TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

The International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments (IASTE) was established at the First International Symposium on Traditional Dwellings and Settlements held at Berkeley in April 1988. IASTE is an interdisciplinary forum where scholars from various disciplines and countries can exchange ideas, discuss methods and approaches, and share findings. As opposed to disciplinary associations, IASTE is a nonprofit organization concerned with the comparative and cross-cultural understanding of traditional habitat as an expression of informal cultural conventions. IASTE's purpose is to serve as an umbrella association for all scholars studying vernacular, indigenous, popular and traditional environments. Current activities of IASTE include the organization of biennial conferences on selected themes in traditional-environments research, a public outreach program which includes supporting films and documentaries, and the publication of the Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Working Paper Series, which includes all papers presented at IASTE conferences and accepted for publication.

Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review is the official publication of IASTE. As a semi-annual refereed journal, *TDSR* acts as a forum for the exchange of ideas and a means to disseminate information and report on research activities. All articles submitted to *TDSR* are evaluated through a blind peer-review process. *TDSR* has been funded by grants from the Graham Foundation, the Getty Publication Program, the National Endowment for the Arts, the Center for Environmental Design Research, and the office of the Provost at the University of California at Berkeley.

IASTE membership is open to all who are interested in traditional environments and their related studies. In addition to receiving the Association's semi-annual journal, members are eligible to attend the biennial conference at reduced rates. Subscription to the journal is available only with membership in IASTE. Domstic annual order rates are as follows: Individual, $50; Institutional, $100; Corporations, $160. Foreign members add $15 for mailing. Libraries, museums, and academic organizations qualify as institutions. Subscriptions are payable in U.S. dollars only (by check drawn on a U.S. bank, U.S. money order, or international bank draft). Send inquiries to:

TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS AND SETTLEMENTS REVIEW

Journal of the International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments

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COVER ILLUSTRATION: Singapore River in the mid-1900s. (Courtesy of The Straits Times' Library,
Singapore Press Holdings.)

Editor's Note

Every six months or so I write this note to the IASTE membership to report on current events and introduce the articles in this journal. Sometimes I have exciting prospects to report; other times I must comment on unpleasant issues. This time I bring sad news: Dominique Bonamour-Lloyd, a long-time IASTE member and *TDSR* editorial advisor has passed away after fighting cancer for several years. Dominique will be truly missed. I would like to convey the condolences of the entire IASTE membership to her family.

Every now and then *TDSR* presents an issue that focuses on a given region or theme. Most such issues take at least eighteen months to produce. Our decision this spring to focus on the Pacific Rim did not come about in this manner. Rather, it was more fortuitous that reviewers accepted several papers in the same round of submissions that deal with a single area of the world. Although the papers are diverse in scope and content, their emphasis on larger issues of ethnicity and identity in a this increasingly globalized region led to our decision to include them in a single issue.

We start with an invited paper by geographer Katharyne Mitchell, one of the plenary speakers at the upcoming IASTE conference, which deals with the Chinese diaspora community in Vancouver. Mitchell shows how the redevelopment of Chinatown has highlighted how the relationship between people and place are central to the functioning of Pacific Rim-based global circuits. Next, adopting the position of an urban analyst, Duanfang Lu continues the exploration of Vancouver by concentrating on the differences between the "hybrid" pattern of the city at the beginning of the twentieth century and at its end. In both Vancouver papers the connection to Hong Kong is very strong, and the third paper takes readers there directly. In it, anthropologist Sydney Cheung explores the present context of a nineteenth-century Chinese communal hall and demonstrates how it has been used to reconstruct the memory of a largely forgotten resistance to British takeover of the New Territories. To finish the section on Pacific Rim issues, architectural historians Heng Chye Kiang and Vivienne Chan report on the changing, and often contradictory agendas at work in the conservation and revitalization of the quays along the Singapore River.

The final article in this issue is by architectural critic Greig Crysler, a Berkeley colleague. The article, which examines the contents of *TDSR* as an intellectual arena over the last ten years, may appear to some as too critical of our organization and the intellectual practices of its members. Nevertheless, it provides an excellent historiography, which I felt was essential to share with the IASTE membership. By publishing this article, I hope to start a debate about the nature of the "critical reflexivity" called for by Crysler.

Finally, I would like to remind all of you about the upcoming IASTE conference to be held October 12-15 in Trani, Italy, co-sponsored by the Politecnico di Bari. "The End of Tradition" theme has generated a great number of abstracts (350), from which we have finalized a program that includes 120 papers by 140 scholars from 29 different countries. This conference promises to be as intellectually engaging as its site will be culturally rewarding. We hope to see you in Trani.

Nezar AlSayyad

Pacific Rim

Global Diasporas and Traditional Towns: Chinese Transnational Migration and the Redevelopment of Vancouver's Chinatown

KATHARYNE MITCHELL

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This article examines two intervals of immigration and capital investment by Hong Kong Chinese into Vancouver's Chinatown in British Columbia, Canada. In the first interval, highly educated professionals from Hong Kong arrived in Vancouver in the late 1960s and allied with local forces to block state-directed urban redevelopment projects which threatened to destroy the cultural and economic core of Chinatown. In the second interval, Hong Kong immigrants allied with offshore Hong Kong investors and local merchants and residents to reduce the development restrictions imposed by "heritage" zoning in Chinatown, thus facilitating the rapid gentrification of the area. The manner in which both preservation and redevelopment occurred highlights the ways that place, and the relationships between people, are always constitutive of and central to the functioning of global economic circuits. Further, the economic and cultural power of this global diaspora facilitated not just the reworking of a traditional place over time, but also galvanized new discussions concerning the very notions and definitions of what constitutes "tradition" itself. The ongoing redevelopment of Chinatown in Vancouver thus provides a lens for a particular type of global-local articulation, one that involves not just morphological change, but also a glimpse into contemporary renegotiations of the very terms and definitions of cultural heritage .

Over the last three decades there has been a large-scale exodus of highly educated, professional, and wealthy emigrants from Hong Kong into several urban areas around the world. Scholarship related to this migration in the Canadian and U.S. context has focused mainly on the influence of the Chinese immigrants on the predominant "Western" cultures and traditions of the nation. Questions of assimilation and/or contestation of the values and institutions of the host society have predominated, and issues related to the changing political and spatial structures of the pre-existing and relatively autonomous immigrant communities within Canadian and U.S. society have been largely ignored. This lack of interest is unfortunate for two reasons. First, the influence of the recent Hong Kong immigrants on both the traditional structures and political formations of Chinatowns worldwide has been absolutely immense over the past three decades. Second, an examination of the ways that the culture and capital of recent Chinese immigrants have penetrated traditional Chinese communities would seem to offer important insights into wider theoretical interpretations of global-local and global-traditional dynamics, which are often elided in more conventional globalization studies.

In addition, the impact of recent immigrants from Hong Kong on the redevelopment of Chinatowns worldwide has raised several important questions about the nature and discourse of "tradition" itself. In Vancouver, British Columbia, in the 1990s, for example, as offshore Hong Kong capital swept through the city and development projects dotted the urban landscape, the city's attempt to preserve "traditional" Chinatown through its zoning policies was derided by many Chinatown residents as a form of neocolonialism. The preservation of tradition, imposed from above, against the wishes of many residents of the community, and in the form of buildings locked rigidly in the landscape, caused a number of people to ask, "Whose tradition?" Many Chinatown residents argued that the emphasis on architectural preservation was making the area uncompetitive in the bid for offshore Hong Kong investment and negatively influencing another tradition of the landscape — the everyday practice of commerce. The struggle over the meaning of heritage and tradition that ensued in Vancouver provides a useful case study of how normative concepts have been called into question in today's period of global flows. Unlike previous eras, when the government's right to "define" the heritage of places such as Chinatown went largely unchallenged, current transnational movements have forced a moment of rupture, when the normative assumptions of government discourse (at all levels) have been opened to question.

Conventional globalization studies often miss these micro-moments of disruption. In relation to Vancouver's Chinatown, many of the "standard" narratives of global forces and transnational flows have been unsatisfactory in explaining either the spatial or the social changes that have occurred over the past three decades. One reason is that the tendency to conceive of globalization as an abstract, monolithic and homogenizing process has obscured the way in which place is always constitutive of and central to the functioning of global economic circuits. As will be shown in this Vancouver research, specific networks, connections and alliances between global and local players have been integral to the manner in which preservation, redevelopment, and the discourse surrounding them have actually taken place.

Another important issue is that much early globalization literature in the social sciences privileged forces "from above," leading to a view of Western-based processes such as capitalism and modernity as extending into every crevice of the world, irrevocably altering the structures and traditions of developing regions.[1] This conceptualization is flawed on a number of counts. First, it has homogenized concepts such as capitalism, and located their origin, development and power squarely in the West. With such an orientation, explanations for local change (the "local" almost always being located in developing countries) have often rested on static, core-periphery types of arguments which have not been able to effectively explicate the types of transformations occurring in many parts of the world.

Moreover, the emphasis on capitalism as a purely Western development has elided historical capitalistic practices associated with non-Western societies. In China, for example, Gary Hamilton has demonstrated how early patterns of long-distance trade between clan and *huiguan* (regional place) members led to a different capitalist trajectory than that of most European societies.[2] Thus, early patterns of interregional trade (within the context of a distant, tributary state system) influenced the development of a form of capitalism regulated more by interpersonal norms and sanctions than by bureaucratic organizations under state control. Historical and cultural patterns like these are important for contemporary analysis because they continue to have ramifications for contemporary business practices. Indeed, as numerous scholars have shown, contemporary Chinese business practices continue to reflect such a personalized, trust-based system. The use of extended family, regional and collegial ties, reliance on *guanxi* (personal relationships), establishment of credit pools, use of trust and reputation to "secure" deals, and omittance of formal contracts and/or state-designed protections and regulations are all key features of Chinese capitalism as practiced today in numerous locales around the world.[3]

Thus, capitalism, as the primary "globalizing" process of the late twentieth century, cannot be adequately understood with a purely top-down approach. Its differing origins, development, and contemporary practices and articulations all influence the way it intersects with "traditional" forms and identities in various regional sites around the world. Knowledge of its particular cultural inscriptions, including the institutions and individuals engaged in capitalist practices (such as urban development), therefore, are essential to understand both how and why local transformation occurs. Certainly, in the case of Vancouver's Chinatown this type of knowledge is imperative to an accurate picture of recent changes in the community.

