



TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF TRADITIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

POST-TRADITIONAL AMAZONIA

*Daniela M. Peluso and
Miguel N. Alexiades*

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THE IMAGE OF UTOPIA IN DUBAI

Ahmed Kanna

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
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Rubie S. Watson*

*Raymond J. Cole and
Richard Lorch*

*E. Charles Adams and
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Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review is the official publication of IASTE. As a semi-annual refereed journal, *TDSR* acts as a forum for the exchange of ideas and a means to disseminate information and report on research activities. All articles submitted to *TDSR* are evaluated through a blind peer-review process. *TDSR* has been funded by grants from the Graham Foundation, the Getty Publication Program, the National Endowment for the Arts, the Center for Environmental Design Research, and the office of the Provost at the University of California at Berkeley.

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IASTE
Center for Environmental Design Research
390 Wurster Hall
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1839
Tel: 510.642.2896 Fax: 510.643.5571 Voicemail: 510.642.6801
E-mail: IASTE@berkeley.edu

TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

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COVER ILLUSTRATION: Street paving in the quarter of al-Abhar, the first area to be paved under the Campaign to Save Old Sana'a. Photograph by Michele Lamprakos.

Editor's Note

I write this note a few months after the tremendous success of the Ninth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments, held in Sharjah/Dubai in December 2004. The conference, which dealt with the theme “Post-Traditional Environments in a Post-Global World” and was hosted by the American University of Sharjah, had the intention of sparking debate among scholars of the built environment on two significant but related issues. First is the failure of globalization to deliver on its promises of liberalization, and democratization and the consequent impacts of this failure on the built environment; second is the severing of the link between tradition and authenticity, and what this implies for the study of cultural traditions. The two terms that emerged from this discourse — “post-traditional” and “post-global” — have already gained wide acceptance, and many members of IASTE have attempted to theorize them in different ways using different case studies.

Several of the articles included in this issue of *TDSR* were a product of these debates. Indeed, earlier versions of three were presented as papers at the 2004 IASTE Conference, and two of these — by Daniela Peluso and Miguel Alexiades and by Michele Lamprakos — were also co-recipients of the Jeffrey Cook Best Paper Award in the field of Traditional Environments.

The issue starts with Peluso and Alexiades’s “Indigenous Urbanization and Amazonia’s Post-Traditional Environmental Economy,” which examines the making of a post-traditional environment through various processes among the Ese Eja, an indigenous Amazonian community living on the border between Peru and Bolivia. Among other things, the authors demonstrate how the Ese Eja’s “past” is being selectively reinvented in response to exacerbated processes of ecotourism and urbanization. Next, Lamprakos’s “Rethinking Cultural Heritage: Lessons from Sana’a, Yemen” researches the interplay between modernity and the conservation discourse, and demonstrates the rise of a unique approach to the critical reevaluation of heritage in the global “periphery.” The issue continues with Eunice Seng’s “Utopia or Euphoria? Six Sites of Resistance in Disneyland and Singapore.” Seng proposes a very interesting pairing between spaces that share specific utopian origins in two different contexts, and she shows how the practices of everyday life result in different totalizing outcomes. Ahmed Kanna’s “The State Philosophical in the Land Without Philosophy” also examines utopian visions — but in the context of the shopping malls and giant development schemes of Dubai, which 2004 conference attendees had a chance to explore. By investigating the relationship between literal and spatial discourses, the article demonstrates how politics may be aestheticized in the making of a nation. Finally, in our On Practice section, we include Muge Akkar’s “Questioning the ‘Publicness’ of Public Spaces in Postindustrial Cities.” Using an analysis of access, actor and interest, Akkar documents the blurring of private and public qualities in the recent construction of a new central bus terminal in Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom.

I would like to end by announcing that the IASTE board has selected Bangkok, Thailand, as the site of the 2006 IASTE Conference. The conference will be hosted by Thammasat University around the general theme “Hyper Tradition.” A specific call for papers will go out in the next couple of months. We hope you will all propose appropriate sessions and submit paper abstracts.

Nezar AlSayyad

Indigenous Urbanization and Amazonia's Post-Traditional Environmental Economy

DANIELA M. PELUSO and MIGUEL N. ALEXIADES

This article examines the makings of post-traditional environments through processes of urban ethnogenesis among the Ese Eja, an indigenous Amazonian group living in the border areas of Peru and Bolivia. We argue that the use of “tradition” as social currency by the environmental service sector, particularly by a thriving international ecotourism industry, has exacerbated processes of urbanization, dislocation, and social and ecological alienation of indigenous peoples. We examine how an Ese Eja “past” is selectively reinvented through discourse and appropriated by “participatory” projects and development. This unearthing and reburial of history is then used to “authenticate” the present and its environmental agenda in a postglobal world of environmental moral righteousness.

Daniela M. Peluso is a research associate in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Kent. She has been working with the Ese Eja since the mid-1980s on questions relating to gender, kinship, personhood and identity.

Miguel N. Alexiades is a Nuffield Fellow at the University of Kent currently working on the Ese Eja landscape, particularly indigenous notions of history, territoriality, and the environment.

The paper on which this article is based was chosen as co-recipient of IASTE's 2004 Jeffrey Cook Award.

The Ese Eja are a lowland Amazonian group comprising about 1,500 people, living in several communities along the rivers Beni, Madre de Dios, Heath and Tambopata, in the border regions of Pando, Bolivia, and Madre de Dios, Peru (FIGS. 1, 2, 3). The Ese Eja language belongs to the Tacana language family, itself part of the Macro-Panoan group of languages of Western Amazonia. Most Ese Eja plant swidden fields, hunt, fish, and extract forest resources, both for consumption and commercial trade. Madre de Dios, the third largest and least populated department in Peru, is itself home to eighteen different ethnic groups and seven linguistic families. The department has also a significant importance for global conservation. As a biodiversity “hotspot,” with more than three million hectares set aside for conservation, it is heavily targeted by external conservation and community-development funds and projects.¹

The popular conception of Amazonia as a place inhabited by forest peoples is outdated: most people today live in urban and periurban environments. Throughout the twentieth century, Amazonians have moved between urban and rural areas in response to




FIGURE 1. (ABOVE LEFT)
Madre de Dios river (Peru).
Photo by M. Alexiades.



FIGURE 2. (ABOVE RIGHT)
Heath river. Photo by M.
Alexiades.

FIGURE 3. (RIGHT) Ese Eja
communities in Madre de Dios
(Peru) and Beni-Pando
(Bolivia). Drawing by authors.



fluctuations in the international demand for forest products. However, in recent years the long, inexorable trend toward urbanization in Amazonia has involved an increasing number of indigenous peoples. The Ese Eja of Peru are a case in point. Traditionally a highly mobile society, the Ese Eja have become increasingly sedentary, largely as a result of the broader social and political changes that have resulted from the penetration of a market economy into the region.² The process of urbanization began during the first half of the twentieth century following the establishment of a Dominican mission and numerous small outposts and rural settlements where forest resources were extracted and agricultural commodities grown under conditions of debt peon-

age. It was extended and facilitated in the second half of the twentieth century through the official creation of “native communities” with titled lands, and through provision of such state services as schools and health posts. Throughout the twentieth century, most Ese Eja embraced — albeit to varying extents — notions of progress and modernity. This in turn entailed the need and desire to develop more intense links with the market, the national society, and, concomitantly, the regional capital of Puerto Maldonado (FIG. 4). Urban models of settlement and dwelling have been adopted and incorporated in Esa Eja communities, while migration and relocation to the town itself has also increased (FIG. 5). Key factors contributing to these forms of urbanization have been



FIGURE 4. *Puerto Maldonado (Peru). Photo by M. Alexiades.*

improved communications and increased dependency on goods and services that are provided in the city, including secondary education. Today, most urbanized Ese Eja maintain ties with their community of origin, as part of a diversified subsistence strategy that links them to the forest through agriculture, extractivism, and more recently, service-related activities, notably conservation and ecotourism projects.

This contemporary phase of indigenous urbanization coincides with the emergence of an environmental service economy in which conservation and development agendas converge, and which privileges certain forms or representations of indigenous knowledge, organization and control. It further coincides with developments in Ese Eja ethnogenesis — the construction of a collective social ethnic identity — in part realized and mediated through their participation in emergent pan-Amazonian local, national and international indigenous organizations, particularly since the 1980s.³ While much anthropological work about indigenous



FIGURE 5. *Ese Eja community, lower Heath river (Peru). Photo by M. Alexiades.*

Amazonia has focused on identity in the context of social and environmental change, scant attention has been paid to urbanization. Urbanized indigenous peoples have similarly been neglected by indigenous organizations and by other organizations working with rural indigenous communities.

In this article we explore the notion that the environmental economy, through such interventions as ecotourism, conservation, and “sustainable-development” projects, advances the integration of indigenous peoples into the market economy and exacerbates the related process of urbanization. Many of these interventions either directly discourage or indirectly undermine many longstanding resource-utilization activities — including hunting, fishing, certain forms of gathering, and swidden-fallow agriculture — and hence continue to disengage people from their land. In addition, wage labor, physical displacement, secularization, new patterns of consumption, and the commercialization of culture all further detach the Ese Eja from the matrix of extended kin and ecological relations that until recently sustained them. This process of social and ecological alienation following incorporation into the market is clearly not novel; indeed, it is one of the historical trademarks of capitalism. What is truly novel, and what this article focuses on, is how processes of market integration and social and ecological alienation now unfold, ironically, under the aegis of “conservation.” Moreover, urbanization, physical and social uprooting, and commoditization simultaneously draw upon and create an idealized, essentialized, reified and nostalgic image of its mirror — “wilderness,” “tradition,” locality, and social and ecological “embeddedness.”

In using the term post-traditional to describe Ese Eja native communities, we are not suggesting that “traditions” have disappeared, but rather that their forms, roles and meanings are fundamentally different from those in the past. The term post-traditionality is reminiscent of Hobsbawm and Ranger’s hallmark notion of the “invention of tradition”: repeated behavior meant to convey a continuity with a suitable, sometimes fictitious, distant past.⁴ Whereas neotraditional communities engage in the manufacture of culture as tradition, post-traditional communities selectively and mimetically reproduce parts of the past in order to make the present appear like the past.⁵ As Appadurai has noted, these discourses about the past are governed by “norms.”⁶ Here, we argue that the “discourse” about an Ese Eja past, in communities involved in an ecotourism economy, is to a great extent dictated by the international tourist market (or the marketing of that market). This market contributes to “the social production of memory,” even though, as Hauschild warned, not all participants have an equal standing.⁷ As such, economic interests, through a calculated market-based system of rewards, play a dominant role in the social production of post-traditional visions of the past.

In this article we look at the contemporary and preliminary phase of urbanization that unfolds within Ese Eja communities. Specifically, we examine how notions of self and

place — including territory, community, gender relations, ritual, health and language — inform, and are informed by, the environmental agenda and the tensions and contradictions that emerge as a consequence. This in turn problematizes simple links between identity and place, often resting on ideas of spatially bounded cultures, “localities,” or territories.

ESE EJA REFERENCE TO PLACE

Notions of self in relation to place are central to how identity is constructed in indigenous Amazonia. The available historical records support the Ese Eja notions of their traditional territory as encompassing three adjacent tributaries of the Madre de Dios and Beni rivers: the Tambopata (Baawaja), Heath (Sonene), and the headwaters of the Madidi (Manini). The headwaters of these rivers all converge in a fairly small and very rugged area in the eastern Andes, on the border of Peru and Bolivia, and flow away from each other to join the Madre de Dios (Na'ai) and Beni (Kuei'ai) rivers (FIG. 6, REFER TO FIG. 3). During the twentieth century the Ese Eja have gradually migrated in and settled in the lower reaches of the Tambopata and Heath rivers, as well as on the Beni and Madre de Dios. As the Ese Eja moved away from the headwaters, they have also moved away from each other, becoming dispersed over a wide area, with some communities as far apart as 400 km. The descendants of each of these three groups (Baawaja, Madidi and Sonene) speak slightly different dialects, and are themselves a mixture of people from different tributaries, many of which once fought or traded with each other. In this way, the people who today identify themselves as Baawajakwiñaji, for example, link their ancestry to such tributaries of the Tambopata as Kuishokuei (La Torre) and Nao'o (Malinowski).⁸ Aside from these three main groupings, people tend to refer to each other more specifically according to which community they



FIGURE 6. Upper reaches of the Heath river. Photo by M. Alexiades.

live in or were born in. For example, Ese Eja from Portachuelo are Madidi'kuiñaji, but they mostly refer to themselves and are referred to by Ese Eja of other communities as Kuei'ai'kuiñaji (people from the big river, meaning the Beni River). Also, these geographical distinctions may not always reflect actual geographical location. For instance, a group of Sonene'kuiñaji who migrated to Portachuelo more than thirty years ago still refer to themselves and are referred to by others as Sonene'kuiñaji.

Ese Eja identity has thus always been fluid and dynamic in its relationship to place. The notion of Ese Eja as a collective entity is also historically conditioned, as is the emerging notion of a pan-Amazonian indigenous movement and identity mentioned earlier. Native communities too, like the notion of “tribe,” are politico-historical artifacts; specifically, they are the products of contact with the state and broad political, legal and economic systems.⁹ As such, and in terms of their location, physical makeup, and internal organization, Ese Eja communities reflect a history of increasingly intense — yet consistently ambivalent — relations with the state and market, including related processes of migration, dislocation, fragmentation, sedentization, dependency on outside goods and services, and increased internal differentiation.

While historically disposed toward a mobile lifestyle, elements of Ese Eja social structure, such as kinship, are also very much rooted in place, notably through residence. When Ese Eja marry, the couple tend to dwell with the woman's family (uxorilocality). Households, therefore, usually consist of a married couple, all of their unmarried sons and daughters, their married daughters and son-in-laws, as well as maternal grandparents, grandchildren and adopted children. By rooting the household and its systems of production in the continuity of female residential clusters, uxorilocality tends to undermine the social and political significance of patrilineality. Consequently, and as in much of lowland South America, residence rather than descent is the key criterion for Ese Eja social organization.¹⁰

ECOTOURISM AND PLACE

Ecotourism has been heralded by its defenders as an effective way of providing economic incentives for the conservation of forests.¹¹ A subset of such ventures directly involves local dwellers, either by including them in some of the activities promoted by an ecotourism lodge, hiring them as employees, or, in some cases, establishing formal partnerships and working agreements (FIG. 7). Two of the Ese Eja communities in Peru have developed formal partnerships with national tourist operators, in both cases with direct support of international environmental organizations and donors.¹² Despite differences in the details of how the partnerships have been set up, both Ese Eja lodges are built within the titled lands of the communities; both seek to directly involve the Ese Eja in



FIGURE 7. Tourism agency, Rurrenabaque (Bolivia). Photo by D. Peluso.

staffing, and to a lesser extent, running the lodges; and both are either partly or fully owned by the community in question.¹³ In one of the lodges, community members have been actively trained as guides, and have been sent to Lima, the capital of Peru to study English or specialist managerial skills (FIG. 8).

As in other areas, ecotourism among the Ese Eja is closely linked to and dependent on the creation and management of natural protected areas, in this case the Tambopata National Reserve and the Bahuaña-Sonene National Park, itself part of an international conservation strategy seeking to establish a corridor of protected areas on the eastern flanks of the Andes.¹⁴ As with other “indigenous” ecotourism ventures in western Amazonia, lodges seek to promote distinct ecological and social attractions in order to lure visitors and compete with neighboring operations (FIG. 9). A global biodiversity “hotspot,” the area is widely known for its “pristine” and accessible environments (forests, lakes, and bird and mammal



FIGURE 8. Ese Eja guides and tourists, Tambopata river (Peru). Photo by M. Alexiades.

licks — areas where large number of animals congregate to feed), and for its extraordinary diversity of flora and fauna.¹⁵ The lodges also provide visitors with a “social experience,” which may include visits to the community or to certain community projects, walks with indigenous guides, or purchasing local handicrafts. The idea of community-operated lodges helping realize broader social goals — notably conservation and sustainable development — also forms a distinct element of the institutional branding of these lodges: for instance, one of the lodges received Conservation International’s Ecotourism Excellence Award, among several others.

While the national park and the state provide a guarantee of the ecological authenticity of the area, the partnership with an indigenous community provides a complementary degree of ethnic and moral authenticity: the lodges are advertised, for example, as follows: “. . . only four hours by river from Puerto Maldonado airport, Heath River Wildlife Center is the gateway to the largest uninhabited and unharmed rainforest in the Amazon. . . . [H]undreds of birds and mammal species and a lodge 100 percent owned by the Ese’eja Indians of Sonene make the Heath the best combination of nature and culture in the entire Amazon.”¹⁶

For indigenous peoples to work, and eventually to own and run ecotourism lodges, they must reorganize their means of livelihood, often putting subsistence agriculture, hunting, foraging, and extractive forest activities in the background. Wage labor, usually in the form of work as boat drivers, guides, waiters or cleaners, takes them out of their household and moves them into the space of the lodge, where they are separated from their families and the social obligations that normally bind them to their household and the rest of their community.

For a variety of reasons, including uxori-locality, women are more tied to place than men. As a result, women find themselves doing a double load, taking on the additional jobs



FIGURE 9. Website with information on the Ese Eja lodge (http://www.greentracks.com/Tambopata_programs.htm).

that their husbands and sons left behind to go work for the lodge. In turn, they have less control over the wage that is meant to compensate for such sacrifices. An Ese Eja woman spoke about her relationship with her husband who was administering an Ese Eja lodge at the time:

My husband is not here. He cannot help me with our six children. Yes, he makes money, but he is not here to chop firewood, carry plantains, and keep the fields or hunt or fish. The little ones do fish, and my sisters help me with meat sometimes, but I have nothing to give them. My husband has bought us a gas stove, but look over there! It has been empty for many months. It is expensive to refill. He is working — but he is not here!

Another clear impact of the boom in the environmental service economy has been language loss among the Sonene Ese Eja. While most Ese Eja are bilingual, Spanish is clearly spoken much more frequently now than ten years ago, and many children are only marginally bilingual. Factors contributing to this recent process of linguistic erosion include a dramatic increase in the number of Peruvian nationals visiting or living in the community as a direct result of interventions linked to the national park or the tourist lodge. Indeed, three households, out of a total of seventeen, now consist of mixed marriages between Ese Eja and lodge workers. As a young man remarked, laughing, “We are embarrassed to talk when they [non-Ese Eja] are with us. And now in our house we do not talk because of him [his non-Ese Eja brother-in-law].”

CONSERVATION: REDEFINING TRADITIONS

Much of conservation, and certainly ecotourism, is inimical to hunting; many conservation biologists view the practice as fundamentally incompatible with their preservation efforts. This is particularly the case for the larger “charismatic megafauna” (tapirs, peccaries and monkeys), which are used to rally public and official support for conservation, and which are also sought out both by tourists and indigenous hunters.¹⁷ The issue of hunting by indigenous peoples in national parks is often contentious, not least among those Ese Eja living around the protected areas now covering much of their traditionally occupied lands. While national legislation recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to hunt in protected areas, this provision is restricted to meat used for domestic consumption, and to the use of “traditional” means, which in many instances is taken to mean bow and arrows. The suggestion that only what are in effect precolonial means of subsistence and hunting are compatible with “tradition” suggests a view of culture as bounded and static, which is hard to reconcile with the dynamism and open-endedness of social processes.

For the Ese Eja who still depend on a “traditional” lifestyle based on hunting and gathering, and who use the

occasional sale of forest products and game to purchase basic goods, the distinction made by the state between subsistence and commercial is absurd. As one exasperated hunter complained, “Do I sell game to become rich? No! We are still poor . . . [and] we hunt to buy soap, to buy books for our children. . . . They [“white” people] . . . are the ones who showed us how to use these things!” Likewise, commodities such as shotguns, soap, cooking oil, sugar and schoolbooks are viewed by the Ese Eja as integral and historically constituted parts of their daily lives. The fact that shotguns have been used by the Ese Eja for generations, that hunting continues to have unparalleled social, symbolic and economic importance, and that Ese Eja have hunted in these areas before there were any white people all serve to underscore the view among many Ese Eja that hunting with shotguns and selling game constitute and inalienable right.

Significantly, a growing number of Ese Eja — particularly those working as wage laborers in the environmental service economy or with greater contact with the rhetoric of conservation, including some leaders — have assimilated the view of hunting as a negative, or indeed shameful activity. One of us once asked a young Ese Eja tourist guide, about to depart on his regular leave, if he was planning to go hunting. He smiled shyly, and looking away, said, “We do not do those things here anymore.”

Another time, a biologist who had been hired by an NGO to make a series of educational cards of animals based on Ese Eja accounts, recalled a decision by the NGO to remove any reference in the cards to hunting:

I was so disappointed when I saw the place-cards. I had collected such fabulously detailed and entertaining stories about various animals from Ese Eja children and adults. When the NGO administrator read them she immediately said that they could not be used because they referred to hunting. People had passionately described the different ways animals “taste” or where they nest and hide.

This instance illustrates how traditional knowledge is strategically edited before it is channeled back to the community as part of conservation and cultural revitalization projects, whose goal is to reinvent tradition in ways that downplay aspects considered aesthetically, morally or politically undesirable, or incompatible with modern sustainable land-use planning. In this way, culture is appropriated and repackaged to legitimize the convergent interests of the state and ecotourist firms: the creation of the illusion of pristine forests inhabited by traditional or authentic indigenous peoples (FIG. 10). According to this discourse, the Ese Eja — akin to an ecological noble savage used to live in harmony with the environment, but have subsequently — and through the perverse influences of modernity — succumbed to the evils of environmental degradation, which presumably includes the use of shotguns to provide one’s dinner.¹⁸ It is



FIGURE 10. Community environmental education poster, Heath river. Photo by M. Alexiades.

no coincidence that technology is thought of and discussed in terms of “traditional” versus “nontraditional,” rather than “precolonial” versus “colonial.” These referents frame people’s choices in terms of a nostalgic past rather than one of subjugation, exploitation and resistance. This rewriting of history is a self-serving way of authenticating the present with an environmental agenda.

The demonization of hunting, with a zeal that on occasion acquires a distinct missionary fervor, also subverts the social legitimacy and prestige of the activity, suggesting that it constitutes an outdated modality of environmental intimacy — and one which may be transcended by the transformation from hunter to tourist guide. The prestige of the hunter, in this new environmental post-traditional economy, is built not on the ability to utilize his skills and knowledge to provide his household with game, but, rather to reinvent and re-create those skills and knowledge, combining them with English and marketing, in order to interpret the forest and provide an “authentic” experience to visitors. This in turn also allows him to bring cash, not game, back to his wife and children.

This powerful interplay of the demonization of the hunt and the commodification of the hunted is illustrated in the reprimands of the representative of the ecotourist company during a meeting with community members. In this instance, a capybara had been shot, in violation of the terms of agreement, in the vicinity of the tourist lodge:

Who killed that capybara? . . . Don't you know that that it is stealing? That capybara was worth money and it belonged to everyone. . . . By killing the capybara, one person has stolen from everybody else! If you kill the animals, what will the tourists come to see?

Hunting is not only undermined by providing a competing idea of value, but also by collapsing the different values

traditionally associated with game and hunting — including aesthetic, moral and spiritual ones — into a simple material choice. Extolling the accomplishments of a project linked to the tourist lodge, a Kellogg fellow noted how “the endangered Harpy Eagle rose in status from just another chicken to their community mascot.”¹⁹ Suggesting that before the arrival of the lodge the Ese Eja viewed the harpy eagle as “just another chicken” is ironic not only because Ese Eja do not eat harpy eagles, but because this animal plays a salient role in Ese Eja oral traditions and is a powerful symbolic referent to the suprahuman *edósikiana*, and to the ontological predation that underscores the intimate interrelationship between human and nonhuman beings.²⁰ Yet Ese Eja beliefs about nonhuman beings also emphasize the regenerative, creative and healing aspects of activities such as hunting, which are otherwise interpreted as strictly hunter-prey, predation-consumption-reciprocity models.²¹

In her study of the relationship between an Ese Eja community and its partly owned tourist lodge, Stronza has observed an apparent paradox: “despite the importance of Harpy Eagles and Giant Otters among biologists, conservationists, and tourists, neither species held special economic significance to people . . . at least not before tourism.”²² In actual fact, harpy eagle feathers were the most highly prized of all bird feathers, and were used in the manufacture of arrows — themselves indispensable technology. The large size of the feathers makes them ideal for manufacturing the arrow’s fletching, which in turn ensures the stability and accuracy of the arrow’s flight path. This, coupled with the powerful symbolic attributes derived from the fact that harpy eagles are the largest and most powerful flying predator, suggests that the bird did indeed have an important economic value for the Ese Eja before the advent of tourism. Stronza’s account not only conceals the “economic” value of harpy eagles as a source of materials for hunting technology, but its allusion to the indeterminate *symbolic* significance of harpy eagles to Ese Eja hunters also disassembles the “symbolic” from the “economic,” thus subverting — and reinventing — Ese Eja traditional notions of value.²³ By defining the economic exclusively in market terms, this kind of rhetoric creates the object of its own discourse: the commodification of ecological and social relations and the primacy of the market as measure of value.

URBANIZATION: LODGED IN ONE’S MIND

Urbanization begins with new ideas and images, whose power lies in their ability to evoke new kinds of desire — not just material desires, but the desire for different lifestyles and different identities. Aside from effecting changes in modes of production and forms of social organization, urbanization brings its own particular sense of aesthetics, value and morals. We have already discussed how international eco-

tourism is helping to shape these transformations, and particularly how Ese Eja notions of subsistence, hunting, the past, and “culture” are subverted and conditioned by the complicity of state and market and transformed into commodities that are consumed according to late capitalism’s theory of value.

Ese Eja often articulate the loss of their traditions through nostalgic discussions of the past. More than a “return to the past,” such nostalgia is a suggestive projection of how people wish to imagine the past, ultimately miming a fantasy (or to paraphrase Taussig: miming a fantasy about someone’s fantasy of them).²⁴ Within newly emerging economic contexts, by convincingly embracing “Ese Eja-ness,” individuals or communities can bolster their political leverage vis-à-vis regional, national and international populations and enterprises. As one young Ese Eja man from Inferno who is involved in ecotourism told us in January 2003:

It is not my fault that I do not speak Ese Eja. It is the older people’s fault because they did not teach us. I am ashamed that I cannot speak Ese Eja because now when the financieras [funding agencies] ask me to say something in my language. I have nothing to say!

Narratives echoing loss reflect how ideas of cultural purity and authenticity are both employed and disemployed. Nonetheless, one paradox is that the desire to reconstruct or essentialize the past manifests itself within the context of cultural hybridity. In a discussion on identity it is not questions about an original authenticity that are provocative, but rather a questioning of how and why and to what political ends one’s positioning of being Ese Eja is deployed. Hybridity makes the limitations of binarisms clear and illustrates how ideas such as authenticity or mixture, for example, are commodified in the expression of identities.²⁵ Indigenous identity is a powerful political resource that, in addition to having its own internal significance, is repeatedly performed for and accessed by outsiders — hence, its continual emergence in more globalized contexts. Although its discourses and appearance have changed, the underlying structures of the hierarchies of power have not. The same young man pointed toward the complexity of such mirroring when he next said:

I ask my father to teach me Ese Eja but he says nothing. If someone from far away, like a “gringo,” asks him something, then he shows them things. Suddenly my father speaks Ese Eja. With me, he can’t be bothered.

Both of this young man’s statements expose Shobat’s main theoretical concerns over the ambivalence and the inconvenience of a politics of hybridity in places like Amazonia, where people’s articulation of a wish to return to the past often express their quest for political survival.²⁶ If discussions of hybridity sidestep aspects of the political consciousness of identity, they end up in danger of sanctifying

whatever neocolonial hegemony is in place. As such, works on hybridity can also encompass theories of mimicry and how Fourth World peoples use ideas about “tradition” to stage their own urgent needs for political representation, land rights, and access to resources without invalidating them. Whereas hybridity and other postcolonial theories can allow for a critical perspective on the mimesis or nostalgia of the past, they can simultaneously recognize peoples agency in using these ideas as embedded within local and global power relations.

CONSTRUCTING VALUE

We have characterized Ese Eja villages as post-traditional communities, a trend which is exacerbated through ecotourism and its impulsion of urbanization. First, individuals are increasingly alienated from a sense of place through their changed relationships to land, nature, and each other. Second, the commodification of culture and the rewriting of “tradition” creates new contradictions and anxieties with regard to people’s relationship with the past and with human others. Last, through a discourse of nostalgia, many Ese Eja now search for a link between history and place.

We have also discussed how such key notions of self and place, including community, territory, gender relations, ritual and language, shape and are shaped by the novel ecological and social relations that urbanization entails. The *production of difference* within common, shared and connected spaces, and how these differences are produced and maintained, takes place in a field of power relations that is always already spatially interconnected.

It has been said that what matters most about tradition is that it is credible.²⁷ In this article we have briefly highlighted how the environmental service economy shapes the credibility of tradition toward an outside audience while concurrently selectively rewriting, reediting and reshaping it toward the inside. The former is fulfilled through marketing, the latter through reconstructing the values placed on both the choices and the reasons for revitalizing “the past.” As such, memory and tradition are bound together in the way that people organize the past.²⁸ It is precisely the way in which nature-based industries are established upon principles of modernity, yet clothed in the discourses and pretexts of “tradition” that mark Amazonian economies as post-traditional. The need for protecting the cultural and biological diversity of tropical rainforests and their peoples remains compelling. This is precisely why it is important for all participants in environmental economies to examine how conservation discourse creates its own object, and at what cost.

NOTES AND
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22. Stronza, "Because it is Ours," p.142.

23. We are not implying that Stronza set out consciously or strategically to undermine Ese Eja views of harpy eagles: Ese Eja, particularly those more exposed to modern and conservationist discourses, do not customarily and openly discuss issues relating to their oral traditions and "beliefs of the ancestors" (*creencias de los antiguos*) with outsiders, given that these have tended to be scorned in the past. Stronza's consultants are thus likely accomplices in this particular instance of the masking of the past.

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Rethinking Cultural Heritage: Lessons from Sana'a, Yemen

MICHELE LAMPRAKOS

The unique architecture of Sana'a has been the focus of international conservation efforts, which have stimulated local interest and contributed to the formation of a local discourse. Because conservation followed so quickly on the heels of modernization, Sana'a provides an opportunity to study the interplay of these two global ideologies in the context of a strong local tradition of building. After a brief discussion of the history of conservation in Sana'a, this article will discuss how conservation discourse and practice have been appropriated and transformed by residents, builders, and conservation professionals. It suggests that a unique approach is developing on the ground, which can contribute to the critical reevaluation of conservation on the global "periphery."

Modernism and conservation are usually seen as contradictory approaches to the built environment: the former, at least in its early formulation, saw the city as a *tabula rasa*, while the latter aims to protect historic buildings and urban fabrics. Yet both these ideologies emerged within the intellectual and historical framework of modernity. Indeed, some authors see conservation as the child of modernity, its ideological "other" which has allowed modern society to develop according to the inexorable laws of progress. This is underlined by the similarity of architectural and conservation discourses in the early twentieth century: both saw the old and the new as antithetical, but also as complementary and dependent on each other.¹ While all cultures and eras have selectively maintained and preserved elements of the past, the modern era is distinguished by an ideology of conservation constructed in opposition to the ideology of progress. The contest between the two has played out in the physical and social fabric of cities: while grand schemes and urban renewal have destroyed historic districts, conservation policy has reified them; both strategies isolated and circumscribed the traditional within the modern.

If conservation is to realize its potentially pivotal role in the creation of a sustainable environment, the old and the new must be treated as part of a single continuum. Such a

Michele Lamprakos is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Architecture/Aga Khan Program in Islamic Architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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shift requires a reassessment of the critical framework of conservation, and a reevaluation of the conceptual and disciplinary boundaries that reinforce the divisions between the new and the old.² A critical reevaluation of the history and theory of conservation is all the more urgent as international agencies promote an approach of “cultural relativism” in the conservation of heritage in various parts of the world. The dissemination of theory and methods is not new, since the conservation of antiquities was established in many European colonies; most native practitioners were trained in “international” standards that are based on European theory. But now research institutes and agencies are assisting certain countries in the development of culture-specific conservation standards, based on “indigenous” principles and values.³ While this approach attempts to counter charges of cultural imperialism, it is questionable whether conservation can operate outside the system of values and assumptions within which it was conceived. “Cultural relativism” is perhaps most useful in underlining the relativism of the established discourse.



FIGURE 1. A woman in Sana'a furious at inspectors who are requiring her to dismantle a wall built in nonconforming materials.

Recent studies in so-called developing countries have presented forceful critiques of conservation policies and practices. They cite the bureaucratic imposition of policies that have little meaning for local residents; the adoption of conservation standards that are incompatible with local social and economic goals; the gentrification of historic districts, the displacement of local residents, and the creation of “stage sets” for the tourist trade (FIG. 1).⁴ While much of this critique is valid and important, it is problematic in several respects. Most of the critics are not trained in architecture or conservation and have little experience in the field. Their studies tend to see conservation as a hegemonic discourse, rather than as a discourse that is appropriated and transformed. Most importantly, they look at conservation in isolation from modernist planning, which imposes its own values and regulations. As such, they often implicitly privilege modernist ideology and its ethic of progress — in effect promoting not only modern design and methods, but the material, human and capital basis of the modern construction sector. Investment in this sector may promote dependence on foreign products, technologies and expertise at the expense of local materials and labor resources. It is in this area that conservation, if carried out within a progressive political framework, can function as a form of resistance, promoting local knowledge and practices as alternative models for modernity.⁵

In this article I propose to reframe conservation within the wider discourse of modernity — recognizing that both are imported ideologies, and are transformed and used by different actors for various purposes. Sana'a, the capital of the Yemen Arab Republic, provides an ideal case study for several reasons (FIG. 2). First, it was the site of a major conservation project conducted under the auspices of UNESCO and the government of North Yemen — one of the first projects to focus on upgrading urban infrastructure, incorporating strategies of modernization and conservation. Second, the distinctive architecture of Sana'a was largely insulated



FIGURE 2. View of the old city of Sana'a in 1995. Photo by Monica Fritz, 1995, courtesy of the Aga Khan Visual Archive, MIT.

from development pressures until the 1960s. The rapid succession of modernization and conservation resulted in a paradox: unlike many other countries in the Middle East that had abandoned traditional construction practices in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in Yemen these practices had not died out. Yemenis were not separated from their “heritage” by an historical divide: rather, living traditions were to be “conserved.”

Yemen is uniquely positioned to contribute to the reevaluation of conservation theory and practice that is occurring on the global “periphery.”⁶ It is home to remarkable and varied architecture, builders who continue to practice traditional techniques, and two decades of experience in conservation. Drawing on one year of fieldwork in Sana'a, I will attempt to describe a unique approach that is developing on the ground in the practices of conservation professionals, builders and residents. This experience should, I believe, provide the basis for conservation plans and legislation which may challenge, rather than conform to, existing international charters.

THE CAMPAIGN TO SAVE THE OLD CITY OF SANA'A

The mythic origins and noble history of Sana'a have been related by historians since medieval times, and are often evoked in conservation literature.⁷ Located at a strategic point in the Yemeni highlands, Sana'a has always been an important political center. One of two capitals of the ancient Sabaean Empire, it was the governor's seat under the early

Islamic caliphs, an important administrative center during the later medieval and Ottoman periods, and from the eighteenth century, the capital of the Zaydi imams.⁸ Thanks to certain historical and geographical factors, Yemen has been able to maintain a degree of autonomy throughout most of its history.⁹ These factors, along with the isolationist policies of the imams in the twentieth century, contributed to the relative continuity of social and built form in Sana'a and in the highlands generally.

Sana'a is known especially for a variation of the tower house, a type that can be found throughout Yemen. In Sana'a these houses, which can reach eight stories in height, are built of stone and fired brick with distinctive, plaster-decorated openings. They were originally designed for extended patrilineal families: as sons married, additional stories were added or new structures were built on adjacent land. The basic social and administrative unit of the city is the quarter (*hara*), which has at its heart an endowed complex of mosque, bathhouse (*hammam*), and agricultural garden (*maqshama*) (FIG. 3). Human waste from houses, disposed through long-drop chutes, dried quickly in the mountain air and was collected for use as fuel for the bathhouse. The ashes were used as fertilizer for the garden, which was irrigated by gray water from the ablutions pool at the mosque. Thus each quarter comprised a kind of ecosystem, which would today be seen as a model of sustainability.

The old city of Sana'a is bisected by a dry river bed (*wadi*) that floods in the rainy season; it has recently been paved as part of the conservation effort. To the east of the *wadi* is the



FIGURE 3. *Maqshamat al-Hurqan*, one of the many agricultural gardens in the old city of Sana'a.

Great Mosque, one of the oldest in the Islamic world, and the central market (FIGS. 4, 5). The buildings of the market are largely one-story, interspersed with large caravansarays (*samasir*) that served the wholesale trade; the oldest probably date to the seventeenth century when the coffee trade was at its height. The old urban core, along with several suburbs that date from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, were surrounded by a series of walls pierced by seven gates, including the monumental Bab al-Yaman at the southern entrance to the city (FIG. 6). Tribal as well as endowed agricultural land extended up to the walls, limiting expansion of the city.¹⁰

The decline of the old city was closely linked to the rapid changes following the 1962 revolution and the opening of North Yemen to the global market.¹¹ The new government initiated a process of modernization which aimed in part to erase the history of the ousted imamate. The foundations of a modern capital city were laid: Tahrir Square was created on the grounds of the former imam's palace, and building projects were undertaken to the north and west of the old city to house new government infrastructure. As part of this process, several city gates and portions of the walls that surrounded the city and its old suburbs were demolished.¹² The destruction was encouraged by Egyptian engineers and advisors who were working in the various ministries, on behalf of what was a de facto occupation authority. As agents of Nasserist modernism, they influenced the design of numerous structures, especially along Abd al-Mughni Street which runs along the line of the old western wall (FIG. 7).



FIGURE 4. (ABOVE) View of the suq looking east toward Jabal Nuqum.




FIGURE 5. (LEFT) Von Wissmann's map of Sana'a, 1929, showing the walled city with the wadi running north to south. To the west of the city are several walled suburbs, including the seventeenth-century Jewish quarter. Source: R. Lewcock and R.B. Serjeant, Sana'a, An Arabian-Islamic City, 1983. Reprinted by permission of author.



FIGURE 6. Bab al-Yaman, restored in the early 1990s.

Foreshadowing the language of conservation, Cairo's newspapers portrayed Sana'a as a relic of the Middle Ages in an attempt to justify the occupation to the Egyptian public.¹³

After the end of civil conflict in 1970, the city began to expand as population gravitated toward the capital from the countryside and from the newly created state of South Yemen (FIG. 8). The expansion accelerated in the mid-1970s when a ring road with radial connections to the old city was built at the advice of UNDP experts, encouraging land speculation. The largely unplanned growth was initially fueled by residents of Aden who had come north with capital to invest, and later by remittances from Yemenis working in the oil-rich Gulf states.¹⁴ Local building practice — which had proven adaptable in prior centuries, incorporating new techniques and elements — now underwent dramatic changes in



FIGURE 7. View of Abd al-Mughni Street.




