TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

The International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments (IASTE) was established at the First International Symposium on Traditional Dwellings and Settlements held at Berkeley in April 1988. IASTE is an interdisciplinary forum where scholars from various disciplines and countries can exchange ideas, discuss methods and approaches, and share findings. As opposed to disciplinary associations, IASTE is a nonprofit organization concerned with the comparative and cross-cultural understanding of traditional habitat as an expression of informal cultural conventions. IASTE's purpose is to serve as an umbrella association for all scholars studying vernacular, indigenous, popular and traditional environments. Current activities of IASTE include the organization of biennial conferences on selected themes in traditional-environments research, the publication of edited books on selected themes, a public outreach program which includes supporting films and documentaries, and the publication of the Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Working Paper Series, which includes all papers presented at IASTE conferences and accepted for publication.

Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review is the official publication of IASTE. As a semi-annual refereed journal, *TDSR* acts as a forum for the exchange of ideas and a means to disseminate information and report on research activities. All articles submitted to *TDSR* are evaluated through a blind peer-review process. *TDSR* has been funded by grants from the Graham Foundation, the Getty Publication Program, the National Endowment for the Arts, the Center for Environmental Design Research, and the office of the Provost at the University of California at Berkeley.

IASTE membership is open to all who are interested in traditional environments and their related studies. In addition to receiving the Association's semi-annual journal, members are eligible to attend the biennial conference at reduced rates. Subscription to the journal is available only with membership in IASTE. Domstic annual order rates are as follows: Individual, $60; Institutional, $120; Corporations, $180. Foreign members add $15 for mailing. Libraries, museums, and academic organizations qualify as institutions. Subscriptions are payable in U.S. dollars only (by check drawn on a U.S. bank, U.S. money order, or international bank draft). Send inquiries to:

TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS
AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

Journal of the International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments

Contents

COVER ILLUSTRATION: Some of the many identities present on Singapore's Orchard Road.   Collage of photos by
Limin Hee.

Editor's Note

By the time this issue of *TDSR* reaches the membership, it will be the beginning of a new year, one that marks seventeen years of successful publication of the journal. I am delighted that our individual and institutional members continue to subscribe to *TDSR* and support the Association.

This issue opens with Howayda Al-Harithy's "[Reframing] World Heritage," an article developed from her keynote presentation at the IASTE 2004 conference. In the article, Al-Harithy critiques the concept of heritage preservation as currently practiced under international agreements. Focusing on preservation efforts in the old city of Tripoli, Lebanon, she concludes by offering an alternative based on engagement with the local population in the continuing production of heritage.

In "Globalization, Neoliberalism, and New Spaces of Capital in Cairo," Khaled Adham then describes the emergence of new urban spaces like gated communities, malls, and theme parks on the outskirts of contemporary Cairo. Adham, an architectural historian, uses an analysis of these spaces to shed light on the effects of neoliberalism and globalization within Egyptian society since the country's transition to a capitalist economy in the 1980s.

Next, Javier Arbona's "Vieques, Puerto Rico: From Devastation to Conservation and Back Again" highlights how the environmental contamination of this Caribbean island has been "camouflaged" to attract tourists, erase its history of inhabitation, and shield the U.S. government from responsibility for having used the island for years as a weapons storage site and military training ground. Arbona suggests a new look at the island, one in which a former U.S. Navy bombing range is foregrounded as a new kind of tourist site.

Our fourth feature article, "Singapore's Orchard Road as Conduit: Between Nostalgia and Authenticity," by Limin Hee, explores how this street juxtaposes many elements of the country's post-traditional environment. From her analysis of this "public space of a nation," she raises a number of critical questions regarding the collision of history, values, contemporary culture, and symbolic economy, as well as division(s) of space between global and local actors.

Finally, in the Field Report section, architect Robert Good studies the process of gentrification in Venice and the limited success of attempts there to manage architectural change and social continuity. Examining the powerful forces of gentrification in detail, he shows how commodification of residential space in vernacular buildings may ultimately endanger the historic character of the city.

I would like to end my note by announcing that the Tenth International IASTE conference will be held December 15–18, 2006, in Bangkok, Thailand. Hosted by Thammasat University, its theme is "Hyper-Traditions." I hope all of you will respond to the Call for Abstracts, included here, with appropriate papers and sessions. As the Call indicates, this conference builds on the previous four conferences, complementing the themes of "Manufacturing Tradition/Consuming Tradition," "The End of Tradition," and "Post-Traditional Environments in a Post-Global World." In these past events, the IASTE membership articulated the debate on tradition through innovative and challenging research, and I have no doubt this scholarly tradition will continue with our upcoming conference.

Nezar AlSayyad

[Reframing] "World Heritage"

HOWAYDA AL-HARITHY

This article critiques the concept of heritage preservation as currently practiced under the aegis of international agreements such as the 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Too often such efforts result in the internationalization of cultural monuments as frozen icons for tourist consumption. Alternatively, heritage preservation may be used in nationalization campaigns that serve primarily political, not cultural, ends. Effective heritage preservation should rather be multidisciplinary and socioeconomically sustainable, linked to the present cultural context of the sites in which it occurs. The article is based on close observation of recent work in the old city of Tripoli, Lebanon, and reference to other preservation efforts, particularly in Cairo, Egypt. As a conclusion, it offers an alternative approach to preservation that in the case of Tripoli would involve encouraging the local population to engage in the continued production of built heritage.

This article addresses the concept of World Heritage based on my research on urban conservation projects in historic medieval cities in the Arab world.[1] Over the years, this research has developed into a critical inquiry of the concept of "World Heritage" as conceived by the international treaty of the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, adopted by the UNESCO in 1972, and as practiced through "universal" tools and implementation strategies imposed by international funding agencies involved in heritage-protection projects.[2] The research is currently focused on the medieval city of Tripoli, Lebanon, but the questions and the issues, I believe, have wider implications (**FIG.1**).

My claim is that cultural heritage has occasionally suffered at the hands of both national and global constructs and actors who claim to defend and preserve it. The position I take is that restoration or conservation efforts should neither be about the internationalization of heritage, which often results in packaged, frozen icons to be understood by the world public; nor should it be about the nationalization of heritage, which often results in its translation into the contemporary political construct of national identity. Heritage should rather remain linked to the cultural context to which it belongs; it should be defined as that which is beyond the physical and visible; and it should be recognized

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FIGURE 1. *View within the historic core of Tripoli.*

FIGURE 2. *View of the northern section of the old city of Tripoli.*

as an open process of production and transformation sustained by roots in the identity of a local community.

This is the argument I will try to construct and elaborate here based on a critique of the concept of "World Heritage." By focusing on Tripoli, I hope to demonstrate the inapplicability of this concept and of the supposedly universal tools used to implement it in a densely populated historic urban center with its own culture-specific political and social dynamics, and subject to region-specific forces of modern development and postwar reconstruction (**FIG.2**). I will also attempt to propose an alternative approach to urban conservation projects within living historic cities — one that deviates from the present emphasis on frozen icons detached from their context and packaged for consumption by the tourist industry.

My principal site of analysis is the historic core of Tripoli, the second largest city in Lebanon, with an estimated population of 500,000 people. In 2003 Tripoli was one of five historic cities (along with Baalbek, Byblos, Sidon and Tyre) to receive World Bank funding for rehabilitation. In April of that year the bank approved a US$31.5 million loan to help the Lebanese government stimulate the local economy and conserve and manage the built heritage of the five cities.

Interestingly, Tripoli was not among the cities listed by UNESCO in 1984 as World Heritage Sites in Lebanon.[3] Only Baalbek, Byblos and Tyre were listed then, as a result of the recognition their ancient monuments received under the international classification criteria of "outstanding universal value" (**FIG.3**).

CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF WORLD HERITAGE

Before I turn to a more specific case of Tripoli, I must address the notion of universality embedded in the concept of World Heritage and the inherent contradictions it contains.

As applied to projects throughout the world, these contradictions surface in attempts to recognize the diversity of cultural practices while at the same time searching for universal values. Such a discrepancy makes any selection criteria of "outstanding universal value" problematic.

During its early deliberations, the World Heritage Committee posed the question, "What is it that constitutes the 'outstanding universal value' of a cultural or natural treasure?"[4] By way of an answer, the Convention specified that a property or site must satisfy the following selection criteria: "A cultural monument: could be a masterpiece of creative genius; have exerted great architectural influence; be associated with ideas or beliefs of universal significance; or may be an outstanding example of a traditional way of life that represents a certain culture."[5] These terms celebrate a grand assortment of abstract and undefined ideas such as treasure, genius, monument, universality, and that which is outstanding!

Above all, however, the concept of World Heritage as defined by the Convention's terminology and selection criteria reveals a contradiction between what is designated as a "cultural" monument and the process of its universalization. This

FIGURE 3. *The ancient ruins of Baalbek.*

process can only lead to a divorce between heritage value as defined by the Convention and local cultural context, one where any sense of regional or local identity is doomed to be lost.

In practice, applications of the Convention so far also reveal a tendency to freeze monuments into an iconic existence and lock their interpretation into a singular reference to a particular historic era. This interpretation is then packaged and marketed to a global audience through the tourist industry.

Ultimately, this process is based on disciplinary memory, a concept Anderson has defined as distinct from social memory.[6] Monuments with supposedly universal value are classified according to their place in an art-historical timeline, according to such concerns as typology, style and building technique. An archeological method is then employed to restore them to an appearance corresponding to a layer of historical use that is deemed most authentic, pure and unique. This problematic universality also neutralizes the plurality of meaning in any cultural product, and denies the dynamic process of cultural regeneration of the built heritage — especially as it cuts social and economic links between the local communities and inhabitants of such sites.

PROFILING TRIPOLI

Tripoli presents a totally different challenge to the international practice and criteria than that ideal case for which the Convention was designed. The city's historic core dates to the medieval period, when the ancient port city, currently called al-Mina, was destroyed by the Mamluks. Following its destruction in 1289, the Mamluks rebuilt the city inland near the hill of the Crusader castle of Raymond de Saint-Gilles. The historic core that now exists here has 195 monuments dating from the Mamluk and Ottoman periods, 45 of which are nationally registered as historic monuments (**FIG.4**). The majority of these buildings date to the fourteenth century, and constitute in their totality an intact medieval urban fabric (**FIG.5**). They range from religious, to civic, to secular buildings and include mosques, madrasas, khans, and hammams (**FIG.6**).[7] They include buildings that have been alternately used, reused, neglected, altered, and added onto for many centuries as dictated by a changing urban dynamic (**FIG.7**).

Though most are now in a sad condition of neglect, they have so far been spared from restoration and renovation under the universal frame of the Convention. Instead, the entire ensemble still bears the marks of having been intensively inhabited since the fourteenth century (**FIG.8**).

Dealing with a living city with urban artifacts of this nature provides a twofold conservation challenge. The first challenge lies in the fact that the numerous historical buildings and their surroundings form an historic urban fabric. The built heritage in this case is far removed from the condition of a single monument or archeological ruin. The second challenge lies in the fact that the city is a fully inhabited, evolving entity. Its functioning monuments are thus dynamic social spaces whose rehabilitation would require the rehabilitation of a whole city across multiple layers: economic, social, political — as well as physical.

FIGURE 4. *The Mosque of AlBurtasi, Tripoli.*

FIGURE 6. *The portal of the Mosque of AlAttar, Tripoli.*

FIGURE 5. *The Saqraqiyya Madrasa, Tripoli.*

FIGURE 7. *Khan AlSabun, Tripoli.*

FIGURE 8. *Streetscape in the old city of Tripoli.*

Cases like Tripoli, no doubt, present a serious conceptual challenge to the internationalist view that cultural heritage should be "preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole."[8] And they reveal the elitist and discriminating application of the so-called criteria of "outstanding universal value." This remains the case, and the practice, despite adoption in 1994 of what came to be called the Global Strategy for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention.

The 1994 Global Strategy report represented a major reform of the conception of cultural heritage underlying the 1972 UNESCO Convention. In particular, it represented a shift of focus from concern for single works of monumental architecture to a conception of heritage that recognized cultural groupings. As it then stated:

> the history of art and architecture, archeology, anthropology, and ethnology [should] no longer [be] concentrated on single monuments in isolation but rather on considering cultural groupings that were complex and multidimensional, which demonstrated in spatial terms the social structures, ways of life, beliefs, systems of knowledge, and representations of different past and present cultures.[9]

Alongside the reformed conception, the Global Strategy report critically acknowledged that "all living cultures — and especially the 'traditional' ones — with their depth, their wealth, their complexity, and their diverse relationships with their environment, figured very little on the list."[10] And it accepted that there existed "imbalances on the List between regions of the world, types of monuments, and periods."[11] Therefore, it recommended that "the list should be receptive to the many varied cultural manifestations of universal value through which cultures express themselves."[12]

Yet, despite these statements recognizing the presence of a diversity of valuable cultural expressions, the Global Strategy still reiterated "universal value" as its main criterion, and it still endorsed a restricted set of implementation strategies and tools. In addition, the Operational Guidelines of the World Heritage Convention did not evolve in correspondence with the reformulated views of heritage value, despite the testimony presented at various international meetings of experts such as those in Nara in 1994 and Amsterdam in 1998.

For example, formal characteristics and physical properties, such as design, material and technique, still dominate the test of authenticity.[13] The Nara conference subjected these standards to considerable debate, and in the end yielded the Nara Document on Authenticity. However, this claimed that "the essential contribution made by the consideration of authenticity in conservation practice is to clarify and illuminate the collective memory of humanity" — another concept worthy of critical assessment.[14]

Despite changes in the framework, then, practices remain stuck within the older conceptual frames of the Convention. Restoration policies and efforts still focus on monuments, still look for outstanding universal value, and still find in tourism the force of economic development. One can see this particularly well in the case of Cairo, another medieval living city, and one that was inscribed as a World Heritage Site in 1979.

CAIRO AS AN EXAMPLE

Today, implementation methods associated with the rehabilitation of historic buildings in Cairo remain largely focused on restoring them as icons of the time at which they were born. This has meant that historical buildings that are part of everyday life are turned into museums of sorts, guarded by the threshold of a ticket booth. Very few projects, such as the Azhar Park project, sponsored by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, aim to "go beyond mere technical restoration to address the question of the social and environmental context, adaptive reuse, institutional sustainability, and training."[15]

Restoration projects in Cairo have also revealed how the UNESCO model process is subject to influence according to the political agendas of funding sources. A good example is the restoration of certain Fatimid monuments there by the Bohras, a religious group branching from the Ismaili sect, thus also

claiming descent from the Fatimids. By funding the restoration of Fatimid monuments, this group can be seen as making a claim for a certain historical layer of the city and its artistic production over others. In particular, the restoration of two fine monuments — al-Azhar, built by al-Mu'iz in 971; and al-Hakim, built by al-Hakim between 990 and 1003 — has replaced much fine carved stucco and brick work with white, imported Italian marble. This material has emphasized notions of light and reflection that are central to the doctrine of the Ismailis, representing the guiding light of the "Imam" (**FIG.9**).[16]

Such restoration work is not only technically problematic but it introduces serious issues that revolve around the important question "Whose heritage?" In addressing such issues, it is therefore critical to avoid divorcing the built heritage from its present cultural context. Such an alienation from local social practices ultimately raises issues of claim and reclaim, authentic and reconstructed historical narratives, all of which may merely justify a group's role definition or political agenda.

This is neither a case of nationalization, nor of internationalization, of cultural heritage. Nevertheless, it does reveal the vulnerability not only of the conceptual frame but also of implementation strategies on the ground. This example also raises issues relating to the layering of a city's history and built environment. Which layer is worthy of recovery, restoration and celebration, and by whom? What this implies is a negotiation of heritage that cannot avoid being discrimi-

nating, even when it comes to individual monuments. Al-Azhar, for example, while originally being built by the Fatimids, subsequently evolved to incorporate Mamluk and Ottoman layers. Similarly, it incorporated a shift of function from a Shi'i symbol of enlightenment to a Sunni educational landmark. Such transformations give it equally important roots in today's cultural practices as in historical memory.

Such examples show how any conceptual frame or implementation strategy for urban conservation projects within the context of a living city has to accept the present dynamics of that city and the nature of its monuments as "open texts." I use this phrase in the Derridan sense, as subject to reading, interpretation and regeneration by its users. If this process is to remain sustainable and open ended, members of the local community must be empowered to participate in it. Otherwise, the historical significance of the building may be hijacked.

As is the case today, this is most likely to result in the uncovering of particular layers of history, or the freezing of monuments or urban settings into iconic, static museum pieces. Such limitations of interpretation, generally engineered to facilitate tourism, ultimately block creative regeneration of meaning.

THE PROJECT FOR THE REHABILITATION OF TRIPOLI'S HISTORIC CITY CENTER

The ongoing effort to inscribe the old city of Tripoli on the World Heritage List will no doubt pose similar challenges to existing conceptions of heritage and the implementation strategies used to facilitate it. This was made obvious to me as I set out to document the twin process of negotiating Tripoli's "built heritage," and then attempting to "represent" it. The project to rehabilitate the historic city center is funded by the World Bank as the major component of the Cultural Heritage and Urban Development project, or CHUD. This heavily politicized process has so far involved international and local key players, agencies and experts. But it has hardly brought any participation from the principal stakeholders, the population that inhabits and regenerates the city every day.

On April 21, 2003, when the World Bank approved the loan for the project, it issued the following statement of objectives: "The World Bank last week approved a US$31.5 million loan to create the conditions for increased local economic development and enhanced quality of life in the historic centers of five main secondary cities, and improve the conservation and management of Lebanon's built cultural heritage."[17] It went on to quote Joseph Saba, World Bank Country Director for Lebanon that, "This project treats Lebanon's cultural assets as economic assets and integrates them into the life of the community to achieve local growth." Saba continued: "We saw an opportunity to focus the Bank's attention on private sector development, on education and proper commercial exploitation of ancient ruins so that local residents can benefit."[18]

To understand better what is meant by "proper commercial exploitation," one has to understand that the CHUD project, as stated in its own agenda, "is based on the World Bank's country assistance strategy for Lebanon, which recognizes the importance of preserving Lebanon's built cultural heritage and developing environment-friendly tourism."[19]

The stated objectives of the project, particularly those pertaining to the integration of the project into the life of the community, may have been appropriately formed. However, they were compromised almost from the beginning through the selection and articulation of designated tasks for consultants by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the project's executing agency. In the case of Tripoli, it specified that these should initially be limited to infrastructure, public open spaces, and facades along the main spine of the *souq* (**FIG.10**). Upon the recommendations of the Debs-Tabet consultant team hired to conduct the study and produce a design proposal, these were later articulated to include the following:

> *Urban rehabilitation and/or construction of: (a) Facades in the old Souq of the historic city; (b) Public spaces rehabilitation in the old town; (c) Historic monuments (Khan Al Askar, Khan & Hammam), (d) Abou Ali River public spaces and around the Citadel; (e) On-street parking and meters in the old town; (f) Lot 131 rehabilitation; and (g) Selected houses.*[20]

The selection and prioritization of areas and types of intervention did not therefore involve any community-based

FIGURE 10. *The souqs of the old city of Tripoli.*

process. Neither were there surveys, negotiations, nor any other form of participation.

Recognizing the limitations imposed by funding structures that prioritized public space, facades and infrastructure, the Debs-Tabet consulting team did opt to collect data and conduct extensive surveys to build an understanding of the social profiles and economic dynamics of the city's inhabitants. And their goal was to incorporate the findings into the proposed urban conservation project (**FIG.11**). But, once more, funding conditions limited the scope of such work,

PREMIERES ORIENTATIONS: PLAN DE SYNTHESE ET DIVISION DU PROJET EN DIFFERENTES OPERATIONS

Réhabilitation et Revitalisation Urbaine de la Ville Ancienne de Tripoli
Conseil du Développement et de la Reconstruction   Tabet et Debs Architectes - Urbanistes

FIGURE 11. *The Tabet-Debs proposed scheme for the historic core of Tripoli. Courtesy of H. Debs.*

FIGURE 12. *Scene from everyday life of the inhabitants of the old city of Tripoli.*

artery and spine of its *souq*, and that could also serve as an important launching point for interventions to come.

The consultants, who believed in a more integrated approach that acknowledged the human/social layer of the city, did manage finally to negotiate a proposal for the restoration of an urban residential block as a possible model for future financial packages (**FIG.13**). But again the issue of private ownership had to be overcome. The negotiated result was that the funded project would offer to hire residents to upgrade the infrastructure, as long as they agreed to spend 30 percent of their pay on restoring and upgrading the old houses in which they lived.[21] The consultants also proposed the rehabilitation of Khan AlAskar and its adaptive reuse as a community cultural center, including workshops and exhibition spaces to support local arts and crafts and facilitate a new social spatial discourse (**FIG.14**).

Despite the efforts of the consultants, the most serious failing of the CHUD project setup was that it did not allow for proper involvement of the community at the early stage of negotiating the city's heritage. The very selection of what to restore and how is an act of historical editing that is rarely either innocent or objective. By preferring to engage only with public institutional and governmental offices, such as the municipality and its council, the project limited itself to being an exercise of disciplinary memory that did not reflect the contemporary cultural understanding of the city's inhabitants. This became intertwined with a funding process that operated only within the realm of public ownership and an economic-development agenda that targeted the tourist industry. Thus, a process emerged whose very structure has alienated the local

since construction money could be spent only on publicly owned property. Thus, all the privately owned khans, shops and residences that make up the connecting tissue of the old city remained outside the funding equation (**FIG.12**).

Instead, funding parameters stressed that design intervention be limited to infrastructure and open public spaces, an orientation that pushed public space design and the restoration of the facades of monuments. It thus gave priority to that segment of the city which served as its main public

FIGURE 13. *Old Houses of Tripoli.*

FIGURE 14. *Khan AlAskar, Tripoli.*

community, and if not corrected, will likely disconnect the restored sections of the city from the daily lives of its inhabitants. Such an outcome will likely also produce resistance.

In the case of Tripoli, this lack of engagement with local concerns has caused tensions between the funding agencies and their local experts on one side, and the local community and its representatives on the other. Further, by failing to engage the larger community in the process, resistance to the project has itself been taken over by certain prominent members of the community who were its representatives on the municipal council. In certain cases these figures have sought to present themselves as the true authorities on the city and its history. Among them, for example, is Omar Tamari, a prominent historian of Mamluk Tripoli — the historic layer the city is most known for, because it is the only city the Mamluks planned and built that remains to a large extent intact.

The argument of these local authorities is grounded on claims of "authenticity," based on their vision of the city as a Mamluk creation with which they retain historical ties. But this claim, too, is problematic because it is based on their self-designation as heirs to and custodians of that heritage. Yet, with this claim to legitimacy, they have set out to defend the city from what they perceive as an intrusion imposed from above. They see this as involving an illegitimate expertise hired internationally — and from Beirut's Christian elite.

One soon begins to see how all forms of heritage appropriation sooner or later can be traced to one political position or another. The question "Whose heritage?" also re-emerges. Or, rather, in this case, "Whose cultural identity?" since local cultural identity remains largely based on heritage.

To better answer the question, a recent study by Nijkamp, Bal and Medda has argued that one must first adopt a broader definition of heritage: "a broad concept including values, attitudes, customs, historical memory, language, literature,

art, architecture, etc. A very important and visible part of heritage consists of the built environment, the context of urban living."[22] Their study acknowledged that

> *Many countries have pursued conservation policies, as conserving the past that offers a source for cultural identity and a basis of reference for the future. Recent attitudes towards conservation bring forward the issue of protecting more and more aspects of heritage. Selection and assessment become therefore priority concerns. Such changes call for a reorientation of conservation policy. New analytical tools and concepts are thus required which would enrich and expand the conventional methods utilized and which would ensure sustainability of cultural heritage in an urban setting.*[23]

PROPOSING AN ALTERNATIVE

By arguing against the frame of internationalization and globalization and for a broad definition of heritage, it is possible to propose an alternative approach to conservation. This would not base itself on recognition of "unique and outstanding monuments," archeological methods of conservation, and disciplinary memory. Rather, it would recognize cities as dynamic entities whose living built heritage is produced every day by diverse spatial practices and is sustained by social memory. Such social memory is based on events and associations with the place and on interactions with it on daily basis, rather than on its physical properties alone.

Underlying this alternative conservation ethic would be a premise that cities themselves can be the trustees of cultural heritage, and, more importantly, that sustainable city life should be the carrier of socio-cultural heritage, to fine-tune the term. This is then a call to reorient the conservation enterprise toward local or regional identity as an alternative to the more ambiguous "cultural identity" or the even more problematic "national identity."

Local identity is that which lies in the rooted social, economic and political practices of the local inhabitants, and of the everyday **(FIG.15)**. It is an identity that emanates from living with historic monuments and dwelling in them on a daily basis, and it belongs to the city's inhabitants who pass by them, meet in them, pray in them, and so on. These are places that are an extension of their daily existence — places where community members are missed when they do not show up for work, a regular meeting, or prayer.

A representation of that social discourse with historic buildings can be seen in the soap workshops of Tripoli. An article in the *Khaleej Times* recently reported on perceptions of and affiliations with places in the old city in which people dwell **(FIGS.16,17)**:

> *In a corner of Tripoli's ancient souk where his father taught him the secrets of their trade, Mahmoud Sharkass*

When using the term local identity, I am also referencing the field of modern urban and regional planning. According to Mignolli and Nijkamp, this

. . . considers local identity conservation as its main goal. And, in doing so, it directs an effective means of sustainable city and territory development. To highlight the importance of protecting and valorizing the identity of places and communities obliges decision-makers — limited by the perennial problem of financial resources and the complexity of certain decisions — to establish priorities and methods for cultural goods recovery within the context of global actions for territory development and human evolution.[25]

FIGURE 15. *Houses and shops in the old city of Tripoli.*

uses the same gestures to teach his own teenage son Ahmed how to produce the handmade olive oil soaps the family has created for two centuries. "Ahmed no longer goes to school. He is my only son and must learn the trade of his ancestors," says Mahmoud, as he cut blocks from a bar of laurel-perfumed soap in his workshop at the Khan of the Egyptian, the ancient inn in Tripoli's old town" . . . "I follow to the letter my own father's methods. I am happy just to introduce new colours and certain methods of carving the soap to diversify its forms," says Mahmoud, seated beneath a portrait of his father dated 1940. It was in 1800 that one of his ancestors introduced the technique of making soap based on olive oil and bay laurel into the Khan, then a caravanserai for Egyptian traders.[24]

Such strong affiliation with historic buildings is an important element of local identity construction. However, it is a construct that is jeopardized by turning the monuments into museum-like public institutions cut off from the people's daily lives. Ordinary residents should not need to purchase a ticket to pass guarded gates to gain access to them.

FIGURE 16. (TOP) *Khan AlMasriyeen, or the Egyptians, Tripoli.*
FIGURE 17. (BOTTOM) *Soap workshop in Khan AlSabun, Tripoli.*

This approach deliberately aims to create implementation methods and design strategies that are multidisciplinary and socioeconomically sustainable. It embodies the effort to move away from conservation policies focused only on the unique and outstanding using conventional archeological methods. Developing sustainable urban cultural heritage will mean recognizing the layering of a city and its open process of production. And it will require integrated multidisciplinary methods of conservation, development and management.

Mignolli and Nijkamp have developed such a frame that blends the disciplines of economy, planning and heritage preservation. They claim it presents "a general framework for local identity analysis and historic environment preservation within the context of a more comprehensive urban ecological planning paradigm."[26] "Based on the notion of sustainable development

[it offers] a taxonomic approach designed with a view to the creation of an evaluation framework that addresses historic entity, public and private values, public and private action strategies, and impacts on various relevant social groups."[27]

They also assert it gives "due attention . . . to three sources of value: the intrinsic values of cultural goods, the potential of cultural goods for local or regional development, and the needs and the willingness of the local community concerned."[28]

Any economic development plan integral to urban conservation or rehabilitation must first invest in the people and support them in staying in the old city and continuing to produce its heritage. If tourism is to be introduced, it needs to be an invitation to a full experience and interaction with the place and its people, and with the social practices of today. It should not be limited to gazing upon the masterpieces of yesteryears.

NOTES

1. This article was presented as a keynote address at the Ninth IASTE conference held in Sharjah, U.A.E., in December 2004. Its title then was "World Heritage: A Redefinition."

2. For the full text of the Convention, see whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?=175.

3. Five sites in Lebanon are today inscribed on the World Heritage List. In 1984, the World Heritage Committee inscribed four of these sites: Baalbek, Anjar, Tyre and Byblos. The Ouadi Qadisha and the Forest of the Cedars of God were inscribed on the list in 1998. For the full list of inscribed properties, see whc.unesco.org/en/list/.

4. See whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=160.

5. Ibid.

6. S. Anderson, "Memory in Architecture/Erinnerung in der Architektur," *Daidalos* 58 (December 1995), pp.22–37.

7. For a discussion of Tripoli's history, and for monographs of its monuments, see H. Salam-Liebich, *The Architecture of the Mamluk City of Tripoli* (Cambridge, MA: 1983); R. Saliba, *Tripoli: The Old City* (Beirut: The American University of Beirut, 1994); and N. Jidejian, *Tripoli through the Ages* (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1980).

8. From the text of The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World

Cultural and Natural Heritage, the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization meeting in Paris from October 17 to November 21, 1972. See www.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=175.

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Globalization, Neoliberalism, and New Spaces of Capital in Cairo

KHALED ADHAM

The general globalization of Egyptian society and economy and its transition to a free-market capitalist system by the late 1980s has led to the emergence of such "new" urban spaces around Cairo as gated communities, malls, and theme parks. The production of these spaces has helped transform the city's urban economy in a way that mirrors the consumption patterns of a dominant new sector of elite Cairenes who are establishing themselves on the periphery of the city. In discussing the condition of these spaces and focusing on a selected case example, this article aims to shed light on the politics of producing such spaces in Egypt today.

In conventional parlance, globalization is roughly defined as a series of cultural, economic and political flows as well as massive-scaled movements of products, ideas, information, people and technology.[1] Among other things, these global flows have caused the boundaries between public and private spaces to enter a rapid and persistent state of flux. Considering how urban transformation has frequently emerged from juxtapositions and interactions between public and private space, this turmoil has produced a variety of novel developments and experiments in cities worldwide.[2] Of course, the precise mix of elements from these global flows varies from one city, or locality, to another depending on the socio-political and economic conjuncture and particularities of the place. Within this frame, this article explores recent urbanization patterns and spatial transformations around Cairo as a manifestation of a reworking of boundaries between these two realms.

