# TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

The International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments (IASTE) was established at the First International Symposium on Traditional Dwellings and Settlements held at Berkeley in April 1988. IASTE is an interdisciplinary forum where scholars from various disciplines and countries can exchange ideas, discuss methods and approaches, and share findings. As opposed to disciplinary associations, IASTE is a nonprofit organization concerned with the comparative and cross-cultural understanding of traditional habitat as an expression of informal cultural conventions. IASTE's purpose is to serve as an umbrella association for all scholars studying vernacular, indigenous, popular and traditional environments. Current activities of IASTE include the organization of biennial conferences on selected themes in traditional-environments research, the publication of edited books on selected themes, a public outreach program which includes supporting films and documentaries, and the publication of the Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Working Paper Series, which includes all papers presented at IASTE conferences and accepted for publication.

Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review is the official publication of IASTE. As a semi-annual refereed journal, *TDSR* acts as a forum for the exchange of ideas and a means to disseminate information and report on research activities. All articles submitted to *TDSR* are evaluated through a blind peer-review process. *TDSR* has been funded by grants from the Graham Foundation, the Getty Publication Program, the National Endowment for the Arts, the Center for Environmental Design Research, and the office of the Provost at the University of California at Berkeley.

IASTE membership is open to all who are interested in traditional environments and their related studies. In addition to receiving the Association's semi-annual journal, members are eligible to attend the biennial conference at reduced rates. Subscription to the journal is available only with membership in IASTE. Domstic annual order rates are as follows: Individual, $50; Institutional, $100; Corporations, $160. Foreign members add $15 for mailing. Libraries, museums, and academic organizations qualify as institutions. Subscriptions are payable in U.S. dollars only (by check drawn on a U.S. bank, U.S. money order, or international bank draft). Send inquiries to:

TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

Journal of the International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments

Contents

COVER ILLUSTRATION: Dashashwamedha ghat, Banaras, India. Photo by Madhuri Desai.

Editor's Note

This issue of *TDSR* starts with a paper by Noha Nasser entitled "The Space of Displacement: Making Muslim South Asian Place in British Neighborhoods." Using examples of built forms in Bradford, Birmingham and London, Nasser argues that the cultural paradigm of global Islam is sufficiently mobile and adaptable to be reproduced even in the local space of postcolonial Britain. The questions of displacement she raises open a necessary discourse on local-global issues of identity and place-making.

The second article, "Mosques, Temples, and Orientalists: Hegemonic Imaginations in Banaras," by Madhuri Desai, deals with architecture under a condition of rising religious fundamentalism, and argues that it is important to examine the processes by which "religious" sites are created. Her general premise is that historical narratives are negotiations, rather than simple renditions of historical facts. More specifically, the article illustrates the processes through which Banaras has been created and represented as an indisputably Hindu city through a process that involved the hegemonic imaginations of both nineteenth-century colonial Orientalists and modern-day postcolonial nationalists.

This is followed by an article entitled "'Marrying Modern Progress with Treasured Antiquity': Jerusalem City Plans during the British Mandate, 1917–1948" by Inbal Ben-Asher Gitler, which evaluates British Mandatory schemes for Jerusalem with regard to more general theories of colonial urban planning. On the one hand, the article shows how the British approach to new urban schemes for Jerusalem deviated from the norms and concepts implemented in colonial cities. Yet, by examining three official British Mandatory publications, Gitler also shows how the intent remained one of promoting an image of British supremacy.

In the fourth article, "Reviving the Betawi Tradition: The Case of Setu Babakan, Indonesia," Gunawan Tjahjono examines the various conditions that gave rise to a new ethnic group, the Betawi, from the diverse peoples who settled the area of what is today Jakarta. Today, as Jakarta has become a global city, the government of Indonesia has begun delegating more authority to localities. This has allowed the municipality of Jakarta to initiate development of a Betawi Cultural Village. However, this project remains controversial, since it occupies a place where the Betawis are actually a minority, its premises are questionable, and its implementation has been seriously flawed.

Our last article, "Traditions of Appearance: Adaptation and Change in Eastern Tibetan Dwellings," by Suzanne Ewing, deals with Tibet as a "heterotopia," or "a plurality of often contradictory, competing and mutually exclusive places simultaneously positioned in a single geographical location." Using the dwelling as a key site for assimilation, appropriation or resistance to external change and influence, she shows how the contested cultural space of Tibet today is both separated from and fundamentally linked to a displaced diaspora leadership that espouses varying perceptions of its history and borders.

I would like to end my note by announcing that the next IASTE conference will indeed be held in December 2004 in Sharjah/Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. It will be hosted by the American University in Sharjah, under the auspices of its ruler. The theme "Post-Traditional Environments in a Post-Global World" also promises to be of great interest to many of our members. I hope you will all respond to the call for proposals, included in this issue, with appropriate sessions and papers. I hope to see you all there.

Nezar AlSayyad

The Space of Displacement: Making Muslim South Asian Place in British Neighborhoods

NOHA NASSER

Globalization and postcolonialization have created new geographies of cultural "displacement" in global cities. This article examines the space of displacement created by Muslim South Asians in British cities. It argues that the cultural paradigm of global Islam is sufficiently mobile and adaptable to be reproduced in local space. The question of displacement opens up a discourse on local-global issues of identity and place-making. By examining the effect of transnational imaginings on everyday practices and social processes constructed within regimes of multiculturalism, this article examines the process of making Muslim South Asian places. Particular focus is on the social (re)production of urban, architectural and built forms in Bradford, Birmingham and London.

The study of cultures has traditionally focused on the intrinsic relation between people and their built environments as fixed in time and space. For most of the twentieth century it was on these grounds of relative fixity that the study of the "Islamic City" became culturally and geographically bound to the Arab Middle East. Framed primarily by Orientalist discourses of cultural difference, the "Islamic city" model was constructed as an ideal type of an essential Muslim identity, culture, and urban form. Such reductionist discourses have now come under scrutiny. But recent migration of large numbers of Muslims to British towns and cities has once again brought to the fore notions of cultural difference. The presence of Muslim South Asians in Britain is the result of the combined effects of globalization and postcolonialization, which have created new geographies of "displacement." These geographies have produced a new British frontier in which the difference between the "Islamic city" and the "Western City" has become increasingly eroded. The cultural (re)production of Muslim South Asian place in the British frontier — in its urban, architectural, and built-form dimensions — is what this article aims to examine.

The contemporary condition of "displacement" has brought into sharp focus the need to redefine the relationship between people and their built environments. Indeed, the processes of reterritorialization involved and their complex links to cultural production

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have highlighted the dynamic nature of culture as lived experience able to adapt and change according to different conditions. In this study of Muslim South Asian settlement in Britain, the question of "displacement" opens up a discursive space on local-global issues of identity and place-making. In particular, it examines the multiple forms of Muslim South Asian representation that are being constructed globally through transnational networks, and locally in response to power structures and intercultural encounter. The case studies used here are taken from ongoing research and fieldwork concerning buildings, streetscapes, and spaces in parts of Bradford, Birmingham and London with substantial Muslim South Asian populations.

MUSLIM SOUTH ASIANS IN BRITAIN

Almost two million Muslims live in Britain, of whom more than half are of South Asian, primarily Pakistani, origin.[1] The large majority originate from mainly rural areas of the Indian subcontinent — namely, Mirpur, Campellbur (Chhachh), Sylhet, and certain villages in Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujurat and Lyllpur.[2] These communities are products of postcolonialism, in the sense that Britain exploited historical links with India and Pakistan to recruit labor to fill the demand for industrial expansion. Beginning in the 1950s, these links brought workers to the Midlands manufacturing industries, West Yorkshire steel and Lancashire textile industries, as well as the Greater London area.[3] Today these regions contain the largest settlements of South Asian communities.

The first significant settlement of South Asians was by mainly male workers, who had come to Britain for economic betterment but with intent to return.[4] However, the hiatus between the passing of restrictions in immigration laws and their implementation in the mid-1960s saw a sharp rise in numbers of migrants choosing to remain in Britain. As a result, a substantial rise in the sponsorship of village kin and the settlement of migrant families followed. A third wave of migration took place in the 1970s, as Asians from Africa sought refuge in Britain from political unrest in Uganda, Kenya, and other countries.[5]

Settlement first took place in spatially defined areas within the major industrial cities, which corresponded to late-Victorian and Edwardian (1875–1918) inner- and middle-ring neighborhoods. Generally, South Asians moved into areas once occupied by the middle class, and in some cases displaced other previously established migrant groups.[6] The highly regular and well-differentiated layout of the industrial urban landscape, characterized by regular streets, long blocks, standardized plot sizes, and repetitive two-story terraces, formed a morphological frame governing urban change (FIG.1). These neighborhoods offered a number of advantages for the early settlers. First, much of the terraced housing stock was vacant, making access to it both cheap and uncontested — with the added advantage that the individual houses could absorb large numbers of male workers. Second, a High Street, or major commercial thoroughfare, generally connected these neighborhoods to the city center, making them readily accessible to the central business, commercial and industrial districts.

This article will focus on neighborhoods of three cities

FIGURE 1. *Aerial view of Sparkhill, Birmingham, in 1950, showing highly regular and well-differentiated layout of the industrial urban landscape. Photo courtesy of Birmingham Central Library Archive Unit.*

with significant Muslim South Asian populations: Bradford, Birmingham and London. Bradford, in West Yorkshire, has a Pakistani and Kashmiri population of some 73,900, as well as one of the largest Bengali communities in Britain (95 percent from the Sylhet district).[7] South Asian settlement here is concentrated within 25 square miles of the center of the city, and more specifically along several major streets, including Lumb and Manningham Lanes.[8] Birmingham, in the West Midlands, has approximately 80,000 South Asian Muslims, the largest single group being Pakistanis, who constitute nearly 7 percent of Birmingham's population.[9] Geographically, the highest concentration of Muslims in Birmingham are in the southern middle-ring districts of Balsall Heath, Small Heath, Sparkbrook and Sparkhill, with major Muslim commercial areas located along Coventry, Stratford, and Ladypool Roads.[10] In Greater London, areas dominated by South Asian Muslims include Southall, Alperton, Wembley, Kingsbury, Tower Hamlets, and Waltham Forest.[11] Major commercial areas have developed along Southall High Street, Brick Lane, and Ealing Road.

The heterogeneity of the Muslim South Asian community is reflected in its members' different histories, cultural traditions, social classes, and methods of insertion into Britain. Although united by belief, the overall community is divided along national, ethnic and sectarian lines. Thus, group solidarities are multivalent, constructed around one or more identities, such as Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Indian, Sunni, Shi'a, Hanafi, Deobandi or Barelvi.[12] These internal divisions do not necessarily mean that the Muslim community lacks cohesion. Rather, it should be viewed as a political project formed around various solidarities and themes invoked at particular times.[13] This political project has been explained by Seddon:

> [F]or Muslims experiencing migration and new environments, religious identity, its preservation and promulgation, has always taken precedence over cultural or ethnic ones. This is because whilst Islam is universal it is not monolithic in its specific localised practice or cultural manifestations therefore, ethnic and cultural identities can be evolved, negotiated, re-defined, transformed, reinvented, adopted, absorbed, or integrated.[14]

This complex geography of identities is activated within particular conditions and circumstances and for particular purposes. As shown in a study by Werbner on Pakistani Muslims in Manchester, "the 'weaving' together of different types of identity — moral, political and aesthetic (the Muslim, the Pakistani, and the South Asian) — has created a powerful grass-roots basis for ethnic mobilisation."[15] The question of how these multiple identities are constructed and represented in space forms the central theme of this article.

THE FORMATION OF LOCAL MUSLIM CULTURE IN GLOBAL SPACES: TRANSNATIONAL IMAGININGS IN BRITAIN

Many critics have argued that globalization and colonization have contributed to the destruction of indigenous cultures. But this view assumes that culture is static, and disregards the often quite remarkable ways societies engage, adapt and resist dominant homogenizing forces.[16] Recently, critical emphasis has shifted from concern for the economic and political imperatives of the unitary sway of global processes to an examination of the minutiae of time and place.[17] Moreover, there is growing recognition that the spatialization of "displaced" cultures cannot be read through binary oppositions of the local and the global. Rather, they are now seen as mutually constituted — the local as a node in the global network, and the global as a network of local nodes.[18]

This is particularly true of Islam, in which the relationship between the global and the local is dialectic. On the one hand, Islam is a divinely revealed religion and way of life with a belief in its universal validity — a global paradigm; yet on the other, it is organized in an assemblage of local structures.[19] Such characteristics are due in part to the portability of the Qur'an, which makes Islam independent of local circumstance for its reproduction, and enables its historical movement across geographically diverse, multiethnic and multicultural terrains.[20] Through this historical process, Islam has transformed other cultures; but it has also been transformed by interaction with them.[21] According to Hodgson: "the very comprehensiveness of the vision of Islam as it unfolded has ensured that it can never be quite the same from one place to another or one time to another."[22] Indeed, in the case of Britain, the physical manifestation of Islam has been determined by an exchange between a global cultural paradigm and the infusion of new meanings produced within an existing urban tradition.[23]

In recent decades an unprecedented intensity of transnational flows of people, knowledge, information, resources and ideas has increased the global reach of Islam. Esposito has described these new cultural flows between the West and the Muslim world as a "multilane superhighway with two-way traffic."[24] Indeed, improved mass communication and travel has created what Anderson has termed "imagined communities," which coalesce around remembered or imagined homelands.[25] And in a study of the social construction of imagined communities in British Muslim neighborhoods, Albrow et al. found that the Muslim sense of belonging to the wider Muslim community (*umma*) is produced and transmitted through a transnational network of social and technological linkages that include religious ceremonies, telephone conversations, television and radio programs, newspaper accounts, videos, and music.[26] They also found that everyday life in Muslim neighborhoods is infused with knowledge and meaning produced in these transnational networks and encountered in local neighborhoods on a daily basis.

These imaginings, however, also create real cultural geographies. For example, the transnational movement of ideologies and institutions has meant that an increasing number of Muslim institutes, think tanks, and political action groups have established themselves in global cities. As Esposito has pointed out, "today the cities and learning centres of the Muslim world are not only Cairo, Damascus, Islamabad, and Kuala Lumpur but also London, Manchester, Paris, Marseilles, Amsterdam, Antwerp, New York, Detroit and Los Angeles."[27] These trends indicate that space is being constituted through social relations and contingent solidarities that are both contained within one place and stretch beyond it, tying any particular locality into wider relations and processes.[28] Indeed, dense networks of transnational Muslim solidarities have produced a much broader range of spaces, which transcend simple religious space to include philanthropic, socio-cultural, economic, and political functions. Cultural flows of images, symbols, and architectural idioms also contribute to the different forms of cultural bricolage, hybridity and creolization represented in space.[29] The question of how transnational imaginings of Muslim South Asians are being represented and spatialized as part of the place-making process provides the focus of the remainder of this article.

MUSLIM SOUTH ASIAN PLACE

Recent discourses on globalization of culture have shifted theoretical emphases within the social sciences to a focus on human agency and subjectivity, redefining older notions of culture and its territorial rootedness. This shift conceives culture to be in a constant state of transformation, in which everyday practice, social processes, relationships, experiences and understandings are continually negotiated in new contexts.[30] These are all part of what Bourdieu has termed "habitus," or a system of dispositions.[31] The term demonstrates the extent to which "place" may be seen as a "practice," rather than a visual, geographic or topographic location — a process of transformation by which space is either "reclaimed" or "reinscribed" as a network of actions, practices and relationships.[32] Such cultural practices are further shaped by operations of globalization (transnationalism) and relations of power in given historical conditions and particular locales.[33]

Islam's remarkable flexibility and adaptability to new cultures and customs has already been remarked upon. Indeed, the survival of Islam as a cultural tradition in Britain owes much to its ability to remain a living practice, or habitus, that does not contradict everyday life in the larger British context.[34] As a lived practice, Muslim South Asians distinguish between *ibadat* (rituals of worship) and *mu'amalat* (social affairs).[35] *Ibadat* is identifiable by adherence to a number of practices and beliefs canonized in texts, and most evident in the "five pillars of Islam": affirmation of one God, prayer, almsgiving, fasting during Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. Of these, the rituals of prayer (often exercised communally on Friday) and almsgiving have physical implications such as in the establish-

ment of mosques and related institutions. The implications of other religious beliefs, such as the special preparation of meat products (*halal*) may also be visible in commercial areas. However, *mu'amalat* allows Muslims freedom of action to deal with the everyday demands of individual and community life so long as the choices made do not contradict a prescribed principle.[36] Such freedom enables Muslims to appropriate the norms of other cultural traditions while preserving the social identity of the Muslim community. In contexts of displacement, these principles, practices, and social processes may adapt and take on new meanings, pointing to the continuing redefinition and reappropriation of Islam as a living tradition.[37]

According to King, these cultural practices and social processes "do not occur in a spatial vacuum, nor on an environmental *tabula rasa*. Cultures are constituted in space and under specific economic and social conditions; they are physically and spatially as well as socially constructed."[38] And, as Wolff has pointed out: "cultures are constructed in relation to one another, produced, represented and perceived through the ideologies and narratives of situated discourse."[39] Hence, the ways in which culture is constituted are a matter of representation — a politics of identity, where the "positioning" or "performativity" of social collectives or individual difference emerge out of contexts which are inherently contested.[40] This suggests that the idea of a monolithic Muslim identity is not tenable, and that Muslim identity should instead be understood as a complex formation, contingent on the "positioning" of various social solidarities and their spatial particularities within systems of power — which may or may not be inflected by finer divisions within Muslim communities.

The engagement of Muslim South Asians with British multiculturalism has brought an inherent contestation of identity. Modeled on Britain's colonial experience, the ideology of multiculturalism has attempted to both recognize the presence of postcolonial cultures and subsume this plurality within the framework of a national identity. Premised on fixed notions of "cultural difference" and "otherness," such imperial constructs have given rise to spatially segregated and racialized geographies of disadvantage in British cities.[41] But the spaces of British cities have also become sites of intercultural encounter that destabilize these imperial arrangements, specifically with regard to the process of constituting political Muslim South Asian identities in resistance to homogenizing tendencies. According to Ashcroft: "the most sustained, far-reaching and effective interpretation of resistance has been 'resistance to absorption,' the appropriation and transformation of dominant technologies for the purpose of re-inscribing and representing postcolonial cultural identity."[42] Indeed, the various ways Muslim South Asians have adapted and transformed existing built forms in Britain, as well as created new cultural forms within British cities (and within defined regimes of multiculturalism), offers a fascinating example of "resistance." In what follows, a number of examples of the Muslim South Asian habitus and representation in Bradford, Birmingham and London will be examined from two perspectives: the practices of *ibadat*, and the social-based formations of *mu'amalat*.

BIRADARI AND NEIGHBORHOOD FORMATION

Muslim South Asian settlers, predominantly male workers, began to arrive in Britain in the late 1950s. These pioneers tended to live together, renting rooms in lodges until they were able to purchase properties in areas that were relatively affordable. Racialized housing policies limited choices in the housing market to certain areas within the vacated Victorian and Edwardian suburbs. Many have argued that a combination of racial politics, discriminatory practices, and labor exploitation were used in Britain to maintain the spatial segregation of the "other."[43] However, it was around these established urban nuclei that South Asian landlords also first began to establish a strong transnational network through *biradari* — extended kinship and village ties. According to this practice, they sponsored fellow villagers and lodged them in their homes, shaping a process of chain migration that continues to influence patterns of settlement within specific geographies in British industrial cities. This form of spatialized *biradari*-based social organization has had its benefits: it has created an environment of social welfare and cohesion in an antagonistic environment, and it has fostered the perpetuation of traditional norms, values, and beliefs among the newcomers.[44]

With the arrival of families from the mid-1960s, the village-kin group, as a residential unit, began to expand into nuclear households of owner-occupied properties in close proximity to one another.[45] Peach has shown that through social processes of intermarriage and proximity, the persistence and stability of the Muslim South Asian cultural group has been able to accommodate differences.[46] By the 1980s, however, a combination of natural increase and a new wave of migration marked a sharp rise in the number of Muslim South Asians in Britain. This period also saw a movement to the outer suburbs. Nevertheless, the close social ties with local and transnational South Asian *biradari* have persisted.[47] Indeed, close proximity to Asian shops, the mosque, good schools, and transport has consistently been a primary factor in the stability of Muslim social groups in particular areas of British cities.[48] Thus, within these social geographies and urban morphologies, new relationships have been spatialized from the most personal and intimate — the family group — outward to associations based on religion, commerce, education and politics.

THE HOUSE

At the micro-morphological scale of the family household, the common housing type in Victorian and Edwardian neighborhoods is the terrace rowhouse, whose basic plan consists of two floors, with two rooms on each (on average, 3.5 x 3m. in size). For variation and enlargement, there may be a cellar and an attic, and a back extension, or "lean-to," for the kitchen-cum-scullery.[49] Muslim South Asian family households tend to be larger than average, usually including grandparents or other extended-family members.[50] In South Asia, the average rural house facilitated the relationship between the activities of family members through spatial boundaries. During the process of displacement, the spatial practices used in such rural houses were to a large degree transferred and reinscribed into the spaces of the terrace house.[51] In South Asia, the most pervasive spatial practice was that of *purdah*, generally interpreted as a restriction against women meeting men other than their husbands and immediate male kin. The degree to which *purdah* was observed varied considerably according to region, wealth, and family traditions, being more strictly observed in some South Asian regions than others. Nevertheless, its principles continued to affect all household layouts in Britain in important ways.[52]

In a detailed ethnographical study of Pakistani families in Oxford, Shaw compared the activities and layouts of the rural South Asian house with that of the English house (**FIGS.2,3**).[53] In her study, she showed that that the former was designed to safeguard *purdah* by dividing the house into three areas: a *baithak* (male-dominated guestroom), a courtyard, and a main family room. When examining the way Pakistanis were adapting to the English house, she then found that the front room had assumed the role of *baithak*. When male guests were present, women could remain out of view in other parts of the house, or they could cover their heads with *dupattas*. Shaw described the gendered temporality of the front room as it changed from a family room to a predominantly male domain during these visits. As in South Asia, the front room typically also served as a place to display indicators of status and wealth. According to Shaw:

FIGURE 2. (LEFT) *Typical rural South Asian house. Drawing courtesy of A. Shaw; originally published in* Kinship and Continuity *(Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000).*
FIGURE 3. (RIGHT) *Typical two-bedroom English terrace house showing South Asian-influenced layout (upper-floor plan is on the right).*

A typical front room is furnished with bright fitted carpets, wall paper in a bold design, easy chairs or a sofa-set covered with vinyl or other shiny upholstery and decorated with hand embroidered cushions. . . . Hanging around the walls are several framed pictures depicting the name or sayings of the Prophet Mohammed embroidered in silver or gold sequins against a background of dark black cloth, sometimes the work of the daughter of the household. There are other pictures depicting pilgrims at the Ka'aba, the major shrine at Mecca.[54]

By contrast, the back room in a terrace house assumes the function of the rural South Asian courtyard. This is where children play and eat, and where women sew, iron, entertain female visitors, watch television, and supervise children reading the Qur'an. In the Victorian and Edwardian terraces, many South Asian families have built kitchen extensions to make sufficient space in this back area.

During a field visit in Birmingham, I was invited into a Muslim Indian home. The head of the household was a twice-displaced migrant from Tanzania, who had moved to Britain thirty years ago. A visual articulation of Muslim identity was immediately apparent on entry to the house. Both the front and back rooms were dominated by Qur'anic verses displayed in many forms on the walls and shelves. And there were prints, ornamental plates, religious words on art objects, an Islamic calendar, photographs of holy relics, and even a clock that chimed *"Allah Akbar"* ("God is Great") (**FIG.4**). These items were meaningful insomuch as they conveyed visual representations of the religious imagination. This imagination was also present in the home through programs on cable TV, and my host was keen to show me the Islamic news and cultural channels his family watched. He believed these channels allowed him to know what was happening in the Muslim world, despite the distance. "We also feel we have a strong kinship, religion-wise, with other Muslims," he told me.

The rooms of the house were also used for performing prayers, one of the principles of *ibadat* (religious ritual). Muslim ritual requires no special "sacred space," and can be practiced anywhere which is neat and clean. In fact, according to religious texts, praying in the house will bring it life and goodness.[55] But in accordance with prescribed ritual, prayer must be directed toward Mecca, or the *qibla*, and my host laid down a prayer rug to show me the orientation of prayer — which had no relation to the alignment of the walls. The practice of prayer thus embodied a connection that transcended the physical boundaries of the room, both spatially and in the religious imagination. And, in general, it was clear that the various methods of representing Muslim identity — whether spatial as in the practices of *purdah* or prayer, or visual and audible in the case of holy texts and television images — constitute the spaces of the Muslim South Asian home in ways that go beyond the materiality of space.

The physical constraints of terrace housing have, no doubt, transformed social practices such as *purdah* in Britain. But the terrace house has also been modified to make space for the larger-than-average Muslim South Asian household. In some cases, as in that of the Muslim Indian family above, one of the two bedrooms may be partitioned to preserve gender segregation among children. In other cases, the only solution to cramped conditions may be to extend to the rear and upward. The original extensions to Victorian terrace rowhouses were commonly simple one-story lean-tos. However, in Muslim South Asian neighborhoods larger, two-story extensions are now common, as well as attic and cellar conversions (**FIG.5**). Generally, since back yards have been built upon, in such settings social interaction must take place in the street (with *purdah* being observed through the use of the head scarf) — a pattern similar to that in the late Victorian city.

FIGURE 4. *The front room of a house in Birmingham. The photo shows several typical signs of Muslim identity: Qur'anic verses displayed on walls, ornaments, and a prayer mat oriented toward Mecca.*

FIGURE 5. *The terrace house has typically experienced expansion to the rear of the plot and in two-story extensions, as well as attic and cellar conversions.*

THE MOSQUE

Historically, the mosque has been the most important building in Muslim communities, providing a sense of identity and place both as a landmark and a space for congregation. In different urban contexts different types of mosques have emerged, from monumental landmark buildings to smaller neighborhood structures. Most are completely integrated into the townscape, and many have been associated with other community functions such as schools or orphanages, as well as with the provision of drinking water in public fountains.[56] In Britain, the mosque has taken on a similar role as a place of worship; but more importantly, it has also served as a focus for community and social welfare.

The development of the British mosque, both as a form of social organization and physical form, traces its origins to the time when the first single male Muslim settlers converted terrace houses for small heterogeneous congregations. However, the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the later arrival of families led to the establishment and differentiation of mosques along kin, ethnic, national and sectarian lines. Then, gradually, as congregations increased in size, space was also appropriated in redundant industrial-era buildings and imbued with new cultural and functional meanings. In the 1980s, a shift in multicultural policies to a more pluralistic model of welfare provision allowed Muslim communities to purpose-build places of worship, asserting a distinctly imported "Islamic" identity. However, institutional practices and policies governing religious expression have also produced a complex and uneven urban political geography in Britain, resulting in many sites of contestation and negotiation of cultural identity.[57]

In Islam, Friday communal prayer is held in higher esteem than prayer in the home.[58] In its simplest form, the mosque consists of a sanctuary in which the *qibla* is directed toward Mecca. Historically, specific forms of "sacred architecture" have been inherent in Islam as a symbolic expression of the faith. However, it was also common, as Islam spread, for Muslims to adapt other sacred locales as sites for communal prayer.[59] This propensity for spatial appropriation and adaptation reveals a certain fluid quality to the Muslim conception of sacred space. Indeed, it points to a certain independence of religious practice from physical form. This quality has provided an effective adaptation mechanism in new cultural contexts, enabling the appropriation of diverse building types for religious practice.

Such adaptability is demonstrated in the case of one of Bradford's first mosques, established by the Bengali Twaquila Islamic Society in 1968. Ethnic tensions during the 1960s had fragmented an initially cohesive Muslim community in the city, dividing it among a number of smaller community mosques. These were set up by Deobandi Pathan and Punjabis from Chhachh, Deobandi Gujeratis from Surat, Barelvi Jamiyyat Tabligh ul-Islam, and the Bengalis — factions that represented the different Muslim South Asian identities emerging within Bradford's cultural landscape.[60] In response to a growing congregation and a need to provide Islamic teaching to children, the Bengali Twaquila Islamic Society purchased two adjacent terrace houses on Cornwall Road and converted them into a house mosque. Barton has described how the layout of the houses was adapted:

> The houses are Victorian, with two rooms on the ground floor, two on the first, an attic and a cellar. The wall dividing the two dwellings has been retained, but the partitions within each house have been removed, thus creating two large rooms, with connecting doors, on the ground and first floors of the mosque. The front door of one house is the entrance. . . . The ground floor rooms are used for children's classes and for prayers when there is an overflow from the rooms above. . . . The first-floor rooms are used daily for prayers. . . . The walls are bare apart from one or two calendars, the timetable for daily prayers. . . . In the corner of the inner room stands a purely symbolic carpeted minbar [pulpit], of three steps, which is also the only indication of the qibla, the direction faced in prayer. . . . The cellar has been converted into a kitchen and place for performing wudu, the ablutions, before the prayers. There is a toilet outside, at the back of the building. The attics, comprising two bed-sitting rooms, and a small kitchen, are used as accommodation for the imam [leader in prayer] or others.[61]

These modifications of space stemmed foremost from the need to create a single large space for the congregation, but meanings were also inscribed into the space by changing its use and inserting traditional symbolic elements such as the pulpit and prayer niche. By modifying the traditional layout of the terrace house, Muslims were able to differentiate a space for themselves and their needs. But the conversion did not remain uncontested; indeed, strong opposition surfaced from neighbors and local authorities, resulting in the issuance of enforcement notices on grounds that the changes constituted a "material change of use" as set out in Town and Country Planning legislation, as well as a "loss of amenity" to neighbors.[62]

In general at that time, the antagonistic nature of interethnic relations had a direct influence on the outward expression of all appropriated buildings — residential or otherwise. Modifications were restrained to interiors, with no extravagant indications of use. Neither were religious symbols or motifs applied to buildings, except the odd banner or sign designed primarily to signify a place of worship to the faith community. Overall, the objective was to ensure each building was "undercommunicating" its function and blending in with its surroundings.

By the late 1970s, however, the constraints Muslim communities faced in catering to their religious needs were recognized by a number of city councils in Britain. In a welcome change of policy, several decided to permit house-

FIGURE 6. *Wimbledon Mosque, London, is a house-mosque whose facade has been completely remodeled.*

FIGURE 7. *Presbyterian Church of St. Andrew's, London, has been converted to a mosque, with adjacent facilities for ablution and a welfare center.*

mosque conversions.[63] By that time, growing congregations were also creating increasing pressure for extensions to such structures. And in some cases, planning authorities permitted extensions to be made to the rear of the properties, despite the substantial increase in densification.

More recently, the growing stature of mosque communities has prompted some to consider building new structures. And the shift in multicultural policy in the 1980s was also accompanied by a new assertiveness in the representation of Muslim identity. Purpose-built mosques are now designed to incorporate "Islamic" symbols such as domes, minarets and arches, and some house-mosques have undergone facade remodelings, as in the case of the Wimbledon Mosque (FIG.6). Many house-mosques today serve only as small-scale neighborhood mosques providing Qur'anic classes for children and adult training courses.[64]

The acute spatial constraints of the house-mosque also prompted some Muslim congregations to seek to convert more commodious buildings. In particular, a decline in industry and manufacturing in the face of modernization, coupled with increasing secularization of British society, had left many picturesque churches in working-class communities available for appropriation. Other building types, such as warehouses, schools, community halls, and even cinemas and clubs, were sometimes also suitable for conversion. For example, the Presbyterian Church of St. Andrew's (c.1920) on Ealing Road, London, was adapted for use as a mosque, with adjacent facilities for ablution and a welfare center (FIG.7). The original design of the church combined a domed bell tower with a gabled hall. Visually, the dome already connoted an "Orientalist" image, but a display of sacred texts above the main entrance and the addition of an arched portal further signified the building's new use. Internally, the main space did not conform with the basic requirement that prayers be conducted facing Mecca (the *qibla* orientation). Thus, worshippers were forced to form prayer lines at an oblique angle

to the walls (FIG.8). Throughout history, realignment of the *qibla* has been a common method of accommodating worship within the constraints of existing building traditions.

Of all these trends, the conversion of listed industrial buildings has created the greatest contention. Indeed, the adaptation of historical buildings has given rise to the politicization of heritage as a means of constructing and redefining "Britishness" and national identity.[65] In this regard, Muslims have often faced difficulties in Britain in regard to conservation laws that reinforce notions of "otherness." One example involves the conversion of an eighteenth-century Georgian building on Brick Lane, London, to a mosque. The building had been bought in the 1970s by a group of Bangladeshi businessmen of the Barelvi tradition. Although the mosque committee did little to change the exterior, substantial internal modifications were made to accommodate an additional six hundred worshippers. Eade has described the revival of nationalist sentiment by conservationist opposition in response to these changes, despite the fact that the

FIGURE 8. *Worshippers align themselves along prayer lines oblique to the walls to conform with the orientation toward Mecca.*

EAGLE STREET MOSQUE, COVENTRY - SEPT. '03   SCALE= 1:1000
COMPLETED 1969-70   ALTERATIONS CARRIED OUT IN 1973

FIGURE 10.   *Eagle Street Mosque, Coventry, is an example of a mosque constructed with a specific orientation toward Mecca. The building footprint was skewed within the plot. Drawing by Munir Ahmed.*

internal modifications did not require planning permission.[66] For many non-Muslims, the mosque conversion challenged the physical expression of a local English heritage exclusive of cultural differences.

Another good example of listed-building conversion can be found in Birmingham, where the Green Lane Mosque was established in a rundown Victorian public library and swimming bath. The building is a beautiful example of Birmingham's terracotta vernacular, and the clock tower serves as a powerful landmark, playing a similar role to the minaret (**FIG.9**). The only outward indication of its new use is a sign over the entrance displaying Qur'anic scripts. But the building was adapted in 1980 with the help of grants from Birmingham City Council, demonstrating how in the space of a decade, attitudes had begun to change toward religious communities. Today, the building serves as a community center, with a library, offices, prayer hall, school, and car park.

By contrast to these early efforts, the shift in multicultural discourses in the 1980s and the subsequent assertion of a Muslim South Asian identity has radically transformed Britain's cultural landscape.[67] After years of struggle to find government support for purpose-built mosques, a number of city councils and planning departments have begun to show interest in Muslim community schemes.[68] The result is an unprecedented increase in mosques with architectural styles drawn from a transnational flow of cultural symbols and images. The stylistic selection of these features by various Muslim South Asian groups reflect either a specific architectural sensibility drawn from the homeland, or a more general repertoire of "classical Islamic" motifs based on fictive Orientalist imagery.[69] Indeed, the dome, the arch, and the minaret are today being deployed as shorthand for the Muslim presence, reinforcing a vocabulary understood in the

West as representing Islam, and thus representing a specific identity. This outward symbolism has been reinforced by the distinctive orientation of these new mosques toward the *qibla*, which invariably involves a skewing of the building footprint in relation to nearby structures (**FIG.10**).

Britain's first purpose-built mosque was actually built in Woking in 1889 at a time when "exoticized" fads in architecture were being imported to the metropole. Known as the Shah Jehan Mosque, its design was also representative of an increasing infatuation with the mystique of the Orient.[70] Established as a place of worship for students of the Orient in the nearby college, it marked the first signification of a Muslim presence in Britain. Its simple geometric form is styled in Indo-Saracenic fashion, with a central arched portal and two smaller flanking doorways (**FIG.11**). The use of color, surface textures, and elements of decoration provide a sense of rich detail. And its four green *chhatri* (cupolas on white-columned turrets) representing miniature minarets, its parapet lined with distinct motifs, and a large green central dome give a further distinct identity.

Following World War II, however, the importation of Oriental exoticism was replaced by the importation of transnational culture by postcolonial peoples themselves. As part of this movement, the East London mosque was established by Bangladeshis of the Deobandi tradition in 1965. A financial

FIGURE 11. *The Shah Jehan Mosque, Surrey, the first purpose-built mosque in Britain, was styled in Indo-Saracenic fashion.*

contribution from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia covered more than half the £2,000,000 total cost of building the new center. According to Eade, the mosque established social relations with Muslim youth groups such as the Muslim Youth Organization, and international missionary organizations such as the Da'wat ul-Islam and Tablighi Jama'at.[71] These solidarities gave the mosque a range of cosmopolitan connections that had a profound influence on its architectural style (FIG.12). Indeed, its minaret resembles that of the holy Ka'aba in Mecca, and such other features as its dome, pointed arches and windows, and high portal may also be attributed to Middle Eastern architectural antecedents.