FIGURE 8. Urban development in Sana'a between 1979 and 1985. Source: Jean-Francois Troin, "Sana: Géographie d'une Explosion Urbaine," in *Sanaa Hors le Murs*, published by URBAMA, CNRS-University of Tours (France), 1995. Reprinted by permission of author.

response to new demographic and technological factors. The majority of Yemenis who migrated to the Gulf worked in construction¹⁵: there they had become familiar with new house types built of concrete and concrete block derived from Western and Egyptian suburban models. Upon their return to Sana'a they introduced these new types, laying them out in orthogonal blocks and domesticating them with such features as multi-lite windows and plaster decoration. Many families began to leave the old city for the new districts which provided certain amenities, including the possibility of owning a car and independence from extended families. At the same time, conditions in the old city were deteriorating: unpaved streets, poor drainage, the absence of a modern water and sewerage system, and litter (resulting from the increased use of manufactured products) all served to accelerate outmigration. Conditions reached a crisis in the late 1970s after piped water had been brought into the old city without any means to carry it off site. The dramatic increase in groundwater destabilized foundations and led to the collapse of numerous houses.¹⁶

Around this time the idea of the “international safeguarding campaign” had emerged at UNESCO: initially aimed

at saving archeological sites, the strategy was applied to the historic cities of Fez and Cairo in the late 1970s. At the 1978 session of the General Assembly of UNESCO, the governments of North and South Yemen called for safeguarding campaigns for the cities of Sana'a and Shibam-Hadhramaut, respectively; these were formally launched in 1984. The Campaign to Save Old Sana'a, like that for Shibam, was in many ways a landmark project: challenging prevailing conservation practice, its authors insisted that not only individual monuments, but the entire historic core, was a testimony to collective genius and thus worthy of conservation.¹⁷ In order to accomplish this, the city must be kept alive by improving conditions and checking the flight of residents to the new districts. The first phase of the Sana'a Campaign thus focused on infrastructure: the water system was replaced and upgraded, and a sewer system installed; streets were paved, and building foundations were stabilized. A second phase, to be launched after infrastructure was in place, would restore and rehabilitate key buildings in the city. These high-profile projects would be funded by donor nations whose embassies were eager to participate but were not generally interested in sponsoring infrastructure (FIGS. 9, 10).¹⁸



FIGURE 9. (LEFT) Street paving in the quarter of al-Abhar, the first area to be paved under the Campaign to Save Old Sana'a.

FIGURE 10. (RIGHT) Interior of Samsarat an-Nahhas, a caravanseray restored by the governments of Norway and North Yemen to serve as the National Center for the Revival of Yemeni Handicrafts.

The innovative strategy of the Campaign was only adopted after a conflict within a UNESCO mission that was sent to evaluate conditions in Sana'a. The two architects on the team, who had recently worked on conservation plans for the old cities of Cairo and Tunis, advocated the conservation and upgrading of the entire historic core of Sana'a. The other members of the team — who were conservators, not architects — objected to this strategy: invoking the Venice Charter, they argued that it went against the prevailing practice of the International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), whose mandate was the careful conservation of historic monuments.¹⁹ The “whole city” approach, however, had the support of certain key individuals at UNESCO, as well as several prominent Yemenis; it seemed to respond to the desire of local reformers, who wanted to introduce modern amenities in the old city while preserving its special qualities.²⁰ Today, largely as a result of the Campaign, conservation-based development has been adopted as a strategy by local and donor agencies in various cities and towns throughout the country.²¹

Because of the two-phase approach, different observers have different conceptions of the Campaign. Residents of the old city greatly appreciate the street paving, water, and sewer works, which have made the old city one of the best-served sectors of Sana'a. For them, conservation is not simply an aesthetic exercise but a process that has improved their lives and validated their environment. Others, including some individuals involved in the Campaign, see it primarily in terms of the restoration and reuse projects which, they feel, were driven largely by the interests of donor nations and agencies rather than by local needs.²² The Campaign unleashed a conflict between two competing notions of conservation, rooted in different histories: the “traditional” approach of monument restoration, and an urbanistic approach that attempts to reconcile modernization and the form of preindustrial urban fabrics. The latter approach emerged at the end of the nineteenth century in the context of urban planning, as city administrators and architects struggled to deal with the effects of modernization.²³ After World War II this process was naturalized as “development.” Modernist planning solutions were proposed for newly independent nations with little concern for local models and conditions — which were in any case seen to be incompatible with modernization. By the 1970s, however, development discourse had taken on a new tone, validating traditional practices and promoting the informal sector. Planners began to call for the conservation of historic urban fabric and architecture, alongside modernization and industrialization.²⁴ It was the fate — and many would say, good fortune — of Sana'a to be drawn into the web of development assistance at this juncture.

The second phase of the Campaign ended in the early 1990s. Around the same time, a number of factors combined to slow or halt conservation activities, especially the economic crisis that followed the first Gulf War. The crisis was largely provoked by newly unified Yemen's opposition to the war, the expulsion of Yemeni workers from the Gulf, and the with-

drawal of donor aid.²⁵ As part of the restructuring of government after unification (1990), the special body that had been created for the conservation of the old city of Sana'a was recast as a national authority, responsible for all historic cities of Yemen (the General Office for the Preservation of Historic Cities of Yemen, or GOPHCY). This new institution, with an expanded mandate and dramatically reduced resources, was also deprived of the donor funding that had helped overcome internal obstacles to conservation.²⁶ In the late 1990s a major World Bank initiative for three cities — Sana'a, Shibam-Hadhramaut, and Zabid — was abandoned after consultants expressed doubts regarding the institutional capacity of concerned agencies. The World Bank has subsequently sponsored conservation-based development through the Social Fund for Development, a semi-autonomous government agency which the Bank helped to create. The SFD has funded most public conservation projects in recent years directly or indirectly, and has been able to attract many veterans of the UNESCO Campaign. It retains close ties with GOPHCY: the two offices jointly initiate projects and some GOPHCY employees work as consultants to the SFD. But the efficiency of GOPHCY continues to be hampered by certain structural problems, to the frustration of all levels of administration.

Today, after two decades of experience in conservation and media efforts to increase public awareness, conservation is now a shared language in Sana'a. While this language is drawn from international practice, it is often used to express local values and concepts that differ from international models. Conservation in Sana'a is at an important juncture: a conservation plan for the old city, supported by a GIS system, is being prepared with the assistance of an Italian team; draft legislation currently under consideration will, if approved, be the first binding conservation law in the country. The state of the old city, which has generally been well preserved, suggests that conservation resonates with the feelings and values of many. Rather than imposing ideas that may be seen as alien, policymakers can build on these feelings by developing plans and legislation that have local meaning and relevance. As a lawyer with long experience in conservation has noted, a law must reflect the feelings and needs of society if it is to be effectively applied.²⁷

I will now discuss some local views of and approaches to conservation, which I have gleaned from interviews with residents, builders, and conservation professionals.

RESIDENTS

Most residents with whom I spoke have a generally favorable view of conservation, and like living in the old city. For many, conservation appears to have validated a “traditional” way of life: the close relations within the quarter (*hara*), a greater degree of piety, and in some cases, religious and political conservatism. On occasion the language of conservation — the injunction against modernization (*istihdath*)

— is used to validate these social forms and norms in the face of rapid change. Some individuals — particularly the younger generation and those without ties to the old city — feel that the benefits of modernity are happening elsewhere, and seek to leave.²⁸ In a few cases, members of families who left the old city have returned or are thinking of returning. Their reasons range from the qualities and “spirit” of the old houses, to the urban life and sociability they feel is missing in the new districts.

The family home is a fundamental institution in the south of the Arabian Peninsula, representing the unity and permanence of a lineage.²⁹ Many residents of the old city of Sana’a have a deep emotional attachment to their houses, particularly when the house has been held by a family for generations. Conservation has touched these emotions, and at the same time has begun to transform them. As a result of conservation and media coverage, residents have become increasingly aware of their houses, as well as aspects of their everyday life, as heritage (*turath*). “Now everyone is conscious of *turath*,” a builder’s wife told me. “Before, it was something they just did.” The term *turath* derives from the verb *w-r-th*, “to inherit”; it associates the idea of *wirth*, or family inheritance — property, values, and traditions — with the collective inheritance of society.³⁰ Many residents have begun to internalize this association, although in some cases it conflicts with deeply held values of private property. The idea that their houses are recognized not only as heritage, but as world heritage (*turath alami*), has reinforced a sense of pride. At the same time, they are becoming aware of their monetary value, which has skyrocketed since the UNESCO Campaign: they can now envision the opportunity — which so far arises only rarely — to transform the family home into capital.

Residents are aware of regulations that prohibit them from making changes to facades and require them to use traditional materials in any renovation or new construction. Most individuals with whom I spoke approve of these regulations — often citing the need to maintain *turath*, which is the work of their forefathers (*ajdadna*) and testimony to their genius. During the recent reconstruction of the well enclosure (*marna*) of Talha mosque, a young man from the neighborhood came up to the builder with an old photograph of the site. He congratulated the builder, noting that the new enclosure looked exactly like it did in the photograph. When I asked him how he felt about this kind of work, he replied, “All of the old city should be rebuilt exactly as it was.” Yet with regard to houses, residents generally have a more fluid interpretation of *turath* than the one articulated in the official guidelines. They see certain changes — for example, adding additional floors or annexes to house married sons — as compatible with *turath*; indeed, this is what they have always done. Planners point out, however, that the traditional mechanisms of adaptation no longer work. The birth rate has increased dramatically: as sons marry, houses will not be able to expand to accommodate their families. Although addi-

tions have been permitted in the past, they are now restricted pending the implementation of a conservation plan.

Conservation professionals speak of preserving the “character” of the city, but this often translates into practical planning concerns: for example, the need to maintain a balance between built and open space, which has decreased dramatically in recent decades. In other cases the criteria are aesthetic — for example, the effect of vertical additions on the skyline. Yet such judgments are, in fact, not so different from traditional practice: a good builder, I have been told, assesses the surrounding context — literally, the “air” (*jaw*) around the house — and builds what is appropriate to it.

The case for safeguarding the old city’s special qualities and pleasant living environment is easily accepted by residents. But they see the enforcement of regulations as uneven and even arbitrary, depending on the degree of influence wielded by a particular property owner. Probably the greatest source of conflict between residents and inspectors is the opening of shops in the ground floor of houses. Traditionally used for animals and the storage of foodstuffs, the now-unused ground floor has taken on added value since the conservation effort, and there is increasing pressure to put it to productive use. I will discuss this in more detail below.

Most residents recognize the value of traditional materials and techniques and would like to continue to use them. Some are aware of the value of local architecture as a system — its strength, its environmental properties, and its artistic qualities. But traditional materials and techniques are in short supply and are significantly more expensive than new materials like concrete block, which is produced locally. Residents often opt for hybrid solutions, applying decorative brickwork and stone cladding as veneers on what is essentially a new constructive system (FIG. 11).³¹ Such solutions are usually approved by inspectors who, following local and international guidelines, are primarily concerned with the exterior of buildings. Yet the reduction of “tradition” to veneer — a process that occurred in the nineteenth century in Europe and the United States as part of the industrialization of building — ultimately undermines the critical potential of the architecture as a constructive and environmental system rooted in local knowledge and practice. By focusing on image rather than substance, conservation guidelines often contribute to the demise of the essence of the heritage they purport to preserve.

The cost of maintaining the massive tower houses is beyond the means or priorities of most families. Most well-to-do residents moved to villas in the new districts, often leaving the old houses to less prosperous relatives. The division of property may remain unresolved after the owner’s death — one of the main reasons for the neglect of houses. It is here that the expanded definition of heritage runs into problems, especially in the context of a poor country. If historic cities are the property of the collective — even the world — should individual homeowners be made to bear the cost of their



FIGURE 11. Brick arches and detailing applied as veneer on a concrete block wall.

maintenance?³² “At least a city like Venice derives some benefit from its status as a World Heritage City,” said one resident. “They have lots of tourists, but what benefits have we seen?”

The expanded definition of heritage requires changes to the legal framework of conservation, in particular the relation between public and private entities. Many national conservation laws require the state to purchase historic properties if they are not maintained by their owners. In light of the limited finances of the Yemeni state and potential conflicts with aspects of Islamic law, authors of the draft conservation legislation devised various strategies to assist homeowners. These include the creation of small loan funds, the repeal of a rule that makes traditional work ineligible for construction loans, exemption from permit fees and eventual taxes, and the provision of free technical assistance and supervision by GOPHCY staff. At the same time, the institutional capacity of GOPHCY would be strengthened by making salaries comparable to those at government research institutes.³³ To date, however, the law has not been passed, and programs to assist homeowners have been tried on only a limited basis.³⁴ The designation of *all* houses as historic also raises the question of conservation standards and methods: it suggests that “conservation” of historic cities should perhaps be reconceived as

maintenance, which was traditionally carried out by residents and builders, rather than experts.³⁵ “Residents had a spiritual tie to their houses,” said a professional who now lives in the old city. “This tie translated into practices (*suluk*), like watering down the earth in front of one’s house, and renewing plaster (*nura*).” This is perhaps why residents and builders have so easily embraced the idea of conservation, which seems to validate familiar practices.

BUILDERS

As noted earlier, building practice in Yemen changed dramatically after the revolution, particularly in Sana’a, the capital city. New materials and technologies — in particular, reinforced concrete — were initially brought north by Adani contractors after the revolution and diffused via a rapidly expanding road network. By the 1970s these techniques were in general use, not only for new commercial and institutional typologies but also for houses.³⁶ While they incorporated certain local materials and elements, these were increasingly reduced to cladding. The master mason (*usta*) initially benefited from the construction boom and experimented with the new technologies. Increasingly, however, projects came to be directed by new professionals — engineers, architects, and construction managers — who had skills that were not part of the *usta*’s training. Some *ustas* acquired these skills and became prosperous contractors. But in many cases highly trained *ustas* ended up working in concrete construction for contracting companies, typically owned by men who had had experience with new construction technologies in the Gulf. No longer the head of a prestigious profession, the *usta* was now subordinated to a building process that valued different skills.³⁷

The building arts have traditionally been highly valued in Yemen, as can be seen by the remarkable variety and quality of so-called “vernacular” architecture; even in Sana’a, many excellent examples are of fairly recent origin (FIG. 12). Building skills were typically passed from father to son, and many families acquired reputations as great *ustas*. Arguably, it has been the social status of builders, rather than their knowledge base, that has suffered most as a result of changing building practice. This has encouraged the tendency for builders’ sons to seek careers in various new professions that carry greater prestige and monetary rewards.

Conservation has had a perceptible effect on architectural taste, and has to some extent renewed the prestige of *ustas* trained in traditional techniques. They have benefited from increased patronage in old-style work in the old city and suburbs, as well as neotraditional architecture throughout the city — what one builder describes as “the revival of heritage” (*tajdid at-turath*).³⁸ For many builders now in their forties and fifties, who began their apprenticeships after the revolution, conservation has validated the work of their fathers and



FIGURE 12. The upper floors of this house were built by the *usta* who served as consultant to the UNESCO Campaign.

grandfathers: they see the old buildings as a training ground for them, challenging them to perfect their own skills.³⁹ Although they continue to work in concrete construction — their bread and butter — they are advocates of traditional methods and materials, which they believe produce better and more durable architecture.

It is often said that builders are fundamental to conservation because they possess the skills needed to restore and maintain old buildings. The *ustas* themselves are very conscious of this fact: they are now caretakers not only of local, but world heritage. Yet they are rarely, if ever, consulted in discussions of what conservation is, or should be, in Yemen. Rather, they serve a system whose goals appear to be defined in the boardrooms of local and foreign agencies.⁴⁰ While they speak fondly of certain conservation professionals who respect their skills, they wonder why their status is not valued and rewarded — especially in public conservation projects that rely on general contractors. Noting the damage that is done to old buildings by materials like cement, one *usta* said:

Do you water a tree with petrol or water? If you keep watering it with petrol, it will dry up and burn. The ustas are the ones who know how to water. We know how to maintain the old city, just like our fathers did, yet we get no benefit from it. The benefit goes to the contractors, who have money but no experience.

Local building processes cannot be conserved through training courses, as has been suggested by some experts. An anthropologist and architect who apprenticed with an *usta* in Sana'a has noted that the building process has many aspects: it includes the social roles and status of builders; their technical knowledge as embodied in practice and performance; the transmission of expert knowledge, normally through an apprenticeship system; and their social and economic relations with suppliers and clients.⁴¹ Unfortunately, these aspects of building process are rarely considered in conservation projects. Public projects, and especially those that receive funds from donor agencies like the World Bank, are expected to use general contractors who are qualified by their administrative abilities and financial resources rather than by their skill in building. *Ustas* generally cannot qualify as general contractors because they may not have bank accounts or money to put up as security. They also have difficulty with, or resist, competitive tendering, which involves certain procedures that are alien to traditional practice. For example, *ustas* are often unable to read drawings and specifications, which are the basis of quantity estimating; they are also accustomed to charging by the day, rather than by the square meter. As the employee of a general contractor, the *usta* suffers not only financially, but in terms of creative autonomy and social prestige. Architects and managers are aware of this. One architect at GOPHCY has proposed that public projects contract directly with specialized building trades: “that way we will preserve the *usta*,” he notes, “not only the product of his work.”

The Social Fund for Development has begun to address these and related issues on an experimental basis.⁴² As cultural heritage began to take on increasing importance as a program area, SFD managers realized that although *ustas* were best qualified to work on historic buildings, they were disqualified by certain procedures and guidelines required by donor agencies. SFD managers have quietly begun to develop ways to facilitate the participation of *ustas* and to strengthen their autonomy. In villages and small towns, a system called “community contracting” is used: local committees act as general contractor and employ *ustas* directly; progress of work and contract payments are overseen by SFD supervisors. In urban areas, however, procedures are complicated by bureaucratic structures that make disbursement of funds more cumbersome. Most SFD projects in Sana'a — for example, the restoration and upgrading of urban gardens, or *maqashim* — are awarded to general contractors, who are required to employ qualified *ustas*. But in a recent project that restored a series of house facades on the *wadi*, the SFD helped one *usta*

qualify as a contractor by simplifying certain procedures and waiving the requirements of a security bond and guarantees.⁴³

Architects and managers also realize the problems inherent in the use of construction drawings. Not only is the *usta* often unable to read them, but they can restrict his creativity, which derives from the engagement of the body and the material.⁴⁴ SFD project drawings are thus often left intentionally schematic, allowing the *usta* to execute details which, as one manager notes, “he can do better anyway.” A project in Shibam-Hadhramaut funded by the SFD and the German development agency GTZ has demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the role of the *usta* and the transfer of expert knowledge. Experienced *ustas* are hired as consultants, who supervise the work of other builders and sometimes help them secure contracts. By supporting the tradition of apprenticeship, the project recognizes that building skills are intimately related to the methods by which they are transmitted.⁴⁵ It should be noted that a similar provision was included in the draft conservation law: older masters of building and manual trades were to be hired by the government as consultants, for the purpose of training new practitioners. Unfortunately, the provision was struck from the law because it conflicted with an age limitation for government employment.⁴⁶

The role of the builder has been undervalued in conservation practice, perhaps because of the perceived rupture between traditional and modern building practices in Europe. In the early twentieth century Alois Riegl, one of the seminal thinkers of conservation theory, argued that the primary value of the monument in the modern era is “age value.” This leads to a new conception of the monument, which Riegl defined as *any* building old enough to be seen through the lens of historical distance.⁴⁷ The primary goal of conservation is thus the indefinite preservation of original material and traces of age, which are the source of the monument’s authenticity. This task is to be entrusted not to builders, but to new kinds of experts:

The care of monuments, until now entrusted essentially to creative artists, who have had to reestablish the originality and lost stylistic unity of monuments, in the future will be provided by historians, who will have to judge and evaluate their historical value as well as their traces of age, and the technicians, who will have to determine and implement the appropriate measures for the conservation of the monument and the traces of the old that are existing in it. There is a place for the artist as such only if he is at the same time an historian and a technician. . . . [S]uch a change in the organization of the care of monuments will not dispossess the artist, as might be superficially thought, but rather will liberate and greatly enlarge the field of his activity.⁴⁸

Modern conservation is conceived not as a creative art, but rather as a science of the past: as an historical document, a building must be restored according to concrete evidence

rather than conjecture or interpretation. Modern interventions and rebuilding are thus strongly discouraged; where new work is required, it must be clearly distinguished from the old.⁴⁹

Along with *turath*, the term “historic” (*ta’rikhi*) can be heard frequently in Sana’a. One builder described his restoration work as an “historical treatment” or “cure” (*‘ilaj ta’rikhi*). Yet in the language of builders, such terms indicate a process that is more fluid and interpretive, rather than documentary. For example, there seems to be no prejudice at all against rebuilding: it must seem natural to builders, since they continue to practice the old techniques. Moreover, there is little attempt to distinguish new work from the old. A noted historian and conservator argues that the continuity of building techniques makes it difficult, if not impossible, to date Sana’ani houses by means of style and details.⁵⁰ This continuity has carried into the “modern” practice of conservation: indeed, builders pride themselves in the fact that their often substantial interventions cannot be distinguished from the original building fabric.

For builders, it appears that the past is not embodied in historical documents or perfectly preserved buildings, but rather in practices that they have inherited and continue to perform in the present.⁵¹ On one occasion, a builder proudly showed me photographs of a facade that he had rebuilt “exactly as it was,” reusing the original materials. Yet upon further discussion, it became clear that he had in fact made significant changes to the building:

The lower level was too short — like an old man hunched over — so I made it taller. The window sills also needed to be slightly higher, because the facade is qibli (north-facing); when the sill is higher, a child sleeping next to it will stay warm.

In building practice in Yemen, as in other art forms, the past is validated by its continuing relevance in the present.⁵² The term tradition — *taqlidi* — derives from the root *q-l-d*, “to imitate.” Builders may describe their work as imitating the past, but in fact it is creative and interpretive — in effect, improving on the past.

This ideological evocation of the past is not so different from modern conservation, which insists on faithfulness to an original model. The language of conservation is thus familiar to builders, and easily adopted to express their own attitudes toward the past. Like tradition, conservation involves change, but achieves its force through the rhetoric of the unchanging.⁵³

CONSERVATION PROFESSIONALS

Even among conservation professionals — some of whom have formal training in conservation and are charged with the execution of official discourse — there seems to be little prejudice against rebuilding. They use documentary

tools like photographs and measured drawings in ways that both conform to and diverge from international practice. Inspectors, for example, may authorize demolition and rebuilding when the existing structure is no longer sound, but also when the proposed use cannot be accommodated within the building fabric. They stipulate, however, that the building must be rebuilt “exactly as it was.” This was apparently standard practice in Sana’a, until it came to be abused by property owners who built new structures that were seen to be incompatible with the surrounding context.⁵⁴ Like builders, conservation professionals make little attempt to distinguish new work from old; in some cases, they build entirely new structures using traditional materials and methods to accommodate new uses. The well enclosure at Talha mosque, which a neighbor said was rebuilt “exactly as it

was,” was in fact substantially reconfigured to house a women’s embroidery center. Project documents clearly indicate that the architects were not trying to adhere to the original form of the building; rather, they were striving to reconcile the requirements of the new program with the building’s historic context (FIGS. 13, 14). The new elements, built of traditional materials under the supervision of an *usta*, might easily be mistaken for original parts of the complex. In such cases, the architect and the builder collaborate to create new typologies, demonstrating the adaptability of the historic fabric and the materials and methods that created it.⁵⁵

Following international practice, conservation guidelines in Sana’a are largely proscriptive, focusing on what should *not* be done. But in practice, conservation officials and builders continue to fabricate the “traditional,” which evolves





FIGURE 13. (ABOVE) Street elevation of the marna’ (well enclosure) of Talha mosque, ca. 1980. The dashed section lines show the ramp for the animals that operated the pulley, with the well at right. The rooms above housed a Qur’anic school and living quarters for the instructor. Source: R. Lewcock and R.B. Serjeant, *Sana’a, An Arabian-Islamic City*, 1983. Reprinted by permission of author.

FIGURE 14. (RIGHT) The same elevation, in a second phase of design for the adaptive reuse of the marna’. Redlines and notes indicate changes architects felt would be more consistent with the local style and surrounding context. Courtesy of the Social Fund for Development.



in response to changing needs. Such experiments, I would argue, are more interesting than official buildings in the old city that attempt to reinterpret old types, limiting traditional materials and techniques to veneer. Buildings like the women's center allow builders to work in the old methods from the ground up — a rare occurrence within the old city and elsewhere in Sana'a. But how else are traditional techniques to be preserved, if they are restricted to the indefinite preservation of "original" material?

Because of their training and their mandate, local conservation professionals are on the "front lines" in the negotiation of international and local practice and are thus, in some sense, the most conflicted group. In most cases they are the first generation of professionals trained in conservation programs in Europe and in local workshops run by foreign experts. They interface with international agencies like UNESCO which, despite their stated interest in sustainability, continue to be largely concerned with aesthetic criteria.⁵⁶ Yet these professionals are aware of the unique circumstances in which conservation has been introduced into Yemen — particularly its association with development which, for some, changes the nature of conservation. "Cultural heritage is a Western term," said a local engineer with long involvement in the Campaign. "It has limited application in a place where the built environment continues to fill the need for shelter and social and spiritual sustenance."

Trained in a variety of fields, including architecture, design, engineering, history, archeology and law, these local professionals generally work to restrict changes in the old city, though some question the regulations in private. As might be expected, the most ardent advocates of international practice are architects and graduates of technical or fine arts programs: they have a deep knowledge of and appreciation for the special qualities (*khussusiyyat*) of local architecture and want to conserve them. The old city is all they have left: "[it] is like a sword that my father gives me," said one architect. "It will not be repeated." A noted restoration architect explained his approach:

The architectural style of Sana'a cannot be changed. Sometimes if an owner wants something new, I will do it very carefully. But most do not know the style, and end up ruining the facades.

These feelings appear to be shared by builders: they work to perpetuate a culturally and historically conceived notion of tradition, which provides the framework and limits for their creativity.⁵⁷ I pointed out to one builder that the architecture of Sana'a was not static, but rather had changed over time; should it not continue to evolve? "Change can be allowed," he replied, "but it must be within the framework (*nitaq*) of the Sanaani style."

The past — usually defined as "before the revolution" — is strangely near in Yemen. The so-called "old city" of Sana'a

and its walled suburbs *were* the city as late as 1970; they now comprise only a fraction of the urbanized area, most of which contrasts dramatically with the older districts in terms of architectural and urban forms. Rapid modernization — what many have described to me as a "cultural shock" — appears to confirm the idea of historical rupture embedded in conservation discourse. This rupture seems to be felt more strongly by the educated, who see themselves on the other side of an historical divide. "Change has happened so quickly," said a professional at GOPHCY. "Everything is so new, that we now long for everything old." The "old city" represents not only the collective past, but the personal memories of individuals and families. For conservation professionals, conserving the old city is perhaps a means to conserve a part of their own identity. They thus embraced the strategy of the UNESCO Campaign, which aimed to conserve not only the physical fabric, but a traditional way of life.⁵⁸

Despite the changes of the last twenty years — especially demographic changes — most people who live inside and outside the walls believe that the old city retains a premodern social cohesion. The idea of old Sana'a as unchanging is probably due to be challenged by historical case studies, as has been done for premodern cities in Europe and other parts of the Middle East.⁵⁹ The idea has nevertheless been reinforced by conservation. Much as a World Heritage City is seen to represent the culture that produced it, the inhabitants, too, take on this representative function, "distanced" from their contemporaries along an historical time line.⁶⁰ This perhaps explains the frequent references in the official press to the old city as a museum of a bygone era. "Even the people," said one prominent official, "are antiquities [*athar*]." Residents themselves sometimes use the term "museum" in protest, when they feel their lives are being artificially circumscribed.

While conservation professionals want to conserve the urban fabric and the way of life it represents, they acknowledge that the old city is changing — in part due to the success of the conservation effort itself. The Campaign aimed to revitalize the central market, Suq al-Milh, which now enjoys increased prestige as the best place to buy certain traditional products. Infrastructure and booming commerce led to a dramatic increase in land prices, and commercial activities have spread to areas that had been largely residential. Planners worry that this process — which they call "suqification" — threatens the traditional life of the quarter.⁶¹ Large merchants are most problematic: they buy up houses — sometimes entire blocks — and demolish them or use them for storage. On a smaller scale, homeowners often try to take advantage of increased property values by opening shops in the ground floors of their houses (FIG. 15). While this is prohibited by current guidelines, conservation professionals note that it is an attempt to deal with changing patterns of use. Few families now keep animals, or stock up on grains from the countryside, notes one architect:



FIGURE 15. Shops installed in the ground floor of houses.

In all the conferences and symposia on the old city, no one has ever mentioned the obsolescence of the ground floor. They only talk about how its form is essential to the historic character of the city. But it is impossible for us to leave it without a function. . . . If the idea of conservation had developed here, rather than abroad, it would be completely different.

The key, many believe, is to give people alternatives. “Instead of prohibiting residents from making openings in the ground floor,” said a senior architect at GOPHCY, “perhaps we should help them design these openings, so that they are aesthetically acceptable and structurally sound.” Such an approach would add a prescriptive element to the largely proscriptive guidelines — acknowledging the implications of development, which is required for cities to remain alive. It might be instructive to cite a similar process that happened long ago in what is now a famous World Heritage City. In Venice, shops and workshops spread into residential districts during the late medieval and early modern periods:

central Venice was, in effect, “suqified.”⁶² Those changes — part of the city’s growth and development — are now part of the historic fabric that is protected by law. How, then, can we exclude such changes in Sana’a in the interest of conserving its “historic character”?

TWO ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PAST

While the term “living historic city” is now commonly used in conservation, standards and methods for the conservation of such cities have not been clearly articulated. The term “living” implies that a city must adapt and change in order to remain alive. The term “historic” is more problematic — especially when it is applied not only to monumental structures, but to the everyday fabric of the city. Certain key concepts in the international charters — concepts like heritage, authenticity, and significance — discourage change and evolution. These concepts derive from various intellectual currents in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe — historicism, romanticism, and theories about culture that were developing in the emerging social sciences. Both historicism and romanticism posited a radical break between past and present, and the “irreversibility of the historical time line.” Applied in conservation, these ideas mean that an object or monument is to be valued primarily as a record of the past: its material authenticity is thus its primary source of value, and must be preserved indefinitely.⁶³ In the early twentieth century, the idea of authenticity was approached from another direction: “culture” came to be conceived as an area of inquiry, largely through experience in the European colonies. Culture was understood as a discrete, bounded entity that contained a genuine, unspoiled essence — an essence that could be discerned from the study of material artifacts and settlement patterns.⁶⁴ These ideas about culture confirm certain premises of conservation — for example, the notion that a material artifact *represents* the culture that created it, providing evidence of the culture’s authenticity. The overlap of historicist and culturalist ideas in the fields of conservation and urban planning has yet to be explored.⁶⁵

The modern practice of conservation — what I will call the “historicist approach” — has produced various tools for the documentation and classification of “heritage.” Like other bureaucratic tools, they are used to translate local, context-based knowledge into theoretical knowledge that is used to order complex social and material phenomena.⁶⁶ Inventories, drawings, maps, texts and photographs are used to document historic buildings and cities, organizing them along an historical timeline that excludes the present. Disseminated via print and virtual media, these representations document an ostensibly “objective” view of the past. Because of the “irreversibility of the historical timeline,” cultural heritage resources are considered “non-renewable.”⁶⁷ But this borrowing from the environmental movement is misleading, particu-

larly in areas of the world where traditional techniques persist: it sees cultural heritage as a product that cannot be rebuilt, rather than as a *process* that is self-renewing.

I would argue that it is the historicist approach to conservation, rather than conservation per se, that is new to Yemen.⁶⁸ By positing a divide between past and present, the historicist approach has the effect of making the past alien. Yet as many observers have noted, the past continues to be a meaningful part of the present in Yemen. This past is not the past of historians, but rather a past that is continually performed and validated in the present, in response to changing conditions. In contrast to textual representations that codify the past, performance involves improvisation within culturally accepted frameworks of practice and aesthetics.⁶⁹ Performance of the past can be understood as “tradition”: not the mechanical reproduction of forms, but rather “an interpretive process that embodies both continuity and discontinuity. . . . [It is] a process of thought — an ongoing interpretation of the past.”⁷⁰ It is this kind of interpretive process that shaped the old city of Sana’a, and is still alive today.

It is tempting to suggest that the text-based, historicist approach to conservation be discarded in favor of a practice-based, performative approach. But conditions have changed in the context of capitalist modernity: change is often no longer a matter of assimilating new concepts and practices within an existing framework, but rather of embracing new systems that undermine the framework itself. One anthropologist has noted that tribal poetry may die out in Yemen because of competing values transmitted via the educational system — for example, the privileging of text over spoken language, and standard Arabic over dialect.⁷¹ In much the same way, local construction practices may die out as new values are embraced — for example, the privileging of abstract representations (drawings, specifications and estimates) over embodied practice. The “rationalization” of construction is naturalized in both architectural and economic discourses, but it is largely driven by ideology: cost and efficiency take precedence over social and environmental concerns, the building of local economies, and the creative role of labor. Like modern construction, the historicist approach to conservation tends to privilege abstract representations over practice. It would appear, then, that local building practice is threatened on two fronts: on the one hand, by new constructive systems that ultimately undermine its conceptual, social, and aesthetic framework; and on the other by conservation, which tends to reify it.

What is the future of traditional building practice in this context? I would like to suggest that a new and critical kind of conservation is already emerging in Yemen from the synthesis of historicist and performative approaches to the past.

In many areas of the world that experienced modernization, historicism tended to replace traditional building practices as the latter were subsumed within modern constructive systems. Due to the rapid pace of change in Yemen, the situation is different: traditional builders continue to practice, and have found validation for their work in historicism. They use not only the language of historicism but its tools: for example, an exceptional documentary work on Sana’ani building practice is used by at least one builder as a reference manual and in training (FIGS. 16, 17).


Historicist tools and concepts have to some extent been absorbed in the performance of “tradition” — not only by builders but to some extent, by residents who would like to see the old city rebuilt “exactly as it was.” This is consistent with the definition of tradition, which has always absorbed concepts and tools and has in turn been transformed by them. At the same time, the “past as performance” appears to check the historicist tendency to reduce traditional building to representation. International strictures against rebuilding seem to be generally ignored in favor of performative re-creations that make little attempt to distinguish old from new. Like builders, architects freely “perform” the past, making use of builders’ skills and creative abilities, and often inventing new *turath* to accommodate changing needs. Significantly, architects and builders seem to agree on a culturally constructed framework of tradition; for both groups, historicist documentation helps to establish the parameters of that framework. This framework can also check the tendency of state and corporate actors to co-opt and homogenize “tradition” in their pursuit of political or commercial goals.⁷²

The synthesis of performative and historicist approaches, then, may allow a city to be both “living” and “historic,” accommodating change within the context of an accepted aesthetic. This synthesis can be crafted into a accepted policy for conservation at the national, regional and local levels. Such a policy would be prescriptive as well as proscriptive, conceiving of conservation as a fundamentally creative process rather than as a means to preserve products. It would recognize and promote builders as independent agents and full partners in conservation. At the same time, historicism would help to establish the framework for change — not by reifying forms, but by demonstrating their relevance and adaptability to present conditions. Such an approach to conservation is fundamentally *critical*, in that it interrogates received notions of modernity and identity that are embedded in both modernization and conservation discourses. As such, it shifts attention from historical images to evolving images.⁷³ Such a critical approach to conservation may help to sustain the special qualities of Sana’ani and other local architectures in the face of two global ideologies.



FIGURE 16 (RIGHT). A new door opening in a recent restoration, designed after the middle drawing in Figure 17 (the builder is the son of the usta whose work is shown in Figure 12).

FIGURE 17. (BELOW) Page from a documentary work on Yemeni building crafts. S. Sallam, "Al-hiraf at-taqlidiyya al-islamiyya fi al-'amara al-yamaniyya" ("Traditional Islamic Crafts in Yemeni Architecture"), unpublished Masters thesis, Department of Fine Arts, University of Cairo, 1988. Reprinted by permission of author.



NOTES AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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1. "The main point about modernism," writes historian and critic Alan Colquhoun, ". . . was that it stood for a change in the relationship between the present and the past. . . ." For Alois Riegl, one of the seminal thinkers of modern conservation theory, the "age value" of monuments was meaningful because of its *contrast* to the new. This "corresponds closely to the ideas of the Modern Movement, in which the preservation of historical monuments sometimes went hand in hand with the destruction and rebuilding of the city. . . . Historical works have here lost their meaning as part of the fabric of time and space and are preserved as emblems of a generalized and superseded past" ("Newness and Age Value in Alois Riegl," *Modernity and the Classical Tradition: Architectural Essays, 1980–1957* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), p.220.

The relationship between conservation and modernity has been discussed by F. Choay, *Invention of the Historic Monument*, L.M. O'Connell, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); D. Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and P. Haughey, "Oppression and Resistance: Historic Preservation in the Politics of Modernity," unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Architecture, University of Washington, 2001.

2. F. Matero and J.M. Teutonico, "Managing Change: Sustainable Approaches to the Conservation of the Built Environment," paper delivered at the Fourth US/ICOMOS International Symposium, Philadelphia, April 6–8, 2001; and M.A. Hewitt, "Architecture for a Contingent Environment," *Journal of Architectural Education*, Vol.47 No.4 (May 1994).

3. The development of conservation standards relevant to different cultures and regions has been the focus of various charters as well as expert missions. The Getty Conservation

Institute and the Australian Heritage Commission, for example, are currently working with the Chinese government to develop the so-called "China Principles" for the conservation of Chinese cultural heritage (J.M. Teutonico, personal communication). The approach of "cultural relativism" in conservation developed from experience at Native American sites (F. Matero, personal conversation). See articles in *CRM/Conservation Resource Management*, a publication of the U.S. Department of the Interior/National Park Service: D. Cushman, "When Worlds Collide: Indians, Archaeologists, and the Preservation of Traditional Cultural Properties," *CRM* 16 (1996), pp.49–54; S.T. Greiser and T.W. Greiser, "Two Views of the World," *CRM* 16 (1996), pp.9–11; and D. Hems, "Abandoning the Cult of the Artifact," *CRM* 4 (1997), pp.14–16.

4. See, for example, various case studies in N. ALSayyad, ed., *Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage: Global Norms and Urban Forms in the Age of Tourism* (London: Routledge, 2001).

5. One author describes conservation that serves local and community needs as "criticism in action" (S.S. Townshend, "Architectural Conservation in the Dawning Second Republic," *Architecture SA*, May/June 1993). Such criticism takes on special relevance in a globalized world. Scholars in various disciplines have recently begun to consider the role of local knowledge and methods in constructing "alternative modernities," or more radically, "alternatives to modernity." The latter approach, in particular, goes beyond the mere domestication of Western knowledge and practices, arguing instead for their radical reformulation according to local epistemological systems. See W. Mignolo, *Local Histories, Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and A. Escobar, "Culture Sits in Places," *Political Geography*, Vol.20 No.2, pp.139–74.

6. See, for example, G.A. Krishna Menon, "Conservation in India: A Search for Direction," *Architecture + Design* (1989), pp.22–27; and "Rethinking the Venice

Charter: The Indian Experience," *International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments Working Paper Series*, Vol.40 (1992).

7. According to medieval historians, the city was founded by Shem (Sam), the son of the Prophet Nuh (Noah). For a discussion of the city's founding myths and their modern uses, see F. Mermier, "Les Fondations Mythiques de Sanaa et d'Aden," *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Mediterranee*, Vol.67 (special issue, "Le Yemen, Présent et Passé") (1994), pp.131–39.

