88.
51. Edwards, *Cambodge*, p.47, citing "Le Cambodge en 1893."
52. D. Scott, "Colonial Governmentality," *Social Text*, Vol.43, p.204.
53. M. Foucault, *A History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Volume I* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), pp.140–147; and M. Foucault, "Governmentality," in J. Faubion, ed., *Michel Foucault: Power* (New York: New Press, 2000), p.220.
54. D.J. Steinberg, *Cambodia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven, CN: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1959), p.13.
55. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p.148.
56. E. Becker, *When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and Its People* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p.56.
57. Wright, *The Politics of Design*, p.54.
58. Ibid.; and Rabinow, *French Modern*.
59. D.M. Bréelle, "The Regional Discourse of French Geography in the Context of Indochina: The Theses of Charles Robequain and Pierre Gourou," Ph.D. diss., Flinders University of South Australia, 2002, p.128.
60. Igout, *Phnom Penh*, p.12.
61. C. Blancot, "Phnom Penh: Defying Man and Nature," in M. Askew and W. Logan, eds., *Cultural Identity and Urban Change in Southeast Asia: Interpretative Essays* (Geelong: Deakin University Press, 1994), p.75.
62. Wright, *The Politics of Design*, p.166.
63. Igout, *Phnom Penh*, pp.12,85.
64. N. AlSayyad, "Urbanism and the Dominance Equation: Reflections on Colonialism and National Identity," in AlSayyad, ed., *Forms of Dominance*.
65. T. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
66. I. Muan, "Citing Angkor: The 'Cambodian Arts' in the Age of Restoration 1918–2000," Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2001.

67. Wright, *The Politics of Design*, pp.15–20,294–97.
68. Edwards, *Cambodge*, p.27.
69. Becker, *When the War Was Over*, pp.182–83.
70. S. Clement-Charpentier, "Rebirth of a Capital Which Was Deserted: The Case of Phnom Penh," International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments Working Paper Series, Vol.76 (1994), p.85.
71. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p.200.
72. H.G. Ross and D.L. Collins, *Building Cambodia: New Khmer Architecture 1953–1970* (Bangkok: The Key Publisher, 2006).
73. M. Kalab, "Study of a Cambodian village," *The Geographical Journal*, Vol.134 No.4 (December 1968), p.535.
74. Norodom Sihanouk's 1961 address to the Sixth World Congress of Buddhists in Phnom Penh, cited in Ross and Collins, *Building Cambodia*, p.9.
75. D. Ly and I. Muan, *Cultures of Independence: An Introduction to Cambodian Arts and Culture in the 1950s and 1960s* (Phnom Penh: Reyum, 2001); and A. Thompson "Preface," in V. Molyvann, *Modern Khmer Cities* (Phnom Penh: Reyum, 2003), p.v.
76. Muan, "Citing Angkor."
77. J.H. Chang, "An Other Modern Architecture: Postcolonial Spectacles, Cambodian Nationalism and Khmer Traditions," *Journal of the Singapore Institute of Architects* (2009).
78. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*.
79. Steinberg, *Cambodia*, p.31.
80. *Time*, "Danger and Opportunity in Indochina," March 30, 1970.
81. B. Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930–1975* (London: Verso, 1985), p.15.
82. K.G. Frieson, "The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants: 1970–1975," Ph.D. diss., Monash University, 1992, p.156; and Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, pp.xi–xii.
83. The lower figure is cited in Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, p.xii; Frieson, "The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants," citing Ministry of Health's 1971 estimate, p.156; and W.E. Willmott, "The Chinese in Kampuchea," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol.12 No.1 (March 1981), p.41. The higher figure comes from G. Curtis, "Cambodia: A Country Profile," report prepared for the Swedish International Development Authority (August 1989).
84. Clement-Charpentier, "Rebirth of a Capital Which Was Deserted," pp.79–80; and K. Beng Hong, "Phnom Penh: The Functions of a City," paper prepared by the municipality of Phnom Penh for the "Families in the Face of Urbanisation" conference in New Delhi (November 1985).
85. K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (London: Penguin Books, 1967 [1848]), p.84.
86. Edwards, *Cambodge*, pp.1–2.
87. M. Vickery, "Cambodian Political Economy, 1975–1990," *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, Vol.14 No.3 (1990), p.23.
88. Kampuchean Inquiry Commission, *Kampuchea in the Seventies* (Helsinki: Finnish Inquiry Commission, 1982), p.32.
89. A. Mbembe, "Necropolitics," *Public Culture*, Vol.15 No.1 (2003), p.39.
90. Ibid., p.20.
91. D. Collins, "From the Ground Up: Phnom Penh Streetscapes," *AsiaLife Phnom Penh* (August 2007).
92. M. Ebihara, "Svay: A Khmer Village in Cambodia," Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1968, p.18.
93. Molyvann, *Modern Khmer Cities*.
94. Igout, *Phnom Penh*, p.11; and Blancot, "Phnom Penh," p.75.
95. K. Beng Hong, *La résurrection de la ville de Phnom Penh après la libération du 7 Janvier 1979*, Préparé par La Délégation de la Capitale de Phnom Penh à l'occasion du 750è anniversaire de Berlin (RDA), Comité Populaire Révolutionnaire de la Capital de Phnom Penh, République Populaire du Kampuchea Indépendance-Paix-Liberté-Bonheur (May 1987).
96. Igout, *Phnom Penh*.
97. K. Beng Hong Socheat, "Patterns of Squatting in Phnom Penh: An Evaluation of the Socio-economic Characteristics of Squatters and Their Reasons for Squatting," Ph.D. diss., University of London, 2000, p.42.
98. International Monetary Fund, *Cambodia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 06/265* (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, July 2006), p.60.
99. Beng Hong, "Patterns of Squatting in Phnom Penh," p.42.
100. Municipalité de Phnom Penh, Bureau des Affaires Urbaines, "Livre Blanc du Développement et de L'aménagement de Phnom Penh: Diagonistic Economique, Social et Environmental Tendances, Prospective et Orientations Avant-Project de Schema Directeur d'Urbanisme de Phnom Penh 2020," Rapport Final (October 2007).
101. S. Nguon and S. Strangio, "Last Sunset on Boeung Kak Lake as Developers Move in," *Phnom Penh Post*, August 13, 2008.
102. Beng Hong, "Patterns of Squatting in Phnom Penh."
103. *The Economist*, "Cambodia's Disappearing Capital: Lake Inferior," January 29, 2009.
104. L. Cochrane. "Planning a Healthy Future for Boeung Kak 'Cesspit,'" *Phnom Penh Post*, October 24, 2003.
105. Beng Hong, *La résurrection de la ville de Phnom Penh*.
106. Beng Hong, "Patterns of Squatting in Phnom Penh," pp.40–42.
107. Ibid., pp.110,189–91.
108. Ibid., p.21.
109. Ross and Collins, *Building Cambodia*, p.16.
110. Ly and Muan, *Cultures of Independence*, pp.157–66.
111. GS Engineering and Construction, "Investor Relations," *International Finance Complex Phnom Penh* (June 2008).
112. S. Kurczy, "Cambodia Shares the Pain," *Asia Times Online*, February 10, 2009; and T. Sturrock, "Boom to Bust in Cambodia," *Asia Times Online*, March 7, 2009.
113. Interview by author with GS senior manager and visit to site in July 2009.
114. Roy and Ong, *Worlding Cities*.
115. Y.-T. Hsing, *Making Capitalism in China: The Taiwan Connection* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); and G. Shatkin, "'Fourth World' Cities in the Global Economy: The Case of Phnom Penh," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol.22 No.3 (September 1998).
116. A. Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Hsing, *Making Capitalism in China*; and K. Mitchell, *Crossing the Neoliberal Line: Pacific Rim Migration and the Metropolis* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004).
117. Y. Lee, Yoolim and N. Ismail, "Cambodia: Capitalism Takes Root," *Bloomberg.com*, October 2008.
118. Interview by author, February 5, 2009.
119. S. Nam, "Speculative Urbanism: The Remaking of Phnom Penh," Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, forthcoming.