Despite the use of vernacular brick on its facades, these distinctive "Islamic" features also make claims on the public space.[72] And its claims are not just visual, but audible, since the broadcast of *azan* (or call to prayers) has sparked controversy over "noise pollution." However, such controversies have clearly been motivated by cultural exclusivism; among other things, they have highlighted challenges to other symbols, such as the ringing of church bells, as constructed representations of indigenous culture.[73]

By the 1990s, Muslims had made substantial inroads into the political arena, and had managed to establish better negotiating positions for their communities. This led to, among other things, new trends in mosque design. One interesting example is the Dar ul Uloom Islamia Mosque in Small Heath, Birmingham, which was established by a Pakistani Barelvi group to provide space for worship, education, youth training, a day center for the elderly, and an employment advisory center. Gale has shown that from its inception, the city council took a leadership role in co-opting this scheme.[74] Indeed, the city council decided to accord the building prominence and visibility, locating it at the corner of a major roundabout on the Small Heath bypass (FIG.13). In a further gesture of good will, the city council subsidized two-thirds of the cost of this site, in return for an understanding that the Muslim community would replace the 35 rundown council houses there with a landmark structure.

According to Gale, opposition by neighboring residents had little effect on the planning for, or design of, this structure.[75] However, the mosque's stylistic expression is highly ambivalent. On the one hand, the building has all the usual "Islamic" architectural imagery, even if it is difficult to trace their referents. But these reductionist, albeit imagined signifiers, are combined with local forms and materials to create a stylistic hybridity. In particular, the fusion of brickwork and slate roofing with an eclectic array of windows, domes, and a minaret represents what Gale and Naylor have called "stylistic domestication" — an aesthetic form that is not reducible to any particular tradition.[76]

Historically, the urban relationship between the mosque and the community has been one of physical as well as spiritual proximity. In an attempt to re-create this close interactive relationship, one Muslim group in London, the Dawoodi Bohras, fought for a plot of land large enough to accommo-

FIGURE 12. *East London Mosque, Tower Hamlets, uses an architectural style based on Middle Eastern models.*

FIGURE 13. *The Dar ul Uloom Al-Islamia, Birmingham, is situated in a prominent position on a major arterial route. It shows a stylistic hybridity of various "Islamic" symbols.*

FIGURE 14. *Mohammedi Park. The Dawoodi Bohras complex in London, showing gated-community housing, as well as religious/cultural building in the back.*

date their community and mosque. The Dawoodi Bohras are a small close-knit community belonging to a Shi'a sect whose heartland lies in Gujarat. Initially, they carried out their religious and cultural activities in a converted Jewish Youth Club in Boston Manor, which they named Mohammedi Park. However, the Bohra presence triggered a series of racist protests against noise and parking during religious celebrations.[77] And in a bid to resolve the dispute, the local authority offered to buy the site in Boston Manor in exchange for a more "appropriate" location. Eventually, the Bohras chose a derelict industrial site in Northolt, where they proposed to build a center for religious, educational and social functions, as well as number of houses.[78] Despite further opposition, the scheme was finally completed in the late 1990s and renamed Mohammedi Park (**FIG.14**).

Situated in a quiet industrial zone, the complex is gated to distinguish its boundaries. Two rows of terrace houses for families and members of the community line the edges of the site, constructed in a vernacular style, each with a small back yard. But the internal space of the block is arranged around a large central square which provides the setting for the mosque-cum-community center. The mosque building takes a more avant-garde design, exploring aspects of modern technology, materials, and abstraction as a means of reinterpreting various aesthetic themes. Overall, the mosque still communicates its function through reinterpretations of "Islamic" imagery and symbolism, but it also employs subtle abstraction to arrive at an innovative expression. The completion of this project was based on a vigorous fundraising campaign among Bohras across Britain. It is through such group initiatives that the spaces of industrial zones are being regenerated and transformed into places for a particular Muslim community.

THE HIGH STREET

A common morphological feature of all British towns and cities is the High Street, a major commercial thoroughfare connecting outlying neighborhoods to the city center. For the first Muslim South Asians settlers, the High Street was an important arena for preserving social ties, and for meeting and economic exchange. Indeed, the first South Asian-owned businesses on such streets were cafes — small shops run by members of the *biradari* that served traditional cuisine.[79] The early Muslim settlers were also concerned about being able to conform to dietary laws governing the preparation of meat, and this soon led to the development of grocer-cum-butcher shops selling *halal* products. Gradually, the major thoroughfares bisecting Muslim South Asian neighborhoods saw the displacement of traditional British High Street shops with South Asian-owned businesses, a process Loukaitou-Sideris has termed "ethnic gentrification."[80] Dahya has studied the initial stages of Manningham Lane's "ethnic gentrification" in Bradford:

> *In 1959 the only Pakistani-owned economic concerns were 2 grocery/butchery businesses and 3 cafés. By 1966, the number of Pakistani concerns had grown to 133, which included 51 grocers/butchers and 16 cafés. In 1970, there were over 260 immigrant-owned and -operated businesses, all of which were located in the areas of immigrant settlement. The number of food businesses, which includes 11 wholesale premises, 1 canning factory, 112 grocery and butchery businesses, 25 cafés, 15 private clubs, and 2 confectioners and bakers.[81]*

For the most part, these small businesses were run by family and kinship networks that catered to all aspects of Muslim and South Asian everyday life. Indeed, the transformation of the High Street created a vital and exciting focus of commercial and cultural life, representing both a Muslim and South Asian identity. Generally speaking, the services that emerged were of three types: local enterprises catering to specifically Muslim or South Asian traditions; businesses that served the wider South Asian population; and businesses that helped South Asians interact with mainstream British society. The creation of a Muslim South Asian commercial habitus — a distinctive service industry based on a distinctive clientele — has gradually transformed the character of these streets.

Typical is the transformation of Coventry Road in Birmingham. An archival photograph taken before large-scale migration in 1968, reveals the ordered relationship between the shop and street, and between private and public domains (**FIG.15**). The shopfronts also exhibit repetitive conventional features and motifs reflecting the uniformity of the Victorian era. When compared to a recent photograph, the shops on Coventry Road display a different sense of place and identity (**FIG.16**). Indeed, major South Asian High Streets tend to be teaming with people buying and selling their goods in the public space, and where elaborate window displays and tem-

FIGURE 15. *Coventry Road, Birmingham, in 1968. Photo courtesy of Birmingham Central Library Archive Unit.*

FIGURE 16. *Coventry Road, Birmingham, present-day view shows the changes in urban character.*

porary stalls compete with semi-permanent shopfront extensions (FIG.17). Signs and notices are in Urdu, Hindi and Gujarati, while colorful displays of saris and fabric shops, jewelers, and "*bhaija* houses" jostle with grocers selling tropical vegetables and exotic spices, bakeries, and shops selling Asian sweets. Meanwhile, interspersed among the accountants, income-tax consultants, importers and exporters, immigration and advisory bureaus, driving schools, insurance firms, real estate and travel agencies, are South Asian community organizations which act as community mediators.

For the most part, the buildings in such areas still proclaim their Victorian and Edwardian origins, but the ambience of the street is distinctly different from non-Asian areas, both visually and audibly. This suggests that the changing character of these commercial areas is the result of spatial and functional, rather than morphological, transformation. The existence of various shops for Muslims, and South Asians more generally, maintain the identity of these groups and meets the community's daily needs. But in the process of transformation, Muslim South Asians have established a secondary economic base in the city, successfully converting rundown buildings into marketable property, and so contributing to the overall urban regeneration of these areas.

In many British cities, the recent construction of a "Disneyfied" South Asian identity has also become a major aspect of efforts to create tourist enclaves. Thus, in seeking to produce a "city image" in the global marketplace, local authorities may market "cultural differentiation." But in connecting to many of these neighborhoods, ties stress consumption rather than production.

For example, Birmingham's Ladypool Road is today being promoted as the heart of the "Balti Triangle" — an exotic landscape of difference. On the city council's tourist website, the "Balti Triangle" boasts fifty "Balti houses" offering a distinct Pakistani and Kashmiri cuisine, as well as shops selling everything "exotic" from colorful saris to Balti cooking pots. As part of this effort, substantial funding has also been allocated to the

enhancement and "theming" of the streetscape to promote the area's South Asian image. Part of this place-making strategy has been to commission PRASADA (Practice, Research and Advancement in South Asian Art and Architecture) at De Montfort University, Leicester, to design the street furniture — lamps, benches, rubbish bins, bollards, etc. — to reproduce an essentialized "South Asian" aesthetic.

The result of this work has been a project based on the "repackaging of difference," structured by commercial interest and the need to present an attractive South Asian ambience. In the process of representing these areas as "exotic landscapes" of attraction, the council has wittingly opened these neighborhoods to a larger audience.[82]

OTHER SPACES

Several other spaces of Muslim South Asian habitus deserve brief mention to demonstrate the multiple and contingent forms of Muslim South Asian solidarities and their spatial occupation in British cities.

In the previous examples of mosques, it was shown how they often performed community as well as educational functions. In Birmingham, the Clifton Road Mosque follows this precedent. It occupies a large site in Sparkhill, with a complex consisting of a large hall for prayers and cultural activities, a small freestanding prayer hall conforming to the *qibla* direction, and a large school. The Sayeda Zainab School offers private education to Muslim students and youth training, alongside Arabic and Qur'anic classes. Although the school building is constructed in vernacular brickwork, its arched lintels frame standard windows, making subtle reference to the building's "Islamic" identity (FIG.18).

Besides private Muslim schools, there are also a small number of grant-maintained "Islamic" schools, such as the Islamia School in London, which follows the British curriculum and is subject to government inspection.

FIGURE 17.   *Ealing Road, London, is a major South Asian High Street. The photo shows the use of public space for shopfront extensions and the display of goods.*

FIGURE 18.   *Sayeda Zainab School and Clifton Road Mosque are purpose-built educational centers in Birmingham.*

Political and religious movements also create educational and political spaces. Most of these solidarities have strong transnational links that serve a number of purposes: to help secure global sources of funding for community institutions; to exercise a degree of political control over various groups; and to exchange information with other Islamic theological and educational institutions.[83]

Among these, the Tablighi Jama'at of the Deobandi tradition has a Center in Dewsbury known as Dar ul Ulum (House of Knowledge). Another of its educational centers is located in Bury, Lancashire. This organization serves as a center for Islamic learning and missionary activity.[84] The U.K. Islamic Mission has a more prominent political role. Its followers belong to a group called the Jama'at al-Islami, which has its own college and research center, the Islamic Foundation, in Leicester.[85] Administrative offices for many of these movements tend to be dispersed nationwide. For example, the philanthropic institution Islamic Relief has its headquarters in Birmingham. Islamic Relief plays a prominent role in the provision of clothes, food and medicine to Muslims in need worldwide, and occupies a large warehouse in an industrial zone close to the city center.

Finally, it is also important to consider the rituals and practices of burial which occur among the Muslim South-Asian population in Britain. According to religious texts, Muslims should be buried as soon as possible after death. But a series of rites, such as the cleansing and preparation of the body and ritual prayer, must take place before burial. Thus, funerary services create a religious space either within the mosque or specialized offices.

Space is also created in cemeteries. In the case of Birmingham, the city council has allocated space in Handsworth Cemetery where Muslims may lease land for graves. Prayers are usually undertaken close to the grave. The religious texts also indicate that the body should face Mecca, thus the graves have a distinct orientation that distinguishes them from their non-Muslim counterparts. The use of Qur'anic scriptures on the tombstones also indicates Muslim identity.

AN ADAPTABLE TRADITION

This article has argued that Islam, as a global cultural paradigm, is sufficiently mobile to adapt to contemporary conditions of "displacement" experienced by Muslim South Asians in Britain. Islam has been able to culturally reproduce itself through the construction of new social relations and everyday practices. Indeed, Muslim South Asians have reterritorialized substantial spaces within British neighborhoods — homes, mosques, the High Street, and other spaces.

As part of the place-making process, these new forms of spatialized social relations and practices have been translated into a distinctly Muslim identity constructed in inherently contested contexts. This does not mean that Muslim identity is monolithic. Rather, identity has taken on multiple forms contingent on finer divisions within the Muslim community, local conditions, and regimes of power. Indeed, in Britain, Muslim identity has partly been constructed as a means of resisting the ideological framework of multiculturalism, which attempts to homogenize cultural difference.

In their representation of Muslim identity, South Asians have drawn inspiration from transnational imaginings in which cultural flows of "Islamic" idiom and symbolism have been reemployed as markers of Muslim presence. And the places they have created are the result of the ongoing dialogue between the cultural norms of the Muslim community and British built form. In whichever ways places have been made, Muslims have ensured that, as a community, their needs are being met. This extensive degree of self-sufficiency has been a way of re-creating a place for themselves, on their own terms.

In this new place, by their own actions and decisions, Muslims are setting new precedents, as they project an agency of their own design, reshaping parts of the city into novel and heterogeneous communities.

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Mosques, Temples, and Orientalists: Hegemonic Imaginations in Banaras

MADHURI DESAI

In a climate of rising religious fundamentalism, it is relevant and pertinent to examine the processes by which a "religious" site is created. My general premise is that historical narratives are negotiations, rather than simple renditions of fact, and thus are always reflective of their authors' contemporary politics. Within this framework, this essay explores the processes through which the city of Banaras has been created and represented as an indisputably Hindu city. In addition to the revivalist religious agenda of the Marathas, this process has involved the hegemonic imaginations of both nineteenth-century colonial Orientalists and modern-day postcolonial nationalists.

Usually described as a Hindu pilgrimage city of riverfront temples, Banaras, India, has long been thought of as a central regenerative source for Hindu tradition and cultural continuity. This image has persisted despite glaring evidence of an Islamic presence in the city in the form of prominent mosques, urban institutions, and a substantial Muslim population.

Even the most vociferous defenders of Banaras's antiquity as a Hindu site admit that in terms of built fabric, the contemporary city is largely an eighteenth-century creation. Thus, the present Vishwanath temple, its preeminent shrine, was only built in 1777, and no building can be dated earlier than the sixteenth century. How then, does an image of a Banaras of hoary antiquity persist?

As this essay will demonstrate, Banaras was re-created as a site of Hindu pilgrimage, and this remaking occurred within the framework of a revivalist religious agenda. In a climate of rising religious fundamentalism, it is relevant and pertinent to examine the processes by which a "religious" site is created. My larger premise, however, is that historical narratives are negotiations rather than simple renditions of fact, and thus reflect their authors' contemporary politics. As Elizabeth Ermarth has pointed out, we can never actually re-create the past; all we can know are representations of it.[1]

In keeping with this understanding, this article presents a historical narrative of the processes of Banaras's creation and representation that is unquestionably colored by my own

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political concerns. Key among these is my belief that hegemonic consciousness inevitably colors interpretations of historical events and their spatial and territorial manifestations. The term hegemony is often used to imply the dominance of one social class or group over another through the use of ideology.[2] This implies one group's ability to project a worldview that subordinated people's accept as "common sense" within a framework of consent. It is within such a framework that Banaras has been created and represented as a Hindu city.

HIDDEN HISTORIES

On my third visit to the Alamo in San Antonio, I was stunned to hear that the United States (or rather the Nation of Texas) had lost the battle there in 1836. On reflection, I realized that accounts of the event never explicitly claimed a Texan victory. Films, books, and oral accounts referred to "the struggle for freedom," but never made clear mention of who won and who lost. Of course, for most people familiar with the story the outcome may be largely irrelevant — it was the fight that mattered. Yet perhaps more significantly, as someone accustomed to American global hegemony, I simply assumed (quite naturally, I thought) that the Texans must have been the victors.

The point of this anecdote is that history entails a selective retelling of the past. And since our expectations in this process often reflect contemporary realities, no historical narrative can provide an unbiased lens. Growing up in a Hindu household in urban India, I experienced this lesson firsthand with reference to Banaras. During those years, I often heard stories of a mosque immediately adjacent to the Kashi Vishwanath temple, the holiest of holy Shaivite shrines in the city. Its presence, I was told, was related to Islam's historic triumph over Hinduism on the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, the mosque provided a conclusion of sorts to a narration of invasion, desecration, destruction, and plunder that began with raids by Mohammed of Ghazni in the eleventh century CE.

But these were stories told and retold to a child. They would never have made their way into an official textbook. In the climate of state-sponsored secularism in the 1970s, my history texts were concerned with a rhetoric of "unity in diversity." They glorified the achievements of Hindu dynasties, followed in chronological order by the achievements of Muslim dynasties: according to the official recounting, there was no overlap or conflict. Of course, my classmates and I were very conscious of what was being left unsaid. But the idealist in me preferred the textbook version — even though, like others, I felt the seductive pull of alternate narrations.

Representations of the city of Benaras are deeply implicated in this symbolic agenda. My earliest image of Banaras is of a poster issued by the Indian government's tourism department. It depicted the riverfront, with its ghats, palaces and temples, and beneath was a caption that read simply

"India." This is the enduring image of the city — a metonym for the "eternal" India of deep spiritual traditions.

In hindsight, I now see this poster as just one of a series of pictorial and textual representations of the city that reiterated a view of the city's exclusively Hindu character. And along with my history text, it was another aspect of a government-approved image for the nation that stressed a benign Hindu hegemony. Although "diversity" could be Muslim, "unity" in the end was almost always a grid defined by Hinduism. In this equation, Banaras was undisputedly Hindu.

Despite these reassuring representations, the anecdotes of siege and salvage heard in childhood persisted, and they became real whenever religious riots broke out. Finally, in December of 1992, when a mob of Hindu fundamentalists destroyed the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, the stories became for me the stuff of realpolitik. The religious conflict in Ayodhya forever disturbed the Banaras of picturesque imagery.

The most clearly identifiable structures in any aerial view of Banaras are the Gyan Vapi and Alamgiri mosques. From the air, it is also clear that each is situated adjacent to a significant Hindu temple. The Alamgiri mosque is adjacent to the Bindu Madhav temple, while the Gyan Vapi mosque is adjacent to the Vishwanath temple (FIG.1). Police contingents guard three of these religious sites, and photography is banned at the Gyan Vapi/Vishwanath temple precincts.[3]

On a visit to the city in December 2002, I became acquainted with Musa, a Muslim man, thirty years old and a weaver by profession.[4] His family was in the silk brocade trade and manufactured the Banarasi sarees that were so prized by my family. On one occasion I asked Musa to take me to the Gyan Vapi mosque. Entry into the mosque precinct is restricted, and I hoped Musa could help me get inside. When the police stopped us, the inspector on duty was very polite, but he refused to allow me to enter the mosque, or to take photographs of its exterior. However, Musa left abruptly. Later he confessed that, dressed as he had been in "traditional" garb, he felt marked as a Muslim male and vulnerable to police brutality. He was well aware how quickly rival claims to space could erupt through and disturb the city's spiritual theater.

I was interested in the Gyan Vapi mosque because it is one of the few unobliterated markers of Islamic presence in Banaras. As mentioned already, it is located immediately adjacent to the Vishwanath temple. The temple was built in 1776, long after construction of the mosque. Nevertheless, its activities and institutions occupy the area immediately around the two precincts. But I was also aware this hidden history of conflict is two-sided. At the rear of the mosque is a carved masonry wall reputed to be a remnant of an earlier version of the Vishwanath shrine. Most historical accounts credit the mosque's construction to the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, who was also responsible for the destruction of the older Vishwanath temple.

The other great remaining Muslim shrine in Banaras is the Alamgiri mosque. Today it is a "protected monument,"

under jurisdiction of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI). Among other things, the ASI has prescribed norms for the repair and preservation of such monuments, and these include a list of do's and don'ts that take precedence over the tastes and preferences of local community management agencies such as *waqf*s or temple trusts.[5]

At the time of my visit there, the caretaker of the Alamgiri mosque, an ASI functionary and a Hindu, recounted its "authentic" history. Then, he told me that the imam of the mosque had wished to renovate the gateway of the precinct, but had been prevented from doing so by the ASI. The reason was that that imam's choice of form and materials did not meet the stylistic standards and preservation norms set by the ASI. "Why then," the functionary asked, "do they [the ASI] not reveal the temple columns under the northern dome? That's the truly authentic structure under there." He was referring of course, to the Bindu Madhav temple that had once occupied the site. In most versions, this temple had also been destroyed by Aurangzeb (also known as Badshah Alamgir), who had sponsored construction of the mosque that bears his name in its place. This incident condensed for me a range of conflicting claims over buildings and space that coalesce around Hindu Banaras and its invented traditions. In order to salvage the Hindu city, it was necessary to obliterate Muslim Banaras. And in order to represent it as an eternally Hindu city, a hoary tradition had to be invented for it.

The principal patrons of the city's eighteenth-century rebuilding were the Marathas. A federation of oligarchies from central India, they established their influence over large parts of northern India following the decline of the Mughal empire. Among other things, the Marathas were interested in rebuilding centers of pilgrimage in the north. In Banaras, they built temples and ghats, sponsored religious and educational institutions, and began to resettle Brahmins from the Maratha country there (**FIG.2**). However, rebuilding the city not only involved the construction of new temples, but the continuing refurbishment of older ones and the provision of financial endowments for temples and *brahmapuris* (residential enclaves for priests). And eventually this newly invigorated tradition of patronage was taken up by other north-Indian Hindu elites, and persisted even after political authority passed to the British toward the end of the eighteenth century (**FIG.3**).[6]

This process of rebuilding corresponded to the propagation of the notion of a sacred Hindu Banaras through a series of spatial and textual productions. In this sense, it is important to recall how Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger have defined invented traditions as symbolic practices, governed by certain norms, that automatically imply continuity with the past.[7] In the case of Banaras, these "invented traditions" encompassed aspects of both the local built environment and native textual representation. However, given the political scenario on the Indian subcontinent from the late eighteenth

century onward, they also became entangled with an Orientalist project of colonial origin concerned with producing a "pure" Banaras of indisputably Hindu antecedents.

As I shall describe, these notions of the city continue to be reiterated today through processes of representation, salvage, obliteration and reinvention. These three categories are by no means exclusive of each other; indeed, they are inevitably intertwined. Yet each of these processes takes on a specific complexion in the case of Banaras that is both textual and spatial.

Today, although the politics of spatial representation reflect the changed dynamics of postcolonial India, it remains important to represent the site as Hindu. And in order to do so, alternate identities must still be obliterated. Thus, the story of Hindu Banaras is best understood as one of continuous remaking, which is only partly indebted to contemporary imaginations.

SPACES OF SIGNIFICANCE

Banaras is the name used in common parlance for the city (also known as Kashi and Varanasi) that is located along the north bank of the Ganges river.[8] The city is called Kashi in almost all Hindu scriptural references. In mythological terms, Kashi is associated with the deity Shiva, and within the Hindu religious tradition, it is the place where people come to die, since dying at this site ensures spiritual salvation. It is also a site for Hindus to venerate the dead.

The ghats of Banaras are central to its religious life. These are defined segments of river frontage between thirty and two hundred yards in length. Most have been constructed as a series of stone terraces and stairs running down into the Ganges, and several are important places of pilgrimage. In the city's creation myth, Shiva, the material form of an immaterial Brahma, together with his female consort Parvati, created the sacred area of Banaras. Shiva then created Vishnu, and the austerities that Vishnu performed by the side of the Manikarnika ghat were instrumental in creating the universe (**FIG.4**).[9] This ghat is one of two preeminent cremation grounds in the city, as well as the mythical center of its creation.[10]

The city has an intimate relationship with the river, and many volumes have been published detailing the place of the city and the river in Hindu myth and religion.[11] While a larger discussion of this subject is outside the purview of this essay, it is important to mention that the city's relationship to the river figures repeatedly in the processes of representation, obliteration, salvage and reinvention by which its contemporary meaning has been created. In particular, claims for the antiquity of the city draw great veracity from the presence of the river. Quite simply, it is easy to conclude that since the river must have always been here, so too must have been the city. Most visual representations of the city are also given from the river, allowing the river and the city to be further entwined in the symbolic imagination.

Away from the river's edge, however, other significant spaces involve the juxtaposition of temple and mosque. As mentioned already, the Vishwanath temple is located immediately adjacent to the Gyan Vapi mosque, and the Alamgiri mosque is adjacent to the Bindu Madhav temple. Such a geography lends credence to narratives of obliteration, and

FIGURE. 4. *Manikarnika ghat. This is the main cremation ghat in Banaras.*

legitimizes efforts at salvage. Most importantly, authorities contend that the Gyan Vapi mosque obliterated an earlier version of the Vishwanath temple on its present site. And other accounts argue that the mosque of Razia Bibi occupies the site of an even earlier version of this shrine. This would lead one to believe that the preeminent Hindu shrine in the city has been built at least three times. And religious and educational institutions, such as monasteries and schools, further influence the public sphere in Banaras, and help create and maintain a climate of Hindu hegemony in which such narratives can gain prominence.

THE HEGEMONIC IMAGINATION

Hegemonic claims in Banaras are inevitably spatial, since all efforts to reinvent its cultural significance must be corroborated in spatial form. While I do not intend to sideline the importance of Banaras within Hindu religious practice, I do intend to deconstruct the process by which it has been made into a preeminent Hindu site. Hegemony is completely successful only when it seems to make sense. And, as Robert Bocock has suggested, in order to be successful, a hegemonic viewpoint must encompass an entire worldview, with its attendant philosophy and morality.[12]

In Hindu Banaras such a hegemonic climate must be examined in the context both of colonial preoccupations and the rhetoric of the independent Indian nation-state. Thus, Ronald Inden has suggested that present knowledge and representation of the people and institutions of the Indian subcontinent are largely based upon the West's fantasies about its own rationality. Toward this end, depictions of India as a civilization of caste, villages, spiritualism, and divine kingship have persisted within a larger Orientalist framework.[13] Colonial narratives of Banaras were typical of the origins of such attitudes, stressing a notion of timelessness. Such notions have operated broadly within the overall framework of Orientalism. But I am more narrowly interested in specific ways they have been applied to the Indian subcontinent, and especially to the domain of Hinduism.[14] As Bernard Cohn has demonstrated, colonial scholarship also conceptualized India through the creation of simplified categories, setting up dichotomous oppositions between religious and social groups.[15] Consequently, along with various other social and religious formations, aspects of the Indian built environment were catalogued as either "Hindu" or "Islamic."

Postcolonial nationalism may also be understood as a hegemonic project. In the case of the independent Indian state, this has involved espousal of what Ayesha Jalal has called "cultural normalization," where the state is required to be impartial to differences of race, language, religion and caste.[16] As Jalal also pointed out, this rhetoric of "inclusionary nationalism" and "equal citizenship" is often accompanied by an unwillingness to deal with the realities of religious difference.[17]

Historically, as Partha Chatterjee demonstrated with reference to the independence movement in Bengal, hegemonic nationalisms are usually concerned with the worldview of a dominant group. Thus, "anticolonial nationalism," created a sovereign domain of its own before engaging the colonial power in nationalist battle.[18]

Colonized societies often also conceived of their world as divided between material "outer," and spiritual or "inner" domain.[19] The outer sphere was where the West dominated; and it was here that it was to be emulated in terms of technology, economy, and administrative skills. By contrast, the inner domain was spiritual, defined by one's cultural identity. And in the context of a hegemonic emergent Indian nationalism, this was defined as Hindu. However, as the nation became more successful in the outer domain, it became urgent to reinforce and protect this inner domain. And, in a sense, the drive to represent Banaras as a site of unalloyed Hindu spirituality came to symbolize this effort.

REPRESENTATION

By the process of representation, I mean the modes and narratives through which a status of antiquity has been consistently maintained for Banaras. Rob Shields has suggested that all urban representations are "souvenirs" that stand for the city itself. Rather than any real social exchange, all representations of cities displace the city so that one is left to deal with a "surrogate level of signs." Shields goes on to say:

> . . . this is true whatever one's theoretical position on whether it makes sense to talk of an objective, pre-representational "reality." Representations tend to follow the formula of telling us "what is really happening." This process can become so complete that quite different representations of a given set of events and experiences are possible, especially when based on wider, culturally different, systems of representation.[20]

The act of representation is carried out through texts, and as Roland Barthes has suggested, all texts are derived from other texts to the extent that there is no "originality," but only "intertextuality."[21] In other words, while interpreting a text, a person is dependent on previous knowledge and conditioning, which in turn is derived from other texts. For Banaras, such textual representations range from scholarly works to coffee-table publications and tourist guides. The myth of Hindu antiquity has also been perpetuated through oral narratives. And recently these narratives have been corroborated by a number of scholarly works that cite Sanskrit texts, especially *puranic* sources.

Following Barthes, Trevor Barnes and James Duncan argued that all representations are mediated by existing theories, perceptions, and cultural information.[22] And they sug-

gested an expanded notion of the text that included a wide range of cultural productions — including paintings and maps to represent the landscape.[23] Barthes himself privileged the image over the text, and wrote about how the photograph is the only uncoded message, able to communicate objects "as they really are" without the aid of another code, such as a language.[24] In this regard, Banaras has indeed been well represented in the West through visual media. But as various scholars have demonstrated, colonialism involved both the control of territory and the control of categories and meanings. And the photographic image, in particular, was a powerful tool to both document and categorize.[25] Thus, colonial images of Banaras cannot be seen as independent of a larger intent, the "text" of colonialism.

As already mentioned, colonial representations were embedded in colonial investigative practices on the Indian subcontinent. These included the establishment of disciplines such as historiography and museology. Colonial scholarship had a marked preference for Sanskrit, and in order to facilitate these investigations, scholars read Sanskrit texts such as the *Kashi Khanda,* the *Khashi Kedar Mahatmya,* and the *Kashi Rahasya,* in addition to gleaning information from Brahmins. This information was then compiled and catalogued, reflecting the colonial anxiety to preserve the subcontinent's "timeless" traditions. The Brahmin's ability to translate was viewed as the appropriate modus through which this "epistemological space" of unequivocal difference could initially be comprehended.[26] But by learning classical and vernacular Indian languages for themselves, the British hoped to make their own classifications and categorizations of this new territorial and epistemological space, so that it could be controlled.

The chroniclers who accompanied the East India Company were also in search of "authentic" traditions. In the colonial mind, such authenticity was defined as "Hindu," and its elements had to be disentangled from layers of Muslim (i.e., foreign and "inauthentic") domination.[27] In their eagerness to produce authentic visual representations of the Indian subcontinent, the British used first painting and then photography.[28]

By established Banaras as authentically Hindu, the city could also be inscribed within a frame of the traditional. As Nezar AlSayyad has suggested, all such efforts are ultimately flawed and inauthentic, since there is never any conjunction between tradition and authenticity.[29] The rubric of the traditional implies a condition of stasis, and it is this very assumption that is inauthentic. Thus, a search for authenticity will always be nostalgic, and in turn propel the production of tradition. When tradition is produced in this way, however, the effect is to aestheticize a site by glossing over any real conflict that may be present.[30] Thus, in their efforts to create authentic representations of Hindu traditions, colonial representations of the city simultaneously rendered it both static and Hindu.

REPRESENTING THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

Paintings of the riverfront such as those by William and Thomas Daniells and those that are included in James Prinsep's *Benares Illustrated* are instances of such representations (**FIG.5**). Prinsep, who arrived in Banaras in 1820, had been trained as an architect, and within a year he had conducted a detailed survey of the city and made drawings of a number of buildings.[31] Based on his surveys, he then created a map of the city. Prinsep was very conscious that he was engaged in a unique task, "a work never yet undertaken." His emphasis was on the "accuracy" of his task, a preoccupation of the Enlightenment European scholar. He also conducted a census of the city — its people and buildings — as well as a catalogue of castes and trades.[32] For Prinsep, Banaras was a repository of both Hindu learning and superstition.[33] His work drew upon selective indigenous interpretations, but was colored by a colonial insistence on authenticity and timelessness.

European paintings of eighteenth-century Banaras by English artists like Daniells depicted picturesque scenes inspired by a pastoral aesthetic. Prinsep was not happy with such representations. For him, Daniells's illustrations were "detached" and failed to "satisfy curiosity regarding a place which exhibits a larger remnant of the external characteristics of Hindoo taste and habits, than is to be met with in any other Eastern city within the pale of British dominion."[34]

In *Benares Illustrated* Prinsep continually reiterated Banaras's "Hindu" character. The buildings illustrated are usually temples, ghats, and the mansions of prominent merchants. By contrast, its two principal mosques found their way into the illustrations only as ruined temples or scenic backdrops. Thus, Prinsep illustrated only the rear of the Gyan Vapi mosque, and captioned it the old "Vishveshvur."

FIGURE. 5. *Prinsep's depiction of Dashashwamedha ghat. Reproduced as "Dusaswumedh Ghat Benaras," in* Benares Illustrated by James Prinsep *(Varanasi: Vishwavidyalaya Prakashan, 1996), p.84.*

Antiquarians will be well pleased that the Moosulmans, in their zeal for the triumph of their own religion, discovering a method of converting the original structure into a capacious Musjid, *without destroying above one half of its walls; so that not only the ground plan, but the entire architectural elevation, may still be traced out.[35]*

As part of his *Illustrations,* Prinsep published a drawing of this mosque/temple. It was accompanied by a reconstructed plan captioned "Plan of the Ancient Temple of Vishveshwur." On this drawing, the outline of the Alamgiri mosque on the site is demarcated as a dotted line, a representation that had the effect of rendering its very presence illicit (FIG.6).

The other prominent mosque in the city, the Alamgiri, received a slightly different treatment: it only appeared in illustration of a ghat that adjoined it, with a caption that read "Madhoray ghat and the minarets at Banaras." Speaking of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, Prinsep added:

The imperial zealot, not satisfied with triumphing over the religion of the Hindoos, chose a method of perpetuating the insult most offensive to their habits and feelings, by carrying his minarets to such a height as to overlook the privacy of their houses, the upper apartments and terraced roofs of which are always tenanted by the females of the family.[36]


FIGURE. 6. *Prinsep's drawing of the "Ancient temple of Vishweshvur," based on the remnants on the site of the Gyan Vapi mosque. Reproduced as "Plan of the Old Vishveshvur Temple," in* Benares Illustrated *by James Prinsep (Varanasi: Vishwavidyalaya Prakashan, 1996), p.68.*

In the manner of other colonial surveyors, Prinsep consistently sought to negate the Muslim presence in Banaras and to view it as illicit. What was at issue for him was not discovering whether or not Aurangzeb was a zealot who may have destroyed temples in the city. Rather, his representations embodied a colonial historiographical tradition that used architecture to render this story without critical investigation.

Anthony King has drawn attention to the inherent tension between discursive representations of cities and their actual spatial and material forms.[37] He implied that aspects of built form, such as architectural style, are themselves a layer of symbolic representation in the city. Thus, built form may be both a vehicle for symbolic representations and a spatial representation of social discourse. And together, they are a prerequisite for the mental constructs that eventually represent the city.[38]

I must emphasize though that by themselves the temples or mosques of Benaras do not indicate one or the other kind of identity. Nevertheless, colonial narratives were preoccupied with separating Hindu Banaras from any Muslim accretions, and so they reiterated the presence of a Hindu city that was continually under siege. Thus, for Banaras to be a "Hindu" city, all its "Muslim" elements had to be carefully filtered out. Such representations continue to influence contemporary accounts of the city. In publications ranging from coffee-table books to those of a more scholarly variety, Banaras is consistently depicted as the epitome of a timeless Indian (read Hindu) culture.[39]

One reason for separating and categorizing was that the image of order that was colonialism needed the specter of chaotic communalism. Thus, when Prinsep does mention the festival of "Mohurrum," he also points to a single incident of violence between groups of Hindus and Muslims that occurred on that occasion in 1805 (FIG.7). And he credits "the judicious intervention of Mr. W.W. Bird, then Magistrate, and the really docile and submissive temper of the Hindoos," with the aversion of further violence.[40] As Gyanendra Pandey has pointed out, to the colonial authorities communalism was conceived as a state of chaos that was only averted by the civilizing intervention of colonial authority. Communalism was therefore the opposite of colonialism.[41]

TEXTUAL REPRESENTATIONS

Representations by Hindu revivalists were influenced by a desire to read antiquity into texts on Banaras. In particular, the *Kashi Mahatmya* and the *Kashi Khand* were used as prime sources to establish an ancient story for Banaras. In these texts the city is envisioned beyond the normal processes of decay and destruction.[42] The *Kashi Khand* is the most elaborate eulogizing text for the city, and provides its creation myth. However, it was only put together in its current form around the mid-fourteenth century — after the first Muslim

OBLITERATION/SALVAGE

The act of salvage cannot occur without a litany of obliteration, and all accounts of obliteration are themselves representations. Such tales of obliteration in Banaras's case appear at many scales and in many guises. Most important, however, is the litany of destruction and rebuilding centered on the Vishwanath temple. It reveals that the notion of a Hindu city has now become so entrenched that contemporary mosque sites are accepted as previous sites of the Vishwanath temple (FIG.8).