The most comprehensive source for the history and architecture of Sana'a before the 1962 revolution is still R.B. Serjeant and R. Lewcock, eds., *Sana'a: An Arabian-Islamic City* (London: World of Islam Festival Trust, 1983). See also R. Lewcock, *The Old Walled City of Sana'a* (Paris: UNESCO, 1986); and H. Kopp and E. Wirth, *Sana'a: Développement et Organisation de l'Espace d'une Ville Arabe*, Cahiers de l'Institut de Recherches et d'Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman (IREMAM), CNRS-Universités d'Aix Marseilles, 1994. The latter work includes a discussion of the history of Sana'a after the 1962 revolution; for this period see also G. Grandguillaume et al., eds., *Sanaa hors les Murs: Une Ville Arabe Contemporaine*, Collection Villes du Monde Arabe, Vol.1, (Tours: URBAMA, 1995); and F. Varanda, "Tradition and Change in the Built Space of Yemen," unpublished diss., Department of Geography, University of Durham, U.K., 1994. Paul Bonenfant has produced a number of important works on Sana'a, especially the edited volume *Sanaa: Architecture Domestique et Societe* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1995).

8. The Zaydi dynasty was established in the tenth century and lasted until the mid-twentieth century, although the extent of its rule varied considerably. It is associated with a restrained form of Shi'ism which, for example, disapproves of the veneration of saints. The highland tribes have historically been Zaydis, and have dominated the Sunnis with or without the encouragement of the imams. See P. Dresch, *Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen* (New York: Oxford Press, 1989), p.11.

9. Two Ottoman occupations (1538–1635 and 1872–1918) did not bring the kind of cultural domination that accompanied European colonization elsewhere in the region; nor did Yemen's modest petroleum reserves attract the kind of foreign intervention that occurred in neighboring states. Even the British occupation of Aden (1839–1967) at the southern tip of the peninsula did not radically transform the tribal structure, but allowed for the emergence of a modernizing elite (G. Grandguillaume, "Sanaa, Ville d'Arabie," in Grandguillaume et al., eds., *Sanaa Hors les Murs*, pp.4–6).

10. Tribal custom prevented the sale of land to individuals outside the tribe. When a capitalist land market emerged after the end of the civil conflict (1970), this custom began to lose its force, and tribesmen began to engage in speculation (Kopp and Wirth, *Sana'a*, pp.43–44, 52–55). Kopp and Wirth do not mention endowed agricultural land outside the walls, but I have heard this from various informants. Much of the endowed land was confiscated or illegally purchased after the revolution — since in principle endowed property (*waqf*) property cannot be sold.

11. North Yemen was the unofficial name of the Yemen Arab Republic. South Yemen, or the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), was created in 1967; it consisted of the southern and eastern portions of contemporary Yemen, with Aden as its capital. The two Yemens were united in 1990.

12. P. Costa, "Sana'a," in R.B. Serjeant, ed., *The Islamic City* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980); and M. Murayt, formerly of the Ministry of Public Works, interview.

13. Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, former Prime Minister, interview.

14. M. Murayt and R. Lewcock, interviews; P. Costa, "Sana'a."

15. Kopp and Wirth, *Sana'a*, p.11.

16. A water supply system for Sana'a was installed in several phases between 1975 and 1982, beginning with the old city. In addition to the absence of sewerage and drainage, faulty pipes and workmanship caused extensive leaking which was exacerbated as water pressure within the system improved. Cisterns overflowed almost immediately, and water soaked into the ground, trapped above a perched water table. This led to disastrous consequences for the

tower houses: by 1982, thirty houses had collapsed (Ron Lewcock, interview; and P.I. Helmore, "Water Supply, Sewerage, and Drainage," consultant report for UNESCO/Campaign to Save Old Sana'a, 1982). The situation has been partially remediated by the installation of a sewerage system and the upgrading of the water supply system; in some areas, the latter is still in process. But according to builders, groundwater continues to be the source of 90 percent of structural problems in houses. 17. The concept of the international safeguarding campaign grew out of UNESCO's rescue of the temples of Nubia, which would have been inundated with the building of Lake Nasser. The success of this project led to the World Heritage Convention of 1972 and the formalization of the safeguarding campaign as a strategy. A list of prospective "World Heritage Sites" was compiled in the mid-1970s, and the idea of the safeguarding campaign was promoted to nations where these sites were located. The strategy was first applied to the cities of Cairo and Fez, which were listed in 1979 and 1981 respectively — although the World Heritage Convention itself was oriented to the safeguarding of ruins and archeological sites (Hadi Saliba, UNDP-Sana'a, and Selma ar-Radi, archeologist and conservator, interviews).

The initial impetus for the safeguarding of Sana'a may have been Pasolini's film "Le Mura di Sana'a" (1971), which appealed to UNESCO to save the city. This was followed by the Cambridge University expedition to Yemen (1972) and exhibit (1973); and in 1976, by the heavily attended international exhibition "Nomad and City," held at the British Museum as part of the World of Islam Festival. The long-awaited study of the Cambridge expedition, edited by Lewcock and Serjeant (*Sana'a, An Arabian-Islamic City*), was finally published in 1983, although parts of it had been available earlier.

Although the Sana'a Campaign was not officially launched until 1984 and the city was not listed as a World Heritage site until 1986, actual work began earlier. Several UNESCO missions to Sana'a in the late 1970s and early 1980s laid groundwork on site. Important contributions were also made from 1981 by the partnership of Quaroni and Bonifica, sponsored by the

Department of Antiquities and financed by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Two young Yemenis — Ahmad al-Ibbi, an architect, and Ali Oshaish, an engineer — were instrumental in securing the support of government officials; when the Ministry of Works agreed to second them for the purpose of developing a strategy, the campaign became a practical reality. Ronald Lewcock, who had carried out UNESCO missions to Sana'a and Shibam, served as UNESCO's coordinator for the campaigns in both cities. Conservation efforts in Fez, Cairo and Tunis were among the models consulted in the preparation of the strategy for Sana'a (Ron Lewcock and Ali Oshaish, interviews).

18. G. Boccardi and R. Lewcock, personal conversations. There were a few exceptions, notably Dutch and German contributions for street paving. Some twenty countries contributed funds for the restoration of individual monuments. For the campaign philosophy and a list of projects — only some of which have been realized — see B. Lane, "San'a: Pilot Restoration Projects for the International Campaign to Safeguard the Old City of San'a," General Organization for the Protection of the Historic Cities of Yemen (GOPHCY), UNDP-UNESCO Report YEM/88/06 (1988).

19. The architects argued that the problem of groundwater, in particular, must be resolved before any building restorations were undertaken. Why restore buildings if they would soon collapse? (R. Lewcock, interview).

20. Qadi Ali Abu Rijal and Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, interviews.

21. See M. Yoshida, "Conservation-Based Development of Historic Cities: the Case of the Old City of San'a in Yemen," *Regional Development Studies*, Vol.1 (winter 1994/5), pp.143–70.

22. "The minimal coordination that takes place between the donor nations and GOPHCY is not inscribed in a comprehensive plan based on urbanistic, social, and economic criteria. . . . Only an external vision, marked by an often reductive aestheticism, seems to prevail notably among the foreign experts, usually architects, involved in these projects. The perception of the old city is sustained by the nostalgia for a golden age, a lost harmony, coupled with the specter of an urban

archipelago isolated from the rest of the city. This ideology of heritage, that conceives the *intramuros* area as an open-air museum and its inhabitants as the last representatives of an endangered species, has colored the elaboration of most of the projects undertaken until now" (F. Mermier, "Sana'a, Metaphore de l'Etat Yemenite," in Grandguillaume, ed., *Sana'a Hors les Murs*, p.50, translation mine).

23. Urban conservation developed alongside the new field of urban planning in the last decades of the nineteenth century, but this has not been adequately considered in the histories of either discipline.

24. In the early 1970s modernist plans for Sana'a, promoted by Egyptian and Saudi consultants, were criticized by U.N. experts who advocated local models and the protection of the old city. In 1978 L. Berger Kampsak's Master Plan for Sana'a and four other cities called for the conservation of the old city of Sana'a (Varanda, "Tradition and Change in the Built Space of Yemen," pp.135,226–27).

25. As a result of the government's opposition to the war, 800,000 to 1,000,000 Yemeni workers were deported by the Gulf states. Their sudden return led to the crash of an artificially inflated economy: they required housing and services and flooded the labor market. The value of the Yemeni riyal began a sharp decline, resulting in a dramatic decrease in income and prices.

26. Mermier, "Sana'a, Metaphore de l'Etat Yemenite," p.52.

27. Tariq al-Hamadi, Director of Legal Affairs, GOPHCY, personal conversation.

28. J. Lambert, "Comsommation de Masse et Tradition a Sana'a: Vers une Culture Urbaine," in Grandguillaume, ed., *Sana'a Hors les Murs*, p.92. Similar sentiments were voiced by several informants.

29. The term *bayt* is used to signify the house and the family that resides in it. It also refers to a form of ownership — the family endowment — that aims to maintain the indivision of property, and thus reinforces the tie between the family line and the house (P. Bonnenfant, "Maisons. Voisins, et Exterieur," in Bonnenfant, ed., *Sana'a: Architecture Domestique et Societe*, pp.65–66).

30. The Arabic terminology follows and essentially translates the French term *patri-moine*, which was also used to evoke a new,

collective concept of inheritance (A. al-Habashi, personal conversation).

31. Walls are typically built of concrete block instead of stone and fired brick (*yajur*). Where stone is used, it is often machine-cut (*manshur*) rather than hand-finished (*muwaqqis*), although machine-finishing is technically prohibited in the old city. Ceiling/floor systems use imported milled woods of standard sections instead of what builders call *baladi* ("domestic," typically *'ilb* for beams). Floor surfaces above are cement on plywood. Interiors are often finished in traditional plasterwork.

The use of structural concrete, hidden from view or disguised by brick veneer, has been much debated among conservation professionals. Some see it as a natural evolution of building practice, while others feel it changes the character and qualities of the architecture.

32. Abdullah ad-Dailami, Director, Cultural Heritage Unit, Social Fund for Development (interview, November 2003).

33. "Draft Law for the Conservation of Historic Cities, Areas, and Monuments, 2004."

34. Funds budgeted for homeowner compensation — for example, in cases of damage from street paving or burst pipes — are diverted to provide small loans for house repair. But the number and amounts of these loans is insufficient; moreover, the use of compensation funds for this purpose has been challenged on legal grounds by the Ministry of Finance. A "heritage fund" was established several years ago by ministerial decree, funded by taxes on several high-volume consumer products. To date, however, these funds have not been requested for projects (Tariq al-Hamadi, personal conversation).

A recent project, funded by the Social Fund for Development, was conceived as part of improvements for Sana'a's turn as Cultural Capital of the Arab World in 2004. Intended as a pilot project, it restored five adjacent house facades and repaired interior structure and spaces that affected the facades. In contrast to a similar project in Shibam-Hadhramaut, which requires residents to request improvements and to pay 70 percent of the costs, in Sana'a participants were selected because of the architec-

tural quality of their houses and their prominent location on the east bank of the *wadi*. They were required to pay only 30 percent of the costs, but to date none have paid; builders are hoping for compensation from the Mayor's office.

35. The restoration of two exemplary tower houses according to "scientific" conservation standards in the early 1990s is now seen by most local and foreign professionals as misguided. One of the projects, financed by Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and executed by Italian firms, made extensive use of techniques like concrete injections. These methods are now seen as expensive and unnecessary, especially when local builders could have stabilized the building using traditional techniques. "The Italian attitude was, 'Let's save these stones,'" said an Italian architect who assisted on the project. "An *usta* [local builder] would have said, 'Let's rebuild.'" Despite thoughtful interior planning and details, the project did not produce a replicable model, as the architect had hoped. This project, as well as another house restored by a Swiss-Yemeni team, also ran into legal problems. While GOPHCY claims that the owners had agreed to sell the houses to the state after restoration, the owners disputed the claim and have refused to sell. The Swiss project was the focus of a controversy that reveals much about how such conservation efforts were perceived (see Mermier, "Sana'a, Metaphore de l'Etat Yemenite," pp.50–52).

36. By the mid-1970s, 20 percent of houses in Sana'a were being built in concrete (Varanda, "Tradition and Change in the Built Space of Yemen," p.158).

37. Varanda, "Tradition and Change in the Built Space of Yemen," pp.156–58.

38. In several important and insightful works on building practice in Sana'a (see below), Trevor Marchand notes that conservation has led to increased patronage for builders trained in traditional methods; he attributes this to the rise in cost of imported materials during the economic crisis of the early 1990s. However, I have found no evidence to support this. Builders and architects have told me that *all* materials became more expensive as a result of the economic crisis. The prices of traditional materials — especially structural wood and the particular

type of brick used in old work — have continued to increase due to their scarcity.

39. “When I first built next to my father’s work, I felt ashamed,” said one builder who specializes in traditional construction. “But gradually I learned from his work, and came to feel proud.”

40. Krishna Menon has noted a similar phenomenon in India, where builders work within a system that is alien in conception, and whose goals they are not asked to help define (“Rethinking the Venice Charter,” pp.51–52).

41. T. Marchand, “Process over Product: Case Studies of Traditional Building Practices in Djenné, Mali and Sana’a, Yemen,” *Managing Change: Sustainable Approaches to the Built Environment*, Proceedings of the 4th Annual US/ICOMOS International Symposium, Philadelphia, April 2001 (Los Angeles: the Getty Conservation Institute, 2003), p.139.

42. These attempts to adapt procedures to the special requirements of cultural heritage projects have been described to me by Abdullah ad-Dailami, Director of the Cultural Heritage Unit; Nabil al-Maqalih, Project Officer; and other project managers at the SFD.

43. See note 34 above.

44. T. Marchand, *Minaret Building and Apprenticeship in Yemen* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), pp.176–79.

45. Omar Abd al-Aziz Hallaj, project manager for GTZ. The SFD/GTZ project recognizes the need to maintain and upgrade houses in Shibam using traditional methods; it thus incorporates a loan program which, in contrast to the pilot project in Sana’a (see note 35), requires owners to pay 70 percent of costs. The project also includes an infrastructure component: a sewer and drainage system will be installed through community-based contracting — that is, without general contractors (Abdullah ad-Dailami, SFD, personal conversation).

46. This objection can and should easily be overcome, especially since laws at the same level are allowed to conflict as long as they do not conflict with the constitution (T. al-Hamadi, personal conversation).

47. In the draft law that accompanied his famous essay “The Modern Cult of Monuments,” Riegl suggested that the period of time required for a monument to acquire

“age value” was sixty years; roughly this same period of time is used in most conservation legislation. See “Progetto di un’organizzazione legislativa della tutela dei monumenti in Austria,” in S. Scarrocchia, ed., *Alois Riegl: Teoria e Prassi della Conservazione dei Monumenti: Antologia di Scritti, Discorsi, Rapporti 1898–1905, con una Scelta di Saggi Critici* (Bologna: CLUEB, 1995), pp.212–21. For the concept of “age value,” see “The Modern Cult of Monuments,” K. Foster and D. Ghirardo, trans., *Oppositions*, Vol.25 (Fall 1982), pp.21–51. This essay is usually presented and analyzed in isolation from the larger legislative project which it was intended to introduce.

48. A. Riegl, “Progetto,” in Scarrocchia, ed., *Alois Riegl*, p.212 (translation mine).

49. These principles are contained in articles nine and twelve of the Venice Charter (1964), and are elaborated in B. Feilden and J. Jokilehto, *Management Guidelines for World Heritage Cultural Sites* (Rome: ICCROM, 1993).

50. R. Lewcock, personal conversation.

51. In the restoration of the Amiriyya *madrassa* (religious school) in Rada, for example, the chief *usta* continually tried to improvise, adding or changing details that he felt would improve the building. He had to be persuaded that as an historic monument, the restoration had to be faithful to the original (Selma ar-Radi, personal conversation).

52. Steven Caton has made a similar argument for tribal poetry (“*Peaks of Yemen I Summon*”: *Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe*) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, pp.35–36).

53. Theorists and practitioners concerned with the conservation of artifacts, architecture and cities have acknowledged that preservation involves change, material as well as social. But procedures and policies are generally aimed at masking or minimizing the apparent effects of change. While the discourse is internally consistent, it is not that different from the use of the term “tradition” in other societies and eras. Indeed, the ideological usefulness of the term “tradition” appears to lie in its ability to mask change.

54. Nabil al-Maqalih, Project Officer, SFD, personal conversation.

55. Builders differ in their opinions of such “innovation” within the historic fabric. The builder in charge of the restoration, while admitting the usefulness of the women’s center, said that it was a mistake to build a new building within the *marna* enclosure; it should be kept “as it was.” Another builder said it didn’t matter, since the enclosure still looks the same on the outside. The latter statement echoes international practice which tends to be concerned with the exterior of buildings: facades constitute public space, and thus “historic character.” Several Yemenis objected to this idea when it was presented in an Italian-led workshop in the early 1990s: “If the house is a whole that reflects the life of a society,” asked one architect, “why should different standards be applied to inside and outside?”

56. See, for example, the report on the Old City of Sana’a in the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Report of the Rapporteur, December 7–8, 2001, twenty-fifth session of the World Heritage Committee, Helsinki (<http://whc.unesco.org/archive/repburext01.pdf>).

57. Marchand, *Minaret Building in Yemen*, pp.235–36.

58. “The goals [of the campaign] are to convey [the] unique character of the [old medieval city] along with its sense of age and history, and to ensure the preservation and protection of [its] way of life as much as possible for those who desire it.

Underlying these aims, however, is a recognition of the importance of carrying the burden of history without stifling urban life so that the population is encouraged to change and upgrade its way of life while still retaining the best of the past” (M.B. Lane, “The Campaign Plan of Action,” *San’a: Pilot Restoration Projects*, p.15).

59. Steven Caton, personal conversation.

60. A city can be listed as a World Heritage site if it is “an outstanding example of traditional human settlement or land use which is representative of a culture (or cultures) especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change” (Feilden and Jokilehto, *Management Guidelines for World Heritage Cultural Sites*, p.6.) As Samia Rab’ notes, it is the “repre-

sentative rather than [the] associative nature [of cultural resources] that renders them worth conserving" ("Authenticity in Cultural Heritage Management: Reassessing the International Charters of Restoration & Conservation," unpublished paper, March 2004, p.4).

61. The term *sugisation* was coined by architect Jacques Feiner and sociologist Hadi Eckert, who were involved in various conservation projects and studies in Sana'a and elsewhere in Yemen. In his dissertation ("La Vielle Ville de Sana'a: Analyse Morphologique comme Fondement de la Sauvegarde Patrimoniale," doctoral thesis no. 1652, Department of Architecture, Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne, 1997), Feiner argued that installing shops on the ground floor of houses led families to vacate because the privacy of women was compromised. These families would then leave their houses, renting out the upper floors or leaving them vacant. These floors would be neglected and fall into disrepair, and ultimately the house would collapse. Feiner's theory has been embraced by many conservation planners in Sana'a. But it appears that many homeowners continue to inhabit houses with shops on the ground floor, some of which have existed for many years. Some residents have told me that the shops in residential areas do not compromise privacy; on the contrary, they make life more convenient. Others, however, have said that "no one would agree to live in a house with a shop on the ground floor." These contradictory reports may be explained by the disjuncture between the image and the reality of the old city. Values and customs are changing, in part as a result of the market economy — for example, increasing numbers of homeowners are renting floors to unrelated families, a change that would for many have been unthinkable some decades earlier. The old values and ways continue to be confirmed verbally, though they are often contradicted by practice.

62. See, for example, E. Concina, *Venezia nell'età moderna* (Venezia: Marsilio, 1989), maps II–IV.

63. Despite attempts of the last decade to broaden the definition of authenticity, it continues to be understood primarily in

material terms. See Feilden and Jokilehto, *Management Guidelines*, pp.16–17.

64. R. Handler, "Authenticity," *Anthropology Today*, Vol.2 No.1 (1988); and G. Wright, *The Politics of French Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), chapter 2.

65. Gwendolyn Wright discusses links between the new disciplines of urban planning and the social sciences in French colonies in North Africa and Asia (see footnote above), while S. Hamadeh looks at the idea of the "traditional city" in urban historiography and its influence on colonial conservation policies in Algiers and Tunis. S. Hamadeh, "Creating the Traditional City: A French Project," in N. AlSayyad, ed., *Forms of Dominance: On the Architecture and Urbanism of the Colonial Experience* (Aldershot: Avebury Press, 1992), pp.241–59.

66. See J.C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

67. Feilden and Jokilehto, *Management Guidelines*, p.16.

68. One conservation professional noted that conservation and sustainability (*istidama*) are old concepts, embodied in practices like maintenance, reuse, and the recycling of water and solid wastes. "Why do we always have to look to Europe for concepts that we already have?" he asked.

Alaa el-Habashi has argued that the *waqf* system encompassed a "traditional" approach to conservation: endowment deeds provided for maintenance and restoration, based on social utility rather than aesthetic criteria. This approach was supplanted by a new type of conservation brought to Cairo by the French in the nineteenth century. Although the new approach was alien, El-Habashi concedes that it saved much of the historic area of Cairo in the drive to modernize. See "Athar to Monuments: The Intervention of the Comité de Conservation des Monuments de l'Art Arabe," Department of Art History, University of Pennsylvania, 2001.

69. S. Caton, "Peaks of Yemen I Summon"; and personal conversation. Paul Dresch discusses the interweaving of past and pre-

sent in tribal histories and in the construction of the Yemeni state. (*Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen* (New York: Oxford Press, 1989, pp.30–31.)

70. R. Handler and J. Linnekin, "Tradition, Genuine or Spurious?" *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol.97 (1984), pp.273–74.


71. S. Caton, personal conversation.

72. An interesting case in point is the mass plastering of house facades in Sana'a to mark the city's turn as Cultural Capital of the Arab World (2004). This YR 65,000,000 (U.S. \$350,000) project was initiated in December 2003 by the Ministry of Culture, apparently without the consultation of local experts. The conception and execution of the project have been criticized by local and foreign architects and conservators, as well as by *ustas* and workers who were hired to carry out the work.

Representatives of the Ministry have defended the project by invoking "tradition," that is, the periodic replacement of plaster on house facades. But the techniques used do not follow traditional practice: plaster was applied thickly and using trowels, rather than by hand; worse, old plaster was scraped off, damaging the surface of the brick and in some cases destroying historic decoration, as on the minaret of al-Abhar mosque. No documentation or technical studies were carried out on monumental structures before the work was carried out. As a member of the World Heritage Committee noted, the use of a single method for monumental structures and houses has tended to homogenize the varied character of the architecture. Although the project could not be stopped — in part because of apparent support from the community — the intervention of the World Heritage Committee persuaded the Ministry to modify its techniques. In this case, local practice was defended by an international agency, which was able to wield more influence than local professionals and *ustas*.

73. Krishna Menon, "Conservation in India: A Search for Direction," pp.25–27.

All photos are by the author unless otherwise noted.



Utopia or Euphoria? Six Sites of Resistance in Disneyland and Singapore

EUNICE SENG

Why are the spaces of Disneyland and Singapore, despite their totalizing tendencies, duplicable, or even desirable? In trying to answer this question, this article begins by identifying six shared utopian projects of Disney and Singapore — Island, Garden City, Housing, Leisure, Travel, and Technology — and the collective for whom they were constructed. Then, by seeking out six other spaces which emerged during the realization of these Cold War utopias, it aims to uncover alternative agencies and forms of power which undermine and reconfigure the original projects. Through this analysis, the article demonstrates that despite the academic and ironic parallels between Disneyland and Singapore as totalizing spaces of consumption, Singapore remains a place whose inhabitants must practice everyday life. This work in progress therefore attempts to evaluate the island state beyond the totalitarian frame — as a sustainable place imbued with political discourse, grappling with issues that confront all postindustrial cities.

Not the least unexpected thing about the 1960s was its reinvention of the question of Utopia.
— Fredric Jameson¹

A review of the utopian projects of Disney and Singapore is imperative and overdue. For years academics and other intellectuals have attacked these spaces, while ignoring the historical, political and economic forces which give them meaning. These attacks are typically launched from an ideological critique of totalitarianism and commodification.² Disney Company critiques are often driven by the need to expose the dominant values of the company or the hidden connections between the happy myth of “the wonderful world of Disney” and the ruthless economic logic of its accumulation strategies and totalizing control. Writings on Singapore typically portray the island nation as a totalitarian state whose middle-class citizenry is a repressed and desublimated mass.³

Eunice Seng is a Ph.D. candidate in the Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation at Columbia University in New York City.

Within architectural discourse, the case against utopian projects like Singapore and Disneyland has perhaps been most forcefully presented by Manfredo Tafuri. In the early 1970s he identified the crisis of utopia as a consequence of capitalist development, concluding that the project of the Enlightenment had witnessed its ultimate degeneration in the paper visions of 1960s neo-avant-garde architects. He argued that their overzealous embrace of new modes of production and institutional reform had produced an image which was merely “a decorative enhancement of the metropolitan chaos it once aspired to dominate.”⁴ For Tafuri, these new strategies would “remain limited to mere fragments which only marginally affect the global setup.”⁵ And by the mid-1980s it seemed his skepticism had been borne out, as such dreams of a global restructuring of cities and territories finally fizzled when it became evident that they offered no real alternatives to the existing social, economic and political structures of advanced capitalism.

Despite the intellectual crisis of utopia and the impossibility of such realizations, it was in America and Singapore that the proliferating technological worlds envisioned by these architects were most extensively reproduced and perpetuated.⁶ Guy Debord’s *Society of the Spectacle* found its ultimate expression in Disneyland; and even Tafuri conceded that Disneyland came closest to the technological utopias envisioned by the 1960s visionaries.⁷ Likewise, those who decried the unequivocal totalitarianism of modernism pointed out how the newly independent, modern nation-state of Singapore bore an uncanny resemblance to the repressive society of George Orwell’s 1984.

The symmetry between Disneyland and Singapore was first articulated by Rem Koolhaas when he described Singapore as a “Barthian slate,” and by William Gibson who pronounced the tropical city “Disneyland with the Death Penalty.”⁸ But the correspondence between the two environments goes beyond simple shared ironic readings or semiotic parallels. Indeed, amidst the global climate of post-World War II reconstruction and decolonization, both urban paradigms emerged from the double-contexts of state and corporate formation. Thus, Disneyland became a theme park operated like a public state by the Disney Company, and Singapore became an island run like a corporate enterprise by a state government.

Despite a recognition of such symmetries, the aim of this article is not to fixate on rhetorical parallels between the company (Disney) and the state (Singapore). Certainly, both reveal pervasive Cold War ideologies of global economy, technology, and networked communication. Yet while Disneyland is a space in which people willingly suspend their rights to political discourse as part of a consumer experience, Singapore (despite its self-identification as Singapore, Inc.) is a place where inhabitants must practice everyday life. The question therefore becomes why these spaces remain popular among the large number of people who live, work

and play in them, while they are simultaneously rejected by intellectual elites and academicians, who lash out at their totalizing tendencies. Why are the urbanisms of Disney and Singapore still duplicable — or even desirable?

A two-fold explanation may underlie the proliferation and sustainability of these environments. The first aspect rests on the way the urbanisms of Disneyland and Singapore were both born out of modernization’s theory of progress and betterment through technology. Simultaneously, the Cold War allowed a dissemination of mass paranoia and provided a pretext for both the state and the corporation to alleviate public fears by propagating utopian images of technology and consumption. Subsequently, in a post-Cold War era defined by the paradoxes of advanced technology and the heightened anxiety of city life, these spaces have continued to offer desirable, protected, and self-sufficient environments.

Beyond the categorical symmetry of the two urbanisms, however, Singapore — as place and political space — also remains sought-after because of its reflexivity to global and local inflections in economy, technology, and body-politics. Thus, the second aspect of the explanation takes its cue on the one hand from Michel Foucault’s notion of bio-power and the biopolitic as exercised on the level of everyday life, and on the other from Henri Lefebvre’s call for a praxis utopia.⁹

SIX UTOPIAS

The 1955 opening of Walt Disney’s planned “new world” coincided with the national project of the “American Century,” an era to be defined by America’s military might and technological prowess.¹⁰ Disney’s role as an exemplary figure in the forefront of this new empire was celebrated in the popular press, which heralded him as an avuncular Horatio Alger, an ordinary man whose career was a living demonstration that the American Dream could be realized.¹¹

A decade later, in 1965, following its decision to separate from the rest of Malaya, Singapore emerged as an independent state. From the outset, surrounded by larger and potentially aggressive neighbors, its single-party government, led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, argued that the only way to forge a cohesive nation was to embark on the “neutral” but aggressive project of economic development. The urban paradigms of both Disney and Singapore thus were built on the trope of one man’s dream for a new community free from poverty and the ravages of war. However, they also displayed a number of other ideological similarities that were typical of what other writers have referred to as an island-settler myth.¹² Among these were a belief in an empty and waiting land, or *tabula rasa*; a desire to tame this wilderness into familiarity and orderliness; a faith in technical solutions to conquer natural problems; a belief that individuals are isolated and self-sufficient; a sense of both being on a journey, yet having arrived; and a sense of the goal of settlement as being

improvement, or progress. At both Disneyland and Singapore these characteristics eventually translated into six forms of utopia: Island, Garden City, Housing, Theme Park, Travel, and Technology.

Despite the power of these visions, during the construction and planning — the dystopian realization — of the six utopian projects, six “other spaces” emerged under the guise of their totalizing processes. One may identify these “other spaces” using Foucault’s six nonhierarchical principles of heterotopia.¹³ Foucault’s persistent critique of state totalitarianism caused him to search for and analyze alternative schema for understanding how culture may produce different types of subjects. In doing so, he turned to subterranean processes embedded within existing totalizing power structures. Ultimately, his celebration of heterotopias was an attempt to locate such agencies. It would also be in such “other spaces” within Disney and Singapore that alternative arrangements and counter-projects, planned and unplanned resistances, would come to be located. And even today, these spaces of resistance continue to inform the patterns of settlement, organization, and forms of architecture envisioned by their original authors. Displaced from the state’s *modus operandi*, such sites of resistance reveal individuals and collective groups negotiating and appropriating the planned spaces of the city through adaptive tactics and everyday practices.

Today, the financial and planning successes of Disney and Singapore are well understood. However, it is their ongoing resilience and the surprising contentment of citizens and visitors that continue to baffle critics. Such utopian fervor is in many respects tantamount to a state of euphoria. The association with pathological mania and fanaticism is not accidental. Indeed, it may be requisite to such a heightened form of success. To pursue the medical analogy, euphoria can be aroused by very different, but constant, states of emergency and insurgence. And quite often, the two conditions may coexist or occur in quick succession of each other. Thus, one common method for enforcing competitiveness and inducing growth is to create a state of crisis. While this may appear to produce a one-dimensional workforce, success at this endeavor also triggers a second, reactionary state to arise as a form of resistance based on renegotiations and counter-points. Ultimately, such new forms of euphoria, harbored in “other spaces,” will provide the necessary destabilizing forces to continually undermine the totalitarianism imposed by utopia.

ISLAND

As an island — its territory is known — it is endowed with indispensable elements for the construction of a mythology: it is small, it is threatened, it has to be protected, it is finite — an enclave — it is unique.

— Rem Koolhaas¹⁴

Like Thomas More’s social utopia, Disneyland and Singapore are islands (FIGS. 1A, B). Both are enclosed urban paradigms, but at the same time economically open territories operating within the global economy. As key nodes on the global map, they are destinations — planned, bounded and defined — as well as spaces of transit. They embody the tensions between openness and closure, which are mirrored by the physical characteristics of their built environments and everyday social conditions.

Disney’s first theme park was intended to be an idyllic, isolated place where there would be no sex, violence, crime, homelessness, or need to work. Any trace of the grittiness of everyday life was to be obliterated. Disneyland was thus the culmination of Walt Disney’s fantasies of transport and hygiene, “a showplace of beauty and magic, filled with the accomplishments, the joys, the hopes of the world we live in.”¹⁵

The government of Singapore, the People’s Action Party (PAP), shared such optimism that everyday life could be improved if the state were to improve people’s environment. In its case, the physical outcome would be a clean, green, orderly urban metropolis with low crime and delinquency rates — a modern version of founder Sir Stamford Raffles’s nineteenth-century social utopia.¹⁶

In practice, the operation of this mythic element at Disney theme parks involves the issuance of one-day “passports” to visitors, who are then encouraged to think of themselves as citizens of a magical land. As such, they often feel compelled to stay until they have exhausted the experience, maximizing their citizenship. From meals and shopping to rest kiosks and thrill rides, every care is taken to ensure they are happily preoccupied. Visitor-citizens are also persuaded to become stakeholders, and few ever leave without buying a toy, a t-shirt, a mug, a decal, a piece of the Disney vision.

However, as Chris Rojek has argued, visitors to Disney theme parks are not simply clean slates upon which to write ideology.¹⁷ When they visit Disney sites they may do so nostalgically, or even ironically, rather than as “true believers” — perceiving the parks as “unreliable museums of living facts.”¹⁸ Many of these visitors also do not fit neatly into the category of the ideologically naïve. Indeed, a specific possibility for recognizing irony arises when “semiotically exhausted” visitors self-assuredly set themselves apart from the happy masses.¹⁹ David Harris interviewed many such tourists of diverse backgrounds who were experienced in Disney’s “techniques of neutralization.”²⁰ His study suggested that such knowledgeable visitors uncover ordinary, quotidian behaviors which persist in Disney environments despite the regulated conformity. Beyond this stance, writing critically about Disney also seems to offer one of the last acceptable locations for academics to practice social differentiation and to demonstrate their commitment to non-popular values. In particular, new class structures appear to have arisen, where certain social or intellectual elitist groups prefer to be set apart from the mainstream by claiming an informed distaste for Disney’s commercialism.

FIGURE I. *Island utopia.*

A) Schematic view of Disneyland with steam train circumventing “the island.” Source: Poster by the Walt Disney Company, aerial painting by Herb Ryman, 1958.

B) 1823 sketch of the island of Singapore showing timber structures and detached houses.

Source: E.T.C. Chew and E. Lee, *A History of Singapore* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991). Reprinted by permission of author.



A.

B.



1. Historical 1823 sketch of Singapore from the original letter, photo and map: www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukiafrica

By contrast, postindependence Singapore was chaotic, disorganized, and ridden with crime, homelessness, and unhygienic conditions. However, after strategic assessment of its economy and society, the government decided to reposition the new island nation in the world economy as the financial center of the Far East. Above all, this strategy involved attracting multinational corporations by developing an affordable, well-trained workforce — creating what Lee Kuan Yew called a “First World oasis in a Third World region.”²¹ Singapore would thus establish First World standards in public and personal security, health, education, telecommunications, transportation and services; and it would become a regional haven for entrepreneurs, engineers, managers and other professionals. To achieve this goal, the reeducation of the population needed to be jump-started around the singular guiding principle of national survival. As the government defined it, this required a more rugged, better organized, and more efficient population than that of neighboring countries. And in exchange for extensive social benefits and interventions, the young citizenry would be expected to adhere to strict political, social and urban codes. The paternalistic PAP insisted that the cohesion of the racially diverse population required such a national ideology.²² Socially, this required the acceptance of state-sponsored family-planning and match-making schemes, national savings ini-

tiatives, and campaigns promoting racial harmony and multiculturalism. It further implied a highly censored local media, and a finely calibrated system of punishment was established for “antisocial” behavior.

Such programs have provided ample material for critics. Of these, Koolhaas’s reading of Singapore as a “generic city,” in particular, may be seen as based on an intellectual, elitist stance similar to that of Harris’s “knowledgeable” Disney visitors. Yet, Koolhaas (like William Gibson before him) also unwittingly assumed that Singapore society was little more than an undifferentiated mass under subjugation of the state. Likewise, Michael Haas has identified the Singapore political system as a populist democracy. Supported by a mass society, and governed by a social constitution without limits on the use of power, he argued such a form of government can only lead to a form of state police control.²³

What these writers fail to observe, however, is that within this highly planned island nation, other configurations have formed in the interstices of state control.²⁴ With regard to the physical environment, one of the most important was the Singapore Planning and Urban Research (SPUR) Group. Formed in 1965, SPUR’s primary aim was to provide alternatives to the city-renewal efforts of the new government. Comprising prominent independent intellectuals — mostly young architects, geographers, sociologists and planners educated in leading British and American universities — SPUR was hugely influenced by the ideas of Team X, the Metabolists, and the socialism of the journal *Ekistics*.²⁵ Among other things, SPUR protested government policies that showed disregard for public participation.²⁶ And in 1966 its members unveiled their own sketches for the “Asian City of Tomorrow.” These showed urban megastructures, with highrise dwellings and many levels of mixed activities amidst a network of parks and roads (FIG. 2).




FIGURE 2. SPUR's 1966 proposal for an Asian Future City. Source: SPUR 65–67, *Singapore*.

SPUR's fight for an alternative, nonsegregated, hybrid metropolis closely resembled the neo-avant-gardist visions of their Western counterparts.²⁷ But, more importantly, its numerous proposals provided a counterpoint to the government's more mainstream urban plans. Eventually, the proposals also provided the origins for such important public infrastructure schemes of the 1980s as the Mass Rapid Transit System and Changi Airport.²⁸ SPUR's limited but active local interventions, highly influenced by foreign-acquired ideologies, exemplified an infiltration of ideas into the supposedly closed process by which Singapore was being constructed.²⁹

What the SPUR proposals also point out is that despite its carefully maintained social isolation, the Singapore population is still exposed to external influences and ideologies. In 2000 a quarter of Singapore's population were noncitizens.³⁰ And besides specialized groups like SPUR, there is today a growing number of citizens with such insidious views. Yet like the seamless but contradictory urbanism of the island itself — for example, the constantly shifting defini-

tion of its shorelines³¹ — such people are elusive. Indeed, many do not physically reside in the island. Nevertheless, they exist within its political imagination. Thus, in a 1999 speech, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong attempted to identify two groups of citizens: the “cosmopolitan,” and their less mobile counterpart, the “heartlander.”³²

Cultural theorist Timothy Brennan has argued that the current period is already substantially cosmopolitan.³³ The cosmopolitan ideal of government envisions an all-encompassing representative structure in which members confer on a global scale. In *Flexible Citizenship*, Aihwa Ong recently suggested that newly affluent Asian immigrants, who have relocated their families and wealth to North America while continuing to pursue business interests in Asia, represent a new kind of disembedded citizenship.³⁴ In this regard, Singapore serves as a home base for many pursuing regional and international businesses; and conversely, businesses in Singapore are being pursued from other global bases.

It is further noteworthy that, based on responses within unmediated cyber-forums worldwide, displaced Singaporeans tend to see themselves as “heartlanders.”³⁵ At the very least, this seems to indicate that a reconsideration of Goh's citizen classification is timely. Whatever the case, the international community of Singaporeans tends to escape accountability by official census, and at present, can best be described as cosmopolitan.³⁶ For now, they traverse such global spaces as intellectual academies and financial institutions. Amid such overlapping commitments, the identity of the mobile citizen emerges — a wandering agent carrying superior technical knowledge, and capable of transforming his or her surroundings. Singapore's mobile, flexible citizenry, far from being a clichéd subjugated postcolonial diaspora, occupies many islands across the globe.