Book Reviews



Living with Heritage in Cairo: Area Conservation in the Arab-Islamic City. Ahmed Sedky. Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press, 2009. 320 pp., b&w illus.

There is a great need throughout the Middle East and North Africa for contemporary urban research that goes beyond classical analysis of the traditional Arab City. Important topics include urban transformation, the flow of global capital and its affect on urban realities, urban structures and polity, changes in social life and lines of inclusion and exclusion, and such "metropolitization" forces as migration, slum formation, and neoliberal investment.

Living with Heritage in Cairo attempts to move in such a direction, skillfully investigating the history, politics and reality of contemporary urban conservation. Its author, Ahmed Sedky, spent some ten years conducting field research in cities of the Arab world. His specific emphasis here on the deterioration of Cairo's ancient fabric grows from and reflects this larger research effort. Through its various sections, the book addresses the difficulty of projects in areas such as Bab al-Nasr, Al-Darb al-Asfar, al-Tumbakshiya, Al-Mu'izz Street, Al-Azhar Square and al-Ghuriya, al-Batniya, and Darb al-Ahmar. As the title suggests, Sedky considers the problem to be an ongoing and dynamic one.

The book is particularly strong in its investigation of competing interests in area conservation efforts. Sedky has divided stakeholders into three general groups. First is what he calls the "U" group: local users and inhabitants whose main concern is to continue to occupy heritage areas in traditional ways. Next is the "W" group: international organizations and institutions such as UNESCO and ICOMOS, which claim to represent the interests of the world community. Third is the "N" group: city and national institutions and organizations, such as the Egyptian Ministries of Culture, Awqaf, and Tourism, whose interests and responsibilities often conflict with those of the first two.

In Part One ("What to Conserve"), Sedky investigates the meaning of historic Cairo. He describes the old city as an Arab-Islamic phenomenon, defines its cultural significance, identifies its key values, and assesses the dilapidated condition of its historic areas. He then addresses the cultural, demographic and urban transformation of Cairo over the last several centuries. A typical Arab-Islamic city at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Cairo underwent Westernization during the era of Khedive Isma'il (1863–79), a neo-Islamic revival at the turn of the twentieth century, and a later turn to social modernity, especially during the Nasser era after the revolution of 1952. The first section of the book also looks at the general meaning of the city's historic areas for the three stakeholder groups. The "U" group (residents) cherish values of place, associated lifestyle, and functional authenticity (a living tradition); the "N" group (national organizations) are preoccupied with physical qualities and with enforcing "sanitized" versions of conservation policies and practices; and the "W" group (international organizations) focus on Cairo's value for all humanity and prioritize more social and humane approaches to historic preservation.

In Part Two ("How to Conserve"), Sedky moves to a discussion of contemporary international theories, concepts and processes, based on his field research not only in Cairo but also in such cities as Amman and Salt in Jordan; Damascus and Aleppo in Syria; Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli in Lebanon; Tunis and Qairawan in Tunisia; and Istanbul in Turkey. He reviews Western concepts of area conservation, discussing various schools of thought (e.g., English, Italian, French); he examines the impact of various conventions and charters (e.g., Venice, Burra, Nara, and regional Arab-Islamic ones); and he skillfully discusses

important issues such as authenticity, integrity, sustainability and gentrification. The second part of the book also addresses historic area appraisal, designation and management, and the difficulty of establishing effective community participation, and it addresses funding mechanisms and the problematic role of foreign donor agencies in area conservation and urban rehabilitation in the Arab world.