From another perspective, most urbanists will agree that economic activities play a central role in the creation of new cities and the transformation of older ones.[3] It is therefore difficult to make any sense of the recent spatial restructuring and transformation of Cairo without looking closely at the impact of the current economic regime on boundaries between public and private spaces. However, these categories of space within the city are multifarious, polymorphous and heterogeneous, reflecting the fractured social geometry that has taken shape with the restructuring of social boundaries and categorical logics of class and income distribution, particularly during the second half of the twentieth century.

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My examination of this jumbled spatiality, therefore, will focus on new bounded spaces that reflect the intensification of socioeconomic inequalities — what Edward Soja has termed metropolarities, "the multiple axes of differential power and status that produce and maintain the socioeconomic inequalities."[4]

From the existing body of research on these subjects, I will pay attention to three interrelated strands of thought and observation. The first concerns an examination of the current economic regime in the context of Cairo. The second has to do with the impact of these economic forces on the spatial restructuring of the social mosaic of the city, particularly the way it has produced greater inequality. The third focuses on a rising tendency to privatize public space and create urban enclaves.

GLOBALIZATION, NEOLIBERALISM, CAPITALISM

A central contemporary force underlying all discourse related to the first strand has been the dramatic, staged comeback of core capital as a sole, dominant and centralized global power. This comeback has coincided with the rise of a specific brand of economic strategy, namely, neoliberalism.[5] By and large, neoliberalism involves a wide range of economic, political, social and ideological discourses which combine aspects of liberal and conservative politics.[6] Its main economic tenets, however, which emerged during the early 1970s at a time the international monetary system was breaking down, revolve around a free-market economy and laissez-faire politics.

Since the early 1970s, the global capitalist system, led by the United States and Britain, has increasingly followed a neoliberal agenda. During the late 1970s and 80s, neoliberalism was promoted vigorously by the conservative Thatcher and Reagan administrations. And by the mid-1980s, these economic policies were strengthened by a revolution in communication technologies that radically increased the speed and scale of financial activities. The 1990s witnessed the demise of socialism and the rise of the neoliberal paradigm to a near hegemonic status. Since then, debate over the meaning and implementation of neoliberalism seems to have engulfed the entire world.

In the ensuing arguments on both the political right and left the term neoliberalism seems to have become conflated with globalization. However, in strict relation to the economic aspects of neoliberal ideology, there may be only limited similarity between the two concepts. Nevertheless, on the basis of a belief in globalization, some political institutions have now adopted neoliberal economic aims and policies. In such circumstances, a critique of globalization and neoliberalism may coincide, but in broader terms, neoliberalism should not be seen as identical or synonymous with globalization.

Another misleading correlation has been that between the crystallization of a new worldwide economic regime during the 1990s and the triumph of capitalism. Such a correlation embodies the orthodox view that the establishment of free markets is the most important sign of capitalism's success. Drawing on the work of Fernand Braudel, Peter Taylor has challenged this association, arguing that capitalism is inherently anti-market. "Any sensible capitalist," he has written, "avoids a proper functioning market because that is not where the biggest profits are to be made."[7]

Following Braudel's lead, Taylor has further contended that capitalism as a mode of production aims to maximize growth and capital accumulation through a ceaseless search for new profit-making avenues *outside* the market: new product lines, new technologies, new lifestyles, new spaces to colonize. For both Braudel and Taylor, capitalism thus also inherently tends toward a world of monopolies which exists within a level of activity above actual markets where "people compete as producers and consumers."[8]

Of course, there are no fixed lines between the two worlds, only a continuum of possibilities. But what Taylor has emphasized is that successful capitalists have always been flexible in shifting their investments outside established markets. This means they aim to make the largest profit available at any time irrespective of specialization: they are neither industrialists, merchants, nor real estate developers, but any and all of these depending on which sphere of activity may yield the greatest return for the least risk.[9]

To go above and stay beyond the market requires a certain degree of political power. In the case of Egypt, I shall argue here that since the days of *infitah* (the opening of the Egyptian market to the West in 1974), successive governments have supplied this power to a new class of neo-capitalists through corruption and/or special business connections. The recent monopoly over steel production in Egypt and the consequent rise in the cost of building activities is just one example of this mechanism. With a certain amount of trepidation, I will state flatly that a monopolistic capitalism based on an alliance between government and these neo-capitalists — an oligarchy, to use the words of the famous Egyptian political analyst and historian Mohamed H. Heikal — characterizes much of the political economy of Cairo's recent history.[10] I will further suggest that much of the recent spatial expansion and restructuring of the city can be traced to the international linkages and socioeconomic forces involved with this alliance.

It is important also to note, however, that for any hegemonic group to succeed, it needs a politics of support as well as a politics of power.[11] The success of neoliberal economic policies at the local and global levels has provided this support to the new alliance between government and neo-capitalists in Egypt. As a predominant world ideology legitimating the privatization of a former state-controlled economy, it was able to give rise to common orientations and provide the ingredients for a coalition of interests, making them appear as general interests for the local audience. At the same time,

outside the country, it announced Egypt's reintegration with global economic circuits.

The apparent success of "neoliberal" economic policies in Egypt is fairly well known these days. It is true, for example, that, compared to the troubled days of the late 1980s, the speed with which macroeconomic indicators turned around during the 1990s "qualifies as one of the most impressive in recent economic experience anywhere in the world."[12] One way of telling this success story, at least from the World Bank's point of view, is to begin with the year 1991, one that will certainly figure prominently in the accounts of future chroniclers of Cairo's urban history. Interrelated national and global events that year had a great impact on Egypt's socio-political and economic position, as well as the condition of its capital city.

A key national decision in 1991 was that to join the American-led coalition in the First Gulf War. Among other things, this won the country a brief respite from its previous economic woes, by allowing good portions of its debts to both the United States and other Gulf States to be written off.[13] Moreover, the government's political position during the war pleased the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This established a general mood in both the government and international agencies that started Egypt down a path of economic "reform" it has traveled ever since.

Like many other governments adopting this path, known as the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), the Egyptian government embarked on a round of selling off public assets according to a much-debated privatization policy. It is thus important to note that the IMF and World Bank have served as the principal tools through which the ideology of neoliberalism has been promoted and policed.[14] As I shall next explain, these undertakings have unleashed new socioeconomic and political forces upon Cairo, to which the city has responded by expanding in every direction, and in ways that are simultaneously old and new. But what is truly striking about these spatial expansions is how they have reflected the unevenness and inequality of new patterns of wealth distribution in Egyptian society at large. It is to these spatial inequalities that I shall now turn, as I pick up the second strand from the discourses of globalization.

INEQUALITY AND SPATIAL EXPANSION

The polarization of society into groups of haves and the have-nots is a recurring theme in the critique of economic neoliberalism and globalization. In a recent book, Amy Chau argued that in all countries that have adopted a free-market ideology, wealth has not been spread evenly throughout the society, but has been concentrated in the hands of a new class of wealthy individuals.[15]

Similar observations have been made in critical writings and analyses of globalization. For example, Walden Bello has

FIGURE 1. *The new Azhar Garden opened up new spaces of contrast between the different classes in Cairo.*

discussed the social disparities created by the implementation of structural adjustment programs in various countries.[16] Saskia Sassen's *Globalization and Its Discontents* has speculated on how the new mobility of people and money under free market policies will create increased relative inequality within the narrow spaces of modern postindustrial cities.[17] In terms specific to Egypt, Timothy Mitchell has argued that recent economic reform has concentrated public funds into a narrowing circle of "ever more powerful and prosperous financiers and entrepreneurs."[18] Mitchell quoted the 1994 United Nation's Human Rights Report, which recognized Egypt as "in danger of joining the world's list of failed states because of wide income gaps between sections of [its] population."[19]

According to economist Karima Korayem, in 1991 the wealthiest 10 percent in Egypt controlled around one-third of the GDP, almost 7 percent more than a decade earlier.[20] This condition is particularly acute in Cairo, where the nation's upper class is particularly conspicuous (**FIG.1**). Meanwhile, Asef Bayat has documented the proliferation of more than one hundred squatter communities around Cairo with some six million inhabitants, and claimed these provide a stark indication of "the growing socioeconomic disparity in Cairo since Sadat's *infitah* and the more recent implementation of the IMF's structural adjustment program."[21]

Such disparities and income gaps have also been elucidated by the Egyptian geographer Rushdi Said.[22] In a 1996 book entitled *The Truth and Delusion of the Egyptian Current Condition*, he divided Egyptian society into two groups, which he termed the submerged and the floating sections, in relation to poverty line (**FIG.2**). Said estimated that 86 percent of Egyptian society belong to the submerged section, which lives in dismal conditions and receives only about 26 percent of the GDP. He then divided the remaining 14 percent into three subsections. At the top he identified a group of exceptionally wealthy people who constitute nearly 2 percent of the

FIGURE 2. *Different categories of population in relation to GDP. Graph by author, based on R. Said,* Al-Haqiqa wa Al-Wahm fi Al-Waqi' Al-Misri *(Cairo: Dar Al-Hilal, 1996).*

population but receive 40 percent of GDP. The next segment encompasses 6 percent of the population and receives about 25 percent of the GDP. Below them is a third group, representing about 6 percent of the population, who receive 9 percent of GDP and is struggling to keep afloat.

Other official numbers are less grim than Said's accounts. For instance, one study evaluated the percentages of housing types built between 1982 and 1997 as an indicator of social-class distribution. It found that 66 percent of urban housing belonged to the low-income group, 24 percent to the middle-income group, and 10 percent to the high-income and luxury segment.[23] Whether one takes Said's or the official account, these nationwide figures are indicative of the socioeconomic conditions in the Greater Cairo Region (GCR), an area home to almost one of every four Egyptians, and whose population increases by 3 percent every year.

The critics of neoliberal practices in Egypt are not without their own critics. For example, Vikash Yadav has contended that there is a general tendency among scholars "to blame austerity induced by Neoliberal structural adjustment policies . . . for Egypt's failure to develop and its growing rates of poverty."[24] Yadav is right in arguing that the economy is not fully liberalized. Market mechanisms have yet to be substituted for the social provision of basic welfare, "massive subsidies, price and wage controls, labor inelasticity, and chronic interventions in the marketplace."[25] Nor can anyone claim that income disparities did not exist before the introduction of the SAP. A consumer budget survey conducted in 1974 by the Central Agency for Population Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) indicated that the share of the richest 20 percent of the population was around 47 percent of total income, while the share of the poorest 40 percent was 17 percent.[26]

However, whether fully adopted or partially implemented, one may argue that the main impact of the neoliberal economic program so far has been "to concentrate public funds into different hands, and many fewer."[27] Earlier, I described these new profiteers as neo-capitalists, and suggested that neoliberalism provided them with an effective politics of support. There are no signs today indicating any reversal of their rise in standing. Rather, there is every sign that further increases in social inequality and impoverishment are in store.

In tandem with the privatization and liberalization mantra and zeitgeist, the government has recently started reversing many of the housing laws inherited from the Nasserite, Arab-socialist era. Although providing only a small step toward full liberalization of the housing market, the Egyptian Parliament recently passed an amendment to the rent law, allowing the renegotiation of rents. Other steps have included drafting a new mortgage law and easing restrictions on foreign ownership of land.

Reform steps imposed by the IMF and the World Bank have further spurred the government to alter its role and position in the housing industry. For example, the public sector's involvement in the production of houses has now dropped to where it represents only 5 percent of total housing units built between 1982 and 1997.[28] Since the early 1980s, the state has also focused only on producing and subsidizing houses for low-income groups.[29] Of course, these subsidies and social-welfare policies contradict the neoliberal mantra of free markets and privatization. And to resolve the contradiction and reduce budget deficits, the state has had to reduce total expenditures for housing loans and subsidies, while at the same time increasing the rate of interest on subsidized loans for housing from 4 to 6 percent and demanding larger down-payments.[30]

One result of these changes has been that in a matter of a few years many low-income people, from the submerged sector of the population, have found that formal, subsidized housing is beyond their reach. Consequently, a study conducted in 1993 found that 52 percent of the population of the Greater Cairo Region (GCR), around five-and-a-half million people, now live in more than one hundred informal, squatted, degraded areas, comprising around 92 square kilometers.[31] Most of these areas are scattered inside or at the administrative boundaries of the GCR, where ownership of land is disputed among various governmental bodies and governorates. It is further estimated that these marginal areas — usually developed as encroachments on agricultural land surrounding the metropolis — are increasing by 150 acres every year. Moreover, recent studies have revealed that many inhabitants of these informal, marginal areas are not migrants from the countryside, but educated professionals and government employees who have moved there from elsewhere in the city.[32]

FIGURE 3. *Dismal, substandard housing conditions constitute a large percentage of the housing stock.*

The rise of inner-city slums, squatter settlements, and all types of substandard, informal housing has been further spurred by the effect of economic reform plans on the local currency. Since the days of *infitah*, the Egyptian pound has been constantly devalued, so that the actual wage of paid labors and governmental employees has fallen sharply. This has brought a significant decline in the average family's purchasing power, which has had an indirect impact on housing markets. The lack of adequate, affordable housing has also forced many young families to seek alternative living space: in graveyards, tents, workshops, garages, riverboats, staircase vaults, rooms inside the apartments of relatives, and rooftop shacks (FIG.3).

Such dismal living conditions, caused by a combination of natural population growth, rural migration, and the government's inability to provide new lands for low-income housing or programs to build it, has also degraded environmental conditions in the city alarmingly. Besides the visual cacophony of deteriorating buildings and clashing architectural styles, colors and heights, the city is becoming increasingly polluted. Noise levels have risen, streets are littered with refuse, and blackish smoke hangs over a city that is subject to never-ending traffic jams. No part of the GCR has been able to avoid the impacts of pollution and overcrowding (FIG.4).

For the upper-middle and upper classes, this condition has resurrected the idea, which began at the turn of the twentieth century, of leaving the city for the surrounding deserts. The state has been supportive of this movement for two main reasons. First, by directing growth outward to new settlements and along new development axes, it could improve some aspects of the living environment of the GCR. Second, the selling of desert land would open new avenues of profit for the government and for a new class of entrepreneurs with ties to it and to international corporations. Today such a program of sales has accommodated a massive transfer of land in the deserts around the city from public to private ownership.

Let us not forget how a neoliberal economic orientation has formed a background of support for such a privatization and commodification of land. The Minister of Housing echoed this spirit of deregulation and privatization in a televised interview a few years ago. At the time, reflecting the government's goal of expanding and supporting the creation of a private real estate market, Mohamed Solieman announced that land constitutes the main asset of any country — despite the conventional wisdom that its people are more important.

To put these new real estate expansions in numbers, Fathy Muselhy has estimated that the total area of the GCR in 1977 was about 50,000 acres.[33] According to a recent government publication, about 175,000 acres have been added to this total since enactment of Law 59 of 1979 on New Urban Communities. This figure, however, does not take into account the squatting and informal expansions of older areas. Some other estimates therefore suggest that the urban area of the GCR is now more than a quarter of a million acres within a total area of 850,000 acres. According to these figures, in 25 years, the area of the GCR has more than quadrupled.

Even these figures are not totally accurate, however, because they conceal the actual extent of spaces claimed by the new upper class. These additional urban expansions extend into desert areas immediately adjacent to the GCR which are not yet included in its administrative boundaries. In a recent

FIGURE 4. *Middle-class neighborhoods are heavily congested and polluted.*

study, Rania Rashed divided the urban expansion of the GCR into two zones, the eastern and western expansion zones.[34] While she estimated the urban expansion of the eastern zone to be around 180,000 acres, she estimated the western expansion, which she divided into four subzones, to be near 110,000 acres, bringing the total new expansion of the GCR to some

FIGURE 5. *The percentage of the total recent expansion of luxurious housing in relation to total land expansion. Graph by author, using data by Rania Rashed.*

300,000 acres (**FIG.5**). One can further add to her mapping a large stretch of land along the Cairo-Alexandria desert road, which I have estimated to be around 100,000 acres.

More striking than the vast acreage of this unprecedented urban expansion has been the large areas of it that are privatized, exclusive spaces for an elite, ostentatious segment of the society. Consider the types of housing planned for these new expansions. Rashed described how 58 percent of the new land in the eastern expansion area is set aside for housing, and 51 percent of that is designated for the luxury market. In the western expansion, housing constituted 69 percent of new lands, with a remarkable 74 percent of that reserved for upscale developments. After adding the area along the Cairo-Alexandria desert road (an area dominated by a new type of gated community based on agricultural production), this means that a total area of around 200,000 acres has been designated on the outskirts of Cairo for the construction of luxury housing. To indicate how vast a space this is, consider that these new elite spaces that have emerged in the last two decades are four times larger in area than the entire GCR, which took more than a millennium to grow. It is to these elite spaces around the city that I shall now turn to pick up the third strand of the discussion.

NEW SPACES OF CAPITAL

The accelerating process of economic globalization and its impact on cities and societies worldwide has been noted in many critical writings in the past two decades. It is a multi-

faceted, multiscalar process whose impacts on contemporary metropolises have been addressed from a variety of points of view. One such discourse has emerged around the increasing tendency to segregate public spaces for privatized, conspicuous consumption.

Scholars concerned with this issue have attributed the rise of such bounded spaces to the drastic increase in economic and social segregation. They have stressed the changing function of cities — from being places of social reproduction to places of market-oriented production; and from being places of managerialism to places of entrepreneurialism.[35] And they have associated the expansion of privatized public spaces with abstract financial speculation, as well as with a boom in the service and entertainment industries.[36] But what most have not stated directly is that this economic reality has been fueled by the neoliberal paradigm developed in the 1970s and 1980s. Under this paradigm, new sealed-off private environments, which purport to be public spaces, are intimately linked to a fusion of consumerism, entertainment, popular culture, and tourism.[37]

Another offshoot from this discourse has focused on the rise and spread of gated residential communities. Edward Blakely and Mary Snyder have written that since the 1980s, the number of lifestyle and prestige gated communities has risen dramatically all over the world.[38] Of course, security may be one major reason why people choose to live behind gates. But in the context of Cairo the gating of residential areas has had less to do with this than with a desire to express an elite, controlled lifestyle and to escape the polluted metropolitan environment. More interestingly, some authors have linked the gating of residential spaces to the spread of other architectural building types, such as the mall, another form of privatized semi-public space.[39]

An excellent discussion of this new geography of inequality and the spatial segregation in Cairo appeared in an article in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, written by Mona Abaza, a professor of Sociology at the American University in Cairo. Among other things, Abaza contended that "walled off, protected areas, gated communities, condominiums, private beach resorts, leisure islands of peace, snow cities in the desert and amusement parks, monitored by private security forces and advanced technology to protect them against the 'barbarians' outside, are no longer just futuristic fantasies." Abaza further associated the spread of these new elite spaces to the expansion of consumer culture.

Despite their apparently diverse appearance, from an urban point of view there are important similarities between these emerging spaces of consumption.[40] Whether a mall, a gated community, a theme park, or some other development type, they all provide a carefully controlled environment that is physically, economically and socially isolated from surrounding areas. They also benefit from the deterioration of the surrounding public environment through the establishment of a simulated alternative ideal. Finally, they enforce

codes of behavior to uphold the utopian imagery which gives them their economic and symbolic value. For example, to establish such forms of symbolic capital, gated communities deploy various marketing strategies aimed at displaying the luxurious lifestyles that are possible there.

Historically, such social and spatial segregation is not new to Cairo. Indeed, Abu Zeid Rageh has suggested that the development of the city has followed a distinct socio-spatial cycle, according to which the flight of the rich and affluent to peripheral areas at first leaves the working and lower classes behind in the center.[41] But this center soon grows until it can no longer contain this population, and at this point it spills out to the periphery, forcing a new move by the higher classes to a ring further out.

The existence of gated communities is also not new. Fatimid Cairo was long a gated city, with restrictions of access applied to most natives. But the first rudimentary prototype for a modern Egyptian gated community appeared in the early 1960s with the construction of the holiday resort village of al-Ma'mura, then located east of Alexandria, but now absorbed into the city. Financed and built by the state-owned company bearing the same name, al-Ma'mura was a semi-public development, and most of the people who stayed there were temporary summer vacationers. Its beaches were also fully public, and anyone could gain access to them by purchasing an inexpensive ticket.

This all changed in the 1980s when a series of resort villages were rapidly built along the Mediterranean coast west of Alexandria — Marabella, Maraqya, Marina, to name a few. Unlike al-Ma'mura, access to these was limited to those who could afford to purchase their own summer house. These resorts thus opened up new spaces of conspicuous consumption for their residents. Many of them were neo-bourgeois Egyptians who had benefited from the economic policies of the 1970s; others were expatriate workers who were earning relatively high wages in the Persian Gulf.

There were two principal motivations for investing in this type of development at the time. One was that the high inflation during the 1980s made it more profitable to invest in a summer house (and real estate in general) than to save money in a bank. But the growth of leisure and entertainment industries was equally important. And in the early 1990s, the desire to extend this lifestyle spread quickly to Cairo, as many elite Cairenes asked why they should not be able to enjoy such leisure activities all year long.

The seductions of these new spaces of leisure are not easily resisted. Besides providing genuine convenience, spectacle, and a total living experience, they offer what Cairo no longer has: clean, organized, human-scaled, and green environments. The developers of these gated communities also stress that their residential enclaves are only a few minutes drive away from specific parts of Cairo. They are thus able to play on the twin desires of prospective residents — on the one hand, to be far from the ills of the large metropolis; on the other, to be

close to its amenities. Like the suspension of time and space in dreams, gated communities present themselves as both sufficiently far away from the city and sufficiently close to it to fulfill any fantasy. One such place is a large-scale, master-planned development, Dreamland, the specifics of which I shall now turn to in greater detail.

DREAMLAND

Located at edge of the western expansion zone of the metropolis, Dreamland has been presented by its developers as a fully packaged living experience, a total lifestyle for Egyptians. Ahmed Bahgat, the Chairman of the Bahgat Group and the progenitor of this project, is an industrialist who, along with many other Egyptian entrepreneurs, jumped on the real estate bandwagon during the economic boom of the 1990s. From the Bahgat group's Internet site, one can learn that while completing his doctoral studies at Georgia Tech University, Bahgat invented and manufactured an electronic device that could provide Muslims, regardless of their location worldwide, with a determination of the correct time and direction for their prayers. According to this story, upon returning to Egypt in 1985, Bahgat capitalized on the success of this device and established a general electronics company.

Between 1985 and 1994, the company, International Electronics, first focused on assembling Korean television sets and other appliances. But, as Timothy Mitchell has written, the company soon expanded, and by means of a suspicious deal linked to senior military officers, began using military factories to build its own products.[42] Besides working in electronics and real estate, the Bahgat Group, as it is now called, has also since expanded through several major subsidiary companies into the fields of household appliances, furniture, marble, glass, medical supplies, entertainment, and agricultural development.

The estimated quick, high profitability of land development in comparison to more traditional manufacturing activities is what initially attracted people such as Bahgat to the real estate business. According to the Investment Authority, between 1993 and 1999, the numbers of real estate developers in Egypt more than tripled to a total of 92, with a capital value of 3.3 billion Egyptian pounds.[43] At the same time, in a matter of a few years, a new type of development, the gated community, became a mass trend prevalent in Cairo's ever-expanding fringe. Although there is no official count of the number of gated communities in the GCR, I have estimated their number at around seventy, and rising.[44]

In the western expansion zone alone, which belongs to the administrative boundaries of 6th of October and Zayed cities, these private enclaves now occupy some 7,000 acres. The size of these projects varies considerably, from as small as 20 acres to large master-planned communities of more than 2,000 acres. Some provide multimillion-dollar palaces

FIGURE 6. *Complexes with multimillion-dollar houses are increasingly appearing in the deserts around Cairo.*

for the super rich, such as Qatamiya Heights, Mirage City, and Al-Rawda (**FIG.6**). Others, comprised of a mix of large apartment buildings and small villas, such as Rehab City in New Cairo to the west, cater to the upper-middle class and to Egyptian expatriates who work in the Gulf states. It is important to note that many of the latter favor living in environments similar to those they are used to in the Persian Gulf.

A new genre of privatized agricultural lifestyle has also now established itself along the Cairo-Alexandria Road, a few kilometers north of Dreamland. Although ownership of the desert lands here is not clear, they have nevertheless been allocated under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. One heavily advertised project is "European Farmlands," which consists of more than 15,000 acres subdivided into sixteen plots — or farms, as they are advertised. Each of these has been named after a European country or region: German farms, Bavarian farms, Spanish Farms, English Farms, and so on.

These names, the project marketing personnel informed me, have nothing to do with anything that will appear there. Each such ranch is supposed to be delivered to its prospective owner planted with apple, apricot and peach trees. On each lot, an area of no more than 2 percent of the total property is designated for building a house. The design of the house may in turn be chosen from twenty existing approved designs. Whereas Dreamland is designed solely as a residential heaven with spaces for consumption and fun, these ranches are being marketed as places for living and production.

In the rush for land that followed the privatization bonanza, the Bahgat group managed to secure a 2,000-acre stretch along the Cairo-Oases desert road, a few kilometers west of the great pyramids of Giza (**FIG.7**). While the land, which was originally a quarry, was appraised at less than two

FIGURE 7. *The Pyramids of Giza form the background scenery for Dreamland.*

pounds per square meter at the time Bahgat bought it, just a few months later its value had soared to 200 pounds per square meter. This dramatic increase in value was enough to collateralize a huge bank loan, which Bahgat used to finance the construction of Dreamland.

It is not clear how Bahgat managed to purchase this large tract, why the land value went up so much, or why the National Bank of Egypt secured the loan and became a partner in developing the project. But Mitchell has written that Bahgat was reputed to be a "front man for unpublicized moneymaking by the presidential family, which may explain why the express roads out to Dreamland were built so rapidly."[45] Other rumors linked Bahgat to certain high officials in the presidential palace.

From the start, Dreamland was intended to function as an independent residential city — as its marketing boasted, the first and largest Internet-wired residential development in the Middle East. Besides offering various types of dwellings, its master plan revealed how its developers intended to include many special attractions and facilities: a theme park, a shopping resort, a polo field, office towers, a hospital, two schools, two hotels, tennis and golf clubs, cinemas, a theater, an amphitheater, a business park, and a manmade canyon (**FIGS.8–11**). Otherwise, however, its planning resembled that of a typical North American suburb. In fact, one architect who worked on the initial scheme told me its site plan was traced from an existing suburban division in California. Like North American suburbs, which typically lack a clear community center, Dreamland was also frag-

mented around a golf course, a theme park, and a shopping resort. And in contrast with the winding alleys, grids, or boulevards and squares of Cairo, Dreamland's designers opted for a hierarchy of curving roads and a less formal, even ambiguous, geometry.

With a total estimated cost to completion of US$2,640 million, Bahgat searched for foreign architects to design his Dreamland. From the beginning, he wanted it to have a North American feel.[46] Buildings were supposed to reflect classical and grandiose American styles, with pitched roofs and arches, all painted with light pastel colors. Bahgat, himself, wanted to build a replica of the White House to live in (**FIG.12**). This wish was never fulfilled, and instead he built a mansion in the middle of the development, which he was eventually forced to sell to a Persian Gulf sheikh on account of financial difficulties he encountered in the early 2000s.

Eventually, Bahgat hired two North American offices to develop Dreamland's master plan and architecture — Development Design Group Incorporated and FORREC, respectively. Both companies are global leaders in planning theme attractions and entertainment facilities. Initially, the design of Dreamland seemed vague in the mind of its maker, mainly comprised of three distinct areas for housing, a theme park, and theme retail. But as it developed, Bahgat realized he wanted it to resemble "the Orlando of the Middle East," referring to the Disney World development in Orlando, Florida.[47]

It is important to note several important trends that have influenced the development of projects such as these. First has been a change in design and construction culture in Egypt in

FIGURE 8. *Hilton Dreamland hotel is one of three hotels planned for the complex.*

FIGURE 11. *Dreamland Ideal Educational School is one of three language schools planned for inclusion in the development.*

FIGURE 9. *Emerald apartments, as they are called, overlook the golf course and the Pyramids.*

the 1990s. During this time, a growing number of North American and European engineering and architecture firms, such as Bechtel, Sasaki, Michel Graves, SOM, and others, began to collaborate with local offices to produce large new developments. It was as if the last decade of the twentieth century was marriage season for foreign and Egyptian design firms.

Second, no doubt, the creators of Dreamland recognized that no other industry worldwide has been able recently to raise the bar so constantly as the entertainment industry. Not only the private sector, but the state as well, has been involved in expanding this industry in Egypt. Thus, just across the highway from Dreamland, the Ministry of Information is developing a theme park and a media production facility.

FIGURE 10. *Dreamland townhouses.*

FIGURE 12. *Initially, the principal shareholder wanted to build himself a replica of the White House, but eventually, he built a palace with a watchtower that overlooks the whole development.*

FIGURE 13. *The interior spaces of the recently completed City Star megamall in Cairo resemble those in such projects in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia.*

My point is that certain global cultural icons, predominantly North American, have come to be identified with a particular way of life, now known as the American way. In this regard, people have argued that the consumer culture and its architectural representations have been imported to Egypt from the West via the Persian Gulf — which, in turn, emulated the successful environment in Southeast Asia (FIG.13). But I would tend rather to agree with Yasser Elsheshtawi, that while Dubai, for example, has exerted much influence on many Arab cities, including Cairo, this is not a one-directional influence, but rather a complex web of influences and interactions.[48]

Of course, there are more significant realities behind this project than the stylistic inclinations of its maker. For example, its construction proved to be extremely complicated, and required the involvement of many local workers and construction companies. Many construction activities were not that different from those required for other building projects in Cairo. But some of its component buildings, such as the amusement park and the Hilton hotel, required that quality-control mechanisms be set by the company and the architectural firms to ensure a higher standard of finishing.

The infrastructure of the project also caused some difficulties. Many elements were designed and executed by local consultants and contractors and linked to the 6th of October City infrastructure. The electricity grid, for example, was linked to the city's main electric power station, and the sewerage system was linked to a municipal treatment plant with a large daily capacity. But perhaps the centerpiece of the infrastructure in Dreamland is its communication network. Built in cooperation with Motorola, this was designed to connect all residences with fiber optic cables, giving space for broadband Internet and satellite services. In fact, two entertainment satellite TV stations have been operating from a small building in the middle of the development.