GARDEN CITY

One possible ideological source for the town-planning ideas of Disney and Singapore is Ebenezer Howard's *Garden Cities of To-morrow* (1902). Howard's solution to conflicts between town and country was to bring the town to the country and make the countryside fully available to the needs of the city. The ultimate objective was to relieve the congestion of the city, and by doing so, lower land values there and prepare the way for metropolitan reconstruction. Just as the garden was at once a fragment of a larger organic world and a microcosm of the same — a kind of universal heterotopia — both Singapore and Disney operate according to an internal organization that reflects a larger cultural logic. In both worlds, the intensification of gardens within gardens, theme parks within theme parks, worlds within worlds, is mediated by the ideals of national mobilization and mass social provision.

At Disney sites, the ideology of the garden in the park embraces a number of formal specifics to which the picturesque plan is as indispensable as the strict regulation of

circulation (REFER TO FIG.1). Sorkin observed that strategies of movement became the ultimate internal rationale and formal arbiter of the garden city. The results in Disney are similar: a single center with a radial plan, united by loops of circulation in picturesque settings. There is even an old-fashioned steam train that circumnavigates the perimeter.³⁷ To reinforce this picturesque garden quality, visitors to Disneyland are first greeted by an inclined bed of flower topiary in the shape of Mickey Mouse. Located in the center of a square, it is part of a small park-island with lawns, benches, and an American flag atop a tall mast.

Leo Marx has previously identified how the pastoral ideal has been used to give meaning to America ever since the age of its discovery, and he has noted that it has yet to lose its hold upon the native imagination.³⁸ The dream of a new life in a fresh, green landscape is embodied in various utopian schemes for making America the site of a new beginning for Western society.³⁹ Disney theme parks are manifest sites of such ideological perfection.

Despite such comprehensive design logic, at least two types of counter-territorialization may be observed in Disneyland — a private park in which “public” amenities are reserved for those who can afford them. One involves the picnicking family which chooses to reject the food selections offered by its multiple restaurants. Any part of a lawn or bench it occupies then becomes a temporary site of defiance to the capitalist logic of the company. Another counter-project involves the amorous couple or thrill-seeker who search out spaces for illicit activities.⁴⁰ Such banal appropriations of space disrupt the seamless perfection of Disney planning (FIG.3).

In a similar way, in a bid to solve the problems of an unruly Singapore after World War II, Sir Patrick Abercrombie was appointed town planning advisor in 1948. An advocate of the Garden City Movement in England, his plans for the island bore the imprint of his 1944 Greater London Plan.⁴¹



FIGURE 3. “La perruque” on the manicured lawn of Walt Disney World. Source: S. Willis et al., Project Disney, Inside the Mouse: Work and Play at Disney World (Durham, Duke University Press, 1995). Reprinted by permission.




FIGURE 4. Ring-city Singapore. Source: C. Abrams, O. Koenigsberger, and S. Kobe, Growth and Urban Renewal in Singapore (Singapore: U.N. Program of Technical Assistance, 1963).

Following the end of colonial rule in Malaya in 1963, however, a team of U.N. experts was called upon to propose a new vision of the future, one that would not be tied to the colonial past. The team eventually called for development of the entire island according to a ring-city model, with no delineation between town and rural hinterland (FIG.4).⁴² Yet, even though they criticized the parochialism of Abercrombie’s plan, the U.N. experts left its central “Green Heart” intact.⁴³ And today this central space is the only area of the island that has been spared from state urban-renewal efforts.

From the start, Singapore’s urban renewal has also been accompanied by an island-wide “naturalization” program. Leo Marx’s pastoral ideal has even been embedded in a national slogan, “living in a garden.” In Lee Kuan Yew’s words, “to achieve First World standards in a Third World region, we set out to transform Singapore into a tropical garden city.”⁴⁴ Thus, in 1965 nurseries and a 1,700-person park maintenance crew were established, and these steps were augmented in 1976 by the creation of a Parks and Recreation Department to construct an infrastructure of parks and green streetscapes.

The government imagined there would be three major social implications from making greening an inseparable part of the national project. First, greening was expected to raise the morale of the people by providing them with attractive surroundings. Second, it would downplay the differentiation between areas belonging to the middle and working classes. Third, it would provide an instructive and disciplinary tool to produce a society of self-conscious citizens: there would be no littering, no trampling on grass, no pilfering of saplings, and no picking of flowers. Greening has since served as a form of national education, and has yielded a ubiquity of instructions and signage. Thus Koolhaas rightly noted the visually curious “empire of semantics,” though he fell short of comprehending its effects.⁴⁵

Within the limits of Singapore (comparable to Louis Marin's "neutral space of the limit"⁴⁶) the juxtaposition of state-owned nature reserves with dense urban development represents the ultimate heterotopia. Bukit Timah Hill, four reservoirs, and mangrove forests — also distinct destinations such as the Botanic Gardens, Chinese and Japanese Gardens, Zoological Gardens, Night Safari, and Jurong Bird Park — form fragments within a fully rationalized system that coexists with new towns and business and civic districts.⁴⁷ Within this hierarchy, the park-like housing estate can be read as comprising a garden city of another scale. Its common spaces are gardens within the garden-estate; its apartments (typically with potted plants like orchids) are micro-gardens within the garden-block. As early as 1967, one former chairman of SPUR was already writing on the parallels between the environment and nation-building.⁴⁸ Greening was already occurring at an unstoppable rate on every scale, producing a hyper-duplication of green utopias — the myth of all garden cities that Koolhaas derides as "Potemkin nature."

Yet, more than the occasional "playful" disruption of garden space in a Disney park, the inhabitants of Singapore's government-owned housing estates fight daily territorial battles, using potted plants to stake individual claims on areas of the public space adjacent to their apartments. These may lead to serious conflicts, especially when a single-loaded corridor is shared by as many as ten families. Since the line of demarcation is implicit, aggressors tend to succeed when they can establish a larger "entry garden." Meanwhile, those unwilling to engage in such battles still find themselves engaged in "rear-yard" contests. In this case, the "front" facade of an apartment block can sometimes become so dense with foliage that an organic aesthetic replaces its original architectural appearance (FIG. 5).

Similar contestations are evident when it comes to footpaths. In the overall scheme of a planned landscape, pedestrians are meant to use paved paths to walk from one block to another. Yet the presence of well-manicured lawns "balding" along the lines of various alternative routes clearly indicates the everyday negotiations between the inhabitants — territorial citizens — and their planned environments.⁴⁹



FIGURE 5.
The piecemeal greening of the facade of a housing block with front-loaded corridors.
Photo by author.

HOUSING

Since it is connected to all other locations, housing plays a dominant communitarian role both at Disney sites and in Singapore. In Celebration, a Disney-created traditional American town and an example of New Urbanism, residents live in elaborately wired, developer-style single-family houses selected from a pattern book. Meanwhile, the majority of Singaporeans live in highrise blocks more than twelve stories high (FIGS. 6A, B). In both locales the emphasis is on picture-perfect images of community life, which necessitate that residents relinquish a large degree of individuality and privacy and retreat deeper into their units. Nevertheless, residents commonly counteract the state allocation and corporate interventions by "borrowing" or appropriating public property or space for private use (FIGS. 7A, B).

At Disney theme parks, guest accommodations are supposed to complete the "magical experience." These accommodations are designed with the same principles as the parks — themed public spaces, "democratic" and identical room layouts, and a staff of cheerful "hosts" and Disney characters. The seamlessness of the Disney experience is maintained to such an extent that even the quotidian is anticipated and accommodated in the design. Disney space also acts as a social leveler, since all differences between guests are displaced in favor of the shared pursuit of recreation, thrill and consumption.

Moving beyond such successful but temporary environmental experiences, the construction of the town of Celebration in 1996 afforded people a chance to literally dwell in a Disney world. Opened on the Fourth of July, the town for a planned population of 20,000 patriotically proclaimed a new American way of living as a corrective to sprawl.⁵⁰ But it was also designed to maximize the value of 10,000 acres of company land. And with half the site preserved for a wetland "Osceola Multi-Use Development" greenbelt, it also promised to earn the company the reputation of "good neighbor."

In Celebration, residents negotiate their multiple roles as spectators, Disney players, and residents. The front porch is a site where many of these everyday spectacles are enacted. One resident, Michael McDonough said fondly, "our porches are so close to the street that it makes them like little theater seats [with] our movie screen [as] our front porch [and] the lake as a backdrop."⁵¹ Not only does the porch frame a carefully constructed "nature" for residents, but it also frames, for visitors, a picture-perfect neighborliness. In such a tableau, the manicured lawn sits silently in the foreground as the guardian of the perfect middle-class American lifestyle.

Shortly before Celebration's opening, however, critics started to point to its deficiencies. Urbanism professor Witold Rybczynski told the *New York Times* that "living there is not going to change people [because] you can't isolate yourself [from the rest of American society]."⁵² Writer and Celebration resident Michael Pollan also suggested that



A.



B.

FIGURE 6. *Housing utopia.* A) New pattern-book houses for the middle-class nuclear family at Celebration. Photo by Andrew Wood, San Jose State University. Reprinted by permission. B) Queenstown Neighborhood VI, Singapore, 1969. Source: Annual Report 1969, Housing Development Board, Singapore.

Disney had conjured an ideal it could only partly fulfill. “A real community,” he wrote, “is messy, ever changing and inevitably political.”⁵³ Even if Disney was “an astute observer of the American character,” in due time its residents would find their political voices, and likely “make a mess of the company’s carefully crafted script.” A community based on a “novel form of democracy” and mere consumerist principles, Pollan argued, was also bound to have problems.⁵⁴ Perhaps not surprisingly, Celebration had only managed to attract 8,000 residents by 2003.

While the viability of Celebration is still unproven, to its critics, Singaporeans on the other hand live in what seems like a conglomeration of Celebrations. Yet, despite the conve-

nient rhetorical parallel, Singapore is also a place imbued with political discourse.

Adopting an ideology of “helping you help yourself,” the national government originally tackled the problem of housing by assuming a comprehensive role as planner, architect, entrepreneur, landlord and developer. Since it claimed “to know what was best,” it saw no need to consult the population. And in the years since, the state has never doubted its own creative but severely pragmatic approach, citing as evidence the significant improvement in people’s quality of life.⁵⁵

Taking lessons from the contentious experiences of Western countries, particularly the United States, the Singapore government decided early on to maintain owner-



A.



B.

FIGURE 7. A) Corridor, or “front yard,” of a Singapore housing block with artifacts of territorialization. B) “Rear yard” of a housing block. Photos by author.

ship of all housing. By doing so, it hoped to depoliticize it, so housing could no longer be a site for class struggle. Indeed, Singapore's early leaders saw collective dwelling as a perfect way to eradicate class and racial divides.

Immediately after independence, however, it was a shortage of housing that was the government's most important concern. The manifestly pragmatic and utilitarian high-rise slab block both solved this problem and introduced uniformity into the urban fabric. Stripped of colonial traces, the government also hoped its neutral, modernizing image would create a sense of belonging to the new nation. Construction of such buildings was further coupled with the "homeownership for the people" scheme of the Housing Development Board (HDB), which included heavy subsidies to systematically rehouse slum dwellers. Since the only affordable housing in Singapore consisted of such high-rise flats, their social acceptance was "automatic."⁵⁶

Lefebvre has observed that "the everyday is covered by a surface: that of modernity."⁵⁷ Indeed, by the 1970s half the Singaporean population was living in such high-rise housing estates, which also provided comprehensive recreational and civic facilities. And when postmodernist aesthetics were introduced in the late 1980s, the HDB only needed to "re-dress" the modernist blocks to keep up. Such cosmetic additions were deemed appropriate to imbue different neighborhoods with safe and politically viable identities. Thus, by the 1990s 80 percent of the population lived in housing estates distinguished by fruit motifs or colors, even though an aerial perspective revealed the striking parallel between Singapore and Corbusier's modern city.

The government's commitment to such comprehensive schemes has shown no signs of abating. In 1993, Tampines New Town won the United Nations World Habitat Award for outstanding contribution toward human settlement and development.⁵⁸ And as part of the Concept Plan 2001, the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) and the HDB recently held an international design competition to redevelop a 2.5-hectare site at Duxton Plain — the site of the very first public housing blocks in the country (FIG. 8).⁵⁹ The symbolism embodied in the winning scheme coincided with the changing face of public housing in Singapore, indicating a new synthesis of state social and economic provision. In particular, the competition marked a new phase of the modern cosmopolitan project: a focus on life and lifestyles for a civilized Southeast Asian nation.

Beneath the dwelling configurations in Singapore's housing estates, however, residents routinely "borrow" or appropriate public property or space for their own private use. The *détournement* of prefabricated architectural elements and spaces arises from creative adaptations made by the residents within the planning grid. Thus, unprogrammed, "empty" spaces within the housing block are used daily as waiting and pickup points for school children, and the elderly bring lounge chairs and potted plants to create



FIGURE 8. Rendering of winning scheme by Arcstudio Singapore. Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority brochure, "Duxton Plains Public Housing Competition, Singapore."

their own social enclaves (FIG. 9).⁶⁰ Chess, table tennis, badminton and break-dancing are not excluded. Funeral wakes and wedding banquets are equally welcomed and tolerated. These affairs are always loud and colorful. Most Chinese funerals hire bands of retired musicians and amateur trumpeters; other families may prefer a modest concert with local or Malaysian popular singers. In the early years, even neighbors would join in such festivities. These practices persist today, with certain variants and technological enhancements. In a reflexive way, the HDB has even learned from some of these practices and incorporated them into later planning strategies.

Delving into the effects of the everyday, de Certeau has described the conditions of subjugation and marginality even in routine existence. Claiming it as "technology's limit," he has urged that more attention be given to practices "beneath technology" that disturb its operations. Engineers have long



FIGURE 9. An enclave staked out by the elderly among the support columns of an Housing Development Board block. Photo by author.

been familiar with forms of resistance which disturb functionalist calculations and their underlying elitist bureaucratic structure. But he has argued they tended to be insensitive to the fictive character — the imaginative citizen — and its relationship to everyday reality.⁶¹

Likewise, the governing power in Singapore is a highly organized and technically competent structure which has the capacity to quickly absorb anomalies and marginalities into its strategy of organization and surveillance, turning them into “signifiers” and “objects of exchange.” Yet despite these systems of classification, certain protected activities such as racial ceremonies and cultural practices can occur “above” the limit of technology. Peculiar habits, religious practices, and other unpredictable personal reactions prevent easy detection or classification.⁶² And even if technically competent structures of surveillance succeed in absorbing these unknown entities or practices, the technological is always one step behind. Perhaps this is how “the weak” appropriate from “the strong.”

LEISURE

Disney and Singapore share a belief that tourism is all-encompassing.⁶³ With tourism as a central focus, conventional divisions between work and leisure, citizen and tourist, thus recede to the background. But a theme park also embodies the conflict between producers and consumers, where aestheticized happiness and leisure is superimposed over a larger societal grid of control governed by the punch-card regularity of work. Indeed, part of the Disney Company’s strategy is to make itself an indispensable part of American life. Sorkin has described the experience within Disneyland as “the redemption of the industrial metropolis: hygienic, staffed with unalienated workers apparently enjoying their contributions to the happy collectivity.”⁶⁴ In this way the empire of leisure is differentiated from everyday life. But the separation means that the recuperating body can receive only temporary relief.

As temporary citizens, tourists enjoy home-like amenities in Disney parks. Themed food kiosks, cafes and restaurants are located throughout, and there is no lack of seating, rest stations, or bathrooms. Visitors seeking a reprieve from the rides can also stroll among the picturesque gardens and lawns. There they will find visual relief in the virtual worlds of fictional characters and the juxtaposition of highly controlled landscapes. Where else can one feast one’s eyes on desert grasses, ivy topiary, tropical orchids, cherry blossoms and coconut palms all in one place? Where else can one caress a rattlesnake without the real hazard of a bite?

Familiar with the operations of both work and play, however, there is a class of tourist-citizens which is engaged in a form of reprogramming — not unlike de Certeau’s notion of “*la perruque*.”⁶⁵ Such people disguise their own work as work

within a larger organization, an appropriation often overlooked by the “establishment.”

It was under such conditions in 1991 that the first annual Official Unofficial Gay and Lesbian Day at the Magic Kingdom was launched. Activist Doug Swallow first proclaimed the event as “a day to have fun, to stand up and be counted.”⁶⁶ Yet, as Jeff Truesdell of the *Orlando Weekly* later observed, Gay Day “became the lightning rod critics needed to challenge that corporate strategy.” Ironically, he also wrote, “by refusing to discourage the gathering, Disney condoned it.”⁶⁷ Today, beyond its economic impact, Gay Day has become an indicator of the cultural landscape of the Disney Company itself — caught as it is between its heavy-handed interest in profits and its self-appointed role as guardian of “family values.”

Meanwhile, in Singapore, leisure has been transformed from a segregated activity into one that infiltrates almost every part of everyday life. In the two decades leading up to World War II, the island witnessed the construction of numerous leisure complexes which followed the example of developments such as the New World in Shanghai. Opened in 1923, New World Amusement Park in Jalan Besar was followed by Great World, Happy World (later renamed Gay World), and Greater East Asia Amusement Park (opened during the Japanese occupation, and later renamed Beauty World). The cabarets, boxing arenas, gambling dens, trade fairs, and eating stalls of such complexes appealed primarily to the immigrant working class. In the early 1950s such spaces were so important that Happy World Sports Stadium served as the site for high-profile international events such as the Thomas Cup badminton tournament.⁶⁸ Such was the proliferation of a kind of Bakhtinian carnivalesque, where the leisure operators and seekers built their own worlds alongside the official world, their own states versus the official state.

However, leisure as rehabilitation and community bonding for working citizens took an institutional turn in Singapore the 1970s. That was when the government began to systematically administer leisure activities in controlled doses within the community centers of its brand-new developments. And, despite the complete disappearance of the older “New Worlds,” in 1972 it also directed that a self-enclosed city as resort be built on the neighboring island of Sentosa. The Sentosa Development Board (SDB) was charged with the development, management and promotion of this space. Marketed as an affordable family getaway, it provided part of a continual redefinition of the idyllic picture of escape, resulting in a hyper-duplication of itself — a getaway within a getaway (FIG. 10).

Beneath this spatial text of leisure, reflexive to the needs of the escaping body of the tourist-citizen, there has always been a coincident specter of violence. Thus, the remains of British World War II fortresses on Sentosa became a further opportunity for museum spectacle. Even the detention of a political dissident on the island for three years did not appear incongruous.⁶⁹ Here, the temporality of escape has juxtaposed



FIGURE 10. Leisure utopia. Sentosa, an island getaway south of the main island. Source: “Map of Singapore,” published by Singapore Tourism Board, 1997.

a blend of golfing, house arrest, and mourning — except that the very notion of escape (liberation) is really an oxymoron when considered within the nation’s *panopticon* of leisure.

However, even Singapore’s premier resort has now become the site of counter-activities that undermine its original purpose. This first occurred when profiteering entertainment companies added a technological dimension to previously spontaneous foam parties at the beach. Then, on August 8, 2001, the day before National Day, the Asian Web community *Fridae* initiated the first annual Gay Foam Bath Party on Sentosa. The event generated so much discomfort within the government that in less than two weeks Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong issued a “gentle” warning against such activities. Specifically, he maintained that greater political freedoms would have to come slowly.⁷⁰

Nevertheless, empowered by a common solidarity and knowledge of their growing strength and expertise, the *homo ludens* continue to negotiate the territories they have become familiar with.⁷¹ Meanwhile, the government, trying to catch up with its well-traveled and restless citizens, has remained always one step behind in devising new planning principles to regulate the use of newly appropriated spaces. For example, for beach revelers, it has now designated small parcels of land as sites for “Zouk-Out” — “spontaneous” large-scale parties organized by Zouk, the most popular dance club in Singapore. But its overarching efforts to create an island resort and workplace that will satiate and contain the increasing demands and restlessness of its citizenry is a project that continues to be challenged.

TRAVEL

The only way to consume [the utopian] narrative is to keep moving, keep changing channels, keep walking, get on another jet, pass through another airport, stay in another Ramada Inn.

— Michael Sorkin⁷²

Disneyland and Singapore enfold the acts of traveling and arriving. Marc Augé has argued that spaces of travel, of “relative anonymity,” are a refuge from the usual scrutiny and responsibility demanded of places with a particular identity and locality. This temporality can be liberating, as travelers need only to keep in line and follow instructions.⁷³

According to Marin, the visitor to a Disney theme park assumes its citizenship upon passing through its gates, and thereafter begins articulating the utopic text.⁷⁴ But Sorkin has called this a “homogenized under-dimensional citizenship.”⁷⁵ Naturally, a sense of arrival is crucial, because it reaffirms that Disney is a definitive place. Specifically, it must overcome the suspicion caused by its seemingly easy duplication — not just in Florida, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Paris, and Hong Kong, but in ubiquitous television space. Born at the same time as the television series *Mickey Mouse Club*, Disneyland has always been conceived as a “non-place.” Thus, Disney’s deliberate place-making challenges the imagination — nowhere, but “there.”

Against this experience, there remain certain figures who skew Disney’s utopian social fabric, from which it has attempted to remove class, race, status, and all other potentially destabilizing factors. To the chagrin of the management, the Gay Day reveler and the occasional working-class Hispanic family resist the company’s capacity for such rationalization. For three days a year, 32,000 gay revelers take over these spaces of control and class oppression. Likewise, for capitalism’s racially disenfranchised, the need to make full use of the expensive day pass may mean a mix of drifting and “poaching” — sneaking in bologna sandwiches for lunch, for example.

Another wanderer class in Disney is the lone visitor, especially one with an academic agenda.⁷⁶ Since Disney’s basic social unit is the family, the loner is always an anomaly. Disney conveyances are constructed to hold various breakdowns of a nuclear family, in two, three or four.⁷⁷ It was precisely from such an outsider position that lone researcher Susan Willis was able to conduct fieldwork “inside the Mouse,” yet purposefully detached from it.

A parallel space in Singapore is Changi International Airport. Since its completion in the early 1990s, it has catered to as many as 44 million passengers a year. Not surprisingly, the arrival and transit spaces were taken very seriously by its planners, just as such spaces were taken seriously at Disney.⁷⁸ Indeed, for many travelers, the hours spent in Changi Airport may be their only introduction to the island nation. More than just an opportunity to exhibit its attractions, therefore, the airport needed to be built as a microcosm of the city itself.

In 1993, in further pursuit of this goal, officials announced the expansion of the airport based on concepts of an “airtropolis” — a city in an airport.⁷⁹ Not surprisingly, this plan involved fitting its arrival and transit spaces with advanced surveillance devices, to carefully observe both errant behavior and spending tendencies. In a fantastic synchronicity of purpose, therefore, the same technology may be used to placate the fear for flying, process the identity of the traveler, verify boarding passes at duty-free stores, screen the body, predict meal options, and so on. The business of travel thus doubles as a system of control (FIG. 11).

The airport, by its very nature, is the privileged space of the traveler. But Changi’s connectedness to city services and transportation networks has also unwittingly opened it to other transitional figures. The activities of these people may be seen as akin to those of de Certeau’s ordinary practitioner, who appropriates the spaces of a city simply by walking and shopping in them.⁸⁰ Likewise, they can be compared to the actions of the nineteenth-century flâneur, characterized by detachedness and freedom.⁸¹

At Changi, this figure takes the form of a wandering student — attracted to the amenities of the airport mall and its always-open policy. Twice a year around examination periods, the numbers of these student loiterers increase. They even create private enclaves with books, plug-in music devices, and occasional sleeping mats. After several years of such occurrences, the authorities, unable to deter their practices, began to provide rooms in designated areas of the terminal, which they equipped with amenities conducive to studying.

Since the early years of Changi, a whole generation of transitory, anonymous “others” has come and gone, and even the strict code of surveillance has not been able to identify them. After the completion of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill’s Changi Airport MRT Rail Station (2006), other “uninvited” guests will undoubtedly enter this private-public space. It will be fruitful to observe the extent to which their presence has been anticipated and addressed in the design.



FIGURE 11. *Travel utopia. SARS infrared thermal imagers at the arrival hall, Changi International Airport. Photo by author.*

TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENDO-COLONIALS

EPCOT will be an experimental city that would incorporate the best ideas of industry, government, and academia worldwide, a city that caters to the people as a service function. It will be a planned, controlled community, a showcase for American industry and research, schools, cultural and educational opportunities.

— Walt Disney⁸²

With world-class biomedical sciences, infocomm technology and media facilities next to green open spaces, private homes, a lively culture and community spirit, One-North . . . offers an open and stimulating atmosphere where you can work, meet and share ideas at the very frontiers of science and technology within five minutes of where you live — not only as colleagues, but as friends and neighbors.

— One-North Community⁸³

On February 2, 1967, Walt Disney Productions announced that it intended to build the world’s first glass-domed city in central Florida, which it called the Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow (EPCOT). EPCOT would be a carefully detailed project of social engineering and infrastructure — an enclosed climate-controlled environment with an advanced garbage-disposal system, ordered according to a garden-city radial plan where the “pedestrian will be king.” The plan envisioned that workers would be housed in low-density green-belt residential areas and be transported by monorail to a central business and cultural district, where they would travel by people mover. EPCOT was also to have a futuristic transportation hub, an educational center, and a technology hub to showcase advanced American industry and research. A conference and hotel hub would allow visitors and researchers to exchange ideas freely. And in their free time residents could attend cultural and professional sporting events. Most importantly, there would be no dirt, crime or poverty; EPCOT would be the ideal city for the future.

Walt Disney died in December that year, and EPCOT was never realized as he had envisioned it. However, many of its ideas were implemented in various ways at other Disney sites. The climate-controlled experimental gardens were built in the Land Pavilion in Future World. The WED-WAY People Mover and Monorail were constructed at the Magic Kingdom. The showcase of technology took form in the World Showcase and Future World. And even the Swedish-built Automated Vacuum Assisted Collection (AVAC) was installed in Walt Disney World. Of course, the garden city radial plan was realized in the organization of various Disney theme parks, while visions for a new residential community and alternative techniques for learning were realized in the new town of Celebration and the Celebration School, respectively. As Disney had envisioned, these environments today are clean, green, and dirt and crime free.

Both Singapore and Disney’s unrealized EPCOT vision share an emphasis on community values and an interest in physical and mental well-being through technological advancement (FIGS. 12A, B). However, not only is Singapore already a technologically driven nation — where citizens work, live and play in a clean, green and low-crime environment — but it has also created a plethora of electronic-controlled self-sufficient *poles* within the city. Single-use buildings have been systematically replaced by self-enclosed interior cities with interconnected passages.

In particular, following the precedent set by Airtropolis, Zaha Hadid’s competition-winning master plan for North-One Biopolis was introduced in 1999. Plans call for the 200-hectare zone for business, industry, research, development and education to be completed in three phases through 2020. Within North-One, there will be three specialized areas: Vista Xchange, a business and transportation hub; Central Xchange, a center for Infocomm Technology (ICT) and media industries; and Life Xchange, for biomedical R&D laboratories, residential units, retail and commercial activities. Built with a distinct “uptown” vibrancy, phase one of ICT will include Kisho Kurokawa’s state-of-the-art Fusionpolis. To maintain the nation’s productivity and progress, the aim is to provide an environment for live, work and play, “inspired by scientists, researchers and technopreneurs.”

However, identifying the Singapore citizen as a mass subject can be a simplistic and self-fulfilling critique. The citizen embodies the simultaneous selves of the postcolonized, the excolonized, and the endo-colonized. The post-colonial body embraces and reworks traces of the colonial — for example, Indians’ love for cricket. The excolonial rejects and is averse to nonindigenous impositions. Meanwhile, the endo-colonial, as Paul Virilio has defined it, is the modified technologized body that has undergone, and is still undergo-

ing, modification, likened to a form of training or drill.⁸⁴ This sensitized and informed body is an inhabitant within the perfectly disciplined Singapore.

In social terms, this class of citizens exhibits the “biopolitical nature of the new paradigm of power” that is still governed by capital. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have noted that a certain self-disciplinary body can possess a form of “biopower” that regulates social life from its interior, an idea they extrapolate from Foucault.⁸⁵ This notion of “biopolitics” implies that the task of policing will be left to the individual, who has been disciplined and is expected to exercise correct judgment in the politics of daily life.


However, this post-discipline body is also an empowered subject — highly reflexive to the changes and innuendos within a world completely governed by global capital. Not yet identified and studied as a collective, this “free agent” traverses within and across various “Disneys” and “Singapore.” The highly mobile endo-colonial is just now coming into its own.

LIFE (AS RESISTANCE), IN LIEU OF CONCLUSION

Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy syntax in advance, . . . desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.

— Michel Foucault⁸⁶

The utopian projects of Disney and Singapore share the modern universal ideals of technology and progress, though their actual realizations reveal multifarious appropriations of



A.



B.

FIGURE 12. *Technology utopia.* A) Disney’s plan for EPCOT. Source: *Waltopia*, a site about Walt Disney’s original plans for EPCOT in Florida (<http://www.waltopia.com/>). B) Singapore Concept Plan 2001. Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority online (<http://www.uragov.sg/conceptplan2001/>).

culture. Social and spatial resistances that emerged during the construction of these utopias today mandate serious reconsideration of Marshall McLuhan's "global village" and Guy Debord's insistence on the homogenizing spectacle of culture. The transplantation of these utopias into the lived realities of the everyday, however, has produced "other spaces" beneath the scripted texts of their controlling powers. These other spaces reproduce the interactions and antagonisms between the state, the corporation, and the individual. They also produce identities which continually reconfigure the everyday spaces of inhabitation. These heterogeneous identities engage in territorial negotiations within the urbanism of the city, and at the same time operate within the global landscape of capital and consumption.

From this brief analysis, roughly four such overlapping counter-identities can be mapped: the intellectual, the sexual (deviant), the marginal poor, and the practitioner of everyday life. Of these four groups, the intellectual can be seen moving between the thin lines of academia and public politics, and across the borders of local and global discourse. Such an identity is systematically gaining force, as indicated by the various groups and ad-hoc think tanks that have formed in recent years.

The politics and economics of sexuality have likewise found their way into the popular imagination. In Singapore, the intrusion tactics of its advocates have provoked reconsiderations of public and private policies. Thus, two years after warning against a too-hasty handing over of greater political freedom to the individual, Senior Minister Goh disclosed in an interview with *Time Asia Magazine* that gays are now given equal employment opportunities in civil service.⁸⁷ This look at thornier cultural changes is a major aspect of the government's two-prong agenda to address the economic downturn, which took its toll on the city-state after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Not surprisingly, it has been accompanied by a review of economic policy changes. Thus, the biotech industry has been promoted at the same time as alternate lifestyles — Biopolis juxtaposed against the bohemian enclave.

While a precise account and mapping of their territorial strategies is beyond the scope of this article, the importance of the marginal poor, or economically disenfranchised, should not be discounted. Within Disney space, they can simply be excluded and planned out of sight. But in Singapore, the presence of this left-behind class has injected uneasiness into the island's otherwise perfect urban landscape. Despite the fact that public-assistance schemes seem to have temporarily relieved these individuals and families, an unaccounted number of self-employed individuals, such as *karang gumis* (neighborhood rag-and-bone men) and newspaper vendors, fall between the cracks of economic classification and blur the definitions of poverty in affluent Singapore.

But perhaps it is the last group, encompassing all the others, which could most significantly "threaten" the totalizing forces of such planned environments as Disney and Singapore. Lefebvre has argued that the rhythms of daily life

are able to find ways to inscribe and prescribe themselves within the texts of the city. The undermining presence of these other spaces then challenges the authoritarianism of master plans, presenting an alternative schema for understanding how culture produces different types of subjects and spaces. More pertinently, with life (and lifestyles) as the new object of power, Deleuze's evocation of Foucault rings loud. "When [sovereign] power becomes bio-power, resistance becomes the power of life, a vital power that cannot be confined within species, environments or the paths of a particular diagram. Is not the force that comes from outside a certain idea of Life, a certain vitalism, in which Foucault's thought culminates? Is not life this capacity to resist force?"⁸⁸

Since the end of the Cold War, notions of freedom and democracy have been continually redefined. For example, Arjun Appadurai has described the United States as the prototype of a new globalism constructed on a society of diasporic identity.⁸⁹ In this same sense Disney sites and Singapore are supported by conditions of an endless diaspora. But the forces behind this phenomenon are the same ones behind the increased occurrence of global terrorism in the years since the millennium. Given these conditions, it has become necessary to recast the 1960s euphoria of individual freedom in light of the civilizational and religious tensions between different regions in the world. Indeed, the global euphoria of cosmopolitanism, as it is today juxtaposed with local economic and social exigencies, will perpetuate other dystopias, forging evolving identities and subjectivities.

Confronted with these new social contingencies, even the Singapore government has begun to recognize the inadequacies and growing irrelevance of its blanket state-of-emergency strategies. The present lack of major policy recommendations, accompanied by social measures that can only be likened to acupuncture treatment, indicates the Singapore dilemma: the efficient central planning that made the island such a success has now become a millstone. A review of its body-politics and technocratic policies is timely and unavoidable.

The gradual shift from patriarchal management to a more freewheeling atmosphere is evident in Prime Minister Goh's words: "So let it evolve, and in time the population will understand that some people are born that way . . . but they are like you and me."⁹⁰ In other words, Goh recognizes the need for the government and the people to be open to shifting sexual and behavioral tendencies among the populace.

Though it may be premature to interrogate this new embrace of organic diversity, the early euphoric urbanism (utopias) of Singapore's first decades has now taken a somewhat unknown and different turn away from the usual preemptive strategies. Perhaps behind the reactionary problem-solution mentality of the state is an intuitive awareness of these "other spaces" between utopia and euphoria. Life, in its ordinariness, has a way of seeking them out.

NOTES

1. F. Jameson, "Of Islands and Trenches," in F. Jameson, *The Ideologies of Theory Essays 1971–1986: Volume 2, Syntax of History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p.75.
2. The commodification of culture in the twentieth century has been discussed extensively by Theodore Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Guy Debord, Henri Lefebvre, Jean Baudrillard, and others. Such work underlay the emergent postmodern discourse of the late 1960s, which intensified in the early 1980s. In artistic discourse, postmodernism was first construed as an attempt to reclaim what remained of the historical avant-gardes. But by the 1980s it was finally acknowledged that the sites of activism against the onslaught of mass culture had shifted irreversibly to local cultural fields and specific identity politics. For a synthetic overview, see A. Huyssen, *After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).
3. With regard to postindustrial societies, Herbert Marcuse's concept of repressive desublimation stems from his reaction to the relentless logic of capitalism and its technological engine. He argued that the progress of technological rationality inevitably subjects advanced contemporary society to a process of desublimation, which implies the repression of sexuality and aggression. The consequence is a condition of "happy consciousness," which reflects a belief that the real is rational, and that the established system will deliver prosperity. For a detailed discussion, see H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).
4. M. Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development*, B. Luigia La Pent, trans. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976).
5. M. Tafuri and F. Dal Co, *Modern Architecture 2* (New York: Electra/Rizzoli, 1986), p.363. See chapter 20, "The International Concept of Utopia." The authors argued that the utopianism of the time was derived from belief in technology as a means of achieving a future perfect society. And they pointed out how the 1960s avant-gardes espoused such belief in the inevitability of progress, and the assumption that progress was precisely technological. While their megaprojects were not realized, images of these schemes were widely disseminated in cultural institutions and artistic academies.
6. The word "utopia" is derived from the title of a novel published in 1516 by Sir Thomas More. The word itself means both "good place" and (literally, in the original Latin) "no place."
7. Tafuri and Dal Co, *Modern Architecture 2*, p.363.
8. W. Gibson, "Disneyland with the Death Penalty," *Wired Magazine*, Issue 1.04 (Sept./Oct. 1993), p.1.
9. H. Lefebvre, "The Right to the City" (orig. 1968), in *Writings on Cities* (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), pp.147–59. M. Foucault, "Right of Death and Power over Life," in P. Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), pp.258–72. M. Foucault, "Body/Power," in C. Gordon, ed., *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1927–1977* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp.55–62.
10. Disneyland opened six months after three Boeing B-52 bombers made the first round-the-world nonstop jet plane flight in 45 hours. That year, *Around the World in 80 Days* won the Academy Award for Best Picture.
11. R. Schickel, *The Disney Version: The Life, Times, Art and Commerce of Walt Disney* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p.317. Schickel claimed to have written the first analytic biography of Disney, with the hope of creating a balanced perspective on the man, his works, and the society that created him and which he influenced.
12. P. Redfield, *Space in the Tropics: From Convicts to Rockets in French Guiana* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.8. In particular, Redfield has analyzed Defoe's memoir of the marooned adventurer, Robinson Crusoe, and summarized the key elements of the settler myth. From his analysis, I have extracted five elements which are applicable in discussing the frontier spirit embodied in the development of both Disneyland and Singapore. To these I have added a sixth characteristic: the simultaneity of being on a journey, yet having arrived. In Singapore and Disney this last mythic element would be translated into planned utopias which are at once destinations and spaces for transit, resulting in the dialectic between program and circulation, stasis and flux.
13. M. Foucault, "Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias," in *Architecture Culture 1943–1968: A Documentary Anthology*, ed. J. Ockman with collaboration of E. Eigen (New York: Rizzoli International Publications, 1993), pp.419–26. Foucault's prior acknowledgement of heterotopia is solely textual. Comparing utopias with heterotopias, he said, "utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold; they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the road to them is chimerical. Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, . . . they destroy 'syntax' in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things . . . to 'hold together'." M. Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), p.xviii.
14. R. Koolhaas and B. Mau, "Singapore Songlines: Portrait of a Potemkin Metropolis . . . or Thirty Years of Tabula Rasa," in *S,M,L,XL* (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 1995), p.1013.
15. M. Sorkin, "See You in Disneyland," in M. Sorkin, ed., *Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space* (New York: The Noonday Press, 1992), p.206. An excerpt from Disney's early publicity.
16. Christine Turnbull provides a lucid description of Raffles's nineteenth-century plan for a modern Singapore in C. Turnbull, *A History of Singapore, 1819–1988* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989).
17. C. Rojek, "Disney Culture," *Leisure Studies* 12, p.121.