Top-down approaches to globalization also tend to homogenize concepts such as "modernity," and similarly posit it as a purely Western phenomenon. However, recent works by postcolonial critics such as Barlow, Rofel and Ong have critiqued this

vision, arguing for broader interpretations and "alternative" modernities that resist Enlightenment narratives of what constitutes the modern.[4] Without a Weberian emphasis on rationality or the rise of the bureaucratic state as the key elements of modernity, it is possible to strip the concept to more basic foundations — to argue, for example, that modernity is comprised primarily of a shifting experience of being in the world, one that is linked with, but not limited to, the growth and spread of capitalist practices. Stripping the concept of its Western biases widens the analytical range of the concept; thus, a broader interpretation of modernity as a globalizing, but not necessarily "Westernizing" process, allows for more nuanced analyses of global-local dynamics and specific transformations of the "traditional," such as will be discussed in the following sections of the paper.

Finally, much past globalization literature, particularly global-local studies, has fixed the relationship between scales as unilinear — i.e., as being always global to local. But research on contemporary migration movements, for example, has indicated that a great proportion of current migration is "transnational" — that is, involving constant and nearly simultaneous flows of people, capital and information back and forth between sending and receiving societies.[5] In the context of Hong Kong Chinese immigrants to Vancouver, there is unquestionably a transnational network of flows and alliances that has operated nonlinearly, and that has also jumped scales. The influence of this back-and-forth movement on the social and spatial politics of the community has been enormous.[6]

The view that emerges today is that place-based, spatial and political dynamics in Vancouver's Chinatown have been influenced by nonlinear, highly personalized and contingent global-local articulations, as well as by local-local dynamics. Chinatown is a heterogeneous space and community, involving people with conflicting aims, goals, values, and understandings of community and what a community should be and look like. The Hong Kong migration to Vancouver, paralleled by a rapid and massive movement of capital into the city, is unquestionably part of a "globalizing" process within late capitalism, but it is a globalizing process that has created a very particular, site-specific set of dynamics within Vancouver's Chinatown. The numerous changes that have occurred in the spaces of this community between the 1960s and the 1990s have been partly the result of global capital and cultural penetration. But they have also resulted from local contingencies, ethnic ties, personal connections, shared cultures and histories, and the transnational movements of people back and forth across space that have been characteristic of the last decades of the twentieth century.

HONG KONG MIGRATION AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: INTERVAL ONE

The original migrants to Vancouver were primarily rural laborers from four counties in the Say-yup region of the Pearl River Delta. A few of the earliest migrants were merchants, but

FIGURE 1. *Map of Chinatown, (c.1892.) (Drawing by author.)*

the majority were laborers and farmers fleeing internal political strife, the Opium Wars, and a poor economy. The spatial community that became known as "Chinatown" was first established in the 1880s, and consisted of a few wooden shacks. After a building boom between 1900 and 1910, it also came to include several blocks of brick buildings **(FIG.1)**. The larger buildings along Carrall and Pender Streets (the heart of the Chinatown community) were primarily brick, three stories high, with recessed balconies and wrought-iron railings **(FIGS.2,3)**. These buildings were similar in style to the town buildings of South China.[7] As a result of a local state policy of containment of Chinese immigrants, nearly all residents of Chinese descent in Vancouver lived in Chinatown until the 1970s.[8]

Soon after the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railroad in 1885, prohibitive Canadian immigration policies such as the "head" tax, greatly constricted Chinese migration.[9] Then, following the Chinese Exclusion Act (CEA) of 1923, immigration from China was completely banned. However, after the repeal of the CEA in 1947, the Chinese residential community extended east into Strathcona and north across Hastings Street into what is now the Downtown Eastside. Within a decade, the relative number of residents of Chinese descent in Strathcona grew from one quarter to approximately one half. This trend in the district's population continued through the 1960s and early 1970s.[10]

Although the CEA was repealed in 1947, it was not until 1962, when new regulations removed "country of origin" as a major criterion for admission to Canada, that direct, legal migration began to flourish. In particular, the shift to a "points" system in 1967, according to which admission came to be based more on education and skills than kinship or sponsorship, created a major surge in immigration from Hong Kong.[11] The number of such immigrants continued to increase through the 1980s and 1990s.[12]

As a result of immigration restrictions and hard economic times, between 1923 and the end of World War II there was relatively little new construction in Chinatown or the adjacent

FIGURE 2. *Mon Keang School, East Pender Street (1921).*

FIGURE 3. *East Pender Street Buildings (c.1910).*

residential community of Strathcona. In the 1950s several new businesses were built along Pender Street and elsewhere, and a number of buildings were torn down or remodeled. At the time, the Chinese community in Strathcona occupied primarily two-story wooden homes built in the early decades of the century. However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s urban planners launched extensive redevelopment plans to address so-called "blighted" areas of the city. The redevelopment, which was scheduled to take place over twenty years, targeted most of the residential sectors of Chinatown and Strathcona for demolition and rebuilding.

As with many other cities in Canada and the United States, the loss of the middle-class residential tax base, increasing competition for downtown commercial land, difficulties in procuring mortgages and home-repair financing for city housing (particularly by nonwhite applicants), and increasing relegation of the poor to confined and rapidly deteriorating inner-city areas had resulted in housing stock in areas such as Chinatown that was generally in bad condition. These areas were then represented as blighted, or (in more anthropomorphic terms) as "ulcers" or "sores" which

needed to be surgically removed for fear their infectious, diseased qualities would contaminate other areas of the city. In the 1950s this rhetoric was heavily laden with cross-references to communism, which was perceived as germinating in vile, crowded slums, and spreading from there to the general body politic.[13]

During this decade there was also a strong move by a number of government bureaucracies, especially transport and planning departments, to "rationalize" or "modernize" land use. Land that was unregularized, with a hodgepodge of uses and activities, was seen as inefficient and, more importantly, expensive for the city to maintain. In 1948 Dr. Leonard Marsh wrote of Strathcona in the report, *Rebuilding a Neighborhood*, that the area had become "a kind of zoning ganglion of mixed uses, badly in need of rationalization."[14] In a later report he called the area a "revenue sink . . . its state of deterioration a menace."[15] Marsh went on to suggest this inefficiency was costly to the city, especially given the neighborhood's proximity to valuable land in the commercial and business districts.

Indeed, this connection between capital revenue "lost" and of a perceived lack of rationalization was made explicit in a number

of government documents. The effort to clear out huge swathes of blighted urban areas in Chinatown and Strathcona was clearly also therefore an effort to increase capital circulation to and through Vancouver's adjacent central business district. This project also included construction of a massive eight-lane freeway to connect the relatively underdeveloped North Shore with the downtown and the southern part of the city by means of a route through central Chinatown (a plan conceived as early as the 1950s, but not made public until 1967). Thus, the removal of crowded and chaotic residential settlements was conceived of as only part of a much larger project of rationalization that would allow more extensive city development and freer circulation of capital and goods.[16]

Furthermore, effective bureaucratic control of the heretofore undisciplined and autonomous community spaces of Chinatown would present a picture to the world of a city ready to attract "modern" capital. The workings of modern capitalism, in this conceptualization, could only operate efficiently in a nonlocal, nonparticularist, unfettered, and "rational" manner — in other words, one that precluded the form of capitalism employed by most members of the extended Chinese community. For example, since such capitalist practices were often based on the procurement and maintenance of long-term relationships (generally based on extended family or regional ties) instead of short-term profit-making, they were perceived as "irrational" and premodern, and therefore not appropriate for the entry of a new world city onto the global economic stage.[17]

The proposed slum clearance project involved the razing of numerous blocks of row homes and the demolition of small commercial areas around the south rim of False Creek, the heart of residential Chinatown. The plan eventually led to the displacement of thousands of residents, who were offered accommodation in high-rise apartment buildings, only one of which was located within walking distance of the traditional community. Phase One of the slum clearance project began in 1960 and was completed in 1963. It involved the displacement of 860 people and the demolition of 30 acres of residential and commercial buildings. Phase Two began in 1963 and involved the demolition of several more blocks of Chinatown and the displacement of more than 2,000 additional people, mostly Chinese (**FIG.4**).[18]

Meanwhile, between 1967 and the late 1970s a new trend appeared in Chinese immigration to the city. Many of the new immigrants were highly educated professionals from Hong Kong who qualified with high points under the new immigration program. In contrast to prior policies, which had encouraged the entry of unskilled rural peasants and then allowed them to sponsor their relatives, the new system favored urban, middle-class applicants with a particular trade or professional skill.[19] These new immigrants immediately began to affect the political and spatial dynamics of the Chinese community, intervening in formative ways. One was the successful effort to block the third phase of the Strathcona "renewal" project. Another was the effort to halt construction of the proposed freeway that would have bisected Chinatown.

FIGURE 4.
"Goodbye Slums, Hello Luxury," photo and headline from the Vancouver *Province, April 2, 1963.*

SPATIAL CHANGES IN THE LATE 1960S AND 1970S

Following the completion of the second phase of slum clearance in the mid-1960s, resistance to further demolition in the area intensified. The community was galvanized in particular by the proposal, first made public in October 1967, to build an elevated, eight-lane freeway along Gore Avenue and Union Street. This freeway's concrete barriers would have completely separated Chinatown's commercial core from its residential area. Resistance to plans in Phase Three of the renewal project to raze an additional 22 residential blocks of Strathcona emerged at the same time. Several associations were formed to fight these urban redevelopment plans. A coalition of residents and merchants from Chinatown, as well as architects, planners, and university professors and students, also formed to defeat the highway proposal.[20] After this success, the newly formed Strathcona Property Owners' and Tenants' Association (SPOTA) began an intensive campaign to highlight the negative aspects of housing demolition and general slum clearance, arguing instead for rehabilitation of the older housing stock in Strathcona.[21]

SPOTA's leadership was composed primarily of residents and tenants of the neighborhood who were anxious to protect their houses and also to win greater political control over land use decisions. Along with many others, one of the early SPOTA co-presidents, Harry Con, as well as the group's public relations officer, Shirley Chan, represented a new generation of Chinese Canadians who challenged both the civic and federal planning process, and also the older Chinatown institutions that had failed effectively to take on these governmental structures over the past decade.[22] These primarily second- and third-generation Chinese Canadians were the first wave of an important movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s that sought to wrest control of community representation from a hegemonic structure of Anglo dominance, and also from old, insular and traditionalist organizations within Chinatown itself, such as the Chinese Benevolent Association (CBA). In this effort, they were encouraged and

aided by architects, social workers, and other unpaid profes-
sional consultants, and also by the newly arrived, highly edu-
cated professionals from Hong Kong. This last group was in
a special position since they were able to contest many of the
undemocratic operations of the CBA and other institutions
from the dual position of being outsiders yet also insiders by
virtue of their ethnic Chinese identity.[23]

Both the freeway and Phase Three of the Strathcona
renewal project were halted by the end of 1968 **(FIG.5)**.
SPOTA successfully lobbied the higher levels of government
to block the urban renewal plans, arguing that the Strathcona
redevelopment would negatively affect the economic vitality
of Chinatown's commercial core, and thus also tourism in
the city (a large money-maker). In one brief, they wrote,