Not unlike most of new luxury developments in Egypt's desert areas, Dreamland has been criticized for its excessive water consumption. Water for Dreamland comes from the Nile River via 6th of October City's purification system, and is, among other things, used to irrigate its golf course and fill its artificial lakes.[49] Statistics are not available for how much water Dreamland or other similar large-scale projects are consuming (FIG.14). But, according to the Minister of Agriculture, many such luxury residential developments are mismanaging the nation's water resources. For example, the stretch of land along the Cairo-Alexandria road depends on an underground aquifer for irrigation and domestic use. According to some estimates, 400,000 acres of agricultural land in this area will soon have to be removed from production because of the heavy usage of this underground supply to realize a new lifestyle environment of golf courses, artificial lakes, swimming pools, and manicured lawns (FIG.15).

Dreamland's promotional materials make it clear that its main purpose is to establish a lifestyle community that offers a permanent sense of festivity. The names given to its different residential building types — Hawaii, Bahamas Lite, and Caribbean, for example — suggest an illusion of fantasy and

FIGURE 14. *Underground water is pumped up to maintain the large artificial lake in the Solaymania Compound along the Cairo-Alexandria road.*

FIGURE 15. *With houses overlooking a golf course, manicured lawns, and artificial lakes, Qatamiya Heights is one of the first exclusive gated communities in Cairo.*

entertainment through semantic association with famous American destinations. But the illusions are not limited to a particular geography or historical time. Brochures describe how in Dreamland one can also expect to experience Vienna, Naples, or the historical district of Khan al-Khalili. In a kind of reverse tourism, the development thus offers to bring the world and its history to its residents.

Such carnivalesque frivolity is particularly glaring in the project's centerpiece, Dreampark. FORREC, the Canadian firm that designed it, had initially proposed an ancient-Egyptian theme. But, according to FORREC's chairman, the developers of Dreamland wanted a North American theme. The park design finally came to include a small "theme area more as an ancient wonders of the world attraction, and not specifically Egyptian. The rest was a hodgepodge of Hollywood television programs and movies that most of the world watches and understands"[50] **(FIG.16)**.

Toward the end of the 1990s the Cairo area witnessed a drastic slowdown in construction activity caused by overspeculation in the real estate market **(FIG.17)**. The government tried to restimulate construction by giving a brief a tax holiday (between 1998 and 2001) to companies working on large new residential projects such as Dreamland. This policy, however, did not help many of these companies balance their budgets.

At this time Dreamland was faced by serious economic difficulties. These ultimately caused the Bahgat Group to realize it could not finance the entire project without forming partnerships with other developers and management companies — a policy it implemented later with the Dreamland hospital and two language schools.

Today, the project is halfway completed — if one judges what has been built in comparison to what was contemplated in its original master plan. But it is not clear how this plan will finally be realized. Moreover, the Bahgat Group has been forced to sell some of its assets in the company to the National Bank because it failed to pay interest on its earlier loans.

FIGURE 16. *Dreampark is a Disney-style amusement park.*

FIGURE 17. *The slowdown of the real estate market turned some of these large developments into ghost cities, with unfinished houses and infrastructure.*

FIGURE 18. *A street advertisement saying "Life as it should be." Like privatized, fantasized archipelagos, certain spaces are becoming like lifestyle exhibits in a large museum we call the city.*

PARTING THOUGHTS

My first concluding thought is that what has been emerging out of the social and material production of Dreamland and similar elite spaces in Cairo is a specific urbanity, which is linked to a particular form of economy. In this economy, experience is organized around and linked to a particular lifestyle, a fusion of consumerism and entertainment. In today's Egypt, then, entertainment and fantasy are intimately interwoven with the production of new elite spaces.

Etymologically, the noun "entertainment" derives from the verb "to entertain" — or, in Latin, *inter + tenere*, which mean "to hold together." Spatially, the production of urban entertainment fantasies in this sense involves the holding together of delusive imaginations, generated through the use of particular signs and images.

This "holding together," I contend, is reached through a process of financial as well as spatial exclusion. This is how liberal economy and the urban oasis, or the neoliberal economy and the gated community are all tied together.

My second thought concerns the impact of the new spatial expansions on the hopes and dreams of the citizens of Cairo (FIG.18). Etymologically, the words "space" and "hope" share the same Latin origin, *spes*. Hope is a mental space that opens up for someone with a dream. Like a dream, hope is a vision in a mental space. But hope, I want to emphasize, is also related to the physical space, the space of everyday life, as Henri Lefebvre put it.[51] The opening up of the possibilities of the physical, spatial expansion thus opens the horizon of the mental space for dreaming — of a better life.

By contrast, when a person loses hope, one may say he or she is in despair, or without *sprare*, or *spes*; he or she is without space. The loss of the mental space is coordinate with the loss of physical space.

To put it differently, when a person cannot see the horizon, when he or she feels that all physical spaces have been taken, there will be no space to dream. In a way, this person has been robbed the capacity to dream. My concern throughout the essay is that places like Dreamland are physical spaces that only a small fraction of the population can dream of, while the rest are left in despair without further possibility to dream.

NOTES

1. See, for example, A. Appadurai, "The Global Cultural Economy," in W. Patrick and C. Laura, eds., *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

2. M. Sorkin, "Introduction," in M. Sorkin, ed., *Variations on a Theme Park* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992).

3. See, for example, J. Friedman, "The World City Hypothesis," in P. Knox and P. Taylor, eds., *World Cities in a World System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.317; and D. Harvey, *Spaces of Capital* (London: Routledge, 2001).

4. E. Soja, *Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions* (New York: Blackwell, 2000), p.265.

5. A variety of authors have suggested this view. For example, Ananya Roy has argued that this round of globalization must be understood as a project of neoliberalism with particular socio-spatial implications. A. Roy, "New Global History and the City," conference material (St. Petersburg, January 9–12, 2003). In a similar line of thinking, Timothy Mitchell has contended that neoliberalism has triumphed over the political

imagination in Egypt. He has also linked the expansions of the city to the neoliberal project. T. Mitchell, "Dreamland: The Neoliberalism of Your Desires," *Middle East Report* (Spring 1999), pp.28–33. In this essay, I take neoliberalism to be the predominant ideology steering globalization in much of the world.

6. H. Overbeek and K. van der Pijl, "Restructuring Capital and Restructuring Hegemony," in H. Overbeek, ed., *Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism in the 1980's* (London: Routledge, 1993).

7. P. Taylor, "World Cities and Territorial States Under Conditions of Contemporary Globalization," http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/rb/rb9.html.

8. Ibid., p.2.

9. Ibid., p.2.

10. In a recent televised program on Al-Jazeera, Mohamed H. Heikal suggested that the current political regime in Egypt can best be described as an oligarchy.

11. A. Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism* (London: Macmillan, 1988).

12. K. Ikram, "Towards Sustainable Development," in *Emerging Egypt 2001* (London: Oxford Business Group, 2001).

13. Mitchell, "Dreamland: The Neoliberalism of Your Desires," p.28.

14. S. Alam, "Globalization and Its Discontent," *Ahram Weekly*, June 12–18, 2003.

15. A. Chau, *World On Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (New York: Doubleday, 2002).

16. W. Bello, "Structural Adjustment Programs: Success for Whom?" in J. Mander and E. Goldsmith, eds., *The Case Against Globalization* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996).

17. S. Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: Free Press, 1998).

18. T. Mitchell, *Rule of Experts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p.282.

19. Quoted in Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*, p.267. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Egypt: Country Profile 1996/1997* (London:

Economist, 1997), pp.22–23.

20. See K. Korayem, "Structural Adjustment, Stabilization Policies, and the Poor in Egypt," *Cairo Papers in Social Science*, Vol.18 No.4 (Winter 1995/6), table 4, p.26.

21. A. Bayat, *"Cairo's Poor: Dilemmas of Survival and Solidarity,"* Middle East Report 202 (Winter, 1996).

22. R. Said, *Al-Haqiqa wa Al-Wahm fi Al-Waqi' Al-Misri* (in Arabic) (Cairo: Dar Al-Hilal, 1996).

23. Ministry of Planning, Al-Istrategiya Al-Qawmiya lil-Tanmiya Al-Iqtisadiya wa Al-Igtema'yia fi Mostahal Al-Qarn Al-Wahid wa Al-'Ashrin (Cairo: Ministry of Planning, 1997).

24. A strong criticism of area experts comes from V. Yadav, "Re-Imagining Egypt (Part II)," http://aucegypt.edu/faculty/vyadav/ipe/2005/02/uk-liberalism-murder.html.

25. Mitchell would not disagree with that either. For him, "the reform program did not remove the state from the market or eliminate profligate public subsidies." Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*, p.282.

26. See G. Abdel Khalek and R. Tignor, eds., *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982).

27. Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*, p.282.

28. Ministry of Planning, Al-Istrategiya Al-Qawmiya lil-Tanmiya Al-Iqtisadiya wa Al-Igtema'yia fi Mostahal Al-Qarn Al-Wahid wa Al-'Ashrin (Cairo: Ministry of Planning, 1997).

29. The housing supply by the state and the private sector provide for only a quarter of the actual demand.

30. F. Muselhy, *Al-'Umran Al-'Ashwai fi Misr*, Vol.1 (Cairo: Al-Maglis Al-A'ala lel-Thaqafa, 2002).

31. IDMSC (Information and Decision Making Support Center), *Al-Mabani Al-'Ashwaiya* (Cairo: Ministry of Local Government, 1993).

32. M. Hanna, *Al-Iskan wa Al-Siyassa* (Cairo: Al-Hayaa Al-'Aama lel-Kitab, 1996).

33. F. Muselhy, *Tatawor Al-'Assima Al-Misriya* (Cairo: Dar Al-Madina Al-Monawara, 1988).

34. R. Rashid, "Al-Imtidad Al-'Umrani lel-Moddon Al-Kubra wa Tawzee' Marakiz Al-Khadamat," unpublished thesis, Cairo University, 2001.

35. See M. Smith, *Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization* (Oxford: Blackwell,

2001); and D. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989).

36. S. Zukin, *The Cultures of Cities* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

37. J. Hannigan, *Fantasy City* (London: Routledge, 1998).

38. E. Blakely and M. Snyder, *Fortress America* (Cambridge: Brookings Institute, 1999).

39. K. Dovey, *Framing Places* (London: Routledge, 1999).

40. I am greatly indebted to Kim Dovey for making these points clear to me. See Dovey, *Framing Places*.

41. A. Rageh, "Al-Taghyour fi Al-Namat Al-Iskani fi Madinat Al-Kahirah," in I. Serag Al-Din, R. Fadil, and S. Al-Sadik, eds., *Tahadiat AL-Tawasou' Al-'Umrrani: Al-Kahirah* (Cairo: The Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 1984).

42. Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*, p.285.

43. E. Mekay, "Luxury Housing Market Glut Triggers Regulatory Calls," *Middle East Times*, May 1999, p.7.

44. This number includes all the gated communities in 6th of October, Zayed, Obour, Shorou', and New Cairo cities. This figure will go over one hundred if one adds to it the agricultural, gated communities along the Cairo-Alexandria Road.

45. Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*, p.285.

46. See A. Warson, "Entertainment Oasis Coming to Sahara," in *Shopping Centers Today*, http://www.icsc.org/srch/sct/current/sct9905/52.htm.

47. J. Matthews, "Construction Special Report," *MEED Weekly Special Report*, 1999, http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/Arabia_MEED38.htm.

48. See Y. Elsheshtawy, "Redrawing Boundaries: Dubai, an Emerging Global City," in Y. Elsheshtawy, *Planning Middle Eastern Cities* (London: Routledge, 2004).

49. See for example, N. Essawy, *Ahram*, May 15, 2005, p.3.

50. Warson, "Entertainment Oasis Coming to Sahara."

51. H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

All photos, except Figure 15, are by the author.

Vieques, Puerto Rico: From Devastation to Conservation and Back Again

JAVIER ARBONA

This article proposes a reclamation of the Vieques bombing range as a spearhead project in the transformation of this Caribbean Island from a U.S. weapons storage and combat training site to an inevitable tourist destination. The real "nature" of the island is today concealed by a carefully constructed camouflage. Official sources promote the island's landscape as representing untouched nature, preserved from development by its former military use. But the island had a long history of agricultural use before the military took it over, and today's supposed natural areas hide high levels of toxic contamination. Nevertheless, a reassembled tableau communicates to visitors that they gaze at something original. This theme is so strong it has even seduced those who came to Vieques to oppose the military presence. Tourists of both strains today read an empty wilderness where residents of the island have no place, and where current problems with pollution and poverty can be ignored. Reversing complacent attitudes may require a new look at the bombing range as a location of an alternative form of tourism.

> At all events, in retrospect I became preoccupied not only with the unaccustomed sense of freedom but also with the paralyzing horror that had come over me at various times when confronted with the traces of destruction, reaching far back into the past, that were evident in that remote place.
>
> — *W.G. Sebald,* The Rings of Saturn[1]

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Vieques is a tiny island located off the east coast of Puerto Rico. It sits amidst vast waters and underneath a huge sky. Long and narrow like a machete, its slimness brings the ocean close to daily life, never too far to be seen, touched, heard, smelled or tasted. Watching too intently the motion of fast-moving clouds caught in the Trade Winds may cause dizziness. Some days, the view of a chopped-up ocean gives testimony to these

gusts, accentuated by the feeling of salt that clings to skin, as if one had dived into the sea before even arriving at the beach (**FIG.1**).

Vieques's north shore has a fine, sawtooth grain containing several dozen half-moon bays and a few beaches where palm trees lean toward an ocean that digs the sand from beneath them. As the terrain gradually slopes upward, however, the soil provides a more stable habitat for other coastal plants, like sea grape. Meanwhile, on the island's south side, tangled areas of mangrove — with their thin, sinuous rhizomes layered with dark, waxy leaves — obscure the many shorelines to create an ecosystem that forms an intriguing edge between water and land, providing shelter for a thriving mix of wildlife. Inland, the island's eastern half is partly covered by a rare subtropical dry forest. Much of the rest of the island is open livestock pasture or thorny scrub, with an occasional forested streambed or hilltop.

On April 19, 1999, an F-18 fighter jet dropped two 500-pound bombs several miles off target and killed Vieques-born David Sanes-Rodríguez, a civilian security guard working for the U.S. Navy. The outrage caused by this event marked the beginning of the end for sixty years of U.S. military presence on the island.[2]

The effort to stop the use of Vieques as a theater of war — one with many chapters over several decades — entered its crucial last phase two days after the death of Sanes-Rodríguez.[3] On April 21, a group traveled to the restricted observation post where he had died and installed a Roman cross in his honor. As the story goes, one member of the group, Alberto "Tito Kayak" de Jesús, then decided to stay at the observation post, at least until someone would replace him. Cacimar Zenón, the son of the president of the local fishermen's association, joined de Jesús the next day, and the group's numbers continued to multiply.[4]

Their actions sparked a growing protest against the U.S. military, which adopted religious iconography to commemorate not only Sanes-Rodríguez, but also the other islanders allegedly killed by cancer as a consequence of military pollution (**FIG.2**). By the end of May 1999, protestors had completed a small open-air chapel on a beach in the Navy bombing range on the eastern tip of Vieques. The Catholic Church threw its support behind this act of civil disobedience, and two bishops visited the site in open violation of federal law.[5] Soon, more and more protesters were flouting federal laws to camp on the bombing range and other areas adjacent to where Sanes-Rodríguez had died. The news

FIGURE 2. *Playa Yayí. Photo by Alina Luciano/Claridad.*

media followed with their own tents and transmitters to report visits by local or foreign politicians, church leaders, and celebrities.[6] Reporters from all over the world cast the story as one involving underdog opposition to the strongest military the world has ever known.

The bombing range became the apotheosis of this struggle to demilitarize the island. Protest leaders, predominantly local men, were soon leading tours of its most ravaged areas. They confidently explained how the blistered holes in the thick steel sides of tank carcasses could only have been made by uranium-tipped ammunition, the leading suspected cause of Gulf War Syndrome. Such visits caused the Navy to retract previous denials and acknowledge that such ammunition was being used.[7] Cameras on site then turned from the tanks to sweep over the landscape below: a cratered, dry, brown bowl where shells, some the length of a person, stuck out from the bare earth or lay on the ground with their heads squeezed like accordions **(FIG.3).**

On May 4, 2000, the FBI, federal marshals, Navy troops, and Puerto Rico state police raided the protest camps and arrested a total of 231 people.[8] Images taken that day at the bombing range were striking: unarmed civilians of all ages, many singing or praying, were rounded up by troops in full body armor, helmets and goggles, backed up by helicopters and battleships.

The arrests only caused the protest to spread beyond Vieques and encourage the largest public demonstrations ever in Puerto Rico. Despite their former disagreements, especially over Puerto Rico's political status vis-à-vis the United States, Vieques became a bumper-sticker issue for all Puerto Ricans. Dissent by elected figures was equivalent to political suicide. At the ballot box in 2000 the power of the issue showed when the party in favor of U.S. statehood lost most of its posts and its grip on the governorship.

On Vieques, after the protestors' encampments were dismantled, military activities resumed under stricter rules set by President Bill Clinton. A pledge was also made for a future referendum on an end to the military presence there.[9] But the protestors rejected this strategy of appeasement and all other compromises that did not entail an immediate, total stop to the bombing. Their response was to persistently enter the bombing range and act as defiant human shields.

FIGURE 3. *U.S. Navy bombing range. Photo by Alina Luciano.*

FIGURE 4. *Along the Gates of Camp García. Photo by author.*

Protests also occurred at the main entrance to the Navy's Camp García on the interior of Vieques. As at the bombing range, activists here placed banners, crosses, and Puerto Rican flags (FIG.4). However, it was the scorched landscape of the bombing range that eventually became symbolic of a struggle larger than Vieques itself.

Eventually, the U.S. Navy completed its departure on May 1, 2003, after a period of civil disobedience that transfixed Puerto Rico and refocused its struggle for a national identity disassociated from the unresolved issue of its *political* identity. Through the bombing range debate, Puerto Ricans approached a claim made by a relatively small community, and deemed it legitimate. In asserting the validity of this claim, Puerto Ricans realized they could speak with a common voice.

A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE

The island of Vieques lies twenty-two miles southwest of Saint Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, and approximately six miles east of the nearest point on mainland Puerto Rico, the former Roosevelt Roads U.S. Navy base in Ceiba. It is a political municipality of Puerto Rico, with its own mayor.[10] However, between 1941 and 2003, the U.S. Navy's Atlantic Fleet owned and managed more land there than the municipal government.

Vieques is approximately twenty-two miles long and four-and-a-half miles wide. Of its 33,000 acres, the military once owned 23,000, roughly two-thirds.[11] For sixty years, a declining civilian population — now just over 9,000 — lived on a 10,000-acre strip with two towns, Isabel II (the capital) and Esperanza.

Military lands were formerly divided into eastern and western areas. On May 1, 2003, the day after the Navy left, the U.S. Department of the Interior inherited most of these lands. Although a portion of the western property was returned to the municipality of Vieques in 2001, this means the U.S. government still holds title to around 19,000 acres on the island.[12] These lands are now controlled by the Fish and Wildlife Service, and are known as the Vieques National Wildlife Refuge, the largest such area in the Caribbean (FIG.5).[13]

During its years on the island, the Navy used its lands in different ways. The western lands served principally as an ammunition storage depot, while its eastern holdings were treated as part of something called the Inner Range. Not just a piece of Vieques, the Inner Range was an enormous 195,000-square-mile game board that covered more ocean surface than land itself.[14] More accurately, it was a game *space* that stretched into the air above and to the sea floor below. The eastern lands were then further subdivided into the notorious bombing range and a "maneuver area" used to train amphibious units, battalion landing teams, and combat engineering units.[15]

The Navy was fond of Vieques. They could practice beach landings, special-operations parachute drops, and small-arms fire in the maneuver area. They could shoot big artillery shells from the dry forest into the bombing range. They could shoot from ground to air, air to the ground, ground to sea, and sea to ground.[16] And they could simulate realistic combat involving close coordination between units and even foreign allies. They claimed such multiuse space was hard to find anywhere else.[17]

By the Navy's own admission, such military activities changed the landscape — just as previous human uses had changed it before the Navy. But the largest of these impacts has yet to be completely measured.[18] Just as there were two different military activities on Vieques — weapons storage on the west and live-fire war practice on the east — there are today two different pollution profiles: synthetic chemicals on the west, and heavy metals on the east. This is a generalization for the sake of brevity, but it not far from what is known. Estimates of the complete nature of the pollution problem are likewise too complicated to fully document here. The total price tag for the cleanup, however, has been estimated at between $130 million (without cleaning up the bombing range) to more than $1 billion.[19]

FIGURE 5. *Vieques National Wildlife Refuge Map (2004). Source: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.*

One thing is certain: the bombing range will surely prove the most polluted part of Vieques.

In its rhetoric, the military has always insisted that it serendipitously discovered the bombing range in a natural state perfectly suited to its training needs. But was this the case? Did the military "find" or "make" this landscape — and how?

The donning of camouflage allows a military force to deceive an enemy by dissolving into the surroundings. On Vieques, camouflage has worked differently. Instead of camouflaging soldiers, the military has tried to camouflage the landscape. More specifically, it has worked to synchronize physical attributes of the land to hide the traces of its former presence, redirecting interpretation of the past to absolve itself of the lingering harm that resides there. This is done by recasting the gaze into the landscape to convince viewers they are seeing pure nature instead of an assemblage of idealizations. A composite of successional vegetation is thus legitimated as primordial, an effect further promoted through the marketing outreach of multinational tourism companies that have come after them. Such an image is so strong it is not just appealing to tourists; it has also captured the imaginations of many who resisted the military presence on the island.

According to Paul Virilio: "open warfare must be a constant allusion to primordial *camouflage,* and its only consistency must be constant change, in which *no one element takes precedence for too long.*"[20] Drawing from primary and secondary sources, personal visits, military environmental reports, internal memos, and tourism reviews, I hope here to show the hallucinatory multiplicities through which the military has presented itself: restorer of nature after Spanish ravaging of the island, yet steward of a virginal wilderness; altruist, and muscular, protector of tiny Puerto Rico; defender of America with timely demonstrations of power, but also defender of America with dutiful, disciplined practice for future combat. The imposition of these multiple perspectives

on the landscape exhaust it of any personal content or associations, leaving it unprepared (yet so well prepared) for transformation by the service- and commerce-based economy of late capitalism. Like that of many of its Caribbean neighbors, the landscape of Vieques, despite its violent history, is now presented as a fulfillment of tourist fantasies.

Politically, the prohibited bombing range — like the devastated cloister in Tarkovsky's *Stalker* — is the most powerful part of the Vieques landscape. Yet, the government-appointed Special Commissioner for Vieques and Culebra has deemed that this crucial site contains such grave health and safety risks that it will never be opened to the public.[21] The true power of this landscape comes not from the history of protest activities that happened there. Rather, it comes from its sterility and the lessons it has to teach about how people continuously make and remake the landscape. There are no "found" landscapes, as the military would have people believe.

Before discussing how the former Vieques bombing range can be instrumental to a rediscovery of such values, I will first step back and examine how the military exploited an idea of tropical nature to pollute an island with relative impunity. Then I will step back even further to see how the people of Vieques were forcibly removed from their lands according to an idea of nature that excludes humans. Finally, I will discuss how it might be possible to use tourism as a way back into this landscape, and possibly reclaim its devastation.

THE VIEQUES PARADOX; OR, JUST HOW LUXURIOUS POLLUTION CAN BE

Bahía de la Chiva on Vieques's southern coast, one of many crystalline beaches there, can be easily reached on a former military road. It has been open to the public during limited daytime hours ever since it was cleared of live ord-

nance in 2003.[22] Previously, this beach was a mangrove forest, but this was felled to make way for a coconut grove during Spanish colonization of the island around 1840. Then, after the United States took the island over from Spain in 1898, the coconut palms, too, were destroyed to create "fields of fire" to use in World War II drills.[23]

The tourism industry has disseminated images of coconut palms far and wide because of their association with warm, sandy beaches. In fact, the coconut palm first appeared to Western eyes through the travel journals of Spanish colonists in the late sixteenth century. It is believed to have evolved in the Pacific region, and is not native to the Caribbean; nevertheless, it has since adapted well to tropical coasts everywhere, and has been planted extensively in the Caribbean because of its valuable fruit.[24] Indeed, wherever there is a concentration of coconut palms, the human hand surely created it. Recently, however, the international tourism industry has intensified propagation of this plant, attempting to use its image to lure the global leisure class. The coconut palm is also a handy selection for hotel landscaping because its foliage is high off the ground and can be used to frame tempting paths to the beach.

Several species of palms were present on Vieques at the time Columbus arrived in the Caribbean, but none were the coconut type. Thereafter, however, Vieques' coasts were widely used for coconut farming — although it's hard to visualize such plantations today. Indeed, many of Vieques' coasts are quite rocky, and others remain dense with mangroves, unlike the beautiful southern beach of Bahía de la Chiva or the dreamy visions of white sand presented in mainstream travel articles about the island (FIG.6).

Today there is only one coconut grove remaining on Vieques from the agricultural period.[25] This swath, at Punta Arenas on the island's northwest tip, has been protected within what is now known as the Laguna Kiani conservation area (FIG.7).[26] In 1972, researchers compared a new aerial photograph to a 1941 U.S. Geological Survey map and found that approximately 18 percent of the mangrove forest here had been lost since the military administration began. With this concern on their minds, they urged protection of the entire area.

The military delayed any formal steps toward protection for another ten years.[27] But the Laguna Kiani conservation area was finally established, along with seven others, as part of a 1983 agreement, a "Memorandum of Understanding" between the Governor of Puerto Rico, Carlos Romero-Barceló and the U.S. Navy.[28] The Memo settled a 1978 lawsuit that Puerto Rico had brought against the Navy for environmental damage on Vieques.

What many heralded as a wilderness conservation area was actually a reduced version of what was once a larger and better-functioning mangrove system. Nevertheless, the military pointed to the establishment of the conservation areas in congressional hearings as a way to justify its presence in Vieques for the next twenty years. And today such areas further fulfill an iconic, ecological theme essential to the tourism industry in the post-Navy era.

What may be more interesting from a local perspective, however, is that the surviving mangroves at Laguna Kiani share space with another remnant, a once-productive grove of coconut palms, in a frozen representation of its past agricultural dynamism. This only underscores how tourists arrive on an island like Vieques, convinced they will find tropical nature. In reality, they gaze into an arranged vitrine that is devoid of a human presence like that which shaped it as a landscape in its agricultural past.[29]

As big tourism corporations establish a more substantial presence in postmilitary Vieques, they will increasingly seek to re-create such faux-agricultural panoramas. The military, with some dose of naïveté, eased the assimilation of such landscapes by protecting places like Laguna Kiani. Certainly, when Navy officials agreed to set aside conservation areas on the island, they could never have imagined they would be aiding the development of a resort industry there. However, the landscape they left coincides perfectly with what the resort business now needs to market Vieques globally.

The tourism business, likewise, has no reason to debunk the message of a heroic military past. But its presence also tacitly facilitates the continued existence of a silent peril the military has left behind. With the 1983 Memo, the military not only struck a compromise with the government

FIGURE 7. *The grainy texture of the vegetation on the jutting peninsula is caused by the coconut palms of the Laguna Kiani conservation area. The vegetation around the lagoons are mangroves. The top lagoon is Kiani. Source: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.*

of Puerto Rico to protect places like Laguna Kiani; it also created a cloak for the toxic contamination that would be its greatest legacy. The correspondence between polluted areas and conservation areas on Vieques is especially apparent in the transfer of land on western Vieques.

At the Navy's weapons depot on the western end of the island, ammunition was stored in concrete bunkers partially burrowed in the earth (**FIG.8**).[30] After the 1999 bombing sparked local activism, the Navy did relinquish ownership of most of this land to comply with a directive from President Bill Clinton.[31] But it did not return everything the Clinton administration apparently expected it to.[32] The February 2000 directive, in the last year of the Clinton administration, called for, among other measures, the return of the depot area to Puerto Rican municipal administration.[33] After coordination with several agencies and Congress, a different plan was negotiated with the Puerto Rico Planning Board and implemented on April 30, 2001. That plan gave 4,000 acres to the Vieques municipal government for low-density residential and tourism development; it transferred 3,100 acres to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for conservation zones; it transferred 800

acres to the Puerto Rico Conservation Trust, an entity that protects wilderness and historic places; and it retained 100 acres for use by the U.S. military for a so-called drug-interdiction radar. In total, then, only half the former depot was returned to state and local administration.

The idea of such a distribution of former military lands has a long lineage; indeed, the 2001 land use plan seems to

FIGURE 8. *Ammunition storage magazine, western Vieques. Photo by author.*

have been thirty years in the making. In effect, it reaches back to the 1972 research in which scientists first proposed the creation of the eight conservation areas.[34] Sometime between the late 1970s and early 1980s, Navy officials also started to conduct interviews with officers who had been stationed on Vieques.[35] The root of this investigation was the 1978 lawsuit demanding the disclosure of polluted sites. But before releasing this information, the Navy may have consulted the 1972 report and harmonized the selection of acknowledged polluted sites with those proposed by the scientists as conservation areas. As I will explain below, such reasoning makes great sense if one considers the economics of toxic cleanup.

More immediately, however, the existence of conservation areas also become useful in ways the Navy may not have anticipated. For example, in 1993, when a bomb missed its target by ten miles, activists appealed to Congress and the White House to stop military maneuvers on Vieques.[36] In defense of the Navy's presence, Rear Admiral Ernest E. Christensen, Jr., the highest-ranking representative of the Department of Defense in the Caribbean at the time, pointed to the Navy's role in environmental conservation. In front of the Congressional Subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs, and in opposition to a House bill presented by Puerto Rico Resident Commissioner Carlos Romero-Barceló, Christensen not only remarked on the urgent national-security need for the depot, but he also highlighted the benefits of the Laguna Kiani, Monte Pirata, and Playa Grande conservation areas for Puerto Rico and all of humanity.[37] He specifically stressed the access that the military provided at the time to Green Beach and the Laguna Kiani mangroves, "in order to allow everyone the enjoyment of the beauty of our conservation areas on the Naval Ammunition Support Detachment [the depot]."[38]

By contrast, it is today known that the U.S. Navy operated five dumps on the weapons depot lands in western Vieques.[39] No modern environmental safeguards, such as clay linings, were ever used at these. Nevertheless, in addition to dumping solid waste and providing an open incineration site for explosives, the Navy used some of these areas to dispose of industrial-strength lubricants, lead-based paints, and solvents for cleaning airplanes and vehicles.[40] The Navy explains on its community relations website for western Vieques that these disposal areas ceased to operate in the late 1970s and early 80s.[41] However, the disposal practices at these sites were never well documented, and other records are lost, the Navy claims. Today, four out five of these dumps are within the boundaries of the conservation zones of the western coast in the 2001 land use plan (FIG.9).[42]

By 1983 the Navy had identified a total of seventeen toxic sites on the depot, including the five dumps (FIG.10).[43] Of these sites, it claimed nine were no longer harmful, and it requested that they be certified as needing no further remediation.[44] This request finally received a public hearing on January 23, 2004, and it must now be approved by the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board and the U.S. EPA.[45]

FIGURE 9. *Conservation areas occupy nearly half of the former weapons depot on western Vieques. Map by author, compiled from information of the Junta de Planificación, Puerto Rico, and* El Nuevo Día.