18. *Ibid.*, pp.121–35.
19. Harris and Moore, “The Popular Pleasure of Disney: Researching the ‘Active’ Visitor” <<http://www.arasite.org/disvisitor.html>>, p.1.
20. A professor at the College of St. Mark and St. John in Adelaide, Australia, Harris is currently working on a publication *Fifty Key Concepts in Leisure Studies*.
21. Lee K.Y., *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), p.59.
22. Ever since 1965, Singapore has been a parliamentary republic, where parliamentary authority rests with the prime minister and his cabinet.
23. Michael Haas has argued that the island republic of Singapore is a totalitarian mass society. The argument is an extension of William Kornhauser’s identification of two types of democratic society: liberal democracy supported by a pluralist society, and populist democracy supported by a mass society. The main difference is that the social constitution of a mass society does not limit the use of power against individuals. Thus, populist democracy may involve direct action by large numbers of people, which may result in the circumvention of institutional channels and the violation of individual rights — a form of police control. M. Haas, *The Singapore Puzzle* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), pp.1–13, 151–93. See also W. Kornhauser, *Politics of Mass Society* (U.S.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), pp.130–31.
24. The need to plan the future city is the prerogative and obsession of the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore. This planning practice simultaneously legitimizes the actions of the state and the power of capital.
25. *Ekistics* was founded in 1954 by Constantinos A. Doxiadis and Jacqueline Tyrwhitt during the first U.N. International Symposium on Housing and Community Planning in New Delhi. Tyrwhitt was the director of the symposium, and Doxiadis was a participant. They agreed that there was a need to keep architects and planners in developing countries up to date with relevant professional expertise from the rest of the world. The first issue was published in 1955, though for the first two years it was called *Tropical Housing and Planning Monthly Bulletin*. Architect William Lim of SPUR was the Singapore correspondent for *Ekistics* in the 1960s.
26. Anon., “Editorial,” *SPUR* 65–67 (Singapore), p.3. Also cited in Koolhaas and Mau, *S,M,L,XL*, p.1053.
27. Spearheaded by architects William Lim (a student of Tyrwhitt at Harvard) and Tay Kheng Soon, two publications were the products of several meetings: *SPUR* 65–67 and *SPUR* 68–71. After these efforts SPUR was disbanded in 1971.
28. The MRT was first introduced in an *Asia Magazine* article, “The Future of Asian Cities,” in 1966. It was republished in *SPUR* 65–67 the following year. That same year, the Singapore government and the United Nations Development Program began a four-year feasibility study for the MRT. The study included a Harvard team, and lasted until 1981. The first trains started running on November 7, 1987. Changi Airport was inaugurated in 1981, based on a 1975 decision to replace the smaller Paya Lebar Airport. Though SPUR was never publicly acknowledged, a SPUR statement of February 23, 1971, contained a proposal to locate a new airport at Changi. E. Cheong, C.T. Seng, et al., *SPUR* 68–71 (Singapore), pp.11–12.
29. SPUR’s seemingly marginal influence on the country’s grand scheme of nation building was reinforced by a lack of official recognition of the research and planning proposals it submitted to the government — relegating their public visibility to sporadic and poorly circulated publications. However, in the private sector, members of SPUR did succeed as individuals in obtaining building commissions, through which fragments of their proposals were realized. And with the young government eager to recruit talent in order to put the city on the world map, a handful of SPUR members were eventually absorbed into the government in various capacities. Many of the members became consultants for government advisory boards. Chan Heng Chee became Singapore’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1989 to 1991, and in July 1996 she was appointed Singapore’s Ambassador to the United States.
30. According to the 2000 census, of the four million total population 7.2 percent are permanent residents and 18.8 percent are nonresidents <<http://www.singstat.gov.sg/papers/c2000/censuscount.pdf>>. In 2003 some 70,000 foreign professionals resided in Singapore. Indeed, foreign-born residents make up one-quarter to one-third of the entire population, a demographic unmatched anywhere except in a few rich Persian Gulf emirates. The Japanese are the biggest expatriate community, with more than 20,000 nationals; there are about 16,000 Americans. Many of the rest are workers from Asia and the Southeast Asia region <<http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/021224re.htm>>.
31. The straightening of the coastline — and in particular, island expansion — was a delicate issue between Singapore and Malaysia. The latter raised multiple protests against what it saw as a territorial encroachment on the part of the island nation. Meanwhile, on its existing territory, the island became a completely urban landscape, an image constructed by private enterprise but based on visions for the city designed by the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore. Among other things, these efforts have tried to suppress any kind of visible divide, such as between city, suburb and country; rich and poor; or between ethnic enclaves.
32. “Keynote Address” by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Community Development Council (CDC) Seminar, March 19, 2000. “The cosmopolitan is the one who has the skills and the global outlook that enable him to do well almost anywhere in the world. The heartlander, on the other hand, has a more domestic outlook.” This polarity assumed a fixation of labels and may produce an unnecessary class divide.
33. Brennan has observed that historically, cosmopolitanism has combined two distinct significations. One the one hand, it designates an enthusiasm for customary differences; on the other, a new singularity (*polis*) is created which blends and merges multiple local constituents. T. Brennan, “Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism,” in D. Archibugi, ed., *Debating Cosmopolitanism* (London: Verso, 2003), p.41.
34. A. Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999).
35. The following are some examples of

- these forums: "How Singaporean are you?" Singapore Expats Forum <<http://www.singaporeexpat.com>>; Jack Whelan, "After the Future: Eschatological Ruminations on Culture and Politics" <<http://www.afterthefuture.net>>; "Heartlander: there can only be one, one" <<http://www.talkingcock.com>>.
36. Brennan, "Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism," p.43.
37. Sorkin, "See You in Disneyland," pp.212–13.
38. L. Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p.3. Marx noted that a favorite strategy, validated by marketing research, assumes that Americans are most likely to buy cigarettes, beer and automobiles they can associate with a rustic setting.
39. G. Teyssot, "The American Lawn: Surface of Everyday Life," in G. Teyssot, ed., *The American Lawn* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1999), p.15. According to Teyssot, the eye-soothing lawn that prepares the spectator for a barrage of design spectacles is also a surface for the inscription of ideologies. It is the site in which the everyday, class structures, and territories are negotiated and displayed.
40. K. Pellman, "The Disneyland Skyway's Final Night" <<http://home.flash.net/~kpellman/Sky.html>>. Pellman is currently a cast member at Disneyland.
41. Abercrombie had earlier presented two high-profile plans — the County of London Plan (1943) and the Greater London Plan (1944). His trademark idea was that open space should be coordinated into a park system to provide easy flow from garden to park, park to parkway, parkway to green wedge, and green wedge to green belt.
42. C. Abrams, S. Kobe, and O. Koenigsberger, "Growth and Urban Renewal in Singapore: Report Prepared for the Government of Singapore," United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, November 1963. In the report, the team was critical of the existing Abercrombie Master Plan, last revised by the British in 1955, for its lack of vision. "It is a plan for a medium-sized town with a rural hinterland, not a plan for a metropolis," they said. In its place, they recommended a citywide urban-renewal program.
43. *Ibid.*, pp.63–71. Notably, such an idea was already in place in numerous Dutch cities — e.g., Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Delft, The Hague, Leiden, and Haarlem — where the city encircles a "green heart" or center void.
44. Lee, *From Third World to First*, p.175. On a regional scale, greening became a frontier in which many international political debates were carried out. Other Asian countries were said to be caught up in the competition of "out-greening" and "out-blooming" one another.
45. Koolhaas and Mau, "Singapore Songlines," *S,M,L,XL*, p.1039.
46. L. Marin, *Utopias: Spatial Play*, R.A. Vollrath, trans. (New Jersey: Humanities Press Inc., 1984), p.242. In Singapore, there is a near-identical comparison with Marin's analysis of Disney's spatial planning. The "neutral space of the limit" is within a zone that is neither utopian nor everyday. There are three such equivalent areas in Singapore, each having a precise semiotic function. The outer limit is constituted by geographies beyond the island, the immediate one being the physical hinterland of Malaysia. The entry ports — airport, harbor, and bus terminal at the causeway to Malaysia — constitute the intermediary limit. The mass rapid transit system and light rail system form the inner limit, like Disneyland's steam train.
47. Set on forty hectares of dense secondary tropical forest, the Night Safari is the world's first wildlife park built to be viewed at night. Through the use of subtle lighting techniques, guests are able to view more than one thousand nocturnal animals from one hundred species in vast naturalistic habitats.
48. T.K. Soon, "Environment and Nation Building," *SPUR* 65–67, pp.43–48. Unfortunately, it was not until the 1980s that the entire profession caught on to the significance of greening as an ideal that could set each built environment apart. A strong advocate of ecological issues, Tay continued to produce his own visions for a tropical green city, even after SPUR had disbanded.
49. Inhabitants find shortcuts from one point to another, and soon an entire band of turf will be completely trampled, leaving barren earth. Some planned paths are hardly used, because their internal logic does not correspond to the routes taken by inhabitants.
50. Celebration can be seen as the contemporary answer to Disney's original vision for the Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow (EPCOT), a high-tech model city for 20,000 residents.
51. D. Frantz and C. Collins, *Celebration, U.S.A.: Living in Disney's Brave New Town* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), p.95.
52. C. Lawson, "When You Wish Upon a House," *New York Times*, November 16, 1995.
53. M. Pollan, "Town-Building is No Mickey Mouse Operation," *New York Times*, December 14, 1997.
54. According to Pollan, so long as the interests of the corporation and the consumer are one, the consumerist democracy holds. This has been largely the case so far, he writes, because all the community's "stakeholders" have dedicated themselves to the proposition of maintaining high property values.
55. Housing and Development Board, "Annual Report 1985," p.52. By 1990, almost 90 percent of the population lived in highrise public housing. Sociologist Chua Beng Huat has described HDB's housing policies as being to eliminate class-based politics, manage ethnicity, and foster the idea of a "normal" Singaporean family. For example, HDB qualification policies ensure that different social groups are matched by corresponding housing types: two- to three-room flats for starter families; four- to five-room flats for established families; and studios for retirees. Chua B.H., *Political Legitimacy and Housing: Stakeholding in Singapore* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp.137–43.
56. R. Hyde, "The Supportive Environment: A Strategy for Creating Quality in the Built Environment in the Singapore Context," *Open House International: Housing Design — Development, Theories, Tools and Practice: Quality in the Built Environment*, Vol.14 No.3 (1989), p.43.
57. H. Lefebvre, "The Everyday and Everydayness," C. Levich, trans., in S. Harris and D. Berke, eds., *Architecture of the Everyday* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997), p.37.
58. Before the new town came into being,

Tampines was a place of forests, plantations and small *kampongs*. The name “Tampines” was derived from the Malay word for the Riau ironwood tree, which grew abundantly in the area.

59. D. Cohn, “ARC plans Mega-Structure for Singapore,” *World Architecture* July/August 2002, p.19. Located adjacent to the central business district, the winning design consists of seven, 48-story towers in a large park above lush landscaping, with the utilitarian garage tucked beneath the ground. The towers are connected by two continuous “sky parks” on the 27th floor and roof. The parks, reached by express elevators, contain recreation and communal facilities required by the newer breed of inhabitants. The jury included Fumihiko Maki, Moshe Safdie, and local architect Raymond Woo.

60. Chua, *Political Legitimacy and Housing*, p.83.

61. M. de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, S. Rendall, trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.200.

62. *Ibid.*, p.xi. According to de Certeau, an “operational combination” is a collection of practices that accumulate to compose a “culture.” This concept was examined across a series of practices — from reading and talking to dwelling and cooking.

63. “Tourism 21: Strategic Thrust 1 — Redefining Tourism,” *Singapore Tourism Board*, 2004. Available at <<http://app.stb.com.sg/asp/abo/abo08.asp>>.

64. Sorkin, “See You in Disneyland,” pp.228–29.

65. De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, pp.24–28.

66. B. Morris, “Gays and Lesbians Plan Day at Disney,” *Column World*, reprinted from *The Orlando Sentinel*, June 3, 1991. Available at <http://www.gayday.com/news/1991/orlando_sentinel_910603a.asp>.

67. J. Truesdell, “How Gay Day Pushed Disney out of the Closet,” *Orlando Weekly*, May 30, 2000. Gay Day began as a grassroots gathering initiated in local bars and with a few hundred participants on the first Saturday of June. It is now an annual event attended by more than 50,000 people that has become a mainstay of Orlando’s tourist industry. See <<http://www.orlandoweekly.com/news/story.asp?id=2470>>.

68. P. Holden, “At Home in the Worlds,” in R. Bishow, J. Philips, and W.-W. Yeo, eds., *Beyond Description: Singapore Space Historicity* (London: Routledge, 2004), p.89. Combining urban renewal with the rehous-

ing programs away from the congested city areas, all larger urban leisure complexes had eventually disappeared by the early 1990s.

69. Human Rights Watch, “Singapore,” in *Human Rights Watch World Report 1989*. Available at <<http://www.hrw.org>>.

70. Goh C.T., *The Straits Times*, August 20, 2001. Citing Gorbachev’s opening up of the Soviet Union under *glasnost*, he warned that should the PAP hand over greater political freedom to its people too rapidly, the country would risk “collapsing with a big bang.”

71. *Homo ludens* refers to the man-at-play in Constant’s New Babylon. “The *homo ludens* of the future society will not have to make art, for he can be creative in the practice of his daily life.” Cited in Ockman, *Architecture Culture 1943–1968*, p.314.

72. Sorkin, *Variations on a Theme Park*, p.232.

73. *Ibid.*, p.101.

74. Marin, *Utopics*, pp.238–57. Using Disneyland as an illustration, Marin posits a linear trajectory for the degeneration of utopia through its representation and subsequent transformation to myth. This assumes that all visitors to Disneyland are actors of the utopian text upon arrival.

75. Sorkin, *Variations on a Theme Park*, p.231.

76. E. Wilson, *Disneyland Hostage: A Liz Austen Mystery* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2000). This mystery novel for teens portrays the unwelcome Hispanics as terrorists who kidnap some American hostages in Disneyland. This alludes to the popular class stratification and self-selectivity in Disney sites.

77. S. Willis, “Public Use/Private State,” in K. Klugman et al., eds., *Inside the Mouse: Work and Play at Disney World*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), p.189–90. Willis observed that the most family-affirming aspect of the site seems to be the way that queues for its rides serve as a place for family members to negotiate who will ride with whom.

78. Marin, *Utopics*, p.242. The first “utterance” of the utopian discourse for air travelers may come in the sky before landing, when they are made to watch a ten-minute video introducing the island.

79. Fong K.W., “Air Transport Industry in the Asia-Pacific: Changi Airport beyond 2000,” paper delivered at the 1993 Global Super Projects Conference. Fong was the Deputy Director of Engineering, Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore.

80. De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, p.97. For de Certeau, walking weaves places together. By walking, wandering, or “window shopping,” people draw a totalizing and reversible line on the city map. Maps, thus, remain incapable of capturing the temporal act of passing by and the momentary act of spatialization. De Certeau recognized this on the most elementary level as a process of appropriation of the topographical system on the part of the pedestrian or shopper.

81. S. Buck-Morss, *The Dialectic of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p.304. Like Benjamin’s nineteenth-century stroller on the city streets, who was the origin of his own class of literary producers.

82. A 25-minute promotional clip of Disney’s vision for the \$100-million enclosed city. Cited in S. Fjellman, *Vinyl Leaves: Walt Disney World and America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p.116.

83. “One-North: Community” <http://www.one-north.com/pages/onenorth/onenorth_community.asp>.

84. P. Virilio and S. Lotringer, *Crepuscular Dawn*, M. Taormina, trans. (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2002), pp.100–1.

85. M. Hardt and A. Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p.23. Hardt and Negri suggest that Foucault’s “disciplinary society” is one in which social command is constructed through a diffuse network of apparatuses that produce and regulate customs, habits, and productive practices. After assimilation, the same society transforms into Gilles Deleuze’s “society of control,” in which “mechanisms of command become ever more ‘democratic’ and are distributed through the brains and bodies of the citizens.” Deleuze’s “society of control” proves more apt as a description of a class that has graduated from Foucault’s “disciplinary society.” See also Deleuze, *Foucault*, S. Hand, ed. (London: The Athlone Press, 1988), pp.70–93.

86. M. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, p.xviii.

87. S. Elegant, "The Lion in Winter," *Time Asia*, Vol.161 No.26 (July 7, 2003).

88. Deleuze, *Foucault*, pp.92-93.

89. A. Appadurai, "Patriotism and its

Futures," *Public Culture*, Vol.5 No.3 (1993), pp.411-29. Also cited in G. Jusdanis, *The*

Necessary Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.206.

90. Goh is referring to the emergent homo-

sexual population. It is not surprising that an economic motivation (to avoid excluding "talented foreign talents who are gay") is behind the change in policy toward non-heterosexuals.



The “State Philosophical” in the “Land without Philosophy”: Shopping Malls, Interior Cities, and the Image of Utopia in Dubai

AHMED KANNA

The relationship between literal and spatial discourse and spatial symbolism underpins the analysis of urbanism of Dubai, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). Are Imarati, or U.A.E. nationals (*muwatinun*), being swept up in historical forces too powerful for them to understand? Are so-called “modal” types of urban development exacerbating that process? It is argued that utopian discourse and symbolism form the link between historical and urban experience, mediating rapid social and cultural change. In this, the first part of a larger critique of the utopian self-representation of state-corporate complexes, I analyze how politics are aestheticized and made emotionally persuasive.

Les utopies ne sont souvent que des vérités prématurées

— Lamartine¹

Abdelrahman Munif is today perhaps the best-known writer on the modern Arabian Gulf region. His novels about the fate of Harran, the fictitious oil boom city in the heart of Arabia, are more than any other works required reading for scholars of the region. Indeed, his *Cities of Salt* is perhaps the only book on the Gulf that has attained the status of a classic in the broader discipline of Middle Eastern Studies.² It is helpful for our purposes to look at Munif’s dominant theme in this work. In the first book of the trilogy, Munif tartly summarizes the modernization of Harran:

Ahmed Kanna is a Ph.D. candidate in Social Anthropology at Harvard University. He can be reached at kanna@fas.harvard.edu.

[T]he . . . oasis turned into a city of glass, iron and stone, and hordes of adventurers and entrepreneurs swarmed in. Thus patterns of behaviour, relationships and interests very

*different from the existing ones began to form. In the midst of all this mutation, the indigenous inhabitants were unable to adjust to the new fast rhythm and the new relationships, and in their search for a new identity they became distorted.*³

More:

*Trees were cut down, people uprooted from their land, the earth dug up and oil finally pumped out only to turn the people into a crowd of open mouths waiting for charity or a crowd of arms fighting over a piece of bread and building an illusory future.*⁴

And simply: “this oil-based civilization is not real.”⁵

Based on such passages, it is not a giant leap to conclude that Munif’s work falls squarely within a much broader tradition, that of the modern dystopia. Indeed, his descriptions of the development of the oil kingdom’s police state and its entry into ever more intimate corners of people’s lives, radically changing their personalities in the process, might have been grafted whole cloth from Orwell’s 1984.

Munif’s *Harran* has proved profoundly influential on work on the Arabian Gulf city, which assumes, simply, that the people inhabiting these cities went from *bedu* simplicity to modernity overnight, scarcely knowing how to absorb the changes, with destructive effects on their traditional society and supposedly heroic worldview.⁶ As an anthropologist reading Munif, however, I am struck by his implicit theory of culture, which assumes that the “traditional” culture (i.e., that of the nomadic *bedu*, which, Munif intends us to believe is by definition “simple,” “honorable” and “stoic”) is the very essence of the Arabian identity, while “modernity” (i.e., “urban,” “materialistic” and “hedonistic”) is simply an ill-fit-

ting import from outside. Having completed more than a year’s fieldwork in Dubai, I have come to several different conclusions. First, *bedu* culture is actually a very small (if disproportionately important) part of overall Imarati (U.A.E. national) culture — and certainly it is much less important in the financial center, Dubai, than, say, in the capital, Abu Dhabi. Second, urban life and experience (especially that of markets and trade and, in general, settlement) has been an integral part of Dubai’s development for over a century.⁷ Third, the very notion of an Arabian “culture” simply does not exist, unless we are willing to grant that this “culture” is in a perpetual state of flux. These observations amount, at the very least, to a serious challenge to Munif’s essentialism.

My most interesting conclusion, however, is that, far from experiencing change and modernity as a homogeneous dystopia, the inhabitants of Dubai have developed ways of culturally *absorbing* these changes.⁸ Furthermore, *contra* Munif, this mode is characterized by utopian thinking — utopian in the fundamental, structuring way meant by Karl Mannheim.⁹ By looking at data gathered from interviews and archival materials collected during my fieldwork, I will make the case here that a certain type of idealized *topos* lurks behind both the literal and spatial discourses and symbols of the city. This is connected to the development over the last five years of certain types of built environment, particularly enormous shopping malls and other types of self-contained, more or less self-sustaining buildings and projects (FIGS. 1, 2). These projects are primarily intended as money-making operations, especially with the aim of increasing tourism and luxury consumerism; they are also “modal” in terms of the global ubiquity of the tourist-entertainment complex. Nevertheless, they also constitute a peculiar phenomenology in which the ideas of hybridity, interiority and enormity play an important role in the self-imagination of individual inhabitants of Dubai.



FIGURE 1. (LEFT) A typical Dubai view. Construction site at the “Tecom” complex, near the Jumeirah district of Dubai.



FIGURE 2. (RIGHT) Exterior of the “Spanish Court,” one of five themed “civilization” stations at the Gardens Mall, December 2004. When it is completed, the mall will cover more than 115,000 square meters.

It might be tempting to deduce from the following a sort of apology for the rule and self-representation of corporate globalization. While I obviously wish to critique Munif's reading of oil-based modernity, I also perhaps even more vigorously attack the notion that the broader context of contemporary Dubai, which basically consists of the domination of the corporate-state nexus, constitutes some sort of actual utopia. The story is complex: in fact, Munif's observations about the reactionary nature of the modern Gulf state are keen, accurate, and applicable to Dubai; on the other hand, Munif dismisses the emotional power of state-corporate self-representation, especially in a context of rapid change and social uncertainty. This is the primary focus of the following observations. I end with a critique of the reactionary, pyramid-building corporate-state as an avenue of further research.

BASIC ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS: HYBRIDITY, UTOPIA, AND THE PHALANSTERY

Historically, periods of rapid, profound change have a salutary effect — from the anthropologist's perspective, though not necessarily from the subject's — on the development of the symbolism for the interpretation of those changes. Dramatic historical change tends to express itself in the most intriguing myths. In Europe, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were such a period when the new regime of industrial modernity witnessed the discursive and aesthetic creation of modern notions of “man,” “culture,” and “the market.” The twentieth-century critic Walter Benjamin wrote (or, more precisely, compiled) his beautiful wreckage, *The Arcades Project*, in eulogy of that heroic time. Some of Benjamin's more productive observations in this work concerned a curious ambiguity within that century's cultural life, the coexistence of the most “rhapsodic” lyricism alongside the “coldest” realism. Thus, the invention of architecture as “engineering,” of photography, and of the *feuilleton*, signaled the homogenization of cultural production and its entry into the market as commodities.¹⁰ The sweeping perspectives of Haussmann, the department store, and railway travel each also contributed, at the substructural and superstructural levels, to the new market demands on mobility, exchange and speed.¹¹ Meanwhile, the era witnessed the cloaking of the new forms and means of production in the garb of the old: arcades with classical columns or ancient Egyptian iconography, fabricated materials posing as natural ones, department stores with “Oriental” themes.¹²

For Benjamin, this mode of interpreting the present was inextricably bound up with the utopian imagination:

Each epoch dreams the one to follow. . . . [In these dreams] the collective seeks both to overcome and to transfigure the immaturity of the social product and the inadequacies in the social organization of production. At the same time,

what emerges in these wish images is the resolute effort to distance oneself from all that is antiquated — which includes, however, the recent past. . . . In the dream in which each epoch entertains images of its successor, the latter appears wedded to elements of primal history <Urgeschichte> — that is, to elements of a classless society.¹³

The experience of the rapid flow of events, for Benjamin, appeared to be connected to a mode of historical interpretation that is tremendously selective and, in architectural jargon, “diagrammatic.” This type of selectivity, furthermore, is a dehistoricizing strategy that ushers in images of the “classless society,” a society that has transcended history and culture.¹⁴

An important aspect of utopia is its deployment of hybridity, or the blurring of genres. The image of the utopia troubles and challenges the conventional oppositions of the status quo.¹⁵ Barriers that are taken for granted crumble, and the debris that results is juxtaposed in potentially novel, and therefore dangerous, ways. Thus Benjamin commented on one popular nineteenth-century image of utopia, the so-called “phalanstery” of Charles Fourier: “Hierarchy of children: juveniles, gymnasians, lyceans, seraphim, cherubs, urchins, imps, weanlings, nurslings. The children are the only one of the ‘three sexes’ that can enter ‘straightaway into the heart of harmony’.”¹⁶ And:

Qualifying examination for the choir of cherubim:

- (1) Musical and choreographic audition at the Opera.
- (2) Washing of 120 plates in half an hour, without breaking one.
- (3) Peeling of half a quintal of apples in a given space of time, without allowing the weight of the fruit to drop below a certain level.
- (4) Perfect sifting of a quantity of rice or other grain in a fixed period of time.
- (5) Skill in kindling and screening a fire with intelligence and celerity.¹⁷

The concept of the “phalanstery” warrants a few words. The phalanstery was the utopian community conceived in the early nineteenth century by Fourier — a total social institution in which workers cooperated in producing goods with the aim of benefiting the welfare of the social body. But it was much more than that. According to Benjamin, the phalanstery would make morality superfluous.¹⁸ In other words, it was a utopia.¹⁹

Significantly, it was perhaps because the phalanstery was never completely realized that it has been such a fascinating phenomenon; its role was much more productive in the realm of fantasy, a fact that can be observed in contemporary Dubai as much as in nineteenth-century Paris. Fourier's fantasy was characterized by a number of (from our perspective) uncanny qualities: its massive size — phalansteries were meant to be cities of passages or arcades; its self-sufficiency — an inhabitant need not ever leave its confines; and its interiority, which entailed a re-creation, or fabrication, of natural

biospheres (indeed, one might say, an abstraction of nature into art). In all of this, the phalanstery was conceptually utopian, not only in the immediate ways just described, but in challenging conventional oppositions of nature-culture, outer-inner, and production-consumption. In short, the *image* of the phalanstery, rather than its literal realization, was to urban cultural production what the steam engine was to actual urban economic and infrastructural (roads, circulation) production.

On the other hand, as Benjamin was all too well aware, there was a gulf between the total aspirations of the Fourierist phalanstery and the reality of a class-divided or fragmented society. Whereas Fourier intended his utopian community to be a holistic institution, implying and trying to meet a complex and total human nature in its material, spiritual and instinctual dimensions, the dream space of the arcade (and even more so of the department store) witnessed the beginning of the decay of Fourier's vision. Specifically, these spaces began to conflate human nature with "the consumer" (hence, for Benjamin, the revolutionary potential of the *flâneur*, who cultivates a resistance to the disciplinary power of high-capitalist culture). The situation of modern Dubai, and its claims to utopia, cannot be understood without an awareness of this conflation of the "human" and the "consumer." In this sense, Dubai is encountering the final colonization of the genuinely utopian by an ever-improvising capitalism which, nevertheless, creates its own utopian self-representation (FIG. 3).

HYBRID DISCOURSE, HYBRID SPACE, AND THE IDEALIZED URBAN TOPOS

There is, as the Russian literary critic M.M. Bakhtin argued, a utopian urge behind the phenomenon of hybridity.²⁰ Writing under the shadow of Stalin, he would have tended to divine hope in something as antithetical to the homogenizing effects of repeated terrors and purges. The situation in the modern U.A.E. is, of course, not at all comparable to that of Russia in the 1930s. Nevertheless, there is an implicit utopian urge also evident in the hybridity of discourse and space in contemporary Dubai.

Before proceeding, I must say a few words about the context of what follows. Other writers have noted the changes related to the oil boom in the sixties, and the subsequent building boom in the seventies.²¹ I will confine my comments to changes in intergroup relations in Dubai — changes which, I suggest, have ramifications for both the appearance and the experience of the urban landscape, and which might account for some of the emotional appeal of the specific modus of utopianism in the contemporary context. According to Heard-Bey's "town sketch" of Dubai before its great period of expansion, in the pre-1960s town, the entire population lived in identifiable groups. Usually, these groups



FIGURE 3. Exterior of the Mercato Mall, Jumeirah. The theme is derived from a notion of Renaissance Venice.

lived in family compounds of either *barasti* (palm-frond) or *barjeel* (coral and mud windtower) houses, and the compounds would expand as family members from outside the town moved in with their relatives.²² Dubayyans were divided primarily along ethnic and tribal lines. Ethnically, the two major groups were the Arab, i.e., those who accounted themselves descendants of the original inhabitants of the area, the *bedu*, or nomadic tribes of the Arabian interior; and the Ajam or 'Iyem, immigrants or descendants of immigrants from the Gulf coast of the Persian Empire.²³

These major groupings tended each to live in their own quarters of town — the Arabs in the Shindagha district north and west of the Khor Dubai (Dubai Creek), and the 'Iyem in the Bastakiyya and Deira areas, west and east of the creek, respectively. The overwhelming tendency was for ethnic endogamy within these groups, and furthermore (and especially among the Arabs), tribal — i.e., both affinal and agnatic — endogamy as well. These practices of ethnic and tribal identity maintenance entailed very specific images of self and other in the groups. Several older informants of both Arab and 'Iyem background recounted how the Arab saw themselves as more traditional and more honorable than the 'Iyem, whom they saw as of "mixed blood" — i.e., not pure Arab —

and whose practices and worldview were consequently seen to be mixed. As an Arab informant in his mid-fifties said: “We [Arabs] didn’t really get into trade until after the [Second World] War. We saw it as beneath us.” A much older Arab informant, in his eighties, confirmed this, but only said that “this was something we didn’t really do [before the war].”

The ‘Iyem, for their part, viewed themselves as more progressive. As one twenty-four-year-old daughter of an old ‘Iyemi family said to me: “When my family first came to Dubai, they saw [the Arab inhabitants] as *qarawiyyin*, [i.e., provincial — literally, village people].” This image of progressiveness entailed a relative openness to Europe and to trade, two emblems of modernity much valued by many ‘Iyem of the generations before (and sometimes even including) the contemporary one. Other ethnicities also appeared at different times during the twentieth century. Baluchis, Indians and Sudanese immigrants were present as early as the first decade of the century.²⁴ And so-called “northern” Arabs, such as Iraqis, Egyptians, Lebanese and Palestinians constituted a significant proportion of immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s. Thereafter, however, the discovery of oil created the now-famous deluge of foreigners from dozens of different countries, with India, and especially Kerala, taking the lead in terms of absolute numbers. By and large, the groups did not mix, either socially or in terms of marriage, either with each other or with the local *muwatinun* (Dubai or Imarati nationals).

With regard to the Imarati local population, the *muwatinun*, such patterns of migration led to the emergence of another group alongside the aforementioned Arab and ‘Iyem. They are the descendants of so-called “mixed” parentage, i.e., those either with an Imarati father and a mother from a non-Gulf country, or those with a naturalized Imarati father.²⁵ This category is often referred to by the vague moniker Arab al Khaleej, “Arabs of the Gulf.” I interviewed several of these mixed-category Imaratis. The role of the experience of hybridity in the construction of imagined *topoi* is perhaps most clear in their stories.

One such person is Rana al Mudarris, a professional woman in her late twenties who works in the new Media City complex of Dubai Crown Prince Muhammad bin Rashid al Maktoum.²⁶ Rana is the daughter of an Arab Imarati father and a Syrian mother. By her own account, her father’s travels and experiences with different cultures from India to Africa to Europe gave him a cosmopolitan worldview that deeply influenced her. The son of a *mutawwa’* (religious teacher), Rana’s father decided at an early age that his life was to be made in traveling the seas in search of trading opportunities. He met Rana’s mother while on a business trip to Damascus, and proposed to her through her father. Both of these factors, her father’s wanderlust and her mother’s Syrian background, helped Rana develop what she calls “open-mindedness.” During one of our interviews, I asked her to comment on a peculiar remark that one of her colleagues at Media City, an expatriate, had made:

AK: Tanya said that you are a second-class citizen. Is that true?

RM: (Laughs). Some people think this way. Not on a daily basis, but when it comes to marriages, and when it comes to talking about traditions, and all. They always prefer pure Arabs whose mother and father are from the region. So, for example, if there is a guy whose mother and father are from Dubai, he will think twice before proposing to me because my mother is not local.

AK: Why is that?

RM: They think they’re very pure. People from here look down on people from other countries, and they think that . . . , you know, al ‘irq al saa’id [lit. “the prevailing roots,” i.e., the roots, or ethnicity, prevail]. . . . [I] used to think that only British white people used to have this tafaqqa ‘unsuriyya [racial discrimination]. . . . [B]ut here you can find it only when it comes to big decisions, like marriage, like all life-related things, I would say marriages and relations and . . . like, “don’t trust him, he’s ‘Ajami and he must be very bakheel [stingy]” or like “don’t trust him, he’s bedu, he must be very stubborn.” . . . But I think that the changing trend has started, because we started talking about it openly. We’re opening up, we’re discussing it. Because we used to just . . . “this is the rule. Ajam is Ajam and Arab is Arab.”

Maryam al Abbasi is another so-called Arab al Khaleej, her parents both having been born in another Gulf country. Her father worked in various different fields, mainly in business, and was close to the former ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed al Maktoum. By the time that her father had established himself as a naturalized citizen of Dubai in the early sixties, Maryam’s mother had only recently moved to the emirate. Her mother also subsequently became naturalized. Therefore, although both parents are considered for most intents and purposes fully Imarati, in certain contexts Maryam’s mother’s place of origin is foregrounded by other Imaratis. For example, when after a great deal of convincing, Maryam and her mother persuaded her father to let Maryam study in the United States, Maryam’s behavior was “justified” by her mother’s foreign birth: “My being half [X] is sometimes used to excuse things. When I went abroad, people said ‘She went abroad because her mother is [from X]. They do things like that.’ If I don’t stick to the traditional rules, they say, ‘Oh, it doesn’t matter, she’s [from X].”

This is related, in Maryam’s view, to a novel concept, marriage based primarily (although not exclusively) on individual choice, rather than familial persuasion. The way that her parents married was peculiar in its day. Her mother was initially betrothed by her family to her cousin, but she wanted to marry Maryam’s future father instead. She therefore had to find a solution to a difficult problem:

[M]y mom told . . . her father, not, “Listen, I’m in love with this guy, I want to get to know him, etc.” [She said], “I want to marry this man, he is a good man.” She didn’t

talk about loving [him] or anything [like that]. . . .
 [Rather, she said]: “He’s a good man, niyyatu saalha ma’iy [his intentions are pure], he has a good intention with me, he wants to marry me, and I want to marry him. I accept marrying him, so, do I have your muwaafaqa [approval]?” And my grandfather, Allah yirhama [God rest his soul], said, “If your brothers also think he is a good man. . . .” [M]y grandfather never met my dad, he was ill. . . . “Then go ahead, don’t worry about your uncle, I’ll talk to him.” Because my mother really didn’t want that. So, that’s how it happened. I like to remind my father now that I’m a young girl and I’m refusing proposals and . . . that he actually did love my mother before he married her [smiles]. So you know, “Extend the same luxury to me.”

The aspect of both Rana’s and Maryam’s discourse that I would like to focus on is its use of hybridity. Specifically, it is hybrid in two ways. First, although both women are fluent in English and chose to answer my questions in that language, they freely interspersed Arabic into their responses. Second, to emphasize certain points and to strengthen the persuasiveness of their rhetoric, they used reported speech (“Then go ahead, don’t worry about your uncle . . .”).

To better understand the meaning of the first aspect, Arabic-English hybridity, we can refer this literal discourse to the spatial discourse of the ubiquitous shopping malls of Dubai (FIG. 4). As part of this effort, I noted the shop-front signage at two popular shopping malls, the Jumeirah district’s Mercato Mall and Deira’s enormous City Centre.

At Mercato I found that in all cases where there were both English and Arabic logos, the name was transliterated into Arabic script (FIG. 5). The only exceptions were, curiously, Kentucky Fried Chicken, which is translated into the Arabic *Dajaj Kintaky*, and the shops of the so-called “Arabian-themed” precinct of the mall, with its souvenir shops and rug merchants. One shop that sold the *muwatin* local dress, the *thawb* or *kandoura* (men’s gowns, usually white) and *ghutra* (headdress), bore an Arabic name, *al-Thawb al-Watani*, that was transliterated into English. I also noticed that a large proportion of the shops did not have either Arabic transliterations or Arabic translations. But in no case at



FIGURE 4. Transliteration of corporate logos from English to Arabic. Photo by Ines Hofmann.

ENGLISH	ARABIC
Promod	<i>Bromod</i>
Patchi	<i>Batshi</i>
Spinney’s	<i>Sbeenas</i>
Aldo	<i>Aldo</i>
Paul Restaurant, Boulangerie & Patisserie	No Arabic translation or transliteration
Virgin Megastore	No Arabic translation or transliteration
Polo Jeans Co.	No Arabic translation or transliteration
Boss	No Arabic translation or transliteration
Armani Jeans	<i>Armani Jeenz</i>
Top Shop	<i>Tob Shob</i>
Starbucks	<i>Starbeks</i>
Next	<i>Nekst</i>
Pizza Hut	<i>Beetsa Het</i>

FIGURE 5. The signage at Mercato.

Mercato was there an Arabic-only shop logo. While it is obvious that this is the result of issues of corporate branding, the shop signage is, nevertheless, significant in creating a spatial phenomenology of hybridity. Deira City Centre mall, whose very name has been transliterated into the Arabic *Seeti Senter* — instead of being translated into, say, *Qalb al-Madina* (heart of the city) or *Markaz al-Madina* (City Center) — exhibited the same pattern (FIG. 6).

In these examples the fate of cafe names is particularly interesting. Arabic has a very well-known word for coffee, *qahwa* or *gahwa*, which, indeed, predates the English “coffee.” Nevertheless, the mall space has in this case transliterated one of the cafe names from “Starbucks Coffee” to *Starbeks Kafeh* — “*Kafeh*” being, in any case, not the Arabic transliteration for “coffee” but for “cafe.” Meanwhile, the other cafe name, Costa Coffee, is transliterated directly into Arabic. In order to correctly interpret the shopping-mall space, then, one has to have mastered a minimal pidgin language consisting of the names of Euro-American, and usually Anglophone, multinational corporations. Although not necessary, it is also helpful to be able to decipher these logos in English. And even where shop fronts at the malls do acknowledge Arabic, the overwhelming tendency is to transliterate the name of the given shop into an Arabic version (nonsensical from the perspective of Modern Standard Arabic) that would only make sense in the contexts of the mall and the wider global corporate culture that it represents. In other words, a certain minimal level of Western cosmopolitanism is required to interpret the shop signs in the mall.

ENGLISH	ARABIC
Starbucks Coffee	<i>Starbeks Kafeh</i>
The Body Shop	<i>Thi Bodi Shob</i>
River Island	<i>Reefer Ailand</i>
IKEA	<i>Eekeya</i>
Dunhill	No Arabic translation or transliteration
Massimo Dutti	No Arabic translation or transliteration
Radio Shack	No Arabic translation or transliteration
Adidas	No Arabic translation or transliteration
Costa Coffee	<i>Kosta Kofee</i>

FIGURE 6. Signage at Deira City Centre mall.

What these examples show is that in both the literal discourse of Rana and Maryam and in the spatial discourse of the aforementioned malls there is an exercise in the blurring of staid oppositions. Both Arabic and English, as it were, “converse” with each other (albeit across an obvious power differential); notions of purity — linguistic and ethnic — become troubled; and novel concepts, such as marriage based on individual choice, become less strange. In the case of the mall, this Arabic-English blurring creates a sort of ahistorical, acultural, interchangeable atmosphere that neutralizes the dangerous aspects of defined urban places. Indeed, as Maryam and other women informants affirmed, they are much more comfortable in shopping malls than in, say, street-facing cafes, because they do not mind being seen there. They see malls as places for everyone, whereas street cafes are too male dominated and “open” (i.e., one is too visible to the street there). Such places do not permit an Imarati woman concerned about maintaining her *sum‘a*, or reputation, to hang out without running grave symbolic risks. Hybrid discourse, in short, seems to play a crucial role in creating a type of utopian blandness that offers symbolic security.