The discussion here is based on a diverse set of case studies from a variety of settings, Arab and non-Arab. These are helpful, but they could have delved more deeply into a number of issues, including the politics of various financing methods, the pros and cons of tourism-led projects, and the role of donor agencies in initiating projects and defining their goals. The discussion also could have examined in greater detail conflicts between donor agencies and other stakeholders such as local communities, urban activists, and national governments. And, in terms of the Arab world, it could have addressed the role of local families, philanthropists, and urban activists in the rehabilitation of cities such as Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Amman, where such actors are playing an increasingly crucial role, which has not yet been fully researched.

In Part Three ("Assessment of Area Conservation in Cairo") Sedky presents an in-depth analysis of the history and politics of area conservation in Cairo. He begins by assessing the history of these efforts since the 1930s. He looks at the slum clearance of the 1950s and the role of the Ministry of Housing in the 1970s, the efforts of UNESCO at both theoretical and practical levels, and the national awareness of urban rehabilitation and area conservation that emerged after the earthquake of 1992. He then investigates the involvement of the "U," "W," and "N" stakeholder groups and their achievements vis-à-vis a variety of projects in the city. He discusses how different values and interests, levels of involvement, and [preferred mechanisms of power underlie the different approaches they have adopted.

In the "N" group, the author addresses the role of the Cairo governorate and its different departments, the Egyptian Ministry of Housing and related bodies such as the Fatimid Cairo Organization, the Ministry of Culture and related bodies such as Historic Cairo Organization, the Ministries of Awqaf (religious endowments) and Tourism, and the Ministry of IT and Communication, including the Bibliotheca Alexandrina. In the "U" group, he addresses the role of various activists and community representatives, as well as community-based organizations and NGOs such as al-Darb al-Ahmar Development Limited. In the "W" group, he addresses the involvement of international organizations such as UNESCO, ICOMOS, and various foreign-aid agencies including JICA (Japanese) and GTZ (German).

It soon becomes apparent how frequently these actors and organizations find themselves in conflict with one another on issues of setting, functional authenticity, integrity, and approach. Furthermore, in many cases local authorities from the "N" group lack adequate background in the general history and typological and morphological characteristics of Cairo — let alone theories and practices of urban rehabilitation and area conservation.

The book concludes with an extensive list of resources on historic Cairo and area conservation in addition to a synopsis of international and regional charters and conventions of heritage and area conservation.

I would like to conclude by offering a few recommendations for future work on area conservation in the Arab world. First, since area conservation is not well institutionalized in local practice, I recommend that such work tackle specific case studies, with an emphasis on the design process and obstacles to implementation. This should include examination of project initiation, stakeholder interests (including those of project designers), implementation mechanisms, and realities. Second, I strongly recommend that future work evaluate the complicated relationship between the avant-garde narratives of designers and urban activists and the practices of local communities or government stakeholders that result in "kitsch." Third, it is crucial to address the ramifications of ignorance among agents and actors at the national level, especially when it comes to the theory and practice of heritage and area conservation and to understanding the historic fabric of cities in terms of evolution and cultural change. Fourth, I recommend addressing, through detailed case study, the politics of donor agencies and their involvement in area conservation projects. Finally, it is crucial to address problems surrounding the definition and appreciation of urban heritage in the Arab world. For example, there is currently little attention to the heritage of modernity and to more recent heritage sites. But there are other problems and obstacles, too, in particular a present lack of cultural and political leadership.

Rami Farouk Daher
Jordan University of Science and Technology

Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design. Greg Castillo.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010. 312 pages, 97 b&w photos.



My father, who held a Ph.D. in literature and was a member of the Union of Soviet Writers, once stole a book. It happened in 1959 at the American exhibition in Moscow. The American guides did not mind. In fact, they encouraged him. But at the exit, he was stopped by two plain-clothes KGB agents, and the book was confiscated.

Recently, I was telling this story to Jack Masey, who, while working for the American Information Agency (USIA), had been the chief coordinator of the exhibition (see the video at http://paperny.com/Jack_Masey_books.mov).

"We wanted people like your father to steal books," Jack told me. "He was our audience."

To understand the full meaning of this episode, one must read Greg Castillo's *Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design*. The book describes the Cold War duel of two globalization projects, American and Russian, concentrating on the less-known "soft power" battles. Castillo borrows the term from the political scientist Joseph Nye, who defined "soft power" as the product of intangibles like culture, values, belief systems, and perceived moral authority.

Unlike the American globalization project, Soviet soft power has remained a terra incognita of contemporary cultural theory. However, this book offers a well-researched and convincingly narrated story of what the cultural historian György Péteri called "the largest deliberately designed experiment in globalization in modern history."

The book starts with a quotation from an obscure 1951 parody, "The Nylon War," by a famous sociologist, David Riesman:

> *Behind the initial raid of June 1 were years of secret and complex preparations, and an idea of disarming simplicity: that if allowed to sample the riches of America, the Russian people would not long tolerate masters who gave them tanks and spies instead of vacuum cleaners and beauty parlors. The Russian rulers would thereupon be forced to turn out consumer goods or face mass discontent on an increasing scale.*

Surprisingly, many Americans took the joke seriously (just as some years before they had believed Orson Welles's radio drama of a Martian invasion). Even more surprisingly, writes Castillo, "less than a decade after its publication, Riesman's lampoon came to seem prophetic." Advising on 1959 exhibition planning, Llewellyn Thompson, the U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R., proposed that the displays "endeavor to make the Soviet people dissatisfied with the share of the Russian pie which they now receive, and make them realize that the slight improvements projected in their standard of living are only a drop in the bucket compared to what they could and should have."

The 1959 exhibition became a Trojan horse. Cars, stoves and refrigerators were aimed at "ordinary Russian citizens," while books and abstract paintings targeted the "more politically alert and potentially most influential citizens" (i.e., people like my father), as specified in a classified USIA report.

Castillo traces the home-front battles in two major locations: Berlin and Moscow. After the introduction of the Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program), Berlin became ground zero in a consumer propaganda war. And the aesthetic lingua franca of the Marshall Plan was International Style modernism, which, as Castillo stresses, "was anything but typical for American household consumers."