> *Vancouver City Council and the Vancouver citizens at*
> *large have urged that Chinatown be preserved and devel-*
> *oped as a business and tourist attraction. These same peo-*
> *ple must realize that Chinatown cannot continue to exist*
> *if there is no residential Chinese community nearby. The*
> *present urban renewal scheme for Strathcona is likely to*
> *destroy the Chinese residential community and in turn*
> *will seriously affect Chinatown as a city asset.[24]*

In 1971, in response to these arguments and to a general
change in mood (particularly on the federal level) concerning
urban renewal, the province passed zoning bylaws designating
the commercial (Pender Street) area of Chinatown, and also
the adjacent historic district of Gastown, as heritage areas. In
1974 new zoning regulations created an HA-1 historic district
(for Chinatown). This area was considerably larger than the

FIGURE 5. *Map of urban renewal plan for Chinatown and Strathcona.*
(Drawing by author.)

earlier provincial designation and was to be managed by the
City of Vancouver. In 1975 a new HA-1A zoning district
extended the protected area further from Pender Street to
Union Street to the south and Quebec Street to the west, an
increase in size of more than 200 percent **(FIG.6)**. The intent
of the new zoning was "to recognize the area's unique ethnic
quality and to ensure the protection, restoration and mainte-
nance of Chinatown's historical, architectural, and cultural
character."[25] This designation carried such tight restrictions on
architectural change that it effectively froze the entire area
from further redevelopment. It was a designation, however,
that would be challenged within just two decades by
Chinatown representatives as being exceedingly detrimental to
the continued economic vitality of the community.

FIGURE 6. *Heritage zoning map. (Courtesy of*
City of Vancouver, Planning Department.)

HONG KONG MIGRATION AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: INTERVAL TWO

Statistics show a shifting pattern of immigration into Canada over the last several decades. Since the 1960s the European predominance (particularly from Britain) has changed to an Asian predominance (primarily from Hong Kong). Furthermore, in the last six years of the immigrant total of approximately 220,000 per year, more than half have arrived from Asia. Immigration from Europe, by contrast, has diminished to less than one-fifth of the total. Of the immigrants from Asia, Hong Kong has been the top source country for the last decade, jumping ahead of India in 1987 and remaining the leader through 1998.[26]

After Toronto, Vancouver is the second most popular destination for all immigrants, and also the second most popular destination for Hong Kong immigrants. The numbers of people arriving in Vancouver from Hong Kong have increased dramatically since the mid-1980s (through 1997), with the largest group, 15,663, entering in 1994 **(FIG.7)**. However, although Vancouver is second to Toronto in terms of overall number of immigrants from Hong Kong, it leads the nation as the destination for "business class" immigrants. (In the 1990s the average annual rate of business immigrants and their families coming to Vancouver was approximately 12 percent of total Hong Kong-Vancouver immigration.)[27]

While the earlier "points" system privileged those with education, skills and training, the business category was specifically created to encourage immigration by people with either business experience or capital to invest. It was first implemented in 1978, designed to facilitate the immigration of those who could "make a positive contribution to the country's economic development by applying their risk capital and know-how to Canadian business ventures which create jobs for Canadians."[28] According to the program, if an investor had a personal net worth of at least C$500,000, they

could apply within this category. Entrepreneurs would be eligible if they promised to invest at least C$250,000 (C$350,000 in British Columbia after 1991) into a Canadian business for three years.[29]

Figures today show that this program has led not only to vast increases in the immigration of wealthy business people and their families to Canada, but also to flows of capital into Vancouver reckoned in the billions of dollars.[30] For a number of reasons, including the personal connections between well-known Hong Kong real estate entrepreneurs such as Li Ka-shing and many smaller developers and the stipulations of the business immigration requirements, much of this capital flowed directly into major urban redevelopment projects in the Greater Vancouver area.[31]

SPATIAL CHANGES IN THE LATE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S

In the past decade Vancouver has been spatially and demographically transformed. In addition to five major urban redevelopment projects in the downtown and adjacent waterfront areas, there has also been a huge turnover of housing stock in residential areas, with numerous demolitions of older buildings and their replacement with much larger "monster houses" or luxury condominiums.[32] Many of the new immigrants from Hong Kong (and also Taiwan) have bought houses in either the west-side neighborhoods of the city or in nearby suburbs, such as Richmond. For example, census statistics show a major demographic shift in the ethnic profile of Richmond over the past decade. In the late 1980s residents of Chinese descent made up just 7 percent of Richmond; contemporary figures indicate those of Chinese heritage now make up approximately 37 percent of the area's 129,500 residents.[33] However, by virtue of the rapidly rising house prices in west-side areas, as well as in Richmond, only relatively wealthy immigrants, such as those entering through the business immigration category, could afford to move to these neighborhoods.

In response to the rapid dispersal of upper-middle-class and upper-class Chinese immigrants into west-side communities and suburban municipalities, developers quickly sought to attract this new niche market through the construction of so-called "Asian" malls in these areas. Aberdeen Centre at Hazelbridge and Cambie, and Parker Place at Number 3 Road and Cambie, were built in the center of Richmond specifically to attract this new clientele. Both malls contain luxury, Hong Kong-style boutiques, entertainment areas, and *dim sum* restaurants, with all signs posted primarily in Chinese characters. More recently, two other malls catering to a Chinese and/or Japanese clientele have been built, at President Plaza and Yaohan Centre in central Richmond.[34] Following this, other Asian malls have also been built in the suburban municipalities of Surrey, Burnaby and Coquitlam.

The identity and background of those business people responsible for the construction of these projects is important in understanding the workings of this global-local economic phenomenon. For example, Thomas Fung, the developer of the first two malls, is the son of Fung King Hey, who ran the Hong Kong-based firms

FIGURE 7. *Immigration from Hong Kong to Vancouver.*

Sun Hung Kai Securities and Sun Hung Kai Bank, among other ventures, until his death in 1985. At the time of his death, the father was among the super-rich strata of Hong Kong, with a personal fortune of at least $300 million and connections to most of the top business echelons in the colony — including the developer Li Ka-Shing. Thomas Fung, through his father's personal contacts, is now networked with many of the key Chinese financial moguls and real estate developers in both Hong Kong and Vancouver.

Another key player, Jack Lee, the developer of President Plaza, grew up in Taiwan and has numerous connections with real estate and food conglomerates there, as well as with local developers. He made the development of President Plaza financially possible by establishing an immigrant investor fund, which could attract Taiwanese immigrants with the prospect of a "legitimate" investment site for the $350,000 required by Canadian government regulations for entry as "entrepreneurs." This type of investment syndicate has often allowed business immigrant capital to "join forces with offshore capital," and so facilitate the financing of urban megaprojects.[35]

Similarly, Kazuo Wada, who was raised in Japan, has retained his Japanese real estate and banking connections in addition to his extensive ties with Vancouver developers such as Lee and Fung. All three of the developers are networked with Hong Kong, Taiwanese and Japanese venture capitalists and real estate developers through personal and collegial ties, and through cultural and ethnic links.[36] Large consortiums of offshore capital, managed and facilitated through local Chinese banking networks such as the Hong Kong Bank of Canada, have provided the primary funding for the development of all four of the Richmond Asian malls, as well as the Asian malls in most of the other municipalities.

By contrast to the massive urban redevelopment occurring throughout Vancouver, as well as in Richmond and in the case of other suburban malls, Chinatown could manage to attract little of this offshore Asian investment. By the 1990s local Chinatown businessmen, represented by the Chinese Merchants Association (CMA), felt one of the primary reasons they were being locked out of these development schemes was a lack of interest in Chinatown because of its HA-1 historical designation. They claimed the area had been "frozen" by this designation — unable to shift alongside the shifting nature of capitalist relations and Vancouver's new status as global city. It was for this reason, they claimed, that businesses were in trouble and the community was stagnating.

To address some of these concerns, the Chinatown Historic Area Planning Committee (CHAPC) was called on to advise the Vancouver Planning Department as to the best strategy for Chinatown's future. The original mission of CHAPC, which was formed in 1976, was to "advise the Director of Planning on matters relating to the HA-1 and HA-1A zones" and to "preserve and protect the heritage and character of the Chinatown Area."[37] In the 1990s the committee was composed of members from the Chinatown Properties Owners, Chinese Cultural Center, Heritage Vancouver, the Chinese Merchants Association, and a number of other key Chinatown institutions. At that time CHAPC's opposition to the continuation of the HA-1 designation was made forcefully in a

number of letters to City Hall and the planning department which, nevertheless, continued to uphold the zoning designation. Joe Wai, an architect, and a member of CHAPC in the early 1990s, expressed the committee's views concerning the HA-1 designation in Chinatown succinctly in a letter to City Hall in July 1993.

> *The issue is not necessarily "the numbers of buildings to be preserved", but the fundamental view, thus approach, of what is "heritage"? If the view is primarily "architectural character", then Planning is correct in holding on to their approach and position. However, if "Heritage" is consideration of culture first (and architectural character is **A PART** of that) then a more holistic view and action are required. It is our contention that "Heritage" particularly for Chinatown goes beyond "Architectural merits" only. [Chinatown is] a place where a continuous way of life has thrived, evolved over 100 years. . . . "Culture" (language, sounds, smells, ways of being . . . etc.) is the essence and the character. . . . The economic clock is ticking louder and louder each passing day, buried in an essentially stifling environment: high taxes/rents; crime, inadequate parking and virtual freeze on redevelopment.[38]*

Despite the rhetoric of death and decay, however, at the time this was written Chinatown land had been increasing in value as a result of its proximity to several urban megaprojects built on part of the enormous False Creek land parcel originally purchased from the city by Li Ka-shing in 1988 **(FIGS.8,9)**.[39] Li had quickly subdivided this land and sold a section to his friend, the Hong Kong tycoon Lee Shau Kee, of Henderson Development (Canada) Ltd. Henderson Development planned to build a 300,000-sq.ft. project here, adjacent to Chinatown, called International Village.

Owing to the proximity of this enormous urban redevelopment project (one of several along the north shore of False Creek), as well as a sense of stagnation and missed opportunity among local businessmen, a movement had quickly grown within Chinatown to loosen the heritage designation and "unfreeze" the community. Among other strategies, members of the Chinatown Merchants' Association (CMA), in cleverly worded messages to planners and journalists, began to depict the heritage designation as a form of racism in reverse. In one newspaper interview a local businessman said, for example: "It seems there is a conspiracy and a discrimination factor aimed towards limiting Chinatown's growth and potential to what it was supposed to be 100 years ago."[40]

CMA members further argued that the district's heritage designation was "reflective of a patronizing and colonial attitude towards the Chinese-Canadian community."[41] Derrick Cheng, of the CMA, said in an interview: "The buildings and architecture of Chinatown represent colonialism. These are not the buildings that the Chinese want to see — they are a Spanish-Portuguese blend with U.S. architecture lifted from California during the gold rush." He then compared the heritage zoning designation enforced by City Hall against the wishes of the community, with earlier eras when government dictated Chinatown policy and tried to manipulate the identity of Chinatown and its residents at the same time.[42]

FIGURE 8. (RIGHT)
Concord Pacific Development.