The second form of hybridity that invites comment involves the skillful use of reported speech made by both Rana and Maryam. Here is Maryam, for example, again on traditional marriage practices:

For traditional Imaratis, the name of the family is very important. They stress very heavily on the purity of the lineage. “Is this family . . . are they [consistent] with our old Arab ‘adaat and taqaaleed [customs and practices]?” . . . [Some ‘Iyem] don’t want a traditional Imarati. They’ll say “hatha Badawi” [he is a bedu]. See, whereas the bedu say it with pride, the others guys will say, “No,

we don’t want someone backward. We don’t want somebody who does this and who does that.”

In the same way, Rana evoked a type of *muwatin* who would talk about “stingy ‘Iyem” or “stubborn *bedu*,” or who would dogmatically distinguish between the two ethnicities. On the other hand, Maryam also referenced her grandfather and her mother as they attempted to solve the thorny issue of an arranged marriage. The reported speech, then, abstracts aspects of experience or memory, and distances them from the speaker, positioning the experience in such a way that it becomes “diagrammatic” — i.e., boiled down to its essence, or, rather, to that part of its essence that emotionally interests the speaker. In other words, the reported speech renders the experience in aesthetic form, permitting the speaker to contemplate the experience in a new light. It is, to adapt a phrase from Coleridgean poetics, a “lamp” which illuminates the experience, thereby giving it new meaning.

At one point in one of our conversations, Maryam al Abbasi’s reflections turned poetic:

I think, when you look at the Arab world, you thank God for a place like Dubai, really. Thank God for a place where you have temples and you have mosques, and [where] you have churches. Thank God. Thank God for a place where you have more than one language. . . . Al Hamdulillaah [Praise God]. Ya’ny [I mean], there’s tolerance across many levels. Thank God we don’t have poverty. We have poor families, [but] nobody’s on the streets without shelter and without food and going hungry.

That Maryam should evoke her home city in such terms is related to the hybridity implicit in much of her and Rana’s discourse. Just as the reported speech is idealized (i.e., it is not literally reported speech but, rather, the alleged reported speech of an idealized type — the *muwatin*, the father-figure, etc.), so this image of Dubai is an idealized one. And through it is constructed a certain ideal *topos* that gives meaning to the experience of a rapidly changing urban landscape.

As the anthropologist Edward Evans-Pritchard has famously argued, such notions have metaphysical rather than literal ramifications with reality — “plugging the dams,” as it were, of realities inexplicable with reference to the empirically experienced world.²⁷ Just as the generative concept of “witchcraft” provided Evans-Pritchard’s Azande with a metaphysics by which to understand the otherwise inexplicable, for many people of Dubai today, the ideal Dubai constitutes a metaphysics that encompasses the profound changes undergone by the urban landscape and the traditional society during the past thirty years, giving them both a concrete meaning and a clearly-defined destiny.


THE SPATIAL-SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF A TOPOS: THE IMAGE OF THE PHALANSTERY

Another source of metaphysical “damming” is the image of the self-contained, gated corporate park, residential community, or giant multipurpose shopping mall. (In fact, these three types of project are increasingly merging into enormous developments that combine residential, entertainment, retail and tourism functions.) I call these projects, collectively, “late capitalist phalansteries” because of their symbolism of size, interiority or self-sustainability, and hybridity.

These projects, which began appearing on the Dubai-scape after the second half of the 1990s (i.e., shortly after the U.A.E.’s entry into the WTO in 1994), are an example of another form of the problematic utopian imagination in Dubai (FIGS.7,8).

Although developers have already completed work on several giant projects, including the Crown Prince, Sheikh Muhammad’s so-called Media and Technology Free Zone (“Tecom”) and shopping malls such as Deira City Centre (with its twenty million visitors annually — a behemoth by any standard), the most ambitious projects are still either in

FIGURE 7. (TOP) “Late capitalist phalanstery”: Dubai Sports City, part of Dubailand, a mixed-use project that, at more than 2 billion square feet, is planned to be larger than old Dubai downtown. **FIGURE 8. (BOTTOM)** Map of the Dubai Healthcare City construction site. The site is represented as isolated from the surrounding urban context. Natural features such as water bodies and vegetation are in fact artificial.



the process of construction or exist only in architects' sketches and mock-ups.²⁸ Three of the latter include the Mall of the Emirates project of the local developer Majid al Futtaim Group (MAF); the Burj Dubai (Dubai Tower) and Dubai Mall of Sheikh Muhammad's EMAAR real estate developers; and the Dubailand themed entertainment/tourism/residential complex, also owned by Sheikh Muhammad. (There is an obvious trend here: the state's, i.e., ruler's, ownership of private, revenue-driven projects. This is one of the characteristic features of large-scale capitalism in Dubai, and is perhaps a source of what one scholar has called the "soft authoritarianism" of the Gulf emirate.²⁹)

Majid al Futtaim Group announced the beginning of work on the Mall of the Emirates in October 2003. To be completed in September 2005, the project was touted as the largest retail space in the world outside North America. The U.A.E. Dh 3 billion (approx. U.S. \$800 million) project would cover more than two million square feet, and be expected to attract about 30 million visitors annually.³⁰ The mall will have a four-hundred-room, a "five-star" hotel, more than 350 shops, a 7,000-space car park, fourteen multiplex cinemas, and, most interestingly, a 300,000-square-foot indoor ski resort.³¹

Not to be outdone, EMAAR announced its Burj Dubai-Dubai Mall project on the heels of the MAF announcement. Seemingly mocking MAF's claims of "largest retail space," the EMAAR project was sized at five million square feet, "the equivalent of fifty football fields."³² It would contain shopping districts, or "precincts," that "in their area and variety can be described as shopping centers within a shopping center."³³ Within the mall's confines shoppers would also find,

[an] enormous aquarium with rare fish and sea creatures and during their visit shoppers will be able to see sharks . . . as they swim in the aquarium. Along with this, the aquarium provides impressive, captivating views of Burj Dubai. The mall also contains the world's largest gold suq as well as a million square feet of clothing retailers.³⁴

Another impressive feature, according to a newspaper review, would be the "enormous lake" (*buhaira dakhma*) next to the mall which, with the connected garden and "meadows" (*musattahat khadra*), would reach 2.6 million square feet in size. Relatively more mundane features included 2.5 million square feet of residential space, a 16,000-space car park, and another 1.5 million square feet of retail space connected to the lake and meadows.³⁵

In turn, dwarfing both these schemes, the Dubailand project was announced in October 2003, at a cost of U.A.E. Dh 18 billion (approximately U.S. \$5.5 billion). Covering an area larger than the current downtown Dubai (over two billion square feet) the project is to consist partly in the following.³⁶

Eco-Tourism World . . . a natural world marvelling at the beauty of our planet, which will comprise a series of

nature and desert-based attractions integrated within their desert parkland surroundings; Themed Leisure and Vacation World . . . a relaxing world of spas, health and well-being. This will consist of appealing retreats designed to respond to the growing international demand for quality vacation village residences, resort hotels and wellness retreats; . . . Downtown . . . a vibrant mix of entertainment and eating out. This will be a mixed destination offering a variety of retail, dining and entertainment facilities. It will feature popular family entertainment components with cross-generational appeal such as cinemas, bowling and street entertainment.³⁷

Three aspects of these propagandistic descriptions stand out: the emphasis on size (measured both in spatial and demographic — so-and-so many million tourists — terms); the self-sufficiency/interiority of the projects (a visitor or resident need not ever venture outside their gates); and the fabrication, literally or symbolically inside, of the natural or outdoor world (lakes, meadows, ski resorts, downtowns) (FIG. 9). All of this constitutes a fairly literal adaptation of the American exurban model of elitist social and urban engineering. In other words, this type of real estate development does much more than simply provide the type of gated community that attracts the crowd "who follow the sun and advantageous tax laws."³⁸ Symbolically, it neutralizes the apparently dangerous, because uncontrollable, image of the natural sphere on the one hand, and on the other of the genuinely urban (FIGS. 10–12).

Since the aforementioned projects are still in the process of construction, it is difficult to collect data on how their spaces are interpreted by actual people. One symbolically if not entirely functionally similar project that does



FIGURE 9. "The Emirates Hills," a gated community by EMAAR developers, in the process of being cultivated. The process is extremely wasteful, but development companies tend to ignore environmental and sustainability issues.



FIGURE 10. (TOP) American Dream. Exurban layout at “the Emirates Hills” gated community.

FIGURE 11. (MIDDLE) EMAAR’s “Street of Dreams” complex of display villas. The fountain and symmetrical vegetation convey the suppression of nature.

FIGURE 12. (BOTTOM) Each EMAAR villa is equipped with a multi-functional LCD monitor. Functions include Internet access, communications with area malls and restaurants, and surveillance cameras.

already exist, however, is the so-called “Tecom” corporate park. Consisting of three large developments — Internet City, Media City, and Knowledge Village — this project, also owned by Sheikh Muhammad, is a so-called “freehold” development, where foreign companies, in this case in the knowledge, communications, and communications technology industries, can set up operations free of local tax or labor-law obligations. My interest here is in how utopia is imagined through such projects (FIGS. 13–15). In this regard, I recorded the following conversation, which transpired over lunch one day with three management-level employees of Tecom, Tanya, an Iraqi expatriate, Marcus, an American expatriate, and Nadia, an Imarati *muwatina*.

Tanya: People [at Tecom] are so conscientious. They don't have to stay [after hours] but they want to. This is a continuously evolving place. The recruitment is by hand-picking. It's selective. And every individual is unique. So you have a lot of complementarity.

AK: Would you say that this all has a campus feel?

T: Yes! That's exactly what it's like. I feel like I'm back at school. There is very strong camaraderie.

Nadia: The sense of community is part of the reason why I decided to join [Tecom].

T: I don't know, maybe I'm romanticizing things, but I definitely think that people care about each other here. I had a friend who once worked here and who left for another company. She likes her job, but she definitely misses the sense of community here.

Marcus: The purpose of the community is to promote interaction. It is to encourage creativity, interaction . . . not just among individuals but among departments and companies. There are “best practices,” . . . certain companies are considered to have “best practices,” that companies lower on the chain are given an incentive to adopt. We definitely don't want weak companies here. . . . A good question to ask is how has this community helped transcend national boundaries within its employees. [For example, you have Nadia. Among most locals] it's taboo for a woman to sit with men, like now. . . . What this community is about is liberalism, or liberalizing oneself. [It teaches you] the necessity of cross-cultural interaction. You can't isolate yourself, you have to communicate with others.

In the minds of both the developers of these projects and their everyday occupants, there is much more than a pecuniary interest at work here. Perhaps more important is the social dimension, one where barriers erected by tradition and a history of (allegedly) comparative unenlightenment are said to be dissolving. Here is Rana al Mudarris' response to my question about why she thinks working at Media City is different from the conventional corporate job: “The image that Dubai is trying to build is Dubai is different. Different in terms of lifestyle, different in terms of the number of



FIGURE 13. (TOP) Map of Knowledge Village posted near the main entrance. Knowledge Village is part of the “Tecom” complex, which also includes Dubai Media City and Dubai Internet City.

FIGURE 14. (MIDDLE) Exterior of Knowledge Village in October 2003, just before completion of the project. The theme seems to be inspired by a notion of French Mediterranean.

FIGURE 15. (BOTTOM) A stroll on the Knowledge Village campus.

nationalities that we have here, different in terms of concept. . . . It’s a trial, it’s in the future.” Working at Media City, for Rana, is no doubt related to personal and career considerations. But, as this comment shows, it is also about playing a role in producing a certain progressive image of the city as an ideal *topos* that, on the one hand, transcends the past and, on the other, prophesies the future. The following vignette, which appeared in April 2004 in a local daily, confirms the status of this representation as a collective one:

They have a smart office in Knowledge Village. They have daily targets of business calls to be made; and they have deadlines to meet on information technology solutions for major clients such as Dubai Police and other Dubai-based businesses. But the employees of Techno Services Team (TST) are not IT professionals. They are young U.A.E. national women, who are all students of Dubai Women’s College.³⁹

“Our students,” a professor is quoted as saying, “are at the forefront of breaking down barriers in the IT industry that has so far been dominated by men.”⁴⁰

FROM FOURIER TO THE CORPORATE STATE, OR THE CURIOUS APPEAL OF IDEOLOGICAL UTOPIA

As the last comment shows, the experience of these development projects is symbolically organized at the nexus of the past and the future, tradition and modernity, and of different identities. One of the standard themes invoked by employees of Tecom, not just Marcus but several others, involved the ways in which one has to overcome prejudices and national boundaries to be an effective employee of Media City, Knowledge Village, or Internet City. This was especially pronounced among the Imarati women I spoke to, many of whom, perhaps not coincidentally, come from less legitimated identities such as the Arab al Khaleej. Being marked both by gender and ethnicity seemed to give them a unique perspective on the sometimes surreal reality of life in a traditional society and a city that are changing at a breathtaking pace.

In his classic work on utopia, Karl Mannheim argued, *pace* Lamartine, that “utopias are often only premature truths,” and that what is utopian is only considered thus by representatives of an era that has already passed.⁴¹ Measured against the standards of the Imarati society that is receding into the past, where it was uncommon for women to study at a university let alone talk frankly to “strange” (i.e., unrelated) men or to travel abroad, the Imaratis I reference here are unconventional. In many ways, Maryam, Rana and Nadia are representatives of a new generation of Imaratis, those who have traveled abroad, usually to the West, often staying several years to complete a university degree. Maryam earned a bachelor’s from a well-known American university, and a master’s from an Ivy League school. Nadia had, at the

time we met, only recently moved to the U.A.E., having lived most of her life abroad with her diplomat father. Rana had studied at an American university in Dubai, and was a seasoned traveler. All shared an ethos of merit that was consciously fashioned within the context of a welfare state that lavishes services on its citizens well beyond their basic needs. All shared a desire both to maintain what they saw as good in “tradition” and to simultaneously challenge inherited assumptions about women’s place in society. All were enthusiastic about the Brave New World of Dubai that Sheikh Muhammad — a charismatic leader, if there ever was one — is seen to be single-handedly creating. It is for such a person — cosmopolitan, conversant in English (the language and the global corporate argot), and, as Rana put it, “open-minded” — that these projects seem to make the most sense.

An intriguing related issue, one that I did not have space to touch on, is how this new discourse of progress is replacing older notions of virtue and of the fully human. Future research should contextualize this sometimes exhilarating new world in its local roots. For example, *muwatinun* do see clear continuities between the older maritime trading culture and the newer system of *rentier* and investment capitalism. “In Dubai,” as they sometimes say, “*al-tijara qabl al-din*” (“business comes before even religion”).

Yet to conclude from the foregoing discussion that the situation of Dubai is actually utopian is premature and fatally partial. The broader context is starker, involving the complete top-down planning of a city by an authoritarian corporate state that is distinctly more interested in accommodating the needs of multinational corporations than the more holistic claims of individual subjects. The fact remains that Dubai subsists within a corporate *cordon sanitaire*, inside of which no tax laws or independent regulations exist to check the power of either state or corporation. Another sobering

reality is that of the manual laborers from whose indefatigable and ill-recompensed labor the modern pyramids of Dubai emerge at blinding speed (FIGS. 16, 17). These multiethnic but predominantly South Asian workers have no rights to speak of, and, as an expatriate project manager once ironically told me, “they are sent home [if they overstep their ascribed function]. At least they don’t kill them, like the pharaohs used to do to their slaves.” One question to explore more deeply in future research, in fact, is how the absolute intolerance of the corporate state for any independent politics relates to the transmogrified images of unity and *communitas* evoked by the built environment. How does the mental energy normally taken up by praxis get diverted into the fantasy of utopia, or, in Freudian terms, how does repression engender dream images of closure? The image of utopia is not, to say the least, the sign of an actually utopian referent.

In their classic *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno made the now well-known argument about enlightened modernity. Taking the broad sweep, and incorporating the origins of enlightenment in Greek myth, Horkheimer and Adorno suggested that what began as a critical, demystifying, and liberating notion — enlightenment in the holistic sense — became reduced to instrumental rationality as a means of bourgeois social and natural domination. Far from increasing the liberation of humanity, enlightenment ended up enslaving it.⁴² There seems to be an uncanny parallel in the historical career of utopia as imagined through the built environment. Fourier’s phalanstery emerged from early-nineteenth-century European preoccupations with escaping and overcoming the corrosive environment of industrial capitalism. In this conception, the utopian community was genuinely utopian in two senses. First, it embodied a fundamental and radical critique of the status quo, thereby reimagining the basis of social life. Second, it implied a holistic notion of



FIGURE 16. (LEFT) A maintenance worker at Knowledge Village prepares to clean up after students.

FIGURE 17. (RIGHT) Welders at the Gardens, a giant shopping center mall project still under construction. At most sites in Dubai, work proceeds 24 hours a day, workers being bused in two to three shifts.

human nature. The community tried to see to it that the new human being to be cultivated within its confines would be fulfilled in all her natural faculties — mental, material, spiritual and instinctual. The brave new phalansteries of late capitalism, as exemplified by the giant complexes of Dubai, suggest a radically narrower definition of the human subject, one that ideally finds holistic fulfillment in the act of consumption. In thus conflating the “human” with the capitalist “consumer,” the new phalansteries might better be called, after Marc Augé, “banal utopias” rather than utopias proper (FIG. 18).⁴³ The notion of the utopian community, once radical, seems to have followed the arc discerned by Horkheimer and Adorno in the case of enlightenment: instrumentalization, accumulating narrowness, and the decay of its capacity to cultivate praxis.

We have, in a sense, returned to Benjamin’s insight, highlighted earlier in this paper, about the coexistence of fantasy and cold realism as the distinguishing feature of modernity. I have attempted here to give an account of the moral persuasiveness of the fantastic, dream-like dimensions of the urban. I have suggested that this is related to the social subconscious of an anxious society and historical period. Future research will have to develop this hopefully productive observation, as well as more systematically relating it to the other



FIGURE 18. Construction site near Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai.

side of the coin, the realistic dimension. For now, it suffices to follow Ernst Bloch in “sift(ing) through the ruins of detotalizing cultures in search of the forgotten dreams, the ‘cultural surplus,’ that might anticipate the future.”⁴⁴

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Reference to the “Land without Philosophy” in the title of this article is taken from the writings of Thomas More. In *Utopia* (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), he writes that the ideal society would be a place where individuals live in a state of unreflective philosophical practice. Since their actions are motivated by the ideal society, the actions themselves are ideal, and therefore the society does not require a proper philosophy. This anticipates Walter Benjamin’s insight that the ideal social body would make “morality superfluous.” See Walter Benjamin’s *The Arcades Project*, H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin, trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p.16.

1. “Utopias are often only premature truths.” Quoted in K. Mannheim, *Ideology and*

Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, L. Wirth and E. Shils, trans.

(New York: Harvest, 1985), p.203.

2. See A. Munif, *Cities of Salt: A Novel*, P. Theroux, trans. (New York: Vintage, 1989).

3. Quoted in R. El Enany, “*Cities of Salt: A Literary View of the Theme of Oil and Change in the Gulf*,” in I.R. Netten, ed., *Arabia and the Gulf: From Traditional Society to Modern States* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p.216.

4. El Enany, “*Cities of Salt: A Literary View*,” p.220.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Cf. Wilfred Thesiger’s lament in *Arabian Sands* (London: Penguin, 1991) that “his” *bedu* had already begun to lose their honorable, simple, picturesque way of life as the first trappings of modernity reached them. El Enany’s review of *Cities of Salt* does not question this popular trope. It is with this in mind that Nelida Fuccaro made her salutary intervention, calling for a more serious engagement with the moral/cultural orders that give shape to the experience of Gulf cities. See N. Fuccaro, “Visions of the City

in Urban Studies on the Gulf,” *MESA Bulletin*, Vol.35 No.2 (2001), pp.175–87.

7. See, for example, G. Balfour-Paul, “Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates: Political and Social Evolution,” in Netten, ed., *Arabia and the Gulf*, pp.156–75.

8. Dubai, like other Gulf states, is mind-boggling in its diversity, with more than 120 nationalities represented in its resident population. Here, I only deal with what is numerically a small part of this larger picture, the U.A.E. nationals (Arabic “*muwatinun*”). In general, I am critical of the facile identification by most writers (including myself) of the geography and “culture” of the region with the national state. As the historian James Onley, among others, has argued (personal conversations), objectively this is not at all the case: at the very least, Persians and Indians have had as profound an influence on the “culture” of the coastal Gulf as any other peoples. It is, however, with some reservation, and for considerations of space and of the coherence of this argument, that I too will identify the “culture” of Dubai primarily with that of the subjects of

the national state in this paper.

9. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, p.209.

10. Benjamin, *Arcades Project*, p.13.

11. See W. Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

12. The classic, and perhaps still best, work on the department store is Emile Zola's *Au Bonheur des Dames (The Ladies' Delight)*, R. Buss, trans. (New York: Penguin, 2001).

13. Benjamin, *Arcades Project*, p.4.

14. Fredric Jameson put it another way: it is a type of imagination that is condemned to interpreting history only through its popular images of history. See F. Jameson, *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991).

15. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, p.209: "The form in which events are ordered . . . appears in the utopia as an immediately perceptible picture, or at least a directly intelligible set of meanings." It is through hybrid images and category-destroying icons that Umberto Eco, for example, has his young monks in *The Name of the Rose* repeatedly challenging an authoritarian clerical elite bent on controlling the interpretation of texts. Thus, as an old man, the self-flagellating narrator, Adso, describes how as a young novice he enjoyed an illicit encounter with a peasant girl in the monastery kitchens: ". . . I realize that to describe my wicked ecstasy of that instant I have used the same words that I used, not many pages before, to describe the fire that burned the martyred body of the Fraticello Michael . . . I experienced them in the same way both at the time. . . ." U. Eco, *The Name of the Rose*, W. Weaver, trans. (New York: Harvest, 1994), p.247.

16. Benjamin, *Arcades Project*, p.640.

17. C. Fourier, *Le Nouveau Monde Industriel et Sociétaire*, as quoted by Benjamin, *Arcades Project*, p.641.

18. Benjamin, *Arcades Project*, p.16.

19. Thus Zola whimsically writes:

"Sometimes, she (Baudu) would get excited, seeing the huge, ideal store, the phalanstery of trade, in which everyone would have a precise share of the profits according to his or her deserts, as well as security for the future, ensured by a contract. . . . All life was there, everything was to be had without

leaving the building: study, food, bed and clothing. *Au Bonheur des Dames* was sufficient to its own pleasures and its own needs in the midst of the great city, full of the racket made by this city of work which was thriving on the dungheap of old streets, open at last to the full light of day." E. Zola, *Au Bonheur des Dames*, pp.348–49.

20. M.M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, M. Holquist, ed., M. Holquist and C. Emerson, trans. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).

21. See, for example, S. Altorki and D.P. Cole, *Arabian Oasis City: The Transformation of 'Unayzah* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), which discusses the parallel but sometimes incomparable case of the Saudi interior; Balfour-Paul, "Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates"; F. Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates* (New York: Longman, 1982); S. Khalaf, "Gulf Societies and the Image of Unlimited Good," *Dialectical Anthropology* 17 (1992), pp.53–84, which discusses similar, but earlier, developments, in Kuwait; and P. Mansfield, *The New Arabians* (Chicago: JG Ferguson, 1981).

22. Heard-Bey, *Trucial States*, pp.247–48.

23. To be distinguished from Farsi. Persians began immigrating to Dubai in the first two decades of the twentieth century. They came primarily from the Gulf coast of the Persian Empire, from towns such as Linga, Bandar-e-Abbas, and 'Awadh. These Persians were Sunni, as opposed to the Shi'i (Farsi-speaking) Persians of the rest of the empire. The Sunni Persians, who had strong cultural and trade connections to the Arab inhabitants of the Gulf coast, became known as "Iyem," the Imarati dialect word for the Arabic "Ajam," meaning "Iranian." This also became the name of their specific dialect, an Arabized Persian that was, and still is, distinct from the Farsi of the Iranian interior.

24. J.G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia* (Amersham England: Demand Editions, 1984), Vol.II, p.455.

25. By "Gulf country," Imaratis usually mean any country that is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, i.e., Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. Descendants of a "pure" Arab father and a "pure" Arab mother from any GCC country

tend to be considered (theoretically) fully "pure" (i.e., Arab) Imaratis. Since descent is reckoned in relation to the father, the mother does not necessarily have to be of Imarati nationality, but she has to be of Arab ethnicity, for the child to be considered pure Arab. In practice, however, certain situations seem to foreground Imarati identity over other Gulf identities. For example, a woman who behaves in unconventional ways, studying abroad for example, and who is, say, of Kuwaiti extraction, will be given more latitude for the unconventional practice. This hypothetical woman may be pure Arab (because of GCC-Kuwaiti descent), but she would not be expected to conform in this case to the highest standards of honorable behavior, of which only fully Imarati women are seen to be the repository.

26. All names of individuals have been changed.

27. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).

28. "Size Counts," *Gulf Business*, Vol.8 No.6 (October 2003), p.19.

29. Personal conversation with academic who chooses to remain unnamed, September 21, 2003.

30. M. Nair, "MAF to Launch Dh 3b 'Mall of the Emirates,'" *Gulf News*, October 6, 2003.

31. Ibid.

32. "EMAAR Announces the Dubai Mall Project, the Biggest Shopping Mall in the World," *al Bayan*, November 17, 2003.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. C.L. Jose, "Dh 18b Dubailand Project Unveiled," *Gulf News*, October 22, 2003.

37. C.L. Jose, "Government to Spend Dh 2.6b on Dubailand," *Gulf News*, October 22, 2003.

38. Martin Giesen, Dean of the School of Architecture and Design, American University of Sharjah, U.A.E. Comment made on the BBC Radio 3 documentary "Architecture in Dubai," (www.bbc.co.uk/radio3/speech/arabian2.shtml).

39. J. Kalsi, "Students Practice the Future," *Gulf News*, April 26, 2004.

40. Ibid.

41. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, p.203.

42. M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, *The*

Dialectic of Enlightenment, J. Cumming, trans. (New York: Continuum, 1972). Cf. Adorno's pessimistic reflection that "No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb." T.W.

Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, E.B. Jephcott, trans. (New York: Continuum, 1973), p.320.
43. M. Augé, *Nonplaces: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*, J. Howe, trans. (New York: Verso, 2000).
44. M. Jay, *Marxism and Totality: The*

Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.188.

All images, unless otherwise noted, are by the author.



On Practice:

Questioning the “Publicness” of Public Spaces in Postindustrial Cities

Z. MUGE AKKAR

The proliferation of alluring, distinctive and exclusive public spaces in many postindustrial cities raises the question of how far these environments are truly “public.” Focusing on this question, this article explores the changing “publicness” of a recently redeveloped space in the city center of Newcastle upon Tyne, Britain, in relation to the dimensions of access, actor and interest. It further seeks to underline two emerging trends: the blurring of distinction between public and private spaces in the public realms of postindustrial cities; and the threat posed by image-led regeneration strategies to the everyday needs of and the civic functioning of genuine public spaces.

Public spaces, inevitable components of cities for centuries, have become the subject of renewed concern among design professionals and researchers for more than two decades.¹ During this time, attractive and alluring public spaces have been placed at the center of many postindustrial cities. In parallel, starting in the 1980s, public spaces have increasingly been used as key components of city-imaging and urban-regeneration programs in Britain. A number of “good-looking” and “well-maintained” public spaces have been built there in order to develop positive images of urban areas and improve their attractiveness to potential investors.²

Despite the resurgence of interest in public spaces, urban design and planning literature has frequently hinted at the diminishing “publicness” of public spaces in postindustrial cities. Some researchers have pointed out the threat of recent privatization policies, and claimed that public spaces, traditionally open to all segments of the population, are increasingly being developed and managed by private agencies to produce profit for the private sector and serve the interests of particular sections of the population.³ Others have commented on the high degree of control now maintained over access and use of public spaces through surveillance cameras and other measures intended to improve their security.⁴ Still others have argued that contemporary public spaces increasingly serve a “homogenous” public and promote “social filtering.”⁵ Unlike older public spaces, which bring various groups of people together and provide a common ground for all segments of the

Muge Akkar is a city planner who studied at the University of Newcastle, and who is a senior instructor in the Department of City and Regional Planning, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.

population, new public spaces have been seen as enhancing gentrification, social stratification, and fragmentation.⁶ Some scholars, such as McInroy, have even argued that many public spaces recently built within urban-regeneration and city-selling projects have undermined the needs of local communities in the service of private interests.⁷

While all these studies claim a progressive erosion of the public qualities of contemporary urban spaces, there remains a need for in-depth and systematic study of these issues. In response, this article seeks to question the “publicness” of public spaces in postindustrial cities, with special reference to Newcastle upon Tyne. Using the case-study method, it examines the Haymarket Bus Station (HBS), a public space in the center of Newcastle that was redeveloped in the 1990s as part of an image-led public-realm improvement program of the local authority. Among other things, the program envisioned that the rebuilding of the bus station and its environs could be used as an instrument to regenerate the northwest edge of the city center. The article explores this change by examining the HBS before and after its redevelopment in regard to three dimensions of publicness: access, actor and interest.

The article is organized in four main sections. The first clarifies what the “publicness” of a public space is, and introduces a framework for measuring it. The second sets the HBS in a wider context by looking into the economic and urban decline of Newcastle in the 1970s and 1980s — as well as the regeneration of the new urban landscape and the rising significance of public spaces within the 1990s economic restructuring. The third section is devoted to a presentation of the case study. It briefly introduces the HBS in terms of its location in Newcastle and the major cornerstones of its history. After summarizing the major actions taken in the latest redevelopment scheme, it also describes the changing publicness of the HBS before and after its development. Finally, the paper discusses the findings of the case study in relation to similar studies on public spaces in other postindustrial cities, and seeks to give clues for urban planning and design practice.

“PUBLICNESS” OF A PUBLIC SPACE

By definition, public, as an adjective, signifies “of or concerning the people as a whole,” “open to all,” “accessible to or shared by all members of the community,” “performed or made openly,” and “well-known.”⁸ It also connotes “a political entity which is carried out or made by or on behalf of the community as a whole,” and “authorised by or representing the community.”⁹ Additionally, public may mean something which is “provided especially by the government, for the use of people in general.”¹⁰ As a noun, public refers to “people in general.”¹¹ However, it may also be used to signify “an organised body of people,” such as a community or a nation.¹²

Moreover, public may mean “a group of people who share a particular interest or who have something in common,” like the audience at a play or film.¹³ Hence, “public space” can be described as space concerning the people as a whole, open to all, accessible to or shared by all members of the community, and provided by the public authorities for the use of people in general.

Though illuminating, such dictionary definitions are not sufficient to systematically describe the public qualities of an urban place. In this regard, Benn and Gaus have offered a valuable empirical tool to define both “public space” and the “publicness” of a public space. Their definitions of the qualities of public and private with regard to urban space are based on three factors: the accessibility to spaces or places, activities, information and resources; the public-private nature of agencies in control; and the status of the people who will be better or worse off for whatever is in question. They thus distinguish between what they call “access,” “agency” and “interest.”¹⁴

Regarding the criterion of access, public space is a place which is open to all. This means its resources, the activities that take place in it, and information about it are available to everybody. Concerning the criterion of agency, public space is a place controlled by “public actors” (i.e., agents or agencies that act on behalf of a community, city, commonwealth or state) and used by “the public” (i.e., the people in general). As for interest, public space is a place which serves the public interest (i.e., its benefits are controlled and received by all members of the society) (FIG. 1).

Of course, these definitions refer to an ideal public space, while the urban environment is not composed of absolutely public and private spaces; rather, it is a composition of public and private spaces with different degrees of publicness and privateness. Accepting that the relation between public and private space is a continuum, it is possible to define public spaces as having various degrees of publicness. Regarding the dimensions of access, actor and interest, the extent of publicness will depend on three indices: the degree to which the public space and its resources, as well as the activities occurring in it and information about it, are available to all; the degree to which it is managed and controlled by public actors and used by the public; and the degree to which it serves the public interest.¹⁵

As Madanipour has shown in the analysis of the Metro Centre in Gateshead (a regional-level shopping mall in Britain), the publicness of a new public space can be assessed by examining its development and use processes according to these three criteria.¹⁶ However, in the case of a public space which already exists and has been subject to redevelopment or improvement, the analysis also needs to assess its publicness before the redevelopment in order to show changes in the level of publicness. The HBS is one such space where the extent of its publicness before and after its redevelopment needs to be defined.

	PUBLIC SPACE
ACCESS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>Physical access</i> ● <i>Access to activities and discussions</i> ● <i>Access to information</i> ● <i>Access to resources</i> 	<p>A space which is accessible to all.</p> <p>A space where the activities and discussions taking place in it are accessible to all.</p> <p>A space where the information about it is accessible to all.</p> <p>A space where the resources are accessible to all.</p>
ACTOR	<p>A space which is controlled by public actors — i.e., agents or agencies who/which act on behalf of a community, city, commonwealth or state.</p> <p>A space which is used by the public.</p>
INTEREST	<p>A space which serves the public interest — i.e., the benefit of which is controlled and received by all members of the society.</p>

FIGURE 1. The definitions of “public space” with regard to the criteria of access, actor and interest. Based on S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus, “The Public and the Private: Concepts and Action,” in S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus, eds., *Public and Private in Social Life* (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983).

Prior to the presentation of the case study, it is useful to look at the change in the economic and urban base of Newcastle in the last three decades and the rising role of public spaces in this period.

NEWCASTLE: FROM AN INDUSTRIAL TO A POST-INDUSTRIAL CITY

The protracted recession of the 1970s and 1980s traumatized a number of previously affluent, heavily industrialized British cities, causing them to fear for their future. Of these cities, Newcastle, in the northeast of England, was devastated by a precipitous decline in three major industries — coal mining, shipbuilding, and heavy engineering.¹⁷ Between 1971 and 1984 the city lost 70,000 jobs (a decline of 43 percent, compared to a national average job loss of 6.6 percent), and between 1971 and 1981 its population declined by more than 30,000 (representing a 9.88 percent drop).¹⁸ The recession left behind vast areas of derelict land along the riverside, increased the ongoing deterioration of working-class housing areas (already suffering from high unemployment and crime), and reduced standards of education and health-service provision.¹⁹ The city center also experienced a severe decline, as evidenced by a high rate of unemployment there, deterioration of urban fabric, loss of population, vacant and underused properties, traffic congestion, limited provision of parking, lack of green open spaces, a poor-quality public realm, and lack of new investment.²⁰

With these circumstances as a background, Newcastle has undergone an economic restructuring since the late

1980s, and now shows some of the characteristics of a postindustrial city.²¹ One of the most significant changes has been the growth of the service sector, especially business services. Of the eight most highly industrialized British cities, Newcastle had the highest increase in employment in the business sector (93.5 percent) between 1981 and 1987 (FIG. 2). But this growth has been accompanied by deindustrialization. Among the same eight cities, Newcastle experienced the second greatest decline in employment in manufacturing during the same time period. The manufacturing sector has also undergone a change in character typical of postindustrial cities. Instead of the former locally owned heavy industry, chemical, food, timber, furniture and clothing industries have now become dominant in the sector. And as part of this shift, Newcastle is also now home to branch plants of national and multinational companies with headquarters principally in London. Komatsu, a major Japanese company producing earth-moving equipment; Findus, a frozen-food company; and Nissan, a Japanese car manufacturer, all moved to Tyneside in the 1980s and 1990s and have fared reasonably well.²² Also in keeping with models of the postindustrial city, the new jobs created since the 1980s have emphasized the development of a higher-quality labor force, especially with central-government support, and increases in productivity based on technological improvement.²³

The city’s economic restructuring in the last two decades has gone hand in hand with the creation of a new urban landscape, particularly in the city center and its immediate periphery. Area-based regeneration schemes driven by public-private initiatives, such as the Grainger Town Project, the Quayside,

	Manufacture	Distribution	Transport	Business Services	Total
Liverpool	-44.2	-28.4	-34.7	+50.3	-20.4
Sheffield	-38.2	-16.9	-9.3	+14.6	-16.1
Birmingham	-27.3	-8.1	-12.6	+21.3	-9.0
Glasgow	-27.7	-14.2	-28.4	+46.7	-7.8
Manchester	-17.9	-8.5	-7.6	+69.3	-4.1
Leeds	-15.0	+4.8	-8.5	+25.9	-2.3
London	-29.6	+0.6	-14.7	+70.9	-1.6
Newcastle	-43.7	-10.3	-18.0	+93.5	-0.4

FIGURE 2. Percentage employment change for eight large cities, 1981-87. See Champion and Townsend, 1990; cited in Cameron and Doling, "Housing Neighbourhoods and Urban Regeneration," *Urban Studies*, Vol.31 No.7 (1994), p.1213.



FIGURE 3. The location of the HBS in the city center of Newcastle. Based on Campus and City Map (homepage of University of Newcastle, on-line, 2004, accessed January 21, 2005); available from http://www.ncl.ac.uk/travel/maps/navigator_large.php.


the Theatre Village, and the China Town Development Strategy, have created mainly consumption-oriented, highly speculative, commercial, and prestigious environments (FIG. 3). Within this new urbanscape, a number of attractive public spaces have appeared, enriched with high-quality materials and embellished with artwork and other design elements. Typical of these spaces, the HBS regeneration was seen as a way to improve the image of the city and its attractiveness to investment, thereby raising the city's competitive position in global urban markets and improving the well-being of its population. As such, the HBS may in many senses also be perceived as a textbook example of the privatization of public spaces within postindustrial cities, especially where such spaces are seen as catalysts for urban regeneration. But, equally, several aspects of the HBS experience stand out as contrary to this model. As will be argued in the following sections, in addition to diminished aspects of publicness largely similar to those of its contemporary counterparts, the new HBS contains features that improve all three dimensions of its publicness.

THE HBS: LOCATION, HISTORY, AND RECENT REDEVELOPMENT

The HBS is located on Percy Street at the northwest edge of the city-center retail core, in close proximity to Haymarket Metro Station, the South African War Memorial, St. Thomas Church, and the Civic Centre (FIG. 4). It is adjacent to the University of Newcastle to the north, the Leazes Conservation Area (a residential area accommodating listed buildings) to the northwest, and a multistory car park on Prudhoe Place. Farther south, across Prudhoe Street, is the Eldon Square Shopping Centre (the biggest shopping mall in the city center) and the Eldon Square bus concourse. Northumberland Street, the city's prime retailing street, is to the east.