By most accounts, the temple was first destroyed in 1194, and the mosque of Razia Bibi is now accepted to occupy that original site.[48] The temple was consequently rebuilt, but again destroyed in the sixteenth century. The culprit for this event is now identified as the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, credited both

invasion.[43] As Diana Eck has suggested, these texts may have become popular precisely because of the nostalgia they evoked for an earlier age.[44] Indeed, many of the texts that detail the city's antiquity were composed after Muhammad Ghuri's invasion of the city and the first reported destruction of the Vishwanath temple in 1194.[45] Vasudha Dalmia has also suggested a nostalgic interpretation for such texts. Specifically, he has pointed out that the textual presence of Banaras became stronger in the presence of successive Islamic invasions — and, consequently, of dwindling support for Hindu religious institutions there.[46]

A similar process took place with regard to narratives of Malaysian history. Ziauddin Sardar has suggested that a compartmentalized history of Malaysia was only invented to serve the purposes of European imperialism. Thus, the history of "Malaysia" was periodized and placed within the larger hegemonic grid of European history, and the very existence of Malaysia was predicated on Europe's knowledge about it. According to Sardar, the *Sejarah Malayu*, "the ancient chronicles of the Malays . . . a riproaring narration, full of adventure, history, myth, migration, poetry and wordplay, where people experience migration, uprooting, disjuncture and metamorphosis" is therefore "both fiction and history," and does not mention dates or time periods. Although the *Sejarah Malayu* does refer to the past, it remains "preoccupied with its own concerns."[47]

Rather than speaking in terms of linear colonial histories versus mythical indigenous accounts, I would suggest that all narrations about the past are preoccupied with their own concerns. A text such as the *Kashi Khand* is as concerned with projecting its worldview as any colonial narrative.

FIGURE. 8.   *Hindu sacred sites in Banaras. Courtesy of S. Freitag, "Introduction to Part I: Performance and Patronage," in* Culture and Power in Banaras: Community, Performance, and Environment, 1800–1980 *(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p.24.*

with destroying the Vishwanath and Bindu Madhav temples and with raising the Gyan Vapi and Alamgir mosques on their sites. Meanwhile, periods of peace and rebuilding in the city have interestingly been attributed to Akbar, the Mughal emperor cited for his eclectic religious beliefs and sense of tolerance.[49]

Even though patronage of Hindu shrines actually continued during Aurangzeb's reign, and a Rajput, Jaisingh-sponsored reconstruction of the Bindu Madhav temple took place at the time, the dominant narrative is one of obliteration.[50] Accounts of destruction and rebuilding coexist in Banaras with mythical accounts of the continuous presence of its sacred geography. Thus, accounts of obliteration are always accompanied by a rhetoric of salvage. For example, in *Benares: City of Light*, Eck recently recounted the events that established a Muslim presence in the city. But her principal preoccupation remained uncovering a sacred, mythical Hindu geography.

Colonial travelers who visited Banaras had interpreted the city as exclusively Hindu. For them, any Muslim characteristics were merely tangential to the city's essential identity as the preeminent site of the Hindu religion. In James Prinsep's words:

> The Musselmans apparently form but one-fifth of the population, and are not more numerous than the Brahmans alone; very few of them reside within the City, properly so-called, which is almost exclusively Hindu.[51]

In their self-styled role as preservers of Indian heritage, the British took over the task of patronizing Brahmin learning, and established the Banaras Sanskrit College in 1791.[52] Thus, Prinsep could lament the decline of patronage in the form of "stipends from Rajas and men of rank." Along with "the great success of the new colleges in Calcutta, in which the study of European literature is united with that of India," he claimed this would spell the decline of this "alma mater of rigid Hindooism."[53]

These efforts at salvage have inevitably been colored with the rhetoric of scientific investigation and reasoning. The result is often a project of reading history into traditional texts. For instance, Nicholas Dirks believes that "fanciful texts" do identify key elements of political action and signify moments in indigenous thought about the past, and that the religious and the political cannot be separated. Dirks's statements challenge those who would completely dismiss texts such as the *Kashi Khand*. However, establishing the veracity of these texts (or even dismissing them for that matter) should be understood as a political act. If myth is to be seen as part of "historiographic possibility and a distinctive way of establishing sequence and relevance in the understanding and representation of the past," then at the very least, the memory of Banaras' mythical past has informed much of its remaking.[54]

Romila Thapar has also suggested that a closer examination of traditional texts (and the *Kashi Khand* may be included in this category) may reveal what she has termed "embedded histories."[55] In her words,

> . . . each version of the past which has been deliberately transmitted has significance for the present, and this accounts for its legitimacy and continuity. The record may be one in which historical consciousness is embedded: as in myth, epic and genealogy; or alternatively it may refer to the more externalized forms: chronicles of families, institutions and regions, and biographies of persons in authority.[56]

Thapar has examined embedded histories in what have previously been seen as mythical texts: the *itihasa-puranas* (chronicles of dynasties and caste groups), the *vamsacharitas* (lineage stories), and *gathas* (epic poems). She also sees the *puranas* as depicting a worldview that linked the past and the present.[57] In addition, Thapar has suggested that several religious sects used historically phrased arguments in support of origin stories in the context of competition for patronage. Thapar sees both an embedded history as well as a historical consciousness that is expressed as "externalized history" in many of these texts.

I see this project as being part of the larger theme of salvage. A nation-state must have a history, and in the absence of clearly recognizable historical literary forms, such "embedded" forms may be discovered in quasi-historical texts. The issue again is not whether Banaras does or does not have a history. Indeed, arguments could be made to prove or disprove either viewpoint. What is interesting is that establishment of Banaras as a Hindu city occurred at the intersection of nationalist motivations that sought "history" in traditional texts, and revivalist and Orientalist agendas that use these same texts to establish the city's mythical origins.[58]

However, all such attempts to use traditional texts to establish Banaras as an ancient Hindu site collide with the reality on the ground. Whatever the reasons for their being, the Gyan Vapi mosque, the Alamgiri mosque, and the new temples erected in their vicinity form zones of tension. These spatial contestations coalesce in particular around the Vishwanath temple/Gyan Vapi mosque. And both mosque and temple precincts are under police guard so that entry to the mosque is only permitted during prayer time. Meanwhile, the preservation discourse has taken a particularly poignant turn with regard to the Alamgiri mosque, where revivalist Hindu representations now underline much of the discourse around its religious significance.

REINVENTION

Reinvention has consistently been the means through which the Hindu essence of Banaras has been salvaged. While reinvention is implied in acts of representation and salvage, I am concerned here with the active creation and sponsorship of new buildings, spaces and activities that are deployed to claim Banaras as an indisputably Hindu site.

Ironically, the elites who financed the eighteenth-century rebuilding of the city were themselves implicated in the syn-

cretic culture of contemporary India. Maratha architecture relied on Mughal techniques and decorative devices derived from mosques and tombs. Architects studied the remains of past traditions, including the Yadava temples of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and married them to Mughal and Sultanate building traditions from the western Deccan (**FIG.9**).[59] And although their agenda was a revivalist one, the fulfillment of Hindu ritual requirements did not prevent Maratha architects from freely borrowing Mughal-style cusped arches, and reinventing them for application in temple colonnades, niches and spires (**FIG.10**).

If hegemony helps maintain Banaras in its status as a Hindu site, the hegemonic climate is reinforced through invented traditions. These are norms and practices that maintain an illusion of continuity with the past. Nezar AlSayyad has suggested that many "traditional" environments are such because they are intentionally presented for consumption by an increasingly global audience. Furthermore, such environments are often sites of ongoing conflict as well as sites where past conflicts are remembered.[60] Thus, far from being a benign act of commemoration, nostalgia is often used as a vehicle for establishing territorial claims.[61]

Thus, all acts of reinvention in Banaras are implicitly also acts of salvage. Indeed, reinvention in the arena of pub-

lic performance has had a powerful political history in Banaras (**FIG.11**). The Rajas of Banaras have been key players in this drama. Although this is a Shaivite city, they patronized Ramlila, a different deity in the Hindu pantheon. Philip Lutgendorf has suggested that the Banaras rulers actively patronized the Ram tradition because it was anchored in a tradition of divine kingship.[62] Since this was a newly created kingship (and since, as Cohn has suggested, the Rajas were placed in a political position of dependence on the Nawabs of Awadh), the need to project symbols of royal legitimacy was pressing.[63]

While the above example presupposes an overtly political motive, other instances of reinvention straddle the realm of the religious (read Hindu) and the secular. For the past three years, an organization called the Ganga Sewa Nidhi has orchestrated just such an invented tradition, the Ganga Aarti. The ritual, a *puja* or lustration ritual for the Ganga, occurs every evening on the riverbank, at the Dashashwamedha ghat. This is how a guidebook describes the ritual:

> *Every evening at five, a magical aarti is performed at Dashashwamedha Ghat. Halt your boat right at the steps for the best view. . . . To the chant of Sanskrit mantras, and the clash of cymbals and drums, the river is wor-*

FIGURE. 9. *One of the many temples in the city built and patronized by Hindu elites. This temple* shikhara *(tower) is built in the "Maratha" architectural style of the Deccan. Photo by author.*

FIGURE. 11. *Festival of Ganesh under Maratha patronage in Banaras. From L. Rousselet,* India and Its Native Princes, *as depicted in S. Freitag, "Introduction: The History and Political Economy of Banaras," in* Culture and Power in Banaras: Community, Performance, and Environment, 1800–1980 *(Berkeley: University of California, 1989), p.4.*

shipped with flowers, incense, sandalwood, milk and vermillion. First the blazing camphor lamp and then the many flamed aarti lamps are raised high and then arched back to the water, the dark river reflecting the golden flames as Ganga accepts the worship.[64]

The ritual is itself a visual spectacle that is meant to be viewed from a boat on the river. Six priests dressed in matching crimson dress stand in a row on raised platforms on the Dashashwamedha ghat. They conduct the ritual in synchronous motions, while music is played from a public address system. Although only three years old, the ritual is already being subtly touted as part of the eternal traditions of the city.

The ritual also marks an act of hegemonic representation. The Ganges is a symbol of the independent nation-state, and is mentioned in its national anthem. The *puja* itself is a Hindu form of worship, and when performed in Banaras marks veneration for the city and its religious traditions as well as the river itself. Thus, this reinvention is an act of Hindu hegemony that may be construed as homage to a secular symbol.

HEGEMONY REALIZED

Such constructions are particularly relevant in the context of the growing influence of Hindu nationalism (Hindutva). It is important to distinguish between inclusion-ary nationalism as expressed within a rhetoric of secularism and the concept of Hindutva. Hindu nationalists desire to create a disciplined national culture from what they claim to be a superior Hindu past. According to Thomas Hansen, Hindutva embodies a space of purity against the dual threats of Islamization and Westernization.[65] On the other hand, although the nationalism espoused by the independent Indian state does not claim adherence to any particular religious belief system, such an inclusionary ethos is uncomfortable with pronounced cultural or religious differences.[66] This discomfort with difference is often expressed in India in terms of a binary opposition between "secular nationalism" and "religious communalism."[67]

The common explanation for the destruction of temples by zealous Muslims rulers has been that mosques were used as instruments of spatial reinscription in the cause of religion. But Richard Eaton has suggested that such contestations were never religious alone, and he has proposed that Hindu temples were destroyed by Muslim rulers because they served as repositories of authority used to further their patrons' political ambitions. In destroying a Hindu temple, often a Muslim ruler was striking against potential political opposition, rather than striking a blow for a religious belief. Eaton has supported this argument by adding that since mosques were not invested with similar associations, Hindu rulers never destroyed them when they conquered Muslim territory.[68] Since temples were symbols of religious and political power, the "Muslim" Mughal state also often supported

temple institutions monetarily and politically, as well as through participation in, and active patronage of, religious events. In this vein, Eaton has suggested that the destruction of the Vishwanath temple by Aurangzeb in 1669 actually occurred in response to a rebellion against imperial authority led by Hindu Rajputs, the temple's patrons.

Eaton's article was published in a "liberal" Indian news magazine, *Frontline*. Yet, regardless of its well-intentioned motives, its arguments were still structured within an overarching atmosphere of Hindu hegemony. Nationalist Indian history treats the Mughals as an Indian dynasty, and claims their achievements as national achievements. Within such a narrative, the Mughals cannot be viewed as religious zealots out to destroy an "infidel" place of worship. Their motives in destroying a temple must be presented as political.

Local Muslim histories in Banaras reflect similar concerns. Take, for example, a history of the Gyan Vapi mosque perpetuated among Muslim students by authors such as Abdus Salam Nomani.[69] Nomani's 1963 writings deny that the iconoclastic Aurangzeb even built the mosque: "This is wrong. The foundations of this mosque were laid by the great grandfather of Badshah Alamgir, Akbar, and Alamgir's father, Shahjahan, had started a madras (*sic*) in the mosque in 1048 hijri."[70] Thus, as Sandria Frietag has pointed out, Muslims of Banaras have turned to rulers with a reputation for secularism, and for patronizing the formation of a syncretic Indo-Muslim culture, in order to substantiate their claims to a role in the city.[71]

Thus, Muslim residents of Banaras who seek a way to express identity are forced to look for symbols that speak simultaneously to secularism as well as Islam. The city is thus a symbol around which both visions — that of inclusionary nationalism, as well as exclusionary Hindutva — are being built. In the past, the physical destruction of temples was accompanied by a strengthening of the importance of the city in Hindu texts. Simultaneously and dialectically, religious sites were located within this textual framework. And all subsequent projects of religious rebuilding in the city

were then conceived within this invented framework. Yet while the Maratha project to rebuild Hindu Banaras has been largely successful, it has not been successful in obliterating the city's Islamic history or the Islamic form of its urban structure and buildings. Nevertheless, current attempts by Islamic groups to rewrite the supposed genealogy of some of the city's mosques does suggest that Banaras continues to be a site of Hindu hegemony.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Banaras has been created through the simultaneous and intertwined processes of representation, obliteration/salvage, and reinvention. These acts occurred in response to the separate but coincident imperatives of Hindu re-annexation and British colonialism. Thus, the revivalist anxiety of Hindus promoted a nostalgic return — to be achieved through a process of reinvention. But these attempts by elite Hindu groups to re-annex Banaras as a place of pilgrimage intersected with the interests of the colonial British, who saw Banaras as a repository of unchanging Hindu tradition. For its part, the colonial anxiety was to create categories, and separate all evidence into them pursuant to the construction of Oriental subjectivity. Eventually, the two agendas colluded, with the result being that the city was increasingly represented and reinvented as Hindu.

Contemporary religious revivalism is also about the invention of tradition, but it is also much more militant about obliteration. As the ASI functionary at the Alamgir mosque reiterated, the preservation discourse embedded in the ideals of the hegemonic postcolonial Indian state is no longer sufficient to satisfy the proponents of Hindutva. Under their new ideology, the salvaging of the Hindu past also implies the need to obliterate the Muslim one. And since the story of Banaras is itself one of continuous obliteration, such actions are increasingly viewed by their proponents as morally justifiable.

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3. I did not see any police at the Bindu Madhav temple.

4. Not his real name.

5. Http://asi.nic.in/. Accessed August 15, 2003. European-led antiquarian activities in India began under the Asiatic Society in 1784. Under William Jones, this aim was to study "the antiquities, arts, sciences and literature of Greater India." The Archaeological Survey of India was formally inaugurated in 1861 with the intent of surveying and cataloguing monuments in

India. Preservation of monuments became an aim of the ASI later. The ASI has always been part of the colonial project of cataloguing the past in the Indian subcontinent. The Archaeological Survey of India was established by the British colonial government in order to preserve the subcontinent's built heritage. Its classificatory norms were established in accordance with colonial categories of knowledge about the Indian subcontinent. Thus, the built her-

itage was clearly bifurcated into "Hindu" and "Muslim" in keeping with what the colonial government saw as the subcontinent's two distinct and irreconcilable pasts.

6. C. Motichandra, *Kashi ka Itihas* (Varanasi: Vishwavidyalaya Prakashan, 1962).

7. E. Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.1.

8. In most accounts of its sacred geography, the city is located between the Varana and the Assi, both tributaries of the Ganges. The name "Varanasi" derives from these two tributary names.

9. J.P. Parry, *Death in Banaras* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp.13–14.

10. Many of these legends are part of scriptural knowledge that is preserved by the Brahmins. Pandit Kubernath Sukul has published some of this knowledge in *Kashi Vaibhav* (Patna: Bihar Rashtrabhasha Parishad, 2000).

11. For a summary account of the myths associated with the city in English, see D. Eck, *Banaras: City of Light* (Princeton, NJ: Knopf, 1982).

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16. P. Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.11.

17. A. Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850* (London: Routledge, 2000), p.573.

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71. S. Freitag, "Introduction," in Freitag, ed. *Culture and Power in Banaras*, p.14. On the other hand, such a recognition of syncretic roots can cut both ways. Attempts at inscribing an overarching Hindu presence in Banaras are visible in tourist pamphlets that refer to the Alamgiri mosque as an "amalgamation of Hindu-Muslim religious sentiments" (and in common parlance as "Beni-Madhav ka Dera"), thus implying a Hindu geneology. See *Varanasi City Guide*.

"Marrying Modern Progress with Treasured Antiquity": Jerusalem City Plans during the British Mandate, 1917—1948

INBAL BEN-ASHER GITLER

British Mandatory schemes for developing Jerusalem have seldom been examined in the context of theories of colonial urban planning. In this article I show that the British approach to designing new urban schemes for Jerusalem deviated from the norms and concepts implemented in colonial cities. I examine three official British Mandatory publications that presented comprehensive urban programs for Jerusalem, comparing them to aspects of colonial city planning. Consequently, I interpret the plans as a renegotiation of Jerusalem's contested space, a renegotiation that erased controversy and subtly promoted an image of British supremacy.

Palestine for most of us was an emotion rather than a reality.
— C.R. Ashbee, 1923[1]

On December 9, 1917, British forces conquered Jerusalem, ending four hundred years of Ottoman rule in the city. The British immediately initiated a long-term urban planning project with two distinctive goals: preserving the walled Holy City's historic sites, which hold immense religious significance for Judaism, Christianity and Islam; and transforming Jerusalem into a modern city.

This article deals with the urban schemes devised during the thirty years of the British Mandate in Palestine, concentrating on the 1922 plan formulated by Charles Robert Ashbee (1863–1942) and the 1944 plan by Henry Kendall (b. 1903). Ashbee served as Civic Adviser between 1918–1922, during the years of British military administration in Palestine and shortly after the beginning of the Mandate. Kendall served as Government Town Planner in Palestine from 1935 until 1948, the year Britain's Palestine Mandate ended. The plans discussed here form an integral part of three official British publications dealing with various aspects of town planning in Jerusalem. These are *Jerusalem 1918–1920: Being the Records*

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of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the Period of the British Military Administration, published in 1921; *Jerusalem 1920–1922: Being the Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the First Two Years of the Civil Administration,* published in 1924; and *Jerusalem: The City Plan, Preservation and Development during the British Mandate 1918–1948,* by Henry Kendall, published in 1948.[2] The fact that no less than three extensive and lavishly illustrated publications dedicated to British town plans for Jerusalem were put forth during those years attests to the importance the British placed on caring for Jerusalem and developing it.

Although these plans have been reviewed in geographical/urban histories of Jerusalem, much has yet to be revealed about their meaning and their relationship to the cultural and political complexities of the period. In this article I explore the British approach to urban planning in Jerusalem as reflected in these official publications.

Recent studies of the British enterprise with regard to the built environment of Jerusalem have taken for granted that the colonial conditions existing in other cities of the British Empire can be transcribed to Palestine. For example, although Fuchs and Herbert acknowledged that Palestine was "not defined as a colony," they entitled their work "A Colonial Portrait of Jerusalem." Emphasizing that Palestine was "administered by the colonial office," they defined the Mandate-era architecture of Charles Robert Ashbee, Austen St. Barb Harrison, and Clifford Holliday as "colonial regionalism."[3] Likewise, in a dissertation entitled "British Planners in Palestine, 1918–1936," which provides a comprehensive study of urban plans for many of the cities developed in Palestine during the Mandate, Hyman stated there is "an a-priori case for considering Palestine within the colonial planning context." Yet, though he questioned the appropriateness of applying the term "colonial urban planning" to Mandate-era Palestine, he did not pursue the question in any depth.[4]

As noted by Hyman, a thorough methodological comparison between Jerusalem and cities in other British colonies — or even colonies of other European powers, such as France — would be required to fully understand the distinction.[5] In this article, I do not attempt such a detailed comparison. Rather, I present a more conceptual analysis of official British plans for Jerusalem in relation to contemporary research on colonial urbanism. In this respect, it is important to see the mandate system as a hybrid form of foreign rule, historically parallel to emerging processes of decolonization. And consequently, I suggest that, rather than using the term "colonial" to discuss the British urban plans for Jerusalem, it would be more accurate to use the term "mandatory."

EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY JERUSALEM

Jerusalem is situated on a plateau in the midst of a mountain region, about 800 meters (2600 ft.) above sea level. Its topography is characterized by rocky hills. In the heyday of Ottoman rule, from the mid-1800s, it experienced rapid growth in population.[6] The layout of Jerusalem's walled Old City resembled the *casbahs* of other Middle Eastern cities, with densely built neighborhoods and narrow streets. But at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, new residential neighborhoods and areas of commerce were constructed outside its ancient walls. These developments were comparable to contemporary transformations of Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad.[7] Yet, unlike these other cities, Jerusalem had a unique socio-cultural makeup, stemming from its function as the center for the three monotheistic religions. This led to a historic division of the Old City into four quarters: Jewish, Christian, Armenian (Christian), and Muslim. Three prominent historical holy sites dictated the quarters' locations: the Muslim quarter was adjacent to the Dome of the Rock and the Haram; the Christian and Armenian quarters developed around the Holy Sepulchre; and the Jewish quarter lay near the Wailing Wall.

Within this overall division of the city according to religion, there existed a further sectionalization of urban space according to subculture — such as in the Christian community between Arabs, Greek Orthodox, Catholics, and numerous monastic orders. Among the Muslim population, sectional division usually accorded to family and clan ties. The Jewish population was divided into Sephardic, Ashkenazi, and other groups. At the time of the British Mandate, Jews comprised the majority of Jerusalem's population.[8] After World War I, Zionist Jews immigrating from Europe quickly became the major and most influential group in the city.[9] They were perceived as a threat by the Arab population because of their aspiration to make Palestine a national home for the Jews. Orthodox Jews likewise perceived the Zionists, with their secular European culture, as a threat.

Similar to the sectional structure of the Old City, new neighborhoods outside Jerusalem's walls for the most part developed according to existing patterns of religious and subcultural affiliation. Thus, the multicultural and multireligious character of the city deeply affected its existing urban layout and architecture at the beginning of the Mandate period.[10]

The final decades of Ottoman rule were also characterized by a growing European presence in the city, manifest in grand architectural projects for churches, hospitals, missions and consulates. The European powers saw their presence in the city as involving more than just a religious mission, and their efforts to establish a political presence led to competition for the best plots of land and ever more ostentatious displays of architecture.[11] In discussing British building projects of the period in Jerusalem, Mark Crinson has used the terms "surrogate colonialism" and "informal imperialism," which are apt descriptors of this phenomenon in general.[12]

BRITISH URBAN PLANNING IN JERUSALEM: EARLY INITIATIVES

For the British Empire, whose armies conquered Palestine during the final stages of World War I, control of Jerusalem was part of a "package deal" involving the postwar dissection of the remains of the Ottoman Empire.[13] The British both aspired to retain a hold on Palestine for strategic considerations and coveted Jerusalem for its religious significance.[14] Upon entering the city in 1917, General Edmund Allenby declared military rule there, and thereafter the city became the seat of British government in the region.

One of the clearest indications of the deep tie the British felt toward Jerusalem was their sense of urgency in gaining control of its physical environment. Shortly after its occupation, Ronald Storrs (1881–1955), the new military governor, issued an edict intended to prevent alteration or destruction of monuments within the walled Old City and the area immediately surrounding it. The edict declared, "No person shall demolish, erect, alter or repair the structure of any building in the city of Jerusalem or its environs within a radius of 2,500 meters from the Damascus gate . . . until he has obtained a written permit from the Military Governor."[15]

This imperative eventually formed the basis for a more complete system of building regulation for the Holy City. Writing in 1948, Henry Kendall attempted to convey the urgency of this preservation mission at the time:

> The enemy was still on the Nablus-Jordan valley line astride the centre of Palestine when Allenby asked the then City Engineer, Alexandria [Mr. William Mclean], to come to Jerusalem and report and advise upon what measures should be taken to institute the necessary control of building operations and town development, keeping in view the architectural traditions of Jerusalem and the importance of preserving its historic monuments.[16]

To the British, the Old City was above all a space of religious practice and historical significance, and they viewed their charge as being to enhance preservation within its walls, while promoting development of a modern city outside them. However, as long as Jerusalem was under military administration, and as long as Britain's hold on Palestine was unrecognized, some form of administrative method was needed to implement such urban plans. Thus, in 1918 Storrs established a society, or council, to advise him on urban development mattes.[17] Named the Pro-Jerusalem Society, its function was to partake in decisions pertaining to city planning, and to some extent assist with their implementation and funding. The society's declared goal was the "preservation and advancement of the interests of Jerusalem, its district and inhabitants. . . ."[18] Among other things, this meant preserving antiquities, developing modern urban cultural functions such as museums, libraries, theaters, etc., and fostering the education and welfare of the city's inhabitants.

The society was comprised of representatives of most of the religious sects and national groups in the city, as well as archaeologists, historians and architects. In his memoirs, an optimistic Storrs supplied a long list of the society's participants:

> I was able to assemble together round one table the Mayor of Jerusalem, the British Director of Antiquities, the Mufti, the Chief Rabbis, the Presidents of the Italian Franciscans and the French Dominicans, the Orthodox, the Armenian and the Latin Patriarchs, the Presidents of the Jewish Community, the Anglican Bishop, the Chairman of the Zionist Commission, the Dominican Fathers Abel and Vincent, Capitano Paribene (with the Distaccamento and afterwards Italian Minister of Fine Arts), with other leading members of the British, Arab, Jewish and American communities.[19]

It was ultimately the multicultural character of the city that prompted the British to seek the cooperation of this diverse assemblage of clerics and representatives of countries and ethnic groups — some of whom had been Britain's allies during World War I, and could not be ignored.[20] But the establishment of the Pro-Jerusalem society also anticipated an important characteristic of British Mandate-era rule: a commitment to creating a democratic, unifying body with the active participation of the local population. However, while the Pro-Jerusalem Society declared its commitment to including the local population in its activities, its members still regarded Jerusalem's inhabitants as having "much to learn yet in the elementary duties of citizenship," as Ashbee put it.[21] And the publications discussed here indicate that mostly British development ideas were implemented.

Ultimately, the society was active until 1926, although its influence and activism diminished after Britain's Mandate over Palestine went into effect in 1922. The society published two out of the three books discussed here: *Jerusalem 1918–1920* and *Jerusalem 1920–1922,* both edited by C.R. Ashbee. These constituted the records of the society's activities, which included archaeological and architectural preservation and presentation of Ashbee's town planning schemes. The two volumes are impressive in their wealth of maps and photographs. The maps include plans for the development of the entire city as well as programs for individual neighborhoods.[22]

THE PLANS OF WILLIAM MCLEAN AND PATRICK GEDDES

Among other things, *Jerusalem 1918–1920* presented the first two comprehensive plans for developing the city. These were commissioned from William Hannah Mclean and Patrick Geddes, consecutively, and formed the basis for later schemes.

Engineer William Hannah Mclean (1877–1967) formulated the first British plan for Jerusalem in 1918 (**FIG.1**).[23] One of its most important features was the encirclement of the Old

City with two belts. One (indicated by a brown line) designated an area where, in accordance with Storr's regulations, "no new buildings [are] to be permitted."[24] In the plan's legend, Mclean specified that this area was to be left "in its natural state."[25] The second belt, located between the brown line and a dotted line, indicated an area for special planning, where building would be allowed under special permission. Among other things, the belts dictated that new urban development should primarily take place to the west and north of the Old City. Such development was envisioned to include a British Governorate complex (to the north of the Old City, near the Notre Dame de France Hospice), and to the west as a grand axis, linking what is referred to on the map as "public buildings" with sites for two memorials. In the area designated for modern development, a grid of streets was imposed upon the city.

Having arrived from Egypt, Mclean was familiar with the urban development of Cairo during the colonial period.[26] He had also planned an extension of an earlier British plan for Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, in 1912.[27] Hyman believes the grid structure of the streets in the Jerusalem plan was derivative of Mclean's earlier plan for Khartoum.[28] Meanwhile, the new grand axis of monuments planned for the city may have been inspired by plans for New Delhi, the new capital of the British Raj in India.[29] The 1913 plan for that city, by George S.C. Swinton, John A. Brodie, and Edwin L. Luytens, featured a similar central axis, with the Government House at one edge, a plaza with a commemorative column, and other buildings and memorials along a central axis (**FIG.2**).[30]

FIGURE 2. *George S.C. Swinton, John A. Brodie, and Edwin L. Luytens, "Urban Plan of New Delhi. Layout labeled 'Accompaniment to the Final Report of the Delhi Town Planning Committee on the Town Planning of the New Imperial Capital,'" March 20, 1913. Source: R. Irving,* Indian Summer: Luytens, Baker and Imperial Delhi *(New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1981), Fig.27. Reprinted by permission of author.*

The similarities in the schemes for New Delhi and Jerusalem indicate that Mclean's attitude toward the planning of Jerusalem was a colonial one, regarding the city as a future capital in the British Empire.[31] Mclean's scheme manifested, to both the local population and competing European powers, that the empire was capable not only of plotting the course of Jerusalem's future development, but of negotiating a new physical space for colonial architecture in the city. Of course, it would be simplistic to define British policy in the Middle East during this period as colonial. Yet it is equally important to stress that, while World War I presented Britain with new realities in the international arena, retaining control of Palestine was one of its top strategic goals.[32] Mclean's far-reaching and comprehensive street plan, calling out the location of new monuments and government institutions, was certainly the reification of a policy of long-term domination.

One year after Mclean's proposal, Sir Patrick Geddes (1854–1932) presented a new plan for the city (**FIG.3**).[33] The famous Scottish sociologist and town planner had traveled to Palestine in 1919 to design a future Hebrew University on behalf of the Zionist Commission.[34] But Storrs also asked Geddes to comment on Mclean's plan, which had been exhibited in 1919 at the Royal Academy in London and been criticized as inappropriate to the region's hilly topography.[35] Geddes had acquired experience in colonial town planning during his sojourn in India, and used this to emphasize preservation of the Old City and prevention of its overcrowding.[36] Preservation of the Old City also accorded with Geddes's philosophy of "conservative surgery" — his attempt to widen the scope of conservation from individual buildings

to the entire historical city.[37] In India, this notion had led Geddes to advocate greater respect for local culture as an alternative to the typical colonial practice of planning new city quarters based on grids of streets.[38] Mclean's plan had combined preservation of the Old City with a grid plan outside the walls. By comparison, Geddes's plan was more fluid and included a clearly defined park or greenbelt encircling the Old City, an enhancement of Mclean's "natural" zone. This greenbelt narrowed toward the west where urban development outside the walls was already prominent, and extended widely to the northeast and southeast. Geddes's plan also emphasized the role of future beltways.[39] These would connect new suburbs with the core of the Old City, substituting for the rigid grid of streets presented by Mclean. In sum, what Geddes presented for the city was a modern scheme of up-to-date Western town-planning ideas. However, because it relinquished the grand axis of monuments, its representation of British power was understated in comparison to Mclean's.

A CITY OF THE MIND: CHARLES ROBERT ASHBEE

Charles Robert Ashbee's plan for Jerusalem was presented in 1922 (**FIG.4**). Ashbee, a central figure in Britain's second-generation Arts and Crafts Movement, was summoned to Jerusalem by Storrs in the spring of 1918 to survey the extant crafts in Jerusalem and advise on town planning.[40] To fulfill these duties, he held the post of "Civic Adviser" until 1922. He also served as secretary and chief coordinator of the Pro-Jerusalem Society.

FIGURE 3. *Patrick Geddes, "Jerusalem Town Planning Scheme No.2," 1919. From C.R. Ashbee, ed.,* Jerusalem 1918–1920: Being the Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the Period of the British Military Administration *(London: John Murray, 1921), No.22. Reprinted by permission.*

Ashbee regarded Jerusalem as a "city of the mind." By this he meant a spiritual place, a place dedicated to culture and religion. Initially, Ashbee shared the optimism of many of his countrymen that Palestine could become a bi-national Jewish-Arab entity under British guidance. However, like many British administrators, he later became disillusioned, as the Arab-Zionist conflict escalated.

Its reception of the Mandate in 1922 meant the British Empire would serve as a trustee in Palestine, accountable to the League of Nations.[41] However, the terms of the Mandate contained a basic contradiction between a commitment to establish a "National Home" for the Jews in Palestine and a pledge to protect Arab land rights there.[42]

Although Ashbee ardently carried out his mission, he also had a rare gift of sensitivity, and was able to see how the indigenous population perceived the British presence. For example, writing about the transition from Ottoman to British rule, he observed, "They did not risk their lives to change masters."[43] Ashbee was also anti-imperialist, and in *A Palestine Notebook* he advocated the notion of commonwealth over empire.[44] Unlike Storrs or Kendall, therefore, Ashbee questioned the basic assumptions of the British Mandate, and was fully aware of the complicated political situation and the national aspirations of both Jews and Palestinian Arabs. In

his diary he also commented on the weakness of the British administration in Palestine. In his opinion, this weakness stemmed from the unjust nature of the British presence there and its support for Jewish colonization, a policy he opposed:

> *The Administration is in one of its recurrent states of nervous collapse. That is to say, being an essentially timid Administration, with an uneasy Protestant conscience, it is arming itself cap-a-pie and shaking as to its knees: route marches, demonstrations in the streets, displays of Indian soldiery, armoured cars, and all for the sake of the Mandate and this unhappy 'Wa'd Balfour' which we should be so much better without. . . . You cannot govern well or wisely except by consent. . . .[45]*

Ashbee's criticism of the British presence in Palestine was not unique. Ambivalence about the necessity of the Mandate ran through British thinking of the period. Written in 1938, *The Colonial Problem*, for example, referred to "the common assumption that the A mandates were veiled protectorates destined to indefinite duration."[46] This "common assumption" has received frequent reinforcement in historical research, and the mandate system itself is often seen as a refinement of imperialistic doctrine to meet the needs of the time.[47] In the mandate system, however, oversight by the League of Nations and emphasis on the eventual institution of self-government in the "entrusted" territories introduced different perceptions of foreign policy, and produced a deviation from colonial practices.[48]

During the mandate system's formative years, British foreign policy also underwent swift, yet profound changes. In the post-World War I years, growing nationalism and the assertion of the right to self-determination by indigenous populations in many colonized or occupied territories brought a re-examination of issues pertaining to Britain's entire overseas empire. In the case of Palestine, which was indeed conceived of as a "veiled protectorate," these changes led to criticism of the burdensome temporary rule almost as soon as it had begun.[49] On the one hand, interest in keeping Palestine in British hands was first and foremost represented by the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. However, there were others such as Maurice Hankey who favored United States trusteeship.[50] Winston Churchill was also critical. In 1920 he wrote: "Palestine is costing us 6 millions a year to hold. The Zionist movement will cause continued friction with the Arabs. . . . The Palestine venture . . . will never yield any profit of a material kind."[51] The cost of an enduring British presence in the Middle East did much to sway public opinion.[52]

Ashbee's opposition to the Mandate in *A Palestine Notebook* shows how these dilemmas filtered through all echelons of the British administration. However, he did not allow his personal opinions or political ideals to enter into the *Jerusalem* books he edited for the Pro-Jerusalem Society. Instead, he emphasized the need for Western guidance in the specific field of town plan-

ning, seeing it as his mission to advise and direct the local population. This he did in an often condescending manner, in contrast to the more egalitarian tone of his diary.