Americans' first major exposure to the International Style had been the 1932 MoMA show "The International Style: Architecture Since 1922," organized by Philip Johnson after his seminal 1928 meeting with the Bauhaus's Mies van der Rohe. Paradoxically, the initial G.D.R. (East German) response to the American cultural offensive was to claim that same Bauhaus tradition as its own.

The U.S.S.R. reluctantly accepted the rules of the game offered by the U.S. In Berlin, said Nikita Krushchev, "the comparison is made, which order creates better material conditions: that of West Germany or East Germany." But eventually, under the insistence of Soviet bosses, the soft power offensive of modernism in East Germany gave way to a bizarre version of Socialist Realism. Erection of the infamous Berlin wall in 1961 could be read as a sign of the complete surrender of the soft power battlefield. The official Soviet line on consumer goods from that time on was best described by the writer Vsevolod Kochetov: "Mass-stamping toilet bowls is much easier than hammering out the New Man."

The 1959 American exhibition in Moscow, Jack Masey told me, was an organizational and logistical miracle. The Soviet-American agreement for the exhibition was signed on September 10, 1958. The exhibition opened on July 23, 1959. Within ten months, Jack's team had to develop a concept, raise the money ($4 million), plan the territory (40,000 sq.m.), design and build two major pavilions including Buckminster Fuller's geodesic dome, design and produce a multi-screen show, as well as accomplish hundreds of other tasks.

How was it possible, I asked Jack, to do so much so quickly for so little money? It was the enormous enthusiasm, he answered, for converting foe into friend. Plus, he added, he managed to recruit very talented people, including such design greats as Fuller, George Nelson, and Charles and Ray Eames — some of them for little or no money.

It worked. "As fantasized in Riesman's fictional 'Nylon War'," Castillo writes, "an unsustainable escalation of consumer desires, fueled by Western lifestyle comparison at times explicitly promoted by the Party leaders, bankrupted state socialism." My father got disillusioned with communism, wrote some sharp political satire, got expelled from the Party, and, even though he never left the country, blessed my decision to emigrate.

Greg Castillo's book is not a triumphalist history celebrating the American Way of Life. The winning globalization project, based on unlimited consumption, has created its own series of disasters. Perhaps it's time to reexamine the European response to the battle of two globalizations and search for something in the middle. That, to me, is the lesson of Castillo's useful and timely investigation. ■

Vladimir Paperny
Marina del Rey, CA

Pride in Modesty: Modernist Architecture and the Vernacular Tradition in Italy. Michelangelo Sabatino. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010. 368 pp., b&w illus.



That vernacular architecture might be a source of inspiration to avant-garde architects seeking to break away from the strictures of academic tradition is one of the central tropes in the historiography of modernism. This position was neatly glossed by Ludwig Hevesi, the art critic and promoter of the Vienna Secession, when he proclaimed that "peasant styles were always secessionist, for they know nothing about academic theory." For Northern European architects, the sacred spring of this evocative, untainted architecture was the vernacular of the Mediterranean basin, especially the area around the Bay of Naples, where Josef Hoffmann, Le Corbusier, and others found an autonomous and deeply rooted architecture that partly inspired the flat roofs, unadorned walls, and geometric abstraction of the modernist formula. While architectural historians have long studied how Northern European architects sought inspiration in Southern and Central European peasant architecture, far fewer have focused on the rediscovery and appropriation of the same material by Italian modernist architects themselves. Michelangelo Sabatino's *Pride in Modesty* addresses this want by deftly revealing the ways Italian architects were influenced by the varied regional building traditions of the peninsula. The result is a successful attempt "to trace an alternative genealogy of the spaces and places of Italian modernist architecture of the twentieth century" (208).

One of the strengths of Sabatino's book is its broad chronological scope, examining the six decades between the 1910s and the early 1970s. In doing so, the author counters the periodization of many studies of Italian modernism, which bracket the *ventennio fascista* from the preceding and following years, even though a number of the most important architects had careers spanning the entire period. Among them was Marcello Piacentini, the key arbiter of architectural culture under the Fascist regime. Among other activities, he oversaw the master plan of Sabatino's first case study, the 1911 exhibition celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Italian republic. A part of that exhibition was given over to an "Exhibition of Italian Ethnography" that included reconstructions of vernacular houses from across Italy, on the model of Arthur Hazelius's Skansen, an open-air museum founded in Stockholm in 1891.

The interest in vernacular architecture at the time followed from a broader ethnographic and anthropological

recovery and revival of regional folk traditions, customs, and cultural forms, which sought to foster national pride and unity through the concept of *Italianità* — supposedly authentic manifestations of the Italic race. Therefore, the vernacular was not simply an aesthetic category; it also had moral and political overtones that associated preindustrial peasant culture with a mythopoeic period of unity and cultural purity. In his first chapter, Sabatino explains that this exhibition brought the vernacular into greater prominence, establishing it "as an alternative to more traditional expressions of Italian identity based on classicism" (49). The following chapter then traces the deepening "picturesque revival" of rustic forms in the years after the World War I, when Piacentini and Gustavo Giovannoni promoted the idea of "minor architecture" in numerous publications, a movement which took form in the garden suburbs of Garbatella and Aniene in Rome.

Chapters 3 and 4 in Sabatino's book tackle more familiar terrain, namely the vexing question of the relationship between Rationalist architects and Fascist politics. Under the heading "*Tabula Rasa* and Tradition," Sabatino centers his discussion on the island of Capri, whose primitive buildings provided a way for both Futurists and Rationalists to escape historicism and proclaim their vernacular-inspired modernism to be inherently Italian. This last quality was a necessary condition of professional survival when chauvinism and patriotic enthusiasm for empire made foreign cultural influence anathema. At the same time, the vernacular's matter-of-fact functionalism, seemingly effortless responsiveness to its environment, and lack of superfluous detail were seen to contain important lessons for contemporary practice.