FIGURE 9. (BELOW)
Proximity of Chinatown's edge to nearby megaproject developments. Building in front is Sam Kee Building, 8 West Pender Street.

Cheng and others publicly questioned whether the urban "preservation" designation was actually promoting the death of the community; whether, in the overweening effort to protect its physical spaces, it was destroying its economic and cultural spaces. Allan De Genova, the project coordinator for the CMA at the time, raised a number of similar issues in a lengthy newspaper interview. As did Cheng, he spoke openly and with scorn about the normative assumptions held by the planning department with regard to the traditional nature of Chinatown. The new discourse opened up by Cheng, De Genova, and others reverberated around the question, "What is Chinatown?" Was it a set of perfectly preserved buildings, a tourist area, a heritage site, a development zone, a way of life? According to De Genova, "We want to be able to put up new buildings and still cater to the character of Chinatown. But after all, the flavor of Chinatown isn't the buildings — it's the people."[43]

The discussion about the future of Chinatown's heritage zoning policy became increasingly heated during the period between 1988 and 1993. Local Chinese merchants and developers (and one prominent architect, Joe Wai) were the primary par-

ticipants in this discussion, but there appeared to be little dissent from within the community. Most institutions, representing a strong cross-section of the community, backed the sentiment that Chinatown needed to remain economically viable in order to survive.[44] The main disagreement concerning the removal of the heritage designation came from the Vancouver Planning Department, which stalled on implementing any changes for a number of years. After five years of meetings and letters back and forth, however, a new zoning agreement was reached in 1994 that lifted the blanket historic preservation designation, but protected specific buildings and areas within the community.

In the years following the removal of the blanket HA-1 designation, a number of redevelopment projects have begun to take shape throughout the major commercial areas and surrounding residential areas of Chinatown. This redevelopment has included Chinatown Plaza, a seven-story, 1,000-car "parkade" and shopping mall near the corner of Keefer and Columbia financed by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce **(FIG.10)**. It has also included a major new building on Main and Keefer financed and built for the Hong Kong Bank of Canada **(FIG.11)**.[45] Other projects have included a new headquarters for SUCCESS and the CBA adjacent to International Village, the extension of the Chinese Cultural Centre, and the construction of new housing **(FIG.12)**.[46]

DISCUSSION

In the development of Vancouver's Chinatown, two differing intervals of immigration have produced quite different results with regard to the community's preservation and development. During the first interval, the attempt to "rationalize" the city within a Western, government-dictated context came to be resisted in the 1960s by community members. Although the primary resistance came from within the community as well as from social workers, professors and architects, well-educated recently arrived immigrants from Hong Kong also

FIGURE 10. *Parking Arcade.*

played a key role. Civic bureaucrats, eager to push Vancouver onto an international stage, believed a drive toward modernization necessitated the removal of local barriers and particularities in order to allow the free, rational movement of capital through the city. They attempted a piecemeal, phased removal of real difference (in terms of an active Chinese commercial and residential district), and proposed instead the substitution of aesthetic difference in the form of Chinatown as a tourist site (including shops with neon lights and a pagoda gateway). This modernization drive was halted after two early phases of housing and commercial demolition and the resulting displacement of thousands of Chinese homeowners and tenants.

The idea of modernization, however, was received quite differently by Chinatown merchants and residents when it was presented as part of a Chinese-inspired and -financed effort to revitalize a dying community.[47] Once outside a Western, state-directed framework of rational management, the redevelopment of the neighborhood has been viewed much more positively, and it has generally been encouraged by community residents — as well as by more recently arrived Hong Kong immigrant entrepreneurs. In this case, and in contrast to the hard-line stance of the 1960s and early 1970s, development has been seen as necessary for the economic vitality and cultural survival of the neighborhood.[48]

Capitalism is a global process, but one involving specific people and groups of people with specific types of affiliations. This article has posed the question of the impact of "globalizing" forces on the "traditional" spaces of Chinatown. In order to be adequately described, however, globalization must be dissected as a contingent, place-based phenomena. Despite the use of a general rhetoric, such as that concerning a "space of flows," to describe the shifting contours of place and the loss of the primacy of place in a globalizing world, it is evident here that the way global flows actually flow remains fundamentally related to particular histories and geographies.[49] The manner in which Vancouver's Chinatown has been both preserved and developed over the past three decades has had as much to do with immigration policy, transnational connections, ethnic ties, state leadership, business networks, and *guanxi* (personal relationships), as it has had to do with the potential for capital accumulation within a "modern" global economic framework.

Foregrounding the dynamic and ongoing connections between people who migrate back and forth across space, and move between the scales of the local, national and global levels with ease, also enables a rethinking of the vast literature on Chinatowns. Chinatowns as "traditional" towns have often been depicted as fixed, static, cultural spaces that provided a symbolic glimpse into Chinese lives and lifestyles and the everyday practices and cultural artifacts that were brought from China in the late nineteenth century and inscribed in the landscape.[50] The focus on transnational movements and differing immigration periods and types of immigrants, however, has moved understanding of these places away from a static, Orientalizing gaze and toward interpretation based on the dynamism of shifting identities and spaces. It has also supplemented work that has foregrounded the social construction of Chinatown. This latter work, although a vast improvement on the earlier essentializing literatures, has, however, overemphasized the imposition of global and Western-centric definitions of racial Chineseness on the community's spaces and politics, thus privileging hegemonic structural forces from above to the detriment of a greater understanding of the internal, local-local and community dynamics of Chinatown and their spatial implications.[51] It is revealing in this regard that the idea of race and the racialization process, and its implication in colonial practices, have not merely been imposed from above and outside the community, but have also been dexterously manipulated from within the community — as was indicated in the rhetoric of neocolonialism employed by the Chinatown Merchants' Association.

The injection of transnational studies into the literature on global capital and global cities has also been a positive development. Cities can no longer be conceptualized as homogenous

entities that either are or are not part of a growing network of so-called "world" cities. They are fragmented and multilayered, and different elements within the urban fabric can become caught up differently in capitalist nets and networks. It is necessary to examine empirically the ways in which specific types of capital articulations and particular communities within such cities become linked into transnational processes in very distinct ways.[52]

This article has employed a case study of Vancouver's Chinatown to elucidate both the fluidity of concepts such as heritage and tradition, and also the ways in which these concepts and the struggles over them are imbricated in a fundamentally global political and economic milieu. Heritage, which many architectural historians have attempted to maintain by preserving the buildings and cultural artifacts of a par-ticular ethnic community, can quickly become hollow rhetoric, easily manipulated by all parties, when the actual lived experiences and practices of community members are not included as a primary aspect of its definition. Local state power over the formation of communities such as Chinatown has meant that historically, state definitions of heritage and tradition quickly became the normative discourse. With the newfound economic and cultural power of certain global "ethnic" diasporas, however, what is "traditional" about traditional towns is increasingly open for debate. The ongoing redevelopment of Chinatown in Vancouver thus provides a lens for a particular type of global-local articulation, one that involves not just morphological change, but also a renegotiation of the very terms and definitions of cultural heritage itself.

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All photos are by the author.

The Changing Landscape of Hybridity: A Reading of Ethnic Identity and Urban Form in Vancouver

DUANFANG LU

Recently a tendency has arisen in cultural criticism to reactivate the notion of hybridity as a way to open a new path for the rethinking of resistance and dominance. However, by conceptualizing hybridity as a timeless form of oppositionality, this new critical direction has tended to succumb to the temptation of homogenizing multiple realities. Through a comparison of the urban forms of Vancouver in the early and late portions of the twentieth century, this essay suggests that, while the hybrid pattern of Vancouver during the first quarter of this century was more likely a boundary-based arena, one major character of the hybridity of late-twentieth-century Vancouver is that "the other" has emerged within the constitutive core. Analysis of the differences between these two historical periods shows how various degrees and forms of hybridity appear to shift continuously with changing relations of power. The essay calls for greater attention to the temporal dimension of hybridity in attempts to understand the complexity of opposition and domination in any specific place.

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Jack Lee, a developer in the city of Vancouver, has a dilemma. His project, a C$60-million hotel, shopping and community center financed by would-be Canadians from Lee's native Taiwan, is almost complete. As reported in a recent *Maclean's,* a fountain is going to be built near the entrance to the modernist-style building, where "water will splash from the open mouth of one fish into that of another." One of the fish will be a carp and the other a dolphin — the former standing for the East and the latter for the West. For Asians, water is a symbol of money, and thus the fish that receives the water should represent the beneficial side. Lee asks himself: "Which fish should receive it? And which should spit it out?"[1]

This is just one scene from a changing urbanscape that reflects Vancouver's rapid integration with Pacific Rim markets and societies. Since the mid-1980s the city has experienced rapid growth in population, labor force, investment, output and trade.[2] Many of these changes have been associated with the arrival of thousands of Asian immigrants, mostly from Hong Kong and Taiwan. This rapid influx, together with the large amounts of investment capital the immigrants have brought, has not only enlivened the economy of Canada's third largest city, it has brought tremendous change to the built environment. As some parts of Vancouver have become increasingly similar to Hong Kong in physical and cultural terms, however, many locals have started to refer to their city as "Hongcouver," and harsh criticisms and protests have emerged at the local level. Meanwhile, stories and debates about this "new" hybrid have reverberated though the Western media.[3]

Why should such severe alarm arise at a time when hybrid products have become so widespread in Canadian daily life? This essay approaches this question by focusing on a comparison of Vancouver urbanism during two periods in the last century. It argues that while the hybrid urbanism of Vancouver during the first quarter of the twentieth century was more likely to have constituted a boundary-crossing mixture, a major characteristic of the city's hybrid nature in the late twentieth century has been that "the other" is now constitutively inside the core.[4] It has been this invasion of a previously privileged "white" landscape by an alien "other" that has given rise to such astonishment over built forms like the city's "monster houses."