Like his friend Patrick Geddes, Ashbee regarded town planning as an art that embraced all aspects of the physical and cultural space of living. He had formulated this conception in *Where the Great City Stands*, published 1917. That book contained a theory of modern town planning based on the ideals of the Arts and Crafts, Garden City, and City Beautiful Movements, along with other examples of modern town planning he had seen in the U.S. Ashbee was enthusiastic about implementing these ideals in Jerusalem, and his meticulously developed plan for the city appeared in *Jerusalem 1920–1922*. Among other things, it incorporated a "zoning system," which had been absent from his predecessors' plans, but which could be used to divide the city into functional areas of residence, industry and business.[53] Ashbee's most direct model for this type of zoning was probably the 1916 zoning scheme for New York City, which he discussed in *Where the Great City Stands*.[54]

In the Jerusalem plan Ashbee proposed several zones. A dotted area, referred to in the legend as "reserved for special treatment," marks the Old City and the Valley of Siloam to the south. A red area to the east of the Old City and surrounding it marks "The Jerusalem Park System." Industrial zones are marked as slanted lines on a red background, while business and residential zones appear as slanted lines on a white background (these are the more thinly drafted lines). An area to the south is marked "new military area." As had the two plans that preceded it, Ashbee's plan called for future development of the city to occur toward the west and north — and here also to the south of the Old City. In general, his scheme also expressed an ambitious project for modernizing Jerusalem. It was to include new roads, new water and energy supply systems, museums, galleries, centers for performing arts, schools, and more.

However, Ashbee's plan for the modern city was most remarkable for what was absent: the historical division of the Old City and existing areas outside its walls into quarters or neighborhoods representing the three major religions and their many subcultures. Ashbee's zones created the illusion (or perhaps the optimistic prediction) that these would eventually blend into a homogenous residential fabric. In effect, therefore, his plan was an embodiment of political policies during the Mandate's early years, which attempted to merge the different sections of the city.[55] This ideology prohibited the expression of religious segregation in urban planning, encouraging urban spatial flexibility instead. The shift from Ottoman to British regulations regarding land ownership further complicated the planning process.[56] This proved extremely complex, and was aggravated by the fact that land ownership was a frequent cause of conflict between Jews and Palestinians.[57] Confirming the presence of religious or sectarian boundaries on maps would have contradicted British attempts to solve these conflicts.

DIVERGENCE FROM THE COLONIAL MODEL

One of the most notable characteristics of colonial cities — often seen, for example, in British colonial India and French colonial North Africa — was the physical separation of the indigenous population from the ruling colonial elite.[58] Among other things, this segregation led to the creation of "dual cities," divided into "native" and "European" quarters.[59]

Ashbee's plan of 1922 is notable in its divergence from the colonial planning model in this regard. The presence of a foreign regime is indicated by the military zone in the southern part of the new city. But Ashbee does not refer to it in text accompanying the map (the presence of military force had also been conspicuously absent from the earlier plans by Mclean and Geddes, and from earlier plans by Ashbee, himself). More importantly, the map does not designate a British or European quarter. Instead, British presence is understated, intentionally diffused within the urban fabric — although in reality, the British did tend to concentrate in the southern neighborhood called the Templers' Colony.[60]

There are other differences between Ashbee's plan and typical colonial precedents. Furthermore, the park system surrounding the Old City was not intended to function as a *cordon sanitaire* or *esplanade*.[61] In India, cities such as Allahabad and New Delhi incorporated greenbelts into their segregating schemes for reasons of health and security.[62] And in Morocco, greenbelts around old cities were justified not only by reasons of health and security, but to "preserve" indigenous culture.[63] In Ashbee's scheme, the park system was intended to provide Jerusalem's new modern spaces with open areas, or "lungs." But, as originally suggested by Geddes, a park system would also frame the Old City and preserve it from the damaging effects of new development. And in this sense it also conformed to the colonial idea of assisting preservation — although in this case the need for preservation was defined in more historical and religious terms.[64] This is not to say that Ashbee did not take an interest in preserving social and cultural forms, as can be seen in his concern for traditional crafts. But in annotations to his urban schemes this aspect was minimized. In addition, Ashbee was fully aware of the diversity of cultures in Jerusalem. Indeed, his views in this regard might best be compared to those of General Hubert Lyautey, who approached the subject of cultural preservation in Morocco based on an awareness of processes of change within indigenous cultures themselves.[65]

The park system's largest area was set out east of the Old City, in a way that integrated and thus preserved ancient Jewish and Muslim cemeteries. Ashbee designated this area around the walls as a public space enabling appreciation of the city's "romantic beauty and grandeur."[66] He then planned the park system down to its smallest details, with the object of arousing emotional and religious sentiment.[67] With the park encircling it, the Old City was symbolically set

in the center of future modern Jerusalem. Modernization of the Old City was thus all but prohibited so as to preserve the past and cultivate a picturesque mosaic of places of worship, Middle-Eastern architecture, and ancient archaeology.[68]

The difference between the use of zoning in plans for Mandate-era Jerusalem and in a typical colonial city can be seen by comparing Ashbee's plan with a British plan for Kampala, dated 1919 (**fig.5**).[69] The zoning plan for the capital of Uganda, which became a British protectorate in 1888, is discussed in Henry Kendall's *Town Planning in Uganda*.[70] Kampala had initially developed as a dual city, Kampala-Mengo, with Europeans and Indians residing in Kampala, and Africans in Mengo.[71] However, a major feature of the 1919 plan was the creation of a central greenbelt that would segregate European residential areas from the rest of the city.

On the plan, the projected European quarter appears as a large, diagonally shaded area in the upper part of the town, including the neighborhoods of Kololo and Nakasero. Its southern boundary dictates the shape of the greenbelt (which would include vegetation and a golf course for the amusement and health of the city's European inhabitants). Also indicated is an Asian quarter, horizontally shaded southeast of the greenbelt. To the southwest, dark areas indicate and Asian trading zone, and hatched areas a European one. Dotted areas designate "public open spaces."

About this plan, Kendall wrote: "The principles of the general draft plan were discussed at length, especially as regards the future of the existing Indian bazaar and the position of the green belt zones separating the residential areas of the three principal races from each other and from the commercial or bazaar area."[72] Yet, although "three races" are mentioned in his text — Africans, Europeans and Indians — the 1919 zoning plan only appears to divide the city into European and Asian zones. Mengo, the major African urban center, located on the map south of the Kampala "Township Boundary," is not characterized as an "African" zone or mentioned in the legend. Nevertheless, a wide "proposed public open space" (i.e., another greenbelt, or *cordon sanitaire*) is shown to separate Mengo from the commercial zones of Kampala. This lack of specificity is consistent with what Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch has noted to be a recurring phenomenon in African colonial urbanism: that the European town is recognized as the "true" urban space, while the African settlements (delineated as Kampala's "environs" in Kendall's book[73]) are perceived as uncontrolled development.[74]

The Kampala zoning plan thus recognizes two levels of racial segregation. The first is a stratification carried over from Imperial India.[75] The second separates this already dual construction from the African population. The result is that the main cluster of African urban functions supposedly exists outside the town boundaries.

By contrast, Ashbee's zoning plan for Jerusalem avoids recognition of any existing socio-cultural divisions. Residential, commercial and industrial zones are all shown as homogeneous spaces, undifferentiated by cultural or, as in the Kampala plan, racial characteristics. The situation in Jerusalem clearly presented several difficulties. One was that new neighborhoods outside the city walls had already formed in ways that replicated the diverse cultural mosaic of the Old City. Another was that centuries of multidenominational religious practices stemming


FIGURE 5. *"Kampala 1919 Scheme." From H. Kendall,* Town Planning in Uganda: A Brief Description of the Efforts Made by Government to Control Development of Urban Areas from 1915 to 1955 *(London: The Crown Agents, 1955), facing p.21. Reprinted by permission.*

from various origins, including European ones, had created a population that largely defied the definitions of "indigenous" or "nonindigenous"/"European." Among other things, this meant that any greenbelt or park system around the Old City would have to be a porous zone, and not one of segregation.

It should be noted here that Jerusalem was not unique in having preexisting patterns of ethnic and religious segregation. Various colonial cities in Asia and Africa evinced forms of cultural and social segregation prior to the arrival of Europeans. The colonial powers simply imposed a new level of segregation on top of this.[76] But the case of Mandate-era Jerusalem differs from these cities in two respects. First, urban tensions and confrontations among Arabs and Jews resulted in spatial dilemmas with which planners deliberately chose not to contend. Second, the planners chose not to impose a colonial "dual-city" form of segregation on the existing layout of space.

Only one plan for a residential neighborhood appears in *Jerusalem 1920–22* (**FIG.6**). It is for a modern Jewish garden suburb designed by the Jewish architect and town planner Richard Kauffmann.[77] The neighborhood, laid out according to Garden City principles, was later given the Hebrew name *Rehavia*.[78] Curiously, Ashbee chooses not to refer to it as a Jewish neighborhood, and only mentions it by an Arab name, *Janjirieh Garden City* (spelled *Janziriah* on the plan), thus refraining once more from reference to sectarian divisions. Like other Garden City neighborhoods of the time, it comprises garden lots that surround houses whose location in relation to the street varies to avoid the appearance of excessive symmetry. Streets are generally laid out in relation to a main boulevard that traverses the neighborhood, but a strict grid is avoided, and a separate system of footpaths is provided to improve pedestrian movement.[79]

It is further important that Ashbee never refers on his maps or in his book to the relation between neighborhood

FIGURE 6. *Richard Kauffmann, "Plan for Janjirieh Garden City [Rehavia]." From C.R. Ashbee, ed.,* Jerusalem 1920–1922: Being the Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the First Two Years of the Civil Administration *(London: John Murray, 1924), No.65. Reprinted by permission.*

planning and local housing traditions. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, traditional residential structures in Jerusalem consisted largely of the Palestinian-Arab *hosh*, or court-house, and the Jewish *chatzer* (court) — both based on similar principles.[80] But Ashbee never refers to the close-knit fabric these apartments created, nor to the family nuclei around which they evolved. Nor does he mention extant early-twentieth-century neighborhoods in which dwellings had evolved beyond the traditional types. Nor does he elaborate on which Jewish, Christian or Muslim sects would reside in the proposed new Garden-City neighborhoods. Nevertheless, by incorporating "Janjirieh Garden City" into his book, Ashbee probably intended to show how a Jerusalem neighborhood could be representative of modern town planning. And as an advocate for Garden City ideas, he probably was also advocating such a model for the many neighborhoods of private dwellings constructed during the first decade of the British Mandate by Jews, Christian Arabs, and Muslim Arabs.[81]

COMMEMORATION: HENRY KENDALL

Henry Kendall was commissioned as Government Town Planner for Palestine in 1935 and served in this office until 1948. His urban schemes, discussed here as they appeared in his book *Jerusalem: The City Plan, Preservation and Development during the British Mandate 1918–1948*, are of great interest, since this publication summarized the process of Jerusalem's urban development during the thirty years of the British Mandate. During the years that elapsed between Ashbee's plans and those of Kendall, other important plans were issued. One of the most notable of these was by Clifford Holliday, which was approved in 1930 as the first statutory plan for the city.[82]

Kendall's book presents his own contribution, a new plan for Jerusalem devised in 1944. A large and lavishly illustrated section is also dedicated to describing the Old City, its history, and British preservation and restoration projects. Finally, the book illustrates the official buildings constructed by the British in Jerusalem during the Mandate.[83] Clearly, the purpose of publishing this volume on the eve of British withdrawal from Palestine was to bequeath for posterity an official record of Britain's role in preserving and developing Jerusalem. Indeed, the last High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Alan Gordon Cunningham, presented this volume as a commemoration "of the efforts made to conserve the old while adding the new in keeping with it, of the process of marrying modern progress with treasured antiquity."[84]

The last ten years of the British Mandate were violent times in Palestine. Both Zionist and Arab nationalism became more defined and extreme, leading to frequent and severe clashes. The British attempted to use force to restrain this violence, while also seeking diplomatic solutions to its underlying sources.[85] The progress of World War II further complicated British policies in the Middle East, and in Palestine in particular. And as

time went on, it became evident the Mandate would not become a permanent arrangement. Misgivings regarding it were underscored by disputes within the British government itself.[86]

During these years, several proposals for a partition of Palestine into Jewish and Palestinian states were put forth by the British, all of which were rejected by one or both sides. Interestingly enough, none of these relinquished Jerusalem to either party. And even though by the end of World War II this particular "A" mandate occupied more than a fair share of the energies of an exhausted empire, the third and final British proposal, in 1946, still left Jerusalem in British hands.[87] The fourth partition proposal, submitted by the United Nations in 1947, retained Jerusalem as an international enclave.[88]

Although the plans and ordinances contained in Kendall's book outlined a course of development for many years to come, and although the official British architecture displayed in it was anything but temporary, Kendall's attitude toward the city's future was cautious:

> . . . *this publication is . . . more of an expression of the various plans and schemes that have been prepared and are in force, rather than a civic survey with recommendations for the development of a master plan. Too much has been heard in recent times of ambitious plans that have been abandoned almost as soon as they have been launched. The development of the modern town of Jerusalem is bound up with its political future, and that is a matter for the attention of the United Nations.*[89]

Kendall's urban scheme for Jerusalem included several maps, some of which documented Jerusalem's layout at that time and some of which, as noted above, contained plans for future development. But Kendall's development schemes were characterized by numerous ambiguities. Among other things, they were disassociated from each other and lacked elaboration and clarification in the text. Delineated in 1944, they above all expressed the tumultuous period during which they were made. As in Ashbee's earlier plan, this uncertainty about Jerusalem's future was embodied in Kendall's lack of methods for coping with urban realities.

Among other trends during the Mandate period (and with the encouragement of British officials), the area outside the Old City walls had undergone a process of accelerated growth and modernization, including massive infrastructure development. Kendall's 1944 zoning plan shows that the city had generally developed according to earlier directives (FIG.7). Residences and business had been built toward the west, north and south; and the park system, which Kendall terms a "nature reserve," had developed toward the east — although the city's rapid growth entailed a significant reduction in its size. Similarly, as Ashbee had intended, the park system had been used to frame the Old City and protect it from new development (but not to segregate its residents from the rest of the city).

Similar to Geddes' 1918 scheme, Kendall's 1944 plan includes a modern road system, with a beltway surrounding the city. The plan also allocates a much larger area for industry, although, like his predecessors, Kendall commented that "Jerusalem is unsuited for heavy industries. . . . [S]uch a development would conflict seriously with its more important cultural and religious aspects."[90] Despite more than twenty years having gone by since Ashbee's plan, emphasis was still placed primarily on the city's spiritual surplus. Preservation areas, identified in the legend as "Archaeological Zones," also appear on the 1944 zoning map. However, as dashed black

FIGURE 7. *Henry Kendall, The 1944 Scheme: Zoning Plan. From H. Kendall,* Jerusalem: The City Plan, Preservation and Development during the British Mandate, 1918–1948 *(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), map facing p.26. Reprinted by permission.*

frames, one often can only guess where they are. Most are also layered over residential zones, so that it is unclear how they would be excavated, or how neighborhoods would continue to exist if they were.[91]

When attempting to analyze the allocation of residential zones, the obscurities in Kendall's 1944 plan are further perplexing. The legend divides residential zones into areas A–F on the basis of the size of the individual dwellings in each zone.[92] Two ideas may be instructive here. First, as did Ashbee, Kendall proposes garden suburbs for outlying areas — although these would include modern apartment blocks, not just private villas.[93] Second, his plan, like his predecessor's, displays considerable insensitivity toward indigenous patterns of housing.[94] Kendall justifies severe limitations on house size based on an assertion that "a house of 150 to 180 square meters in area is ample for the normal requirements of most families in Jerusalem."[95] He dismisses the possibility of larger homes for the wealthy, and he ignores the fact that traditional or orthodox Arabs and Jews often had very large families. In the end, Kendall integrated such housing regulations into a town plan ordinance, which was viewed as restrictive even by his contemporary, Clifford Holliday, who blamed him for adopting an outdated plan with "regulatory and restrictive control of development."[96]

In a critique of Le Corbusier's Plan Obus for Algiers, created during the 1930s and early 1940s, Michele Lamprakos discussed how that plan's modern housing dismissed the relation of traditional Muslim dwelling form to such suprafamilial institutions as the extended family and clan.[97] She argued that in the colonial city, planners often viewed such traditional patterns as a hindrance to the development of a capitalist economy.[98] Kendall's emphasis on modern housing, coupled with his use of dwelling size as a criterion for zoning subdivision, is consistent with such a view. Indeed, his zoning plan may have been indicative of a desire to introduce modern criteria, based on the structures of a capitalist economy, to Jerusalem.

The effect of this dismissal of the city's existing sociocultural structure is only accentuated by the use of a confusing color scheme. In most sections of the 1944 zoning map it is impossible to make a connection between the colors in the legend, which in some cases are framed or striped, and the colors of the map itself. Thus, it is unclear which neighborhoods and roads are extant and which are proposed for future development. In addition, several of the residential areas appear to overlap open-space zones.

Holliday sharply criticized this graphic ambiguity in a review of Kendall's book in 1948. It may have been, as Holliday put it, that this was the result of "faulty reproduction."[99] But I would like to suggest that the incoherence was at least partially intentional. In the 1944 plan, no "Residential Zone" is mentioned by name, making its division into religious and sectarian neighborhoods invisible. The legend does mention "Old City," "Silwan," and "Et Tur" next to a bluish square, but no reason is given for singling

them out. Quite simply, no zoning plan which ignored the basic division of a city such as Jerusalem into neighborhoods could ever convey the reality of its existing urban fabric, let alone project its future. And since Palestinian Arabs and Jews contested many areas of the city, Kendall may also have been attempting to avoid any political statement that could be construed as allocating territory for future development by one group or another.

Another key feature of Kendall's plan was its refusal to identify a "British" or "European" neighborhood. The reality here was that during the last years of the Mandate — even more than during Ashbee's time — such an explicit declaration of foreign presence would only have injured British attempts to resolve the conflict between Arabs and Jews, and undercut Britain's image as a mediator not just in the eyes of the local population, but in the eyes of the world. The omission of the British presence from the maps also accentuated Kendall's hope that his book would be seen as a commemoration of Britain's trusteeship, not a statement of continuing ownership of the city.

Despite his decision to leave racial and religious divisions off the main zoning map, Kendall's book does include another map entitled "Distribution of the Population" (**FIG.8**). This indicates areas populated by Jews, Christians and Muslims, with blue indicating areas of Jewish population; green, Muslim; and purple, Christian. But the map does not address subdivision by sect, nor does it indicate areas co-populated by two or more groups. And the map's fluid blocks of color are rendered even less legible by such additional designations as "overcrowded areas," "commercial," and "industrial" zones. Moreover, Kendall makes no attempt to connect the information on the general zoning scheme to this second map, and so project patterns of development which might reflect the existing religious divisions in the city.

Another map, describing "Grouping of Neighborhood Units" also seems surreal today (**FIG.9**). Clearly, this is an application of contemporary British planning theories, according to which cellular neighborhoods, each containing a primary school and shops, are joined together by zoning hierarchies and roads to form a town.[100] In Kendall's map, however, biomorphic shapes in dark brown and beige, representing neighborhoods, float freely among the main roads of the city. The dark-brown forms indicate "existing quarters"; the beige halos surrounding them are their extensions; and earth-brown forms indicate future neighborhoods. True to the theoretical British model, the nucleus of each Jerusalem neighborhood contains a school (indicated by a red dot) and shops (indicated by a blue dot). However, they are devoid of such basic Middle Eastern facilities as places of worship (be they mosques, synagogues or churches) and public baths, the *hamaam* or the *mikveh*. By omitting these cultural or religious signifiers, Kendall again avoids committing his neighborhoods to one group or the other. By contrast, Albert Laprade integrated such places as public baths, Q'uranic

FIGURE 8. *Henry Kendall,*
"1944 Survey: Distribution of the
Population." From H. Kendall,
Jerusalem: The City Plan,
Preservation and Development
During the British Mandate,
1918–1948 *(London: His*
Majesty's Stationery Office,
1948), map facing p.34.
Reprinted by permission.

FIGURE 9. *Henry Kendall,*
"The 1944 Scheme: Grouping of
Neighbourhood Units." From H.
Kendall, Jerusalem: The City
Plan, Preservation and
Development During the
British Mandate, 1918–1948
(London: His Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1948), map facing p.40.
Reprinted by permission.

schools, mosques, and neighborhood ovens into his plans for
new neighborhoods in Casablanca.[101] The map in Figure 9
thus also dismisses the sectarian urban neighborhoods, and
it too creates the illusion of a unified urban space.

Set among the numerous photographs and illustrations
of Jerusalem that filled the rest of his book, Kendall's urban
plans attempted to erase the fundamental ethnic, religious
and cultural characteristics of the city. In their place at the
end of the Mandate era they stressed the potential of unen-
cumbered modern development.

DEFINING ARCHITECTURAL STYLE

Significant portions of Ashbee's and Kendall's books
were also dedicated to defining an appropriate architectural
style for the planned new sections of Jerusalem. In deter-
mining this style, they turned to the ancient edifices and
"Oriental" urban setting of the Old City as a source of inspi-
ration. Recognition of the Old City as a model for new archi-
tecture provided additional impetus for its preservation.
Both in relation to preservation and the definition of a new

style, Ashbee's and Kendall's attitudes were similar to the approach commonly adopted in colonial cities.

During the early years of the Mandate, preservation of the Old City was directed by the Pro-Jerusalem Society. The romantic, Orientalizing conception held by its officers was well expressed in Ashbee's opening remarks in *Jerusalem 1918–1920*:

> The [Pro-Jerusalem] Society's objective has been to regard the old city as a unity in itself, contained within its wall circuit, dominated by its great castle with the five towers, and intersected with its vaulted streets and arcades, the houses often locked one over the other . . . 'Zion is a city compact together'. It is this compactness or unity, so characteristic of Jerusalem, that the Society has set itself to preserve.[102]

The Old City thus became subject to British intervention, so that Western approaches and concepts of urban preservation dictated architectural practices. British decisions pertaining to the urban fabric also had distinct political purposes, the first of which was to delegitimize the recent era of Ottoman rule.

British officials sifted through the grains of history, preserving first and foremost their own romanticized notion of Jerusalem. Thus, ancient Israelite, Roman, Muslim and Crusader remains and monuments were valued as treasures. So were Ottoman monuments from the age of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent. Archaeologists and historians who collaborated in the production of Ashbee's volumes marveled at sites attributed to these epochs, and their preservation was discussed in detail. Henry Kendall also repeatedly expressed admiration for these eras.[103]

In sharp contrast, more recent projects of the Ottoman period were systematically devalued.[104] And the erasure of physical evidence from this later period of Ottoman rule was justified by a constant debasement of the Turks.[105] Thus, an article in the London *Times* on February 5, 1919, hailing new British schemes for Jerusalem and apparently written by Ashbee, contained the following:

> It is difficult to imagine a sharper contrast between the Jerusalem of man's imagination, whether he thinks of it in terms of Mahomed's vision and ascent to Heaven, of Solomon's grandeur, or of Christ's Sermon on the Mount, and the actual Jerusalem left us by the Turk. This latter concrete Jerusalem is a picturesque but filthy medieval town, with sprawling suburbs; ill timbered, unwatered, with roads inconvenient and leading nowhere. . . . [106]

In actuality, the Ottoman administration had introduced many improvements to Jerusalem toward the end of the nineteenth century.[107] Yet despite these improvements, the British still faced many serious problems, and they used these sites of disrepair to strengthen their claim to the city.

Both Ashbee's *Jerusalem* volumes and Kendall's *Jerusalem: The City Plan* contain numerous comments similar to those in

the *Times* article. A recurring theme was hygiene, or rather the lack of it. Claims of inferior hygiene and sanitation in colonized lands were routinely used as justification for their possession by European powers. And in the case of Palestine, both Ashbee and Kendall used this theme to delegitimize the land's former rulers.[108] Generally, in the colonial setting, the "native city" was seen as a site of "picturesque" architecture, erratic traffic flow, and filth.[109] However, instead of using this discourse of debasement to establish the superiority of the "European" city, Ashbee and Kendall used it to deplore their predecessors' negligence. Ashbee, in particular, discussed the need to clean up the refuse left by the Turks.[110] And both he and Kendall emphasized what they perceived to be the Turks' lack of regard for the archaeological significance of the city walls.[111] Thus, Kendall also reported that "Prior to the arrival of the British the condition of the buildings generally in the Old City was appalling."[112]

Perhaps the most symbolic act of erasure concerning the period of Ottoman rule was the demolition of an ornate clocktower and its adjacent *sebil*, referred to by Kendall as "unsightly," and by Ashbee as "hideous."[113] These edifices had been erected in 1901 near the Jaffa Gate in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the rule of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II.[114] They were dismantled in 1924, despite public protest.[115]

Kendall also referred to "clearing of the unsightly shops in the vicinity of the Damascus Gate."[116] And in this case he related the process by which such a demolition might legitimately occur:

> With the collaboration of the local authority notices were served on the owners of these properties giving them ample time to find alternative accommodation. Expropriation proceedings were commenced and after a period of some months the buildings were demolished and owners compensated.[117]

In a section of his book dealing with urban traffic flow, Kendall also provided the following description of the western entrance to Jerusalem: "the Jaffa road straggles through a partly built-up locality and provides frontage to some buildings which fall within a reconstruction area and which are *ripe for demolition* [my emphasis]."[118] Here, too, he pointed out, "it is hoped that the local authorities will achieve in collaboration with competent persons a more satisfactory type of architectural expression for buildings. . . ."[119]

Kendall's dominating expressions can today be perceived as colonial, yet he also stressed the advantages of collaborating with "local authorities." Although the identity of these "authorities" was not revealed, he was most likely referring to Jerusalem's semi-autonomous municipal administration.[120] This again reflected the terms of the Mandate, which required that Britain foster a new tradition of autonomy and self-governance among the local population.[121] Yet while the local authorities were to be consulted, Kendall showed no interest in considering the views of local inhabitants. Ashbee also wrote, in a manner consistent with colonial discourse, about how the local population could be enlisted to clean up "Turkish" debris

and implement archaeological reconstruction. Contented by the prospect of enforced cooperation, he also observed that "Work with the hands . . . keeps men from empty political speculation."[122] In general, the British approached the conservation and development of Jerusalem in a manner similar to that of French colonial authorities in the cities of the Maghreb. For example, the French singled out the *medina* of Rabat and the *casbah* of Algiers for preservation because of their picturesque Oriental fabric.[123] Yet in both cities, as in Jerusalem, preservation also carried a clear agenda of domination, and was characterized by similar modes of justification in colonial texts.[124] Despite this similarity, the objective of protecting Jerusalem's religious functions made it distinct from the French case. The most important principle in Jerusalem was to allow all three religions to continue to observe important rituals at their holy sites. For this reason, the preservation of Jerusalem could not include the confinement of the indigenous population to the Old City — as was the case, for example, in Rabat.[125] It should be reiterated that in Jerusalem, the population within the Old City included both indigenous and immigrant inhabitants of European, Middle Eastern, and various other origins, and that these inhabitants had already begun to settle outside the city walls, replicating their old groupings in new spaces.

Another important goal of preservation was to maintain the buildings of the Old City as a source for an "appropriate" architectural style for modern Jerusalem. This new style was to be in keeping with the domes, flat roofs, arches, and stone masonry admiringly displayed through photographs in both Ashbee's and Kendall's books (**FIG.10**). Once again, this approach bears similarity to the situation in French Morocco, where colonial planners used stylistic elements from the Moroccan vernacular to define an appropriate style for new development.[126]

In Jerusalem, the architecture of the Old City was perceived as constant and unsusceptible to change and development. The only "threat" came from outside in the form of "foreign" or European architecture, which was to be avoided as much as possible. Ashbee, in particular, viewed the invasion of European architecture as not just a problem of style, but also of technique and materials.[127] Thus, building regulations placing restrictions on style and allowing the use of local stone only were developed into a doctrine, and eventually implemented in the modern city as well.[128] In this way, the building traditions of Jerusalem's inhabitants were turned into law. But, as perceptively cited in the 1938 treatise *The Colonial Problem*:

> *Custom belongs to the community itself, but to remove*
> *from the community the right of interpretation and of*
> *transformation is an act of violence more serious, though*
> *less visible, than the confiscation of arable land or of forest.*
> *Now, as soon as custom is written down, formulated in leg-*
> *islation, and invested by the European Power with its*
> *omniscient authority, it is applied, no doubt, to the native*
> *community as a caning may be applied, but it no longer*
> *belongs to the community.*[129]

FIGURE 10. *Photograph entitled "Domes: various types in the Mount Zion Area." From H. Kendall,* Jerusalem: The City Plan, Preservation and Development During the British Mandate, 1918–1948 *(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), Fig.86. Reprinted by permission.*

In Jerusalem, the British Mandate authorities took upon themselves this exact annexation of style and its definition.

Ashbee's plan for the rearrangement and remodeling of an area outside the Jaffa Gate is an excellent example of this approach. He proposed replacing new European-style structures there with buildings featuring a series of white domes and arches (**FIG.11**). Pre-Mandate-era buildings were also designated for demolition, so that the remaking of the area would include a process of historic erasure. However, Ashbee did not accompany this proposal with detailed architectural plans, and so his concern seems to have been mostly with the aesthetic interplay of facades. In a sketch, Ashbee also reproduced the figures appearing in the photograph, emphasizing their traditional clothing, so as to convey an Oriental atmosphere. In the texts for the Pro-Jerusalem Society books, picturesque and Oriental details are not abundant, but in photographs and architectural schemes in the books, Ashbee routinely incorporated robed figures driving camels and donkeys, or carrying baskets.[130]

Kendall's *Jerusalem: The City Plan* also showed the local population in a manner that perpetuated Oriental conventions. And like Ashbee, Kendall put forth several suggestions for "Oriental" facades and landscaping, while his book's illustrations and plans were also often dotted with "Oriental" figures. This can be seen, for example, in a model prepared for a reconstruction of the Damascus Gate, where a robed figure leading a camel and a figure riding a donkey ascend toward the ramp (**FIG.12**).

Jaffa Gate, the present condition, showing the market sprawling over the road area and upon the Fosse (now covered).

Jaffa Gate, showing the proposed alterations from the same point, with the reconstructed café and a low-built containing wall for a properly regulated market.

FIGURE 11. *Charles Robert Ashbee, photograph of the Jaffa Gate Market, coupled with a sketch showing "Proposed alterations from the same point with the reconstructed café and a low-built containing wall for a properly regulated market." From C.R. Ashbee, ed.,* Jerusalem 1920–1922: Being the Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the First Two Years of the Civil Administration *(London: John Murray, 1924), Nos.42–43. Reprinted by permission.*

FIGURE 12. *Henry Kendall, "Damascus Gate Improvement Scheme," photograph of model. From H. Kendall,* Jerusalem: The City Plan, Preservation and Development During the British Mandate, 1918–1948 *(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), Fig.27. Reprinted by permission.*

In respect to architectural preservation and the definition of style, then, both of Ashbee's *Jerusalem* books and Kendall's *Jerusalem: The City Plan* took an approach that largely mimicked prevailing colonial attitudes. This approach seems to contradict the character of the urban development schemes presented in the books, further accentuating the sense of ambivalence regarding the British position in the city.

THE IMAGE OF COEXISTENCE

Since Jerusalem never became the capital of a British *colony*, one cannot speak of an expression of colonialism or a process of decolonization in its urban plans. However, certain characteristics of these processes can be noted, which constituted a renegotiation of the urban space. First, colonialist attitudes dehistoricized and petrified the Old City, while attempting to erase marks of the Ottoman regime and introduce new urban policies. Indeed, preservation of the Old City was used as propaganda to justify British rule. One can almost hear the slogan "nobody does it better" echoing through British Mandate-era writing. Second, the Old City's architectural traditions were

extracted by both Ashbee and Kendall, and used to designate an appropriate architectural style for new buildings. New architectural schemes were not presented in detail in Ashbee's or Kendall's publications, but it is clear that neighborhood planning did not take into account local cultural practices and traditional dwellings. Third, planning policies for Jerusalem displayed certain aspects of a decolonization process, in as much as they expressed a city seemingly belonging to its native inhabitants, who were to fulfill certain administrative functions, and who were encouraged to collaborate with the British authorities.

Yet despite these similarities to other colonial cities, the planning of Jerusalem differed remarkably from the colonial model. Although the Old City was separated by a greenbelt from the new city, as often seen in colonial cities, the purpose was not to segregate, but to create a "spiritual" zone. In addition, the tendency of the population to segregate along cultural-religious lines, both within the Old City and the newer areas outside its walls, was ignored in both Ashbee's and Kendall's plans. This was done even though both men clearly recognized the presence of the three monotheistic religions as essential to the city's character. Moreover, the presence of the British as a ruling power was virtually nonexistent on planning maps. Hence, the colonial phenomenon of imposed segregation between "European" and "indigenous" populations did not manifest itself in schemes for Jerusalem's urban development. Nevertheless, accompanying texts often expressed this sense of authority through rhetorical devices common to discourses of colonial alterity.[131]

It would be an oversimplification to attempt to explain these differences between Jerusalem and other colonial cities solely on the basis of Jerusalem's unique hybridity.[132] It is instead necessary to examine the mandatory situation, which was different from the colonial one. Considering this context, it is possible to see that the urban plans discussed here express an ambivalence that stemmed from the very uncertainty of the British trusteeship and a resultant vagueness toward the future of the city. Indeed, the blurring of Jerusalem's sociocultural realities in all the plans discussed here is evidence of a persisting atmosphere of temporality and political instability, which was at times voiced by British officials regarding the Mandate. In particular, the British schemes expressed the necessity of manifesting control while at the same time acknowledging the growing right of both Jews and Arabs to assert their own national identities. Thus, on an urban level, the schemes were shaped by the need to camouflage an emerging conflict, which evolved from the aspirations of cultures and subcultures to define their urban space in the same geographical zone.

In support of this effort to maintain the image of successful urban custodianship, Ashbee's and Kendall's rhetoric refrains from discussing conflicts within the city, since discussions of this nature would have adversely reflected on the Mandate's success. Rather, the texts reiterate Jerusalem's importance to the British and their will to maintain its guardianship. British dedication to the city is further commemorated by the books' emphasis on those portions of the plans that were actually carried out

during the Mandate years, such as government building projects and conservation operations in the Old City.

Although British presence is consistently muted in these maps, the act of prescribing new town plans was in itself a reification of political and cultural authority. By reproducing the urban space for its inhabitants British administrators created a "cartography of hegemony."[133] In other words, they conveyed the power of their Mandate supremacy through a graphic enunciation of Jerusalem's urban space. In this process the cartography that delineated Mandate-era plans for Jerusalem constructed an illusionary space of coexistence, and created the image of Britain as a neutral mediator, striving for a peaceful city and a unified urban plan. The Old City was at the center of this cartography, its historical narratives serving not as a reminder of the complexities of its multicultural space but as a symbol of a coveted peaceful coexistence. The modern Western town plan that was imposed on the city, with its parks, highways, and garden neighborhoods, did not just convey the message that modernity can cross social and cultural barriers, it also disguised those barriers. The modern schemes also emphasized the need for the presence of a guiding Western entity capable of their implementation. In the absence of direct colonial rule, the imperative of modernization provided justification for the presence of the mandatory power.[134]

The ambiguities in the maps are thus better understood in the context of the broader historical conditions, exposing the diverse voices of British administrators, planners and politicians. In this article, the different perspectives among British planners are discussed as well as the ambivalent British approach to the mandate system. These different approaches reemphasize the need, as King has pointed out, to avoid generalizations not only when discussing the indigenous inhabitants of a city (in his case the "colonized" of a colonial city), but also the agents of a ruling power.[135] In the case of Mandatory Palestine, these were the administrators who formulated British policies and created the urban plans for Jerusalem. Hence, Jerusalem's urban schemes acquired unique characteristics. They were shaped by a distinct mode of rule in relation to a renegotiation of cultural and political realities, which resulted in their deviation from more typical colonial urban planning. It is because of these distinctions that I have suggested that these be viewed as *mandatory*, and not colonial, urban schemes.