Out of the four dumps that are in the conservation zones, one is a "No Further Action" (NFA) request. That leaves eight toxic sites that the Navy ostensibly continues to investigate, five of which are on the land relinquished to the Municipality of Vieques. In other words, more than twenty years after the toxic sites on the western end of Vieques were first identified, eight are still under review, and no significant action has been taken with regard to any of the nine others. Assuming that the sites in conservation zones will only need to be cleaned to a low standard, and if all the NFAs are approved, this may ultimately mean the Navy will be obligated to clean only five of the original seventeen sites to the highest standard.

This unfolding scenario reveals how conservation areas have provided first a pollution veil, and second (especially after 1993) a green shroud in which the Navy has wrapped itself. But how is it that toxic sites on conservation areas need to be cleaned to a lower standard than sites on other lands? In the world of "risk-based" legal standards, the cleanup of a wilderness conservation area does not have to be as stringent as, for instance, that for an area planned for housing. In the remediation business, future use must be determined before answering the question "how clean is clean?"[46] Obviously, it would be in the Navy's fiscal interest if the worst-polluted areas were to remain as federally managed wilderness refuges.[47]

Today, however, such calculations of self-interest are obscured by a rhetoric of preservation.

> *[The] Department of the Interior . . . created, arguably as a kind of absolution for earlier governmental policies, the largest fish and wildlife refuge in the Caribbean, all of it on a single island. One important, and positive, legacy this leaves for Vieques is that development will be kept severely limited and perpetually in check.[48]*

This statement is taken from a review in *Architectural Digest* of the Vieques Wyndham Martineau Bay Resort and Spa, the first self-contained tourist franchise on the island, which opened in 2003 (**FIG.11**). It also exemplifies the importance of conservation and the wildlife refuge in terms of satisfying tourism desires. From the point of view of tourist use, "severely limited development," and polluted wildlife refuges are a positive legacy of the military's former presence. However, some might argue that instead of providing "absolution," they may be considered a form of pay-back.

The leitmotif here is of an "untouched," "unchanged" wilderness handed over by the military for tourism to safeguard. The polluted, and for that reason "preserved," wilderness assures two things for the *Architectural Digest* author (and for the rest of the future resort industry on Vieques): the thrill of discovering a "virginal" landscape — ironically, a "discovery" that is widely advertised beforehand; and the pre-

FIGURE 11. *The Wyndham Martineau Bay Resort and Spa exterior. Photo by author.*

served charm of poverty and underdevelopment that the tourist can experience (from a safe distance).

The inauguration of the Wyndham Martineau Bay Resort and Spa has also marked a monumental change for the residents of Vieques. As one resident commented in *Smithsonian* magazine, ". . . as far as future developments, [the resort] will set the stage."[49] But does this development represent the arrival of a menace the Navy previously kept at bay? Is it "the beginning of the end of the Vieques that we know," as another local said?[50] Or does it represent the inevitable future of the island in the context of Caribbean commercialism, and (simultaneously) the beginning of a long-awaited economic miracle?

One can be more certain it will mean that Vieques will see many more coconut palms. The palm has already reappeared in the design of the Martineau Bay's guest rooms. According to the *Smithsonian* writer, Shane DuBow, "[interior designer Dan Nelson] commissioned toiles that feature palm-tree motifs, had them bordered with raffia and produced an unpredictable headboard."[51]

The tree's appearance in the article is surprising because the article includes no other mention of vegetation. It is almost as if DuBow believed the entirety of the hotel's foliage and grounds were found, not made. Thus, the article credits an architect and an interior designer, but not a landscape designer, whose hand is evident everywhere. The palm, of course, plays a major role in this composition (**FIG.12**). If the global tourism corporations profit from this vitrine of conservation, at a place like this Wyndham, they also return the favor to the military by perpetuating a belief that the military defended this sentimental illusion of paradise, especially from the despoiling hands of resident islanders.

FIGURE 12. *The Wyndham Martineau Bay Resort and Spa interior grounds. Photo by author.*

Judging by other travel articles, it works. Take, for example, the following impressions. According to Reed Johnson of the *Los Angeles Times*: "paradoxically, the Navy preserved the beauty of Vieques for posterity."[52] Leigh Gallagher, for *Forbes*: "Vieques has some of the most beautiful beaches in the Caribbean. Paradoxically, it's the Navy's presence that has kept them that way."[53] And Amy Graves, in the *Boston Globe*: "the forests and beaches at each end of the island were never developed because the Navy occupies them — an ironic twist to the controversy."[54]

Such blanket talk of paradox and irony, of course, forecloses understanding of many real nuances of the island's history. For instance, the ugliest beaches on Vieques were made that way by the Navy, and the two forest-covered tips of the island are its most polluted areas. Tourists also mistakenly assume present vegetation predates the military presence, and that the military could therefore have "protected" it.[55] Tourists recognize paradise when they see it (but especially when a tourist industry shows it to them). And the consensus is that while the military originally harmed the island, in the end it rescued Edenic nature.

Pollution even plays an explicit part in this calculation of tourist value, as if to acknowledge its blessings. In the following paean from the *Smithsonian* article, DuBow accidentally reveals how the idleness of the tanning tourist may be the most appropriate activity on Vieques. It also shows just how luxurious pollution can be.

> *Vieques is a paradox. The Navy's 60-year occupation has left the island largely undeveloped and free of the commercialism common to other parts of the Caribbean. But the pollution the military left behind may imperil paradise.*

> *Even so, apart from the likelihood of a nasty sunburn, a short-term tourist faces little health risk, say experts. And the lack of development means that the visitor has naught to do but bike, hike, kayak, ride horses, and honor the island's painful past by enjoying its hard-won peace and charm.*[56]

When DuBow cites the island's "lack of development," he reveals how even poverty may be presented as one of paradise's paradoxical charms — as if it were somehow "natural," a condition that allows companies to be praised for sustaining it.

These writers, as do many other people, eventually manage to "see" paradox almost everywhere. But gazing in order to locate paradox involves both passing judgment on the military and forgiving it. And this gaze is also fixated on a mirage — one that confuses vegetation with a commodified idea of nature, and that misses the real evidence of human-driven change. It is literally also a gaze in desperate search of a silver lining to the dark cloud of Vieques' past. Thus, the gazing has dual benefit: it facilitates an economically irresponsible exit by a now-excused military; and it spares the tourist from feeling complicit in either the local problems of Vieques or the hypocritical consensus fundamental to global tourism.

ENCANTO: WELCOME TO PARADISE

In 2004, community groups including the Vieques Women's Alliance and the Vieques Pro-Rescue and Development Committee supported a proposal to build modestly priced tourist cabins at Sun Bay beach on Vieques' south

FIGURE 13. *Anonymous anti-Sun Bay cabins development propaganda.*

coast. It was a project they said could provide an affordable vacation idyll for working-class visitors. The individuals opposed to this project soon posted a flyer with a hand-drawn image of a beach with palm trees where four lone people enjoyed the sandy plain. In the distance is a peninsula that looks completely foliated: the next frontier to be conquered. The words below the image say: "sabes que [sic] . . . ¡¡la vas a perder!!" or "know what . . . you're gonna lose it!!" (**FIG.13**).

In 2003 prominent ecologist John Todd, *Time* Magazine's "Hero of the Planet," wrote a *New York Times* editorial to similar effect.[57] Todd called the wildlife refuges on Vieques a "priceless gift," and his article strongly advocated ecotourism, particularly that which could take advantage of them. But who exactly will participate in such ecotourism, and at what price? Todd also referred to the Vieques refuge as "16,000 acres of untouched land," as if Bahía de la Chiva (among other examples) had not been completely altered by human hands. Most of the refuge is actually covered by dry, thorny scrub that is merely sixty years old — vegetation that has emerged since the abandonment of agriculture.[58]

Todd went on to state: "Vieques may one day be nostalgic for the era of Navy occupation," saying that the Sun Bay project would destroy mangrove areas. Yet why should anyone be nostalgic for a Navy occupation that caused the deforestation of much of the Laguna Kiani area between 1941 and 1972?

I am in no position to judge if the Sun Bay cabins would result in the ecological damage Todd envisioned, or if it would ever cater to "working-class families" as some community activists promised.[59] What is more important is that even a knowledgeable academic like Todd can be blinded by the brightness of a sugar-sand beach. This not only allows him to excuse the military by calling the wildlife refuge an "accident of history," but praise an essentially elitist vision of paradise. "The magnificent white-sand beaches are almost deserted," he wrote, seemingly gripped by the same charm as other travel writers. However, it is only "deserted" because the Navy expropriated the holdings of people who had previously lived there.

The United States government actually took control of two-thirds of Vieques through two rounds of land acquisitions, in 1942–43 and 1947–1950. Recently, Cesar Ayala has argued that the land transfer was only legal on paper. He also wrote that the first round took place in response to paranoia of another Pearl Harbor-like attack, and the second under the cloud of the Cold War.[60]

Before 1942 land ownership was extremely concentrated among a few sugar-producing families who were largely absent from the island. The property-less rural class lived both as workers and tenants, under arrangements where they exchanged their labor for permission to plant subsistence crops. Such conditions made the Navy takeover relatively easy; rather than dealing with more than 10,000 worker-tenants (*agregados*), it only had to deal with a handful of absentee owners.

According to Ayala and Carro, since the sugar economy was battered at the time, the Navy mainly had to strong-arm two weak owners: the eastern Sugar Associates and the Tió family. Later patterns of Navy ownership corresponded almost exactly to the property boundaries of these sugar producers, with the addition of a few additional small cattle farms. However, as Ayala and Carro stated, "it would seem necessary to distinguish between the process of expropriation as such, and a much wider process of evictions (*desalojos*) which affected not only landowners, but *agregados* and rural workers as well."[61]

After these evictions, many of the former rural class, especially the men, turned to fishing. For about two years after the first evictions, the construction of the Navy's Mosquito Pier on the north coast of the island also provided some jobs. But after 1943 the situation grew increasingly dire, especially in terms of jobs, and some islanders migrated to mainland Puerto Rico and the neighboring islands of St. Croix and St. Thomas.

Anthropologist Katherine McCaffrey has researched and written about the identity of the fishermen of Vieques. She claimed that the practice of fishing involved more than survival in the face of a difficult and sudden transition; it became a practice of resistance and proud defiance.[62] It was a way of "making-do." But what started as informal resistance to a

common enemy (an enemy that just wanted them to leave the island completely[63]) eventually mutated into an organized movement. One reason was that the fishermen's daily life increasingly came into conflict with the U.S. military as maneuvers destroyed fishing nets and progressively killed off the nearby coral reefs that were vital to the sea harvest. As a result, the fishermen began to take direct action in fierce clashes on the high seas that quickly gained the aura of a David-and-Goliath struggle — especially when viewed by press photographers.

However, while the fishermen were ultimately victorious in their battle to remove the military, the identity they forged in this decades-long confrontation already appears to have been co-opted for tourism.[64] Esperanza, on the south coast of Vieques, is the only other town on the island besides the capital of Isabel II. It does retain a small boat landing and an unkempt, almost forgotten parking lot at one end of a long ocean boulevard. Presumably, this is where fishermen once launched their boats and perhaps cleaned their catch — although I have never seen many of them around. But the rest of Esperanza Fishing Village consists of two-story buildings, most containing restaurants with names like "Bananas" or "Coconuts," owned and operated by Americans (FIG.14). The establishments all offer typical American diversions: burgers and fries, beers, and baseball on television.

The views from the *malecón*, or boardwalk, are spectacular, and the rents or mortgages in this area must be correspondingly high. Thus, while the presence of fishermen can still be imagined in a view of masts silhouetted against the horizon, the reality is this place is dominated by island-hopping ex-pats. To complete the panorama, a few guesthouses are intermixed with the restaurants, or are located on the second floors of the buildings. Taxi-vans come and go. Even the one-time pro-Navy Vieques Conservation and Historical Trust has its headquarters on the boulevard.[65]

FIGURE 14. *The Esperanza Fishing Village. Photo by author.*

In short, the practice of fishing, like the successional forest that has taken over much of the island since agriculture was terminated, is now a by-product that has been commodified as "native." For tourists, it is part of the supposed authentic "charm" that glosses over an actual emptiness left in the wake of military occupation. Graves used the word "charming" in the title of her *Boston Globe* article: "Vieques: A Charming Caribbean Island."[66] She wrote: "Locals fishing on a pier at sunset. Wild horses roaming nearly empty beaches. Family-run restaurants serving tapas and paella. If there's one island in the Caribbean that I hope never loses its authentic charms, it's Vieques." In fact, paella and tapas are not part of "native" Puerto Rican cuisine, casting some doubt on what, if anything, is authentic about this Vieques charm.

Exactly eleven years to the day before the death of David Sanes-Rodríguez, the chief admiral of the Atlantic Fleet's southern Command was quoted in the *El Mundo* newspaper explaining how 40,000 service personnel throughout the Inner Range were participating in an operation called "Ocean Venture 88." The mock event included an attack on an imaginary island. Ironically, that island was Vieques, and the Navy also code-named it "Encanto," or "Charm."[67] Military occupation has further been at least partly responsible for the "charming" underdevelopment of Vieques. This is apparent if one compares Vieques to other Puerto Rican municipalities, especially those with similar agricultural pasts.[68] Nonetheless, the military also seems to have lulled itself into believing that Vieques had something indigenously charming, not found anywhere else in the world:

> This unique facility is the only location in the Atlantic where realistic multi-dimensional combat training can be conducted in a combined and coordinated manner. It is the only range which offers a live fire land target complex with day and night capability, an immediately adjacent large area of low traffic airspace, and deep water sea-space. Co-located are underwater and electronic warfare ranges, amphibious landing beaches and maneuver areas, a full service naval base and air station and interconnected range support facilities.[69]

As the description later continues:

> Vieques also offers the opportunity for U.S. forces to train with Allied forces in combined naval exercises, enhancing our ability to operate with potential coalition partners. . . . Vieques stands alone in its ability to support senior commanders in evaluating and strengthening the readiness of weapons, systems, and most importantly, people.[70]

"Unique"; "the only"; "stands alone." These were the same points made to the U.S. Congress after the bomb drop that killed Sanes-Rodríguez in 1999. A few years before those statements, Rear Admiral Christensen testified on Capitol Hill

that "this facility is perhaps the best training facility in the world."[71] What the Navy seems to imply is that it discovered Vieques, and therefore deserved to keep the island.[72]

If the military once managed to convince itself of this, it is easy to see how the tourist can assume a similar sense of ownership. In his *Smithsonian* article, DuBow expressed a similar sense of being seduced by the sense of discovering Vieques:

> *By now we've glimpsed enough sugar-sand beaches and aquamarine views to know that if we're not careful, we may soon feel gripped by a certain sense of possibility that so many travelers have felt, a sense that this might be the sort of place that we could at last settle in, buy some property and feel like our lives have turned lucky.*[73]

One attraction of Vieques before the Navy's departure and Wyndham's arrival was its slow pace. There were seemingly few cares here — not even a stoplight. Such "sleepiness," however, heralded only a backwardness symptomatic of its lack of socioeconomic development during the more than sixty years of the Navy's presence. Leigh Gallagher of *Forbes*, as if out of a Stanley Kubrick script, even encouraged tourists to get there before the shelling stopped.   His article was accompanied by the teaser "Forget the bombing. Vieques is one of the Caribbean's best-kept vacation secrets. For now."[74] He was clearly aware the big hotel chains would face serious challenges trying to maintain the same slow pace and charm the Navy occupation was able to instill.

A popular standard journalists point to when they try to describe Vieques's charm is that the island has no fast-food franchises, no stoplights, no shopping malls. "Not yet, anyway," wrote Reed Johnson in *The Los Angeles Times*.[75]

But such narrators also omit other things. For example, there are no hospitals on Vieques — not even, until 2003, a neonatal unit. This is cruelly ironic for a population that has a roughly 25 percent higher cancer rate than San Juan.[76] However, to acknowledge that these problems exist is to acknowledge that people live there. And this would contradict the sense of discovery, and thus ownership, inherent to the Vieques charm.

PROTEST AS TOURISM

The 1885 map *Inspección de montes de la Isla de Puerto Rico: Plano del Monte del Estado, Cabeza del Este de la Isla de Vieques*, which predates American colonization, shows the bombing range long before it was even planned. Cabeza del Este means "Eastern Headlands." What is surprising about the survey is how it demarcates the same western boundary the military used for the "live-impact area" of the bombing range. The map's title and the fact that it was drawn by a public-lands division of the Spanish Department of the Interior imply that this property was once more or less the

equivalent of a public land trust for the Spanish crown.[77] While other parts of Vieques were leased to European plantation owners operating in the Caribbean, this was set aside.

Even more striking is how the survey presents several water bodies on the eastern tip that are no longer there. On the map, they are demarcated as *salitrales*, or salt flats periodically recharged by ocean tides. In fact, the U.S. military emptied these to provide a place to locate the ruins of tanks and airplanes for target practice.[78] The 1972 Survey of Natural Resources also alluded to "land filling, drainage, silting-in, and cutting off access to tidal water" as a general problem of Vieques under military administration.[79] Photographs taken after 1999 indeed show landscapes that resemble American deserts more than the Caribbean: flat, cratered expanses with spent shells where nothing grows.

The report implies that the Navy took a functioning environment and removed all the natural elements that might have caused it to change over time.[80] From 1999 to 2003, the protest movement also used this landscape as a blank slate onto which to graft temporary monuments to a fantasy nation in the form of religious iconography and structures, national flags, and other symbols. The protestors demanded that the military stop its activities; but they also accepted without question — and perhaps willingly — the literal and symbolic stillness the Navy had installed there. This emptiness had been created through the removal of people, animals and vegetation, and it had been sustained by the severance of natural interchanges between them.

Today this movement, like the Navy, is gone. It succeeded in establishing its own heroism, but it has left Vieques with little more than the same problems it had before: pollution, poverty and disease. If there is a *military-tourism complex* on Vieques, one should also include protest in the category of *tourism* — even if it was only a careless collusion of forces.

On the other hand, tourist visits to the bombing range could serve as a means to reclaim this landscape. Tourism could provide the vehicle by which residents and members of the visiting public come to see the bombing range as a fertile ground for reinvention. The danger of ignoring this place may be too great. Yet, without diverse involvement from various sectors, its eventual reclamation could produce an artificial construct like Crissy Field in San Francisco's former military installation, the Presidio. There, the military destroyed a wetland to build an airfield — where aviation records were broken and important missions were launched. But in recent years the National Park Service has restored the airfield to its 1920–30s condition and simultaneously re-created the marshes where they never existed. The outcome is an atemporal montage that recaptures an implausible combination of cultural and natural origins. In the words of Krinke and Winterbottom: "The airfield has been made into a sculpture about the airfield. The marsh may also be considered a sculpture about a marsh. . . ."[81]

By the time a few generations pass and anyone is allowed back into the bombing range on Vieques, its "live-impact area" could look like an improbable original wilderness, be it polluted or not — as if it had been rescued by the U.S. military and subsequent federal agencies. Perhaps worse, it could be made to appear like a set of sculptures about salt flats, mangroves *and* craters, with re-creations of protest signs and crosses.

The truth is that a comprehensive remediation process will drastically overturn everything there and obscure the experience of *landscape as process*. The most immediate remediation need is to de-mine the place. But ultimately more severe measures will need to include removing radioactive soil to special landfills. Other soils on site will need to be treated to remove chemicals through a mechanical process called "low-temperature thermal desorption" — a reverse of "absorption." Still other contaminants, such as heavy metals, might be removed through phytoremediation, a process by which local species of dry forest plants take pollutants up into their bark. Depending on circumstances and future uses, however, these plants might have to be removed to a special landfill or incinerated.[82]

But these are all design choices. To dig and not regrade, or to remake the contours of the land? To plant or remove vegetation? What is important is that residents should demand participation in these decisions. There must also be external support for the local people. This is the pressure that alternate tourism could generate.

Since the bombing range today poses many threats to humans, such an engaged tourist option would need to involve careful assessment of dangers to determine what areas were safe enough for passage. But design and engineering could partially ameliorate these risks, or at least provide sufficiently safe conditions for a level of temporary occupation.

Politically, however, such a program would be a complex hurdle to pass, for such use would certainly be objectionable to all segments of the military-tourism complex. Military and corporate concerns would clearly not be in favor of such a disruptive project. But the leftist protest movement would also probably object to any such iconoclasm in their cathedral. For them, the permanence of the site "conserves" the idea of Vieques as a wounded paradise without real people, enshrined by an obstinate alliance between bureaucratic caution and political opportunism (**fig.15**).

Nevertheless, to comprehend what the tourist experience of the bombing range might be like, one can turn to W.G. Sebald's travelogue *The Rings of Saturn*. In it he visits the British test area of Orfordness. This place is neither entertaining nor pleasant — at least not in the way Crissy Field is. However, at this formerly top-secret site, Sebald turns Henry David Thoreau's 1846 journey to Katahdin mountain, Maine, on its head.

As William Cronon has explained, Thoreau tapped into the sublime on Katahdin in an unnerving meeting between the vastness of a supposedly untouched nature and human

FIGURE 15. *The native and the nation blur at the bombing range. Photo by Alina Luciano/Claridad.*

loneliness.[83] Sebald, on the other hand, could not have had a more "unnatural" experience when he arrived at Orfordness. But it was just as much an encounter with a "stern loneliness," and it was "sublime" in the sense that he almost lost himself:

> My sense of being on ground intended for purposes transcending the profane was heightened by a number of buildings that resembled temples or pagodas, which seemed quite out of place in these military installations. But the closer I came to these ruins, the more any notion of a mysterious isle of the dead receded, and the more I imagined myself amidst the remains of our own civilization after its extinction in some future catastrophe. To me too, as for some latter-day stranger ignorant of the nature of our society wandering about heaps of scrap metal and defunct machinery, the beings who had once lived and worked here were an enigma, as was the purpose of the primitive contraptions and fittings inside the bunkers, the iron rails under the ceilings, the hooks on the still partially tiled walls, the showerheads the size of plates, the ramps and the soakaways. Where and in what time I truly was that day at Orfordness I cannot say, even now as I write these words.[84]

Whereas Thoreau thought he encountered God himself personified in Katahdin mountain, Sebald felt the haunting presence of demons. But Sebald surpassed these feeling and discovered that what was chasing him was not something supernatural, but something utterly human: the destruction caused by his own species.

By contrast, one can read this quote from the marketing brochure for Wyndham's Martineau Bay Resort and Spa.

> *There's a world of wonders to explore inside and out. Sun, sea, sky — this is where it all comes together in perfect harmony. Our relaxed style and attentive service will make you feel as if the whole island were created for your enjoyment.*[85]

This is precisely the illusion that would be shattered by a Sebald-like experience of the bombing range, for it would underscore how the whole landscape *is* created and transformed by people over time. By opening the bombing range to a gradually emergent process, one could pull the curtain, as it were, and allow the audience to take charge of the action on stage.

Finally, what would we see at the bombing range if we were someday able to gaze at it as an empty wilderness? In another Wyndham brochure, a nude woman becomes an element for the gaze that a person travels all the way to Vieques to posses **(FIG.16)**. The depth of the reclining woman in between the eye and the infinite emptiness of the ocean beyond is the same as the width of the paper on which she appears: flat.

Perhaps one can compare the fishermen to that woman. The *viequenses* remain as paper figures that complete a desired picture; they are cutouts. But maybe they have one additional purpose besides fulfilling tourist desire: to numb

FIGURE 16. *Reclining nude in a promotional brochure for the Wyndham Martineau Bay Resort and Spa.*

us, as tourists, from the alienation of the emptiness. The tourist seeks escape. But what if horror seeps in instead?

After the horror induced by a real appreciation of these traces of destruction comes a freedom brought by the realization that new creation is also possible.

NOTES

1. W.G. Sebald, *The Rings of Saturn*, Michael Hulse, trans. (London: The Harvill Press, 1998).

2. J.E. Rivera-Santana and L. Cotto-Morales, eds., *Guías para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques* (San Juan: GATP, 2001), p.21.

3. For a full account, the reader may want to consult A.A. Barreto, *Vieques, the Navy, and Puerto Rican Politics* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002); and K.T. McCaffrey, *Military Power and Popular Protest: The U.S. Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2002).

4. De Jesús is well known as an activist for his spectacular demonstrations. See the documentary film by M. Pérez-Riera, *Cuando lo pequeño se hace grande* (San Juan: Maramara Films, 2001). See also Rivera-Santana and Cotto-Morales, eds., *Guías para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques*, p.23.

5. Ibid., p.22.

6. Readers interested in media representations of the events may want to look at F. Jiménez, *Vieques y la prensa: el idilio fragmentado* (San Juan: Editorial Plaza Mayor, 2001).

7. Rivera-Santana and Cotto-Morales, eds., *Guías para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques*, p.22.

8. Ibid., p.25.

9. W.J. Clinton, "Directive to the Secretary of Defense, Director, Office of Management and Budget," January 31, 2000. The directive included a switch to inert weapons and a shorter practice period.

10. Puerto Rico has 78 municipalities.

11. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile District with Technical Assistance from Tetra Tech, Inc., "Environmental Assessment for the Relocation of Special Operations Command, South and Selected U.S. Army South Elements from the Republic of Panama to U.S. Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico and Other Locations," December 1998, p.4–48.

12. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, "Vieques National Wildlife Refuge Welcomes Public to Eastern End of the Island," press release, April 30, 2003.

13. Ibid.

14. Vieques and the Inner Range were man-

aged as parts of the Roosevelt Roads, Ceiba, military base. When the neighboring island of Culebra also was a rehearsal site (until 1975), the entire complex was a sort of Pearl Harbor of the Atlantic. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "Environmental Assessment," p.4–48.

15. The bombing range was officially known as the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility, and the maneuver area as the Eastern Maneuver Area. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "Environmental Assessment," pp.4–48 and 4–49.

16. Ibid., p.4–49.

17. Commander U.S. Second Fleet and Commander U.S. Marine Corps Forces Atlantic, "The National Security Need for Vieques: A Study Prepared for The Secretary of the Navy," July 15, 1999, p.ii.

18. At the time this article was being finished, a complete accounting of pollution on Vieques was caught in a complicated tangle of red tape, since it was not clear who would pay for the cleanup and in what amounts, the Pentagon or taxpayers. See, for instance, J.J. Pérez, "Escepticismo con la descontaminación de Vieques," *El Nuevo Día*, January 22, 2005, p.12.

19. J.A. Delgado, "Incluido Vieques en la lista oficial del Superfondo," El Nuevo Día, January 21, 2005, p.24.

20. P. Virilio, *Popular Defense & Ecological Struggles*, M. Polizzotti, Trans. (New York: Semiotext(e), 1990, orig. 1978), p.22. Emphasis mine.

21. The Special Commissioner for the islands of Vieques and its neighbor Culebra, also a training facility until 1975, is a special czar who acts as an intermediary between the federal and local governments. See J. Férnandez-Colón, "Casi imposible el lograr una limpieza completa," *El Nuevo Día*, January 6, 2004, p.25.

22. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, "Vieques National Wildlife Refuge Welcomes Public to Eastern End of the Island."

23. This was done in 1941. *Vieques Times*, Vol.150 (September 2003), p.4.

24. E.L. Little, José Marrero, and F.H. Wadsworth, *Árboles comúnes de Puerto Rico y las Islas Vírgenes* (San Juan: Editorial Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2001), pp.11–31.

25. See also Map of Vieques National Wildlife Refuge in Figure 5.

26. There is a significant forest of fan-leaved palms, said to be an endemic plant, elsewhere on Vieques, but this is an inland high-elevation variety. See R.O. Woodbury in Environmental Quality Board (EQB), Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, *Vieques 1972: Survey of the Natural Resources*, p.VII–11; and Rivera-Santana and Cotto-Morales, eds., *Guías para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques*, p.38.

27. EQB, *Vieques 1972*, p.IX–5.

28. C. Romero-Barceló and J.F. Goodrich, "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Island of Vieques," 1983.

29. For a more detailed discussion of the history of this idea, refer to R. Williams, "Ideas of Nature," in *Problems of Materialism and Culture* (New York: Verso, 1980), pp.67–85.

30. The Navy called their western Vieques land holdings the Naval Ammunition Support Detachment, or NASD for short.

31. See W.J. Clinton, "Directive to the Secretary of Defense, Director, Office of Management and Budget," January 31, 2000. See also Jiménez, *Vieques y la prensa*, pp.135–53, for an entire explanation on the substitution of the term "agreement" in the press and in politics in place of "directive." The latter is the appropriate term to describe the unilateral decision by Clinton, rather than an action agreed-upon with the government of Puerto Rico.

32. He stated this in a radio interview with journalist Amy Goodman before the 2000 elections, although the language in the actual order is less explicit than what he would have us believe. W.J. Clinton to A. Goodman, "Exclusive interview with Bill Clinton," *Democracy Now!* (Pacifica Radio, November 8, 2000). Clinton says in his directive: "the Navy will submit legislation to the Congress to transfer land on the western side of Vieques (except 100 acres of land on which the ROTHR and Mount Pirata telecommunications sites are located)." On the one hand, it implies that *everything* is to be returned *except* for the 100 acres of the federal telecommunications facility. But on the other hand, it says *land* without specifying a quantity. It leaves the door open for the Navy to satisfy their own needs through legislative process.

33. As I have already mentioned, a previous

strategy of appeasement had not worked. The protesters were insistent in their demands for a bombing moratorium and a cleaning and return of all military lands.

34. *Vieques 1972: Survey of the Natural Resources.*

35. "Site identification began in the late 1980s. Based on interviews with current and retired station personnel, historic records, aerial photographs, and field inspections, 17 potentially contaminated sites were identified at the NASD." From the Navy's community information website, navy-vieques-env.org.

36. In the first year of his presidency, Clinton was not willing to concede what he gave up in his last. In 1993, he was in a bind with the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on gays in the military, and was not about to raise the military's ire on the Vieques issue. For a complete account of the second-tier status that Vieques received in light of tensions over the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, see Barreto, *Vieques, the Navy, and Puerto Rican Politics*, pp.34–36.