HYBRIDITY: A SHORT HISTORY

Since the argument of this essay is closely related with the larger cultural debate over hybridity, I will begin by situating my views within existing scholarship. In this essay, the word "hybrid" is used to describe things, as defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary(OED)*, "derived from heterogeneous sources, or composed of different or incongruous elements."[5] Despite this seemingly simple definition, however, it is impossible to use such a word without recognizing that it comes with a loaded history. As R.J.C. Young has written, the notion of the "hybrid" originally developed from biological origins. It was defined by Webster in 1828 as "a mongrel or mule; an animal or plant, produced from the mixture of two species." However, by 1861 the *OED* was also using the word to denote the crossing of people of difference races. Especially during the remainder of the nineteenth century, the term "hybridity" then became deeply inscribed in discourses of scientific racism, specifically to connote the negative consequences of sexual cross-fertilization and racial intermarriage.[6] It was only during the 1980s that the association of hybridity with colonial and white-supremacist ideologies started to be broken. Specifically, as a growing number of postmodernist theorists discarded binarized frames of analysis and began to examine

the fragmented, mobile and ambiguous nature of culture, the concept of hybridity become reactivated as a key component of cultural criticism, particularly within postcolonialist theory.[7]

In part, the new orientation can be traced to Mikhail Bakhtin, whose philological model of intentional hybridity for the first time proposed an ideological framework which set different elements against each other within a conflictual structure.[8] Homi Bhabha, one of the most active contemporary advocates of the notion of hybridity, went beyond Bakhtin, however, to develop the potentially subversive side of the concept. In various essays, Bhabha approached the issue from different angles to illustrate specific moments of colonial encounter. However, one common characteristic of his formulations was always to avoid a simple dichotomy of margin and center. For example, in his "Signs Taken for Wonders," he analyzed how natives in colonial India accepted the Bible differently from the way their colonizers imagined they would.[9] For Bhabha, authority and its texts were split when the colonized raised such questions as "how can the word of God come from the flesh-eating mouths of the English?"[10] In the process of hybridization, within which authority is both doubled (reproduced in translation) and reduced (separated from what it used to be and rearticulated within a different range of knowledge and positionality), "new forms of knowledge, new modes of differentiation, new sites of power" are produced.[11] Bhabha conceptualized hybridity as a form of resistance that "is not necessarily an oppositional act of political intention, nor is it the simple negation or exclusion of the 'content' of another culture."[12]

Bhabha's formulations of hybridity have appealed to cultural critics who see them as opening new possibilities to rethink resistance and dominance. And together with such related notions as "third space" and "borderlands," hybridity has today entered circulation as a positive concept connoting subversive multiplicity and progressive agency. Yet the tendency in much of this usage has been to appropriate Bhabha's notions, originally derived from sophisticated readings of defined moments of colonial encounter, as if they represented a universal, timeless schema. For example, Edward Soja, in his *Thirdspace*, summoned Bhabha's notion of hybridity to build a trialectics of "thirding-as-Othering." Citing Bhabha's comment that "all forms of culture are continually in a process of hybridity," he argued that "This third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives. . . ." Soja then claimed that Bhabha "explicitly challenges hegemonic historiography."[13] But this was never Bhabha's true goal.

Such a reflexive desire to move from the specific moment to the general space is a weakness in many cultural critiques, one which Bhabha, himself, has not avoided entirely. For example, in "The Commitment to Theory," Bhabha cited A. Duff's 1839 book *India and India Missions* as an instance of hybridity. Then, from this example, he developed the notion of "cultural difference" to highlight the continual splitting between the subject who is enunciated and the subject who enunciates.[14] For Bhabha, "all cultural statements and systems

are constructed in this contradictory and ambivalent space of enunciation." This space, which Bhabha termed "third space," constitutes "the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure that the meaning and symbols of culture have no pri-mordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appro-priated, rehistoricized, translated, and reread." Once this uncontrollableness of cultural transformation is recognized, Bhabha argued, it becomes possible to grasp "why hierarchical claims to the inherent originality or 'purity' of cultures are untenable, *even before we resort to empirical historical instances that demonstrate their hybridity* [my emphasis]."[15] This distanc-ing from concrete history may be deliberate, as revealed by Bhabha's comment on Fanon: "it is one of the original and dis-turbing qualities of *Black Skin, White Masks* that it rarely his-toricizes the colonial experience."[16] Nevertheless, I believe such an abrupt generalization of the hybridity model to all times and places succumbs to a temptation to homogenize multiple realities, a tendency Bhabha seeks elsewhere vigor-ously to avoid. It may even push the fluidity of the notion to "a new stability, self-assurance and quietism."[17]

In their introduction to the edited book *Displacement, Diaspora, and Geographies of Identity*, S. Lavie and T. Swedenburg have also pointed out how Bhabha's notion of third space fails adequately to take the politics of location into account.[18] To fill the gap, Lavie and Swedenburg advocated the concept of "third time-space." While the two thus called for reconsideration of a time component, they did so in a different way than I am attempting to illustrate in this essay. What they sought to invoke was the "everydayness of this space and time" — that is, concrete lived experience as opposed to its textual representation.[19] What this essay is concerned with has more to do with historicity.[20] Specifically, it hopes to contribute an appreciation for the weight of historicity to the study of hybrid-ity through the development of empirical case studies.[21]

In the sections that follow, I will first examine the hybridization of Vancouver in the late twentieth century, as partly brought about by the arrival of wealthy Chinese immi-grants. I will then turn the clock back to examine the hybrid nature of Vancouver urbanism during the first quarter of the twentieth century. The final section will compare the hybrid urbanism of the two historical periods.

A CITY ON THE PACIFIC RIM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Vancouver has always been Canada's front door on the Pacific. This situation was determined by the location there of the terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railroad and the Canadian National Railway, which have long provided a physical tie between the rest of Canada and the Pacific Rim. But the city's cultural ties to communities of ethnic Chinese, Japanese, and Indians have also been of long standing.[22] And recently, the city's linkages with the Pacific Rim have only become broader, as a result mainly of growth in Chinese immigration and investment.

There are several reasons for this growth in Chinese influence. Among them was the decision by the Canadian government in 1978 to introduce a program allowing anyone willing to invest at least C$250,000 (US$190,000) in a Canadian business venture to enter the country as an "entre-preneurial immigrant." In 1986 a second visa category, "investor immigrant," was also introduced. Meanwhile, in that same year, the EXPO '86 transportation and telecommu-nications fair helped show off the amenities and economic opportunities of the city, and British Columbia as a whole, to an international audience. Around this time considerable anxiety also surfaced among Hong Kong Chinese about that city's future after its reversion to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. And in Taiwan, growing unease began to be felt as a result of the growing pro-independence movement. One result was a flood of Chinese immigrants into Vancouver, such that by 1994 the number of its residents who claimed Chinese ances-try had reached 350,000, or one-quarter of the total metropoli-tan-area population. The new arrivals helped boost the local economy, contributing a large portion of the US$2.3 billion in new investment Canada received between 1986 and 1991.[23] With the rapid influx of ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs and their capital, Vancouver not only saw its recession of the early 1980s give way to economic prosperity, but it began to emerge as a modest global city on the Pacific Rim.[24]

Today it is clear that the growing presence of Chinese immigrants both as consumers and investors has produced major changes in the built environment. During my field-work in 1999 I was struck by the widespread Asian influ-ence in the city. Walking along streets in Richmond, a rapidly growing south Vancouver suburb, I noticed a dis-tinct similarity of scale and style between many of the buildings there and those in Hong Kong, or even a typical middle-sized Chinese city **(FIG.I)**. The *Maclean's* article with which I began this essay described this hybridized landscape vividly:

FIGURE I. *Henderson Center, Vancouver. (Photo courtesy of Nan Jun.)*

The elegant compound curves of Lee's mirror-sheathed President Plaza embrace both a Sheraton Hotel, due to open in April, and the country's largest Asian-food supermarket, which is already doing business. On its shelves, Old Dutch Potato Chips share space with Korean kim chi and cans of grass jelly drink; a live seafood section boasts tanks of eels as well as lobster. Three floors above the shoppers, seven Buddhist nuns and monks clad in plain ochre habits are preparing to dedicate a 5,000-square-foot temple, the heart of a community centre that will offer adult education in Asian languages and crafts. . . . Immediately to the south of President Plaza sits the Aberdeen Centre: despite its Scottish name, the bustling complex of shops and restaurants is owned by investors from Hong Kong. . . . To the north of Lee's building stands the Yaohan Centre, the first Canadian link in an international chain of supermarkets and department stores owned by Japan's Wada Group.[25]

Investment from ethnic Chinese reached its peak in 1988, when the former site of EXPO '86 was sold for US$200 million to Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-Shing and his associates. Eventually to cover one-sixth of downtown Vancouver, this project will eventually include 204 acres of office buildings, high-rise condominiums, parks and public facilities. While it will take ten to fifteen years to complete, the mammoth high-rise apartment towers that have been built as part of Li's development have already reconfigured Vancouver's urban core **(FIG.2)**. Compared with other high-rise residential projects in North America, these buildings are slimmer and their footprints are generally much smaller, and as such, they seem to have much in common with typical residential buildings in Hong Kong. Yet during the late 1980s local anxiety about this project had less to do with its architectural form than with the fact that some of its apartments were put on sale in Hong Kong weeks before they were offered in Vancouver. Many Vancouverites felt this reduced their chances of purchasing certain parts of their own city, and local opposition subsequently forced Li's company to change its sales strategy. Now the claim is that "Vancouver is two weeks ahead of Hong Kong."[26]

Big commercial and residential projects such as these within the metropolitan core have been accompanied by equally extensive suburban housing development. According to one developer involved in housing construction on Vancouver's west side, during the recession in the early 1980s some developers lost almost everything. But during the mid-1980s, "things started to move, . . . and 99 percent of it was triggered by foreign, mostly Hong Kong and Taiwan, investors."[27] In order to derive maximum profit from such ventures, local developers seized upon incipient cultural differences and articulated a new style of housing and landscaping for their principal client group, Hong Kong Chinese. In many local developers' minds, what wealthy Hong Kong home buyers wanted were palatial houses with sumptuous decorations representing family power. Many of these new consumers also believed in *feng shui*, a tradi-

FIGURE 2.
Concord Pacific, Vancouver. (Photo courtesy of Nan Jun.)

tional Chinese geomantic practice based on careful attention to the flow of *qi* (cosmic energy) and the balance of *yin* and *yang*. And many preferred houses that would allow aged parents to live in the same household as their adult children. Such aesthetic and spatial nuances were immediately captured by Vancouver developers and reworked into a hybrid housing style in the city's residential and suburban areas. Although such houses appeared stylistically "Western," they also shared certain features that enunciated a readable "Hong Kong Chinese taste." For example, most were much more spacious than their neighbors. Their entranceways were particularly large and often had double doors. Quite a few were box shaped, clad in colored brick, and distinguished by large window areas on the front facade. Finally, their yards were often paved by stark cement and surrounded by a stylized hedge or fence **(FIG.3)**.