A report of the League of Nations Research Committee regarding the Palestine Mandate, dated June 1930, ends its review with the conclusion that, "The Palestine Mandate represents one of the great political and social experiments of history."[136] In many ways, this is also true for the urban development schemes for Jerusalem, which can be seen as experiments, characterized by an ambiguity that reflected neither the city's cultural realities nor the Jewish-Arab conflict and Britain's role in it. Rather than reiterating Jerusalem's tormented existence during the Mandate era, these plans inscribed, on the Holy City's hilly topography, both a perception of its past and a hope for a peaceful future.

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7. See S. Bianca, *Urban Form in the Arab World* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2000), pp.169–71.

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20. For a comprehensive account of Britain's alliances during and after World War I, see D. Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1989), especially parts 6–9.

21. Ashbee, ed., *Jerusalem 1918–1920,* pp.4–5.

22. The photographs form an intriguing record of Jerusalem in the beginning of the twentieth century. The majority of photos serve to document sites designated for architectural conservation or renovation. They are coupled with sketches that Ashbee made suggesting how to implement these projects. One example is figure 11 of this article. Yet the photos are in themselves worthy of a separate study.

23. Mclean's plan is discussed in Hyman, "British Planners in Palestine," pp.39–96.

24. The edict appears as item 2 on the map's legend.

25. This is defined in item 2 on the map's legend.

26. Urban transformations that took place in Cairo during the colonial era are discussed in M. Scharabi, "Stadt- und Stadtarchitektur im Nahen Osten zur Kolonialzeit: Das Beispiel Kairo," *Architectura*, Vol.15 No.1 (1985), pp.47–51; and in J. Abu-Lughod, *Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp.99–143.

27. Hyman, "British Planners in Palestine," pp.45–47.

28. Ibid., pp.41–42.

29. Hyman also notes this affinity, and compares the grand monument axis to planning for Washington, D.C. See Hyman, "British Planners in Palestine," p.82. This comparison is noteworthy, as the plans for Washington, D.C., apparently influenced those of New Delhi. See R. Irving, *Indian Summer: Luytens, Baker and Imperial Delhi* (New Haven: Yale, 1981), pp.82–84.

30. Irving, *Indian Summer*, pp.73–75.

31. For an analysis of the principles and layout of colonial cities using New Delhi as a case study, see A.D. King, *Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power and Environment* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), especially chapter 10.

32. Britain's strategic interest lay in protecting the Suez Canal. Control over Palestine would create a protective buffer between Britain's most important artery to its dominions in the east and any threat from the north. The terms of this control would be defined in post-World War I negotia-

tions, primarily between Britain and her allies. These were conducted by Britain's top diplomats, including Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, and others. See Tuchman, *Bible and Sword*, pp.210–14; Adelson, *London and the Invention of the Middle East*, pp.136–54; and Gilbert, *Jerusalem in the 20th Century*, pp.42–43.

33. Geddes's plan is discussed in Hyman, "British Planners in Palestine," pp.121–44.

34. The plans for the Hebrew University conceived by Geddes in collaboration with his son-in-law, the architect Frank Mears, are discussed in H. Meller, *Patrick Geddes: Social Evolutionist and City Planner* (London: Routledge, 1990), pp.263–84; D. Dolev, "Architectural Orientalism in the Hebrew University," *Assaph*, Section B No.3, (1998), pp.217–34; Fuchs and Herbert, "A Colonial Portrait of Jerusalem," pp.98–102; and V. Welter, *Biopolis: Patrick Geddes and the City of Life* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), pp.229–39.

35. Meller, *Patrick Geddes*, p.276. This criticism is also mention by Ashbee in *Jerusalem 1918–1920*, p.12; and by Kendall in *Jerusalem City Plan*, p.4.

36. Meller, *Patrick Geddes*, pp.276–77.

37. Geddes's concept of "conservative surgery" is discussed in P. Clavel, "Ebenezer Howard and Patrick Geddes: Two Approaches to City Development," in K.C. Parsons and D. Schuyler, eds., *From Garden City to Green City: The Legacy of Ebenezer Howard* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp.53–55; and Welter, *Biopolis*, p.109.

38. Welter, *Biopolis*, pp.116–20.

39. In the last years of the twentieth century, construction began on a beltway along lines similar to those in Geddes's 1919 scheme. Most of it has now been completed.

40. For a biography of Ashbee, see A. Crawford's landmark work, *C.R. Ashbee: Architect, Designer and Romantic Socialist* (New Haven: Yale, 1985). Ashbee's town planning in Jerusalem is discussed in Hyman, "British Planners in Palestine," pp.357–415.

41. Porath and Shavit, eds., *The History of Eretz Israel*, p.18. It is important to note that by 1920 the British had already instigated civilian rule in Palestine and nominated a high commissioner, despite the refusal of the Turks to relinquish sovereignty there. See Adelson, *London and the Invention of the Middle East*, pp.183–84; and Gilbert, *Jerusalem in the 20th Century*, p.85.

42. Gilbert, *Jerusalem in the 20th Century*, pp.200–5; and Porath and Shavit, eds. *The History of Eretz Israel*, pp.11–14,20–33. The history of this clash of interests, especially as reflected in the Balfour Declaration, is discussed in Tuchman, *Bible and Sword*, pp.198–203; and in Adelson, *London and the Invention of the Middle East*, pp.149–54. For a discussion of the unique terms of the Palestine Mandate in the framework of the mandate system as a whole, see *The Mandate System: Origins — Principles — Application* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1945), pp.24–32.

43. Ashbee, *A Palestine Notebook*, p.205.

44. This is evident, for example, when he discusses the Egyptian Nationalist Manifesto of 1919 as a model for Palestine. See Ashbee, *A Palestine Notebook*, pp.182–83.

45. Ashbee, *A Palestine Notebook*, p.206. Written July 11, 1922.

46. *The Colonial Problem* (London: British Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1938), p.249.

47. R.F. Betts, *Uncertain Dimensions: Western Overseas Empires in the Twentieth Century* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), pp.48–49.

48. F.S. Northedge, "1917–1919: The Implications for Britain," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.3 No.4 (October 1968), pp.202–3.

49. Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, pp.361–63.

50. Ibid., p.374.

51. Ibid., p.448.

52. Ibid., pp.499–501,556. See also Gilbert, *Jerusalem in the 20th Century*, pp.94–95.

53. Ashbee discusses his zoning principles in *Where the Great City Stands: A Study in New Civics* (London: Essex House Press, 1917), pp.59–67.

54. Ibid., pp.61–63. For the development of the New York City zoning scheme, see A. Sutcliffe, *Towards the Planned City: Germany, Britain, the United States and France, 1780–1914* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp.116–21.

55. For this policy, see Porat and Shavit, eds., *The History of Eretz Israel*, pp.28–29; and R. Storrs, *Orientations*, pp.364–65.

56. British land-ownership policies in Palestine are discussed in Kark and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and its Environs*, p.167,178,259–76,299–300; and M. Bunton, "'Progressive Civilizations and Deep-Rooted Traditions': Land Laws, Development, and British Rule in Palestine in the 1920's," in G. Blue, M. Bunton, and R. Croizier, eds., *Colonialism and the Modern World: Selected Studies* (Armonk, NY, and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp.145–63.

57. R. Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp.114–17; T. Segev, *Palestine under the British* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1999, in Hebrew), pp.89–107; and Porat and Shavit, eds., *The History of Eretz Israel*, pp.103–6.

58. A.D. King, "Colonial Cities: Global Pivots of Change," in R.J. Ross and G.J. Telkamp, eds., *Colonial Cities* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), pp.22–23; A.D. King, "Exporting Planning: The Colonial and Neo-Colonial Experience," in G.E. Cherry, ed., *Shaping an Urban World* (London: Mansell, 1980), pp.212–13. For case-specific discussions, see J. Abu-Lughod, *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), especially chapters 7–8; Z. Çelik, *Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers Under French Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp.26–27,35–39; Irving, *Indian Summer*, pp.75,76; and G. Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp.145–49.

59. King, "Colonial Cities: Global Pivots of Change," pp.25–26.

60. Kark and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and its Environs*, pp.167,212. Ashbee, for example, chose to live in the Arab village of Wadi Joz, to the north of the Old City. See Ashbee, *A Palestine Notebook*, p.208.

61. The greenbelt as a means of segregation is discussed in King, "Colonial Cities: Global Pivots of Change," pp.24–26; and King, *Colonial Urban Development*, pp.39–40.

62. T.R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.180–81; and King, *Colonial Urban Development*, pp.88,271.

63. Abu-Lughod, Rabat: *Urban Apartheid in Morocco*, pp.142–47.

64. The idea of the greenbelt, adopted by both Ashbee and Geddes, stemmed from Ebenezer Howard's concept of a belt of agriculture surrounding the Garden City. This was later developed as a park area around existing metropolitan centers, and was furthered as such especially by the leading British planner-architect Raymond Unwin, who had collaborated with Geddes on a plan for a suburb of Dublin in 1914. See R. Freestone, "Greenbelts in City and Regional Planning," and M. Miller, "The Origins of the Garden City Neighborhood," both in Parsons and Schuyler, eds., *From Garden City to Green City*, pp.73–74,120.

65. P. Rabinow, "Colonialism, Modernity: The French in Morocco," in N. AlSayyad, ed., *Forms of Dominance: On the Architecture and Urbanism of the Colonial Enterprise* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), p.172.

66. Ashbee, ed., *Jerusalem 1918–1920*, p.21.

67. I. Ben-Asher Gitler, "C.R. Ashbee's Jerusalem Years: Arts & Crafts, Orientalism and British Regionalism," *Assaph*, Vol.5 (2000), pp.29–41.

68. The long-term adverse effects that halting urban development had on the Old City are discussed in E. Schiller, "Ha'eer Ha'atika Kayom" ("The Old City Today"), in E. Schiller and G. Biger, eds., *Yerushalayim: Ha'eer Ha'atika (Jerusalem: The Old City)*, special publication of *Ariel*, Vols.57–58 (1988) (in Hebrew), pp.70–92.

69. Interestingly enough, in 1903 Uganda was offered by the British to the Zionist leader Theodore Herzl as a land where a national home for the Jewish people could be established. This offer, unacceptable to the majority of members of the World Zionist Congress, who envisioned a return to the land of the Bible, died with Herzl in 1904. See Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, pp.272–74.

70. H. Kendall, *Town Planning in Uganda: A Brief Description of the Efforts Made by Government to Control Development of Urban Areas from 1915 to 1955* (London: The Crown Agents, 1955), facing p.21. Kendall became director of town planning for Uganda sometime after his Palestine commission terminated in 1948 with the end of the British Mandate.

71. A. Southall, "Imperialism and Urban Development," in P. Duignan and L.H. Gann, *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p.237.

From a report on the population of Kampala by A.E. Mirams, Town Planning Advisor to the Government of Uganda, it would appear that already in the late 1920s these distinctions disintegrated. According to Mirams's report, by 1930 the majority of Kampala's inhabitants were African. Thus, the city obviously did not evolve according to the 1919 designations. See A.E. Mirams, *Report on the Town Planning and Development of Kampala* (Antebbe: The Government Printer, 1930), Vol.1, pp.17–20.

72. Kendall, *Town Planning in Uganda*, p.21.

73. Ibid., inside cover.

74. C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, "The Process of Urbanization in Africa (From the Origins to the Beginning of Independence)," *African Studies Review*, Vol.34 No.1 (1991), p.69. See also King, "Exporting Planning," p.208.

75. For a discussion of segregation in India, see Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, pp.179–81.

76. King, "Colonial Cities: Global Pivots of Change," p.22.

77. Richard Kauffmann planned the majority of the first modern Jewish garden suburbs in Jerusalem, such as Talpioth, Bait-Hakerem, and Bayit Vagan. He was influenced mostly by modern urban planning of his native Germany, but was also well aware of the British Garden City movement. See D. Kroyanker, *Jerusalem Architecture: Periods and Styles: The Period of the British Mandate, 1918–1948* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1991, in Hebrew), pp.248–84; Kark and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and its Environs*, pp.201–4; R. Kauffmann, "Talpioth, Erlaeuterungsbericht zum Bebauungsplan," Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, L18/78/4,1, n.d.

78. The principles of the Garden City neighborhood are discussed in M. Miller, "The Origins of the Garden City Neighborhood," in Parsons and Schuyler, eds., *From Garden City to Green City*, pp.99–130.

79. Ibid.

80. For the Jewish residential building types, see Kark and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and its Environs*, pp.137–140; and Ben-Arieh, *A City Reflected in its Times*, pp.248–53,257,273–58. For the Palestinian type, see R. Fuchs, "The Palestinian Arab House and the Islamic Primitive Hut," *Muqarnas*, Vol.15 (1998), pp.157–77; and R. Kark and S. Landman, "Hayezia'a Ha-Muslemit Michutz La Chomot beshalhey Hatkufa ha'Ottomanit" ("Muslim Building Outside the Walls in the Heyday of

the Ottoman Period"), in S. Shealtiel, *Prakim Betoldot Yerushalayim Bazman Hachadash* (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi and Israel Ministry of Defense, 1981, in Hebrew), pp.194–207.

81. The approaches to planning of the different sections' neighborhoods are discussed in Kark and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and its Environs*, pp.166–243.

82. Ibid., pp.172. Holliday's Jerusalem work is discussed in Hyman, "British Planners in Palestine," pp.436–75,526–27.

83. The most prominent of these were built by the British architect Austen St. Barb Harrison. They are discussed in R.A. Fuchs, "Austen St. Barb Harrison: A British Architect in the Holy Land," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Technion, Haifa, 1992 (in Hebrew); and Fuchs and Herbert, "A Colonial Portrait of Jerusalem," pp.91–98.

84. Kendall, *Jerusalem: The City Plan*, p.v.

85. An historical account of these events is given in N. Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle between the British, the Jews and the Arabs 1935–48* (London: Andre Deutch, 1979); and R.W. Zweig, *Britain and Palestine during the Second World War* (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1986).

86. M.J. Cohen, *Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate: The Making of British Policy, 1936–45* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978), pp.160–85.

87. Porat and Shavit, eds., *The History of Eretz Israel*, pp.77–79; and Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle*, pp.257,269–70.

88. Porat and Shavit, eds., *The History of Eretz Israel*, pp.46–54,79–84; and Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle*, pp.30–38,194–202,294–97.

89. Kendall, *Jerusalem: The City Plan*, p.xi.

90. Ibid., p.3.

91. The existence of ancient archaeological sites within areas of urban development has been a recurring phenomenon due to Jerusalem's long history. It still poses a substantial challenge to urban planners and architects.

92. Kendall, *Jerusalem: The City Plan*, p.25.

93. Ibid., facing p.44 and p.50.

94. It is noteworthy that in *Town Planning in Uganda*, Kendall does take into account certain cultural aspects of local indigenous dwellings. His zoning plan for Kampala, made in 1951 and apparently exhibiting a preliminary expression of decolonization, is

an intriguing comparison to the Jerusalem 1944 scheme, but is beyond the scope of this paper. See Kendall, *Town Planning in Uganda*, p.24 and map facing p.25.

95. Kendall, *Jerusalem: The City Plan*, p.19.

96. C. Holliday, "Jerusalem City Plan by Henry Kendall (1948)," *R.I.B.A. Journal* (August 1948), p.469.

97. M. Lamprakos, "Le Corbusier and Algiers: The Plan Obus as Colonial Urbanism," in N. AlSayyad, ed., *Forms of Dominance*, pp.198–99. Another example which can be cited is Michele Ecochard's failed attempt to provide adequately sized dwellings for Morrocans in Casablanca in 1946. See Rabinow, "Colonialism, Modernity," pp.180–81.

98. Lamprakos, "Le Corbusier and Algiers" pp.198–99.

99. Holliday, "Jerusalem City Plan by Henry Kendall (1948)," p.469.

100. W. Houghton-Evans, "Schemata in British new town planning", in G.E. Cherry, ed., *Shaping an Urban World*, pp.109–10.

101. Rabinow, "Colonialism, Modernity," p.178.

102. Ashbee, ed., *Jerusalem 1918–1920*, p.1.

103. Kendall, *Jerusalem: The City Plan*. See, for example, pp.12,14.

104. Much of the Ottoman architecture dated from the late nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth was emulative of European eclecticism, such as the neo-Baroque clock tower discussed below. It is probably due to the "foreign" influences of this style that the British did not value it as highly as earlier Ottoman architecture, which did contribute greatly to the "Oriental" atmosphere of the city. In all likelihood, this is the reason for the British distinction between "appropriate" and "unsuitable" Ottoman architecture in the city.

105. A useful definition of architectural erasure is given in A. Wharton, "Erasure: Eliminating the Space of Late Ancient Judaism," in L.I. Levine, Z. Weiss, and D. 'Amit, eds., *From Dura to Sepphoris: Studies in Jewish Art and Society in Late Antiquity* (Portsmouth, RI; Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2000), p.195.

106. *The Times* (London) (February 5, 1919). The article, as it first appeared was not signed. Only the attribution "(from a correspondent)"

appeared under the title "Reconstruction in Jerusalem." However, Ashbee later included this article in *A Palestine Notebook*, citing the same date and claiming authorship. See Ashbee, *A Palestine Notebook*, pp.78–80.

107. Kark and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and its Environs*, pp.29–31.

108. See, for example, the case of India, described by Thomas Metcalf in *Ideologies of the Raj*, pp.171–76.

109. King, *Colonial Urban Development*, p.88.

110. Ashbee, ed., *Jerusalem 1918–1920*, p.2.

111. Ibid., p.22.

112. Kendall, *Jerusalem: The City Plan*, p.37.

113. Ibid., p.6.; Ashbee, *A Palestine Notebook*, p.182.

114. For a discussion of the events related to the demolition of the clock tower, see Fuchs and Herbert, "A Colonial Portrait of Jerusalem," pp.89–91.

115. Kark and Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and its Environs*, p.35.

116. Kendall, *Jerusalem: The City Plan*, p.17.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid., p.20.

119. Ibid.

120. An excellent account of the history of the municipality in the years of the Mandate is given in P.A. Alsberg, "Hama'avak al Rashut Iriyat Yerushalayim Bitkufat Hamandat" ("The Struggle over the Leadership of the Jerusalem Municipality during the Mandate Period"), in Shealtiel, *Prakim Betoldot Yerushalayim Bazman Hachadash*.

121. *The Palestine Mandate* (Geneva: League of Nations Association of the U.S., 1930), p.23, article 3.

122. Ashbee, ed., *Jerusalem 1918–1920*, p.34.

123. This aspect is discussed in relation to Rabat in Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism*, pp.85–90; and in relation to Algiers in Çelik, *Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontation*, pp.25–26.

124. See Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism*, pp.89–90,117–18; and Çelik, *Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations*, pp.40–42.

125. Abu-Lughod, *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco*, pp.141–44.

126. Rabinow, "Colonialism, Modernity," pp.175–79.

127. *Report by Mr. C.R. Ashbee on the Arts and Crafts of Jerusalem and District* (1918), p.44. Copy of the report from the Felicity Ashbee Papers, in the Jerusalem Municipal Archive, box 361 [C.R. Ashbee].

128. Many of these style-setting regulations are in effect to date.

129. *The Colonial Problem*, p.264. Cited from Pierre Charles, S.J., *Le Problème des Centres extra-coutumiers*, pp.118–27.

130. Conventions of Orientalism in British art and photography have been dealt with widely in art historical research. The following studies on the subject should be mentioned, to name a few of the most relevant: J. Sweetman, *The Oriental Obsession: Islamic Inspiration in British and American Art and Architecture, 1500–1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); J.M. MacKenzie, *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); and J. Davis, *The Landscape of Belief: Encountering the Holy Land in Nineteenth-Century American Art and Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

131. For a discussion of these devices, see A. Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.43–57.

132. My use of the term "hybrid" in this context is based on the definitions put forth by Nezar AlSayyad in: "Hybrid Culture/Hybrid Urbanism: Pandora's Box of the Third Place," in AlSayyad, ed., *Hybrid Urbanism*, pp.1–17.

133. The term "cartography of hegemony" is used in the context of colonial space-power relations by Ananya Roy in "'The Reverse Side of the World': Identity, Space and Power," in AlSayyad, ed., *Hybrid Urbanism*, p.241.

134. The role of modernization in colonial discourse is discussed by D. Spurr in *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial Administration* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), p.70.

135. A.D. King, "Rethinking Colonialism," in AlSayyad, ed., *Forms of Dominance*, pp.339–55.

136. *The Palestine Mandate* Vol.1, No.3, June 1930 (Geneva: League of Nations Association of the U.S.), p.16.

Reviving the Betawi Tradition: The Case of Setu Babakan, Indonesia

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This article examines the various conditions that gave rise to a new ethnic group, the Betawi, from the diverse origins of people who settled in the area of today's Jakarta, Indonesia. It first traces the identity-formation process of the Betawi, then examines how Betawi culture has been challenged recently by the development of Jakarta as a global city. As Indonesia's central government has delegated more authority to localities since the end of the New Order era, the municipality of Jakarta has attempted to revive Betawi identity through development of a Cultural Village in Setu Babakan, a place where Betawis are actually a minority. However, it is questionable whether such architectural intervention either has had, or will have the desired effect on cultural revival.

Space has meaning if it is socially constructed and produced.[1] The same may be said for the generation of ethnic identity and tradition. One might predict, then, that it would be difficult to re-create ethnic identity through a revival of traditional built form, especially on a site partially occupied by others. As the case of a Betawi Cultural Center on the periphery of Jakarta shows, it may be particularly important to critically examine such attempts to revive ethnic traditions within the context of the present, globalizing world.

The Betawi emerged as an ethnic group in Batavia (now Jakarta) when present-day Indonesia was ruled by a Dutch colonial administration. The new group encompassed people of various ethnic origins, including Javanese, Buginese, Sundanese, Malay, Balinese, Ambonese, Makassarese, Arabs, Chinese, Portuguese, and others. Over a span of more than two hundred years, people from these backgrounds successfully mixed and produced a unique language, house style, and forms of dance, music, ceremony and theater now known in Indonesia as Betawi. The rich hybridity of this tradition combined components from many ethnic origins, and as it was handed down from generation to generation, Betawis gained a distinct sense of ethnic pride and distanced themselves from their former identities. Under colonial conditions, this process of identity-construction to some extent (to use Manuel Castells's term) came out of resistance.[2]

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After Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, Batavia was renamed Jakarta; and in the years since, the city has been transformed into a metropolis. As an ethnic group, the Betawi still comprise a majority of Jakarta's population, and their culture is still representative of the city. But they are not politically dominant due to the policy during Suharto's New Order era (1966–1998) of appointing local political leaders from the top down. During this period, most Betawis were marginalized as the "other" ethnic group, living either in the old *kampung* (urban village) of Jakarta or in its vicinity.

Recently, however, the municipal government of Jakarta has become worried about the Betawis' decreasing cultural activities and fading identity. Among responses to this concern has been the development of a Betawi Cultural Village in Setu Babakan, on the southern edge of the city. In this district, city authorities have established design guidelines for new construction based on their idea of the traditional Betawi house. Their hope is that this may eventually help revive the cultural identity of the Betawi, generate cultural activities, and attract tourists. On the surface, such a plan might seem workable. But it is clear today that the Betawi Cultural Village lacks the force that originated Betawi culture. And despite the continuing availability of government grants to renovate buildings in the Betawi style, the district has yet to attract significant interest from local or foreign tourists. Meanwhile, the Betawi house type has been reduced in many people's minds to a series of decorative motifs.

Using the case of the Cultural Village in Setu Babakan, I examine the conditions that give rise to ethnic identity. I first focus on how, over the course of many years, Betawi space and identity were negotiated, constructed and produced. I then employ participant observation to understand the corruption of spatial meaning when it is imposed from the outside, rather than generated from the hybrid cultural components of a locality. The Betawi case also shows how identity and tradition so constructed are fragile, especially when confronted by the rapid processes of social, economic and political change characteristic of the present information era. This fragility is particularly marked in Jakarta, where the growth of the city since Indonesian independence has revived older bonds of ethnicity, and where residents are no longer galvanized by common resistance to a dominant colonial force.

GENESIS OF THE BETAWI

It has yet to be fully explained how a society of various ethnic origins gradually merged to become a new group.[3] Nor has it been fully explained how this group came to be differentiated into several key subgroups.[4] However, I will attempt to describe this process, with certain speculations, based on the available materials.

It is unclear whether the term "Betawi" was given by outsiders to certain people residing around the former

Batavia, or whether it originated with those people themselves as a means of establishing a common ethnic identity. Whatever the case, the word "Betawi" is undoubtedly associated with Batavia, probably derived from a mispronunciation of the place name as *batawauya* by visiting Arabs. This was then popularized by the local people as "Betawi."[5] As such, the term is now a common attribute of those who associate themselves with the local culture of Jakarta.[6]

Although the Betawi are generally considered a new ethnic group, related to the development of colonial Batavia, their existence can be traced further back in Indonesian history. Indeed, one epigraph from the Tarumanagara Kingdom reveals that the area of Jakarta has been inhabited since the fifth century. Early settlers there spoke Malay and Sundanese, but their origins are still a matter of debate.[7] Known as Sunda Kelapa, the area was initially controlled by the Pajajaran (Sundanese Hindu) Kingdom. Despite not being as prosperous as its rival Banten, it had certain advantages as a seaport, and the Portuguese attempted to take control of it through allegiance with the Pajajaran Kingdom in the early sixteenth century.[8] However, when the Islamic Javanese ruler Fatahilla defeated the Portuguese in 1527, Sunda Kelapa's name was changed to Jayakarta. It was later renamed Batavia after the Dutch East Indies Company took control of the area in the early seventeenth century.

During their rule, the Dutch colonial administration controlled the various ethnic groups of Batavia by assigning them to walled compounds, each headed by a *capitan,* who was responsible for representing the community and collecting taxes (**FIG.1**). This system allowed each community to retain a certain regulated amount of autonomy, but it also created uncontrolled living conditions that led to overcrowding and poor public health. The Dutch strategy for control of the local population was based on dividing and ruling with "multi-otherness." But the Dutch also established separate rules for the local Chinese population. This created a triangular series of relations, in which Europeans were the preferred group, but where the Chinese served as middlemen to the other ethnic groups.[9]

As part of everyday life under such colonial circumstances, it is reasonable to speculate that small numbers of people within each ethnic compound would have developed intense contacts with members of other groups. Eventually, interracial marriage would have occurred among the Malay, Javanese, Madurese, and other groups of the same religion — or, with some exceptions, between people of different religions. Such interactions would have offered an opportunity for interethnic subcultures to form in certain districts of the city as a result of solidarity and tolerance. Under the pressure of colonial rule, such groups may then have developed hybrid forms of language, building, art, and material culture. Eventually, a new "habitus," to use Bourdieu's term, would also have emerged.[10]

The genesis of such a new group identity would also have involved a process of ethnic change. As part of this

FIGURE 1. *Old map of Batavia. The striped portion indicates the area of ethnic compounds.*

change, each group would only have united with others after it had first separated itself from its original ethnic identity. Linguistic and religious conversion, intermarriage and procreation, and collective action are some of the activities that would have allowed such gradual differentiation of people and modification and transformation of identity.[11] The new group would then have formed through processes of assimilation — either when a new group formed out of several groups (amalgamation), or when several groups were submerged into another (incorporation).[12] The formation of Betawi identity probably involved both amalgamation and incorporation, with Batavia serving as a new symbol for place identity.

Betawi identity would only have crystallized after the group was able to establish new symbols and distinctively identifiable cues. Among these were a new language based on Malay; greeting cues of Arab origin; and hybrid forms of material-cultural expression through arts, theater, dress, wedding ceremonies, and — to a lesser degree — house style. Spoken Malay had long been the most popular language in coastal areas of the Southeast Asian archipelago. And although the majority of the original inhabitants of Sunda Kelapa were Sundanese, their language did not predominate. Indeed, the seaport was a multilingual zone, a melting pot of sailors from many origins. Thus, the Malay language gradually emerged as the basis for a new local language, and this language was gradually "institutionalized" as a new society was constructed in and around Batavia.[13]

One of the earliest descriptions of the Betawi — or Selam, as Batavia residents were also referred to by other groups — appeared in the travel notes of a Javanese aristocrat, Raden Arya Sastradarma, in 1865.[14] Sastradarma distinguished Betawi peoples from Javanese, Chinese and Arabs; and he noted their habits, dialects, fashion, wedding ceremonies, and dress. From his descriptions, it appeared that the culture of local Chinese laborers had profoundly affected Selam or Betawi behavior, particularly in terms of wedding costumes and forms of greeting and personal address. Sastradarma also described how the spiritual orientation of the Betawi had been greatly influenced by the religious devotion of Arabs. And he recounted how the main language of these people was a mixture of Malay and Sundanese, with minor influences from Arabic and Chinese, and some common terms derived from Dutch and Portuguese.

Several factors may underlie this pattern of influence. Contact with the Chinese had been established throughout the archipelago long before the coming of the Dutch. The Chinese were also the major group of foreign settlers in Batavia during the colonial era, and had been granted certain privileges by the Dutch as a catalyst to the natives.[15] The natives also admired the Chinese for their business sense and hardworking habit, and for the fact that they exhibited a type of behavior that was free from feudalism. Indeed, one result of such Chinese influence was the development of an "easygoing" style of public relations among other settlers of the

coastal area. The Betawi, in particular, exhibited a relaxed style in public, and employed Chinese-derived terms for address and food. In contrast to the ritual politeness of elite Javanese, such behavior struck Sastradarma as rude.

Meanwhile, Arab influence grew with the spread of Islam. Among other things, Islam offered a linear concept of time that made the future and past visible — unlike the karmic (circular) sense of time characteristic of Hinduism and Buddhism. Islam also spread a notion of egalitarianism among previously stratified social groups.[16] Religious rituals are a necessity in life-cycle rites and rites of passage in most Southeast Asian communities. And in this regard, Arabs set a new standard for religious practice. As a result, the Betawi eventually came to employ Arabic terms for religious activities and acclamation.

THE BETAWI AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE OF INDONESIA: BUILT ENVIRONMENT AND CHALLENGE

Following independence, Indonesia entered a period of nation-building, during which its different cultural traditions were merged to create a common new identity. During this time of cultural homogenization, the ruling ethnic group was able to gradually impose its values on the others. Under the slogan of "nationalism" in the Sukarno era, and "development" during the Suharto era, the "others" were reconciled with the power center.

As the Betawi joined the nation as equals to other ethnic groups, the creative force that once defined them ceased to function. Many social organizations continue today to be active under the label Betawi, and Betawi symbols and cues continue to serve as attributes, but no new forms of Betawi cultural expression are today being created. In addition, through the years of economic development from the 1970s to the 1990s the Betawi were largely displaced from the center of the city. During this time, government land-clearance programs in the center of Jakarta pushed many people, including most Betawis, out to scattered lands on the urban fringe, where they used government compensation money to construct new settlements. Meanwhile, the land they had vacated was developed by new elites of various backgrounds as the city's central business district.

Under such conditions, television also helped establish and promote a particular view of Betawi culture.[17] In particular, the "Si Doel" show has been one of the most popular TV series in Indonesia. In this and other settings, things Betawi are usually portrayed as provincial and associated with rural life. Such characterizations, of course, also reflect a perceived lack of cultural advancement in comparison to popular culture. Yet, at the same time, as political awareness has spread in the information era, more people have come to demand rights to facilities and rewards.[18] And as a result, local authorities came to realize that, politically, the Betawi, as a "native" group, deserved special attention.

Ali Sadikin, a former governor of Jakarta, was the first to respond to these concerns. In 1974 he ordered that Condet, an area of eastern Jakarta, become a special Betawi Cultural Heritage District. Jakarta had been growing at an unprecedented rate during his administration, and the idea was to prevent Condet's overdevelopment and retain its character as a traditional village.[19] The designation meant that anybody who wanted to construct a building in Condet had to follow rules that specified decorative embellishments, that limited lot-coverage ratios, and that established architectural guidelines based on models of the Betawi house.[20] Sadikin expected that such restrictions would eventually enable the creation of a special zone that would enrich local culture and improve the well-being of Betawis. But his successors were not able to maintain these rules, and the district continued to grow with little effective control. Today, Condet is almost indistinguishable from other districts of the city, and its main road bears no significant character. In particular, the embellishments imposed on new construction did little to effect the overall atmosphere, and many buildings today resemble those of other modern districts of Jakarta (FIG.2).

Under the New Order government, Jakarta was the center of development in Indonesia, and benefited from its centralized policies. Yet financially, culturally and politically the Betawis played a very limited role in this process. They were often dismissed as a common people of strong religious devotion — fruit producers who wore *sarongs* as their daily dress, and who were characterized by "informal" and open behavior.[21] Once a year, during the anniversary of Jakarta, a lavish festival agenda did revive Betawi cultural attributes. But in daily life, modern (Western) lifestyles and forms of architecture came to dominate in the city.


FIGURE 2. *Some examples of embellishment details in a Betawi house. Based on drawing by Lembaga Teknologi University of Indonesia.*

Even with such rapid urbanization, however, most Betawis still live within the city's administrative borders. However, their built environment varies from extremely urban in the center to more rural in more removed areas. Generally, rich Betawis of the urban center live in a manner indistinguishable from their modern counterparts. Poorer Betawis continue their relaxed way of life — if in increasingly urbanized settings. And the most remote rural Betawi still live as traditional fruit producers, relying on the ownership of smaller and gradually more fragmented landholdings. Overall, as Jakarta and its region have become a "*desakota*" urban-rural continuum, the built environment of rural Betawi has gradually been transformed to reflect hybrid urban characteristics.[22] In such a region, members of traditional agricultural households are employed in a variety of occupations; land use is mixed and difficult to officially control; mobility is high, due to improved transportation systems; and women increasingly take part in nonagricultural sectors of the economy.

In terms of house form, the Jakarta municipality today classifies Betawi residences according to three types: *gudang, joglo*, and *bapang* (or *kebaya*).[23] *Joglo, gudang*, and *bapang* have long existed in both urban and rural environments. But from the derivation of the terms, one can infer that only *bapang* (or *kebaya*), which employs an extended side-gable roof, bears a Malay connection.[24] By contrast, *joglo* relates to the aristocratic Javanese house, with its trapezoid roof. *Gudang* is most likely a derivative of "go-down," which, with its front gable, was a building used primarily for storage.

In terms of spatial division, these house types do share some similarities. In particular, *joglo* and *bapang* have a clear tripartite division of front, middle and rear (in *gudang* the distinction between middle and rear tends to be more blurred) (**FIG.3**). The front part of these houses takes the form of an open veranda with a low balustrade, and is used both for receiving guests and relaxing in the afternoon. From here, the entrance to the interior is normally located in the center of the intervening wall. A double door at the center of the middle wall then defines an outer semi-private from an inner private zone. And a rear door is either aligned with, or slightly shifted from, the center of the rear exterior wall.

Such arrangements are typical of dwelling space in many of the raised coastal houses of the Indonesian archipelago and Malay peninsula. To some extent such a type is also built by farmers on agricultural land away from the coast. If one follows the logic that house form generally evolves from simple to complex, one can speculate that this basic type probably generated other house forms after being elaborated by the elite classes of the coastal areas.[25]

Yet, as none of these Betawi house styles dominate either in the urban center or on the fringes of Jakarta, and since none of the other forms of Betawi cultural expression dominate life in the metropolitan region, the Betawis have become increasingly marginalized. And this condition has now

FIGURE 3. *Plan of a Betawi house. Based on drawing by Lembaga Teknologi University of Indonesia.*

become a liability for Indonesia's post-Suharto reformation government. In particular, local autonomy laws, approved by the Legislature and the central government in 2000 after five years of preparation and promotion, have today created confusion with regard to outsiders who still hold top local-government posts. In such a transitional stage toward a more mature democracy, mass political sentiment has emerged and led to calls for a greater role for "the native son."[26] To appeal to the hearts of local people and relieve some of this political pressure, the government has recently paid more attention to things Betawi, including cultural activities.