Early in the city's history, the site functioned as a parade ground. It only became a marketplace where hay and straw were sold, and where agricultural servants were hired, in the

FIGURE 4. The HBS and its surroundings before the latest redevelopment scheme. Based on: Campus and City Map [homepage of University of Newcastle, on-line, 2004, accessed January 21, 2005]; available from http://www.ncl.ac.uk/travel/maps/navigator_large.php.



early nineteenth century (FIG.5).²⁴ As the site continued to develop in the late nineteenth century, a row of houses and a public house, The Farmers' Rest, were constructed on the site.²⁵ This was followed by the erection of the South African War Memorial at the north of the Haymarket, the development of Bainbridge Hall and Employment Exchange at its south end, and the introduction of a single-deck tram line on Percy Street.²⁶ Then, in the 1930s, as its agricultural connections disappeared, the Haymarket's traditional roles were abandoned, and it became a departing point for carriers and a bus station.²⁷ Later, the nineteenth-century houses on the site were reconstructed and named Haymarket Houses.²⁸

The 1960s and 1970s witnessed further significant changes in the urban landscape of the Haymarket and its surroundings. With the 1960 City Centre Plan, the Central Motorway East was constructed, Percy Street was widened, and a number of buildings were pulled down to make way for Eldon Square Shopping Centre and bus concourse.²⁹ Next, in the early 1970s, the Haymarket Houses were knocked down, and replaced by a three-story building in the Haymarket and a row of single-story shops on the south of Prudhoe Place.³⁰ These changes were followed by the construction of the Haymarket Metro Station to the north of the bus station in 1980 and the development of a multistory car park in the mid-1990s.³¹

The bus station and its environs were intended for redevelopment three times in the 1980s; yet, none of these attempts succeeded.³² However, in the early 1990s Marks and Spencer (M&S), a big high-street retailer which owned the land where their store and service yard were located, saw new potential in the Haymarket. With the idea of extending their store into the Haymarket to create their biggest outlet in Britain outside London, it bought the three-story building there.³³ It then approached two other major property owners on the site — Scottish & Newcastle (S&N) Breweries, which owned The Farmers' Rest and the former Ginger Beer Works, and the



FIGURE 5. Maps showing the spatial development of the Haymarket and its surroundings between the eighteenth century and the end of the twentieth century. Based on S. Middlebrook, *Newcastle upon Tyne: Its Growth and Achievement* (Newcastle: Kemsley House, 1950) (left above); F. Graham, *Historic Newcastle* (Newcastle: Frank Graham, 1976) (right above); R. Mittins, "The History and Development of Percy Street — Newcastle upon Tyne," B.A. thesis, University of Newcastle, 1978 (left below); Campus and City Map [homepage of University of Newcastle, on-line, 2004, accessed January 21, 2005]; available from http://www.ncl.ac.uk/travel/maps/navigator_large.php (right below).

Newcastle City Council (NCC), which owned the temporary shops on Prudhoe Place and Percy Street and all vehicle-circulation areas including the bus station.³⁴ For their cooperation in the complete redevelopment of the site, M&S offered S&N Breweries a new pub there, and it offered to redevelop the city-owned portions, including the bus station, at no public cost.³⁵

Following negotiations between the three parties, an agreement was reached to redevelop the bus station and its environs through a public-private partnership. M&S would venture £30 million on the redevelopment.³⁶ S&N Breweries would pay the extra land value for their new pub and restaurant.³⁷ The NCC and the Passenger Transport Executive for Tyne and Wear (PTE) would be involved in collaborative,

facilitating, coordinating and regulatory roles. In the mid-1990s, then, the old bus station and all other premises on the site were demolished, and a two-story extension to the M&S store was constructed, along with a new service yard and customer-collection areas, three kiosks, and a public house and restaurant (FIG. 6).³⁸ A new bus station with a glazed canopy was also built; Prudhoe Place was realigned in association with the bus station and with access to Prudhoe Chare; the taxi rank in Prudhoe Place was relocated; the hard landscaping around the bus station was improved; and the rear service lanes were redesigned to allow barrier-controlled access to the M&S service yard.³⁹ The new bus station was opened to the public in 1997.




FIGURE 6. The land use map of the Haymarket in 1995 (left), the proposed layout and model of the new Haymarket (right and below). Left image based on NCC, "The Map of Haymarket: Marks & Spencer," prepared by the Director of Development and the Chief Planning Officer and drawn by C.A.B., June 21, 1994, NCC files, DET/01/0625/94. Right image based on NJSR Chartered Architects, "The Plan of the Haymarket Bus Station," submitted to the Newcastle City Council, Booked no. 12/625, NCC files.



FIGURE 7. *The old HBS in the 1960s. Source: Newcastle City Libraries & Arts, The Sixties: Gone But Not Forgotten (Newcastle, Newcastle City Libraries & Arts, 1984); reprinted by permission.*

CHANGING DIMENSIONS OF "ACCESS" AND "ACTOR"

Before the reconstruction, the HBS was an open public space. Situated close to the Metro station, the multistory car park, and taxi ranks, it was fully accessible to pedestrians, Metro and bus passengers, and car users (FIG. 7).⁴⁰ The public space was also used by a wide range of groups working in both public and private areas of the site. The PTE, bus companies (especially Northumbria Motor Services and Stagecoach), a private-hire taxi company, hackney carriages, and street traders were common users of the public space, while small-scale retailers and their employees composed the working population of the private premises.

The public realm was not only publicly used, but publicly managed. Apart from certain transport services provided by private bus companies, the PTE operated the bus station. As manager, it arranged for cleaning and small-scale repair, while the NCC, as owner, was responsible for large-scale maintenance. The NCC also ran the car parks, and its police were responsible for the security of the public space. Being accessible to and serving a variety of groups, and being under the control of public authorities, the old HBS was a highly "public" environment.

The recent redevelopment scheme has improved certain physical characteristics of the old HBS. To some extent it has eliminated such undesirable conditions as noise, smoke, and untidy and disorganized taxi ranks, and it has introduced a better-organized queuing system and a glazed canopy protecting users from bad weather conditions. In short, it has brought a new "order" and "discipline" into the space, and has increased levels of comfort and convenience for users. It is now more predictable what types of activities (such as queuing and waiting for buses, taking taxis, walking) will occur, where they will occur, and who will be involved in them (FIG. 8). Meanwhile, the HBS, used by more than 7.5 million people in 2001, remains one of the busiest public spaces in the city center.⁴¹



FIGURE 8. *The new design brought an "order" and "discipline" into the Haymarket. Photo by author.*

To a degree, new management efforts have also enhanced physical and social accessibility by increasing the standard of maintenance and the level of control. For example, the NCC has improved the aesthetics of the space by hanging flower baskets on street lights and the railings for the bus station, and by planting new trees outside the Metro station, in front of the Old Orleans pub, and on Prudhoe Place (FIG. 9). An electronic information board has also been installed to inform the public about bus services.

In addition, control over the public space has become much stricter through the installation of police surveillance cameras and increased street lighting. Beside these public measures, M&S security cameras monitor the front and rear of their premises, and the retailer has installed lights to increase the security of its service yard and the staircase along Prudhoe Place.⁴² Classical music, played in the bus station, is a further means of control, intended to relax people, discourage violence, and keep teenagers away. Continual police and NEXUS



FIGURE 9. *The aesthetic quality of the bus station is enhanced by new management policies.*
Photo by author.

(the new name for the PTE) monitoring and patrolling has also largely eliminated so-called undesirable groups such as beggars, homeless people, and noisy teenagers — and such undesirable activities as sleeping on benches, drinking alcoholic beverages, or simply hanging around.⁴³

In addition to area-based management and design strategies, local authorities have also adopted a coordinated citywide approach to the problem of graffiti in public spaces. A dedicated Graffiti Forum now records graffiti incidents, cleans up graffiti when it appears, and monitors public spaces to catch, prosecute and educate graffiti writers.⁴⁴ The NCC has also enacted by-laws which empower specially trained traffic wardens to issue £50 penalty notices for littering, dog fouling, and distributing literature in public spaces.⁴⁵

Both the Haymarket-specific and citywide management and design policies of the public authorities can be regarded as an admirable effort to create and maintain a cleaner, safer, and more ordered public space. But they have arguably tried to turn the bus station into an “ideal” public space, when in reality such spaces are never as clean or disciplined. Moreover, by infringing on the public’s right to full access to public space, the policies no longer allow as much chance for spontaneity in social encounters as before, and they promote social filtering — and inevitably, social exclusion and stratification. They have, therefore, naturally reduced the social accessibility of the public space, and compromised its “publicness.”

The late-1990s redevelopment has also brought about a drastic change in the user profile of the Haymarket. In addition to discouraging access by “undesirable groups,” the variety of Haymarket users has been reduced by displacing small retailers and their budget shoppers, and by welcoming large, international businesses and their more affluent consumers. Despite the protests of the former tenants of Haymarket shops against displacement, the only small-scale retailer that kept its location was Greggs (FIG. 10). A few, such as Pizza King, Get Stuffed, and the Newcastle United souvenir shop, were able to

reestablish themselves elsewhere in the city center, but the rest probably went out of business.⁴⁶ Another group deprived of a place in the new Haymarket were regulars at The Farmers’ Rest. The new pub, Old Orleans, replaced a modest, local and traditional establishment with an up-market, exclusive, theme-based, and more commercial pub and restaurant.⁴⁷ With new retailers seeking to attract affluent new groups and new management efforts seeking to exclude “undesirable groups,” the result has been a gentrification that has impoverished the social accessibility and “publicness” of the Haymarket.

Finally, although the public space is still managed and controlled publicly, some private actors have become involved in this aspect of it too.⁴⁸ For example, the bus companies and some high-street retailers (especially M&S, Bainbridge, Eldon Square Shopping Centre, and Fenwicks) now pay for traffic wardens to ease the traffic congestion on the site.⁴⁹ In addition, public transportation services are now mainly provided by private bus companies, and M&S’ and Old Orleans’ security guards and cameras intervene in the operation of the bus station when their security is jeopardized. These are the key elements that partly privatize the management of the public space and reduce its “publicness” (FIG. 11).

CHANGING “PUBLIC INTEREST”

Prior to its redevelopment, the Haymarket was a vivid and colorful social environment. People met there for various reasons — to have a meal or a drink in a cafe, restaurant, or the public house; to shop; or to travel somewhere else. Small retail stores and The Farmers’ Rest, with its austere decor but inexpensive food and drink, also attracted a large number of people. And because of the take-away restaurants, bus station, and taxi ranks, people came to the Haymarket after closing time in the city’s pubs and clubs to have midnight meals and take a bus, Metro or taxi to go home.

BEFORE THE REDEVELOPMENT	AFTER THE REDEVELOPMENT
Large-scale retailers:	Large-scale retailers:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● S&N Breweries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● M&S ● S&N Breweries
Small-scale retailers:	Small-scale retailers:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Get stuffed ● Newcastle Kebab ● Pizza King ● Greggs ● Park Café ● Mayfair ● Stages Truck Dance-wear ● Timpsons ● M&N News 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cascade Amusement Arcade ● Gus Carter ● The souvenir shop of Newcastle United ● Park Lane ● Bobby Ann ● Pasha ● Casa Del Florio ● Eldon Antiques ● Top Style hair dresser
PTE (the operator of the bus station)	NEXUS (the operator of the bus station)
Street traders	Street traders
Taxis:	Taxis:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Hackney carriages ● Private-hire taxi company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Hackney carriages
Bus companies:	Bus companies:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Northumbria Motor Services ● Stagecoach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● ARRIVA ● Stagecoach ● Go Ahead
Bus passengers, pedestrians, mostly "small-budget" shoppers, and "undesirable" groups	Bus passengers, pedestrians, and mostly "affluent" shoppers

FIGURE 10. The user profile of the HBS before and after its redevelopment.

There is no doubt the old Haymarket's rich social functions served the public interest.³⁰ Yet it could also be said that it undermined the public benefit due to insufficiency in performing some of its physical roles.³¹ As a communication and transportation node, it was the place where people gathered and dispersed. Yet, the users of the public space suffered from traffic congestion, conflicts between pedestrian and vehicular movement, and a chaotic, unorganized, and physically deteriorated public space that lacked street and traffic signs.³² Furthermore, the bus station lacked public convenience facilities (like toilets and baby-changing rooms), and it was poorly integrated with the primary activities (especially Northumberland Street and Eldon Square Shopping Centre) surrounding it. In general, it did not function efficiently or safely for either the bus passengers, bus companies, or the operator of the bus station.³³

The old HBS, as a public space, could not perform its aesthetic role either.³⁴ The old and modest-looking shops in the Haymarket, the dirty and ugly rears of the buildings facing Northumberland Street, and the vacant premises on the upper floors of shops did not create an appealing environment. All these factors also diminished the potential economic benefit of the public space, which could neither make much of a contribution to nearby land values, nor attract investors, developers, or potential businesses to the site.³⁵

By contrast, the recent redevelopment created a considerably better-looking and relatively more accessible, safer, and healthier public space. In the process, the public also gained a brand-new bus station at very low cost. The new bus station, in a way, has become a source of pride for citizens of Newcastle. And the new public space has started to attract investment to nearby private spaces, helped fill previously underused buildings with new uses, created new jobs and resources for the economy of the city, and contributed to the regeneration of the city center. It has therefore served the public interest.

The new design and management has also powerfully accentuated the public space's aesthetic and symbolic roles by improving the visual and aesthetic qualities of the Haymarket and creating a strong new visual identity. The new management policies, for example, have created a prettier, cleaner, more ordered and disciplined public environment. Similarly, the physical rebuilding employed expensive construction materials such as York stone for the hard landscaping. Artworks have also been introduced, including a clock tower, art-glass panels in the canopy of the bus station, ornamental railings on the balconies of Old Orleans, and well-considered details within the bus station (FIG. 12).

A strong visual identity has also been developed by introducing manufactured and imported images, which are not in

	BEFORE THE IMPROVEMENT	AFTER THE IMPROVEMENT
ACCESS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Physically open to all. ● Accessible for public transport and private car users, and pedestrians. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Still physically open to all and accessible for the same groups. ● More public because of its improved physical accessibility through the new design and management which have made the public space safer, more attractive and ordered. ● Less public due to its diminishing social accessibility. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Promotes social filtering, social stratification, and exclusion. ○ Promotes gentrification.
ACTOR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Agencies in control Public authorities (except the private bus companies providing bus services). ● User groups Used by a wide range of groups (SEE FIG.10). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Agencies in control Still dominantly managed and controlled by public agencies. Less public because of the partial privatization of its operation and management. ● User groups Still used by a high number of people Less public due to diminishing variety and diversity of user groups of the Haymarket (SEE FIG.10).
INTEREST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Served the public interest because of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ the social roles of the HBS. ● Undermined the public interest, due to the insufficiency in performing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ the physical, economic and aesthetic roles of the HBS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Still serving the public interest because it: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ has become more attractive, cleaner, safer and healthier than it used to be; ○ functions as sources of pride for the city; ○ contributes to the city-center regeneration and city-imaging campaigns; ○ is a new brand-new bus station at no cost to the public. ● Still undermines the public interest due to its: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ overemphasized aesthetic, symbolic and economic roles; ○ diminishing social and physical roles. ● Serves more private interests (SEE FIG.16).

FIGURE 11. Change in the “publicness” of the HBS.

harmony with each other, but which create what Crilley has called “scenographic variety.”⁵⁶ In particular, by reflecting the architecture and construction materials of a Victorian building on Percy Street, the design for the new bus station has associated it and its environs with a “grandiose” historical image. It has also brought a foreign, American image into the Haymarket through the design of the new pub and restaurant according to a New Orleans theme (FIG.13).

By stressing symbolic and aesthetic functions, the redevelopment has also increased the economic role of the public realm. Importantly, the new public space has now increased land values around the Haymarket, attracting outside

investors, developers and businesses to nearby properties. A number of projects have been underway since the late-1990s. East of the Haymarket, the site stretching from Morden Street to St. Thomas Street is being developed as offices, shops, a hotel, leisure facilities, and a multistory car park.⁵⁷ Other schemes have been recommended for approval to convert the Eldon Square bus concourse into a new shopping area, as the extension of Eldon Square Shopping Centre⁵⁸; develop a new cultural quarter to the northwest of the Haymarket⁵⁹; and redevelop the Haymarket Metro Station with a new five-story building to include a new bus station concourse, a travel agency, shops, offices, and a restaurant and bar.⁶⁰

FIGURE 12. *The enhanced aesthetic and visual quality of the public space and its overemphasized aesthetic and symbolic roles. Photos by author.*



The strong emphasis placed on the economic role of the new HBS can also be seen in the effort to use and promote the public space as a place of consumption. Public spaces have been used as locations for commercial activities for centuries.⁶¹ But what is remarkable about the new design of the bus station is the creation of a public environment which is far more consumption oriented than it used to be. While the design of the old Haymarket set some distance between the bus station and retailing activities, the new layout has removed this and placed the passenger waiting area, pedestri-

an passageway, and shops in close proximity to each other. This has created a public space that encourages everybody there to purchase goods from the shops (FIG. 14). Such overemphasis on the economic function of the public realm has undermined the public interest to some degree, and impoverished its ideal public-realm qualities.

While the new design and management have strongly stressed the symbolic, aesthetic and economic roles of the public space, they have impoverished its social role. The improvement of the environmental image and ambience of the HBS

FIGURE 13. *The Victorian building whose facade was copied for the facade of the M&S store extension (above), and the embellished facade of Old Orleans pub and restaurant (below), aim to create a grandiose image for the Haymarket. Photos by author.*





FIGURE 14. *The close relationship between the shops, pedestrian passageway, and passenger waiting area. Photo by author.*

has made it more welcoming to a wider range of social groups, and thus improved its “public” qualities. But by employing imported and manufactured images, which have no tie to the modest history of the Haymarket, the new design has generated confusion over the symbolic meanings of the public space.

Studies have shown that public spaces may become symbols for a society by reproducing elements which appeal to or represent “higher-order values.”⁶² They may also become symbols through the build-up of overlapping memories of individual and shared experience.⁶³ Thus, by representing cultural, historical, religious or other social and political values for a group or a society, they may evoke connections to past events that stimulate feelings of national pride, a sense of belonging, or concern for an entity outside one’s primary associations with family and friends.⁶⁴ Studies have shown that such feelings bind the individual members of the group or society together.⁶⁵ Therefore, with their symbolic meanings, public spaces contribute to the creation of the sense of continuity for a group, or a society.⁶⁶

In the case of the HBS, however, the key motivation of the redevelopment agencies has been to promote the public space’s economic role by manipulating the Haymarket’s images through imported and manufactured images, rather than maintain and strengthen the social role of the public realm by conserving its modest historical images. Their major concerns were to change the rundown scenery of the Haymarket, create a good-looking environment which would increase land values around it, attract further new investment to the site, restore the economic vitality of surrounding areas, and change the declining image of the northern end of the city center. But the manipulation of the Haymarket’s images has worked against the creation of sense of belonging and continuity. This has created doubts about how far the new public space will be appropriated by the public, and how well it will perform as a social binder. Such design interventions have impoverished the social role of the Haymarket, thereby diminishing its public qualities.

Additionally, in a number of ways, the new design has undermined the physical roles of the public space. Interviews conducted with users of the HBS show that the public is generally content with the more accessible, healthier, safer, and aesthetically improved new bus station.⁶⁷ Yet, they also indicate that conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles, and traffic congestion, are still prominent problems on the site (FIG.15). Direct observations and interviews at the Haymarket also reveal that the bus station remains inefficient, and that it continues to suffer from lack of free-of-charge public-convenience facilities. Further, the new design is unable to strongly integrate the bus station with its surroundings. The closest connection between the bus station, Northumberland Street, and the shopping mall is via the Eldon Square staircase, which does not afford the public 24-hour access.⁶⁸ Neither is this connection adequately accessible for disabled and elderly people. In addition to these older problems, the new glazed canopy has created a ventilation problem for bus passengers.⁶⁹ By undermining the HBS’s physical roles, the redevelopment scheme has, therefore, failed to solve some essential daily problems of the users of the public space.

CHANGING INTERESTS OF PRIVATE ACTORS

Although the new HBS design has undermined the public interest in various ways, it has significantly favored the private interest (FIG.16). The main private actors benefiting from the old HBS were S&N Breweries, small retailers (the tenants of the retail units at the Haymarket and Prudhoe Place, and street traders), a private taxi company, hackney carriages, and bus companies (especially Northumbria Motor Services and Stagecoach).⁷⁰ With the exception of the small retailers and the private-hire taxi company, these private actors are also the primary beneficiaries of the new HBS. They have been able to keep their position in an important part of the city center, and they have gained a more disciplined and ordered environment, which has made their operations easier. But, of the private actors, the new HBS design most prominently favors M&S and S&N Breweries, which have not only increased their retail areas, but have profited by being located next to a busy bus station. As claimed by the manager of Old Orleans:

Obviously, as a business, we’re trying to benefit from the fact that the bus station is outside the door. Because people waiting for a bus are coming and having a drink, while they’re waiting, or they get off the bus, and may decide to have something to eat in the restaurant before they go out or before they go shopping. So we do benefit from that. But we noticed that when the bus station is closed, it actually had an impact on our business.⁷¹

M&S has obtained an especially significant privilege, since the redevelopment increased the customer capacity of its store



FIGURE 15. Conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles (above right and left) and traffic congestion (below left and middle) continue to be problems in the new Haymarket; the Eldon Square staircase is an emerging problem area (below right). Photos by author.

	BEFORE THE IMPROVEMENT	AFTER THE IMPROVEMENT
PRIVATE INTEREST	<p>Those benefited by being adjacent to, or close to the public space, or using it:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ S&N Breweries ○ Small retailers ○ Private-hire taxi company ○ Hackney carriages ○ Bus companies ○ Street traders 	<p>Those benefiting by gaining a disciplined and ordered environment to operate smoothly:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ M&S, S&N Breweries, hackney carriages, bus companies, and street traders <p>Those who operated in the site before the improvement of the public spaces and who were able to keep their position in the sites</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ hackney carriages, bus companies, and street traders <p>Up-market retailers and business groups benefiting by the improved image and design attracting affluence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ M&S, S&N Breweries, retailers of Eldon Square Shopping Centre <p>Those benefiting by moving into and starting a business in these sites:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Finlays <p>Those benefiting by gaining privileged positions and facilities for retailing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ M&S and S&N Breweries <p>Landowners, developers and investors benefiting by the increasing property values</p> <p>Business interests in the finance and construction industry, and real estate agencies benefiting by the good image of the areas which have boosted the development activities in and around the HBS</p>

FIGURE 16. Private interests benefiting from the HBS before and after its improvement.

by 35 percent, and now allows it to function as a major passage-way between the Haymarket, Northumberland Street, and the shopping mall. Pinpointing the advantages of their new store, a M&S representative explained their targets as follows:

We know that the route between Northumberland Street and bus station is used as a short cut by a lot of people. We know that only 70 percent of the people who come through these doors actually spend money. So the big challenge of M&S is how to make the invitation to shop better, to persuade them to stop and buy when they pass through. That's the real commercial challenge for us.⁷²

Moreover, M&S has acquired three kiosks, and gained a better service yard and customer-collection zone.

The public space has also benefited new private-actor groups. For example, the tenants of the M&S kiosks, Greggs and Finlays, have taken good advantage of their position in the Haymarket. The HBS, with its new and exclusive images and design, has also attracted the affluent groups favored by up-market retailers and business groups. Landowners, developers and investors of the private spaces around the Haymarket are other private actors who have benefited from the remarkable increase in property values due to the improved image of the site. Furthermore, in a wider context, the new positive image of the Haymarket has boosted private development activities throughout this part of the city, benefiting the finance industry (building societies, banks, personal loan investments, etc.), the construction industry (building contractors, construction materials suppliers, etc.), and real estate agencies involved in the regeneration activities. Therefore, in comparison with the number and variety of private-actor groups which the HBS served before its redevelopment, the new public space can be seen to increasingly favor private interests.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES WITH THE POSTINDUSTRIAL MODEL

This article has discussed the question of the “publicness” of public spaces in postindustrial cities by examining the HBS, a public space redeveloped as a part of the image-led regeneration policies of City of Newcastle. By studying conditions on the site before and after the HBS redevelopment, it has found that the publicness of this space remains secure, since it is still dominantly under public management and control. Furthermore, the recent redevelopment scheme has improved its physical accessibility. By using and promoting public space as a catalyst for urban regeneration and a place of consumption, the project has also turned the Haymarket into a remarkably good-looking, well-maintained, safer, more organized, and better controlled space. The new public realm has therefore benefited the public by serving as a source of pride for citizens and by contributing to image-led city-center regeneration strategies.

As such, the investigation shows that improvements to public space can be used to improve a city’s image and attractiveness, and that it can attract investment and economic vitality back to declining central-city areas. Nevertheless, the “publicness” of the public space at the new Haymarket has been undermined by partial privatization of its management and operation, and by its diminishing social accessibility. In this regard, the investigation has also shown that, by impoverishing certain social and physical functions and by strongly emphasizing its economic, aesthetic and symbolic roles, the new HBS has undermined other aspects of the public interest, while favoring private interests much more than it used to.

This study of the HBS reveals at least four main trends that have been noted elsewhere as hallmarks of public spaces in postindustrial cities: 1) the increasing involvement of the private sector in the design, management and control of public spaces; 2) increasing restrictions on the social accessibility of public spaces through surveillance and other control measures that improve security and promote “good” or “sanitized” images; 3) the tendency of such public spaces to promote gentrification, social exclusion, and stratification; and 4) the creation of new urban forms which significantly favor private interests over community needs.

These four areas of similarity reflect the ever-smaller, more internationalized, and more homogenous world in which we live. Nevertheless, the study has also revealed some curious differences between the HBS case and other contemporary public spaces, reflecting the different experience of Newcastle. For example, a more complete privatization is common in public spaces of many other postindustrial cities — where ownership, provision, management and control of spaces may all sometimes be shifted from the public to the private sector. While the HBS features partial privatization in terms of the provision, operation and control of the public space, the agencies in control are still public.

Another rising feature of public spaces in postindustrial cities is that they are either rarely used by the general public or used predominantly by a more homogenous public than previously. The investigation of the HBS revealed that because of its diminishing variety of users and strict control measures, it serves a more homogenous public than previously. Indeed, there is a strong tendency evident toward gentrification, social exclusion, and stratification. Nevertheless, the HBS does still serve a great number of people.

Urban design and planning literature, in general, illustrates how public spaces in postindustrial cities favor private interests at the expense of local needs and benefits. The HBS exemplifies a public space significantly serving such private interests; indeed, private-sector involvement in the redevelopment project has led to the bus station being shaped largely according to their needs and interests. Yet despite various aspects in the new design and management that undermined certain public needs and benefits, the HBS is still an example favoring the public interest. Most impor-

tantly, by providing a relatively inclusive and accessible environment, it has helped attract investment, create new job opportunities, bring economic vitality back to declining parts of the city center, and boost civic pride.

All these observations lead to two major conclusions. First, contrary to the wide recognition of diminishing publicness of public spaces in postindustrial cities, the redevelopment of the HBS has both improved and diminished certain of its public qualities. The general point that can be drawn from the case study, and which may be extended to its counterparts, is that contemporary public spaces may show different shades of publicness, in which degrees of access, actor and interest can vary widely. Nevertheless, the trend toward a blurring of distinction between public and private spaces does pose a threat for the public spaces of postindustrial cities. The challenge for planners, designers, architects, developers, and other place-making agents is to deal with the rising ambiguity between the two realms in the new urban space of postindustrial cities.

Second, as in the Newcastle case, many postindustrial cities in Britain (especially those with decaying urban economies and environments) evince a strong desire to use enhancements to public spaces as a policy instrument for economic and urban revitalization. But efforts to promote the economic, aesthetic and symbolic roles of these spaces also threaten their "publicness." The challenge for local authorities, planners, architects, and regeneration experts is to take into consideration the needs of everyday society and the wider civic functions of public spaces in cities (i.e., their social, political, physical — as well as economic, aesthetic, and symbolic functions), and not to allow the economic or image-related effects to dominate. The creation of genuine "public" spaces is essential to the sustainability of regeneration initiatives. Vital and viable city districts (especially city centers), can only be achieved if image-led regeneration strategies adequately address everyday society's needs and interests, as well as the genuine civic functions of public spaces.

NOTES AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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1. See, for example, S. Carr, M. Francis, L.G. Rivlin, and A.M. Stone, *Public Space* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); M. Francis, "The Making of Democratic Streets," in A.V. Moudon, ed., *Public Streets for Public Use* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp.23–39; A. Madanipour, "Public Space in the City," in P. Knox and P. Ozolins, eds., *Design Professionals and the Built Environment* (New York: John Wiley, 2000), pp. 117–25; D. Mitchell, "Introduction: Public Space and the City," *Urban Geography* 17 (1996), pp.127–31; and F. Tibbalds, *Making People-Friendly Towns* (Essex: Longman, 1992).

2. See D. Crilley, "Megastructures and Urban Change: Aesthetics, Ideology and Design," in P.L. Knox, ed., *The Restless Urban Landscape* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993), pp.127–64; M. Goodwin, "The City as Commodity: The Contested Spaces of Urban Development," in G. Philo and C. Philo, eds., *Selling Places: The City as Cultural Capital, Past and Present* (Oxford: Pergamon

Press, 1993), pp.145–62; T. Hall and P. Hubbard, "The Entrepreneurial City: New Urban Politics, New Urban Geographies?" *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol.20 No.2 (1996), pp.153–74; P. Hubbard, "Urban Design and Local Economic Development," *Cities*, Vol.12 No.4 (1995), pp.243–51; and D. Sadler, "Place-Marketing, Competitive Places and the Construction of Hegemony in Britain in the 1980s," in Philo and Philo, eds., *Selling Places*, pp.175–92.

3. See Crilley, "Megastructures"; A. Loukaitou-Sideris, "Private Production of Public Open Space: The Downtown Los Angeles Experience," Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1988; A. Loukaitou-Sideris, "Privatisation of Public Open Space: Los Angeles Experience," *Town Planning Review*, Vol.64 No.2 (1993), pp.139–67; A. Madanipour, "Dimensions of Urban Public Space: The Case of the Metro Centre, Gateshead," *Urban Design Studies* 1 (1995), pp.45–56; A. Madanipour, "Why Are the Design and Development of Public Spaces Significant for Cities?" *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design* 26 (1999), pp.879–91; J.V. Punter, "The Privatisation of Public Realm," *Planning, Practice and Research*, Vol.5 No.3 (1990), pp.9–16; M. Sorkin, "See You in Disneyland," in M. Sorkin, ed., *Variations on a Theme Park*

(New York: The Noonday Press, 1992), pp.205–32; S. Zukin, *Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); and S. Zukin, *The Cultures of Cities* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1995).


4. See M. Davis, "Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space," in Sorkin, ed., *Variations on a Theme Park*, pp.154–80; N.R. Fyfe and J. Bannister, "The Eyes upon the Street: Closed-Circuit Television Surveillance and the City," in N.R. Fyfe, ed., *Images of the Street: Planning, Identity and Control in Public Space* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.254–67; S. Graham, J. Brooks, and D. Heery, "Towns on the Television: Closed-Circuit TV in British Towns and Cities," *Local Government Studies* 22 (1996), pp.3–27; D. Mitchell, "The End of Public Space? People's Park, Definitions of the Public and Democracy," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 85 (1995), pp.108–33; T. Oc and S. Tiesdell, "City Centre Management and Safer City Centres: Approaches in Coventry and Nottingham," *Cities* 15 (1998), pp.85–103; A. Reeve, "The Private Realm of the Managed Town Centre," *Urban Design International* 1 (1996), pp.61–80; Sorkin, "See You in Disneyland"; and Zukin, *Cultures of Cities*.

5. See T. Boddy, "Underground and Overhead:

- Building the Analogous city," in Sorkin, ed., *Variations on a Theme Park*, pp.123–53; M.C. Boyer, "The City of Illusion: New York's Public Places," in Knox, ed., *The Restless Urban Landscape*, pp.111–26; Crilly, "Megastructures"; J. Defilippis, "From a Public Re-Creation to Private Recreation: The Transformation of Public Space in South Street Seaport," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 19 (1997), pp.405–17; M.A. Hajer, "Rotterdam: Re-Designing the Public Domain," in F. Bianchini and M. Parkinson, eds., *Cultural Policy and Urban Regeneration: The West European Experience* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp.48–72; Loukaitou-Sideris, "Privatization of Public Open Space"; and Mitchell, "The End of Public Space?"
6. See M. Crawford, "The World in a Shopping Mall," in Sorkin, ed., *Variations on a Theme Park*, pp.3–30; Madanipour, "Design and Development of Public Spaces"; Mitchell, "The End of Public Space?"; Mitchell, "Public Space and the City"; N. Smith, *The New Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City* (London: Routledge, 1996); and Zukin, *Landscapes of Power*.
7. See N. McInroy, "Urban Regeneration and Public Space: The Story of an Urban Park," *Space & Polity* 4 (2000), pp.23–40.
8. *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1976), p.1805; and *Collins Concise Dictionary* (Wrotham: Harper Collins Publisher, 1998), p.1079.
9. *The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p.936; and *Webster's*, p.1805.
10. *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.920.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Webster's*, p.1805.
13. *Oxford*, p.920; and *Collins*, p.1079.
14. S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus, "The Public and the Private: Concepts and Action," in S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus, eds., *Public and Private in Social Life* (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp.3–27.
15. Certain overlaps may occur in this method for analyzing the qualities of a public space, especially in relation to the dimensions of access and actor. By identifying the range of user groups, the analysis of access seeks to discover the extent to which a space is accessible to society as a whole. Meanwhile, the study of actor involves examination of the variety of user groups to identify the extent to which the public space is used by the society. Despite such cross-cutting of data, the three dimensions of access, actor and interest can be usefully employed in empirical analyses of public spaces, where it becomes possible to identify degrees of their publicness and privateness.
16. Madanipour, "Dimensions of Urban Public Space."
17. D. Usher and S. Davoudi, "The Rise and Fall of the Property Market in Tyne and Wear," in P. Healey, S. Davoudi, S. Tavsanoğlu, M. O'Toole, and D. Usher, eds., *Rebuilding the City: Property-Led Urban Regeneration* (London: E&FN Spon, 1992), pp.77–99; P. Winter, D. Milne, J. Brown, and A. Rushworth, *Newcastle upon Tyne* (Newcastle: Northern Heritage Consultancy Ltd., 1989); A. Lang, "Regulation and Regeneration: How Do Development Plans Affect Urban Regeneration?" Ph.D. diss., University of Newcastle, 1999; N. Vall, "The Emergence of the Post-Industrial Economy in Newcastle, 1914–2000," in R. Colls and B. Lancaster, eds., *Newcastle upon Tyne: A Modern History* (Shopwyke Manor Barn, Chichester: Phillimore, 2001), pp.47–70.
18. Usher and Davoudi, "Tyne and Wear," p.77; and Office of Population Census and Surveys, *Census 1981 — County Report: Tyne and Wear* (Her Majesty's Stationery Office: London Office of Population and Surveys, 1982).
19. Lang, "Regulation and Regeneration," p.127; F. Robinson, "The Labour Market," in F. Robinson, ed., *Post-Industrial Tyneside* (Newcastle: Newcastle Libraries and Arts, 1988), pp.62–85; Winter et al., *Newcastle upon Tyne*, p.184; and S. Cameron and J. Doling, "Housing Neighbourhoods and Urban Regeneration," *Urban Studies*, Vol.31 No.7 (1994), pp.1211–23.
20. EDAW, *Grainger Town: Regeneration Strategy* (Newcastle: EDAW, 1996); and P. Healey, C. de Magalhaes, A. Madanipour, and J. Pendlebury, *Shaping City Centre Futures: Conservation, Regeneration and Institutional Capacity* (Newcastle: University of Newcastle, 2002).
21. McClelland has identified three major indices of a postindustrial city: 1) an economy, which specializes in service and technology-based activities; 2) an economy which experiences deindustrialization, as represented by a shift from labor-intensive production to capital-intensive production, and where the labor force is highly qualified (i.e., with a high level of education and specialization); and 3) an economy that is mostly dependent on footloose industries and multinational companies and institutions. See G. McClelland, "Foreword," in Robinson, ed., *Post-Industrial Tyneside*.
22. Robinson, "Industrial structure," p.46. Newcastle and its conurbation adjacent to the banks of the River Tyne are called Tyneside.
23. *Ibid.*, p.57.
24. W. Collard, *Architectural and Picturesque Views in Newcastle upon Tyne* (Yorkshire: S.R. Publishers Ltd., 1971); R. Mittins, "The History and Development of Percy Street — Newcastle upon Tyne," B.A. thesis, University of Newcastle, 1978; J. Grundy, G. McCombie, P. Ryder, H. Welfare, and N. Pevsner, *Northumberland* (London: Penguin, 1992); and A. Simpson, D. Leitch, and T. Wharton, eds., *Cityscape: Streets for People* (Newcastle: Northern Region of the Royal Institute of British Architects, 1997).
25. Mittins, "Percy Street," p.46.
26. *Ibid.*, pp.46–53.
27. *Ibid.*, pp.46,52.
28. *Ibid.*, p.53.
29. Simpson et al., *Cityscape*, p.7; Mittins, "Percy Street," p.55; and Newcastle City Council (hereafter cited as NCC), "Development Plan Review 1963."
30. B. Harbottle, "Haymarket and Percy Street," report prepared by the archaeologist in the County Conservation Team for the Newcastle City Planning Department, 1990.
31. Simpson et al., *Cityscape*, p.8; and Winter et al., *Newcastle upon Tyne*, pp.183,185).
32. NCC, "Report of the Director of Development," submitted to Development Control Sub-Committee, July 1, 1994.
33. NCC, "Report of the Director of Development," p.16.
34. P. Young, "Revealed-Tyneside's new M&S superstore," *Evening Chronicle*, June 4, 1994, p.46; and NCC, "Newcastle upon Tyne Unitary Development Plan, 1994."
35. NCC, "Report of the Director of Development."
36. *Ibid.*
37. M. Akkar, interview with the representatives of S&N Breweries, 2000.