37. Rear Admiral Ernest E. Christensen, Jr., "Statement before the Insular and International Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Natural Resources," H.R. 3831, October 4, 1994. The Resident Commissioner is Puerto Rico's voice without vote in the U.S. Congress. Carlos Romero-Barceló, founding member of the pro-statehood New Progressive Party, was governor of Puerto Rico from 1976 to 1984, and resident commissioner from 1992–2000. As governor, Romero-Barceló had signed the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding, or "Fortín Accord," which attempted to diffuse calls for the Navy's departure by stimulating investment in the Vieques economy by the military-industrial complex. See also Z. Nazario, *The Battle of Vieques*.

38. Rear Admiral Ernest E. Christensen, Jr., "Statement before the Insular and International Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Natural Resources," H.R. 3831, October 4, 1994.

39. F. Herrera, quoted in Rivera-Santana and Cotto-Morales, eds., *Guías para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques*, pp.61–63.

40. U.S. Navy in http://www.vieques-navy-env.org/.

41. Ibid. I cannot confirm if the Navy is

being honest when it said these disposal areas ceased functioning in the late 1970s-early 1980s. If they did cease operating, the question, then, is why? One hypothesis might be the opening of environmental litigation against them around the same time (Brown vs. Romero-Barceló, 1978). See Rivera-Santana and Cotto-Morales, eds., *Guías para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques*, p.16.

42. One of these four sites within the conservation zones has already been proposed as an additional site needing "No Further Action" (NFA). T. Henry to author, email correspondence, February 14, 2004.

43. T. Henry, "Draft Final No Further Action Report," July 11, 2003, p.3. Furnished by the author.

44. J. Férnandez-Colón, "Solicita la Marina la reducción de las áreas a limpiar," *El Nuevo Día*, December 15, 2003, p.24.

45. Ibid., p.24. At the time of this writing, no decision had been made.

46. Ibid., p.24.

47. This was reasserted by a toxicologist that I consulted regarding the number of contaminated sites on western Vieques. "When there is a site that is too expensive or not technologically feasible to be cleaned up to a useful condition, the military's first goal is to hand it over to DOI (Department of the Interior). It does not leave the federal government, thus reducing liability; but it does get off the military's books." T. Henry to author, email correspondence, February 14, 2004.

48. M. Frank, "Wyndham Martineau Bay," *Architectural Digest*, 2004, pp.98,100.

49. C. Connelly, quoted in S. DuBow, "Vieques on the Verge," *Smithsonian*, January 2004, p.78.

50. Taxi driver quoted in DuBow, "Vieques on the Verge," p.81.

51. DuBow, "Vieques on the Verge," p.81.

52. R. Johnson, "Forays on Vieques," *Los Angeles Times*, January 25, 2004. Accessed online.

53. L. Gallagher, "Damn the Torpedoes," *Forbes*, March 4, 2002. Accessed online.

54. A. Graves, "Vieques, a Charming Caribbean Island," *Boston Globe*, December 9, 2001. Accessed online.

55. "A large part of the island is in thorn scrub or woodland. This is for the most part a secondary succession after the original forest was cleared or put in pasture. The thorn trees are not grazed by cattle and soon take over unless cleared periodically." R.O. Woodbury in *Vieques 1972: Survey of the Natural Resources*, p.VII–12.

56. DuBow, "Vieques on the Verge," p.83.

57. J. Todd, "A Golden Opportunity for Vieques to be Green," *The New York Times*, July 26, 2003. Todd had received *Time*'s accolade in C. Hallowell, "'Living Machines' that Make Water out of Sewage," *Time*, March 22, 1999.

58. See *Vieques 1972: Survey of the Natural Resources*, p.VII–12. See also the military's own statement on the dominant vegetation after agriculture: "A natural progression of vegetative types from coastal areas to higher elevations has been lost, and present-day vegetation on the island is characteristic of the dry coastal zone vegetation of mainland Puerto Rico. Thorn scrub communities now constitute the dominant vegetation type on the island." In U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "Environmental Assessment," p.4–58.

59. R. Rabin to author in a personal interview, January 21, 2004.

60. C. Ayala, "Del latifundio azucarero al latifundio militar: las expropiaciones de la marina en la década del cuarenta," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, University of Puerto Rico, January 10, 2001, pp.1–33. See also C. Ayala, "From Sugar Plantations to Military Bases: the U.S. Navy's Expropriations in Vieques, Puerto Rico, 1940–45" *Centro —Journal of the CUNY Center for Puerto Rican Studies*, Vol.13 No.1 (Spring 2001), pp.22–44; and C. Ayala and V. Carro, "Expropriations and Displacement of Civilians in Vieques. 1940–1950," in *Puerto Rico: Political Persecution and the Quest for Human Rights* (New York: SUNY Press, 2004).

61. "Expropriations and Displacement of Civilians in Vieques, 1940–1950," p.19.

62. See McCaffrey, *Military Power and Popular Protest*, pp.62–64.

63. Between 1958 and 1964 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara conducted secret negotiations with the Governor of Puerto Rico, Luis Muñóz-Marín, to remove every last civilian from Vieques and Culebra. See E. Vélez-Rodríguez, *Plan Drácula: Negociaciones secretas entre Luis Muñoz Marín y la Marina* (Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, 2002), p.15.

64. The name "Esperanza Fishing Village" is a common sight in English tourism media. On Vieques, it is common to hear it called *la villa pesquera* (fishing village).

65. The Trust was one North American-supported entity that for decades worked to protect areas like the bioluminescent bay, but not to take a stand against the military bombings and their effects on ecosystems. McCaffrey demonstrated through interviews that many North Americans ("winter birds") who purchased land in the civilian suburban areas between the two military zones and built vacation and retirement homes, hotels, and restaurants, such as those at Esperanza, perceived the Navy's land as undeveloped pristine wilderness, proving that the imagery served its purpose. This privileged class acted upon their attachment to this landscape by joining the Navy League, a social group formed by the U.S. Navy for propaganda and support. For instance, the Navy League sponsored a Sea Cadet program for island youth to earn the sympathies of their families. See McCaffrey, *Military Power and Popular Protest*.

66. Graves, "Vieques, a Charming Caribbean Island."

67. M.S. Calero, "Aquello fue un ataque de película," *El Mundo*, April, 19, 1988, p.20.

68. Vieques had a 26.7 percent higher cancer rate than San Juan between 1985 and 1989. Socioeconomic stagnation can be grasped by the high teenage pregnancy rate (went up by 14.5 percent between 1990 and 1999, compared to 8.5 percent in San Juan). Also, the lack of health infrastructure, as well as other primary necessities, can be almost as devastating to the citizens as the chemicals themselves. Nonetheless, the cancer rate in Vieques went up by 150 percent between 1990 and 1999, the highest of any Puerto Rico municipality. About 40 new cases are reported each year, out of a population of 9,400. Breast cancer leads among women, and prostate cancer leads among men. See J. Fernández-Colón, "Health chief says cancer on rise in Vieques," *The San Juan Star*, October 5, 2003. p.8. See also chapter five in J.E. Rivera-Santana and L. Cotto-Morales, eds., *Guías para el Desarrollo*

Sustentable de Vieques.

69. "The National Security Need for Vieques: A Study Prepared for The Secretary of the Navy," p.ii.

70. Ibid.

71. See "Statement before the Insular and International Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Natural Resources." Ironically, in 2004 the Navy said that the training they are receiving after leaving Vieques is "much, much better" (B. Kackzor, *The San Juan Star*, March 16, 2004).

72. See Jiménez, *Vieques y la prensa*, pp.61–75. The author has an interesting subchapter, "La niña de los ojos," on the matter of totalizing and cartographic readings of Vieques in the public discourse, specifically the association of landscape with femininity or geomorphology, to metaphorically recover it from the possessive male figure of the military.

73. DuBow, "Vieques on the Verge," p.78.

74. Johnson, "Forays on Vieques."

75. Ibid.

76. DuBow, "Vieques on the Verge," p.82, quoting epidemiologist C. Ortíz-Roque.

Also see Rivera-Santana and Cotto-Morales, eds., *Guías para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques*, p.97.

77. The text on the map clearly supports that it was some kind of public property of Spain's Department of the Interior. When the United States began to use it as a bombing range, they did not change the western boundary line of this property at all. Rather than careful military planning, lazy opportunism translated the area from public sphere to prohibited zone. Found at: Mapoteca, Archivo General de Puerto Rico, Instituto de Cultura.

78. There are some accounts of how the military cut the flats off from their ocean channel to make them dry and useful for the target practice all year. One such narrative appears in the documentary film *Viéques: metáfora de Puerto Rico* by I.M. Soto.

79. *Vieques 1972: Survey of the Natural Resources*, p.IX–1.

80. For instance, the images in the "Vieques on the Verge," pp.76–83, from 2004 show new flooding in these areas after the Navy's departure.

81. R. Krinke and D. Winterbottom, "Response: Natural Processes, Cultural Processes and Manufactured Sites," in N. Kirkwood, ed., *Manufactured Sites: Re-Thinking the Post-Industrial Landscape* (New York: Spon Press, 2001), p.207.

82. These statements are a very brief summary of conclusions regarding decontamination on eastern Vieques. A long discussion can be found in Chapter 3 of Rivera-Santana and Cotto-Morales, eds., *Guías para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques*, pp.31–78. It is clear that the specifics of remediation (1), need to be looked at more carefully; and (2), are currently not even on the negotiating table between Vieques and the Pentagon.

83. W. Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature," in W. Cronon ed., *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature* (New York: Norton, 1996), pp.74–75.

84. Sebald, *The Rings of Saturn.*

85. Wyndham Martineau Bay Resort and Spa, Vieques, promotional brochure, 2003.

Singapore's Orchard Road as Conduit: Between Nostalgia and Authenticity

LIMIN HEE

Through the frame of reference of a conduit or "flowing channel" (both literal and figurative), this article shows how Orchard Road juxtaposes many elements emblematic of Singapore's post-traditional environment — its colonial legacy, present patterns of mass consumption, fascination with artificial spectacle, the symbolic economy, youth culture, Singaporean national identity, flows of global workers and tourists, locally historic architectural and landscape forms, underlying geography, and enlivening spatial practices. The construction of Orchard Road as the main public space of the nation through a montage of these erstwhile or embedded elements provides insights to Singapore's postglobal moment. Three related issues focus the examination. First is the collision of history, values, contemporary culture, and the symbolic economy — how are these represented or embodied in space? Second is the division of space between global and local actors (and the formal and informal economy) — how do these groups come together? Third is the disjuncture of fragmented personal experience and memory with mass urban phenomena — what is the nature of nostalgia within the post-traditional environment, and how does this affect the sense of Orchard Road's authenticity?

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Orchard Road is the East's answer to New York's famed Fifth Avenue, Paris's Champs Elysée, London's Mayfair and Sloane Square and New Delhi's Janpath, all rolled into one. The only competition it may face in the very near future could be from Nanjing Road in Shanghai or the ultra-modern and fast and dazzling developing eastern end of Jianguo Avenue in busy, bustling Beijing.

— *Alex Abraham*[1]

At first sight, Singapore's 2.4-kilometer-long Orchard Road may seem little more than another glitzy shopping street within the rising tide of global consumerism. One author even recently commented, "Orchard Road is the prototype for a new shopping typology that is becoming more prevalent in Asia: the urban linear mall. This type of mall rescales the plan of the traditional mall . . . to one that amasses the spaces of the city."[2]

Such commentaries, however, fail to take proper account of Orchard Road's spatial and social complexity, its layered histories, or the nature of post-traditional urbanism. In this article, I argue for an understanding of Orchard Road that goes beyond the popular but essentialist view that it as simply another global shopping street. I will try to show its role as an authentic urban space of great relevance to Singaporeans. Furthermore, as a space whose past continues to be both selectively reimagined and reconstructed, Orchard Road provides a portal to understanding the types of new identities of place typical of post-traditional urbanism.

Since the 1800s the space of Orchard Road has undergone vast transformations as entire networks of places, times and bodies have supplanted each other. Today it serves as the main street of a nation, a teeming "ethnoscape" of residents, tourists and workers.[3] The quintessential urban public space, Orchard Road is where different groups are channeled into proximity with one another. Actors in global epistemic communities, globe-trotting *flâneurs*, urban nomads, middle-class Singaporeans, and foreign domestic guestworkers all share the spaces strung together to create Orchard Road. Sometimes a "space of appearances," it is also a "space of friction."

MONTAGES AND FRAMES

Local historical and urban contexts make it difficult to offer direct comparisons between Orchard Road and other world-renowned streets. Thinking about Orchard Road alongside some other models may, however, reveal what it is not, and help define what it is. For example, Orchard Road is not a linear urban mall like City Walk at Universal City, California. That space was conceived for wholly commercial purposes as a piece of retail-based connective tissue predicated on a limited consumption-induced urbanity.[4]

Like the "brick-street" Ginza district of nineteenth-century Tokyo, however, Orchard Road was developed as a tourist-oriented shopping street due to its proximity to expatriate communities. Pre-World War II Ginza was a hangout for fashionable *mogas* and *mobos* (modern girls and boys), and Orchard Road, too, lures youthful crowds with the latest fashions and with movies, discotheques, cafes, and food from around the world. However, Orchard Road is not comparable with the scale and complexity of Ginza today, with its large-scale interior environments of *depatos*.

Of a more similar scale would be Berlin's Kurfürstendamm (or Ku'damm). This stretches for 3.5 kilometers and was built in the late nineteenth century to emulate (albeit on a more modest scale) the Champs-Elysées of Paris. Like the modern international showcase of the Ku'damm, once touted as "*das größte Caféhaus Europas*," Orchard Road boasts fine hotels, department stores, restaurants, cinemas, and art galleries. It is similarly served by two subway stations, thrives despite heavy vehicle traffic, and is sometimes closed to traffic and transformed for carnivals, festivals and parades.

Unlike the Ku'damm, however, Orchard was not conceived and rebuilt as a coherent shopping and entertainment street, but grew piecemeal over time.[5] Neither is Orchard Road dominated by storefronts; rather, it is lined by disparate buildings with deep interiors, joined by a pedestrian mall — which, interestingly, was built in the 1970s in anticipation of the many new buildings that line it today.

Such lack of uniformity gives Orchard Road a different character than many European shopping streets. In terms of urban space, Orchard Road offers a wide variety of sectional profiles, creating an array of spaces with different scales and relationships to each other. It also engenders a secondary economy of street-side kiosks and an informal economy of vendors — from ice cream to on-the-spot caricatured portraits. This involves a plethora of structures for display — pushcarts, kiosks, mobile food trucks, temporary sidewalk stalls, product-promotion marquees, and even temporary stages for street performances. Unlike the controlled interior of a mall, there are a range of spaces one can inhabit — interior, exterior, and in-between — and a variety of activities one can engage in.

Within this manmade world, the verdant green of the erstwhile tropical landscape reemerges now and then in startling bits, providing a reminder of Singapore's location one degree north of the Equator. One particularly emblematic feature of Orchard Road is its stately fringe of historic angsana trees. But other pools of greenery along Orchard's lower stretches offer a sense of languid tropical calm that contrasts with the harder edge of its more built-up areas. And, or course, when it rains on Orchard Road, it may take the form of a real tropical torrent.

Unlike the self-contained experience inside a shopping mall, the conglomeration of spaces called Orchard Road is more than the sum of its parts. It is this, in essence, that defines a street. As a public space, Orchard Road is made up of all these structures, visible and invisible, as well as its changing narrative of use through time.

To understand these spaces, my approach here follows a visual rather than a linear logic, in the sense of the montage as suggested by Walter Benjamin.[6] The methods through which data were collected — and especially represented — have made use of different media, such as photographs, news clippings, personal Internet diaries (blogs), archived materials, and narratives. These were then pieced together within "frames," dynamic montages compressed in time to express certain themes in spatial practices, supplemented by textual materials. Without reducing the images and textual

materials to essentialized forms, the intention is to use this material as concentrated information, compressed in time, framed and juxtaposed to bring out meanings and themes which would otherwise be hidden.

Within this overall strategy, a particularly useful organizing concept has been the analogy and actual geography of Orchard Road as a cleavage in the topography. Orchard Road began its life as a kind of trough that ran through a hilly area of colonial plantations, collecting the agricultural produce from the plots that flanked it. As it developed as a vehicular artery, it also came to provide space for a drainage canal to alleviate flooding in the area.

A more pronounced topography began to appear along Orchard Road in the 1960s and 70s, as its profile as an indentation between gentle hills was deepened by the construction of tall buildings to either side. At that time, it also began to exhibit its new role as a concentrator and distributor of commerce and consumers. By the 1980s and 90s, it had already come to reflect the tastes of a new middle-class Singaporean consumer for high-end goods, sophisticated environments, speed (fast food, rapid transit), and a caffeinated lifestyle stretching well into the night. Today, Orchard Road is the primary conduit transmitting the energy and pulse of the city, linking networks of air-conditioned atria and public open spaces, both above ground and through the subterranean world of the city's mass rapid transit (MRT) system.

In much the same way Benjamin once perceived trajectories in the elements of the arcades of nineteenth-century Paris, Orchard Road projects the urban future of Singapore — allowing one to reassemble, and at the same time relate to each other, the disparate elements embodied within. Such elements are like Internet hypertexts, projecting one into whole realms of possible future discourse. In the case of Orchard Road, these might include shopping, mass transport, tourism, entertainment, fast food, globalization, urban renewal, state control, youth culture, and real estate speculation. Orchard Road acts like a portal into the future, concentrating and connecting otherwise disparate urban discourses within a constructed urban public space.

Materially, this post-traditional present is one where architectural substance has shifted from solid building forms and shapes, such as the old Mandarin Hotel and C.K. Tang Building, to new typologies predicated on surfaces, such as video walls, seasonal facades, and even morphing walkway paving, in a constant updating of images. This new physical ephemeralism and instability is also concomitant with the displacement of bodies — a changing clientele of *flâneurs*, a dynamic ethnoscape, and shifts in affinities to spaces — sometimes by choice, sometimes not.[7]

Even the forms by which Orchard Road is represented have changed, as traditional figure-ground maps and photographs have given way to abstract graphs depicting real estate and rental values (peaking around the Scotts-Orchard intersection and falling in the middle); demographic patterns (age-groups of consumers, shopping preferences, petty-crime statistics); and scopes of remote surveillance (as cameras record activities in atriums, MRT stations, sidewalk ATMs, and the prominent Electronic Road-Pricing gantry).

The post-traditional condition of Singapore, as offered by these constructions, is not based on a history of progress or even a progression of history, but rather on a compression of moments, images, places, people, and scales of phenomena.

ORCHARD ROAD — A BRIEF HISTORY

Early settlers of Singapore used the hilly areas near present-day Orchard Road to grow gambier, which was used for tanning, as a natural red dye, and as a component of betel nut chewing, a favorite pastime of field workers. However, by the 1840s these areas were given over to colonial merchants to cultivate cash crops, principally nutmeg.

By 1846, when the Plan of Singapore Town was drawn up by J.T. Thomson, the first government surveyor, the hitherto unnamed path through the area had acquired the name Orchard Road. The hills flanking it had also been named after the estate owners, such as Oxley Rise, Claymore Hill, Cairnhill Hill, Mount Sophia, Mount Elizabeth, and so forth. Disaster struck in the 1850s, however, as an unknown disease largely wiped out the nutmeg crop, ending the agricultural ambitions of landowners there. Eventually, the plantations were sold and divided into smaller residential plots, and Orchard Road became an area of airy colonial bungalows.

Although the area remained largely rural, by the 1880s Koek's Market and the first shophouses were built there. The shops were of utilitarian types — sundry-goods stores, and later, motor vehicle workshops. Horse-drawn carriages and jinrickshas remained the common modes of transport in the 1920s. But this changed dramatically to automobile traffic by the 1940s.

With the addition of more shops and three supermarkets in the 1950s, Orchard Road began to take on the mantle of a small-scale shopping street. A milestone was reached when C.K. Tang, an enterprising local merchant, set up the first department store there in 1958. However, Orchard Road continued to be flood-prone until the building of the Stamford Canal in the 1960s. And it was not till the 1970s that it replaced High Street as the city's main shopping street.

With the opening of Lido Cinema, Orchard Theater, Raffles Village, and Jackie's Bowl in the 1960s and 70s Orchard Road also developed into a local entertainment strip. Across the street from Cold Storage Supermarket, a car park by day served as a popular nighttime open-air food court. In 1973 the Mandarin became the first large-scale modern hotel on Orchard Road, but the pace of development stepped up in 1974 with the opening of Plaza Singapura, the city's largest shopping center at the time. The Orchard Road Pedestrian Walkways, a state-implemented project begun in 1976, pro-

vided wide sidewalks for shoppers, adding to its upscale image.[8] Then, in 1979, Singapore's first MacDonald's opened at the junction of Scotts and Orchard Roads, heralding the arrival of fast-food culture.

During the 1980s a number of significant new developments continued to change the face of Orchard Road, including the construction of the iconic, if somewhat eclectic, Dynasty Hotel (now the Marriott) at the prime junction with Scotts Road. Its podium floors comprised Tang Plaza, which replaced older commercial space in the landmark C.K Tang building. Other towering buildings soon replaced many of the two-story shophouses along the street. And the opening of three Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) stations along Orchard in 1987 spurred further a growth of retail activity, which planners anticipated would ultimately stretch all the way south to Marina City.

By the 1990s, Orchard Road had become a busy hotel, entertainment and shopping street, with high-class residential areas to its north and south. Large, self-contained malls like Ngee Ann City not only offered space for shops, restaurants and department stores, but for public functions including a public library, post office, and a "civic plaza." At the turn of the twenty-first century, Orchard Road had acquired all the standard components (and brand labels) typical of globalized shopping street. Its image was further defined by bright lights, large-screen video walls, and a cosmopolitan crowd at its al-fresco curbside cafes.

Such physical change began to be paralleled in the 1980s by the staging of mass spectacles such as the colorful Chingay Procession during Chinese New Year. The first-ever large-scale street party, Swing Singapore, was held there in 1988, with a turnout of about 250,000 people.[9] The annual Orchard Road Christmas light-up also began in the 1980s, during which the entire street is transformed into a simulated Winter Wonderland.

Ad-hoc events have also taken place, such as exercise sessions led by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong as part of the Healthy Lifestyle Campaign of 1997. But the culmination of Orchard Road's rise as an event space and Main Street of the nation came during the Millennium Countdown Party, televised worldwide, when it was shown in the same take as Tiananmen Square in Beijing and New York's Times Square.

In the public mind, Orchard Road is also today synonymous with youth culture. In the 1990s such buildings as The Heeren and Cathay Cineleisure Orchard were built specifically to cater to young consumers, and the Youth Park adjacent to the National Youth Center offers a venue for youth recreational and social activities. Another important group that has changed the character of Orchard Road — at least on Sundays — are Filipina domestic guestworkers who gather at certain spaces there on their day off.

The fully urban character of Orchard Road today is a far cry from its rural appearance during the colonial plantation era, or during its early-twentieth-century incarnation as a local commercial street. Today its cosmopolitan orientation produces the sense of a concentrated edge, where differences become apparent, and where one is acutely aware of Singapore's place in a global age.

ORCHARD ROAD AS A COMPRESSION OF TIME AND IMAGES

As the above discussion makes clear, Orchard Road's character has grown up over time. It should not be surprising then that the spatial moments that animate it embody historical responses to its underlying topography (FIG.1).


FIGURE 1. *Orchard Road timeline. The birth of an urban shopping street.*

Indeed, it is this history that to a large part determines its nuances as an *archipelago* of public spaces. Such nodes of activity float amid the currents of an urban sea, in reverse of traditional figure-ground conceptions.

Starting at its west end, one finds the first such node just outside Orchard Towers (1975). Within a stretch of new or refurbished hotels and upscale malls, this complex is somewhat of a relic. A motley crowd of foreign workers gathers there each work day to visit the employment agencies within. Meanwhile, at night and on weekends crowds of foreigners, especially sailors from the ships that berth Singapore's busy harbors, frequent its bars and euphemistically named escort

agencies. In fact, Orchard Towers is a "Designated Red-Light Area," meaning it has been legalized for prostitution. However, nothing on its public facade suggests this, and a little further down the street, the Thai embassy sits within a fenced compound, surrounded by serene greenery.

Next comes the prime real estate junction with Scotts Road. Several large commercial buildings dominate here, namely the eclectic Tang Plaza and Marriott Hotel (1982), Shaw House (1993), and Wheelock Place (1994). Major brand labels literally festoon these buildings, an effect accentuated by the large video wall on Shaw House. In true global fashion, the buildings reveal their insides on the outside. Shoppers can

further enjoy being seen under the yellow umbrellas of Borders, sipping coffee at Starbucks, or just hanging out at the Civic Plaza fountain of Ngee Ann City (1993).

In terms of pedestrian activity, this is one of the busiest districts along Orchard Road. The exit/entrance to the Orchard MRT Station (1987) is located here. Lush, old angsana trees still provide delicious shade along its sections of pedestrian mall. The public spaces at the Ngee Ann Civic Plaza and Shaw House are also popular. And on weekends white marquees here provide a setting for product promotions or special events such as Lion Dance performances.

The next nodal point is the domain of the young and trendy. They spill out of the Somerset MRT Station and head straight for The Heeren, which contains a major record store and annex dedicated to youth fashion, and in whose atrium teen music idols often make appearances. The arcade and promenade outside The Heeren is also a favorite rendezvous point for youngsters.

A little down Grange Road (a side road leading off Orchard) one also finds Cineleisure Orchard. And right across the street is the Youth Skate Park, which draws a constant flow of youngsters. The youthscape of Orchard is a temporal state that comes alive particularly on Friday nights.

The Istana Park and Istana Gate further down the road take on a completely different character. The Istana building and grounds have been here since 1869, when it served the British colonial government as a headquarters, then known as Government House. This remains an iconographic space today, emblazoned with general emblems of statehood and the Singapore flag in particular. Otherwise, Istana Park embodies the tranquility of mature trees, pools of water, and sleepy pavilions. On national holidays, crowds of Singaporeans who do not normally visit Orchard Road queue up for rare visits to its gardens.

A look at the vintages of these buildings and open spaces should already provide a hint at Orchard Road's asynchronous development. They embody many different plans and visions, including the colonial master plan, the CTD commercial development of the 1950s and 60s, the URA Development Guide Plan for Orchard of 1994, and the 2001 Singapore Tourist Board master plan for "Making Orchard More Happening." Thus, even as Orchard Road has hardly developed in a "natural" fashion, neither has it developed according to a single blueprint. Over time, many ideas have been discarded, modified, or augmented to reflect changing conditions.

Far from a homogenous manufactured reality, then, the milieu of Orchard Road is best understood as having been constantly repositioned to meet the challenges of each new moment. Its importance thus lies not so much in the specific identity of the structures alongside it as in the role it has played in the larger "geography" of the city. As a channel or conduit through different urban moments, the street itself has been able to provide a narrative that strings together a series of temporally disjunctured pieces, conflating their

images and projecting them into the present. The forces at work here — history, planning ideology, real estate speculation, popular culture, changing tastes and habits, and political regulation — sometimes work synergistically. But more often they are antagonistic, and the end product is more negotiated than planned.

Amid these conflicts, the desire by agencies such as the Singapore Tourist Board (STB) to bring Orchard Road onto the world stage by creating the imagery of a "global city of the twenty-first century" create enthusiasm for such events as its "twinning" in the 1990s with the Ginza in Tokyo or the Champs-Elysées in Paris. During these weeklong celebrations, fashion shows, tea ceremonies, wine festivals, and other events have brought the culture of such foreign locales to Orchard Road, while the culture of Orchard has been reproduced elsewhere. Orchard Road is thus made a conduit that beams Singapore across the world.

Within this arena of manufactured consumerist spectacle, the ultimate simulation must be the hyperreal re-creation over the Christmas and New Year season of a Winter Wonderland, replete with snow-laden buildings, icicles, and reindeer sleighs. Only 15 percent of Singaporeans are Christians. Yet after twenty years, the Christmas light-up has become a "new tradition."

During this two-month period, phenomena like snow, the Northern Lights, and traditional symbols such as fir trees, angels, bells and snowmen, are writ on an urban scale, to the degree of becoming hyperreal. In effect, such displays provide only a *simulacra* of a Christmas celebration. Nevertheless, because the light-up has worked its way into both collective and personal narratives, it is sustained as a public event and expression of the national collective.

ORCHARD ROAD AS A COMPRESSION OF PEOPLE AND PLACES

Every Sunday, several areas along Orchard Road — the segment extending from the Orchard MRT Station to Lucky Plaza, across the street at the lane next to Wisma Atria, and the green space behind the MRT station dome — are transformed into temporary social enclaves by groups of domestic workers from the Philippines. These women spend much of their weekly day off in these favorite rendezvous spots engaged in spatial practices not typical of Singaporeans in general, especially the use of open green spaces for picnics and group socializing. These acts of space appropriation, along with loud chattering and laughter, are viewed with some degree of ambivalence by Singaporean shoppers, and with amazement by some tourists.

The Sunday meetings are a distinct manifestation of the global flow of labor on which the Singapore's economy relies. In particular, the Filipinas free Singaporean women to contribute actively to the workforce. However, because their work

is limited to the private realm, its value is not always apparent. Nevertheless, their weekly gatherings on Orchard Road bring them into the same space as workers at the other extreme of global flows — white expatriate executives, many of who live in the nearby Tanglin district or just off Orchard Road itself.

Such a scene is further complicated by the ubiquitous presence of tourists, identified less by nationality than by their slightly offbeat clothes, the variety of branded bags they carry, and their somewhat worn-out-from-shopping looks. Such populations combine to make Orchard Road an embodiment of what Appadurai has termed an "ethnoscape," a shifting human environment of tourists, immigrants, exiles, and other mobile groups (**FIG.2**).[10] Here, on Orchard Road, in a space that almost every Singaporean is conscious of (but may not necessarily frequent), the identity of the Other — and thus also of the Singaporean — is constantly remade and redefined.

A closer look at the Orchard Road ethnoscape reveals that different groups tend to gravitate to different spaces, and define them for their own use. As already mentioned, the core gathering space for Filipina guestworkers remains the promenade outside Lucky Plaza. However, emanating from this, a number of peripheral spaces have also been occupied that are largely hidden from view. These spaces lie between buildings, have slipped through the cracks of official programming, and are rarely used by Singaporeans due to a different culture of space use.