Resurgence of interest in Betawi culture since 1997 has led to two pilot projects in the Jakarta area: the Betawi Cultural Village built by the provincial government in Setu Babakan; and the "modern *kampung*" of Kemang by the municipality of South Jakarta.[27] The first phase of the Setu Babakan project, the focus of this article, was completed in 2001. Kemang is a separate district closer to the center of the city, and the work there is currently in the master-planning stage.[28] In both cases, however, architecture has been framed as a means to achieve a Betawi cultural revival. However, the two projects are not entirely comparable. Kemang grew from a housing estate in the 1970s to include a new business district by 2003, and its expensive restaurants and exotic and exclusive shops in various architectural styles largely serve expatriates. It would therefore be questionable to push for Kemang as an exclusively Betawi district. In Kemang, careful consideration should be given to what "modern" means to the Betawi, as the area already bears aspects of a "modern [Western]" architectural expression.

THE CULTURAL VILLAGE

Setu Babakan Cultural Village is located in South Jakarta (**FIG.4**). The word "Setu" probably derives from Betawi pronunciation of Sundanese *situ*, which means lake or big pond. "Babakan" is a local Jakarta term for wood skin. But in this case the reference is to a neighboring village, Kampung Babakan, home to a majority of the area's Betawi. Before being identified for special development status, the 160-hectare lakeside site for the cultural village was inhabited both by people who claimed to be Betawi and by members of other ethnic groups (**FIG.5**). Yet, even then, the local Betawis did not appear in colonial-era litera-

FIGURE 6. *Distribution of Betawi Dialects in Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi. Based on a drawing by Yasmine Shahab, 1992.*

FIGURE 4. *Location of Setu Babakan in Jakarta.*

FIGURE 5. *Site of Setu Babakan. Based on drawing by Lembaga Teknologi University of Indonesia.*

ture on the Betawi. Instead, they are today considered to belong to a new category, Betawi Udik (literally, rural Betawi).[29] Such people may also be known as Betawi Ora — *ora* in Javanese means "not" — the reference being to Betawi who speak with a Javanese accent, and whose behavior is closer to rural Javanese in terms of politeness (**FIG.6**).

For the government, an initial key to the project was gaining control of certain areas so it could infill these with cultural activities. Toward this end, it negotiated with two of the most influential persons in the village and eventually obtained several empty lots around the lake. In 1998 the government then assigned an academic-associated engineering firm, Lembaga Teknologi Fakultas Teknik Universitas Indonesia (Institute for Technology of the Faculty of Engineering, University of Indonesia), to develop a master plan for the cultural village. Initially, the planning consultant suggested a "bottom-up" approach to developing the farmland around the lake. To enhance the sense of belonging, this would have involved community members in a participatory process. But government officials in charge of the project had other views, which included imposing a new street pattern on the site, with the consequent destruction of some of the existing environment.[30] It was only when they realized this approach would have unacceptable social and political costs that government officials temporarily backed off the idea.

As initially constituted, the project called for a museum, a theater, housing, a management office, a children's playground, souvenir kiosks, a horse-carriage stand, four gates, a health-care center, a recreation area and fishing pond, and a fire station. By 2003, only one gate, one residence, one guesthouse, an office-cum-gallery, an open theater, lake recreation activities (including the fishing pond), and some kiosks had been completed (**FIGS.7–11**). Nevertheless, these improvements stand as models for future development in coming years. And eventually the government expects this

FIGURE 7.   *Gate of Setu Babakan.*

FIGURE 8.   *The residence built by the government at Setu Babakan.*

FIGURE 9.   *The guesthouse.*

FIGURE 10.   *The open theater.*

FIGURE 11.   *The fishing pond.*

project will not only revive Betawi tradition but attract visitors of various origins, both domestic and foreign.

Of the buildings so far complete, the office, guesthouse, and residence stand side by side facing south. The residence ends a row of buildings at the edge of the site; the theater faces east toward the lake next to the office. A large paved courtyard forms the setting for these structures, located above a paved lakeshore street which provides space for kiosks and parking (**FIG.12**). Visitors may ascend to the paved courtyard from the street by means of concrete steps (**FIG.13**). Once there, they face the stage of the open theater, where they may enjoy its performances.

The residence was built for, and is owned by, one of the oldest persons of the area. Community members consider it to be of mixed style, basically derived from the Central Betawi (Betawi Tengah) tradition. It adopts the Betawi *joglo* form, but it also incorporates a Javanese roof shape adopted and popularized by the Dutch in the nineteenth century.[31] The facade of the guesthouse resembles that of the house, and the office-cum-gallery employs a similar outlook. The theater consists of two small structures that provide backstage facilities and that support a tensile roof.

FIGURE 12. *Paved street at lakeside.*

FIGURE 13. *Open square.*

A major feature of Betawi style, as evident in these buildings, are roof eaves decorated with a repeating geometrical motif (FIG.14). Experts in Indonesian architectural styles will, however, recognize that such a motif is not distinctively Betawi, but is shared by a number of coastal communities (FIG.15). In the former cultural village of Condet the government also mandated that such motifs be applied to new houses. However, by reducing Betawi style to mere motifs, such government regulations run the risk of freezing building traditions and discouraging new inventions. Furthermore, they embody an image that is not necessarily representative of the collective memory of individual communities. Instead, the imposition of such images derived from the past can be read as promoting nostalgia rather than genuine respect for local culture. Indeed, such impositions are akin to forcing those who are not Betawi to bear a Betawi mask; and in so doing, they create a false environment.

In addition to construction of the new buildings described above, the government has also offered incentives, such as eas-

ier access to building permits, for those who want to renovate their houses with Betawi decorative motifs (FIG.16). And it now appears that many community members, whether of Betawi origin or not, have accepted this offer.[32] The government has also created an annual cultural performance program. Thus, every Saturday, except during Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting, the open theater offers cultural performances for the community.[33]

Prior to the cultural village project, most people in the area pursued a Betawi Udik type of peasant lifestyle within a subsistence urban economy.[34] This pattern is typical of many Betawis on the fringes of Jakarta, and within the administrative borders of such neighboring areas as Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok and Bogor.[35] But the first phase of the project generated a considerable amount of construction activity, jobs, and income for the community. It has also stimulated business, as visitors have flowed in — although their numbers are still small relative to other recreation centers in Jakarta. These visitors include many who come as part of school programs, as well as nearby resi-

FIGURE 14. *Betawi-style decorated eaves.*

FIGURE 15. *Similar motifs in North Sumatra.*

FIGURE 16. *A newly built house in Setu Babakan with Betawi deco-rative motifs.*

dents who lack other recreation space. The project has also attracted some younger people to remain in the area.

Despite its positive economic impact on the area around the lake, the project has also brought some negative local effects. In particular, non-Betawi squatters have reportedly moved onto some of the land owned by the government. The habit of squatting on public property continues in the city whenever law enforcement does not adequately protect a place. And the nearby community can do nothing about it, since it has no authority to control who occupies the land. Indeed, squatting has often become a major obstacle to all kinds of government projects, which are then turned into "projects" of underground organizations.[36]

Nevertheless, the most immediate benefit to the community today is that the area now comes alive on weekends. The flow of visitors has created a new vitality, and the fish pond is productive, despite a tendency for the area to be dominated by a certain group. Yet one problem remains: without an official program, can the community generate one if its own? As the project is only now entering its second year, it is too early to answer this question with any assurance.

SPATIAL CONSTRUCTION OF BETAWI: A DISCUSSION

The importance of places like Setu Babakan is problem-atic for reasons that go beyond issues of physical articulation outlined in the previous section. However, to understand its difficulty as a designated site of ethnicity in an increasingly globalized society, it is important to understand the present quality of Betawi identity.

The Betawi are composed of many subgroups, each with its own subculture. Among these groups, the earliest settlers of today's central Jakarta, the Central Betawi, have over the years undergone a process of urbanization. As a result, many are unrecognizable as "Betawi," as their lifestyle today more

closely resembles that of other residents of the fashionable metropolis. Most Central Betawi live either in *gudangs* or Western-style villas, or in *kampungs* (crowded urban villages). A second group of Betawi live in the southern part of Jakarta next to the Central Betawi. This group is generally character-ized as devoutly religious. A third group lives in the neigh-boring regions of Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi. As mentioned above, they are known as Betawi Udik (rural). They include both those of Chinese influence, who reside in the northern and the western parts of Jakarta and Tangerang; and those with Sundanese influence, who reside in the east-ern and southern parts of Jakarta and Bogor as well as Bekasi.

According to a survey done by Yasmine Shahab, many Betawi Udik were originally not Betawi at all. Rather, they claimed to be Betawi only after the 1970s, during the era of Jakarta's fast development.[37] Shahab has further suggested that, contrary to the common view, Betawi identity is still in the making, and that the group is actually expanding. This claim is probably correct in terms of number, although cul-turally, it needs more supporting evidence.

If Shahab's observation is correct, the present Betawis in the area of Setu Babakan would have undergone the ethnic fusion process by incorporation. The previous groups living in the area, most possibly the first generation born in Jakarta, assumed the identity of the Betawi and have gradually, but not totally, been assimilated.[38] Language would most likely have played a significant role in this process, providing the hybrid location for the incorporation of cultural values.[39]

Such an increase in the number of Betawi indicates how Jakarta, as a national symbol, remains a magnet for migrants, who over time come to identify themselves as Jakartan, or Betawi. But such a continuing process also complicates the notion of Betawi ethnic identity. Most significantly, consider-ing Betawi to be a name for the citizens of the Indonesian capital may have a deterritorializing effect. In this case, it reduces Betawi identity to little more than a symbolic projec-tion for the new generations living in Jakarta.[40] As migration and urbanization increase, and as new members of each migrant group move in with those who came before them, the Betawis of Setu Babakan will therefore face new challenges. Those Betawi who live there now sense that they were the first settlers of the area, and they have come to accept the newcom-ers as "the others" who share space with them.[41] But they are also intensely aware of differing cultural practices, and may ultimately come to see them as a threat to the cultural village.

In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the Betawi ethnic identity emerged in as an urban movement, even though many of its subgroups maintained rural behav-iors. Its genesis was directly related to the dominating struc-ture of the ruling colonial power in Batavia. Through force, the Dutch East Indies Company constructed a walled city whose controlling power was both spatial and political. And under the pressure of this new situation, the local coastal people who had lived under quite different conditions prior

to the contest among Europeans and Islamic traders in the early seventeenth century responded by readjusting the entire nature of their lives in Batavia. In particular, they created a hybrid condition where — to borrow Wheatley's concept — a process of urban imposition encountered a process of the urban generation.[42] The new identity was arguably defensive, but it evolved by attracting other existing ethnic groups. Hence, a transterritorial identity emerged, which the local communities eventually constructed and produced within the segregating frame created by the power center.[43] The process encompassed hybrid conditions in which the "habitus" — as a collective mental habit, as well as a socially constituted cognitive and motivating structure — produced practices suitable for the group.[44] In this way, the group constructed and reconstructed a form of knowledge which provided a framework of practice upon the site they inhabited.[45]

Today's Betawi ethnic culture thus emerged from a long process of cultural reconstruction. And in this process, the space of enunciation — or "third space," to borrow Homi Bhabha's term — played a significant role.[46] Specifically, the reconstruction occurred under the conditions imposed by Dutch hegemony, which enabled other positions to rise and new political initiatives to emerge. This condition then led to the creation of new and different areas of negotiation.[47] Such a condition mirrors the present relation between the global and the local, in which the hierarchical dependency between a strong center, represented by the West, and the weak margins, represented by developing countries, creates the conditions for a constant blurring and destabilizing of cultural identities.

Such relations create a continuum of hybridities in which meaning and representation are constantly negotiated. Hybridity thus understood can generate either obedience or separation. In the former case it may express assimilative acts that mimic the hegemonic power and attempt to be reconciled with it, while in the latter it may attempt to shift the drift and overthrow the center.[48] Over the years, the formation of Betawi culture revealed both proclivities. However, since Indonesian independence, despite being to some extent marginalized, it appears to have become more assimilative, and the group is now largely dependent on the helping hand of the government to achieve its goals.

One result of these circumstances of cultural evolution is that most Betawi cultural symbols today were invented in the colonial past. And although these symbols may be renewed with new material, they are not accompanied by new interpretations or meanings. Thus, for example, exaggerated *ondel-ondel* puppets may enrich the festivals of city, but there has been no significant new construction and production of meaning around such shows.[49] In general, it also appears that the force that once was able to absorb various new cultural traits into the Betawi world now seems to be in decline. Faced with this situation, the Betawi elites who occupy more influential places within the city have attempted to revive what they regard as Betawi cultural heritage. But

Betawis at the fringes of the city live and enjoy their environment in a peaceful condition without striving to substantiate, improve, or reinvent their traditions. And in so doing, they become more bound to the past than open to the future.

The Kampung Betawi at Setu Babakan clearly reflects these conflicts within Betawi culture. It started functioning in early 2002 with various programs of performing arts and some occasional exhibitions. Surrounding peoples visit every Saturday, Sunday and holidays (except during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan) for recreation and cultural entertainment. Weekdays, the only activity is the renovation of houses. On the one hand, such a project depicts symbols of rural Betawi life with the hope it will propel and sustain the tradition. Yet, on the other, many Betawis, especially those at the center of the city, currently live a modern lifestyle, wear Western clothes, dwell in modern villas, enjoy pop music, watch American TV programs, and work in modern offices. In some cases they have even become detached from their Betawi identity.

The process by which the project has been developed by the government has highlighted additional conflicts that derive from the dependence of the Betawi on government funding. In some cases the "habitus" of government agency may be open to implementing such a project from the bottom-up. But the noble idea of empowering the local peoples seldom comes to fruition, because those who are charged with implementing it are either reluctant to do so wholeheartedly, or lack knowledge and patience. In this case, such a responsive approach, which might have helped advance Betawi culture, was also hampered by a definition of success that stressed the ability to meet annual budget goals and get the money absorbed.

In such projects, the consultant always works within a tight time schedule. Meanwhile, the government agency in charge seeks only visible, practical results, without fully exploring a situation or examining all potential opportunities. As a result, it is doubtful that all groups are being well represented in the work at Setu Babakan, or that the whole range of local expectations about the future built environment is being addressed. For example, the approach the government and the consultant have implemented relies too much on the view of elders, and fails to consult youth, women, and representatives of "other" groups. Such work based on inadequate data can only yield a planning scheme which will intervene in the existing context without adequately incorporating the interests of all potential actors.

Furthermore, by projecting a certain image of the Betawi upon the existing environment, the planners of Setu Babakan have taken sides in the development of Betawi culture. And since their intervention is one-sided rather than mutually resolved, they have precluded any basis on which new cultural elements might be born. In other words, the planners have used representational space to create something that is not necessarily representative of the local people — something that might have opened the possibility for different practices to take place.[50] The planners have thus acted

as if they occupied a position "above" the local people. In such a planning process officials reciprocally bear both the colonizer's and decolonizer's attitude.[51]

If the planners had taken a more participatory approach, the space filled by representational elements might in time have produced and reproduced new social facts. Instead, the social construction and production of space at Setu Babakan has from the beginning been activated only with nostalgically attributed meaning. Furthermore, the government has made no attempt to serve as a catalyst for constructing a sense of what it means to be Betawi in terms of global-local interaction. In such an atmosphere, it is doubtful whether any aspects of a "new" Betawi identity may emerge.

In post-Suharto Indonesia, as many local governments attempt to establish their regions as distinct from the center, there is a danger that the wrong lesson will be learned in reaction to the Javanization and centralization practiced by Suharto's regime in the name of nation building.[52] In particular, some local governments have turned to the opposite extreme, reacting to previous governmental pressure by reviving exclusively local characteristics. But such an approach may embody other forms of hegemony. And it may produce interethnic conflicts should the government be unable to retain justice and balance. Space thus constructed may not be equally accessible, and may become the stage upon which conflicts are performed.[53]

THE BETAWI CULTURAL FUTURE

It is important to recognize that Setu Babakan is not a homogenous district, and that attempting to revive the Betawi cultural tradition through architectural elements and spatial patterning in such a multiethnic zone represents a severe challenge. Perhaps more significantly, by encouraging the elaboration of Betawi material-cultural expressions here, while ignoring the complexity of local conditions and the facts of contemporary globalization (which may need other forms of articulation to provide needed space for cultural exchange), government intervention may be opening the way for unexpected side effects.[54] Another important question is whether Betawi identity can continue to play a significant role in future mixing of cultures in the region when its former uniting force appears to be significantly diminished. It is equally important to critically examine the present strategy of building a cultural future for Betawis through the past.

In a globalized world, demographic migrations are the rule rather than the exception, and so it would seem a wise choice for localities to open themselves to the traditions of others.[55] However, domestic and international visitors are also drawn to authentic local places, rather than to built-up fantasies such as Disneyland.[56] In this complex social condition, the government-sponsored revitalization of Betawi cultural traditions may need to encourage some level of competition if it is to be successful.[57]

What may be needed, rather than building on nostalgia for past images, is a stimulation program toward the invention of new traditional elements. A productive first phase may include strengthening the self-image of local peoples through campaigns to re-create traditional forms. But in the present era of global-local competition, cultural revitalization will ultimately require the creation of new cultural expressions out of existing traditions of material culture.

1. See S. Low, "Spatializing Culture: The Social Production and Social Construction of Public Space in Costa Rica," in S.M Low, ed., *Theorizing the City: The New Urban Anthropology Reader* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999), pp.111–37.
2. Manuel Castells uses the concept of resistance identity to describe those who construct identity in a position devalued by the logic of domination. See M. Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Vol II: The Power of Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p.8.

3. In a 1930s census, 778,953 people in the area of Batavia claimed to be Betawi; in 1988, this number was estimated to have more than doubled. Depdikbud, *Peta Suku Bangsa: Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah* (Jakarta: Depdikbud, 1989).
4. Betawi scholar Yasmine Shahab has categorized at least five different types of Betawi. Each has considered the other groups to be non-Betawi according to certain criteria such as religion and lifestyle. See Y.Z. Shahab, "Siapa Orang Betawi?" in Y.Z. Shahab, ed., *Betawi dalam Perspektif Kontemporer: Perkembangan, Potensi dan Tantangannya,* (Jakarta: Lembaga Kebudayaan Betawi, 1997), pp.185–88.
5. See R. Saidi, *Profil Orang Betawi: Asal Muasal, Kebudayaan, dan Adat Istiadatnya* (Jakarta: Gunara Kata, 1997), p.15.
6. See Z. Hidayah, *Ensiklopedi Suku Bangsa di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996).
7. Ridwan Saidi, a Betawi scholar, prefers the hypothesis of Nothofer, a comparative dialectologist, that the Malay language used in that area was cognate with that in West Kalimantan, which belonged to Polynesian Malay rather than Austronesian Malay, as proposed by many scholars. See Saidi, *Profil Orang Betawi,* p.10.
8. Based on written sources, there were contests of power between the Portuguese, the rising Islamic kingdom of Demak, the inland Hindu kingdom, the Dutch East Indies Company, and the British. The sources are recently compiled and translated by Adolf

Heuken. See A. Heuken, *Sumber-sumber Asli Jejarah Jakarta Jilid I: Dokumen-dokumen sejarah Jakarta sampai dengan akhir abad ke-16* (Jakarta: Cipta Loka Caraka, 1999).

9. For a detailed description on the condition of Batavia from a more distant view (not of the Dutch and Indonesian), see W.A Hannah, *Hikayat Jakarta* (Jakarta: Obor, 1988).

10. "Habitus" is a term used by Pierre Bourdieu to describe a socially constructed system of cognitive and motivating structures that produces practice. See P. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. from the French by R. Nice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.76. The term is also used by Henri Lefebvre as related to the mental habit of social actions in a scholastic sense. See H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. from the French by D.N. Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp.239–41.

11. For a discussion of Betawi language formation, see Y.Z. Shahab, "Socio Linguistic Aspects of Ethnic Identity," *Jali-Jali, Journal of Betawi Socio-Cultural Studies*, No.IV (July 1990), pp.12–21. For the Jawanese language influence on Betawi language, see Muhadjir, "Jejak Jawa di Jakarta: Tinjauan Kebahasaan," *Jali-Jali, Journal of Betawi Socio-Cultural Studies*, No.IV (July 1990), pp.22–29.

12. See D. Horowitz, "Ethnic Identity," in N. Glazer and D. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp.111–40. See also N.N. Soeyono, "Etnik Sebagai Ciri Masyarakat Majemu," *Jali-Jali, Journal of Betawi Socio-Cultural Studies*, No.IV (July 1990), pp.3–11.

13. This process is one of the basic institutional facts in creating social reality. See J.R. Searl, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), pp.31–35.

14. Sastradarma described the daily life of the peoples in Batavia with a special focus on the new ethnic group, the Selam or Betawi. See S.Z. Hadisutjipto, *Sekitar 200 Tahun Jakarta (1750–1945)* (Jakarta: Pemerintah DKI Jakarta, Dinas Museum and Sejarah, 1979), pp.53–59.

15. For the Chinese influence on Indonesian culture in general, and on the literature and language of the Betawi, see S.N. Oey, "Pengaruh Kebudayaan Cina di Jakarta," *Jali-Jali, Journal of Betawi Socio-Cultural Studies*, No.IV (July 1990), pp.46–58. For a

more elaborate study on Chinese influence upon the island of Java, see D. Lombard, *Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya. Volume 2. Jaringan Asia* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1996).

16. The information is according to Denys Lombard, as told by Ridwan Saidi. See R. Saidi, "Sejarah Betawi," in Shahab, ed., *Betawi dalam Perspektif Kontemporer*, pp.1–34, especially 20–21.

17. The role of television in the social transformation of rural peoples is undoubtedly significant. See Alfian, *Transformasi Sosial Budaya dalam Pembangunan Nasional* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1986), pp.194–210.

18. On the political awareness affected by information and communication, see the observations of Immanuel Wallerstein in *The Essential Wallerstein* (New York: The New Press, 2000), p.430.

19. Ali Sadikin governed Jakarta from 1965 to 1977. About Condet, see R. Ran, *Condet: Cagar Budaya Betawi* (Jakarta: Yayasan Kebudayaan Betawi, 1977).

20. I.B. Harun, H. Kartakusumah, R. Ruchiat, and U. Soedarso, *Rumah Tradisional Betawi* (Jakarta: Dinas Kebudayaan DKI Jakarta, 1991).

21. The description is a popular joke. This joke is frequently addressed in various occasions by the government officials of Betawi origin.

22. "*Desakota*," as a unique region with both an urban and rural character, was first defined by Terry Mcgee. For detailed discussion on the nature of desakota regions, see T.G. McGee, "The Future of the Asian City: The Emergence of Desakota Regions," *Proceedings of the International Seminar and Workshop on the Southeast Asian City of the Future* (Jakarta: Indonesian Institute of Architects, The Aga Khan Program for Architecture, 1989), pp.10–17.

23. Harun, Kartakusumah, Ruchiat, and Soedarso, *Rumah Tradisional Betawi*.

24. See A. Heuken, *Historical Sights of Jakart* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1989).

25. The house type of the common peoples across the coastal areas of the Indonesian archipelago shares a similar plan and roof form. This condition can also be found in some locations inland. It is only the house forms of elite classes that vary from one place to another. See G. Tjahjono, "Dwellings of Indonesia: Tradition,

Resilience, and Change," in R. Knapp, ed., *Asia's Old Dwellings: Tradition, Resilience, and Change* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.159–84.

26. After the Autonomy Law was passed by the Legislature, many local legislatures preferred that executives should be from among "native sons."

27. *Kampung* is a term for urban village in Indonesia. The term was originally applied to village compounds, but it is now commonly used to designate places with a village character in an urban area.

28. This is an ongoing project sponsored by the mayor of the City of South Jakarta. Efforts are still underway to develop guidelines and urban design elements that will enhance the Betawi atmosphere.

29. Y.Z. Shahab, "The Creation of Ethnic Tradition: The Betawi of Jakart," doctoral thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1994, p.165.

30. I owe this information to Mr. Abimanyu Takdir Alamsyah, a planner with whom I had several interviews. The latest was on December 18, 2002, in Depok. For the project, see Lembaga Teknologi FTUI, *Laporan Akhir Penyempurnaan Masterplan dan Rencana Teknis Ruang Kampung Budaya Betawi di Situ Babakan* (Final Report, Masterplan and Spatial Plan Improvement on the Situ Babakan Betawi Cultural Village, Jakarta, 2001).

31. For a description of the Indies style, see R. Gills, "Country Houses of the 18th Century," in G. Tjahjono, ed., *Architecture, Volume 6 of Indonesian Heritage Series* (Singapore: Archipelago Press, 1998), pp.110–11.

32. At the time this article was being written, about thirty houses were in the process of renovation.

33. See S. Imron, Y. Muchtar, and H. Neneng, *Perkampungan Budaya Betawi Setu Babakan: Buku Panduan Wisata* (Jakarta: Pengelola Kampung Budaya Betawi, 2002).

34. For further explanation on such types of living in Southeast Asian cities, see H.-D. Evers and R. Korff, *Southeast Asian Urbanism: The Meaning and Power of Social Space* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000).

35. A report by a research team of the University of Indonesia on Betawi of Bojong, near Bogor, reveals a similar rural

habit. See M. Junus Matalatoa, *Budaya Orang Bojong* (Depok: Pusat Penelitian Kemasyarakatan dan Budaya, Lembaga Penelitian Universitas Indonesia, 1993).

36. This is the issue that circulates around the area. The squatters of public land had been backed by powerful persons who organized the social action and protest to claim land release compensation. Community members and consultants tend to hold this view.

37. See Y.Z. Shahab, "Betawi dalam Mite dan Kenyataan," in Shahab, ed., *Betawi dalam Perspektif Kontemporer*, pp.135–64.

38. Horowitz, "Ethnic Identity," p.116. For the scale of assimilation and theory about it, see T. Parsons, "Some theoretical Considerations on the Nature and Trends of Change of Ethnicity," in Glazer and Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity*, pp.53–83.

39. Compare with H.K. Bhabha, "The Postcolonial and the Postmodern: The Question of Agency," in S. During, ed., *The Cultural Studies Reader* (London: Routledge, 2000, second ed.), pp.189–208.

40. G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* trans. by H. Tomlinson and G. Burcell (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1994), p.86.

41. Compare with E. Soja, "Heterotopologies: A Remembrance of other Spaces in the Citadel-L.A.," in S. Watson and K. Gibson, eds., *Postmodern Cities & Spaces* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp.13–34.

42. For further explanation, see P. Wheatley, "Negara and Commandery: Origins of the Southeast Asian Urban Tradition," University of Chicago, Department of Geography, Research Paper No.207–8, 1983, pp.5–10.

43. For the production of meaning and identity of local communities as opposed to greater power, see and compare with M. Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Vol II: The Power of Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp.60–64.

44. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, p.95.

45. See K. Dovey, *Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form* (London: Routledge, 1999), p.18–19.

46. Homi Bhabha uses the concept of third space in a linguistic sense in cultural analysis. However, as language reveals thought and thus the construction of concept, the term can also explain the complex situation of cultural construction. See H.K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 2002, 1994), pp.36–39.

47. Bhabha's concept of hybridity and of third space was well explained by Edward Soja in E. Soja, Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p.211.

48. This condition was also explained by Soja by quoting Jan Nederveen Peterse's idea of "Globalization as Hybridization" in Ibid.

49. *Ondel-ondel* means a couple of giant-sized puppets wearing the Betawi dress.

50. Compare with Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, pp.33,38–39.

51. See A. Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political Cultures in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2000), p.212.

52. See Wahyudin, "Pemujaan terhadap Kelompok Etnis dalam Kerajaan Postkolonial," in M.M. Dahlan, ed., *Postkolonial: sikap Kita terhadap Imperialisme* (Yogyakarta: Jendela Grafika, 2001), pp.165–72.

53. Since 1998, various local conflicts have occurred in Indonesia, such as those in Ambon (1999–2002) and Poso (1999, 2001) for "religious" reasons, and Sampit (1999, 2001) for interethnic causes.

54. Compare, for example, with J.M. Jacobs, *Edge of Empire: Postcolonialism and the City* (London: Routledge, 1996), p.155.

55. See J. Abu-Lughod, "Creating One's Future from One's Past: Nondefensively," *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, Vol.VII No.1 (Fall 1995), pp.7–12.

56. Some tourists expect authenticity, and thus expect that conservation should lead toward a return to the original. But this view has now shifted as more tourists now tolerate minor changes in the context of Western heritage conservation. However, in Setu Babakan the case is neither of reconstruction nor conservation, and it is doubtful whether there is a connection to genuine cultural tourism. See G.F. Ross, *Psikologi Pariwisata* (original title: *Psychology of Tourism*), trans. by M. Samosir (Jakarta Yayasan Obor, 1998), pp.104–8.

57. Yasmine Shahab had a similar view on inventing an ethnic tradition. Compare with Shahab, "The Creation of Ethnic Tradition," p.383.

All photos by author unless otherwise noted.

Traditions of Appearance: Adaptation and Change in Eastern Tibetan Dwellings

SUZANNE EWING

Tibet has been described as "a heterotopia . . . a plurality of often contradictory, competing and mutually exclusive places simultaneously positioned in a single geographical location."[1] The question of how the combining (or not) of such difference takes place is particularly interesting to consider within the context of domestic life, since the dwelling is a key location of assimilation, appropriation or resistance to external change and influence. For many years the cultural space of Tibet has also been contested. Today, it is apart from, yet fundamentally connected with a developing global diaspora, with a displaced leadership; and it is marked by varying definitions and perceptions of its history and borders.[2] This article explores how these competing forces have caused differences in the image of the dwelling and in the dialogue between this image and actual built and modified form to become more pronounced.

Dwelling form carries significance both as the framework for and embodiment of specific social and ritual cultures, and the working out of particular vernacular building traditions dependent on local processes and materials. It is part of a larger social and spatial system which relates family, way of life, settlement and community, landscape and ecology. In Tibet, as in other parts of the Himalayas, the dwelling and its cycles of construction, inhabitation and renewal are also intricately bound to the particular phases and aspects of its inhabitants' lives as understood from an underlying Buddhist framework. In the Kham region of Tibet, the area of this study, these are also linked to the Bon religion and local folk beliefs.[3] Traditional image-making in relation to dwellings in Tibet thus situates the house in relation to mountain and cosmos, enclosure and boundary, and a distinctive color and squareness of form (**FIG.1**).

Generally speaking, both the *form* of tradition and the *tradition of dwelling,* as a collection of encounters and processes of inhabitation, are understood to implicitly assimilate change. However, the speed and confluence of external influences in Tibet in recent years has accelerated and sometimes distorted traditional paradigms. The result has been an increased focus on form, resulting in hybridities where differences often blatantly coexist (**FIG.2**).

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FIGURE I. *Wall painting, garden building in Norbulinka summer palace, Lhasa. (Photo by author, 1999.)*

Today emerging shifts in the making of buildings in Tibet demonstrate changes both to the form of tradition and the tradition of dwelling. These have been informed to differing degrees by a number of factors: changes in the availability and supply of materials and labor, political agendas for improvement, demographic change, the assimilation of new (global) media, local aspirations, and attitudes toward modernity. This article looks at how these various factors are being resisted or accepted in dwelling forms, and how the image of the dwelling may be changing.

FIGURE 2. *Local hybridity: an almost-complete new "traditional" Tibetan house with a Chinese-inspired roof. (Photo by author, 1999.)*

The research consisted of an examination of specific houses and groups of houses in three areas in Ganze County in the northwest of China's Sichuan Province, between 1998 and 2000.[4] It included case-study observations, surveys, and interviews regarding local building processes and buildings under construction, to establish knowledge and understanding of current practices and evaluate issues that may influence future development and house adaptation.

In particular, the research focused on three sites located at various distances between Kanding (a mid-sized town at the eastern edge of ethnic Tibetan settlement) and the buffer zone of the nationally designated Luoxu Nature Reserve (an area of outstanding natural beauty in the very northwest of Sichuan Province) (FIG.3). The areas were defined as follows: area one — grasslands around the temple town of Thlagong (Tagong Na Wa Xe settlement); area two — a historic town northwest of Yushu/Serxu (Dengke); and area three — a rural mountain village at the edge of the current Tibetan Autonomous Region (Bengda).

CHANGE IN EASTERN TIBET

The Kham are one of four main ethnic Tibetan groups. Their area of residence combines the eastern portions of the current Tibetan Autonomous Region with the western area of Sichuan. The TAR was created as a political region of the People's Republic of China in 1965, following the absorption of Xikang (eastern Tibet) into Sichuan in 1955 (FIG.4).[5] However, the geographical area populated by ethnic Tibetans is much larger, extending from Qinghai Province in the north, to Sichuan in the east, to areas of northern India and Nepal in the south.

Since the late 1990s, the influence and pressures of social and urban modernization have grown in eastern Tibet, as increasing numbers of Han Chinese migrants have arrived as part of the PRC's "Great Leap West."[6] Launched in June 1999 by President Jiang Zemin, the central ambition of this initia-

tive was to relate the rapid urbanization of China's east to the development of its perceived "backward" west. Among other things, it has meant encouraging a change in rural production from a pattern of largely domestic consumption to a more market-oriented system — with the goal of better harnessing and controlling the resources of the Tibetan plateau. Within the Chinese government, the perceived need for such a modernization project had its roots in the 1950s, as evident in discussions following the Khampa uprising in eastern Tibet.[7] From the 1980s, the west of China has been the site of major road-building projects, as well as one of the most ambitious development projects in Asia, the 190-km. Qinghai-Tibet railway (due to be completed in 2007). Running south from Golmud in Amdo to Lhasa in central Tibet, this railway traverses high altitudes, cold terrain, and a fragile ecological setting. It illustrates why many of the projects of the Great Leap have been likened to the development of the Wild West.[8]

Although the movement of Tibetans is still restricted for economic and political reasons, the rural areas of western China are today being opened to visitors from eastern China and abroad.[9] Implicit in this policy is an expectation that the region will remain attractive to the global tourist market as a site of cultural consumption, based on its image as a "Shangri-la," or spiritual antidote to the material West.[10] The danger does exist, however, that improvements to the region's infrastructure in support of increased levels of visitation may jeopardize the environmental and cultural values tourists wish to experience. Indeed, this larger discussion of ecological sustainability now encompasses development projects and debates in many Himalayan regions, including Bhutan, Nepal, Ladakh, and the area of central Tibet around the city of Lhasa.[11]

According to the *Encyclopedia of Vernacular Architecture of the World (EVAW)*: "Since 1950, new developments and hastily constructed roads have introduced new materials (such as cement and aluminium) and new needs, causing a rapid degradation of the architectural heritage of the

Himalayas. . . . Most of these changes have produced maximum disruption to the environment."[12] Individual localities have taken various strategies with regard to such outside forces. In the region, for example, it is possible to contrast the effects of Bhutan's tightly controlled attitude toward modernization with the experience of Nepal, which was widely opened to visitors in the 1970s and 1980s and has since suffered significant cultural and environmental damage. Another important site of study has been Ladakh, a rural region of northwest India. Following a number of appropriate-technology initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s, it was recently cited as a potential model for the "ecological" development of the region as a whole.[13]

More specifically, in the Kham region of China a number of factors are converging to create changes in the form and traditions of dwelling. Among these are government campaigns of nomadic resettlement, a new availability of consumable items, infrastructure development in terms of new roads and electrification, and the spread of global communications technology, including satellite television, radio, and the Internet. However, as the studies presented below indicate, spatial practices implicit to traditions of dwelling are relatively slow to change, despite increased awareness of alternative forms.

On the other hand, the image of the "traditional" can be appropriated in a number of ways. As Dodin and Räther have pointed out, the "inherent ambiguity" of this image allows it to be ". . . proposed with one meaning while it is used politically in another, allowing a government to present a model of Tibet intended to be read by its domestic audience as concern for the threat to traditional culture, and by Chinese diplomats as sympathy for the difficulties of bringing a backward society into the modern world."[14] Conversely, what that image represents can also be appropriated in the context of the domestic as a continuity of tradition, while outwardly appearing to be at odds with it.