This was the explicit message of the Exhibition of Italian Rural Architecture organized by Giuseppe Pagano and Guarniero Daniel at the 1936 Milan Triennale. However, in an otherwise excellent discussion, the author makes the questionable claim that recourse to the vernacular was a form of "resistance" to Fascist doctrine and an antidote to the "bombastic classicism" of official architecture. This is perplexing given that romantic primitivism was a hallmark of Fascist policy, and that, as Sabatino readily admits, Pagano and many of the most prominent Rationalists were committed Fascists. Part of the confusion may stem from the fact that his emphasis on the vernacular leads to a one-dimensional characterization of classicizing architecture, which was arguably as polymorphous as vernacular modernism.

The final chapter of *Pride in Modesty* traces the continuing vitality of Italy's vernacular tradition in post-World War II architecture, especially its use as a model for public housing and contemporary urbanism. For example, the irregular form of the traditional hilltown was emulated in a number of projects, such as Ludovico Quaroni's village of La Martella (1951), an influence that lent a sense of the incidental and spontaneous to the master plan.

Though tantalizingly brief, this survey also addresses the continuity in the careers and concerns of Modernist architects as they navigated the transition from the Fascist to postwar periods. "Like an underground river that meanders through the crevices of the bedrock, only to surface occasionally and disappear once again, the ubiquitous presence of vernacular architecture was a continuous presence in Italian modernist architecture and design," Sabatino writes (196). His eloquent and significant study of this lineage establishes and develops the critical ground that will serve as a benchmark for future research. ■

Andrew J. Manson
University of Kentucky

Design with Microclimate: The Secret to Comfortable Outdoor Space. Robert D. Brown. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2010. 179 pp., b&w illus.



Whether by necessity or by choice, people throughout history have used outdoor spaces for activities such as meals, community meetings, contemplative thinking, and visiting with friends. However, as building strategies have progressed to create fine-tuned, controlled environments, people have been drawn indoors for easier comfort. The vast majority of lives in the United States are now spent inside. This increased thermal convenience, in partnership with altered contexts and methods of planning, building design, and material use, has resulted in less populated and less comfortable outdoor spaces.

In *Design with Microclimate,* Robert Brown masterfully outlines the various complexities and considerations embedded in creating comfortable, usable and even popular outdoor spaces. His goal is to encourage designers to think holistically as they strive to design meaningful places. Though once integrated into local designs through trial and error over time, responses to complicated issues of temperature, moisture, wind, and other environmental variables have been culturally forgotten and are now often absent from the design process. Unfortunately, these criteria deeply affect outdoor environments, specifically those associated with structures in the landscape, and their omission is adversely effecting our designed environments.

In this volume Brown breaks down the intricacies of atmospheric physics into easily understandable criteria and illustrates strategies to apply them. His first chapter, "Experiential," compiles examples from his experiences to illustrate how inhabitants of different contexts have adapted their environments to be comfortable and successful. Among other sources, his examples are drawn from his childhood in Canada, travels through Africa, and research endeavors in Italy. Using this material, Brown capitalizes on his gift of narrative to connect conditions of atmospheric physics to design strategies and considerations. At times the flow and transition between stories is difficult to follow and the extensive narratives distract from the message and substance. However, the conceptual framework provided through the stories substantially illustrates the historical and community value of well-designed outdoor spaces, and is helpful in understanding the principles and details that follow.

The narratives in chapter one lay the groundwork for Brown's "enduring microclimate hypothesis." Simply stated, this is that "Landscapes that create positive microclimates are likely to endure, while negative microclimates are likely to be removed or replaced over time." Unpacking this further, Brown focuses on the "energy budget" of a space at the core of his conversation. Much like the carbon-neutral discussion in building design, Brown breaks down different energy paths into and out of a designed outdoor space to establish the criteria for creating a truly comfortable space.

Following the examples and the statement of this thesis, chapter two, "Vernacular," reviews various instances in which microclimates have historically been understood, often through trial and error, by indigenous and native peoples. Through a series of examples set in assorted climates around the world, Brown validates the importance of microclimate consideration in design throughout history.

Chapter three, "Components," and Chapter four, "Modification," then break down the structure of the hypothesis. Chapter three outlines the separate components of microclimates to enable designers to appropriately and knowledgeably incorporate these elements into their designs. With subsections of "Big Picture," "Air Temperature," "Humidity," "Solar Radiation," "Terrestrial Radiation," "Wind," "Precipitation," and "Energy Budgets," it reviews the concepts integral to Brown's position.

Chapter four builds additional depth with two subsections, entitled "Critical Component Design" and "Process." The latter is where the proverbial rubber hits the road. Addressing issues of "Climate," "Precedents," "Microclimate Modification through Design," "Communication," and "Evaluation," Brown walks the reader through specific considerations needed to establish an energy balance, and therefore create comfortable outdoor space. The steps and concepts are fairly easy to follow, providing a nice roadmap for outdoor space design.

Brown's final chapter, "Principles and Guidelines," is intended as "a chapter where the key information [is] summarized and easily accessed." It succeeds wonderfully at this. In essence, it functions as a *CliffNotes* for the whole book, listing bullet points for "Main Concepts" as well as sections on "Understanding and Modifying Radiation," "Understanding and Modifying Wind," "Understanding and Modifying Air Temperature and Humidity," and the "Effect of Landscape Elements." In an additional section titled "Quick Reference," Brown compiles all key information relating to the orientation of a site into a series of tables that are clear, simple and concise.

Design with Microclimate provides a valuable resource for anyone involved with designing buildings, outdoor spaces, and landscapes, regardless of role or experience level. It is particularly applicable to students and professionals engaged in the design process itself. However, project managers, project architects, and contractors would also gain from reference to it during implementation. Brown's "enduring microclimate hypothesis" is rooted in valued and time-tested local examples; the posited hypothesis is extremely pertinent; and the presentation succeeds at clearly outlining the concepts needed to design valued and poignant spaces. ■

Traci Rose Rider
North Carolina State University, Raleigh

Biophilic Cities: Integrating Nature into Urban Design and Planning. Timothy Beatley. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2010. 208 pp., b&w illus.