Locals started to use the term "monster houses" in the late 1980s to satirize the aesthetic qualities of these huge dwellings of wealthy immigrants. And although resentment against them spread throughout the metropolitan area, it was their impact within elite neighborhoods, such as Kerrisdale and Shaughnessy, that raised the most vociferous local opposition. The resentment may have been partly due to the dramatic inflation in house prices in these neighborhoods caused by the influx of foreign money. (The assessed value of some west-side houses rose as much as 300 percent, which not only forced long-term homeowners in these areas to pay more in municipal taxes, but also priced the market beyond the means of many local buyers.[28]) However, even more bitter complaints were devoted to the monster houses' "unacceptable" scale, "bad" taste, and "unneighborly" spatial arrangements. Kerrisdale, for example, had initially been established as a upper-middle-class British suburb, characterized by a relative

FIGURE 3.
An example of a "monster house" in Kerrisdale. (Photo courtesy of Nan Jun.)

FIGURE 4. *A typical single-family detached house in Kerrisdale. (Photo courtesy of Nan Jun.)*

uniformity of architectural style, incorporating rural English architectural motifs as well as English picturesque landscaping **(FIG.4)**. In terms of population mix and appearance, the community had also remained largely unchanged between World War II and 1980. But since the mid-1980s, when the so-called rich Chinese immigrants began moving in, many older houses have been sold and replaced by "monster houses," while mature trees have sometimes been cut down to make room for them. Such transformations have triggered harsh criticism and protest, with the city government receiving thousands of letters addressing the issue.

In criticizing changes in neighborhood character and defending their struggle against it, protesters have invoked the notion of a specifically Canadian identity and sense of place. One petitioner wrote in a letter to the *Western News*: "Canadians see monster housing as an arrogant visible demonstration of the destruction of Canadian culture. Yes, we have a Canadian identity and Canadians should beware of persons who say we don't while they try to rebuild Canada in a different mould for their own purpose and profit."[29] In their efforts to keep Chinese capitalists from buying houses in their neighborhoods, many petitioners have thus equated "Canadian heritage" with British culture. In their minds, people of other than "Anglo" descent can never truly be part of this heritage. Jud Cyllorn, the founder of a local organization that advocates the preservation of Western cultural values, claimed bluntly in an interview that Canada's "British culture, which is based on trust," has given way to an "Asian culture [of] individual greed." He further lamented: "In 22 years, we have completely changed who we are and what we believe in. . . . Anything I say is not to raise hatred against anyone, but only to raise disgust at our own laxity and stupidity in surrendering our country without even a whimper."[30] This line of criticism was dramatized in a graffito spray-painted on one monster house in large, black, letters: "Genius Loci?"[31] (*Genius loci* is a Latin phrase which means "the spirit of a place."[32]) In invoking the phrase, one might assume the graffitist presumed that the "place" in question was of pure European heritage, and that this implicitly excluded the possibility that newcomers of Asian ancestry might reside there. But history tells a very different story.

"A CITY OF COSMOPOLITANS"

In his address to the Union of Canadian Municipalities in 1910, L.D. Taylor announced, "I am the mayor of a cosmopolitan city — I should rather say of a city of cosmopolitans whose sense of cityhood . . . has . . . self-consciousness and the self-importance of youth."[33] Vancouver has been a multicultural mix since its very beginnings. Indeed, as early as 1891 the census of Canada documented more than 42 countries of origin among the 14,000 people living in the young city. Orientals even outnumbered whites from continental Europe: 840 to 560.[34] In fact, Chinese were among British Columbia's first immigrants, drawn from California by the Fraser River gold rush of 1858. Between 1881 and 1885 17,000 Chinese arrived, most of whom were hired to build the Canadian Pacific Railway. At least 600 died during the construction, but many of the survivors were eventually able to move to Vancouver, where they gradually created a solid presence in the city.[35] Following the 1890s a surge of Japanese immigration into the area brought Asians to more than 10 percent of Vancouver's total population. As more Japanese came, they developed "Little Tokyo" adjacent to Chinatown.[36] Then, in 1904 immigrants from East India came to the province for the first time. Their poverty and distinctive customs, such as the wearing of turbans, made them seem even more obviously "foreign" to the city's British majority. Although small in numbers, the presence of East Indian immigrants eventually caused a violent reaction from this majority, including an anti-Asian riot in Chinatown and Little Tokyo on September 7-8, 1907.[37]

Because Asians remained the largest and most visible non-British group in the city, many researchers on Vancouver's history have come to an easy association between "foreign" and "Asian." However, as R.A.J. McDonald has rightly observed, historical records reveal that the city's category of "outsider" was much broader than this.[38] For example, it included not only nonwhites but also non-British white foreigners. And it referred to such marginal groups as aboriginals and loggers. Since urbanization had almost completely separated them from non-Native peoples, it is not surprising that aboriginal people were considered to be in this group: in fact, they were almost entirely absent from civic discourse. But the situation of loggers was more curious. Although they could be of Canadian, British or American origin, they were considered outside the mainstream of respectable society because of their distinct life pattern. This was typified by their being single men without family, living in a masculine community, and being isolated much of the time in forest camps.[39]

The situation of Italians, however, may offer the most insight into dominant social thought in the city in the early twentieth century. During the pre-World War I boom a large number of Italian laborers came to the city, until by 1913 its Italian population had exceeded 4,000. Italians were able to compete successfully as unskilled laborers because of their ability to outwork Englishmen on street- and drain-construction projects. Nevertheless, because they were southern

European, Roman Catholic, and poor, Italians were thought to threaten Vancouver's "British character." As one longshoreman told the BC Commission on Labor: "Italians live on macaroni and the Russians on salt herring and bread. . . . That is impossible for us."[40] In general, both Asian and non-British white immigrants, most of whom lived in untidy and crowded conditions, were said to threaten the public health of the city.

The presence of such a hybrid population soon came to have physical manifestations in the landscape. Settlements for immigrants were largely located in the inner city, among which Chinatown and Little Tokyo were the most visible. Early Chinatown's two-story, frontier-style buildings were originally leased from whites. But between 1900 and 1910 Chinese merchants bought land and erected their own buildings.[41] The new buildings adopted a hybridized architectural style, constituted by both Western and Chinese features. Among Western features were bay windows and "cheater floors" (bay windows were widely adopted in Chinatown because they increased the amount of interior floor space; the cheater floor was a low-ceilinged mezzanine, so named because tax assessments were based on the height of a building, and intermediate floors were not taxed). Chinese architectural features included tiled roofs, latticed windows, moon-shaped doors, and recessed balconies. To some extent such features made many Chinatown structures resemble town buildings of south China.[42] Unlike those in Chinatown, buildings in Little Tokyo had few distinctive architectural features. Its residents also showed a greater willingness to adopt Canadian clothes, furnishings, and religious practices.[43] Nevertheless, a hybrid urban culture still developed in Little Tokyo which separated it strikingly from the rest of the city. According to one author:

> The area was apart as if a ghetto wall defined it. It was possible to shop at Japanese-owned stores, to live in Japanese-operated boarding houses or hotels, to congregate at street corners, to sit in soft drink and ice cream parlours, to eat traditional Japanese foods in cafés. . . .[44]

Most immigrants lived in cheap hotels and crowded rooming houses in downtown areas. Lacking home and controlling little private space, they lived much of their lives on city streets. These streets served as meeting places for people from different cultural backgrounds engaged in both recreational and practical pursuits. As one observer put it, during the pre-World War I years,

> . . . the street corners were filled with music, on one corner the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) singing 'Solidarity Forever,' on another a religious group singing 'There is honey in the rock for you my brother,' and on yet another the Salvation Army band booming out 'We will understand each other when the mists have rolled away.' . . . The streets also fulfilled economic needs. For some, like Greek ice cream pedlars, they were a place of business. For others, such as transient labourers, streets were the equiva-
> lent of the union man's Labour Temple, where between seven and eight o'clock each morning the city's 'unorganized element' scanned the boards of employment offices in search of work.[45]

When loggers were bored of the forest, they usually headed for Vancouver's Gastown, the downtown heart of the city. Their presence there inscribed a distinct masculine character into the urban landscape. As M.A. Grainger described at the beginning of his 1908 novel *Woodsmen of the West*:

> As you walk down Cordova Street in the city of Vancouver you notice a gradual changes in the appearance of the shop windows. The shoe stores, drug stores, clothing stores, phonograph stores cease to bother you with their blinding light.
>
> You come to shops that show faller's axes, swamper's axes — single-bitted, double-bitted; screw jacks and pump jacks, wedges, sledge-hammers, and great seven-foot saws with enormous shark teeth, and huge augers for boring boomsticks. . . .
>
> You see few women. . . . Your eye is struck at once by the unusual proportion of big men in the crowd, men that look powerful even in their town clothes. . . . You are among loggers.[46]

Like Chinatown and Little Tokyo, the area where most loggers moved was also geographically circumscribed. It centered on the waterfront and sprang up along a section of streets lined with saloons, hotels, employment agencies, and cheap recreational facilities such as movie houses and shooting galleries. Finally, it was bounded by the brothels of Chinatown and Shore Street.[47]

Facing social isolation and the absence of family, "outsiders" of all types had made streets, hotels, and gambling houses their homes — the places where they could talk and laugh. With each ethnic group carving a niche in the landscape, the city became a place of differences. Vancouver has thus never been a city of a pure British heritage; it has always been a hybrid city.

SOMETHING IS DIFFERENT, BUT WHAT, WHY, AND TO WHOM?

If Vancouver urbanism has been hybrid in character since its beginnings, what makes the hybridization of the late twentieth century so different? Why today have so many newspaper articles been devoted to it; so many petitions been produced; so many protests been held against such hybrid creations as "monster houses?" What, indeed, makes these forms of hybridity so threatening?

I argue that there has been a considerable spatial shift in the hybrid pattern of Vancouver urbanism between the two historical periods. In the past, in the face of prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory policies, the Chinese-origin community responded by

turning inward and constructing self-contained ghettos. Thus, the densely populated Chinatown not only shielded its members from racism, but allowed them to draw on culturally constituted resources of sociality and mutual aid for survival. Since Chinatown and other minority settlements (such as Little Tokyo) clustered in a central location in the inner city, the hybridized urbanism of Vancouver at the turn of the century appeared as a boundary-crossing mixture. It was limited in certain geographical zones, and it still enabled its elements (various urban forms and urban cultures) to draw parameters around themselves, even if they were sometimes blurred. Such a pattern of hybridity enabled the domain of respectable society to stay socially and geographically intact, separate from "foreign" elements.