Such a "hybrid typology" has been noted in other Himalayan areas. For example, according to Dujardin (in relation to Bhutan):

> . . . one may feel uneasy about the way urban architecture adopts architectural features from the country's unique traditional architecture. Major efforts have been made to give each (imported) urban building type a traditional appearance. "Tradition" is seemingly brought down to the level of wall-paper decorations by providing each "westernized" urban building with a Bhutanese character. . . .[15]

This phenomenon of new buildings donning an external "coat" or dress suitable to a particular locality, which mimics its recognized local idiom, is certainly evident in developing areas of eastern Tibetan. In an institutional context it has often involved efforts to localize urban buildings such as government offices or new power or supply stations (**fig.5**).

figure 5. *Urban hybridity: new building type (government office) with applied image in the local idiom, Kanding. (Photo by author, 1999.)*

EASTERN TIBETAN DWELLING TYPES: A NEW HYBRIDITY

> *Everyone knows the magnificent, daring stone buildings typical of Tibet — palaces, castles, temples and even private houses. Such technology is not the work of nomads. The prototypes of this architecture are reported in the land of Fu and the Country of Women, in eastern Tibet in the sixth century; nine-storied houses and defence towers some 75 to 90 feet in height. These towers, which are often octagonal, are still characteristic of the Ch'iang and other districts in Kham, in the modern period.[16]*

Historically, the buildings of Tibet have often been striking, combining almost monumental simplicity of form and construction with intense decorative moments. They often occupy settings of topographic complexity, in a harsh yet "fragile" environment.

EVAW has categorized eastern Tibetan dwellings according to three types of Himalayan dwelling and four shapes of Tibetan houses in Sichuan.[17] Dwellings observed in this study included a range of typically noted arrangements — *sun genka* (U-shaped), *lov benka* (L-shaped), and *gongoag* (rectangular). In terms of the three case-study areas, *gongoag* dwellings predominated in the grassland settlements of the Thlagong (Tagong) valley, north of Kanding (**fig.6**). *Sun genka* and *lov benka* dwellings were more common in the town of Dengke, situated on the banks of the Yangtse in the northwest of the province. The same was true of the more rural, mountain-valley settlements of Bengda further northwest.

All types of dwelling in this area are traditionally massive-walled, flat-roofed structures. They must shelter an extended family through the extremes of a harsh, snowy winter and a hot summer, and they must withstand occasional earthquakes. Walls are constructed of dry stone or rammed

FIGURE 6. Gongoag *type houses in the rural settlement of Na Wa Xe, in the grassland area outside Thlagong. (Photo by author, 1999.)*

earth, with an internal timber post-and-beam structure which supports timber/earth floors. Other typical features include timber stairs and paneling and carved hardwood window frames and shutters. Although variations occur from settlement to settlement, individual family dwellings are generally rectangular and either two or three stories tall. Settlements vary in size, but it is rare to see isolated houses. Generally, the study found that traditional differences between houses in the Thlagong valley and the historic town of Dengke, two to three days travel to the northwest, included overall shape, amount and use of timber, and detailed aspects of decoration. Depending on wealth, dwellings in Dengke ranged from a single story to three stories tall. However, all usually featured some form of entrance courtyard, which separates family spaces of encounter from the street or adjacent path.

In terms of recent changes to dwelling form, in area one the study found that significant expansion and building had taken place in the town of Thlagong over the past five years, including extensive renovation of the existing temple. New materials, roof forms, and extended infrastructure (such as electric cables to houses) were evident. The increased accessibility of the area had generated demand for a tourist hostel in Thlagong (FIG.7). More shop trade had appeared along the main street to the temple, primarily to serve the needs of recent Chinese settlers, who inhabit many of the new houses.

In the second area, the historic town of Dengke, the study found a considerable number of recently constructed buildings, generally for wealthy households. Despite the continued poor access infrastructure, concrete and other new materials and processes were being used alongside traditional forms and processes (FIGS.8–10). The town's bureaucratic compound, school, and hospital buildings, built by the Chinese government, stood in stark contrast to more traditional rammed-earth and timber structures.[18] Electricity was available, and the glass and plastic litter along the main street was evidence of the availability of consumer products.[19] It emerged from interviews that an increase in the price of timber, due to a government-imposed afforestation ban on logging in the area, was a significant factor in present building choices.[20]

In the third study area, the rural mountainous settlements of Bengda consisted primarily of single-story buildings with stepped courtyards and roofs. Traditional materials were similar to those in Dengke — rammed-earth walls with internal timber post-and-beam frames. However, the influence of a nearby Sakya monastery (*Bengda gompa*), with its strong pattern of striations, was evident in building decoration. Satellite dishes had been installed in the concrete, Chinese-built bureaucratic compound, as well as in one traditional walled private house. Since the area is only accessible by jeep, the use of outside materials is still limited. The tradition of building with rammed-earth walls is being maintained, although an inventive use of waste glass signaled the emergence of an ad-hoc hybridity (FIGS.11,12). A number of houses in the settlements of Bengda had been improved recently. One, in particular, near the foot of the village, had new glazing and a very colorful new painted timber facade for its upper story. The Bengda Xiang secretary commented in a meeting that families with more income now wanted more "styles" to differentiate their houses. Other desired changes included "letting in more light" and the use of pitched tiled roofs.[21]

In terms of trends, the investigation revealed that the *form* of tradition is being maintained to differing degrees in the three study areas. In Dengke and Bengda the image of the dwelling has remained generally close to earlier versions, with local adaptations/assimilations and adjustments. At the other extreme, however, the blatantly hybrid new forms in the more rapidly urbanizing areas of Thlagong clearly illus-

FIGURE 7. *Section through a tourist hostel in an existing Tibetan building next to the main street in the town of Thlagong. The box on the right indicates the main (physical and spiritual) vertical organization. (Drawing by Nic Crawley, 2000.)*

FIGURE 8. *Old methods and forms are maintained in this* lov benka *house under construction. Such buildings using traditional construction materials and methods are becoming increasingly costly, however, due to a lack of local timber since the institution of a logging ban by Chinese authorities. (Photo by author, 1999.)*

FIGURE 10. *Recently completed* lov benka *house that conforms to the image of a local tradition accepting of new materials and products. Thus, the concrete steps take the place of timber or earth steps, and Chinese clay tiles appear at the edge of the roof. In addition, the square timber ends running under the eaves are probably of imported, bought softwood, unlike the round-ended locally available timber that supports the floor of the upper level. (Photo by author, 1999.)*

FIGURE 9. *Hybrid construction on a new house in Dengke. Rammed-earth walls enclosing new poured concrete, brick, and timber wall structures. (Photo by author, 1999.)*

trate the impact of demographic and market changes. In this case, the marked distinctions between buildings reinforced cultural boundaries and issues of identity — in particular declaring the presence of Han Chinese migrants and their political and economic power.

The study found that the use of imported, rather than local, labor and skills was perhaps the most significant shift in building practices in the region. As a result, the construction process itself is developing a new hybrid character, in which known materials and associated methods of construction are used to create a form-related "identity." Concrete, for instance, is being introduced in a variety of ways, as are different grades of imported sawn lumber. In addition, glass windows are replacing wooden screens/shutters, and a cladding of glazed brick and tile, ubiquitous along roads throughout Sichuan, is becoming a new "face" for the region, jostling with "Tibetan-style" facades.

Meanwhile, architectural elements that have long been understood as "traditional" are being extracted and fused to differing degrees with that which is perceived as new and desirable. Thus, traditional external decoration and signification may be joined with completely "other" building processes and types. This change has been facilitated by the increased presence of specialist construction workers and product sellers. Such outsiders are taking over the job of building maintenance and adaptation, a responsibility which traditionally fell to each family which occupied a structure. As a result, regional variation in, for example, timber window decoration is tending toward greater homogeneity, as standard building products are replacing locally made building features.

FIGURE 12. *Ad-hoc use of "modern products": glass bottles fill the eave area
traditionally occupied by timber, brush or slate. (Photo by author, 1999.)*

Generally, the study also found that the most visibly
hybrid buildings were those in proximity to areas undergoing
rapid urbanization.

SPATIAL PRACTICES: TRADITION OF DWELLING

The building of houses in Tibet has historically enabled
a continuity of relationships between family and community
through time, and between the realms of interior and exteri-
or in space. In broader terms, it has also signified the inter-
dependency of earth and gods. Indeed, the internal spatial
arrangements of the Tibetan home evidence deeply rooted
symbolic structures and spatial relationships also evident in
the single, overarching spaces of nomadic tents.[22]

*At the time of the thirteenth century Mongol censuses, a
family was defined as a house, four pillars in size, contain-
ing six persons: the married couple (their children, no
doubt), manservant and maidservant. The household
included domestic animals and fields.[23]*

Within a typical Tibetan house, the central living area is
usually located on a floor raised above ground level. This is
the heart and primary place of encounter within the
dwelling, both for the family and in relation to outsiders and
other members of the community. Family relationships are
most pronounced in this space. It is where eating, celebrat-
ing, and decision-making take place — both as ordinary,
everyday activities and as related to more significant events.
Occasionally, this space is also used for sleeping.

In spatial terms, the central living area is usually at least
partly enclosed by internal walls or screens, which denote
separation from other areas of the house. It is entered after
passing by an adjacent area containing a stove and used for
cooking. In one of the poorer case-study houses, this cook-
ing area was part of the same room; however, it was differen-
tiated by a lower floor.

Within the main living space a low table and bench seats
are provided. Guests or important members of the family sit
furthest from the door, while the host sits with his back to
the door. Relationships are thus ordered while tea or food is
being served and received (**FIGS.13–14**). Generally, the area
defined around this table also allows the host to see out
through a window, either directly to the house's entrance
courtyard or to an intermediate balcony.

Specific arrangements vary between settlements depend-
ing on the overall setting of each house. But a structural tim-
ber column is generally used to define areas within the
room. The column can mark a place for a small shrine, and
has been interpreted as "the fixing peg of the earth," related
to the household deity and hearth.[24] The wealthiest living-
area interiors are intensely decorated with timber paneling
and flooring, brightly painted cabinets or wall details, and
simple wooden furniture. Window frames and shutters or
screens are also made out of carved and painted wood.

In terms of the relation between interior and exterior,
Stein has commented on the defensive appearance of Tibetan
houses: "even the dwelling houses are fortress-like," he has
written.[25] In this regard, the perimeter walls are physically
and symbolically significant, not only for climatic reasons but
also as a means of marking, defining and ordering the bal-
ance of social, spiritual and physical relationships — the
phyi-nang relationship (**FIG.15**).[26] How this boundary is
made can depend on the local settlement situation: for exam-
ple, a house may be isolated, freestanding, or built as part of
a tight-knit neighborhood in a village or town. Whatever the
case, its single entrance door on ground level denotes a pri-
mary orientation, which both locates the house in its settle-
ment and sets up its interior ordering.

FIGURE 13. *Interior of Fong Ying's house, Dengke, northwest Sichuan, showing living area. The central column is visible on the very left-hand side. (Photo by author, 1999.)*

FIGURE 14. *Interior plan and section of living area of Fong Ying's house. (Drawing by author.)*

FIGURE 15. *Schematic drawings of a Tibetan house, showing the clear boundary between outside (*phyi) *and inside (*nang*). Internally, spatial arrangements are defined by the relationship between kLu, lha, and intermediate btSan, the realm of humans. Offerings to house protector gods (*pho.lha.mkhar*) are located on the four corners of the roof (1). The hearth is, significantly, the home of* thlab-lha, *the household deity (3). A shrine to an interior or mother god (*phug.lha/mo.lha*) may also be associated with a column near the hearth (2). (Drawing by author.)*

In terms of materials, the solid base of a house is deliberately contrasted to the more lightweight timber construction of window openings, cladding, and decoration on its upper levels. The distinction signifies how the human act of dwelling is situated between earth and sky. To further accentuate this relationship, prayer flags and offerings may be located at the outer corners of the roof.

In this tradition of dwelling, the articulation of window openings in the perimeter wall may be particularly significant, as can be seen in an example from a Thlagong house (**FIG.16**). Here, the hierarchy from earth to sky underlies all choices of materials and architectural details. In particular, the color white, painted on the stone surrounding the window, denotes the protector deity framing the opening to the *btSan* world of dwelling. Meanwhile, the wood of the windows is often painted red, and relates to red horizontal bands, or defined courses, on the surrounding walls.

The symbolism of particular carved window forms relates to more detailed representations of Buddhist *dharma* texts/teaching. Traditionally these may also vary between settlements according to their relationship with specific monas-

MATERIAL:
1 DEFINED
2 STONE/SLATE
3 TIMBER
4 CARVED TIMBER
5 MUD

'PURE' LHA [WHITE a
'NEUTRAL' KLU [BLACK b
'POWER' BTSAN [RED c
              [YELLOW d
              [BLUE e

FIGURE 16. *Analysis of a traditional window. (Drawing by author.)*

area — and, significantly, the hearth — exists between the lower (*kLu*) and upper (*lha*) realms, a pattern synonymous with the organization of the Tibetan cosmos (**FIG.17**).[28] In typical arrangements, the entrance level is used for storage and shelter for animals. The main living floor above has separate cooking, living, sleeping and storage areas varying in size and division depending on the wealth of the family. The top floor, or roof, typically houses a "god" room or shrine, which is sometimes associated with a room reserved for visits by significant guests, such as a lama. The flat-roof area, snow-covered for most of the winter is also used for storage and drying of crops in the summer. However, such flat roofs are also prone to leaks during heavy rains and due to seasonal loading of snow, and traditionally require significant maintenance. It is therefore not surprising that adjustments to the form of the roof are being experimented with as new materials, products and processes become available.

It is significant today that the above spatial arrangements, indicative of a *tradition of dwelling*, are being maintained in contemporary houses. In all three study areas established relational definitions (family-community, interior-exterior, earth-

teries.[27] For example, the Sakya *gompa* near Bengda is distinctive in its use of three colored stripes on its external walls, and this pattern carries over to the local settlements. In the temple compound, however, there is also a differentiation between the striped exteriors that face out toward the valley, and the wall surfaces facing the inner courtyard, which are painted a deep, plain red. This can be interpreted as another signification of the differentiation of the world of the earth and human interaction in terms of spatial location. The treatment of individual windows and the exterior of individual dwellings can also be traced back to painted images of dwellings in their collectively understood framework (**refer to FIG.1**).

The tradition of "tripartite" spatial ordering within the clearly bounded, four-walled enclosure of the Tibetan dwelling also establishes important symbolic divisions between the world of earth and the gods. Thus, the living

FIGURE 17. *Tripartite ordering of traditional family house in the grasslands of Thlagong. Special areas are outlined in gray and numbered: 1) SBas-ka ("Pillar of the sky, fixing peg of the earth") establishes a basis for all vertical relationships in the house; 2) a sky door, the opening in the roof, links* btSan *with the realm of* lha *by means of a ladder, a connection that may sometimes be manifest as rising smoke; 3) an earth door associated with the family hearth and/or opening from the ground level links the lower world of spirits,* kLu, *with* btSan. *(Drawing by author.)*

gods) continue to structure the spatial organization and circulation of recently constructed dwellings. This is particularly true of the relationship between a lower-level entrance and an upper-level reception and living area containing a hearth and table. Where electricity is available, this main living area may also be the area of the house that is lit. Even the spatial order of a small, one-room apartment in a new housing block in Kanding, inhabited seasonally by a trading family from the Thlagong grasslands, was found to be structured according to the general qualities described above. In addition to "living area," this space needed to provide places to sleep and store the butter of the family's trade. Yet despite the cramped scale and the setting in a ready-made housing block, the essential inter-relationships were maintained.

The continued importance of the ordering of the main living space as a key to family dwelling practices is also indicated today in the relative placement of such new high-status products as televisions, stereos, and built-in furniture. On the other hand, the incorporation of products giving access to global media inside this ordered space has had important impacts on the lives of the occupants and the way they inhabit it.[29] According to Morley and Robins,

> . . . time, distance, and culture are almost interchangeable concepts, in explaining and justifying the differences between the colony and the metropole . . . the colony is seen as primitive, backward and underdeveloped. . . . The flow of time, in this context, is the product of colonial agents . . . who collectively represent themselves as agents of "progress" — a term opposed to "tradition," that also merges time, distance and culture. Progress implies movement in time, from unchanging past to the dynamic future; in space, from the isolated hinterland to the bustling city; and in culture, from static tradition to fashionable modernity.[30]

The separation of the spatial-symbolic aspects of tradition from their material embodiment may ultimately be one factor that will lead to the fragmentation of the *tradition of dwelling* (as embodied in the *form of tradition*). In particular, it may allow a new consciousness to arise of a discrete vernacular, "ordinary" building in opposition to a deliberately "modern-style" house, according to the status and aspirations of the owners, developers or authorities. At the same time, concepts of style, choice and individuality may diverge from the more synchronized understanding of detail and situation that currently allows different activities and meanings to interrelate. No longer seen in a relational context, building process and inhabitation may then lose their sense of situated place and meaning, and become discontinuous from older processes of making and remaking the dwelling.

Given the influential and unique political and cultural exposure of Tibet in the West and within China, this separation may potentially have wider implications — in particular, as it relates to differentiating, delimiting and maintaining

particular interpretations of national and cultural identity. Thus, an accelerated developmental model, involving a Chinese national view of minority groups like Kham Tibetans as historically backward and in need of modernization and national appropriation, can be perceived as exploitative. However, beyond lies contact with a global market and documented associations of "no-choice" modernity that may prove equally dominating in economic and cultural terms. Dodin and Räther have written, "The spectrum of foreign renderings of modernization is wide . . . a developmental consequence of globalisation that exists irrespective of 'the Chinese' and their policies."[31]

RHETORICS OF IMPROVEMENT

According to Bishop: "Since the 1979 reforms, and especially since Deng Xiaoping called for a commitment to rapid marketization of the economy in 1992, the principal Chinese rhetoric about Tibet has also become a rhetoric about modernity."[32] One result has been that the implicitly evolving process of tradition in Tibet has shifted to accommodate the replaceable products of global markets, with their implicit associations of the new, the modern, and the progressive. In terms of building practices, then, a local impact of globalization has been the perception that local building techniques and forms are inferior to "new" construction methods and materials.

Today specialists argue that experimentation with new techniques is superior to common knowledge and local ability to build using such techniques as rammed earth. Yet such a transfer of construction, repair and maintenance techniques may not be appropriate. The main problems with traditional Tibetan buildings today are that their roofs may leak, they lack adequate light and ventilation, and they need to provide improved levels of sanitation. And in this regard, the perception of "modern" (usually Western or Chinese) technology as being superior to local methods may ultimately lead to superficial decisions that not only inadequately address these issues, but affect judgements embedded in a larger understanding of how materials behave in the local environment.

Ironically, the tendency to shift from a collective understanding of building forms and practices to individual "style" in single-family dwelling has been countered by the repetitive quality of government resettlement housing, both in form and methods of construction. The horizontal banding courses evident in the stone construction of these new structures may also be less related to the local dry-stone technology and the layouts of existing houses in the region, than to the brick and block/mortar technology more typical of the skills of Han Chinese migrants to the area.

Early in the twentieth century Tibet's exposure to the "other" came largely as a result of its Indo-British relations. Today, such exposure comes primarily from China. However, as a result of such outside contacts, the image and identity of

Tibetan buildings are coming to reflect a number of outside agendas. Among these have been the "nationalization" and "modernization" projects of the People's Republic of China and the "conservation" agenda of concerned global agencies and networks with their alternative-technology models. Meanwhile, traditions of adaptive local building practice and processes continue, appropriating new products and methods. However, such slower processes of traditional building adaptation orthodoxy are being confronted and challenged by local people already appropriating and accommodating global media and ideas, with resulting shifting aspirations. And in this context the perceived superiority of new products and the more "advanced" infrastructure of the "global" inevitably reinforces the conclusion that what is local is inherently inferior.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE POLARIZATION OF CULTURE

The characterization of Tibet as a heterotopia is evident in recent shifts in dwelling traditions and practices. As observed and documented in recent changes in the more urban and accessible centers of Kanding and Lhasa, the identity and substance of Tibetan architecture is at a critical juncture. Here, fast-track concrete buildings often define themselves as regionally distinct using little more than

"Tibetan-style" cladding. This appropriation of style may be seen as serving the wider political aims of The Great Leap West; it may also be seen as deriving from exposure to the pressures and politics of the globalization of space and place.

"Modernity" in this context may be understood as involving a marked shift from local process to the importation of global products. A number of overriding agents have been influential in this shift: the developmental/modernizing agenda of the central Chinese government; the opening of the region to global economic and tourist markets, bringing new pressure for infrastructure development and cultural conservation; and the equating of a specific culture/aspiration with particular building decoration, which raises questions concerning social, cultural and national identity. In the architecture of the traditional rural dwelling, an increasing awareness of individual style difference seems to be accompanying these general shifts. As a result, the *form of tradition* is becoming more self-conscious. It may also be gradually separating from the implicit *process* (or *tradition*) *of dwelling*.

This article has identified some aspects of the tradition of dwelling in a rural area of Eastern Tibet. It has found that the tradition of dwelling and processes of inhabitation here are generally adaptive to change, but often involve an additive rather than a synchronized appropriation of new building features. A new hybridity of dwelling form in the region also exemplifies a polarization of material and socio-spatial reality.

REFERENCE NOTES

1. P. Bishop, *The Myth of Shangri-La: Tibet, Travel Writing and the Western Creation of Sacred Landscape* (London: Athlone Press, 1989).

2. T. Dodin and H. Räther, eds., *Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections and Fantasies* (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2001).

3. J. Studley of the Care & Share Foundation notes from a conservation-ethics survey undertaken in 1999 that local gods (Lamaism/*lha chos*, Bon dharma/*bon chos*, folk religion/*mi chos*) continue to play an important part of everyday life. M. Dujardin, "From Fortress to Farmhouse: A Living Architecture," in F. Pommaret-Immaeda and C. Schicklgruber, *Bhutan: Mountain Fortress of the Gods* (Vienna: 1997), noted that in Bhutan, "House construction is essentially an act of cultural belonging. . . . Each house is the materialization of the cultural identity of its users, endorsed by the entire community."

4. The author acknowledges the support of

the Centre for Architectural Research and Development Overseas (CARDO), the School of Architecture Planning & Landscape at the University of Newcastle, and the University of Newcastle Small Grants Fund awarded in 1999 to enable fieldwork under the auspices of a multidisciplinary ecotourism project led by the Care & Share Foundation. Material is based on fieldwork studies in Sichuan, PRC, in 1998–1999, as well as ensuing literature reviews and documentation, including exploration of the sustainable adaptation of existing traditional dwellings. A subsequent linked research project was undertaken by Nic Crawley, with fieldwork in 2000. Some of the ideas developed in this paper were presented at the Seventh IASTE Conference in Trani, Italy, October 2000, as S. Ewing, "Authentic Dwelling? Contemporary Aspects of Traditional Building Aspiration and Process in Eastern Tibet."

5. For detail on recent political history, see T. Shakya, *The Dragon in the Land of Snows:*

A History of Modern Tibet since 1947 (London: Pimlico, 1999).

6. *China's Great Leap West* (Cheltenham: Tibet Information Network, 2000). The title makes reference to China's 1959–61 "Great Leap Forward."

7. Shakya, *Dragon in the Land of Snows*, discusses reactions to the Khampa uprising in the 1950s. Among other things, the Chinese believed these areas had "special problems" because they were "less developed and socially backward" (p.136), and also included a large nomadic population. The uprising resulted in Tibetan refugees from the east (old Xikang) moving to central Tibet, where support for their reaction to Chinese control was ambivalent. Newly completed roads, and efforts to settle nomads are also noted (pp.137,184). An encounter between Khampas and the Communists of the Long March in April 1935 was hostile.

8. *China's Great Leap West*, pp.20,27,141.

9. Various Western agencies, such as

Brathay Exploration Trust, have investigated possible attractions for tourists on the route from Chengdu toward the TAR. They note that the remoteness of the region could be a draw for Western ecotourists, as well as Chinese tourists from the richer east.

10. See the following chapters from Dodin and Räther, eds., *Imagining Tibet*: R. Kaschewsky, "The Image of the West before the Nineteenth Century"; P. Bishop, "Not only a Shangri-La: Images of Tibet in Western Literature"; and R. Barnett, "'Violated Specialness' — Western Political Representations of Tibet." See also C. Allen, *The Search for Shangri-La: A Journey into Tibetan History* (London: Little, Brown & Company, 1999).

11. See J. Ives and B. Messerli, *The Himalayan Dilemma — Reconciling Development and Conservation* (London: Routledge, 1990). A Tibet Information Network report, "'Rebuilding' and 'Renovation' in Lhasa," (www.tibetinfo.net., September 2002), also presents a discussion of conflicts arising from improved infrastructure.

12. P. Oliver, ed., *Encyclopedia of Vernacular Architecture of the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.1026.

13. H. Norberg-Hodge, *Ancient Futures: Learning from Ladakh* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1991); discussion in E. Dudley, *The Critical Villager: Beyond Community Participation* (London: Routledge, 1993); and H. Norberg-Hodge, "Tibetan Culture as a Model of Ecological Sustainability" and G.E. Clarke, "Tradition, Modernity and Environmental Change in Tibet," in Dodin and Räther, eds., *Imagining Tibet*.

14. Dodin and Räther, eds., *Imagining Tibet*, p.297. These issues are presented in more detail in *China's Great Leap West*.

15. M. Aris and A. San Suu Khyi, eds., *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson* (Warminster: Aris & Philips 1980), p.65.

16. R.A. Stein, *Tibetan Civilisation*, S. Driver, trans. (London: Faber & Faber, 1972).

17. Oliver, *Encyclopedia of Vernacular Architecture of the World*, p.575.

18. Evidence of new building skills and urban influence, usually concrete construction with pitched tiled roofs, has been noted in the town of Dengke since the early 1990s (Andrew Sneller, CSF report, 1992). Also see Semple in Oliver, *Encyclopedia of Vernacular Architecture of the World*, p.579: "Increasingly with the scarcity of wood in Tibet and the Himalayas, detailing around windows is being reproduced using concrete. With this change, though the aesthetic qualities of the Tibetan building are being maintained, the carpentry skills to build in the traditional way are rapidly disappearing."

19. It was noted that there had been major deterioration in the state of the street since the last CSF visit in 1995.

20. Logging trucks used to travel through this area to serve areas of Sichuan, facilitating locally affordable timber supplies. It emerged from interviews that the timber in new constructions had been bought and stored prior to the logging ban in September 1998. There is an increasing impact on the forestry and building trade due to this, and, of course, the lessened possibility of building solely in the local materials of timber and mud or stone. The Tibet Foundation Newsletter (no.31, February 2001) reported on a visit to Kandze by editor Jon Aldridge: "The villages . . . displayed a strongly regional Tibetan identity, each village having a different design and style. There was a visible affluence among sections of this population — many houses were recent, and new religious buildings became increasingly common as we went further west. Large monasteries had been expensively and extravagantly rebuilt with government money, smaller monasteries were being invigorated with private money. Recent afforestation legislation across the whole of China will doubtless slow any future building work — already the local market price of timber has doubled."

21. Meeting between CSF representatives and local officials in Bengda, July 25, 1999.

22. S. Ewing, "Hearth and Cloth — Dwelling Practice and Production in Eastern Tibet," *Journal of Architecture,* Vol.7 No.2 (2002); and S. Ewing and N. Crawley, "The Hearth in the Landscape: The Black Tent of the Nomadic Pastoralist in Tibet," *Forum* (Research Journal of School of Architecture Planning & Landscape, University of Newcastle), Vol.4 No.1 (2001), pp.33–40.

23. According to Stein, *Tibetan Civilisation*, p.119–122: "It is significant that the inhabitants are described by a figure of speech derived from the architecture of a house, not a tent. We have seen how the phrase 'beam and rafters' typifies a particular kinship structure. The word 'beam' (*gdung*) also denotes a pedigree. These metaphors were applied to spiritual descent in a religious school (also expressed, as we know, by the father-son relationship). The principal disciples of Marpa are the 'Four Pillars', the disciples of Mila Repa the 'Eight brothers'. Those of the Nyingma-pa Lama Gyano-pa are labelled 'Four pillars, Eight beams, Sixteen rafters and Thirty-two planks'. A similar classification was applied to the noble house of Shalu and its estates: four pillars, eight beams, or rather nine counting the northern one with a 'maned lion', (probably the pillar capital) and seventy rafters."

24. B. Hillier and J. Hanson, *The Social Logic of Space* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) explore spatial significance when the interior is thus defined as synchronized, allowing different activities and meanings to interrelate. The altar furthest away from the entrance can be seen as a "deepest sacred space" within this spatial and transpatial environment.

25. Stein, *Tibetan Civilisation*.

26. A. Gansach, in an unpublished thesis, has drawn attention to this and other aspects of the interior ordering of dwellings.

27. W.A. Semple, "Symbolism and Ritual in Tibetan Architecture," *Indian Institute of Architects Journal* (Oct–Nov 1995).

28. These and symbolic aspects of the traditional Tibetan house are explained in Semple, "Symbolism and Ritual in Tibetan Architecture"; Dujardin, "From Fortress to Farmhouse"; C. Corlin, "The Symbolism of the House in rGyal-thang," in Aris and San Suu Khyi, eds., *Tibetan Studies*, pp.87–92; and F. Pommaret-Immaeda, "The Construction of Ladakhi Houses in the Indus Valley."

29. S. Ewing, "Making Space to Allow the World in: Appropriation and Accommodation of New Media in a Tibetan village," in H. Turgut and P. Kellett, eds., *Traditional Environments in a New Millennium* (Istanbul: IAPS – CSBE book series, 2002).

30. D. Morley and K. Robins, *Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries* (London: Routledge, 1995).

31. Dodin and Räther, *Imagining Tibet*, p.297.

32. Bishop, *The Myth of Shangri-La*, p.295.

Book Reviews

Barns. John Michael Vlach. New York: W.W. Norton & Company (and Library of Congress: Washington, D.C.), 2003.

Studies of rural vernacular architecture, and of barns in particular, have typically fallen into two categories: regionally focused scholarly treatments, or nationally focused photographic essays of the coffee-table variety. For decades, students of American farm architecture and barn aficionados from all walks of life have hungered for a single source-book that might tie all of the nation's regions together in a serious effort to understand and interpret the wide range of building forms that distinguish our varied agricultural landscapes. Our collective prayers have finally been answered by a work that exceeds the expectations of the most demanding historians of American rural studies. Simply entitled *Barns*, John Michael Vlach's substantial book is comprehensive in scope, spanning sea to shining sea and providing a fat feast of text, historic and modern photographs and maps, and examples of barn construction from the Historic American Building Survey (HABS). Most everything one could want or need to know about the evolution and distribution of what the author calls "the architecture of American agriculture" is thoroughly researched from an impeccable list of sources and interpreted in a lively style that engages both the academic and the casual reader.

Vlach introduces the juicy compendium with an essay describing changes in the cultural position of barns through the years. In early American history, barns were "the clearest signs of success and well-being" in a society founded on agrarian production. Later, during the rapid transition to an industrialized and urbanized society, "heroic views" of barns and farmsteads were used to strengthen the value of farming life. Finally, with the ascendancy of motorized vehicular transportation, "a barn — a farmer's most valued building — became little more than a place to post a bill," and Vlach includes several choice photos of such advertising art. The introduction goes on to discuss the history of American barns, which Vlach describes as "immigrant gifts" whose forms can be traced to European antecedents. However, foreign barn shapes acquired native character through processes largely governed by the economy and environment, and through adjustments made by immigrant farmers who "used their inherited pasts as a necessary resource but gradually modified what they remembered when faced with new demands and circumstances." According to Vlach, "Gradual pragmatic changes led not only to the emergence of new barns but to new identities."

A majority of barn studies focus on pretty European imports, and on the locally adapted folk building styles that reflected early transformations of these old forms to meet the new needs of pioneer farmers. *Barns* takes off where these studies stop and expands our understanding of the roots of all the agricultural buildings we see in our landscapes today. What most observers see as the ubiquitous American barn — the transverse crib barn — Vlach cites as "the dominant barn in the United States," and ". . .

a prime icon of the American farm" that "ties together much of the nation." More importantly, the author believes in the artifactual value of barns as historical texts that "offer us messages about the past. . . ." Using the geographer's concept of "cultural hearths," he correctly advocates observing the "path of the barn builder" as a way to "outline the formation of succinct regional identities across the entire United States." Even the layout of *Barns* encourages us to follow the barn-builder's path through chronological and regional sequences. As Vlach explains, "Barns serve here as physical evidence of the key stages in American settlement history and as markers of specific pathways followed during the process of transcontinental migration."

The remaining bulk of *Barns* is packed with black-and-white photographs, drawings, and explanatory text on barns and other types of farm structures from the eight cultural regions of the United States. The material culture of each region is treated with equal respect and interest, without the usual snobbish disregard for resources west of the "cactus curtain" which one finds all too frequently in American vernacular-architecture studies. Examples of every conceivable barn type and style across America are carefully depicted, along with other key structures and buildings that the author feels are crucial to our appreciation of the rural landscape. Supportive text is provided throughout so that the reader may be assured of a good working knowledge of barn architecture in one region before being transported to the next.

Vlach considers how the most important and diagnostic features of agricultural architecture — shape, size, materials, and farmstead arrangements — are set within contexts of climate, topography, local economies, and cultural influences. Among the most valuable photographic contributions are those taken in the early decades of the twentieth century — several by Dorothea Lange. Barns are quickly vanishing from our landscapes, and so many that remain have deteriorated severely. It is a rare treat to see so many good-quality historic photos of farm architecture, because they show us the detail that is generally missing when we encounter these structures in the field. Equally prized in this volume are the numerous renderings of barns from the HABS survey. These kinds of drawings are essential to our understanding of how barns "work" and of the importance of the interior arrangements. A definitive bibliography is included, as well as a glossary that no greenhorn city slicker should ever be without when looking at a barn or speaking with a farmer.

Preservationists and scholars alike owe a great debt to John Michael Vlach for all the hard work that went into compiling this vast array of barn imagery. An intelligent and informative work that educates and entertains is a wondrous thing, and *Barns* will quickly seat itself as an indispensable contribution to American vernacular studies.   ∎

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Postcolonial Urbanism: Southeast Asian Cities and Global Processes.
Edited by Ryan Bishop, John Phillips, and Wei-Wei Yeo.
New York: Routledge, 2003.

The academic prestige of postcolonial studies has risen rapidly over the past two decades with the burgeoning of texts that take the field itself as their object within such disciplines as English, history, geography, and anthropology. The expansion of the domain of the postcolonial, however, has been accompanied by growing critical reflections on the field. Today critics argue both that postcolonial studies is more concerned with the colonial past than the postcolonial present, and that it is too oriented toward texts, thus becoming unhistorical and dematerializing. *Postcolonial Urbanism* makes a significant step toward addressing these critiques by focusing on contemporary "globality" and by dealing with disparate local circumstances and concrete social practices.

Ryan Bishop, John Phillips, and Wei-Wei Yeo's introduction states several goals of the book. These include a desire to explore the roles that Southeast Asian cities play in knowledge production about phenomena such as globalization, and the proposal of new modes of analysis that may lead to a better understanding of postcolonial city formation. Drawing from both urban and postcolonial scholarship, the introduction addresses various issues, including the global and its metaphoricity, postcoloniality, the empirical and stereoscopy, the Cold War versus postcolonism, and historicity. The discussion is engaging, although some readers may not be satisfied by the cursory manner in which some arguments are framed.

One of the best features of the collection is its presentation of diverse field research that is also theoretically grounded. Contributors are based in Southeast Asia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and come from such disparate fields as English, history, architecture, anthropology, and international business. Many chapters reflect critically on canonized views and present new types of responses to urban realities and processes. Differences in the urbanism of Bangkok, Singapore, Dili, Jakarta and Manila, for instance, are grasped in terms of the complex and often conflicting historical conditions that constituted these cities, and the various trajectories along which they developed from colonial to postcolonial rule.

Kathleen Adams's chapter on "danger tourism," for example, reveals how the move from Cold War to neoliberal networks has caused a commodification of intranational violence as spectacle. Thus, the city of Dili, capital of East Timor, was recently the scene of urban turbulence, suffering and destruction, but is now visited by tourists seeking to witness former sites of revolution and economic-political violence. According to Adams, such tourism is not unlike real-time TV — except that it unfolds in the "here" of spatial proximity, while simultaneously providing the distance of economic advantage.