Architects, landscape architects, and city planners will likely be eager to dive into Timothy Beatley's latest offering. A long-time advocate of creative strategies by which cities and towns can reduce their ecological footprints and become more livable and equitable, he is the author of numerous books, including *Green Urbanism: Learning from European Cities* (1999). Yet while *Biophilic Cities* provides a convincing argument for integrating "nature" into cities, from a practitioner's perspective, it is lacking in detail, depth, and practical value. At approximately half the size of *Green Urbanism*, *Biophilic Cities* is written in a similarly persuasive, "overview" format, but does not reverberate as strongly as this earlier volume.

At its outset, the book is hampered by recourse to the age-old and problematic dichotomy of "nature" and "culture." It is prefaced with statements that emphasize that society and culture should attempt to mirror what exists in the "natural" biosphere, and it seeks to distinguish between what is "nature" and what is "culture" — insisting that there is not enough of the former in cities. In a pure ecological context, "nature-culture" cannot be so divided; rather, they are complex, interacting systems. Beatley clearly prioritizes the sociobiologist's perspective, as emphasized by E.O. Wilson's conspicuous foreword. And, as such, the book falls prey to the fallacy of environmental determinism. Yet, despite this conceptual misstep, the author eventually calls for rapprochement between "nature" and "culture," generating at least the wish for a more holistic, integrated landscape.

Chapter one begins on a strong note. Beatley clearly outlines the argument for biophilic cities. He contends that the majority of Americans don't understand how cities can support much "nature," and he cites various studies that outline how sedentary lifestyles have created problems, especially a lack of outdoor stimulation, a rise in obesity, and new Vitamin D deficiencies. In this regard, the book is excellent at bringing together environment-behavior studies and summarizing the latest in environmental-psychology research. Irrespective of the book's mainly descriptive format, Beatley does a solid job outlining this debate, mixing ongoing academic research and current case studies.

Chapter two describes the range of urban biodiversity and urban nature that has adaptive advantages. Here, Beatley draws extensively on Sim Van Der Ryn and Stuart Cowan's *Ecological Design* (1996) and Janine Benyus's *Biomimicry* (1997), to whom, to be fair, he does pay homage later in the book. One fascinating example of a species that adapts to its environment is the "water bear" or "moss piglet." This creature shrivels and dries up out of water, but rehydrates and swells to life when rain falls, a process called "anhydrobiosis." In addition, Beatley mentions several other "bio-indicator" species from which urban designers and architects can learn strategies of resiliency.

Next, Beatley tackles what a biophilic city really is. Criteria such as access to "nature," multisensory environments, and stewardship are requirements for a sustainable city. Successful architectural projects that have made use of environmental design, such as the Harare-Eastgate Center by Michael Pearce, are identified as notable precedents. However, projects in development, such as Masdar City (the performance of which has yet to be determined), are prematurely cited as excellent initiatives. Antoni Gaudi's work can obviously be classified as biophilic, but lumping work by Zaha Hadid and Santiago Calatrava into the same "ecological" camp is somewhat questionable.

In chapter four, Beatley outlines recent projects representative of biophilic urban design and planning. Here he draws mainly on Cynthia Girling and Ronald Kellet's *Skinny Streets and Green Neighborhoods* (2005) to provide planners and designers with a framework for gauging biophilic scale. Topics in this section include regional planning, urban forestry, streets and infrastructure, urban agriculture, car-free developments, green buildings and roofs . . . even biophilic schools. The list goes on. . . .

The last chapter, which addresses new tools and institutions to foster biophilic cities, would seemingly provide the most utility to planners, although the mechanisms are described only cursorily. Beatley is correct in acknowledging that physical "green" design will only go so far, and that more regulation and incentives for biophilic planning are needed. Importantly, Beatley mentions that overcoming cultural and social obstacles to biophilic cities is harder than addressing regulatory barriers, which explains why Europe has advanced more quickly in this endeavor than North America.

In short, Beatley's book is not as visionary as one might hope, except that he conceptually extends Wilson's concept of "biophilia" to describe advances in sustainable urbanism over the past ten to fifteen years. Overall, the focus seems to be on providing many examples rather than engaging in a detailed examination of process or quality. The emphasis and interest in education and "nature" seems to be genuine. But this book is perhaps best suited as a starting point for examining biophilic case studies. One might hope that future work will assess the performance of strategies outlined here more critically. ■

Nicola Szibbo
University of California, Berkeley

Conferences and Events

UPCOMING CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA AND SEMINARS

***"Nationalism and the City,"* Cambridge, U.K.:** February 10–11, 2012. This conference aims to "re-center" the urban in theories of nations and nationalism, facilitating a dialogue across disciplines to address the many layers of what has been described as "the urban palimpsest." For more information, please visit: http://www.crassh.cam.ac.uk/events/1684/.

***"Architecture for Leisure in Post-War Europe (1945–1989),"* Leuven, Belgium:** February 17–18, 2012. Organized by the Department of Architecture, Urbanism and Planning, K.U. Leuven, this conference will explore modernization, the rise of bureaucratic planning institutions, and the democratization of leisure in Europe. For more information, please visit: http://www.architectureforleisure.be/.

***"Contemporary Vernaculars: Places, Processes and Manifestations,"* Famagusta, Cyprus:** April 9–21, 2012. The Sixth International Seminar on Vernacular Settlements (ISVS) will be hosted by the Eastern Mediterranean University and will explore the juxtaposition of "historical" and "contemporary" vernacular. For more information, please visit: http://isvs-6.emu.edu.tr.