Such factors mean that the Sunday enclaves of Filipinas are bounded in space, time, and by social distance. Indeed, groups of Filipinas generally keep a distance from Singaporeans, and seem uncomfortable when locals approach them. Yet, it is only when these workers are grouped together that they seem empowered by a sense of identity and a right to claim space for themselves in the city. By contrast, individual Filipina domestic workers tend to hang out at the margins of public space, out of sight of the busy sidewalk.

The phenomenon of the Sunday enclaves has generated debate in the press regarding issues that affect these workers.[11] On another level, even with the apparent lack of public interaction between the Filipinas and locals, Orchard Road remains a place where such a "silent" group can appear in public. And simply the visible culture of space use by the Filipinas gives Singaporeans some degree of exposure to a culture other than their own.

Another group that inhabits Orchard Road is what the *Straits Times* has called the "Triangle Tribes" — adolescent youths who converge at the "Youth Triangle" defined by The Heeren, Cineleisure Orchard, Youth Park, and Skate Park.[12] Here is how one commentator, William Gibson, has described this scene:

> Rococo pagodas perch atop slippery-flanked megastructures concealing enough cubic footage of atria to make up a couple of good-sized Lagrangian-5 colonies. Along Orchard Road, the Fifth Avenue of Southeast Asia, chocka-block

> with multi-level shopping centers, a burgeoning middle class shops ceaselessly. Young, for the most part, and clad in computer-weathered cottons from the local Gap clone, they're a handsome populace; they look good in their shorts and Reeboks and Matsuda shades.[13]

In the past, the presence of groups of youngsters such as the Far East Kids and the Centrepoint Kids hanging out on Orchard Road was deemed a sign of social problems. But the Tribes there today have been embraced by retailers and sanctioned by planners. On any given Friday a number of subspecies of this group — such as the Skateboard Pack, the Heeren J-Popsters, or the Cineleisure Railing Huggers — actively fill the public areas of the Triangle. Patrolling police are wont to leave them to their devices, such as showing off their skateboarding prowess at the Orchard Road Pocket Park.

Statistics indicate that 80 percent of the 7 million tourists who visit Singapore annually make a trip to Orchard Road. Although globetrotting tourists may be found in many places along Orchard Road, a closer look reveals that white visitors generally gravitate toward Emerald Hill and Peranakan Place's perpetually carnival-like atmosphere, while Asian tourists are more likely to be found toward the Tanglin end, near the large duty-free malls. To many expatriate residents of Singapore, Orchard Road may in fact seem like home, as their employers may furnish them with an apartment with a view of the street.

For many local Singaporeans, then, Orchard Road is where one might be most likely to meet someone with a different social, cultural or political identity. At the promenade outside Centrepoint, a student might find a representative of the opposition Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) promoting a book or pamphlet. Elsewhere, a Singaporean child might for the first time meet someone with hair and eye color different from hers. A middle-aged housewife might meet a skateboarder with orange hair and a pierced tongue. A Singaporean woman might place offerings for the Hungry Ghost Festival on the side of the public promenade, while a group of student flag-sellers meets at their favorite rendezvous space.

In fact, Orchard Road is the kind of public space where one can assemble one's own favorite *a la carte* menu of public spaces and encounters. Such dynamic negotiations make this a space of "friction," where the ideas of self and other are constantly evolving. As different spheres exist in proximity at the same time, a space of possible exchange and sometimes antagonism is created. The value of such space is not so much in the sharing, let alone true "meeting" of identities, as in the simple opportunity for divergent urban proximity. An experience of otherness, of spatial practices and views other than one's own, allows for possible "shifts of perspectives." This is something which is often not (as proclaimed in discourses on public space) a pleasant experience — and which at times can even be disturbing or offensive.[14]

Ultimately, Orchard Road is where the Singaporean "Heartlanders" go out to the city.[15]

FIGURE 2. *Identities on Orchard Road.*

. . . like you, when I step out on weekends, I don't want to go downstairs of my block or round the corner from my house; why stay in my backyard, I want to go OUT.

And, say what you will, out IS Orchard Road.

All the mallians I talked to yesterday were from out of town ('weekdays heartland, weekends Orchard'), and they were out in force (meeting friends) and vengeance (shopping with). All their reasons for joining the thick and the fray boiled down to 'fun lah!' 'shopping!' 'more things to see and buy'. It's not like they can't buy the identical mobile phone accessory from their neighborhood. But there is no frenzy, no carnival, no 'going out' attached to chilling and eating and shopping in your own kampung. Not one young person was bothered, much less aware, that it was crowded, that you sometimes had to push and shove, that for everything you had to queue.[16]

ORCHARD ROAD AS COMPRESSION OF SCALE AND PERCEPTION

Orchard Road and its public spaces take on different meanings when perceived from different perspectives and at different scales. Take for example, the concept of "non-places" used by French anthropologist Marc Augé to describe public spaces that lack the characteristics of traditional places. He has applied the term especially to transit spaces, or spaces we tend to move through instead of stay in.[17]

Identities

Theme: Meeting the other
Practice: to see
           to critique
           to understand
           to meet

Theme: Finding your niche
Practice: to claim space
           to be seen
           to make social space

Theme: Affinities
Practice: to become associated with
           to re-affirm identity
           to produce and re-produce
           associational social spaces

Theme: "Districts": e.g. DRAs, local,
           youth-haunts
Practice: to reveal and conceal
           to aggregate
           to subvert

Theme: Youth-scapes
Practice: to claim space
           to socialize
           to look "cool" - be seen

Players: people of different ethnicity,
gender, age, nationalities, position in
political-economy, political leanings,
culture, etc.

From the eyes of those who actually use them, these spaces may not be as one-dimensional as they seem. Consider this case revealed through newspaper accounts and blogger diaries:

At 2.10 pm, the Singapore flash mob rode up and down the escalators near the MRT entrance three times. While going down, they shouted 'whee' with their hands raised, as if they were on a roller coaster. The whole thing took about three minutes. By 2.13 pm they had split up in three different directions.

'What was that? Some uni (university) orientation is it?' asked 25-year-old Selena Wong who was waiting for her friend at the station. She didn't know what flash mobs

were. *Flash mobs do not seem to have any political or ideological agenda. They are supposed to be spontaneous, whimsical fun.*[18]

I took the train to the Orchard Station, got out, and walked around a spot that Lily and I had agreed to meet. I heard the roar of the crowd as everybody was off from work and going about and Orchard is especially one of the busiest train stations. But then I heard some footsteps running behind me and towards me. I quickly turned around and saw a short (5'4") Chinese girl smiling at me. Lily. "Damn! Craig — I was playing your hide-and-seek game, trying to beat you!"

"You can't beat me babe, I invented the game," I replied. We then embraced and kissed, and then hand-in-hand, walked off into the crowd. We walked through the train station which is of course underground, and then through connecting tunnels and hallways that lead through all kinds of connected underground shopping malls — no, I'm not kidding

So Lily and I walked through this subterranean shoppers paradise and then popped out onto the street eventually — far away from the original train station. We walked into a small 7/11 store (yep, they even have those here), where Lily bought us both a drink — ice cold cans of "Chrysanthemum Tea," and she also bought me a pack of Marlboro Lights ($6.70).

We then walked along the throngs of people on Orchard Road and came upon a band of Chinese Acrobats performing on the sidewalk. We sat down and watched them for a bit, commenting here and there of what we liked about their show and what not.[19]

The above accounts show how the non-places of the Orchard MRT Station and its surrounds may provide for quite unique, sometimes intense or novel individual experiences. The spaces described here are indeed transitory, but they are still in many ways "compressed" public spaces which act as a platform where people with all sorts of different itineraries cross paths and have a chance to spend "public time." These spaces are often also integrated with other networks of public spaces and have the potential to become viable social spaces.

On an individual level — on the level of small, personal stories — Orchard Road, instead of the glitzy shopping street, can thus be perceived as a giant playground, a space for individual expression, or even transgression. Sometimes, events portrayed on the scale of the individual can thus ring differently than when perceived as an urban phenomenon:

A short word on this area. This is the shopping district of Singapore. There are stuff to skate but human traffic is impossible especially after 5 pm. Lotsa long rails are a temptation to great to resist! Go before 4 pm. Watch out for cops. Prime shopping area means more reason to diss out "injuring passers-by" shit.

Orchard road is one of the best skate spots in Singapore — marble and tile as far as the eye can see. It's got everything, rails, benches, curves, ledges, and about any kind of screwy fixture you can think of. Even though it's awesome skating, you have to watch for the police because you'll get busted faster than holding up a doughnut shop.[20]

While Orchard Road has generally been regarded as a consumption-scape par excellence, there are many who also regard it as work space. These may either be people with regular jobs there, or who fall within the informal economy. Ice cream carts — identifiable by their blue umbrellas, and run mostly by old men — are a ubiquitous feature of the Orchard Road sidewalk, and are little magnets of activity. In contrast, newspapers kiosks are invariably run by old ladies in sun hats. Street sweepers may sometimes be spotted, but more often they remain invisible.

Food vendors, mobile food-truck operators, and push-cart operators also service pedestrians along the street. Many of them have makeshift tables or stands. Caricature artists also display their work on the sidewalk or show off their skills. Some of these people are almost semi-permanent fixtures, and their absence may be felt immediately. They also serve as points of noncommittal public contact and as reference points, defining spaces such as street corners. Their presence may depend on the time of the day, or they may remain day and night, serving different crowds. Here is one account of such a street vendor:

Every afternoon the 72-year-old woman takes a slow, painful hour to trudge the 3 km distance from her one-room flat on Indus Road to the Orchard underpass beneath Scotts Road. She doesn't take the bus — she can't afford to. Madam Tay earns her money by selling sachets of Super coffee mix and Super chrysanthemum tea, clean towels and aunty blouses.

Walk past her along the tunnel, and you will notice that unlike other buskers or beggars, she never calls nor signals for help. What she does, is smile and hope that someone kind will buy her wares for a dollar or two.[21]

These anecdotes suggest that to perceive the scale of Orchard Road solely as that of urban events and phenomena misses the personal meaning, positive or negative, that attaches to it as a public space. To bring into focus such multiple perspectives of the urban, I have tried to collect, document, collage or reconstitute such personal constructions. Ultimately, however, such a reconciliation of different views of the urban intensifies and enriches the resolution of Orchard Road as a public space. It is at this scale that notions of identity and place can be fleshed out and brought to life.

By contrast, the scale and urban prominence of Orchard Road also allows for the staging of large-scale events and spectacles, often with themes like "health," "nation" or "culture." These spectacles have ranged from nationally televised mass events to product launches, fashion parades, and the annual Chingay Parade (marking Chinese New Year), which

for a decade and a half was held on Orchard Road. Other examples were the one-off Millennium Swing Singapore street party and short-lived end-of-the-month road closures for do-it-yourself street parties.

The general lack of spontaneity involved in mass events organized by the state is well known. Such events are often played out with coordinated, mimicked movements and rehearsed steps — "following the leader" — with participants dressing and acting the same way. When these involve performances, there is usually also a strict separation between performers and audience, with a defined realm of activity bounded in space and time. In other words, sanctioned crowds are invited to watch staged actions that are without any innate content or meaning other than a reinforcing of the status quo (for example, of collectivity as a nation).

The banal unity and boundedness of these events show a degree of disembedding of cultural practices (such as dancing in the street — a concept not indigenous to Singapore) from elsewhere, without any attempt at reembedding these practices within Singapore public space.[22] For example, the state-organized street parties tended to be so bounded by their allowed time slot that they verged on the bizarre:

At 9.50 pm, men and women were already sweeping the streets, weaving in and out through the dwindling crowd. And seven minutes later, police moved into groups of party revelers to tell them to end their party. The drumming stopped, the dancers stopped, the music stopped and the onlookers gradually dispersed all over Orchard Road. At 9.59 pm, with military precision, the late, late "show" began. It had hints of the closing of a parade, except this time the centerpiece escorted by a traffic policeman on his gleaming motorcycle was a mechanical sweeper. It made its grand entrance as if to show the crowd it was king of the road. Meanwhile, at the Dynasty Hotel end of Orchard Road, five other traffic policemen sitting neatly in a row on their revved-up bikes waited for their turn to wrap up the party.

It came exactly at 10.02 pm. With the five motorcycles coming down the road, the crowd started to disperse — some into the MRT stations, some milling on the pedestrian mall. By 10.12 pm it was all over, and the motorists were back to showing the party-goers that Orchard Road belonged to them.[23]

However, once the road closures came to be for do-it-yourself street parties, the activity shriveled up and died completely. The reason was that Singaporeans do not have such a spatial practice ingrained in their social culture.

NARRATIVES OF LOSS

Although Orchard Road possesses a dearth of built history, it has nevertheless to attracted its own "discourses of

nostalgia."[24] Most of these voices seem to lament the loss of an age of innocence, of nature, and of authenticity. The most vociferous of appeals have come from a group some have called the "retrogrades."[25] The retrogrades complain of the loss of an authentic past, are suspicious and skeptical of planned changes, and ruefully view new schemes as careless or irresponsible toward history.

Others would prefer that places like Orchard Road be allowed to develop "naturally" — and perhaps die a natural death, rather than suffer any form of intervention. Here is an example:

> In earlier times, the area around it would have been more green and even more striated. Orchard road derives its name from the nutmeg and gambier plantations owned by colonial planters . . . in the middle of the 19th century. These plantations were at the edge of virgin jungle and a tiger was even spotted in 1846. Such was the mystic of Orchard. But the plantations and the jungle are gone. The only 'tigers' along Orchard Road these days are the ones you down alfresco at its many outdoor cafes and bars. The angsana trees are the ersatz jungle that are enjoined by more systematic green and exotic 'landscaping' co-opted to evoke another mystique — the garden city or the city as garden. But these too may go.[26]

The author of the above comment, K.M. Tan, is a practicing architect in Singapore who has decried the loss of a greener, more "natural" Orchard Road, as opposed to the highly abstract and constructed environment of today. He goes on to say:

> At this very moment another narrative is being constructed. The future of Orchard Road is being plotted by the Singapore Tourism Board (STB). Soon, it is rumored, the angsana trees will be gone; there is an ominous campaign of extermination of the angsana in the face of this island, because they are difficult to 'maintain'. Instead, a re-forestation of the past may take place. And soon the orchards may perversely reappear again, if only as a theme. Apparently still not vital enough for them, the STB together with foreign consultants, local architects and planners are huddled together to conceive an immaculate rebirth of Orchard Road.

An even harsher critique is that of architect Rem Koolhaas. Although he has written of Singapore in general, his comments can just as easily be applied to Orchard Road in particular. Among other things, he has referred to "the global consumer frenzy" that "perverted Singapore's image to one of caricature: an entire city perceived as a shopping center, an orgy of Eurasian vulgarity, a city stripped of the last vestiges of authenticity and dignity."[27] The reason that Singapore is "a city without qualities," according to Koolhaas, is the "curse of the *tabula rasa*." "Once applied, it proves not

only previous occupancy expendable, but also each *future* occupancy provisional too, ultimately temporary. That makes the claim to finality — the illusion on which even the most mediocre architecture is based — impossible. It makes Architecture impossible."

Koolhaas's charge is that the ease with which Singapore's built history has been erased has made it impossible for the city to have a legitimate sense of authenticity. Worse, where Tan ruminates that the colonial orchards may yet reappear on Orchard Road, albeit as a theme — a kind of "re-forestation of the past" — Koolhaas has asserted that in Singapore "colonial history . . . is rehabilitated, paradoxically because it is the only one recognizable as history."

Although it is true that the colonial era gave Orchard Road a legacy of names, it is important to remember, too, that the monoculture of nutmeg trees cultivated by the colonials caused the sudden death of the plantation era. The historical lesson would seem to be that a diversity of (crop) culture would have ensured the continued vigor of the venture. Such a lesson would still seem to be applicable to contemporary plans for Orchard Road — its survival thus seen to hinge on its continued diversity of activities, architecture, culture, people, goods, public spaces, and memories.

Nostalgia takes different forms. There are those for whom nostalgia may take a more positive turn. Thus, while wistful and sentimental about a more innocent age, they realize that those memories of Orchard Road belonged to a different time, and their loss was inevitable. Such people include the "reminders" and the "resilients," who may recall fondly the Mont D'or and Tivoli Café (famous for cream cakes), shopping at the old C.K. Tang, or going up the first escalator in Singapore to watch movies in the old Orchard Cinema.

Such people may still be optimistic in a pragmatic sort of way about the future of Orchard Road. Their nostalgia takes the form of memory trips to the past, associating people and places. But they do not miss the lack of good public transport or the persistent floods that plagued the area. Their view comes with the knowledge that their loss is personal, and — if they ever existed — the "golden days" of Orchard Road are a shifting ghost, which changes with each generation.

Such people recognize that nostalgia is a luxury that can be enjoyed only because there are new frames through which to regard the old fondly — at a distance, without the accompanying grime. This is the brighter view of the discourse of nostalgia. The other extreme is a chronic, crippling nostalgia for a lost, "good-old" Orchard Road — a discourse which does not allow possibilities beyond the past, and which too often substitutes personal sentiments for critical, constructive analysis.

Whatever the case, it is clear today that nostalgia for a remembered or idealized past is not part of the present construction of Orchard Road's history. Rather, it is a state that itself is symptomatic of the post-traditional condition. During the decade of the 1980s to 90s Singapore's rapid growth became manifest in a rapidly changing built environment.

This was the "historical moment" when the "nation" arrived in an economic sense. But it was also a time when the city became somewhat removed from its past, and this was perceived to involve a certain intangible lack of spirit and soul.[28]

CONSTRUCTED AUTHENTICITIES AND THEIR LEGITIMACY

If the discourses of nostalgia for a lost history are put aside, what then are the new mimetic structures of Orchard Road? What legitimizes its history, if history can be said to exist in a city described by Koolhaas as "perpetually morphed to the next state"? In other words, how can one construct a new authenticity for Orchard Road? To answer these questions, I must return to the discourse on compressions of time and images, people and places, and scales of perceptions.

The sedimented history of Orchard Road avails itself with a closer look. The past still lies buried in the names of streets and buildings; the collage of pavements of different vintages; in the course of the Stamford Canal, which runs quietly and almost invisibly; and in the angsana trees gracefully flanking its sidewalks.[29] Refurbished exteriors of old buildings may give a new identity to Orchard Road, but there is still a layering of memory which even the newest master plan (2001) for revitalization will not fully obscure.

The dialectic of people and identities on Orchard Road also reflects a global reach and diversity that will ensure the street's survival. Orchard Road does not cater only to the shopper or consumer; it continues to be a public space, and even a work and home space for some. The scales of encounter on Orchard Road, ranging from the solo adventures of a young skateboarder to the mass urban experiences of celebrating Christmas, reflect the variety of perspectives that may form new mimetic structures from the personalized to the spectacular.

Narratives of loss simply do not apply on Orchard Road. Instead of a systemic "erasure of history," the mechanism at work here is more akin to the constant construction of the hyperreal — what Baudrillard has described as the creation of a model for which the original does not exist.[30] Ask anyone what imagery comes to mind to describe Orchard Road, and more often than not people will cite the ersatz concrete and glass pagoda-like tower of the former Dynasty (now Marriott) Hotel and the curving green Chinese roofs of its Tang Plaza podium. This iconic complex is itself a reincarnation of the old C.K. Tang Building (1958), which was demolished in 1982. Now super-sized, its signature Chinese green roofs have simply been magnified and multiplied. Considering this, it should not be surprising that studies have found that Singaporeans, "despite being aware of other highly imageable streetscapes in the world, still think that the Orchardscape is aesthetically pleasing."[31]

One might also note the brass-embossed plates depicting local fruits on the pedestrian mall. Whether such fruit

trees ever existed on the nutmeg plantations near here is beside the point; it is the romance of fabled fruit orchards that counts. The same applies for the simulated winter scenes right from of a Hallmark Christmas card that pop up on Orchard Road every November. These definitely have no historical roots, but they are now an accepted part of the seasonal change of "weather." Even the air-conditioned food courts in buildings on Orchard Road are hyperreal quotations of the rowdy open-air food stalls of the long-gone Orchard Road car park.

In the end, we return to the analogy of Orchard Road as a channel, or conduit through which history *flows*, sometimes sedimenting, sometimes eroding. What matters is that its banks are fertile because of its active life as a mover, not a stagnater. It *collects*: brings together, mixes the different lives which inhabit its waters, sometimes bringing into friction, at other times bringing into happy collisions. It *distributes*: shares, transmits, and conducts the energy, life-pulse, and yes, wealth of the city — a life line for some, an occasional thrill for others. It *connects*: for Orchard Road is intimately connected with the surrounding city fabric, an important thread connecting the heart of Singapore to the Marina Bay Downtown, and to the waterfront.

Orchard Road thus remains an important commercial corridor and connective tissue which links recreational, civic and cultural nodes in the city. Plans have been proposed in the past to divert vehicular traffic away from it, but these have never been found feasible, for it cannot be reduced to an isolated urban shopping space. Pedestrianization would suck out its life-blood and sound its death knell.

Orchard Road's wide sidewalks preempted its character as a lively shopping street, just as its character as a lively shopping street now preempts efforts to "make it more happening."[32] Such self-conscious tinkering with what Orchard Road should entail often comes only after the fact. It has come of age somehow, and no one seems quite able to put his or her finger on what exactly makes it tick.

Although those with power to intervene seem to wield the power to determine its fate, like the conduit I have here tried to show it to be, Orchard Road seems to have a life of its own.[33] The legitimacy of its post-traditional environment lies precisely in its ability to flow with the times and constantly reinvent itself. Orchard Road is a hyperreal environment where reference is made simultaneously to an imagined past, a real history as a commercial and entertainment center, abstracted models of great shopping streets from elsewhere around the world — and, to some extent, to the notion of the urban shopping mall.

Orchard Road's continued relevance to the hearts and minds of Singaporeans lies precisely in its ability to morph into new, constructed authenticities — and in its capacity and potential to provide the public space of the nation.

NOTES

1. A. Abraham, *Awestruck on Orchard Road*, 2003.

2. T. Vinh, "Coopetition," in C.J. Chung et al., eds., *Project on the City 2: Harvard Design School Guide to Shopping* (Taschen: Cambridge, 2001), p.208.

3. The term "ethnoscape" was coined by A. Appadurai in *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

4. Designed by Jon Jerde, 1992.

5. The Ku'damm was largely destroyed in World War II. Subsequently, however, many of its buildings rebuilt, and the framework of the street set up by Otto von Bismarck in 1875 is still discernable.

6. S. Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).

7. For example, the current proposal to redevelop of the open green space above the Orchard MRT station for commercial purposes will inevitably cause the displacement of the temporary Sunday enclaves of Filipinas. These women will have to find an alternative rendezvous spots when this is developed.

8. The provision of walkways was completed in two phases — in 1976 under the Public Works Department's "Walkway Program," and in 1989 under its "Ten Year Walkway Masterplan." The second program involved the aesthetization of Orchard Road with the installation of decorative street lamps, railings, seats, "pocket parks," and embedded brass motifs of tropical fruits (the "orchard").

9. Street closures continued on a monthly basis, but the practice of street parties fizzled out after a few years, its novelty apparently worn out.

10. Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*.

11. For example, that the display of workers in the shop windows of employment agencies is against the practices of a civil society.

12. The *Straits Times* is the main local English language paper. "Triangle Tribes" appeared in November 2003.

13. W. Gibson, *Wired* 1.4, (1994).

14. M. Hajer, *In Search of New Public Domain: Analysis and Strategy*, (Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2001), pp. 89–90.

15. The terms "Heartlanders" and "Cosmopolitans" were coined by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in one of his early National Day Rally Speeches to describe the bifurcations of Singapore society — one more home oriented, the other more globally oriented.

16. From Sylvia Toh Paik Choo, a well-known Singaporean columnist, November 2003.

17. M. Augé, *Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* (London, New York: Verso, 1995), pp.107–8.

18. From the *Newpaper*, December 9, 2003, "The mob that wasn't."

19. From the Internet blog of "Craig," an American expatriate living and working in Singapore.

20. From the Internet blog of "Dexter," 17, a skate fanatic.

21. From the *Electric New Paper*, January 2003.

22. Here, I use the terms disembedding and reembedding from A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

23. Adapted from the *Straits Times*, May 28, 1989.

24. The term was used by Marshall Berman in his paper "Signs of the Times," *Dissent* 44 (Fall 1997), pp.76–83.

25. I owe the credit for the use of some of the descriptive terms here, such as "retrogrades," "reminders," and "resilients," to L.B. Sagalyn's *Times Square Roulette* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp.457–62.

26. K.M. Tan, "Orchard Road: The Hyper 'Longkang' of Consumption," *Singapore Architect*, No.204 (1999), pp.94–99.

27. These and following comments are taken from Rem Koolhaas's article "Singapore Songlines: Portrait of a Potemkin Metropolis . . . of Thirty Years of Tabula Rasa," in R. Koolhaas and B. Mau, eds., *S, M, L, XL*, (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995).

28. L. Kong, L. Yeoh, and B.S.A. Yeoh, "Reconstructing the Nation," in *The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore: Constructions of "Nation"* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003), p.132.

29. For example, the Wisma Atria building sits on the site of the former Indonesian Embassy. The Ngee Ann City complex as well as Wisma Atria sit on land owned by Ngee Ann Kongsi, a Chinese clan, which owned the parcel of land previously known as Tai Shan Ting, a Chinese burial ground. The cemetery was cleared in 1957 and leased to the present Meritus Mandarin, Cathay Cineleisure Orchard, and the Indonesian government. See also http://www.ngeeann.com.sg/webtop/property.phtml.

30. J. Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, S.F. Glaser, trans. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).

31. H.W.C. Yeung and V. Savage, "The Singaporean Image of the Orchardscape," in B.S.A. Yeoh and L. Kong, eds., *Portraits of Places: History, Community and Identity in Singapore* (Singapore: Times Editions, 1995).

32. I refer to the current plans by the Singapore Tourist Board (STB), called "Make Orchard Road More Happening!"

33. Those who wield power to change the shape of Orchard Road include the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), the Singapore Tourist Board (STB), the Orchard Road Merchants' Association, the Land Transport Authority (LTA), among other government, quasi-government, and private-interest groups.

All illustrations are by the author.

Field Report

Tourist Commodification of Residential Vernacular Architecture in Venice: Livability and Conservation in an Historic District

ROBERT GOOD

Gentrification occurs when affluent residents displace existing lower-income groups, bringing a significant reinvestment in the built environment. This tie between architectural change and social continuity is managed in most historic cities through regulations that limit the scope of allowed building conservation to issues of material stability. However, this approach has had limited success in Venice, where housing quality is only one factor influencing access to housing by long-term residents. Another, more widespread phenomenon is investment in the housing market by vacationers. The resulting commodification of residential space in vernacular buildings has introduced architectural and contractual changes that threaten the historic qualities that support long-term resident livability.

Current practice in urban conservation is to tie the material preservation of historic cities to broader social and economic stability.[1] Such a link is of particular importance in districts comprised of vernacular dwellings that house long-term residents. In such contexts, conservation of residential structures should occur in conjunction with efforts to stabilize the local population.

A common problem in conservation districts is gentrification, because poorly managed preservation efforts may lead to the displacement of vulnerable segments of the population by more affluent residents. But conservation need not be synonymous with displacement if

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it is focused on basic issues of structural and material stability. An early and successful example of this approach was conducted by Cervellati and Scannavini in Bologna in the 1970s. Although it was criticized for generalizing the unique physical features of individual buildings through "typological restoration," its core approach, using vernacular housing conservation to stabilize an existing resident population, continues to be lauded as a model for preservation planning.[2]

The same housing strategies implemented in Bologna have been attempted in the historic center of Venice, but with only limited success. Unlike Bologna, which was largely free of tourism and outside development pressure at the time the conservation program was initiated, residential markets in Venice have been exposed to widespread speculation from outside tourist interests.[3] The increasing predominance of vacation properties and the growing amount tourists will pay for them have inflated residential prices well above what local wages will sustain.[4] Under such conditions, efforts to make conservation affordable may translate into only limited gains in terms of population stability. Even when conservation is made accessible through procedural clarity, grants, and tax incentives, heritage simply sells to the highest bidder. With tourists willing to pay several times the actual dollar cost of conservation activities to occupy space in restored buildings, other methods will be necessary to support access to housing by the local population.

These are severe issues that must be addressed by the municipal government. Long-term residents make an irreplaceable contribution to the well-being of an urban environment through their daily investment in its social, political and economic life. This effect is particularly important in historic cities, where patterns of daily life and development have long relied on relatively stable populations. While the physical structure of places rooted in tourist activity may accommodate the volatility and capriciousness of vacationers, cities like Venice are far less able to accommodate either intense short-term occupancy or long periods of abandonment during tourist off-seasons.

The loss of a stable resident population may have many consequences for an intricately constructed historic city like Venice. These may include declines in safety, economic and political stability, and the material quality of the residential fabric itself. Currently, a significant number of Venice's homes are either closed for a great portion of the year, or are subject to a rapid succession of short-term visitors. Such use patterns fail to provide adequate support for neighborhood grocery stores or other resident-oriented services. Instead, a monoculture of tourist-oriented shops has exacerbated the difficulty of living in the city.

These important issues were discussed at length in Appleyard's *The Conservation of European Cities*, and they have been more specifically addressed in relation to Venice by Paolo Ceccarelli.[5] In general, they form a basis for the field of Urban Conservation, whose concerns are not exclusively architectural, but have equally to do with the socioeconomic vitality of historic urban communities.

This report contributes to this discussion by explaining how tourist commodification may create a structural problem in the architectural and contractual organization of housing itself. Its first section seeks to explain the decline in Venice's long-term residential population in relation to changes in both household size and housing capacity. Its second section discusses resulting patterns of housing underutilization and how they are being addressed though government- and non-profit-sponsored conservation programs. In its third section it explores patterns of housing overutilization, and explains how the commodification of residential space for vacation use has changed both the size and contractual disposition of dwelling units in the city. The conclusion addresses the impact of tourist commodification on resident livability, and discusses implications for public policy.

HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND HOUSING CAPACITY

Many authors have cited the drastic decline of Venice's resident population as a way to explain the dramatic social changes that have occurred in the city over the last half century.[6] The city's population is now only a third of what it was in 1951; while more than 174,800 people lived there just fifty years ago, today the city is home to less than 66,000.[7] There is little agreement as to the precise cause of this decline. A multifaceted problem, on the one hand it is linked to changes typical of historic city centers throughout Italy including industrialization, suburbanization, and modernized housing preferences. On the other hand, it derives from changes unique to Venice, such as its geographic location on a lagoon and the transformation of its economy over the past several centuries from mercantile exchange to tourism.