Such a residential pattern remained largely intact for a long time. In fact, as late as 1971, when approximately one in six Vancouver residents lived on the urban fringe, people of Chinese origin accounted for only one in every forty suburban dwellers.[48] It has only been since the mid-1980s that the presence of Chinese immigrants has started to become more pervasive. Now the rich among the newcomers conduct large-scale real estate transactions and redevelop land for profit. And they have bought homes in the settled suburbs that were previously the preserve of the Anglo-Canadian middle class and elite. While they have been invisible as capitalists behind investments in downtown commercial properties, wealthy Hong Kong Chinese are now highly conspicuous as investors in suburban homes, where they have inserted different lifestyles and patterns of consumption into the very heart of the "white" landscape. Compared with the earlier patterns of hybridity, a major feature of the hybridity of the late twentieth century is that "the other" has chosen to constitute itself at the core in Vancouver, rather than on the margins.

This shift in the spatial configuration of hybridity has been very disturbing to white communities. As one informant told me: "I don't mind if they build their own buildings at Chinatown or any place downtown. But when they build these [monster houses] within our neighborhood, it touches my nerve and heart."[49]

To understand why this change should cause such severe alarm, it is instructive to take a closer look at examples of both Chinatown architecture and the newer suburban monster houses. Both are apparently hybridized built forms. On the one hand, they have largely imitated local Western-style buildings (which may be a sign of immigrants' desire for approval within the host society). Yet, on the other hand, they have always remained different, with certain elements being adopted from their owners' home countries (which to some extent may express their owners' native life patterns and aesthetic preferences). Hence, both hybrid built forms result from a combination of sameness and otherness. In particular, one might observe how sameness is used to camouflage otherness so that otherness can safely dwell in sameness. It should also be noted that such a dynamic of hybridity embodies an inherently imbalanced cultural exchange, in which the margin

always mimics the center, seeking to make itself into a copy of the stronger culture. Such mimicry is never complete, however, and whatever traces of difference there are become crucially important for the center.[50] In fact, when the center looks at these hybrids, it never takes them as part of itself. Rather, the center often only sees the difference that marks them as being from the margin. Such an analysis may partly explain why so many reports about Vancouver's monster houses describe them as a new genre, when in fact they are hybrids, partial doubles of the "white" houses.

But the privileged status of the center against its imitation is far from stable. To maintain the vague, wavering line between itself and its copy, the center often needs more transparent reference(s) to circumscribe its identity. In the case of Vancouver, the center historically relied on a spatially inscribed hierarchy to fulfill this need. Thus, for a long time Chinatown was described in local discourse as a filthy, erotic and dangerous ghetto.[51] It was a world "out there," far from the world "here" where the dominant community dwelled. Members of respectable society only showed up in Chinatown as visitors, consumers or researchers. Consequently, the hybridized architecture in Chinatown never seemed to menace the identity of the dominant group. No matter how much they resembled mainstream built forms, with a spatial brand marking them as "other," Chinatown hybrids lacked power to challenge the center's sense of self. By contrast, the monster houses built in elite neighborhoods have called into question this very privileged status of the center. They no longer belong to the world "out there"; they are situated right in the core of the "here."

What this situation highlights is that as the binarized division of "us" and "them" previously imprinted into Vancouver's geography has been compromised, it has become increasingly difficult for the center to distinguish itself from its imitation. In the face of the intrusion of monster houses, two responses have thus arisen. One has been to dramatize the dissimilarities between monster houses and "authentic" English houses. Thus, although monster houses are not as stylistically divergent as Chinatown buildings from the Anglo-Canadian norm, they nevertheless appear completely outlandish to many Anglo-Canadian residents. The other response has been to provoke a search for a distinctive "Englishness" as the natural essence of the place. This has been achieved by selecting one of many possible sets of experiences from the history of the city. However, the recent actions, ostensibly undertaken in the name of "cultural defense," are, in fact, little more than disguises for the anxiety of the center over its loss of difference. I argue that it is precisely this crisis in the identity of the center, caused by the changed spatial configuration of hybridity, that has accounted for the extent of alarm over the latest phase in the changing nature of the city.

As might be expected, such changes in the forms and nature of hybridity have ultimately been the product of a shift in the geometry of power. In the early twentieth century most immigrants arrived with little capital (in both economic and

symbolic sense). They contended with incredible social and economic hardship, and were willing to accept whatever work was given and whatever place was afforded. The making of Chinatown, as K.J. Anderson's *Vancouver's Chinatown* has explained, was a process in which the dominant society constructed the Chinese as "other" in both a discursive and spatial sense.[52] Thus, hybridization for earlier generations of Chinese immigrants was a process of alienation filled with fear and pain (although they sometimes managed to rearrange the master codes to adapt them for their own sly purposes — recall the example of "cheater floors"). Meanwhile, having successfully constructed a differentiated identity for the immigrant cultures and marked it in space, those born to membership in the dominant society were able to view the hybridized urban forms of their city as satisfying a fantasy for the "Oriental," while they themselves possessed an undisrupted self-identity as "original."

In contrast to the earlier generations of immigrants, the middle- and upper-class Hong Kong Chinese who have now arrived in the city, occupy an ambivalent position in the new geometry of power, in that the former dividing line of race has been intersected by another line of class. As international capitalists, these Hong Kong immigrants possess both wealth and knowledge of how to use the universal global grid designed to facilitate capital mobility. Some are considerably wealthier and skilled at using the mechanisms of international business than are the members of the host society. Accordingly, they have considerably greater freedom to choose what they want in terms of type of work and places for residence than did their predecessors. The image of Chinese immigrants has long been of contract labors (*coolies*) who took work from whites by accepting below-average wages and living conditions. But this has now been altered by local newspaper stories about Hong Kong millionaires who "toured the city for twenty minutes, bought ten luxury houses, and flew back to Hong Kong."[53] To borrow P. Werbner's words, if the former are bees and ants who "build new hives and nests in foreign lands," the latter are butterflies in the greenhouse of global culture who "travel among global cultures, savouring cultural differences as they flit with consummate ease between social worlds."[54]

Despite these advantages of wealth, as people of an ethnic origin that has long been subject to bias in the city, these Hong Kong capitalists have still been forced to camouflage their difference, and they have still suffered the bitterness of being resisted in their bid to enter the mainstream of the host society. This subtle position is expressed in the style of the monster houses. Similar to Chinatown buildings, these hybrids to some extent are copies of local "authentic" built forms. Yet they are bigger, stronger, and grander than the models they are seeking to imitate. Monster houses thus turn up in the landscape as caricatures of the degenerated economic status of some members of the dominant group. To consolidate themselves against this disturbing assault, the newly economically marginalized "local" people have resorted to reasserting their privileged position through expression of the continued cultural hegemony of the Eurocenter over the margin. Their resis-

tance against the monster houses brings to mind what Sigmund Freud called the "dream-work," in which acceptable representations (criticisms about the size, style, and spatial arrangement of monster houses) are created for unacceptable wishes (to stop the invasion of Hong Kong immigrants that brought about the weakening of their economic status and destabilized the hierarchical division of ethnicity).[55]

CONCLUSION

As can be seen from the above discussion, hybridization in Vancouver is far from a process of harmonization. Instead, it involves unequal exchanges and constant struggles. As the global power geometry has changed over time, the forms and natures of hybridity have shifted from one pattern to another, and different social forces have obtained their own set of experiences in the process. But it is also clear that these findings are inseparable from the methodology that has been used to arrive at them: reinserting a "pastness" into the study of the present. This case study therefore also demonstrates the power of the temporal dimension of hybridity as a tool in the study of the complexity of oppositions and dominations in a specific place.

Such a resort to historicity, however, runs counter to the general tendency to privilege space over time that has arisen in cultural analysis since the 1980s. Before I end this essay, therefore, I would like to elaborate my position in this debate. The attempt to establish the centrality of space in social theory was represented by Edward Soja's *Postmodern Geographies*, a book in which its author advocated that "an overdeveloped historical contextualization of social life and social theory" should be replaced by a new critical human geography which gives a privileged position to the spatial dimension.[56] Although I feel sympathetic with this endeavor, I also believe that neglect for history will tend to generate simplistic readings of social space. In fact, had this case study of Vancouver not connected what is happening today to what happened at the beginning of the twentieth century, its conclusion might have been very different.

In a recent article entitled "Different Diasporas and the Hype of Hybridity," Katharyne Mitchell also raised the example of Hong Kong capitalists in late-twentieth-century Vancouver.[57] Her article provided a careful examination of the narrative of nations and roots generated by Anglo residents against redevelopment in their neighborhoods, as well as the counter-narrative created by the Hong Kong capitalists. Mitchell rightfully argued that it is problematic to equate diasporas and hybridity with a progressive agenda. Yet her inattention to the past situation of Chinese immigrants in Vancouver also led her to neglect the different subjective positions that Hong Kong Chinese immigrants possess — not just as members of the capitalist class, but also as members of an ethnic group that has long been socially marginalized. This neglect may have driven her to depict Hong Kong-Vancouver capitalists as purely reactionary, which indeed misses some important aspects of the picture.

In the essay "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," Fredric Jameson identified the disappearance of a sense of history, manifested by a pervasive denial of various "depth models," as the "supreme formal feature" of postmodernism.[58] Later, he claimed that only a new "cognitive mapping," which unifies past, present and future, can link contemporary ideological positions with contemporary imagination.[59] As does Jameson, I also maintain that the weakening of historicity will lead to "a new kind of superficiality in the most literal sense."[60] But unlike Jameson, I would advocate a sense of historicity that gives position to localized and plural histories, rather than seeking to construct one grand history which binds distinct narratives together into a linear and centralizing schema. Only when various trajectories of the temporal movement of things are taken into account can people understand the spatial connections between things at any specific moment. One might term this way of seeing space — to paraphrase Jameson — a "depth model of space."