***"Still Architecture: Photography, Vision and Cultural Transmission,"* Cambridge, U.K.:** May 3–5, 2012. A University of Cambridge, Department of Architecture, Centenary Event, the conference analyzes the potentialities of photography as a source of creative imagination and as a tool for spatial knowledge, aiming to develop a novel interpretation of architecture from avant-garde movements to present. Deadline for abstract submission: December 18, 2011. For more information, please visit: http://www.crassh.cam.ac.uk/events/1707/.

***"High-Tech Heritage: How Are Digital Technologies Changing Our Views of the Past?"* Amherst, MA:** May 2–4, 2012. Organized by the U. Mass. Amherst Center for Heritage & Society, this conference will bring together academics, museologists, digital specialists, heritage professionals, and community leaders to examine the achievements, opportunities, and serious social challenges of digital heritage. Abstract deadline: December 15, 2011. For more information, please visit: http://scholarworks.umass.edu/hightechheritage/.

***International Conference on Urban Design Theory and Practice in Iran Since the Late 1950s*, Sanandaj, Iran:** May 16–18, 2012. The first international conference on questions related to theory and practice of urban design in Iran will be co-hosted by the University of Kurdistan and Birmingham City University. For more information, please visit: http://urbdesign.uok.ac.ir/.

***Architecture "Live Projects" Pedagogy International Symposium*, Oxford, U.K.:** May 24–26, 2012. The Oxford Brookes International Symposium for 2012 will be a three-day event by and for live-project educators, community participants, and students; architects involved in community co-design; university management involved in community partnerships; and practitioners and participants from associated fields. For more information, please visit: http://architecture.brookes.ac.uk/events/240512.html.

***European Architectural History Network, International Meeting*, Brussels, Belgium:** May 31–June 3, 2012. The second meeting of the EAHN proposes to increase the visibility of the discipline; foster transnational, interdisciplinary and multicultural approaches to the study of the built environment; and facilitate the exchange of research results in the field. For more information, please visit: http://eahn2012.org/.

***"HERITAGE 2012": Third International Conference on Heritage and Sustainable Development*, Porto, Portugal:** June 19–22, 2012. Heritage 2012 will gather international academics and researchers working on the relationships between heritage and sustainable development. For more information, please visit: http://heritage2012.greenlines-institute.org/H2012website/.

***"Cities and Societies in Comparative Perspective,"* Prague, Czech Republic:** August 29–September 1, 2011. The Eleventh International Conference on Urban History, sponsored by the European Association for Urban History, will explore the circulation of knowledge and urban spatial practices at the turn of the twentieth century. For more information, please visit: http://www.eauh2012.com/european-association-for-urban-history/.

***"Fokus Fortification,"* Athens, Greece:** December 9–12, 2012. The Conference on the Research of Fortifications in Antiquity is seeking submissions that highlight fortifications as consciously structured elements within the built space of ancient societies. Deadline for abstract submission: December 30, 2011. For more information, please visit: www.fokusfortifikation.de.

RECENT CONFERENCES

***International Conference on Preventive Conservation of Architectural Heritage*, Nanjing, China:** October 29–30, 2011. For detailed information about this UNESCO-sponsored event, please check the news on the PRECOMOS website: http://precomos.org/index.php/news/.

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

ENVISION: Collaborations of Art, Analysis, and Activism invites scholarly essays and artist/activist presentations for its Spring 2012 issue entitled "THE SPECTACULAR." The issue is concerned with ongoing violence that prompts forms of the spectacular, both as a vehicle of social inclusion and visibility, and as a form of counter-performance by states, corporations, or other entities. Please send enquiries and submissions to Beth Uzwiak and Laurian Bowles at editors@envisionimprint.org. Deadline: January 1, 2012.

Guide for Preparation of Manuscripts

1. GENERAL
The editors invite readers to submit manuscripts. Please send three copies of each manuscript, with one copy to include all original illustrations. Place the title of the manuscript, the author's name and a 50-word biographical sketch on a separate cover page. The title only should appear again on the first page of text. Manuscripts are circulated for review without identifying the author. Manuscripts are evaluated by a blind peer-review process.

2 LENGTH AND FORMAT
Manuscripts should not exceed 25 standard 8.5" x 11" [a4] double-spaced typewritten pages (about 7500 words). Leave generous margins.

3. APPROACH TO READER
Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the journal, papers should be written for an academic audience that may have either a general or a specific interest in your topic. Papers should present a clear narrative structure. They should not be compendiums of field notes. Please define specialized or technical terminology where appropriate.

4. ABSTRACT AND INTRODUCTION
Provide a one-paragraph abstract of no more than 100 words. This abstract should explain the content and structure of the paper and summarize its major findings. The abstract should be followed by a short introduction. The introduction will appear without a subheading at the beginning of the paper.

5. SUBHEADINGS
Please divide the main body of the paper with a single progression of subheadings. There need be no more than four or five of these, but they should describe the paper's main sections and reinforce the reader's sense of progress through the text.

Sample Progression: The Role of the Longhouse in Iban Culture. The Longhouse as a Building Form. Transformation of the Longhouse at the New Year. The Impact of Modern Technology. Conclusion: Endangered Form or Form in Transition?

Do not use any numbering system in subheadings. Use secondary subheadings only when absolutely essential for format or clarity.

6. REFERENCES
Do not use a general bibliography format. Use a system of numbered reference notes as indicated below.

A condensed section of text might read as follows:

> In his study of vernacular dwellings in Egypt, Edgar Regis asserted that climate was a major factor in the shaping of roof forms. Henri Lacompte, on the other hand, has argued that in the case of Upper Egypt this deterministic view is irrelevant.[1]
>
> An eminent architectural historian once wrote, "The roof form in general is the most indicative feature of the housing styles of North Africa."[2] Clearly, however, the matter of how these forms have evolved is a complex subject. A thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.[3]
>
> In my research I discovered that local people have differing notions about the origins of the roof forms on the dwellings they inhabit.[4]

The reference notes, collected at the end of the text (not at the bottom of each page), would read as follows:

> 1. E. Regis, *Egyptian Dwellings* (Cairo: University Press, 1979), p.179; and H. Lacompte, "New Study Stirs Old Debate," *Smithsonian*, Vol.11 No.2 (December 1983), pp.24–34.
> 2. B. Smithson, "Characteristic Roof Forms," in H. Jones, ed., *Architecture of North Africa* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p.123.
> 3. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see J. Idris, *Roofs and Man* (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 1984).
> 4. In my interviews I found that the local people understood the full meaning of my question only when I used a more formal Egyptian word for "roof" than that in common usage.