38. NCC, "Report of the City Estate and Property Surveyor, Director of Development, Director of Engineering, Environment and Protection, Acting Director of Law and Administration and City Treasurer," submitted to the Regeneration Sub-Committee, Finance Committee, Development Committee and Environment and Highways Committee for decision, 1994.
39. Ibid.
40. No statistics were found about the number of bus passengers using the HBS before its redevelopment.
41. M. Akkar, interview with the planning officer of NEXUS, 2000.
42. M. Akkar, interview with the M&S' assistant financial manager, 2000.
43. PTE has recently changed its name and logo. It is now called NEXUS. See *NEXUS, Who are we?* (homepage of NEXUS, Tyne and Wear, on-line, no date, accessed March 28, 2002), available from <http://www.nexus.org.uk/pdf/corporatebrochure.pdf>.
44. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), "Living Places: Cleaner, Safer, Greener," London, 2002, p.59.
45. Ibid., p.124.
46. M. Akkar, interview with the former planning chief of the NCC, 2000.
47. M. Akkar, interviews with the former planning chief of the NCC and the manager of Eldon Square Shopping Centre, 2000; and I. Wood and E. Openshaw, "Drinkers in Battle to Save Their Pub," *Evening Chronicle*, June 8, 1994, p.6.
48. M. Akkar, interviews with an officer of the Highway and Transportation (HAT) Department of the NCC and the planning officer of NEXUS, 2000.
49. M. Akkar, interviews with the assistant financial manager of M&S, the commercial director of ARRIVA bus company, and the planning officer of NEXUS, 2000.
50. Public spaces ideally play significant social roles in cities by bringing together a wide range of people regardless of their class, ethnic origin, gender and age, making it possible for them to intermingle; and by helping the emergence of the "social coherence," and the creation of community life. See Carr et al., *Public Space*, p.45; J. Gehl, *Life Between Buildings: Using Public Space* (Copenhagen: Arkitektens Forlag, 1996); Madanipour, "Dimensions of Urban Public Space"; Tibbalds, *Making People-Friendly Towns*, p.1; M. Walzer, "Pleasures and Costs of Urbanity," *Dissent* (Fall 1986), pp.470-75; and C. Moughtin, *Urban Design: Street and Square* (Oxford: Architectural Press, 1999).
51. Physical roles can be defined as those affecting communication and movement between objects, people and information; embodying facilities to ease this intercommunication, such as street and traffic signs and parking areas; and serving the daily needs of the public through such facilities as street lights, furniture and signs, as well as public convenience facilities like toilets and changing facilities for babies. See Carr et al., *Public Space*, pp.26,30; Gehl, *Life Between Buildings*; and Moughtin, *Urban Design*, p.131.
52. M. Akkar, interviews with the former planning chief and an officer of the HAT Department of the NCC, 2000.
53. M. Akkar, interviews with the managers of Old Orleans, Eldon Square Shopping Centre, the planning officer of NEXUS, and the former planning chief and an officer of the HAT Department of the NCC, 2000.
54. Public spaces function to beautify the city; they improve and enhance the aesthetic quality of the city. See Carr et al., *Public Space*, pp.10-11; and I.H. Thompson, "Landscape and Urban Design," in C. Greed and M. Roberts, eds., *Introducing Urban Design* (Essex: Longman, 1998), pp.105-15.
55. Public spaces perform economic roles by accommodating commercial functions and thus being places for commercial exchange. They can also play a role as economic value generators; i.e., they can increase the land value of private properties surrounding the public space. See H.L. Lofland, "A World of Strangers: Order and Action in Urban Public Space," Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1971; Gehl, *Life Between Buildings*; and Thompson, "Landscape and Urban Design," pp.108-9.
56. Crilley, "Megastructures," p.140.
57. "Plan to Change Face of the City," *Evening Chronicle*, July 26, 2001, <http://icnewcastle.icnetwork.co.uk/0100news/0100local/page.cfm?objectid=11184921&method=full&siteid=50081>.
58. "Developers Lay Out the Square Deal over Revamp," *The Journal*, December 3, 2003, <http://icnewcastle.icnetwork.co.uk/0100news/thejournal/thejournal/page.cfm?objectid=13685949&method=full&siteid=50081>.
59. P. Young, "Expert Adds Weight to Bid," *Evening Chronicle*, December 5, 2003, <http://icnewcastle.icnetwork.co.uk/eveningchronicle/eveningchronicle/page.cfm?objectid=13695202&method=full&siteid=50081>.
60. P. Young, "Backing for New Style City Station," *Evening Chronicle*, July 20, 2004, <http://icnewcastle.icnetwork.co.uk/eveningchronicle/eveningchronicle/news/page.cfm?objectid=14444161&method=full&siteid=50081>.
61. Gehl, *Life Between Buildings*.
62. J. Montgomery, "Café Culture and the City: the Role of Pavement Cafés in Urban Public Social Life," *Journal of Urban Design*, Vol.2 No.1 (1997), p.89.
63. See Carr et al., *Public Space*, p.20; and Moughtin, *Urban Design*, p.88.
64. See Carr et al., *Public Space*, pp.47-48.
65. Loukaitou-Sideris, "Private Production," p.8; K. Lynch, "The Openness of Open Space," in T. Banerjee and M. Southworth, eds., *City Sense and City Design* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), pp.396-412; and Moughtin, *Urban Design*, p.88.
66. See Loukaitou-Sideris, "Private Production," p.6.
67. Twenty-five interviews were conducted in 2000 with the representatives of three user groups: 1) the working population of the HBS (Old Orleans public houses, M&S, and the Eldon Square Shopping Centre); 2) the groups who operate in the public space (NEXUS, ARRIVA bus company, taxi and bus drivers, and street traders); and 3) the daily users (pedestrians, shoppers, and bus and Metro passengers).
68. The staircase is only open when the Eldon Square Shopping Centre is open: between 9 AM and 5:30 PM on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday; between 9 AM and 8 PM on Thursday; between 9 AM and 6 PM on Saturday; and between 11 AM and 5 PM on Sunday.
69. M. Akkar interview with a member of the design team of the NCC, 2000.
70. The bus company Northumbria Motor Services is now called ARRIVA (M. Akkar, interview with the planning officer of NEXUS, 2000).
71. M. Akkar, interview with the manager of Old Orleans, 2000.
72. M. Akkar, interview with the assistant financial manager of M&S, 2000.

Book Reviews



Yin Yu Tang: The Architecture and Daily Life of a Chinese House. Nancy Berliner. Boston: Tuttle Publishing, 2003. 192 pp., 210 illus.

This lavishly illustrated book is an extended essay that grew out of a preservation project for Yin Yu Tang, a 200-year-old vernacular Chinese house that was recently moved, brick by brick, from its home in a remote village in southeastern China and re-erected in the courtyard at the Peabody Essex Museum (PEM) in Salem, Massachusetts. Nancy Berliner, the author, is the curator of Chinese arts at PEM and a well-known scholar of Chinese furniture. She was also responsible for orchestrating Yin Yu Tang's entire preservation process, one which took six and a half years and was of unprecedented scale for such a project in the United States. Designed for general circulation and as a companion piece to the permanent exhibit of the house, the book offers a fascinating account of the life of eight generations of the Chinese family who lived in Yin Yu Tang, as well as the architecture of the house, by presenting details documented throughout the preservation process.

The essay is divided into three parts. In the first, "Huizhou Mountains and Merchants," Berliner discusses the cultural traditions of the Huizhou region and describes the geographical, economic and historical circumstances which have affected the development of Huang Cun — the village where Yin Yu Tang was built. A longer second part, "Jia: Hometown and Family," tells the life stories of the Huang family members who resided in Yin Yu Tang for nearly two centuries. The third part, "The Architecture of Yin Yu Tang," provides detailed analysis of the construction of the house and how it was appropriated and transformed by the most recent two generations.

The move of Yin Yu Tang was initiated when Berliner and her colleagues unexpectedly encountered the half-abandoned house while traveling in China. After negotiating with members of the Huang family and the local government authority, an agreement was made to relocate the house to the United States through a partnership formed between PEM and the Huizhou government. As explained in the foreword to the book, the main reason for PEM to undertake the Yin Yu Tang project was that it represented a "perfect convergence" of its longstanding interests in Asian architecture and historic preservation. As part of an ambitious plan to expand and transform its museum space, the project was developed as a highlight of PEM's new collection. The specific goal, as described in the epilogue, was to disseminate Chinese culture in the Western world by accurately interpreting all aspects of the house and its tenure.

While Yin Yu Tang shares many common characteristics with other Chinese vernacular houses, its architecture retains a unique regional style. Modest in exterior appearance, with white-plastered brick facades and black tiled roofs — a utilitarian feature of the houses in the Huizhou region — its timber-framed interior is surprisingly lavish, containing many intricate decorative details in stone and expensive woods which reflect the wealth and social status of its owners. Like most traditional dwellings in China, it also

has a central courtyard surrounded by many rooms which (the book explains) have undergone extensive renovations by different generations of the Huang family.

Overall, the essay is written in a straightforward, comprehensive manner highly accessible to a wide audience. Using genealogies, diaries, letters, and personal accounts from interviews with surviving members of the Huang family, the author unfolds the dynamics of the house and the family, effectively linking them to the broader historical and social context of China. As one might expect from an exhibition catalogue, it is also a visual feast in its own right, supported by a plethora of primary documents, including sepia-toned photographs, memorabilia, and pages from letters and other personal documents. Supplementing these are contemporary images of existing artifacts, furnishings, and construction details of the house, as well as architectural drawings produced during the research process.

While the story of the house is engaging and the illustrations are attractive, the one drawback of the book is that it provides little account of what happened to the rest of Huang Cun village after the removal and preservation of the house commenced. This gives a sense of incompleteness to the story of Yin Yu Tang. In a twist of fate, it was transformed from an ordinary private home into a public museum piece to be viewed by hundreds of visitors each day. But there is no exploration of how displacement from its original setting in a Chinese mountain village to an outdoor courtyard in an institutional setting in America might have affected its integrity and meaning, and how this might today lead to different understandings and interpretations.

To be sure, raising issues of displacement and dislocation inevitably leads to other contentious questions of preservation which cannot be fully answered in an exhibition catalogue designed for a general audience. However, if one of the objectives of the Yin Yu Tang project was to raise awareness of the challenges facing the preservation of vernacular dwellings in China, then there would seem to be a need for some reflection on the changes brought to the original context by the removal of the house, and how its absence may have effected the local community. Despite the admirable efforts of Berliner and the PEM team who made this difficult project possible, the author's claim that it is a clearly "successful story of preservation" is somewhat problematic. Some crucial questions include: Where does this "success" belong? Who does the project benefit? How might this success affect attitudes toward preservation within and outside China over time?

Indeed, contentious questions of this kind seem to be missing in many well-publicized preservation projects. Often, more attention is directed at preserving the internal integrity of buildings, with their seemingly fixed meanings, associations and significance, than at examining the complex dynamics created by the process of preservation itself. Although recent literature on historic preservation reflects a

growing concern for the social meanings and potential new (economic) values preservation can elicit, there is often a tendency to downplay the complexity embedded in the process and the multifaceted challenges it brings.

The Yin Yu Tang story might have been made more compelling by engaging with these issues. While the first two parts of the essay give excellent accounts of the historical context and cultural traditions of Huizhou, there is comparatively little description (less than half a page) of the current transformation and development taking place in Huang Cun. Although the author has been careful not to impose her own value judgments, the overall impression is that what is valuable and memorable resides largely in a "traditional context" that belongs to the past. And since this cannot be redeemed, it must be salvaged before it completely disappears with modernization.

What might be more informative would be to ask about the aspirations of the current generation of the Huang family and Huang Cun villagers and how they relate to the past. This would offer readers important insight into the present widespread desire in China to live in different ("modern") environments, and how the preservation of vernacular dwellings such as Yin Yu Tang might relate constructively to this context.

As economic development and social change gather pace in China, ordinary dwellings and neighborhoods are continuously being demolished without a trace. *Yin Yu Tang* is an important contribution to enabling more people outside China to understand Chinese vernacular architecture and to raise awareness of the issues of preservation. However, one would hope that the book can also inspire further writing and research, and thus spur further, much-needed critical inquiry into the subject. ■

Cecilia Chu

University of California, Berkeley

Planning Middle Eastern Cities: An Urban Kaleidoscope in a Globalizing World. Edited by Yasser Elsheshtawy. London: Routledge, 2004. 210 pp., illus.

This edited volume is a collaborative effort, bringing together the local voices of Western-educated Arab scholars currently living and working in various parts of the Middle East to narrate the stories of individual cities. Its authors discuss the impact of globalization on selected sample of Middle Eastern cities, some chosen because they are characterized by a rich tradition (Cairo, Tunis and Baghdad), some because they have been insufficiently explored (Algiers and Sana'a), and some because of their very recent emergence, such as the Gulf "oil city" of Dubai.

Planning Middle Eastern Cities organizes these cases into two parts, with each part consisting of three chapters. Part one, "Overview and Developments," focuses on Algiers, Baghdad and Sana'a. According to the editor, Yasser Elsheshtawy, these "have not, for a variety of reasons, responded to the globalizing influence occurring throughout the world." He adds that "none of these cities has engaged in the kind of large-scale urban development witnessed elsewhere in the region" (p.11). Quite the opposite, Tunis, Cairo, and Dubai are the subjects of the second part, "Case Studies: Redrawing Boundaries." These are cities that have attempted to "become global players" by "engaging in large-scale urban projects meant to attract visitors and investors to the city" (p.14).

The book begins by posing two much-asked questions about cities and globalization: "Is there evidence of a new spatial order due to globalization? And is the response of the Middle Eastern city to these globalizing influences an echo of similar trends in other cities?" (p.6). Especially since the latter question has been little explored, this edited volume provides a valuable contribution to the literature. And even if the answer to both questions happens to be a clear "yes," Elsheshtawy emphasizes the variation among cities in their responses to the current moment of globalization. I say "current" moment because Elsheshtawy draws parallels in terms of political hegemony and economic conditions between conditions today and the process of modernization at the turn of the twentieth century. This leads to another question, one that the various authors also use to structure their chapters: "How has the Arab city responded to globalism, and does it differ significantly from colonialism?" (p.9). The answers here are more varied because the diversity of cases and processes analyzed defies simple generalization. Readers also must reach their own general conclusions since there is no concluding or summary chapter to the book.

Of the individual contributions to the book, the most successful attempt at exploring the similarities between colonialism and globalization is Khaled Adham's chapter on Cairo. It asserts that "many of the circumstances that ushered the economic upsurge of the 1890s resembled those that led to upswing of the 1990s," especially in real estate

development (p.135). Adham illustrates this by selecting two large-scale land developments, one from each era (Heliopolis and Dreamland), to unravel the process by which Egypt became an actor on the world stage. However, he warns that both terms — colonization and globalization — are "very contextual, hence contingent on the political and economic situations of the time and place in which they were used" (p.135).

The chapter by Bechir Kenzari on Lake Tunis presents both a story of internal continuity or progress and change inspired by external influences. The internal story traces the city's development from its traditional *medina*, the original city center, to the construction of the European city, to the more recent Lake Tunis development. From one point of view, Lake Tunis, also known as the project of the millennium, is seen as a local manifestation of national-state policies that have created new environmental awareness. However, from another perspective, external influences, especially Tunis's association with the European Union, have also led to the emergence of a new center for financial and specialized services. In this respect, both Tunis and Dubai are dominated today by ongoing construction of new centers for commerce on reclaimed land — a clear manifestation of the current form of globalization, in which cities turn their backs on more traditional spaces to embrace the future through developments that cater to a global audience.

In spite of this similarity, the development of Dubai as a global center, according to Elsheshtawy, is unique, and can serve as a "potential model for other cities in the region" (p.17). Furthermore, Elsheshtawy reminds readers that the processes of development in Tunis, Cairo, and Dubai were initiated by local governments, and not imposed by external hegemonic forces. This, in his opinion, is what makes colonization different than globalization, although both are seen as forms of domination that can contribute to the underdevelopment of some cities in the region, such as those discussed in the first part of the book.

In that first section, the chapter on Algiers by Karim Hadjiri and Mohamed Osmani provides an excellent case in point. The independence of Algiers did not mean an end of planning policies and plans from the colonial era, since these continued through the ensuing decade. Soon thereafter, however, and for a brief moment before the country descended once again into violence and political turmoil, Algiers was a metropolis visited by world renowned architects — Le Corbusier, Oscar Niemeyer, Kenzo Tange — who left their mark through a number of projects.

The next essay, by Hoshiar Nooradin, focuses on Baghdad from its early importance in the 1920s, through its becoming the capital of Iraq, to the present. Unlike the other cases studied here, Baghdad has been marked by major political shifts — from colonialism, to the rise of a national movement and eventual independence, followed by the rise of the Baathist regime and three regional wars. In the shadow of

these developments, and despite it being the site of frequent conflict, Baghdad has been visited by international architects, and it has fostered the rise of local Iraqi architects, some of whom were trained and educated in the West. Nevertheless, since the late 1960s the rise of Baathism has largely shaped its physical environment, and the architect's role has been to respond to local needs, not to changing global influences.

Sana'a is the last of the cases used to illustrate cities removed from the global scene. The independence of Yemen and the establishment of a republic in 1962 marked the beginning of a new era, with the regime focusing on establishing a modern infrastructure. This included moving away from the traditional vertical architecture that dominated the landscape up to the 1960s, and toward a modern architecture which, the author asserts, largely proved a failure. Afterward, the country descended into political turmoil, with both the first Gulf War and a civil war damaging its society and economy.

This volume provides a nonspecialist audience with a thorough overview of issues and approaches to contemporary Middle Eastern urbanism. But it also points to the emergence of unique spatial patterns derived from global pressures, colonial history, internal social composition and political institutions, and state policies. ■

Sophia Shwayri

New York University


Village Life in Hong Kong: Politics, Gender, and Ritual in the New Territories. James L. Watson and Rubie S. Watson. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2004. 490 pp.

The task of reviewing a book like this is made easier because it contains republished journal articles and book chapters that have all been previously accepted following professional review. As a result, one can be sure its individual chapters embody research that has attained a high standard of recognition in a variety of areas. However, it may be a different matter whether these significant pieces fit well together to provide the desired comprehensive picture of a topic area. But in this respect, too, *Village Life in Hong Kong: Politics, Gender, and Ritual in the New Territories* is an exceptional success.

This book is basically a collection of work by the two Watsons originally published from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s, and based on ethnographic research in two villages — San Tin and Ha Tsuen — in the northwestern New Territories. I have to admit that before reading this volume, I did not know of all this work — which covers a wide range of topics. The book also gave me a chance to better understand the historical development of the New Territories — an area which extends from Boundary Street in the southern Kowloon peninsula to the border between Shenzhen and Hong Kong, and which was leased to the British Government in 1898 for 99 years until 1997.

It is revealing that republishing these articles in an edited volume after more than two decades allows one not only to reconsider the original research on cultural traditions in these two renowned traditional settlements, but also to consider the extent of socio-historical change in indigenous New Territories villages since then. Especially with the recent decline of rural areas and the rapid expansion of urbanization in the New Territories, the contrast between such cultural heritage areas and modern new towns, with their many leisure facilities, is now extreme. Yet, even considering how the New Territories have become an important hinterland for history and tradition, which Hong Kong people recently discovered through the development of domestic tourism, there are few comprehensive records about the social development of these villages.

Thus, I agree with the authors' introductory comment: "What is past is past — but the history of Hong Kong's indigenous peoples (*yuanjumin* or *bendiren*) should not be forgotten. The ancient villages of the New Territories have



unique histories that set them apart from all other villages in Guangdong Province and, as such, they represent an important part of China's cultural heritage" (p.xii). I should also add that even though this book provides relatively little discussion of tangible aspects of traditional Chinese villages, the documentation and analysis of intangible aspects will be appreciated by most *TDSR* readers.

The volume has nineteen chapters, divided into four sections. Section I gives a brief introduction, drawing readers' attention to what the authors have experienced in three decades of study of Chinese society in the New Territories. Section II, "Village Social Organization," gives a general background on Chinese culture in the New Territories, explaining how class differences, eating, adoption, slavery, tenancy and landlordism were all important determinants of social organization in villages in South China. The four chapters in section III, "Gender Differences and Women's Lives," discuss various aspects of gender roles from social and historical perspectives. The last section, "Religion, Ritual, and Symbolism," contains eight chapters, more than half about death and funerals, which provide a comprehensive discussion of such rituals and their symbolic meanings.

Two chapters in particular are worth noting here. "From the Common Pot: Feasting with Equals in Chinese Society" (Chapter 5) shows how the authors' research interests have developed during the last two decades. In comparison to two more recent articles by James Watson, it shows how their initial interest in eating has developed from simply describing the significance of a local tradition, to evaluating the meanings of globalization from a local perspective, to exploring the complicated relationships between child-rearing and rapid social change in China today.¹

The other significant chapter is "Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of Tian Hou ('Empress of Heaven') along the South China Coast, 960–1960" (Chapter 12). Since this chapter first appeared, it has been translated into Chinese and widely read not only by anthropologists but also by scholars in religious studies, history and architecture, both on the mainland and outside China. In other words, it shows how a rich ethnography is always welcomed not only by experts from different disciplines but also by native scholars willing to understand local cultural tradition from an objective and critical point of view.

1. J.L. Watson, "McDonald's in Hong Kong: Consumption, Dietary Change, and the Rise of a Children's Culture," in J.L. Watson, ed., *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp.77–109; and "Food as a Lens: The Past, Present, and Future of Family Life in China," in Jun Jing, ed., *Feeding China's Little Emperors: Food, Children, and Social Change* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp.198–212. ■

Sidney C.H. Cheung
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Buildings, Culture & Environment: Informing Local and Global Practices. Edited by Raymond J. Cole and Richard Lorch. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.

Born out of an international research workshop on "The Cross-Cultural Transfer of Environmental Building Information" in March 2002 at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, this book does not purport to provide definitive answers to pressing issues of sustainable urban development. It does, however, illuminate a path of inquiry and practice concerning potential linkages between culture and technology. Most importantly, it presses the case that local and regional identity and know-how have an important role to play in the development of a new knowledge base about the built environment. As such, it breaks with stereotypical thinking about the assumed superiority of "modern" (Euro/North American) technology, and advocates a symbiotic relationship between global and local, with culture as context. The resultant "glocalisation" implies a blending and hybridization that is a more accurate description of real conditions than that suggested by the usual convenient and oversimplifying dichotomies.

The book's twenty contributing authors are academics and practitioners representing the fields of architecture, urbanism, engineering, environmental science and health, anthropology, and sociology. The editors have organized their work into three open-ended discussions: of context, expectations, and process.

The primary concern of the first section, "Understanding Context," is the continuing friction between "local" and "global," which is most often expressed through the imposition of international design standards or solutions that compromise local identity and heritage. Whether this involves cultural imperialism or simple commercial exploitation, it implies a one-way transfer of knowledge, rather than an exchange. Public political demonstrations are often the most noticeable local manifestations of resistance to this negative aspect of globalization. But architectural resistance has also taken the form of "critical regionalism," an approach that seeks to mediate between the "universal" and the "particular." Several of the chapters here find critical regionalism wanting in terms of its preoccupation with form and image. Nevertheless, they see promise in its potential to empower communities through science-based knowledge of local environmental and social conditions. Throughout, the book's contributors are also consistent in not simply documenting and bemoaning conditions we all know, but seeking conceptual and pragmatic solutions.

In the second section, "Understanding Expectations," the tone is not so optimistic. What people "expect" from their buildings and cities can be drastically at odds with principles of sustainable design. In the United States, in particular, an addiction to air conditioning, a low tolerance for temperature variation, and a predilection for automobile-

dependent urban development are deeply embedded social and cultural desires that, if not met, usually result in rejection. Furthermore, global communications and advertising have now spread Euro-American standards, as representative of modernity and well-being, to people throughout the world. Meanwhile, relatively cheap energy presents no incentive to retain alternative local patterns. And while education can help reformulate expectations and regulation can enforce limitations, such programs may or may not be politically viable within a given culture. Nonetheless, as the chapter concerning the international electronic network BEQUEST (Building Environmental Quality Evaluation for Sustainability through Time) demonstrates, it might be possible to define sustainability in relation to cultural diversity; to agree upon terminology, objectives, criteria, and a decision-making process; and to systematically evaluate alternative approaches.

There are five case studies of technology exchange in the third section, "Understanding Process." Using disparate examples — from vernacular building processes, to housing in China and Japan, to large-scale infrastructure projects such as bridges and power plants — the chapters here express a remarkable convergence about the process of project delivery. In all cases there is concern for a "built environment that also best accommodates the needs of the natural environment," and a process in which "technology and culture are fused and essentially inseparable." Stressing a reflective design practice that constantly examines performance and social fit, they express a need not so much for new techniques or skills, as for depth, professionalism, and accountability to well-informed clients. The suggested paradigm shift is toward the "recognition of the cultural value attributed to all technologies" — which challenges the Western, modernist concept of technology as universal and culturally anonymous.

Buildings, Culture & Environment explores sustainable development through themes of user expectations, global and local expertise, and cross-cultural exchange of know-how. Although its individual chapters may stand alone, its introductory and summary chapters also skillfully and critically explore the commonalities that unite the diversity of viewpoints and experiences. The readings are dense and informative, and should be especially useful in broadening discourse on sustainability to include culture as an indispensable component of project success. While schools and professional practices are accomplished in developing technological solutions for "green" building, they are less cognizant of the design implications of working within particular social and cultural contexts. *Buildings, Culture & Environment* makes an important contribution in this regard.

William Bechhoefer

University of Maryland, College Park


The Protohistoric Pueblo World, A.D. 1275–1600. Edited by E. Charles Adams and Andrew I. Duff. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2004. 218 pp., 66 illus.

The protohistoric period in the American Southwest was characterized by the aggregation of population into increasingly larger pueblos, many eventually exceeding the size of the preceding "great houses" at Chaco and Sand Canyons. Clan and village histories name many of these abandoned protohistoric villages; some contain shrines, and others are visited periodically. Still others — such as Taos, Picuris, Cochiti, Zuni, and Orayvi — are still inhabited. In 2001, E. Charles Adams and Andrew I. Duff organized a symposium to discuss such protohistoric villages, their chronology, and social organization. The outcome, *The Protohistoric Pueblo World, A.D. 1275–1600*, is the first synthetic volume to focus on the clustering of settlement in the Southwest during the protohistoric period.

The story begins in the late 1200s, as the Pueblo people abandoned most of the San Juan Basin — including Chaco Canyon and Mesa Verde. Around 1275 they moved to new locations, changed the layout of their villages, and altered ceramic production and decoration. Again, in 1325 — possibly in response to adopting a Katsina or Southwest Cult — the people changed ceramic and rock art iconography. At the same time, they again abandoned or reorganized their villages, often into clusters, concentrated along drainages of rivers such as the Rio Grande and Little Colorado, and along prominent landscape features such as the Mogollon Rim. By 1400 the people had once again abandoned many of their settlements and become further concentrated in villages along the Rio Grande, on the Hopi Mesas, and at Acoma and Zuni.

In general, this "protohistoric" period was a time of transformation in settlement patterns, as people migrated in groups to join established villages or founded new villages in uninhabited areas. They also built distinctive public architecture including enclosed plazas with one or more unattached kivas, round in the east and rectangular in the west. Overall, the diversity of ritual structures, an abundance of ritual deposits, and the iconography of rock art, ceramic decoration, and kiva murals all indicate increased concern for religious ritual during the period.

This book is a companion to the 1996 synthesis *The Prehistoric Pueblo World, A.D. 1150–1350*, edited by Michael Adler, and its design and organization is similar to the previous book. It begins with a chapter by the symposium organizers; a dozen geographically ordered chapters by symposium participants follow;



and two discussion chapters by symposium respondents conclude. The book begins in northern New Mexico, moves south along the Rio Grande, covers a large stretch of Chihuahuan desert, traverses northwest to Zuni, then circles through east-central Arizona to end up at Hopi. The book spans from initial population migration and aggregation in 1275 up to 1600, so as to include processes precipitated by European arrival in 1539.

As mentioned, the volume's unifying theme is settlement clusters. What is a settlement cluster? In their introduction, Adams and Duff observe these share the following characteristics: "the existence of spatially proximate groupings of two or more villages that are more similar in material culture to each other than to adjacent groupings, and the existence of significant spatial gaps between clusters" (p.14). Discussant Katherine Spielmann then defines two distinct types. "Emergent" clusters were clustered spatially, but had diverse types of decorated pottery: located west of the Rio Grande, they were short-lived. By contrast, "integrated" clusters were closer spatially and shared a common, locally made decorated type of pottery: sited along the Rio Grande, they persisted several centuries. In their chapter on the central Rio Grande Valley, Suzanne Eckert and Linda Cordell further refer cautiously to spatially linked sites as belonging to a "district." They reserve the term cluster for a group of sites that were contemporaneous, had similar architecture and ceramics, and were close spatially to each other and yet separated from other clusters. Finally, citing Taos and Picuris — villages that are nearby and share architectural and ceramic style, religion, and language, but have been openly hostile — Severin Fowles points out that spatial proximity and cultural similarity did not necessarily indicate sociopolitical cooperation; intragroup tensions also need to be examined.

Why did people establish villages in clusters? James Snead, Winifred Creamer, and Tineke Van Zandt provide three different explanations of cluster formation with regard to three sites in the northern Rio Grande: distribution of natural resources; historical processes of settlement formation; and sociopolitical organization. Daniela Triadan and Nieves Zedeño find that settlement clusters of the Mogollon highlands were defensive: villages were located to mark boundaries, and they were located on defensible sites or faced inward. The Homol'ovi cluster, as discussed by Adams, was formed by people from Hopi, probably to secure ownership of a resource rich area during a time of massive migration. Finally, William Graves suggests that the cluster of Jumanos pueblos represented a new form of social identity tied to a sense of place and shared social history.

How did clustering vary throughout the Southwest? Andrew Duff describes three clusters of three villages along the Upper Little Colorado River, and Wesley Bernardini and Gary Brown describe two tight clusters of three villages on Anderson Mesa. Yet Eric Kaldahl, Scott Van Keuren, and Barbara Mills do not discern clusters along the Mogollon Rim, and neither do Eckert and Cordell find them in the Albuquerque or Cochiti districts. For their part, Huntley and Kintigh suggest that all contemporaneous villages within the Zuni area might have been a regional social entity, and that within this entity, clusters did not emerge until later

in the protohistoric period. Meanwhile, Stephen Lekson, Michael Bletzer, and A.C. MacWilliams address social interaction at a much larger scale. They argue that the metropolitan Paquimé, in Chihuahua, was a significant player in the protohistoric period, and that there is a correlation between a drop in population in the northern Southwest and a population boom in Chihuahua.

One of the questions that Charles Adams, Vincent LaMotta, and Kurt Dongoske ask in their chapter on Hopi is how villages within a cluster related to one another. On each of the four Hopi Mesas they found clusters of four interdependent, functionally discrete villages, including a primary village. The primary villages are the oldest in each cluster; they are located in elevated positions; and they are large and include elaborated plazas. Ethnologist Peter Whiteley, in his concluding chapter, promotes the application of upstreaming — applying subsequent ethnohistoric information from the Pueblo people so as to contribute to understanding the protohistoric period. Yet Adams, LaMotta, and Dongoske suggest cautiously that the social structure of Hopi's clusters might have differed in the past, and that the clusters might have competed economically.

Why did some clusters endure over centuries while others dissolved quickly? Spielmann notes that a shared history, favorable conditions for agriculture, and the adoption of a unifying religion all contributed to the long-term success of a cluster. Immigrants to the Rio Grande arrived in larger groups, established large sites, and stayed put. In the west — except for Zuni, Hopi, and Homol'ovi — people clustered with others without a common background, did not integrate, and then moved on.

In addition to being a provocative scrutiny of recent issues regarding settlement patterns of societies of the Southwest, *The Protohistoric Pueblo World* is an authoritative, eminently utilitarian resource. Its scholarship is solid, and the chapters are well written and organized. Each chapter covering a geographic area also includes maps and information regarding settlement patterns and ceramics. The maps are further unified graphically and linked to a comprehensive table; however, it would have been useful to include at least some of the site names on the more complex maps, and to have provided more topographic information. Village plans are also provided for six of the areas — however, additional plans would have enhanced the text. Photographs would also have been valuable.

One of the book's most useful features is the comprehensive table giving comparable data in twelve areas for all known villages with at least fifty rooms. The table lists maps and references, and includes numbers of rooms and kivas, numbers and styles of plazas, occupation periods, and types of decorated ceramics.

Adams and Duff have organized the chapters in this book into an integrated cluster that promises to persist in the literature of the protohistoric Southwest. *The Protohistoric Pueblo World, A.D. 1275–1600* is a volume all scholars of settlement patterns or Southwest archaeology will want to own.

Anne Marshall

University of Idaho/Arizona State University

Conferences and Events

UPCOMING CONFERENCES

“Encounters/Encuentros/Rencontres,” Mexico City, Mexico: June 9–12. The Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México will host the 2005 ACSA International. Open to students, teachers and practitioners from Canada, Mexico, the U.S. and beyond, the conference will investigate the implications on architectural education and practice of every kind of encounter — between individuals and groups, peoples and nations, intentions and ideas, technologies and cultures. For more information, contact: ACSA, 1735 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20006. Phone: (202) 785-2324. Fax: (202) 628-0448. Email: info@acsa-arch.org. Website: <http://www.acsa-arch.org/meetings>.

“True Urbanism and the European Town Square,” Venice, Italy: June 20–24, 2005. Organized with the University of Notre Dame School of Architecture, the 43rd annual International Making Cities Livable conference will focus on multifunctional democratic town squares, true urbanism, as well as Venice and older European examples of planning and architecture. For more information, visit: <http://www.livablecities.org/43ConfVenice.htm>. Or contact: Suzanne H. Crowhurst Lennard, IMCL Conferences, P.O. Box 7586, Carmel, CA, 93921, USA. Fax: (831) 624-5126. Email: Suzanne.Lennard@LivableCities.org.

“The Aspects of Equilibrium: Architecture, Urban Design, Planning at the Threshold of the U.N. Decade of Education for Sustainable Development,” Wroclaw, Poland: June 23–25, 2005. The Faculty of Architecture at the Wroclaw University of Technology hosts this conference, which asks how problems of equilibrium, harmony, and spatial order were understood in the past, and how are they perceived today in light of current documents, projects and realizations. For more information, visit: <http://rownowaga.arch.pwr.wroc.pl>. Or email: izabela.mironowicz@pwr.wroc.pl or magdalena.belof@pwr.wroc.pl.

“CITIES: Grand Bazaar of Architectures,” Istanbul, Turkey: July 1–10, 2005. Hosted by the Chamber of Architects of Turkey, the XXII World Architecture Congress and XXIII General Assembly of UIA will bring together seven to eight thousand architects from around the world. The program will address the architecture of cities, architecture and life in cities, the architectural profession and education in the city, and the celebration of the world’s cities. For information, contact: UIA Istanbul 2005 Congress Management, ISEVV Consortium, Mete Cad. No. 16 K.4, Taksim 34437, Istanbul, Turkey. Phone: 90 212 244 7171. Fax: 90 212 244 7181. Email: aycil@ikontour.com. Website: www.uia2005istanbul.org.

“Changing Boundaries,” Paris: France: August 31–September 4, 2005. A joint symposium of the Institut National d’Histoire de l’Art (Paris) and the Society of Architectural Historians (SAH). The event will include paper sessions and an architectural tour of Paris. For more information, visit: <http://www.sah.org/index.php>.

“Cities for People,” Penang, Malaysia: September 11–14, 2005. The Associate Planning Schools of Asia 2005 Congress will investigate the need for planners to reevaluate their philosophy and approach to cities so that the civility and gentrification that once made cities wholesomely attractive can be re-created for a modern, caring humanity. Themes will include public spaces, neighborliness in neighborhoods, biodiversity for healthy cities, and the identity of cities through promoting localism. For more information, visit: <http://www.apsa2005.net/index.htm>.

“Monuments and Sites in their Setting: Conserving Cultural Heritage in Changing Townscapes and Landscapes,” Xi’an, China: October 17–21, 2005. The 15th General Assembly and Scientific Symposium of ICOMOS will be organized along four themes: definition, threats, tools, and a special focus on heritage routes. The symposium was developed with ICOMOS China colleagues, and will result in the production of a Xi’an Declaration. For more information, contact: Liu Zhao and Cao Mingjing, The Bureau of Cultural Heritage and Parks, Xi’an Municipality. Email: icomos15th_xian@vip.163.com. Tel. and fax: 86 29 8741 7981. Website: www.international.icomos.org/xian2005.

"Eleventh Biennial Conference on Planning History," Coral Gables, FL: October 20–23, 2005. Sponsored by the Society for American City and Regional Planning History, this conference will include sessions on North American metropolitan history and its global comparisons, along with special events and tours examining the history and future of the dynamic Miami region. For more information, visit: <http://www.urban.uiuc.edu/sacrph/conference/conference.html>. Or contact: Kristin Larsen, Department of Urban & Regional Planning, University of Florida, P.O. Box 115706, Gainesville, FL, 32611-5706. Tel.: (352) 392-0997, ext. 433.

"A Critical Look at Authenticity and Historic Preservation," New York, NY: March, 2006. The Fifth National Forum on Historic Preservation Practice will explore the meaning of authenticity as it applies to the preservation of various components of the built environment, as well as differences of meaning between those who preserve and use them. For more information, contact: Janet Foster, Historic Preservation Program, Columbia University, 400 Avery Hall, New York, NY, 10032. Tel.: (212) 854-3080. Fax: (973) 822-0437. Email: jf2060@columbia.edu.

"The Ethos of Design for this Century," Salt Lake City, UT: March 30–April 2, 2006. The 2006 ACSA Annual Meeting will examine the ethos and ethics of architectural design today. For more information, contact: ACSA, 1735 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20006. Tel.: 202 785-2324. Fax: (202) 628-0448. Email: info@acsa-arch.org. Website: <http://www.acsa-arch.org/meetings>.

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"ARCHCAIRO 2006: Appropriating Architecture, Taming Urbanism in the Decades of Transformation," Cairo, Egypt: February 21–23, 2006. The Third International Conference of the Department of Architecture at Cairo University will address the appropriation of architecture for existing and new settings, architectural theory, environmental systems, building technology, community and urban design, and planning management in the planning and building of developing communities. The abstract deadline is June 15, 2005. For more information, contact: Department of Architecture, Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University. Phone: 002 02 774 0748. Fax: 002 02 572 8967. Email: info@archcairo.org. Website: www.archcairo.org.

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"2005 Annual Conference: Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture," Chicago, IL: March 3–6, 2005. For more information, contact: ACSA, 1735 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Tel.: (202) 785-2324. Fax: (202) 628 0448. Email: info@acsa-arch.org. Website: <http://www.acsa-arch.org/meetings>.

"City Futures: An International Conference on Globalism and Urban Change," Chicago, IL: July 8–10, 2004. The conference sought to bring together leading scholars from across the world to examine how global forces are impacting cities and how governments, cities and communities are responding to these new challenges. For more information, visit: <http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/cityfutures/>.

Guide for Preparation of Manuscripts

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Manuscripts should not exceed 25 standard 8.5" x 11" [A4] double-spaced typewritten pages (about 7500 words). Leave generous margins.

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Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the journal, papers should be written for an academic audience that may have either a general or a specific interest in your topic. Papers should present a clear narrative structure. They should not be compendiums of field notes. Please define specialized or technical terminology where appropriate.

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Provide a one-paragraph abstract of no more than 100 words. This abstract should explain the content and structure of the paper and summarize its major findings. The abstract should be followed by a short introduction. The introduction will appear without a subheading at the beginning of the paper.

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Please divide the main body of the paper with a single progression of subheadings. There need be no more than four or five of these, but they should describe the paper's main sections and reinforce the reader's sense of progress through the text.

Sample Progression: The Role of the Longhouse in Iban Culture. The Longhouse as a Building Form. Transformation of the Longhouse at the New Year. The Impact of Modern Technology. Conclusion: Endangered Form or Form in Transition?

Do not use any numbering system in subheadings. Use secondary subheadings only when absolutely essential for format or clarity.

6. REFERENCES

Do not use a general bibliography format. Use a system of numbered reference notes as indicated below.

A condensed section of text might read as follows:

In his study of vernacular dwellings in Egypt, Edgar Regis asserted that climate was a major factor in the shaping of roof forms. Henri Lacompte, on the other hand, has argued that in the case of Upper Egypt this deterministic view is irrelevant.¹

An eminent architectural historian once wrote, "The roof form in general is the most indicative feature of the housing styles of North Africa."² Clearly, however, the matter of how these forms have evolved is a complex subject. A thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.³

In my research I discovered that local people have differing notions about the origins of the roof forms on the dwellings they inhabit.⁴

The reference notes, collected at the end of the text (not at the bottom of each page), would read as follows:

1. E. Regis, *Egyptian Dwellings* (Cairo: University Press, 1979), p.179; and H. Lacompte, "New Study Stirrs Old Debate," *Smithsonian* 11 (December 1983), pp.24-34.
2. B. Smithson, "Characteristic Roof Forms," in H. Jones, ed., *Architecture of North Africa* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p.123.
3. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see J. Idris, *Roofs and Man* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
4. In my interviews I found that the local people understood the full meaning of my question only when I used a more formal Egyptian word for "roof" than that in common usage.

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 IASTE, Center For Environmental Design Research
 390 Wurster Hall
 University of California
 Berkeley, CA 94720-1839
 Tel: 510.642.2896 Fax: 510.643.5571
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