Peter Jackson's chapter "Gay Capitals in Global Gay History" provides an account of how the society of Bangkok,

previously characterized by a limited range of explicitly differentiated forms of gender and eroticism, has today become highly differentiated in terms of gender and sexual culture. However, to explain this transition, Jackson moves beyond the simplistic application of Foucauldian theories on sexuality to offer a careful analysis of the interaction between the world's homoerotic cultures and local discourses on them (which may be very different than in the West). And through an investigation of changes in familial structures, traditional ways of life, and the commercial power of gay purchasers, Jackson's chapter reveals the various ways in which global processes affect people and places.

Wei-Wei Yeo's "City as Theatre" begins with an account of Singapore's hyper-reality: "lives within it press on with an ever increasing sense of urgency about the present, not having time or space for thinking about the past." In the context of this phenomenon of speed and the demand on city dwellers for an increasing intensity of present experience, Yeo identifies the significant role of "distraction." Based on a subtle reading of recent experiments in Singaporean theater, he argues that constructive distraction is crucial to making sense of the city's overwhelming overload of external stimuli.

Several chapters in the volume reexamine theoretical and disciplinary models in relation to urban phenomena in the region. Anthony King's "Actually Existing Postcolonism" gives an inspiring overview of the routes postcolonial studies have taken and could take in the future. He identifies two significantly different streams of thinking: theoretical and specifically literary postcolonialism; and geographically and politically specific "actually existing postcolonialism." King maintains that empirical approaches to postcolonism may offer alternatives to Western metanarratives on the basis of "a more intimate local knowledge." Rajeev Patke's chapter is another example of this type of thinking. It extends Walter Benjamin's notion of modernity through a simultaneous reading of Benjamin's *Arcades Project* and the postcolonial Southeast Asian city.

The collection also touches on a few paths that are seldom covered in existing postcolonial literature. For example, while the U.S. presence in the region has been extensive, its implications for Southeast Asian postcolonialism remain largely unexamined. In this context, however, John Armitage and Joanne Roberts's chapter brings new richness into the understanding of Southeast Asia as a "post-but-still-neo-colonial" region. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. military installations such as the Subic Bay Naval Base provided a significant economic contribution to the Philippines. Then, as the U.S. withdrew its military, Special Export Processing Zones were established in the country to minimize the economic impact of withdrawal. In fact, Armitage and Roberts argue, these Export Processing Zones may the futural avatars of Tax Free Zones, or Enterprise and Incentive Zones, which have recently emerged in rural centers of North America and the United Kingdom. As such, the Southeast Asian global

cities of the postcolonial moment foretell what laborers and investors in cosmopolitan cities will see in their own neighborhoods and city centers.

Overall, *Postcolonial Urbanism* is an insightful work: it not only examines the cultural byproducts of center/periphery relations, but also tackles the imperialist dimension of capitalist expansion in the region — which is much needed if the ultimate goal of postcolonial criticism is to alter asymmetries of power, rather than reproduce them. The collection deserves to be on the shelf of scholars interested in issues of globalization, postcolonism, urbanism, and the cultural landscape. The book will also make a fine text for advanced seminars in global urbanism and Southeast Asian studies. ∎

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Early Art and Architecture of Africa. Peter Garlake.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 214 pp., illus.

The recently launched Oxford History of Art series, of
which Peter Garlake's interpretation of the early art and
architecture of Africa is a very welcome addition, inevitably
invites comparison with similar productions — and in some
ways it suffers from that comparison. Since World War II
several such series have been published in Europe and the
United States; and to this reviewer, the earlier Penguin
History of Art is the lodestone by which others should be
measured. That series has one great strength that the pre-
sent series does not appear to share: the overall vision of its
founding editor, Sir Nikolaus Pevsner. Art-historical scholar-
ship and archaeological research has made enormous
advances in the fifty years or so since that earlier series was
launched, and there are now far fewer empty spaces on the
art-historical map. But students in that earlier generation
who persevered with each successive publication (as they
appeared over a period of fifteen or twenty years) could feel
reasonably confident they had been brought comprehensively
up-to-date with world art-historical scholarship.

I doubt whether any student who perseveres with this
present series could feel so confident. However, as far as the
present volume under review is concerned, the overall series
director could certainly find no author more competent and
more knowledgeable to write on the early art and architecture
of Africa than Peter Garlake. The subject of this volume has
been his field of study ever since he graduated in
Architecture from the University of Cape Town in the early
1960s. But he, himself, on the first page of the introductory
chapter, draws attention to the underlying problem that char-
acterizes not only this book, but the whole series: namely, the
problem of selection.

Who determines the boundaries, in space and time,
between the contents of one volume and another? In the
sixty or so advertised volumes in the series, of which about
half are already published, more than thirty deal with the art
of particular regions and periods. Ten deal with the architec-
ture of particular regions and periods, and only two with the
art and architecture of particular regions and periods. This is
a major weakness of the whole series. If there has been a
major advance in the understanding of the discipline of art
history in the last half century, it is to view the art of any
country clearly within its social and environmental context —
of which the architecture of that country is the cultural
embodiment (however much or little of it survives today).
Garlake clearly supports this view: the art which he describes
so vividly and interprets so profoundly is clearly set within its
particularly environmental context. And, with the exception
of the prehistoric rock art of Southern Africa, of which the
physical environment is the spectacular landscape of high
hills, *kopjes* and caves, all the other "themes" he interprets
have their architectural dimension.

But Garlake's field of study cannot be fully understood
by excluding the neighboring cultures that interlocked with
his in former periods. Presumably, his was not the decision
to exclude from this volume the art and architecture of Egypt
and North Africa or the rock art of the Sahara — though he
probably made the decision to impose a terminal date of CE
1500. Readers who wish to study these neighboring cultures
will have to search at least three other volumes in the series,
and will probably search in vain for volumes on the rock art
of the Sahara and on African architecture post–1500. I can
see no logic in this decision, or selection. Of the seven
"themes" that Garlake presents, two — Nubia (Chapter 3)
and Aksum (Chapter 4) — depend closely and over a long
period of time on the cultures of neighboring countries.
Whatever the convenience of excluding the art and architec-
ture of Egypt to the series editor, the reader is significantly
disadvantaged by being unable to study Nubia and Aksum in
the context of their great neighbor.

Garlake presents the reader with seven major themes —
cultural "outcrops" that give heightened definition to the
African art-historical landscape he maps for us. Three I have
already mentioned, and these form, after his introductory
chapter, the early chapters of this book. The later themes, in
the order they are presented, are: The Niger River (Chapter
5), West African Forests (Chapters 6), Great Zimbabwe and
the Southern African Interior (Chapter 7), and the East
African Coast (Chapter 8). There is a certain logic in this
sequence, though it is neither consistently chronologically or
geographically defined. But do these themes do justice to the
wealth and diversity of early African art and architecture?
Where, for example, is the hidden culture of medieval equa-
torial Africa, or the prolific urban architecture of the Hausa
of northern Nigeria and the Sahel? Is it acceptable to limit
the examination of the culture of the once vast West African
forest to one city — Ife; and to ignore the astonishingly rich
culture of Ife's powerful neighbor, Benin (which derived so
much from Ife) merely because of the arrival of the alien
Portuguese and the imposition of a cut-off date of 1500?
And can we be satisfied by the exclusion of the late flowering
culture of the Asante or the Dahomey merely because they
arrived on the scene after 1500?

If we accept Garlake's themes as representative of his
field of study, rather than as a comprehensive account of its
cultural manifestations in plastic form, how do we appraise
his exposition of those themes? Clearly, the themes fall into
two categories: those dealing with areas in which Garlake has
himself worked as an archaeologist (the rock art of southern
Africa, Ife in the West African forest, Great Zimbabwe, and
the East African Coast); and the remaining areas of which he
has no such direct experience. In those areas he knows well
his interpretation of artifacts and the environments which
nurtured them is both profoundly illuminating and often
controversial. This is to be expected, since Garlake is an
archaeologist with strongly held views about the meaning

and purpose of cultural activity. In those areas where he has no such immediate experience his interpretations are less controversial, though equally revealing.

In conclusion, the undergraduate students, for whom this series is presumably intended, will gain a great deal of benefit from it, and will find the illustrations particularly enlightening and informative. Particularly noteworthy in this respect are his extended interpretations of the rock art of Zimbabwe (the most important locations of which he deliberately declines to reveal to protect it from potential pollution and vandalism). Also noteworthy is his presentation of the spectacular fourteenth-century palace of Sultan al Hasan ibn Suleman, Husani Kubwa, at Kilwa on the coast of Tanzania. They will probably conclude, however, that although Garlake is a scholar who has made a major contribution to the sum of knowledge in his particular field of study, his views and interpretations do not always find universal acceptance by his fellows working in the field of African archaeology.

If this review appears overly critical, the critique is directed much more to the overall editorial direction of the Oxford History of Art series than to the author of the volume under review. This volume undeniably validates Garlake's stature as an interpreter of the tangible historic culture of the African continent. ■

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Architecture in Black. Darell Wayne Fields. London and New Brunswick, NJ: The Athlone Press, 2000. 189 pp., illus.

This book takes on the weighty topic of race and its relationship to architecture. Specifically, it is a collection of essays and manifestos related to the topics of blackness and architectural discourse, sometimes separately, sometimes in tandem. A number of the essays were originally published in *Appendx: Culture, Theory, Praxis*, the journal Fields co-edits (or is the executive editor of, depending on whether you believe the book jacket or the credits on the *Appendx* website) with Milton S.F. Curry and Kevin L. Fuller.

The book begins with an allegory on blackness (reprinted from *Appendx*) that is telling of the content and style of the rest of the book: it is philosophical and enigmatic. While the chapters then touch on a wide variety of themes, one of the main sections in the book is comprised of a comparative textual analysis of the following essays: "Philosophy of History," and "Aesthetics" by G.W.F. Hegel; "The Course on General Linguistics" by Ferdinand de Saussure; and "The Signifying Monkey" by Henry Louis Gates, Jr. According to Fields, Hegel's texts show that race and architecture are connected by an "aesthetic" intersection. Through textual analysis and revision, Fields concludes that the theoretical discourse he analyzed is racialized.

Fields asks in the introduction, what does architecture have to do with blackness? He succeeds in presenting a textual analysis relying on philosophy and semiotics. Based on this interpretation, he concludes that "contemporary architectural theoreticians are unconsciously 'speaking' an architectonic version of the black vernacular" ("Introduction," p.xxix). Fields's references to and citations of historical texts are impressive, but I am not convinced that they answer the question he poses. He links various texts through semiotics, but never brings his analysis to the built environment.

There is, of course, a discussion about the terms "black" versus "African American." Fields denounces the term "African American" because he believes it denies the history of blacks in the United States by fictitiously attempting to align "African Americans" with other immigrant groups, negating slavery and matters of choice. He also finds "African American" to be problematic because it collapses different parts and cultures of Africa into one. "Black," on the other hand, denotes the social, political and cultural lines drawn by race, which is more telling of the actual racial situation in the United States. This discussion, while interesting, does not elucidate the relationship between architecture and blackness.

In an allegory situated on the day the Los Angeles riots began, Fields recalls Frantz Fanon's essay "The Fact of Blackness." In his explanation about becoming black as opposed to African American, Fields parallels Fanon's construction of race relations in which whites fear blacks. Although Fields had considered himself African American before the riots, he realized on that day that a suit and a copy

of the *New York Times* could not, and perhaps should not, separate him from the "blacks" who were portrayed as initiating the riots in the news. However, this literary parallelism ignores the fact that Fanon was writing about black identity in relation to white identity, not one black identity as opposed to a different one.

I opened *Architecture in Black* looking forward to an enlightening analysis of the relationship between race and architecture. What I found, however, was a theoretical project on architecture, blackness, and racial theory. Fields attempts to prove that there is no such thing as black architecture, although there is (in his estimation) black literature and black music. Although Fields may be correct in this assertion, the method he uses in an attempt to prove it is lacking both in analysis of the practice of architecture and the black response to architecture, relying instead on literary analysis of philosophical and architectural discourse to support his thesis. He does not even discuss the practice of architecture by black architects or analyze how architecture is described by the black population. If the author believes there is no such thing as black architecture, why write a book about it?

While Fields is able to deftly find discrimination and racism in architectural texts, he is less successful in discussing the relationship between race and real, not textual discussions of, architecture. One might be tempted to rename Fields's book *A Black's Reflections on Architectural Discourse*, a title that would be more descriptive of the book's actual content. In fact, Milton Curry, co-editor of *Appendx*, has a forthcoming book entitled *Optic Black: Architectural Theory and the Racial Imaginary*. As the title of Curry's book aptly describes the content of Fields's book (better than its own title does, in fact), it will be interesting to compare the two. ∎

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Asia's Old Dwellings: Tradition, Resilience, and Change.
Edited by Ronald Knapp. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2003. 487 pp., 318 illus.

The editor of *Asia's Old Dwellings*, Ronald Knapp, is a prolific writer. A Professor Emeritus of Geography at the State University of New York at New Paltz, his many works include *China's Old Dwellings* (2000); *China's Walled Cities* (2000); *Living Heritage: Vernacular Environment in China* (1999); *China's Living Houses: Folk Beliefs, Symbols and Household Ornamentation* (1999); as well as chapters in several books, including Paul Oliver's *Encyclopedia of Vernacular Architecture of the World* (1997). However, *Asia's Old Dwellings* may be one of Knapp's most important books, because, unlike his more geographically specialized work up to now, it attempts to address a variety of vernacular forms throughout Asia. Overall, he discusses the range of such forms through the lenses of tradition, resilience and change — definitions he borrows from Paul Oliver, Yi Fu Tuan, and Amos Rapoport.

In a prologue, Knapp addresses Asia's vastness and the fact that it presents few continuities — either environmental, cultural, social or otherwise. Simultaneously, he expresses discomfort with the notion that rural dwellings should be looked on as primitive. Rather, they should be seen as practical, and even sophisticated, solutions, given environmental and cultural conditions, he says. In this argument, Knapp invokes the issue of tradition. Specifically, he writes, tradition is not about a building form being unchanging or non-modern; rather, it reflects the way certain essential building forms have been passed down from generation to generation. And in the process of moving, or of adaptation, tradition does change considerably over time.

The book itself is divided into four parts, each addressing a broad subregion: South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Inner Asia. Within each part, a number of countries representative of that subregion are used as examples to study not only particular vernacular forms, but also the process by which these forms evolve. In the South Asian example, the chapter "Himalayan Dwellings: A Cultural Environmental Perspective," written by David Zurick and Nanda Shrestha, looks at ways in which dwellings evolved in the Himalayan region for both climatic and cultural reasons. Thus, Tharu homes in the Tarai region of Nepal are built closely together not only because the Tharu people live predominantly in forested regions where they are prone to animal attacks, but because of their belief in ghosts and the notion that anyone who sleeps alone is prone to attack by evil spirits.

Similarly, in the Southeast Asian section, a chapter by Gunawan Tjahjono, "Dwellings in Indonesia: Tradition, Resilience and Change," explains how the region's longhouses were influenced by Austronesian cultural norms, even among groups that were not of Austronesian descent. With a few exceptions, the author also points out that almost all traditional

dwellings were raised off the ground on high posts, and that this was probably a byproduct of frequent warfare. Only houses of more recent peaceful times sit directly on the ground.

While the chapters in this edited volume are insightful, particularly in identifying the ways vernacular forms evolve due to culture and environment, attempting to edit a book that covers such a large domain may be overly ambitious. Clearly, Knapp is aware of the difficulty of attempting to describe the traditional dwellings of more than half the entire world's population in a single volume, but he offers few explanations of troubles he may have faced. For example, there is no mention of Western Asia in the book. And the division into categories leaves the reader wondering why Central Asia has been renamed "Inner Asia."

Within the chapters themselves, there is also tremendous ambiguity as to what entails "Indian" or "Chinese" architecture. Knapp attempts to address this issue by observing that many Asian countries, such as India, only acquired the status of nations recently, and that within the boundaries of each such nation there exists a tremendous diversity of built form. Yet, there is still an attempt in the book to describe what is, for example, an "Indian" architecture. Two problems result from this conceptual ambiguity. First, the discussion of structures themselves sometimes appears overly broad and ill developed. In the Indonesian case, for example, we are left wondering what characterizes an "Indonesian" dwelling other than that it is located in Indonesia. Second, in the process of trying to develop arguments about particular dwelling types, large regions of countries are left out, rendering them irrelevant. This problem plagues two chapters in particular: "China's Vernacular Architecture," by Puay Pen Ho; and "Patterns and Relationships of Indian Houses," by Allen G. Noble. In Ho's piece, there is much discussion of *fengshui* principles and evolution of building form; however, almost all the discussion appears to be centered in eastern and southern China, and very little mention is made of the country's west, and almost none of Tibet. Similarly, in the Indian context, examples of aspects of Indian built form, such as floor plans and roof styles, are primarily taken from north India, with far fewer references to the south, and none to the northeastern region. In addition, generalizations about Indian traditional forms are so broad they render some arguments irrelevant.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter is that by Lee Ho Yin, "The Singapore Shophouse: An Anglo Chinese Vernacular." Here Yin addresses the evolution of the shophouse from Singapore's establishment as a British outpost to the nation-state's present moment. However, while looking at the historic reasons for the shophouse evolution, Yin fails to address ways the local population evolved the housing type in resistance to colonial control. Instead, Yin paints an image of the locals being complicit with every rule laid down by the colonizers.

Asia's Old Dwellings unfortunately places too much emphasis on the issue of authenticity when addressing questions of tradition in building form. Neither the editor nor the authors attempt to really unsettle the notion of Asia, or even given categories such as "Chinese" or "Indonesian." Instead, they are content with establishing their work within these broad categories. This is problematic because the attempt to classify buildings under particular ethnic/vernacular types is not proven. In this sense, even the title of the book appears awkward. Not only can Asia be seen as a contested grouping, but the term "old" appears to imply that age alone can guarantee value.

Not being an encyclopedia, this book does a very good job of addressing issues of traditional forms without overcategorizing. However, it could perhaps have been a more engaging work if it had narrowed its scope to a smaller region of Asia, or broadened its outlook so that its individual authors could have discussed the case studies more thoroughly and convincingly. ∎

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iasté 2004

POST TRADITIONAL ENVIRONMENTS IN A POST GLOBAL WORLD

DECEMBER 14–18, 2004   SHARJAH/DUBAI, UAE

The discussion of the end of tradition in past IASTE conferences necessitates a reflection on our intellectual toolkit. It may be argued that the emerging post traditional environments are spaces that unsettle the historically developed or assumed relationship between place and meaning. They may be contrasted with both neo-traditional environments — places which attempt to replicate original settings by engaging in the manufacture of heritage, and simulacra environments — places that are "authentically" fake in a blatant manner. In both of these cases, the referent remains important, albeit for different reasons; where the former reinforces the referent, in the latter, it is satirically engaged. In post traditional environments, the past is not only invented but also intentionally ignored in favor of an immediate present that is assumed to be the past. With the passage of time, the referent ceases to be a fixed moment in history — related to place, nation, or ethnicity — but instead becomes a constantly moving target that legitimizes current actions and aesthetics. As such, the connection to both history and geography is severed and the referent itself ceases to hold any significance. Under this condition, historical and vernacular styles become either irrelevant or relics of the past. So where, then, does tradition go? Here, the post traditional condition creates the hypothetical possibility for individuals to choose from a rich display of traditions detached from their previous encumbrances of places and peoples.

These changes are all occurring against a backdrop of an ever-changing world. The idea of a global world was predicated on the promises of a widespread prosperity, of economic globalization, and the further belief that this prosperity went hand in hand with delivering the fruits of liberal democracy. The betrayal of these promises, however, is evident in growing inequalities and increased poverty. It may now be argued that the globalization paradigm is no longer operative because its libratory potential was never realized. Some see the events of 9/11 as a symbol of the failure of globalization and the triumph of the local frustrations that it engendered. Indeed, the euphoric ideal of global freedom has been replaced by the very real threats posed by globally unbounded and unrestrained "others." It is important to recognize that the post-9/11 era witnesses the rise of a new paradigm, one that we call "Post Global" not because we abandon globalization, but because we need to move beyond its discursive limitations. It is post global because it supercedes the development era of multiculturalism and multilateralism, and replaces it with the concept of a unilateral dominant culture, which shatters the information-happy notion of a singular global village. So, post global is not an end to globalization but the emergence of a different kind of engagement that is sharply at odds with the visions of liberal, multicultural globalization. Here, both religious fundamentalism and imperial hegemony begin to emerge as the new forms of global engagement.

This IASTE conference is about the intersection of this post traditional condition with this post global moment. It is about interrogating the fate of both traditional and post traditional environments in this post global era. The discussion of the post global is related to both: the persistence of global aspirations that appear increasingly disassociated from place or nation and other forms of belonging, and the recognition that the currency of tradition will continue to circulate through global networks and capital. Identity in a post global era becomes increasingly complex as the connection between identity and place is no longer determined by tradition. Unlike neo-traditional settings such as Seaside and Poundburry, and simulated traditional places like Las Vegas and Disney, cities such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Dubai may be considered post traditional places. Although nodes in the space of flows, these are places that have acquired a global imageability based on precedents drawn from elsewhere. They are places in a constant race, whose history is in the current present, and where the veneer of cosmopolitanism often negates their own traditions or accepts a borrowing from elsewhere without any need for legitimation. Here, the idea of a post traditional, while discrete in its own right, should be seen neither as a disengagement from the imposed limits of tradition, nor as an acceptance of a linear evolution from past traditions, but rather as a repositioning necessitated by this post global moment.

As in past IASTE conferences, scholars and practitioners from related disciplines are invited to submit papers that address one of the following three tracks.

I. Post Traditional Environments

Papers in this track will examine the global representations as well as the local articulations of the post traditional condition. Papers that critically address the various re-workings of identity, ethnicity and other traditions of belonging will also be included. A key component to be addressed will be the place of history, particularly the built history of peoples and places, and its relevance in the post traditional moment.

II. The Post Global Condition

This track will include innovative papers that tackle the new geographies and built environments of the post global world. In particular, it will focus on the spatial implications of contemporary imperialist projects and the nostalgic reconstruction of the geo-political periphery as traditional societies. Also encouraged are those papers that investigate the very real spatiality of power and new hegemonic orders, which continue to lie concealed by the euphoric visions of the global world.

III. Questioning and/or Redefining Authenticity

Papers in this track will explore the limits of authenticity and focus on dwellings and settlements that have no referents. It will critically engage with the concept of precedents, and examine the contemporary geographies where authenticity is produced and redefined. Also encouraged are those papers that explore the ramifications of new meanings of authenticity in academic discourse and within traditional disciplinary and pedagogical boundaries.

Submission Requirements

Interested colleagues are invited to submit a short, one-page abstract, not to exceed 500 words. Do not place your name on the abstracts, but rather submit an attached one-page curriculum vitae with your address and name. All authors must submit an **electronic copy of their abstract and (short) CV** via e-mail. Abstracts and CVs must be placed within the body of the e-mail, and also as attachments.

E-mail this material to:
iaste@uclink4.berkeley.edu

Authors must specify their **preference for one or two of the above tracks** when submitting abstracts. Proposals for complete panels are welcome. All papers must be written and presented in English. Following a blind peer-review process, papers may be accepted for presentation in the conference and/or publication in the conference Working Paper Series.

Contributors whose abstracts are accepted must pre-register for the conference, pay registration fees of $375 (including a special discounted $25 IASTE membership fee), and prepare a full-length paper of 20–25 double-spaced pages. Registered students may qualify for a reduced registration fee of $175 (including a special discounted $25 IASTE membership fee). All participants must be IASTE members. Please note that hotel accommodations, travel, and additional excursions are not covered by the registration fees and have to be paid directly to the designated travel agent. Registration fees cover the conference program, conference abstracts, and access to all conference activities including receptions, keynote panels, and a half-day tour of nearby Sharjah sites and the historic Al Bastakiya district in Dubai and the Burj Al-Arab tower.

Conference Schedule

February 15, 2004
Deadline for receipt of abstracts and CVs

May 1, 2004
E-mail notification of accepted abstracts for Conference Presentation

July 15, 2004
Deadline for pre-registration and for receipt of papers for possible publication in the Working Paper Series

October 1, 2004
Notification of accepted papers for the Working Paper Series

December 14–18, 2004
Conference Presentations

Organizing Committee

Nezar AlSayyad, Conference Director, University of California, Berkeley

Nadia Alhasani, Conference Local Director, American University of Sharjah, U.A.E.

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Conference Sponsors

American University of Sharjah, U.A.E.

College of Environmental Design, University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A.

Conference Site

The conference will be held at the American University of Sharjah, with hotel accommodations in Dubai. In order to obtain special conference room rates at the hotel, reservations, accompanied by full payment, will have to be made by September 15, 2004. Hotel and travel arrangements should be made directly with the designated travel agency.

Optional Excursions

One-day and two-day trips to nearby sites will also be available to conference participants for an additional fee. Optional paid excursions will include a one-day tour of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi including the cities of Abu Dhabi and Al-Ain; and a two-day tour of the neighboring state of Oman including the city of Muscat and the traditional villages of the Omani countryside.

Inquiries

Please use the following information when making inquiries regarding the conference.

Mailing address:
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Conferences and Events

UPCOMING CONFERENCES AND SYMPOSIA

"Towards a Better Quality of Life in the Cities," Porto, Portugal: November 26–29, 2003. EUROCITIES Conference & Annual General Meeting 2003 is organized jointly with two associated networks: ACCESS-EUROCITIES for a new Mobility Culture, and TeleCities. The conference will include the presentation and discussion of Strategic Vision and Objectives that will determine the future direction and main priorities of EUROCITIES for the coming years. For more information, visit http://www.eurocities2003porto.org/agm2003/.

"The International Symposium for Urbanism: New and Green," Havana, Cuba: December 5–11, 2003. This conference is for professionals interested in learning more about the importance of New Urbanism and Green Urbanism and their impact at an international scale. It is the foremost conference for people interested in the impact of New Urbanism, urban sustainability, building or restoring mixed-use neighborhoods, and creating energy-efficient cities and environmentally appropriate communities. Visit http://www.cubanow.org for complete details.

"Healing our Habitat: Revitalization, Redesign and Redevelopment of Human Settlements," Mumbai, India: January 30–February 1, 2004. The Sixth International Conference on Humane Habitat (ICHH) is organized by the International Association for Humane Habitat (IAHH) in association with the Commonwealth Association of Architects, the Brihan Mumbai Centre of the Indian Institute of Architects, the Forum of Colleges of Architecture, and the University of Mumbai. Architects, planners, engineers, social scientists, environmentalists, policy-makers, administrators, professionals, educators, and concerned citizens are invited to participate. Details of the conference can be obtained at http://www.humanehabitat.org; or by email at ichh2004@humanehabitat.org.

"Culturepoles: City Spaces, Urban Politics & Metropolitan Theory," Hamilton, Ontario, Canada: February 13–15, 2004. The annual conference of the Canadian Association of Cultural Studies seeks to critically engage with questions of the location of culture and cultural studies through a conscious revisiting of the city as a site for the production of theory, dominant/resistant cultural practices, and as the location of radical politics. The conference will be held in conjunction with the opening events of "Future Cities," a major international art exhibit and speakers series organized by the Art Gallery of Hamilton over the course of 2004. For more information, send email to cacs@mcmaster.ca.

"Planning on the Edge," Hobart, Tasmania, Australia: February 22–26, 2004. The Tasmanian Division of the Planning Institute of Australia is hosting the institute's annual conference in 2004. The theme is not only indicative of the geography of the venue in Hobart, but of the opportunity presented for the profession to display its leading-edge thinking and practice as reflected in the institute's new structure. The conference will coincide with the marking of the Bicentenary of European settlement at Sullivan's Cove on February 20, 2004. For more details, visit http://www.planning.org.au.

"Architecture and Urban Design in the Tropical Regions: Sustainability and Society," Singapore: February 26–28, 2004. The International Network for Tropical Architecture/First International Tropical Architecture Conference is organized and hosted by the Centre for Advanced Studies in Architecture, National University of Singapore. It will provide a platform for researchers and practitioners in the tropical (and subtropical) belts of the world to communicate with one another and explore shared climatic problems and opportunities in the region. For more information, contact: iNTA 2004 Conference Secretariat, c/o Integrated Meetings Specialist Pte Ltd, 1122A Serangoon Rd, Singapore 328206. Tel: (65) 6295 5790; fax: (65) 6295 5792; email: inta@inmeet.com.sg; website: http://www.arch.nus.edu.sg/iNTA/index.htm.

"Medi-Triology: Momentum, Metamorphosis, Manifesto," International Gazimagusa Symposium 2004, Eastern Mediterranean University, North Cyprus: April 12–16, 2004. In view of the historical and cultural richness of the region, this conference will explore similar problems, potential solutions, proposals, and innovations related to the Mediterranean. The main themes will be Theories, Concepts, Methods; Case Studies/Projects; and Innovative Ideas, Approaches within the context of City, Architecture, and Art in the Mediterranean Region. For recent news and developments about the symposium, visit http://www.emu.edu.tr/medi3ology. Email: medi3ology@emu.edu.tr.

"The Healthy Community & the Built Environment," Sarasota, Florida: March 15–19, 2004. Papers are now being accepted for the Thirty-Ninth International Making Cities Livable Conference (IMCL). Topics include built environment/community health interconnections; urban design & the elderly; healthy environments for children & youth; the "city of short distances"; the square as community catalyst; achieving mixed-use development; town centers for healthy communities; increasing walkability through design; transportation policy for healthy communities; sustainable urban development; successful development models: case studies; and teaching models. For more information, email Suzanne.Lennard@livablecities.org; or see http://www.livablecities.org.

"City Futures: An International Conference On Globalism And Urban Change," Chicago, Illinois: July 8–10, 2004. The aim of the conference, hosted by the University of Illinois at Chicago, College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs, is to boost the quality of international dialogue about urban issues. Contributions are welcome from all continents of the world. For details, visit http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/cityfutures. Tel: (312) 413-8088; email: cityfutures@uic.edu.

RECENT CONFERENCES AND SYMPOSIA

"New Ideas for Urban Neighbourhoods in Europe," Budapest, Hungary: October 11–13, 2003. This project documented innovative neighborhood- and housing-management practices which promote social cohesion. Findings of the NEHOM project, drawn from 26 neighborhoods in Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, were presented. For more information, see http://www.nhh.no/geo/NEHOM/finalconference.htm.

"Planning in a More Globalized World — International Planning Congress," Cairo, Egypt: October 17–22, 2003. The International Society of City & Regional Planners (ISoCaRP) 2003 Congress, in association with the Faculty of Urban & Regional Planning, Cairo University, afforded a wide exchange of experiences and opinions among planners and researchers on territorial phenomena and urban/regional planning practices in a globalizing world. For more information, visit http://www.isocarp.org/pub/events/congress/2003/index.htm; or write to International Society of City and Regional Planners (ISoCaRP), Willem Witsenplein 6, Rm 459a, 2595 BK, The Hague, Netherlands. Tel: 31 (70) 346-2654; fax: 31 (70) 361-7909; email secretariat@isocarp.org.

CALL FOR ARTICLES/PAPERS FOR PUBLICATION

"Spontaneous Shrines and Other Memorializations" Call for articles on spontaneous shrines and other forms of public death-memorialization for a proposed edited volume. Papers should be approximately 25 pages with references cited, and should include ethnographic description, analysis, and theory. A particular interest of the publication will be the ways these phenomena memorialize deceased individuals while taking a position on a public issue, such as drunk driving, police brutality, or terrorism. Send inquiries and manuscripts to Jack Santino, Room 108 Popular Culture, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio 43403; jacksantino@hotmail.com. Deadline is January 1, 2004.

"Globalization and Architectural Practice" Up to five articles will be accepted for this special issue of the *Journal of Architectural Education* on the topic of "Globalization and Architectural Practice." The issue will provide a forum to explore some of the challenges brought about by globalization in the study and practice of architecture. The editors seek submissions addressing issues ranging from the technical traditions of the profession (with its educational infrastructure), the social functions of its practice, and the extent of its resulting markets, to the introduction of specific technological, political and geographical paradigms. Submissions are welcomed from allied and nonallied fields. Work with a strong empirical foundation is encouraged. Prospective authors may find guidelines for submission at http://www.jaeonline.ws/. For inquiries, contact Howard Smith at hsmith@usc.edu; Paolo Tombesi at p.tombesi@unimelb.edu.au; or Craig Wilkins at Craig.L.Wilkins-2@tc.umn.edu. Deadline for articles is January 15, 2004.

Guide for Preparation of Manuscripts

1. GENERAL
The editors invite readers to submit manuscripts. Please send three copies of each manuscript, with one copy to include all original illustrations. Place the title of the manuscript, the author's name and a 50-word biographical sketch on a separate cover page. The title only should appear again on the first page of text. Manuscripts are circulated for review without identifying the author. Manuscripts are evaluated by a blind peer-review process.

2 LENGTH AND FORMAT
Manuscripts should not exceed 25 standard 8.5" x 11" [A4] double-spaced typewritten pages (about 7500 words). Leave generous margins.

3. APPROACH TO READER
Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the journal, papers should be written for an academic audience that may have either a general or a specific interest in your topic. Papers should present a clear narrative structure. They should not be compendiums of field notes. Please define specialized or technical terminology where appropriate.

4. ABSTRACT AND INTRODUCTION
Provide a one-paragraph abstract of no more than 100 words. This abstract should explain the content and structure of the paper and summarize its major findings. The abstract should be followed by a short introduction. The introduction will appear without a subheading at the beginning of the paper.

5. SUBHEADINGS
Please divide the main body of the paper with a single progression of subheadings. There need be no more than four or five of these, but they should describe the paper's main sections and reinforce the reader's sense of progress through the text.
Sample Progression: The Role of the Longhouse in Iban Culture. The Longhouse as a Building Form. Transformation of the Longhouse at the New Year. The Impact of Modern Technology. Conclusion: Endangered Form or Form in Transition?
Do not use any numbering system in subheadings. Use secondary subheadings only when absolutely essential for format or clarity.

6. REFERENCES
Do not use a general bibliography format. Use a system of numbered reference notes as indicated below.

A condensed section of text might read as follows:
    In his study of vernacular dwellings in Egypt, Edgar Regis asserted that climate was a major factor in the shaping of roof forms. Henri Lacompte, on the other hand, has argued that in the case of Upper Egypt this deterministic view is irrelevant.[1]
    An eminent architectural historian once wrote, "The roof form in general is the most indicative feature of the housing styles of North Africa."[2] Clearly, however, the matter of how these forms have evolved is a complex subject. A thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.[3]
    In my research I discovered that local people have differing notions about the origins of the roof forms on the dwellings they inhabit.[4]

The reference notes, collected at the end of the text (not at the bottom of each page), would read as follows:
    1. E. Regis, *Egyptian Dwellings* (Cairo: University Press, 1979), p.179; and H. Lacompte, "New Study Stirs Old Debate," *Smithsonian* 11 (December 1983), pp.24–34.
    2. B. Smithson, "Characteristic Roof Forms," in H. Jones, ed., *Architecture of North Africa* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p.123.
    3. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see J. Idris, *Roofs and Man* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
    4. In my interviews I found that the local people understood the full meaning of my question only when I used a more formal Egyptian word for "roof" than that in common usage.

7. DIAGRAMS, DRAWINGS AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Illustrations will be essential for most papers in the journal, however, each paper can only be accompanied by a maximum of 20 illustrations. For purposes of reproduction, please provide images as line drawings (velox, actual size), b&w photos (5" x 7" or 8"x 10" glossies), or digitized computer files. Color prints and drawings, slides, and photocopies are not acceptable.

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If you have done your work as the result of direct employment or as the result of a grant, it is essential that you acknowledge this support at the end of your paper. *Sample acknowledgement*: The initial research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the National Endowment for the Arts [NEA]. The author acknowledges NEA support and the support of the sabbatical reasearch program of the University of Waterloo.

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13. COMPUTER DISK
If you have prepared your paper using a word processor, include a floppy-disk version of it in addition to the printed versions. Please indicate the hardware and the software used. We prefer *Microsoft Word* on an IBM PC or a Macintosh.

14 NOTIFICATION
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