7. DIAGRAMS, DRAWINGS AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Illustrations will be essential for most papers in the journal, however, each paper can only be accompanied by a maximum of 20 illustrations. For purposes of reproduction, please provide images as line drawings (velox, actual size), b&w photos (5" x 7" or 8"x 10" glossies), or digitized computer files. Color prints and drawings, slides, and photocopies are not acceptable.

Digitized (scanned) artwork should be between 4.5 and 6.75 inches wide (let the length fall), and may be in any of the following file formats. Photos (in order of preference): 1) b&w grayscale (not rgb) TIFF files, 300 DPI; 2) b&w grayscale Photoshop files, 300 DPI; 3) b&w EPS files, 300 DPI. Line art, including charts and graphs (in order of preference): 1) b&w bitmap TIFF files, 1200 DPI; 2) b&w grayscale TIFF files, 600 DPI; 3) b&w bitmap EPS, 1200 DPI. CDs are the preferred media for digitized artwork.

8. ELECTRONIC IMAGE RESOLUTION AND FILE TYPE
All images should be submitted as separate grayscale TIFF or JPEG files of at least 300 dpi at the actual size they will appear on the printed page. Images taken directly from the Web are unacceptable unless they have been sourced at 300 DPI.

9. CAPTIONS AND FIGURE PREFERENCES
Please include all graphic material on separate pages at the end of the text. Caption text and credits should not exceed 50 words per image. Use identical numbering for images and captions. The first time a point is made in the main body of text that directly relates to a piece of graphic material, please indicate so at the end of the appropriate sentence with a simple reference in the form of "**(FIG. 1)**." Use the designation "**(FIG.)**" and a single numeric progression for all graphic material. Clearly indicate the appropriate **FIG** number on each illustration page.

10. SOURCES OF GRAPHIC MATERIAL
Most authors use their own graphic material, but if you have taken your material from another source, please secure the necessary permission to reuse it. Note the source of the material at the end of the caption.

Sample attribution: If the caption reads, "The layout of a traditional Islamic settlement," add a recognition similar to: "Source: E. Hassan, *Islamic Architecture* (London: Penguin, 1982). Reprinted by permission." Or if you have altered the original version, add: "Based on: E. Hassan, *Islamic Architecture* (London: Penguin, 1982)."

11. OTHER ISSUES OF STYLE
In special circumstances, or in circumstancesnot described above, follow conventions outlined in *A Manual for Writers* by Kate Turabian. In particular, note conventions for complex or unusual reference notes. For spelling, refer to *Webster's Dictionary*.

12. WORKS FOR HIRE
If you have done your work as the result of direct employment or as the result of a grant, it is essential that you acknowledge this support at the end of your paper.

Sample acknowledgement: The initial research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the National Endowment for the Arts [NEA]. The author acknowledges NEA support and the support of the sabbatical reasearch program of the University of Waterloo.

13. SIMULTANEOUS SUBMISSION AND PREVIOUS PUBLICATION
Submission of a manuscript implies a commitment to publish in this journal. Simultaneous submission to other journals is unacceptable. Previously published work, or work which is substantially similar to previously published work, is ordinarily not acceptable. If in doubt about these requirements, contact the editors.

14. ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION
Please include an electronic file of your entire paper on a CD or other commonly used media at the time of submission. Please indicate the software used. We prefer *Microsoft Word* for PC or Macintosh. PDF files are also acceptable. Initial submission by email is not allowed.

15 NOTIFICATION
Contributors are usually notified within 15 weeks whether their manuscripts have been accepted. If changes are required, authors are furnished with comments from the editors and the peer-review board. The editors are responsible for all final decisions on editorial changes. The publisher reserves the right to copy-edit and proof all articles accepted for publication without prior consultation with contributing authors.

16. ELECTRONIC PUBLICATION
Published articles will be archived for free download on the IASTE website after eight months or following publication of the next issue of the journal.

17. SUBMISSION AND CORRESPONDENCE
Nezar AlSayyad, Editor
Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review
IASTE, Center For Environmental Design Research
390 Wurster Hall
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1839
Tel: 510.642.6801 Fax: 510.643.5571
E-mail: iaste.@ced.berkeley.edu
http://iaste.berkeley.edu

TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

is the official publication of IASTE. As a semi-annual refereed journal, *TDSR* acts as a forum for the exchange of ideas and as a means to disseminate information and to report on research activities. All articles submitted to the journal are evaluated through a blind peer-review process.

Advance payment in U.S. dollars is required on all orders. Make checks payable to U.C. Regents. Orders should be addressed to:

IASTE
Center for Environmental Design Research
390 Wurster Hall
University of California
Berkeley, ca 94720-1839
510.642.6801
iaste.@ced.berkeley.edu; http://iaste.berkeley.edu

DOMESTIC ORDERS:

_____ $60 INDIVIDUAL _____ $120 INSTITUTIONAL [LIBRARIES AND SCHOOLS]

INTERNATIONAL ORDERS:

_____ $75 INDIVIDUAL _____ $135 INSTITUTIONAL [LIBRARIES AND SCHOOLS]

ALL MEMBERSHIPS INCLUDE DOMESTIC FIRST CLASS OR INTERNATIONAL AIRMAIL.

NAME

TITLE / AFFILIATION

ADDRESS

CITY STATE / ZIP COUNTRY

PHONE

International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments
Center for Environmental Design Research
390 Wurster Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-1839

issn # 1050 - 2092