Venice's population decline is also linked to problems with employment, housing, and even social preference. Thus, even though a great number of people from the metropolitan region travel to the historic center each day to work, their jobs are unlikely to pay a sufficient wage to afford housing there. Even if these same workers would prefer to live in the historic center, it is another question whether they would choose to give up ready access to the mainland automobile culture.

Approaching the issue of population decline from the perspective of households and housing capacity limits discussion to a set of specific questions that can be answered in the scope of this report. What is the specific capacity of the city's housing stock to accommodate resident households, and how has this changed during the past fifty years? What is being done to improve the condition of vacant and underused housing through conservation? How have the economic changes caused by tourism limited the ability of conservation to improve the housing situation? What policies will be necessary to improve housing capacity and livability for residents in the future?

In relation to the city's total habitable housing stock, what immediately stands out is how the number of resident

households has declined far less steeply than the total resident population. In comparison to an absolute population decline of 62 percent since 1951, the number of households has dropped only 37 percent. The discrepancy would seem to signal a trend toward smaller family units, resulting in a greater distribution of population among available dwellings. Indeed, in 1951, the average household in Venice was composed of 4.9 members, while today the average household size is 2.0 persons.[8]

Such changes have been shaped both by general social attitudes and local issues directly related to housing occupancy. In social terms, decreased household size reflects a changing expectation for space in Italian cities, a growing standard of living, an aging population, and the propensity for childless or single-child families.[9] However, the effect of these larger trends has been compounded in Venice by a general limitation on housing supply. Indeed, at the time Venice's population began to decline in the early 1950s, the number of its resident households actually exceeded the number of dwelling units in the city. As a result of such initial overcrowding, the early decades of population decline should actually be characterized as an outward migration from an overcrowded urban center.[10]

Some statistics may help clarify the changing nature of the city's population decline. In 1951 the coefficient of overcrowding was 1.34 persons per habitable room. But as residents left to seek less crowded conditions elsewhere, that ratio reached 1:1 in 1966.[11] However, by 1969 the motivation to escape an overcrowded city could no longer fully explain the continued exodus. In that year the index of overcrowding in Venice equaled that of other Italian cities (0.81:1) — clearly an important landmark.[12] Nevertheless, the downward demographic trend continued, and in 1984 the number of resident households had declined to where it was actually less than the number of habitable dwelling units.[13] At this point an official surplus of housing came into existence, and under normal circumstances this might have been expected to create a condition of falling prices, which would have encouraged the infiltration of new residents to the city (FIG.1.1). In actuality, the years since have not only seen a continued household and population decline, but a sustained shortage of housing access, accompanied by rising prices (FIG.1.2–1.3).

Two primary theories were presented to explain the conflicting trends behind Venice's continued loss of residents following 1984. Either the dwellings were habitable yet unavailable to residents because they were in active use for vacation accommodation, or they were vacant because their owners did not have the resources to maintain them in active use through conservation. During the early years of this trend, however, it was impossible to test these theories because analysis of demographic data provided the primary method for tracking changes in housing use. It was only possible to point out that the number of dwellings continued to exceed an ever-declining number of resident households.

However, by the early 1990s the presence of vacant vs. vacation homes began to be systematically quantified though analysis of utility use. This research involved gathering data on


Figure 1.1: Unadjusted

Figure 1.2: Adjusted for Vacant Dwellings

Figure 1.3: Adjusted for Non-Resident Dwelling Use

FIGURE 1.1–1.3. *Housing capacity charts. By author based on census data from* Il Censimento Generale Della Popolazione, E Delle Abitazioni, *ISTAT.*

the amount of gas, water and electricity consumed per household, and tracking whether those who were paying the bills were able to qualify for a reduced resident rate **(FIG.2)**. By 2000, this work revealed that 29.3 percent of utility use was associated with nonresident occupancy, including dwellings occupied intermittently and ones occupied steadily with a nonresident contract. By contrast, long-term residents steadily occupied 61.7 percent of the total housing stock. The remaining 9 percent of dwellings were presumed to be in need of conservation because they had inactive patterns of utility usage.[14]

In relation to Venice's capacity to support a stable resident population, the combined demographic and utility data led to some important discoveries. First, despite appearing to be a uniform demographic phenomenon, the overall decline in the city's population was shown to comprise two very distinct phases. The early decades of the decline relieved overcrowding and placed dwelling densities and household sizes in line with other historic centers in Italy. But since 1984, an apparent housing surplus has done little to slow or reverse a continued population decline because it has been absorbed into two extremes of use.

At one end of the use spectrum, residential properties have clearly been left vacant, a pattern of underutilization that remains linked to problems with building conservation. Indeed, only by addressing problems of structural instability and outdated utilities can such dwellings be returned to active use. However, at the other end of the use spectrum, the data clearly showed a pattern of housing overuse linked to tourist commodification. According to this pattern, the subdivision of dwelling space couples with the segmentation of access into weekly contracts to create an intensification of use that significantly raises the value of dwelling space for tourist occupancy. Such commodification of residential space creates further financial pressure within the entire housing market, based merely on the potential for greater profit by converting long-term resident units to tourist use. When unsupported

by increases in local wages, such upward pressure on housing prices has serious implications for resident livability.

CONSERVATION AND HOUSING UNDERUTILIZATION

As mentioned above, housing underutilization remains an important factor behind the continuing decline in Venice's resident population. Not only do uninhabited dwellings reduce the total number available for long-term residents, but units held off the market also create upward pressure on prices.

In this regard, two government-sponsored conservation programs have sought to stem further population decline. As mentioned above, dwellings in need of conservation were found to comprise about 9 percent of the city's housing stock. The programs further hope to avoid tourist-market pressures by focusing on units that are either unmarketable or have a limited marketability to nonresident groups. Financed under Italian Law 798/1984, these initiatives address two distinct segments of the "minor" housing stock.[15] One program focuses on social housing through the maintenance of publicly owned buildings; the other addresses privately owned ground-floor residential space.[16]

The conservation of dilapidated and underused government-owned residential buildings provides a direct way to make dwellings available to the most disadvantaged sectors of the city's population. For example, in partnership with the private foundation Venice in Peril and the British committee of UNESCO, the city has conserved a mostly abandoned seventeenth-century residence in Calle delle Beccarie. The project aimed to transform a structure that had previously provided only precarious shelter for a single household into four highly livable apartments **(FIG.3)**. It thus demonstrated how straightforward conservation can both return underused publicly owned buildings to habitation and provide affordable accommodation for low-income residents.[17]


FIGURE 2. *Utility use patterns. Table by author based on* Osservatorio: Quarto Rapporto *(Venice: Comune Di Venezia, June 1999).*

61.7%	**Resident**	Primary Dwellings	Continually occupied housing with resident utility contracts 23,390 (61.7%)
29.3%	**Non - resident use**	Time-share / Vacation Use	Continually occupied housing with non-resident utility contracts 4,810 (8.4%)
		Second Dwellings	Underutilized housing with non-resident utility contracts 3,800 (9.4%)
			Underutilized housing with resident utility contracts 4,610 (11.4%)
9%	**Vacant**	Vacant	Vacant housing with disactive utilities 3,640 (9%)

Source: *Osservatorio: Quarto Rapporto,* (Venice: Comune Di Venezia, June 1999)

Before   **After**

Plan

Section

FIGURE 3. *House in Calle delle Beccarie, before and after Restoration. Drawing by author from UNESCO working drawings.*

As a model, the house on Calle delle Beccarie presents an excellent linkage between livability and conservation goals. However, the potential of such projects is limited because only 4 percent of residential buildings in Venice are owned by a public entity.[18] The purchase of a similar structure on the open market would prove difficult because of the numerous owners involved. In the rare case of a single seller, the cost would surely be prohibitive due to exposure to the vacation market.

The second conservation program, however, is linked to a particular subset of dwellings still available on the open market — ground-floor units exposed to periodic flooding. In Venice such dwellings represent a unique conservation challenge because of the rising frequency of floods and their implications for health and comfort.

Historically, ground-floor space in Venice was not commonly used for habitation because of its high humidity and poor access to light and ventilation. Such space was used most often for storage, office, or retail activity. Nevertheless, ground-floor dwellings do remain as a byproduct of previous periods of overpopulation. Indeed, it has been estimated that there are more than four thousand such ground-floor units in the city, representing 11.5 percent of the total housing stock.

Such dwellings offer the additional benefit of remaining largely free of tourist investment, and 92 percent are currently occupied consistently. Unfortunately, these units are also characterized by a high degree of general degradation, and only 14.2 percent are equipped with the waterproof tub (*vasca*) needed to prevent inundation during unusually high tides (*acqua alta*).[19] To the extent that these issues can be resolved through conservation and upgrading, however, the program should have an important impact in terms of stemming the city's ongoing population decline.

Combined, the two government-sponsored programs described here could potentially affect the affordability and livability of 12–15 percent of the city's housing supply. Their estimated impact might correlate with a return of up to 3,700 residents and the improvement of housing conditions for approximately 4,000 existing resident households.

COMMODIFICATION AND HOUSING OVERUTILIZATION

Housing overuse related to tourist occupancy is the other problem identified as contributing to the continuing decline of Venice's resident population. The known percentage of dwellings used for time-share or vacation rental is only 8.4 percent of the current housing market. However, the impact of tourist use extends throughout of the remaining market because of informal spatial and contractual arrangements that create the potential for lucrative conversion of conventional resident dwellings.

Most residents and conservationists struggle with affordability indexes that are linked to local costs, wages, and income. In this context, the difference in price between a home in need of restoration and one that has been restored is roughly 1:1.7 on a citywide per-square-meter basis.[20] This 70 percent increase in price presents a significant economic hurdle for most long-term residents, and explains why many people believe conservation is the primary obstacle to affordability. It is, however, not the cost of the conservation work itself that drives up this price, but the value placed by tourists on conserved dwellings.

A study by the author of time-share housing for sale to tourists revealed the relatively small effect of conservation on housing prices (**FIG.4**). Using a preliminary survey of sale prices, unit plans, and unit areas, it showed that a time-share unit's total sale price per square meter exceeds the value of unrestored dwelling space by an average factor of 13.6.[21] A similar escalation on account of tourist demand is present in the rental market. While many apartments in the city exceed the locally affordable rent by a factor of 1.5 to 2.5, the study showed the rent a landlord may receive by marketing a unit to tourists may be much higher. Indeed, it is likely the majority of rentals will exceed local affordability indexes precisely because landlords know these same units rented on a weekly basis to tourists will bring rents that exceed affordability by a factor of thirteen.[22]

The significantly greater increase in the value of a unit due to tourist commodification is only partially based on the fact that vacationers have greater financial resources than those working in the local tourist economy. Such a direct relationship would really only apply in the case of second homes, which are bought and sold like any other homes and provide no built-in financial-leverage benefit.[23] What makes time-share housing and tourist rentals additionally valuable is that their occupancy may be structured to accommodate short-term use at higher cost — but with a greater perceived value to tourists. Thus, less affluent vacationers can collectively

For Sale	Euro/M²	Diff.	Housing Description	Sources
Non- Resident	**20,515**	**13.6**	**Time-share**	Price per week of ownership for a 36 square meter unit was quoted in person. 27 milioni x 52/ 36 = 39 milioni al mq.
Resident	2,582	**1.7**	"Restored"	Assessorato alle Politiche Abitative, *Osservatorio: Quarto Rapporto* (Venice: Comune di Venezia, June 1999)
	2,066	**1.3**	"Used"	"Ristrutturati" - 5 milioni al mq. "Usati" - 4 milioni al mq.
	1,498	—	"In need of Restoration"	"da Ristrutturare" - tra 2,8 e 3 milioni al mq.

For Rent	Euro/M/Mo.	Diff.	Housing Description	Sources
Non- Resident	**69.0**	**13**	**Combined Weekly Rental**	Price of 1597 Euro per week for 92.6 sq. M reflects average of www.barclayweb.com 1597 Euro/ 92.6 mq.x4 = 69 Euro/mq./mo
Resident	13.6	**2.5**	Central Zones	Osservatorio Casa, *Secondo Rapporto: Monitor E Approfondimenti Tematici* (Venice: Comune di Venezia, June 1999)
	9.1	**1.5**	Peripheral Zones	
	5.3	—	Affordable Rent	Giuseppe Santillo, *Politiche Abitative A Venezia Dall' Emergenza Al Social Housing* (Venice: Comune di Venezia, June 1999)

FIGURE 4. *Housing cost charts. By author based on sources noted.*

purchase a time-share right at a fraction of what it would cost to buy a flat outright. Similarly, rents that would be out of reach on a full-time basis are sustainable for a week or a month as a part of an annual vacation budget. This difference in perceived value and access between tourists and long-term residents is the primary factor behind the inflation of housing costs when units are converted to tourist occupancy.

The value of housing to a permanent resident typically combines the amount of space provided with the longevity of the contract available for access to it (FIG.5). In most markets, the housing space will be sufficient to accommodate a full range of resident needs, including cooking, bathing, sleeping, working, and entertaining guests. Payment for this space is usually made in monthly increments (either through a mortgage or according to a lease), and it is envisioned to

encapsulate durations of occupation measured in years and decades. In the case of a conventional residence, the layout of dwelling space will remain unaffected.

In the case of tourist use, however, the value of housing is more incremental in terms of time, and it can be more constrained in terms of space, introducing the opportunity for subdivision. Because of the short duration of stay, the needs of tourists for domestic space are more limited and flexible. Tourists still need spaces for sleeping and bathing, but places for cooking, working, and entertaining are less critical. Indeed, over a short duration it is often preferable to eat meals out of the dwelling, and there may be little need to entertain guests at all. The reduced priority of these spaces is reflected by the fact that in many tourist rentals kitchens become kitchenettes, and many living spaces become multi-use areas designed to convert into sleeping spaces at night.

The conversion of a residential unit in Venice's Dorsoduro neighborhood provides a good example of the implication of these forces over time. The unit was once a three-bedroom, two-bathroom residence similar to many units in the city. While the dwelling was somewhat unconventional in its typology, the principal architectural elements of a partial *sala passante* with the kitchen at the back, flanked by supporting rooms, were recognizable (FIG.6.1).[24] A decade ago, however, this original plan was subdivided into two smaller apartments for rental in the tourist market. The smaller of the two units can now accommodate up to four visitors at an average monthly rate of 45 Euro per square meter (FIG.6.3). The larger of the two units contains a full separate kitchen and living space; and although owner-occupied in the past, it too is now being rented to vacationers on the short-term market (FIG.6.2).

From the point of view of a long-term resident family, a subdivision such as this takes what might suffice as a primary residence and partitions it into two largely inadequate


FIGURE 5. *Housing subdivision diagram. Drawing by author.*

Figure 6.1: Original Dwelling

Figure 6.2: Larger Subdivision

Figure 6.3: Smaller Subivision

**FIGURE 6.1–6.3.** *Subdivided of dwelling* alle zattere. *Drawing by author from architectural plans.*

FIGURE 7. *Three phases of spatial subdivision. Drawing by author.*

units (**FIG.7**). This process in some cases is taken beyond the point of informal subdivision, to the formalized sale of the units as two separate condominiums.

The full extent of such informal subdivision is difficult to track from a public-policy perspective. And while most such activity is illegal, it is hard to prohibit since it is largely undetectable from the public realm. But the government has contributed to the permanence of such activity by pardoning it once it takes place. This would explain how, without additional construction, the number of residential units in the city has grown by more than 4,000, while the average unit size has decreased.[25] In 1951 the average dwelling had 4.2 rooms; today the average number of rooms per dwelling is 3.6.[26]

There are two great benefits from such subdivision activity: greater profit for the dwelling owners, and increased value and flexibility for tourists. As can be seen in the case of the subdivided spaces in the Dorsoduro dwelling, vacationers find they can economize on the amount of space they rent by using common areas as secondary sleeping spaces. Thus, while each of the apartments could potentially accommodate only one to two resident adults, as tourist flats they can accommodate up to four. Furthermore, because the smaller units are usable by a greater number of people, they yield greater rental profit for their owners. Smaller units are actually also more profitable than larger ones, as dwellings of less than 60 square meters exceed larger vacation homes in price on a per-meter basis by a factor of 1.5. Indeed, the most profitable units marketed for tourist rental on the three major websites included in this study had an average area of 51.5 square meters, while the least profitable averaged 120 square meters.[27]

Declining overall dwelling-unit size has significant negative implications for resident livability. It is also problematic from a population-stabilization perspective because it discourages residence by growing families with children. A study of first-time homebuyers participating in a housing subsidy program conducted by the Municipality of Venice has revealed

some of these problems. It showed that additional funds were helpful when it came to finding a home that was in a better state of conservation than the housing the buyers left. But the program was less able to provide assistance when it came to finding accommodation of comparable size. The largest group of buyers moved from dwellings of between 75 and 100 square meters to ones of 50 to 75 square meters, and the most frequently voiced complaint was the need for more space.[28]

Subdivision of dwellings is also not the only way that tourist occupancy affects housing options. While economic segmentation may increase convenience of access to housing for tourists, it makes access more difficult for long-term residents (FIG.8). Such economic segmentation may take place in a wide variety of dwelling types and sizes, and generally involves rapid turnover in occupancy by a series of short-term users. Such a pattern of occupancy is perfect for tourists, who may be glad to purchase or rent housing at inflated prices by the week. But long-term residents can generally only pay for housing on a monthly basis, at prices that must be sustainable for years, or even decades.

Evidence of this shift is most clearly demonstrated in a tourist flat at S. Francesco del Giglio. This 36-sq.m. time-share flat is part of a larger time-share community located in a cluster of "minor" dwellings behind Palazzo del Giglio. In its current configuration, the condo is much too small to accommodate more than a single person or a couple in stable residence (FIG.9). However, this same space may be used by up to four people for weekly periods. By adding up the weekly time-share sales prices for an entire year (approximately 14,000 Euro per share) one arrives at a total value for the property of 738,500 Euro. This equates to a total purchase price per square meter of nearly 20,515 Euro. This price is more than thirteen times greater than the cost of other homes in the city.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESIDENT LIVABILITY

This examination of resident livability in the historic city of Venice is rooted in a study of the capacity and compatibility of vernacular housing to accommodate continued long-term dwelling patterns. From this perspective, the social problems conventionally associated with population decline can be understood as involving a basic incompatibility between the structure of long-term resident households and the impact of unregulated change within the city's housing markets. It is this evolving crisis that has caused the number of Venetian residents to continue to decline, despite the technical existence of a housing surplus since 1984.

Efforts to reverse this trend today remain focused on issues of affordable conservation, without establishing needed limits to the further expansion of tourist occupancy within the broader housing market. This approach has provided some important improvements by increasing the number of dwelling units available to low-income residents, and by improving the conditions of some dwelling units occupied by long-term residents. However, the potential overall impact of these conservation initiatives is limited because this work affects only the small percentage of housing that is unmarketable (publicly owned), or that has limited marketability to tourists (ground-floor dwellings). Furthermore, there is little sense in expanding conservation strategies to cover a greater portion of the city's marketable housing because of the inflationary effect of tourist occupancy.

When subject to tourist commodification, the escalation of housing prices far beyond actual conservation costs involves structural changes to the housing itself. These may generally be described as taking two forms: a reduction in dwelling unit sizes, and a shortening of periods of occupancy. The resulting intensification of housing use has effectively removed much of the city's dwelling space from the market available to meet the needs of long-term residents. The accompanying tables provide a tool that economists, conservationists, and policy-makers can use to understand how tourism forces may modify housing in both informal and official ways that ultimately limit long-term resident access (FIG.10).

Such trends are difficult to counter. No matter how rigorous the inspection mechanism, the informal market through which much of this housing is produced and marketed remains difficult to monitor and control. However, preventing these properties from obtaining formal legitimacy does hold the door open for a program of future buyouts. Once a home is subdivided, a buyout requires the purchase of two properties from two owners to reconsolidate the pieces into a single dwelling. Time-share conversion is even

FIGURE 10. *Table of combined spatial and economic factors. Drawing by author.*

more difficult to reverse, because a single dwelling might have to be repurchased from 52 co-owners.

It will ultimately be up to municipal governments in tourist centers like Venice to evaluate if enough political will exists to restrict tourist-oriented conversions so that long-term residents can compete for housing on a level playing field with tourists. There certainly is value to encouraging long-term residents to remain in Venice. This value is supported by the ever-increasing number of people who now commute into the historic center to work, and by the existing political will evident in the program to subsidize first-time homebuyers.

But subsidies alone cannot address all the housing imbalances created by the tourist industry. Access to housing for vacation use should be monitored more intensively, and greater disincentives for permanent subdivision should be explored. Such policies should further be targeted toward curbing the conversion of large, historically habitable resident dwellings to time-share and mini-apartment units. However, any formal program must also recognize the limited ability to stop informal subdivision and subletting unless effective monitoring is perceived as part of the common good.

NOTES AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

1. A. Orbasli, *Tourists in Historic Towns: Urban Conservation and Heritage Management* (London: Spon Press, 2000), p.8.
2. For a review of the restoration efforts in Bologna, see G. Gianighian, "Venice, Italy," in *Management of Historic Centres* (London: Spon Press, 2001), p.167. For a summary of the work in Bologna, see P.L. Cervellati and R. Scannavini, *Bologna: Politica e Metodologia del Restauro nei Centri Storici* (Bologna: Soc. Ed. Il Mulino, 1973).
3. See D. Appleyard, *The Conservation of European Cities* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979).
4. Author research established that the cost of occupying time-share dwellings in the city reached eight times the average cost of occupying restored homes, as published in a local newspaper. For a detailed discussion of housing prices, see Assessorato alle Politiche Abitative, *Osservatorio Quarto Rapporto* (Venice: Comune di Venezia, 1999).
5. Appleyard, *Conservation of European Cities*; and Orbasli, *Tourists in Historic Towns*.
6. Examples of authors who cite population decline as evidence for reduced livability

include M. Rinaldo, "Italy: The Other Venice," in UNESCO, ed., *The Conservation of Cities* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975); and M. Folin, "La Casa A Venezia," *Urbanistica: Rivisto dell'Istituto Nazionale di Urbanistica*, March 1990.

7. SISTEMA, ed., *La Famiglia Veneziana: Cambiamenti e Mobilità Residenziale* (Venice: Comune di Venezia, 1997).

8. Ibid.

9. ISTAT, *I Grandi Comuni* (Rome: ISTAT, 1995); and Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *IX Censimento Generale Della Popolazione* (Rome: Soc. Abete, 1954).

10. Osservatorio Economico, *Il Patrimonio Edilizio di Venezia Insulare* (Venezia: Osservatorio Economico, 1970).

11. Ibid.

12. J. Gaitanakis, "Housing Study," *Architectural Review*, May 1971; and *Il Patrimonio Edilizio di Venezia Insulare*.

13. *I Grandi Comuni*; and *IX Censimento Generale Della Popolazione*.

14. *Osservatorio Quarto Rapporto*.

15. The term "minor" refers to the stock of common dwellings that occupies the majority of the city. See E. Trincanato, *Venezia Minore* (Venice: Filippi Editore, 1948).

16. Gianighian, "Venice, Italy," pp.162–86.

17. For more information on this project, see conference proceedings of "The Other Ninety Per Cent: Residential Vernacular Architecture in Venice," May 17, 2002.

18. From a May 2001 meeting with Prof. Giorgio Gianighian. Of the current 13,197 buildings in Venice, only 520 are owned by public entities, of which 328 are owned by the local municipality.

19. Osservatorio Casa, *Le Condizioni Abitative Nei Piani Terra Del Centro Storico e La Propensione Al Risanamento* (Venice: Comune di Venezia, 1997).

20. G. Santillo, *Politiche Abitative A Venezia Dall' Emergenza al Social Housing* (Venice: Comune di Venezia, 1999).

21. *Osservatorio Quarto Rapporto*.

22. Appleyard, *Conservation of European Cities*; and Santillo, *Emergenza al Social Housing*.

23. *Osservatorio Quarto Rapporto*.

24. For a discussion of the housing typology of Venice, see Trincanato, *Venezia Minore*; and P. Maretto, *La Casa Veneziana Nella Storia Della Città* (Venice: Marsilio Editori, 1986).

25. Gianighian, "Venice, Italy," pp.162–86.

26. SISTEMA, ed., *La Famiglia Veneziana*.

27. Calculations from author research of prices and unit sizes posted between March 2000 and March 2002 on three websites: www.barclayweb.com; www.rentavilla.com; and www.venice-rentals.com.

28. Osservatorio Casa, *I Contributi Per L'Acquisto Della Prima Casa Finanziati Dalla Legge Speciale* (Venice: Comune di Venezia, 1997).

Book Reviews

Werner Hegemann and the Search for Universal Urbanism. Christiane Crasemann Collins. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005.

In one of this book's more prescient moments, Christiane Crasemann Collins discusses Werner Hegemann's argument that a government is obligated to devote resources to urban development and welfare rather than to waging war abroad. In a career that included exile to the U.S. under two militarist German regimes, Hegemann argued against the human and financial waste incurred by warfare, and instead linked pacifism to city planning. Collins refers repeatedly to his belief that, "The whole world could become engaged in internal improvements and urban rivalry to such an extent that, during the time required for carrying out civic plans, international peace would rule and even become a permanent guest upon our planet."

Hegemann (1881–1936) was an important urban critic and scholar who stands out in early urban planning because he actively participated in its growth on both sides of the Atlantic. By providing this first true study of his career, Collins, a historian of architecture and city planning best known for her work on Camillo Sitte, has increased our understanding of the diversity of urban and architectural criticism in the early twentieth century.

Interestingly, Hegemann was not an architect, but a prolific writer and editor of books, novels, and even short journalistic pieces that Collins likens to those of American muckraker Lincoln Steffens. Yet, while Hegemann is best known for his long tenure as editor of two prominent Berlin journals (*Wasmuths Monatshefte für Baukunste and Der Stadtbau*) — and his criticisms therein of European modernists — it is his connection to America that Collins emphasizes.

Collins devotes attention both to Hegemann's formative and later, final years working in the United States. Notable from his first visit was a 1913 cross-country journey that included stops in numerous medium-sized cities such as Syracuse, New York; Lima, Ohio; and Sacramento, California — before ending in Oakland, California. It was in this last destination that Hegemann crafted his first urban plan, the 1915 *Report on the City Plan for the Municipalities of Oakland & Berkeley,* which developed a regional vision of harbor development, open-space preservation, and lowrise housing. Collins uses the Oakland plan as the first example of Hegemann's lifelong attempt to reconcile scientific urban planning with the historic, cultural and aesthetic uniqueness of individual city regions.

The many diverse regional planning efforts of the early twentieth century remain inadequately studied, and in her discussions of Hegemann's work Collins brings some of these to light. Hegemann was a frequent advocate of such efforts. His first real exposure to city planning was the Berlin 1910 Universal Planning exhibition, which focused on plans for the entire Berlin region. His influence continued through the 1915 Greater Boston plans led by Edward Filene, his own Oakland-Berkeley plans, and the later Greater Berlin and Düsseldorf-Ruhr regional plans.

More than anything, however, Collins argues for Hegemann's interest in housing as the critical element in city planning. It was this conviction that led to his early criticisms of the City Beautiful movement in America. It led to an early interest in exploring and photographing the housing slums around South American cities. *Der Steinerne Berlin* (The Stones of Berlin), perhaps his best-known work, was subtitled the "History of the Greatest City of Rental Barracks in the World." This was followed by a multivolume history of housing that he worked on up to his sudden death in 1936.

Throughout his career, Hegemann argued for lowrise decentralized housing. This was perhaps best exemplified by his collaboration with Elbert Peets during his World War I exile in the United States, when the two developed several garden suburbs between 1916 and 1919. It was this collaboration that resulted in Hegemann's first significant book, *American Vitruvius: An Architect's Handbook of Civic Art*, later praised strongly by New Urbanists such as Andres Duany. Their garden suburb of Wyomissing Park was also notable because Hegemann hired a young architecture school graduate, Joseph Hudnut, to help with its design.

Indeed, almost all the notable urban planners and architects, American or European, of the mid-twentieth century make an appearance in this book as they cross paths with Hegemann, a testament to his influence at the time. Collins particularly discusses Hegemann's clashes with European modernists, particularly the members of the German Ring. As Collins argues, much of this conflict can be explained by Hegemann's appreciation of history, his rejection of German hero worship (expressed in several novels), and his belief in the superiority of the urban fabric over set pieces of architecture.

But Collins is less clear when it comes to explaining Hegemann's alternating positive and then negative critical attitudes toward modernism and breakdowns in his personal relationships with modern architects. Most of this confusion results from the repetitiveness of the book, which seems to assume the reader has not read the previous chapter, or section, or even, occasionally, the previous page. Furthermore, the book is so driven by a summation of Hegemann's archival material and written work that all sense of context and larger debate is sometimes lost. The book, in the end, seems to stand on only a few repeated Hegemann quotations.

According to Collins, the obscurity that followed Hegemann's death resulted from his criticisms of high modernism. It also had to do with the intellectual compartmentalizing of people by history, in which Hegemann is hard to place.

While her book fails to substantially deepen our understanding of prewar modernism, it does manage to bring Hegemann, and potentially other alternative urban thinkers, out of that obscurity. ∎

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Hopi Oral Tradition and the Archaeology of Identity. Wesley Bernardini. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005. 220 pp., 42 illus.

A primary message of the one-year-old National Museum of the American Indian is, "We are still here." Despite five hundred years of struggles for survival, American Indians are still here, including the Hopi who have inhabited four mesas in northwestern Arizona since before the Spanish first came to the area in the early 1500s.

Four of the twelve pueblos that Hopis dwell in today were founded as early as the 1300s. Yet Hopi oral traditions and archaeological evidence also indicate that people migrated to the Hopi mesas from elsewhere. The Hopi people also claim a much larger area as their ancestral homeland. In *Hopi Oral Tradition and the Archaeology of Identity*, Wesley Bernardini proposes a new method for combining Hopi traditional knowledge with archaeological evidence to understand Hopi migration and identity so as to help determine where the Hopi came from and which ancient archaeological sites were inhabited by their ancestors.

Why is it important to know about Hopi migration and identity? Although Hopi culture has fascinated scholars of the American Southwest for more than a century, there is now a pressing new application for anthropological work. In 1990 the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) was enacted, requiring that federally funded institutions establish the cultural affiliation of archaeological remains in their collections as a first step toward their repatriation. In many cases it has been quite challenging to determine which contemporary tribal group is heir to human remains and artifacts from people who lived centuries and sometimes millennia before we have any written records in North America. Complicating the issue is the fact that ancient people did not stay put; they moved around the landscape.

Using published sources of Hopi traditional knowledge, Bernardini develops a model of Hopi migration in this book that he then tests using archaeological data. Hopis conceive identity in terms of clan affiliation, and their traditional knowledge about migration focuses on specific clans and their unique histories of migration. Typically, a Hopi clan might depart a particular village that it had occupied together with other clans, migrate, and join with different clans in another village. Later, that clan might again depart and

repeat the process, moving not in a straight line, but spiraling in toward the four mesas presently occupied by the Hopi.

Because each clan had a unique sequence of serial migrations, each clan had a unique historically based identity. Hopi identity therefore was linked to clans rather than larger social groups. Among other things, this meant that spatial proximity did not guarantee a shared social identity.

From this appreciation of Hopi traditional knowledge, Bernardini hypothesizes that archaeological data from villages inhabited by migrating ancestral Hopi would contain evidence that they were occupied for only a short time, and by groups of people from different cultural backgrounds.

Hopi traditional knowledge identifies Homol'ovi and Anderson Mesa as staging areas for migrating clans hoping to gain entrance into a Hopi village. Bernardini examined three types of archaeological data from eight villages in Homol'ovi and Anderson Mesa: architectural variability, rock-art symbolism, and the chemical composition of pottery.

When Bernardini examined rock art, he found clusters of particular clan symbols in each village. He interprets this to mean that the village was made up of heterogeneous groups of people who migrated to that village independently of other clans.

Bernardini next analyzed chemical signatures of Jeddito Yellow Ware pottery found within these eight villages to determine the source of the clay. He found that the pottery was from particular villages on the Hopi mesas. He therefore infers that clans from Homol'ovi and Anderson Mesa villages were trading partners with specific clans at Hopi villages, and that those were the villages that the clans would most likely migrate to in the future.

Of most interest perhaps to *TDSR* readers will be the section on architectural variability of Homol'ovi, Anderson Mesa, and Hopi villages. Bernardini points out that architectural layout, construction timing, construction materials and methods, and room size all varied in these places. For example, three contemporaneous, intervisible Anderson Mesa sites included such diverse forms as a compact, rectilinear, 200-room pueblo enclosing small plaza; a rectilinear, multistory, four-hundred-room pueblo enclosing a very large plaza; and an informal, concentric agglomeration of 95 rooms. These same three villages also contained different forms of public architecture: a large, roofed structure with walls on only three sides; a rectangular great kiva; and a rectangular space without kiva features.

Construction materials and techniques likewise varied, and in some cases stone masonry and coursed adobe were used in different parts of the same structure. Lastly, room size, argued to be a result of the builder's "proxemic system" (the proper spatial relations between people and the built environment) varied among nearby villages at Homol'ovi. Bernardini eventually argues that the variability in architecture suggests the independent arrival of various migrating clans who temporarily shared villages before moving on.

Hopi Oral Tradition and the Archaeology of Identity is the product of a research project that is enormously ambitious in the breadth of data it considers. But it is also notable because Bernardini makes a significant contribution in his pioneering use of Hopi traditional knowledge as a framework with which to interpret archaeological data.

In this case, archaeological data on architecture, rock art, and ceramics supported his model of serial migrations. In his efforts to understand Hopi migration and identity, Bernardini finds that, "prehistoric identity resided in social groups, not geographic territories. Consequently, it is more appropriate to trace identity through time in many small groups rather than across space in a few large ones" (p.182).

The findings of this book have enormous implications for the establishment of American Indian cultural affiliation and, in turn, ownership of artifacts — as well as rights to territory and natural resources. In addition, many of the issues raised in the book can be applied cross culturally, such as notions of migration, the use of oral history, and the potential lack of shared social identity of spatially proximate people.

Hopi Oral Tradition and the Archaeology of Identity suggests new ways of conceptualizing space and identity that are applicable across the globe. ∎

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Edifice Complex: Power, Myth, and Marcos State Architecture.
Gerard Lico. Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press,
2005. 179 pp.

From its beginning, this book about the relationship between power, state and architecture is dominated by its portrait of Imelda Marcos as a calculating and relentless architectural patron with a fanatical "edifice complex." The author, Gerard Lico, sets out to tell the story of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), conceived and built under her direction between 1966 and 1982. He ultimately contends this monumental complex was created by the Marcos regime as "an instrument of political propaganda and agent of social pacification" (p.158).

In the first two chapters Lico, an assistant professor at the University of the Philippines, situates the design and construction of the CCP within a larger frame of scholarship on the role of authoritarianism in architecture. His opening chapter provides a comprehensive literary review of the topic and establishes a theoretical groundwork for his later arguments. In the second chapter, he goes on to relate these theories power, space and authority to a socio-political history of the Philippines and to architecture's role as a tool of colonial oppression and marginalization.

In particular, Lico's historical account covers the Spanish and American colonial presence in the Philippines, the Japanese occupation during World War II, and the destruction left following the war. Lico then asserts that the years following World War II were also when the slate of Manila's architectural history had been wiped clean, and when the representation of the country's new political identity was most open to interpretation.

Chapters three and four (the body of the book) then provide a mini-biography of Imelda Marcos and how she chose to interpret this new identity. Lico paints a picture of an omnipotent patron obsessed with architecture as a means of promoting an "imagined" Philippine built identity and architectural history. Under her control, the CCP was created on a 28-hectare landfill in Manila Bay as a stage on which she directed pet architects to design her vision of a Filipino acropolis.

Lico's writing is engaging, and he frequently uses anecdotes to describe Marcos's maniacal building spree, undertaken at any cost, for the benefit of the national elite, and to impress foreign visitors. However, the grandiose cultural

buildings only disguised underused and unneeded spaces. And Lico further argues they were neither modern nor reflective of any recognized local style. Rather, they were created out of indigenous building materials and forms, at Imelda Marcos insistence, to create an imaginary nostalgia for a postcolonial Filipino architectural history and identity that did not exist.

In the final two chapters Lico situates this narrative of autocratic power within his original thesis. In this case, he argues, a form of architectural propaganda was engineered through the reinvention of vernacular iconography and an appeal to the Filipino collective memory. In the end, however, the buildings served only to perpetuate the power that created them.

Lico's argument is convincing, if not slightly overstated. But his concluding chapters lack context and human presence. Indeed, it is only in the final pages that he briefly touches on how the inhabitants of Manila received the CCP's elitist spaces and managed to transform them into useful spaces within their own public realm.

It is curious that a book that focuses on nationalism and propaganda should contain so little mention of the Filipino people — only of the Marcoses, a handful of architects, and the construction workers who labored (and sometimes died) at the project site. Perhaps the author's intended audience is one with an extensive background in Filipino history and sociology; but by omitting this human story, Lico sterilizes his argument.

In particular, Lico provides only a cursory description of the urban poor who inhabited nearby slums, hidden behind a whitewashed wall, while the ostentatious, isolated and exclusionary spaces of the CCP were being constructed. Without an understanding of the specific struggles of Filipino people and the particular politics of their oppression, it is easy for arguments about power, state and architecture to become overly generalized. The building of state-financed monumental architecture was not a practice that, in and of itself, distinguished the Marcos regime. In order to prove that the CCP was "an agent of social pacification," and to emphasize how it was different from other political expressions of power in architecture, it would have been better to situate this discussion in relation to the reality of the (mis)governed and their day-to-day urban existence.

Lico has provided a valuable source and reference for architectural history in the Philippines between 1966 and 1982. And, although it was not his intended goal, he has also provided a case example of the power of architectural patronage. However, by slighting the urban and social context of Manila during construction of the CCP (and the history of the Filipino people in general), he has missed a chance to illustrate the primary reason why the construction of the complex provides such a chilling example of the power of politics and architecture: the consequences of such a project on the people it is supposed to represent. ∎

Shannon E. Brown
University of California, Berkeley

Conferences and Events

UPCOMING CONFERENCES AND SYMPOSIA

"Vernacular Architecture in the 21st Century: Theory, Education, and Practice," Oxford, United Kingdom: December 12, 2005. This conference is focused on the major social and cultural implications of contemporary global transformations — population growth, natural disasters, resource depletion, and technological development — as they relate to vernacular traditions. For more information, visit http://www.brookes.ac.uk/schools/be/planning/shortcourses/media/vernacular_architecture_web2.pdf.

"Fourth Annual Hawaii International Conference on Arts and Humanities," Honolulu, Hawaii: January 11–14, 2006. This multidisciplinary conference will provide many opportunities for academicians and professionals from fields in the arts and humanities to interact with members inside and outside their own particular disciplines, and will include performances in a range of arts, including live dance, theater and music.   For more information, visit http://hichumanities.org/.

"Shaping Sustainable Work Communities and Humane Work Places," Mumbai, India: January 27–29, 2006. The Eighth International Conference on Humane Habitat is organized by the International Association for Humane Habitat in collaboration with the Mumbai Centre of the Indian Institute of Architects; Forum of Colleges of Architecture, Mumbai Region; Maharashtra Association of Schools of Architecture, Indian Association of Schools of Architecture and the Commonwealth Association of Architects. Interested educators, researchers, architects, planners, engineers, social scientists, environmentalists, policy-makers, administrators, developers, managers, corporate associations, nongovernmental organizations, concerned citizens and students interested in shaping sustainable and humane work places are invited to attend. For more information, visit http://humanehabitat.org/.

"ARCHCAIRO 2006: Appropriating Architecture, Taming Urbanism in the Decades of Transformation," Cairo, Egypt: February 21–23, 2006. The Third International Conference of the Department of Architecture at Cairo will address the appropriate of architecture for existing and new settings, architectural theory, environmental systems, building technology, community and urban design, and planning management in the planning and building of developing communities. For more information, visit http://www. archcairo.org/.

"Navigating the Globalization of the American South," Chapel Hill, North Carolina: March 2–3, 2006. The Center for International Studies at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, in collaboration with The Center for the Study of the American South, is hosting an interdisciplinary conference to explore the broad impact of globalization on the changing Southern United States from a wide range of academic, business, economic, artistic, social and political perspectives. For more information, visit http://www.ucis.unc.edu/globalsouth/conference06/index.htm.

"Rethinking Local Knowledge in Vernacular Settlements: Anchoring the Concept of Place in the Post-Disaster and Post-Global World," Surabaya, Indonesia: March 2–4, 2006. The Third International Seminar on Vernacular Settlement is about critical views, theories and investigation upon the dynamic of the people's concept of place in the vernacular architecture. The seminar is highly multidisciplinary in nature. Similar to the past International Seminar on Vernacular Settlement, scholars, academicians and practitioners from architecture, architectural history, anthropology, art history, archeology, cultural studies, planning, sociology, urban studies, and related areas are invited to participate. For more information, visit http://architecture.petra.ac.id/ISVS3-06/index.htm.

"Imagine — Impacts2," Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia: April 2–5, 2006. The 2006 joint Congress of the New Zealand Planning Institute and the Planning Institute of Australia wishes to extend the theme of the first successful joint Congress, "Impacts," to another level, challenging the profession to imagine the possibilities in terms of innovative new approaches to urban design, sustainability, community, integration and implementation; and our relationship to the Pacific and beyond. For more information, visit http://www.astmanagement.com.au/nzpia6/Default.htm.

"Harmony in Culture and Nature," Jogjakarta, Indonesia: April 3–5, 2006. The Second Conference of the International Network for Tropical Architecture is expected to provide an important forum to learn together, and share information for the architects, researchers, lecturers, and students from the tropical region and other countries around the world. For more information, visit http://www.into2006.org/.

"From World Heritage to Your Heritage," Newport, Rhode Island: April 19–23, 2006. The Ninth Annual US/ICOMOS International Seminar is focused on the protection and management of heritage sites with a particular focus on World Heritage cities. For more information, visit http://www.icomos.org/usicomos/Symposium/SYMP06/2006_Symposium.htm.

"City Building," New York, New York: June 14–17, 2006. The 2006 Annual Meeting of the Vernacular Architecture Forum will focus on any aspect of vernacular architecture and the cultural landscape from any geographic region worldwide that relates to the conference theme. Potential topics include vernacular architectures of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; speculative development in urban places; place making, and more. Fore more information, visit http://www.vernaculararchitectureforum.org/.

"The Sustainable City 2006," Tallinn, Estonia: July 17–19, 2006. The Fourth International Conference on Urban Regeneration and Sustainability will address the many interrelated aspects of the urban environment, from transport and mobility to social exclusion and crime prevention. For more information, visit http://www.wessex.ac.uk/conferences/2006/city06/.

RECENT CONFERENCES AND SYMPOSIA

"European Cities Open up to the World," Lyon, France: November 19–22, 2005. The EUROCITIES Conference and Annual General Meeting 2005 is focused on the increasing prominence of cities and local governments in international relations, focusing particularly on the role of European cities in the activities of the European Union. For more information, visit http://www.eurocities2005.lyon.fr/.

"MESA 2005 Conference," Washington, D.C.: November 19–22, 2005. The Annual Conference of the Middle Eastern Studies Association featured panels and special sessions on a variety of topics related to Middle East studies, complemented by meetings of MESA's affiliated groups, an exciting four-day film festival, a comprehensive book exhibit featuring the latest books and software in the field, and other informal events. For more information, visit http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/MESA05/mesa05.htm.

"Affirming Human Values in a Time of Terror," Puebla, Mexico: October 26–29, 2005. The International Congress for Vernacular, Hispanic, Historical, American and Folklore Studies attracted scholars from a wide variety of disciplines to address a range of themes, including race, ethnicity, and gender; dependency theory; travel and tourism; and borders, boundaries, and visual culture. For more information, visit http://www.ipsonet.org/vernacular/2005/.

"Tradition and Modernity in Urban Form," London, United Kingdom: August 25–27, 2005. This forum, held by the International Seminar on Urban Form, explored the fruitful intersections between the interest, ideas, and expertise of members of ISUF and the International Network of Traditional Building, Architecture, and Urbanism. For more information, visit http://urbanform.org/.

"Environmental Justice and Global Citizenship," Oxford, United Kingdom: July 5–7, 2005. This interdisciplinary conference, hosted by Mansfield College, explored the role of ecology and environmental ideas in the context of contemporary society and international politics, and assess the implications for our understandings of fairness, justice and global citizenship. In particular, conference attendees explicitly explored the relationships between environments, sustainability and technology, the role of technology in creating possibilities for sustainable resources for the future, and the inherent problems and dangers which accompany that role. For more information, visit http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ejgc.htm.

CALL FOR ARTICLES/PAPERS FOR PUBLICATION

"Making Space: Leisure, Tourism, and Renewal." Call for papers for the 2006 Conference of the Leisure Studies Association to be held in Bristol, England, from July 11–13, 2006. Submissions should focus on the relationships between leisure, tourism and the environment; the ways in which leisure and tourism, in addition to being social and cultural practices, play a role in creating and re-creating social and cultural spaces from the macro level of global culture to the micro level of local communities; the changing role of leisure, sport and tourism in promoting economic development related to urban and rural regeneration; and/or critical evaluation of theoretical, methodological and pedagogical developments within the subject field of leisure studies. Prospective authors may find guidelines for submission at http://www.leisure-studies-association.info/LSAWEB/2006/Main.html. **Deadline for articles is January 10, 2006.**

"Constituting Globalization: Actors, Arenas, and Outcomes." Call for papers for the Eighteenth Annual Meeting on Socioeconomics to be held in Trier, Germany, from June 30–July 2, 2006. Contrary to views that globalization constitutes an unstoppable force, immune to intervention, this conference foregrounds a focus on the role of actors in both the creation and further shaping of the globalization process. Actors, such as MNCs, states, international institutions, nongovernmental and interest organizations, as well as social movements are seen to influence the dynamics and direction of this process in many arenas and at multiple levels. Participants will address crucial interventions by collective actors in developed and developing societies and the often complex and contradictory economic, social and political effects on various constituencies, such as vulnerable countries, regions, industries, or social groups. Submissions from a variety of disciplines are welcomed. Prospective authors may find guidelines for submission at http://www.sase.org/conf2006/callforpapers/callforpapers.html. **Deadline for articles is January 15, 2006.**

"Environmental Architectures and Sustainability." Call for articles an upcoming issue of the Journal of Architectural Education. This issue will provide a forum to discuss sustainability as a social and historical phenomenon. Contributors to this expanding planetary discourse include ecologically minded cutting edge architects, critics and scholars; enlightened federal bureaucrats and developers; community designers and design-builders; prefabricators and mass-customizers; and theorists of place cognizant of the relationship between locale and sustenance. Interdisciplinary thinkers in the fields of ecology, energy, landscape urbanism, cultural history, social equity, and technology also make valuable contributions. In addition to authors from these fields, we welcome contributions by, or about, the modern pioneers of sustainable design. Submissions in the form of scholarly papers, case studies, and design projects are encouraged. Prospective authors may find guidelines for submission at http://www.jaeonline.ws/sustain.html. **Deadline for articles is August 1, 2006.**

ประเพณี HYPERTRADITIONS เหนือจริง

IASTE 2006   DECEMBER 15–18, 2006   THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY—BANGKOK, THAILAND

For scholars and researchers interested in the study of traditional environments, the far-reaching transformations brought by globalization require not only a recalibration of the idea of tradition but also a substantial repositioning within a shifting intellectual environment. While it is clear that contemporary forces of globalization have proven transformative, the transformations have largely defied prediction. Contrary to the expectations that globalization would act as a totalizing force, somehow erasing "tradition" and challenging "cultural coherence," investigations reveal that globalization may more accurately be said to have destabilized the idea of tradition as a repository of authentic ideas and customs. In this way, it has intensified the process of de-linking identity and place and, by extension, intensified the deterritorialization of tradition: a process that has challenged the idea of tradition as an authentic expression of a geographically specific, culturally homogenous and coherent group of people. However, this process is not entirely new. Prior moments of globalization, such as colonialism, have also brought about the deterritorialization of tradition and provide useful points of comparison to the present moment. Prior IASTE conferences have explored the effects of globalization upon understandings of space and place; inquired into the post-traditional condition; analyzed the implications of migration, diasporas, and emerging hybridities; and asked whether or nor the millennium marked the "end of tradition." For the 2006 International IASTE Conference, participants are invited to investigate a new dimension of the transformation of tradition: hyper-traditions.

We use the term "hyper" to refer to social and cultural realms, created and maintained through contemporary technologies of communication, transportation, and information transfer that have radically transformed notions of time and space, forever changing the meanings of distance and immediacy. Hyper-reality is just one of a repertoire of technologies that have altered time and space at different historical moments, including older technologies like world exhibitions. As one form of current time-space altering media, the hyper-real entails simulation: in this realm, the simulation is a map that precedes the territory to which it refers, a map that effectively creates the territory and becomes the reality itself. In this way, perhaps as a response to the perceived "end of tradition" or "loss of heritage" (seen by some as an inevitable by-product of globalization), hyper-traditions emerge in part as references to histories that did not happen, or practices de-linked from the cultures and locations from which they are assumed to have originated. To the degree that they indicate a search for or re-engagement with heritage conducted by those who perceive its loss, hyper-traditions raise fundamental questions about subjectivity in a globalized world. At the same time, many scholars have illustrated how these transformations of subjectivity offer radical and liberatory possibilities through emerging practices of mimesis, identity formation, and knowledge creation: How do these practices change our understanding of tradition?

There are countless contemporary examples of phenomena that can be seen as hyper-traditions: neotraditional towns whose history is invented by the developers who create them and embraced by their inhabitants; intensifying fundamentalisms that articulate a political agenda based on the perceived loss of heritage, customs, morality, and/or identity in a globalized world; the political struggles over sites of varying religious and historical significance; and the rise of global tourism and the desire of the hyper-tourist to see and experience the "traditions" of particular destinations without the inconveniences that actual exposure may require. Indeed, hyper-traditions cannot be separated from the apparatus and relations of political economy. They circulate through global networks and circuits of capital exchange and serve as mechanisms by which it is possible to encounter "traditions" from all over the world. Thus, hyper-traditions arise in response, and often in direct opposition, to globalization at the same time that their deployment and resonance depend upon the same advanced communication infrastructure and technology.

As in past IASTE conferences, scholars and practitioners from such fields as architecture, architectural history, art history, anthropology, archaeology, folklore, geography, history, planning, sociology, urban studies, and related areas are invited to submit papers that address one of the three main tracks.

TENTH CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF TRADITIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

From Simulated Space to "Real" Tradition

Contemporary communication networks have fueled the expansion of simulated spaces, which may not exist in the physical sense but are nonetheless real for those who access and occupy them. Is the uncharted realm of simulacra space used as the site for the re-imposition of "real" tradition or the invention of new traditions, or both? One example of this complex relationship appears in the film *The Truman Show*, whose premise, a fictitious "real-life" television show, influences our understanding of New Urbanist environments like Seaside, Florida, where the movie was filmed. Papers in this track will examine how simulated space is mapped and navigated, and how the idea of tradition can be transformed within and by the virtual realm.

Hyper-Traditions and "Real" Places

Hyper-reality has opened up new social and cultural realms, from which new hyper-traditions regularly emerge. To a certain extent, virtual representation has become a key instrument for the transmission of "real" tradition and the act of place-making. This is evident not simply with simulated spaces but also with physical spaces that simulate places embodying "real" traditions. How have the cultural norms and rules that govern the hyper-real been absorbed and brought back into "the real"? Papers in this track will examine the emergence of hyper-traditions: how they are shaped by the unique geography of the hyper-real, and how they give rise to new understandings of social life and/or influence the lived experience of "the real."

Identity, Heritage, and Migration

Migration is one of the most prominent factors in shifting cultural, economic, and political geographies throughout the world. Migration is a transformative force, not simply for migrants, but also for the places that have become the loci of migratory flows. From migration emerge new identities and cultural formations: hybrid identities and spaces, ethnic enclaves, etc. Yet these new hyper-formations are inextricably linked to the notion of heritage. What physical and cultural effects does the "hyper" have on representations of heritage? In many cases, the experience of migration also entails a perceived loss of identity, a struggle to preserve heritage, or the invention of a new heritage. Papers in this track will examine the complex relationships between identity, heritage, and migration.

CALL FOR ABSTRACTS

SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS

Interested colleagues are invited to submit a short, one-page abstract, not to exceed 500 words. Do not place your name on the abstract, but rather submit an attached one-page curriculum vitae with your address and name. All authors must submit an electronic copy of their abstract and short CV via e-mail. Abstracts and CVs must be placed within the body of the e-mail, and also as attachments.

E-mail this material to iaste@berkeley.edu no later than February 17, 2006.

Authors must specify their preference for one or two of the above tracks when submitting abstracts. Proposals for complete panels are welcome. All papers must be written and presented in English. Following a blind peer review, papers may be accepted for presentation in the conference and/or publication in the conference Working Paper Series.

Contributors whose abstracts are accepted must preregister for the conference, pay registration fees of $375 (which includes a special discounted $25 IASTE membership fee), and prepare a full-length paper of 20–25 double-spaced pages. Registered students may qualify for a reduced registration fee of $175 (which includes a special discounted $25 IASTE membership fee). All participants must be IASTE members. Please note that expenses associated with hotel accommodations, travel, and additional excursions are not covered by the registration fees and have to be paid directly to the designated travel agent. Registration fees cover the conference program, conference abstracts, and access to all conference activities including receptions, keynote panels, and a short tour of nearby sites.

CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

February 17, 2006	Deadline for receipt of abstracts and CVs
May 1, 2006	E-mail notification of accepted abstracts for Conference presentation
July 14, 2006	Deadline for pre-registration and receipt of papers for possible publication in the Working Paper Series
October 2, 2006	Notification for accepted papers for the Working Paper Series
December 15–18, 2006	Conference presentations

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CONFERENCE SITE

The conference will be held at the Montien Riverside Hotel in Bangkok. In order to obtain special conference room rates at the hotel, reservations, accompanied by full payment, will have to be made by September 15, 2006. Hotel and travel arrangements should be made directly with the designated travel agency.

OPTIONAL EXCURSIONS

A variety of one-day and two-day trips to nearby sites will be available to conference participants for an additional fee. Optional excursions will include trips to Ratanakosin Island, the northern region of Chiang Mai, and the island of Phuket. Arrangements for these excursions can also be made with the designated travel agency.

INQUIRIES

Please use the following information when making inquiries regarding the conference.

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Guide for Preparation of Manuscripts

1. GENERAL
    The editors invite readers to submit manuscripts. Please send three copies of each manuscript, with one copy to include all original illustrations. Place the title of the manuscript, the author's name and a 50-word biographical sketch on a separate cover page. The title only should appear again on the first page of text. Manuscripts are circulated for review without identifying the author. Manuscripts are evaluated by a blind peer-review process.

2. LENGTH AND FORMAT
    Manuscripts should not exceed 25 standard 8.5" x 11" [A4] double-spaced typewritten pages (about 7500 words). Leave generous margins.

3. APPROACH TO READER
    Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the journal, papers should be written for an academic audience that may have either a general or a specific interest in your topic. Papers should present a clear narrative structure. They should not be compendiums of field notes. Please define specialized or technical terminology where appropriate.

4. ABSTRACT AND INTRODUCTION
    Provide a one-paragraph abstract of no more than 100 words. This abstract should explain the content and structure of the paper and summarize its major findings. The abstract should be followed by a short introduction. The introduction will appear without a subheading at the beginning of the paper.

5. SUBHEADINGS
    Please divide the main body of the paper with a single progression of subheadings. There need be no more than four or five of these, but they should describe the paper's main sections and reinforce the reader's sense of progress through the text.
    Sample Progression: The Role of the Longhouse in Iban Culture. The Longhouse as a Building Form. Transformation of the Longhouse at the New Year. The Impact of Modern Technology. Conclusion: Endangered Form or Form in Transition?
    Do not use any numbering system in subheadings. Use secondary subheadings only when absolutely essential for format or clarity.

6. REFERENCES
    Do not use a general bibliography format. Use a system of numbered reference notes as indicated below.

    A condensed section of text might read as follows:
    In his study of vernacular dwellings in Egypt, Edgar Regis asserted that climate was a major factor in the shaping of roof forms. Henri Lacompte, on the other hand, has argued that in the case of Upper Egypt this deterministic view is irrelevant.[1]
    An eminent architectural historian once wrote, "The roof form in general is the most indicative feature of the housing styles of North Africa."[2] Clearly, however, the matter of how these forms have evolved is a complex subject. A thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.[3]
    In my research I discovered that local people have differing notions about the origins of the roof forms on the dwellings they inhabit.[4]

    The reference notes, collected at the end of the text (not at the bottom of each page), would read as follows:
    1. E. Regis, *Egyptian Dwellings* (Cairo: University Press, 1979), p.179; and H. Lacompte, "New Study Stirs Old Debate," *Smithsonian* 11 (December 1983), pp.24–34.
    2. B. Smithson, "Characteristic Roof Forms," in H. Jones, ed., *Architecture of North Africa* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p.123.
    3. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see J. Idris, *Roofs and Man* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
    4. In my interviews I found that the local people understood the full meaning of my question only when I used a more formal Egyptian word for "roof" than that in common usage.

7. DIAGRAMS, DRAWINGS AND PHOTOGRAPHS
    Illustrations will be essential for most papers in the journal, however, each paper can only be accompanied by a maximum of 20 illustrations. For purposes of reproduction, please provide images as line drawings (velox, actual size), b&w photos (5" x 7" or 8"x 10" glossies), or digitized computer files. Color prints and drawings, slides, and photocopies are not acceptable.

Digitized (scanned) artwork should be between 4.5 and 6.75 inches wide (let the length fall), and may be in any of the following file formats. Photos (in order of preference): 1) b&w grayscale (not rgb) TIFF files, 300 DPI; 2) b&w grayscale Photoshop files, 300 DPI; 3) b&w EPS files, 300 DPI. Line art, including charts and graphs (in order of preference): 1) b&w bitmap TIFF files, 1200 DPI; 2) b&w grayscale TIFF files, 600 DPI; 3) b&w bitmap EPS, 1200 DPI. Zip cartridges are the preferred media for digitized artwork.

8. CAPTIONS AND FIGURE PREFERENCES
Please mount all graphic material on separate 8.5" x 11" sheets, and include as a package at the end of the text. Caption text should not exceed 50 words per image and should appear on each image sheet. Please do not set caption text all in capital letters. The first time a point is made in the main body of text that directly relates to a piece of graphic material, please indicate so at the end of the appropriate sentence with a simple reference in the form of "**(FIG.1)**." Use the designation "**(FIG.)**" and a single numeric progression for all graphic material. Clearly indicate the appropriate fig. number on each illustration sheet.

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Most authors use their own graphic material, but if you have taken your material from another source, please secure the necessary permission to reuse it. Note the source of the material at the end of the caption.
Sample attribution: If the caption reads, "The layout of a traditional Islamic settlement," add a recognition in the following form: "(Courtesy of E. Hassan, *Islamic Architecture*, London, Penguin, 1982.)" Or if you have altered the original version, add: "(Drawing by author, based on E. Hassan, *Islamic Architecture*, London, Penguin, 1982.)"

10. OTHER ISSUES OF STYLE
In special circumstances, or in circumstancesnot described above, follow conventions outlined in *A Manual for Writers* by Kate Turabian. In particular, note conventions for complex or unusual reference notes. For spelling, refer to *Webster's Dictionary*.

11. WORKS FOR HIRE
If you have done your work as the result of direct employment or as the result of a grant, it is essential that you acknowledge this support at the end of your paper.
Sample acknowledgement: The initial research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the National Endowment for the Arts [NEA]. The author acknowledges NEA support and the support of the sabbatical reasearch program of the University of Waterloo.

12. SIMULTANEOUS SUBMISSION AND PREVIOUS PUBLICATION
Submission of a manuscript implies a commitment to publish in this journal. Simultaneous submission to other journals is unacceptable. Previously published work, or work which is substantially similar to previously published work, is ordinarily not acceptable. If in doubt about these requirements, contact the editors.

13. COMPUTER DISK
If you have prepared your paper using a word processor, include a floppy-disk version of it in addition to the printed versions. Please indicate the hardware and the software used. We prefer *Microsoft Word* on an IBM PC or a Macintosh.

14 NOTIFICATION
Contributors are usually notified within 15 weeks whether their manuscripts have been accepted. If changes are required, authors are furnished with comments from the editors and the peer-review board. The editors are responsible for all final decisions on editorial changes. The publisher reserves the right to copy-edit and proof all articles accepted for publication without prior consultation with contributing authors.

15. SUBMISSION AND CORRESPONDENCE
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TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

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