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12. Ibid., p.110.
13. E.W. Soja, *Thirdspace* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996), p.140. The quote is from H. Bhabha, "The Third Space," in J. Rutherford, ed., *Identity, Community, Culture, Difference* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), p.211.
14. This division can be illustrated by the following example. In the sentence "I am not speaking," it is clear there exists a split between the subject of the proposition and the subject of the enunciation. While the "I" who is spoken is not speaking, the "I" who is telling the fact that "I am not speaking" is speaking.
15. The above quotations are from Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, p.37.
16. Ibid., p.42.
17. Young, *Colonial Desire*, p.4.
18. S. Lavie and T. Swedenburg, "Introduction," in Lavie and Swedenburg, eds., *Displacement, Diaspora and Geographies of Identity* (Duke University Press, 1996), pp.1-26.
19. Ibid., p.24, note 11.
20. My emphasis on historicity is largely inspired by the introductory chapter in Alsayyad's *Hybrid Urbanism*.
21. Toward this end, in June 1999 I conducted fieldwork in Vancouver — among other activities interviewing more than thirty local residents, architects, and city planners.
22. D.W. Edgington and M.A. Goldberg, "Vancouver: Canada's Gateway to the Rim," in E.J. Blakely and R.J. Stimson, eds., *New Cities of the Pacific Rim* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
23. P. Le Corre, "Canada's Hong Kong: Vancouver is Being Revitalised by Chinese Immigrants," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol.157 No.6 (February 10, 1994), pp.36-37.
24. Edgington and Goldberg, "Vancouver."
25. Wood et al., "Lessons of Vancouver," p.28.
26. Le Corre, "Canada's Hong Kong," p.37.
27. K. Mitchell, "Fast Capital, Race, Modernity, and the Monster House," in M.G. Rosemary, ed., *Burning down the House* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), p.206.
28. Interview with planner, Vancouver, June 24, 1999. In this article the names of individual informants are not revealed, based on a promise from the author.
29. Mitchell, "Fast Capital," p.204.
30. Wood et al., "Lessons of Vancouver."
31. Mitchell, "Fast Capital," p.198.
32. J. Sime, "Creating Places and Designing Places," in K. Dovey et al., eds., *Place and Placemaking* (P.A.P.E.R. Conference Proceedings, Melbourne, 1985), p.275.
33. P.E. Roy, *Vancouver: An Illustrated History* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1980).
34. Wood et al., "Lessons of Vancouver."
35. P.S. Li, *The Chinese in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998).
36. K. Adachi, *The Enemy that Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976).
37. R.A.J. McDonald, *Making Vancouver: Class, Status, and Social Boundaries, 1863-1913* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996), pp.205-6; and J. Norris, *Strangers Entertained: A History of the Ethnic Groups of British Columbia* (Vancouver: British Columbia Centennial '71 Committee, 1971).
38. McDonald, *Making Vancouver*, pp.206-14.
39. Ibid., pp.213-14.

40. Ibid., p.208.

41. P. Yee, *Saltwater City: An Illustrated History of the Chinese in Vancouver* (Vancouver/Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1988), p.21.

42. D.C. Lai, *Chinatowns: Towns within Cities in Canada* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988), p.69.

43. Ibid., p.131.

44. Adachi, *The Enemy that Never Was*, p.131.

45. McDonald, *Making Vancouver*, p.224.

46. M.A. Grainger, *Woodsmen of the West* (London: E. Arnold, 1908), pp.1-2. Also see McDonald, *Making Vancouver*, p.214.

47 McDonald, *Making Vancouver*, p.214.

48. D. Ley et al., "Time to Grow Up? From Urban Village to World City, 1966-91," in G. Wynn and T. Oke, eds., *Vancouver and its Region* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), p.250.

49. Interview with west-side resident, Vancouver, June 26, 1999. Interestingly enough, a San Francisco architect expressed a similar concern when commenting on physical changes brought by immigrants. From this, one can see how such disturbing effects of hybridization may not be confined to Vancouver.

50. My idea of "mimicry" is inspired by H. Bhabha's "Of Mimicry and Man" (Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, pp.85-92), although my point of departure is quite different from Bhabha's. In the essay, Bhabha formulates mimicry as one colonial process.

51. For a description of the making of Chinatown, see K.J. Anderson, *Vancouver's Chinatown* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991).

52. In *Vancouver's Chinatown*, Anderson provides a spatialized interpretation of Said's notion of Orientalism.

53. A. Ward, "Vancouver: Good Luck City," *National Geographic*, Vol.181 No.4 (April, 1992), pp.94-121. The quotation is from p.111.

54. P. Werbner, "Introduction: The Dialectics of Cultural Hybridity," in P. Werbner and T. Modood, eds., *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism* (London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1997), pp.11-12.

55. S. Freud, "The Dream-Work," in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (New York: Avon Books, Inc., 1998), pp.311-546.

56. E.W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies* (London and New York: Verso, 1989). The quotation is from p.15.

57. K. Mitchell, "Different Diasporas and the Hype of Hybridity," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol.15 (1997), pp.533–53.

58. F. Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," in *New Left Review*, Vol.146 (1984), pp.53-92. The quotations are from pp.62 and 60, respectively.

59. F. Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), p.418.

60. Jameson, "Postmodernism," p.60. It should be noted that the connotation of Jameson's "historicity" is much broader than my use of the term. His use not only refers to the sensibility of history in the literal sense, but also stands for awareness of other kinds of "depth models": for example, the hermeneutic model of inside and outside, the dialectical one of essence and appearance, and the Freudian model of latent and manifest.

Martyrs, Mystery and Memory Behind a Communal Hall

SIDNEY C.H. CHEUNG

This article concerns how memories are affected by social change and shaped within specific cultural and political contexts. Starting from the local interpretation of a communal hall in a traditional settlement in Hong Kong's New Territories, it explores some historical background in relation to village alliances and the contested meaning of such a heritage in relation to the armed resistance to British takeover of the New Territories in April 1899. By questioning the identity of the 172 villagers memorialized as "martyrs" on a plaque in the hall and seeking to understand the building's position in regard to a specific socio-cultural landscape, I attempt to explain recent social change in the New Territories. Most importantly, I explore how the indigenous villagers' memory was reconstructed to mark the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.

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In 1995 a Hong Kong television program showed how a traditional hall in the western New Territories village of Ping Shan had been flooded since 1990 because construction of a nearby new-town development had raised the local water level. The building itself had been badly damaged by soaking in water for several years, and its front yard was full of abandoned vehicles (**FIGS.1,2**). As late as 1999 this flooding problem had still not been resolved, and some villagers even thought a government conspiracy was involved to destroy the monument. At one local gathering in which I participated, a young village representative claimed the real reason for the hall's neglect was that the government did not want to reveal its history. He pointed out the hall had served as a center for village resistance to the British takeover of the New Territories in 1898-1899. The villager's explanation revealed the depth of hostility between the villagers and the government, especially since a plaque in the hall memorialized the death of 172 of their fellows in anti-British uprisings nearly a century before. But it soon became apparent the meaning of the hall was even more complex. Within the present-day socio-political landscape, it potentially served not only as a place for memorializing loyalties, but also for creating a victimized identity among villagers who opposed the outgoing authority of the colonial regime.

FIGURE 1. (TOP) *The flooded hall. (Photo by author.)*
FIGURE 2. (BOTTOM) *The outside part of the flooded hall. (Photo by author.)*

Drawing upon Paul Connerton's understanding of collective memory as it is embedded in the rites and ceremonies of everyday life, I suggest in this article that collective memory may also be installed in built structures, particularly in relation to specific events within a socio-political context. Using as an example the historic narrative of the Ping Shan communal hall (in Cantonese, *kung soh*), I will investigate how the meanings of such a building have been interpreted (or misinterpreted) to construct memory among the indigenous inhabitants of the New Territories. I do so by asking such questions as these: Why was the memory of the martyrs forgotten in the first place, and then rediscovered? How is it possible to say that the indigenous villagers' voices were "suppressed," and simply "not recorded"? Why do clan members all of a sudden need to create for themselves an identity of "victimization"? Finally, how could independent scholars for 100 years have missed making the connection between the memorialized villagers and the 1899 resistance movement?

THROUGH A DETECTIVE'S EYE: MARTYRS OR MYSTERY?

Let me start with the history of the 1899 anti-British resistance as I found it in a brochure distributed for the 1997 celebration when Hong Kong's sovereignty was returned to China. The brochure was published by the clan with the surname Tang in order to express their feelings about the return of their land in Hong Kong to the China motherland after a separation of 99 years. It is a thirty-page booklet, divided into ten chapters, written in Chinese, recounting the general history of the New Territories as well as specific topics related to the Tang clan in Ping Shan. Apart from some chapters talking about recent issues of the village, it was initially surprising to me to find the anti-British resistance in the New Territories in 1899 repeatedly mentioned in it. Particularly, two of the chapters focused on the history of the Tang clan villagers' involvement, as well as the fact that 172 villagers had died in the battle. The information had been provided by local people, and had been written up by a Chinese author from the mainland. This was not the first time I had heard this story. Yet, I had never been able to discover answers to the following questions: Who were these martyrs? When and how did they die? And why were they memorialized in that particular communal hall even though, as I later found out, they were not from nearby villages?

According to many scholarly studies of the history of the New Territories, there seems little doubt that indigenous villagers did participate in a local resistance movement in 1899.[1] However, evidence relating to the number of people who died in battle has never come to light, nor has there emerged any official record of the issue. In previous studies of the New Territories, historians have paid more attention to such questions as the "origins" of different lineages, their routes of migration, the formation of regional alliances, and the sources of local traditions.[2] Alternatively, social and cultural anthropologists studying current conditions in the New Territories have looked into the area's religions, folk beliefs, lineage organization, and the social changes brought about by industrialization from the 1960s on.[3] However, data about the anti-British movement and the beginning of the colonial era has somehow always remained as a missing link between the periods intensively studied by historians and anthropologists. To better understand how this missing link was created and what its relevant meanings are from a socio-political perspective, I chose to explore the mystery behind the flooded hall in Ping Shan. Considering the changing social context in the New Territories and the emergence of an indigenous identity in the past decade, I wanted to show how collective memory could only be clarified on the basis of anthropological study.

Ping Shan, located in the western part of the New Territories, is the name used to signify several villages that include Hung Tau Tsuen (Valley's Head Village) and Hang Mei Tsuen (Valley's Tail Village). In between lies a Tang ancestral hall, which is a principal landmark in the Ping Shan area (FIGS.3,4). Historians believe the Tangs, originally from Jiangxi

FIGURE 3. (ABOVE)
The Tang Ancestral
Hall in Ping Shan.
(Photo by author.)

FIGURE 4. (RIGHT)
Altar of the Tang
Ancestral Hall in
Ping Shan.
(Photo by author.)

holidays, many tourists come to the area to walk the Heritage Trail that links its remaining ancestral halls.

The flooded hall this paper is concerned with — Tat Tak Kung Soh — is situated at the northern side of Hung Tau Tsuen, near a river that has been reclaimed for modern housing and commercial development (FIG.5). As for its function, I was told the open area in front of the hall had once served as a marketplace, called Ping Shan Shi (meaning Ping Shan Market), which had been under the management of the Tat Tak Kung Soh.[6] In addition, I was told by local villagers that Tat Tak Kung Soh was originally constructed to provide a meeting place for the merchants from Ping Shan, Ha Tsuen, Pat Heung, Kam Tin, Ping Kong, San Tin, and Tai Po Tau (FIG.6). Some villagers also mentioned that Tat Tak Kung Soh had been used as meeting place in 1899 to organize the anti-British movement, as well as serving as one of the headquarters for guerrilla bands formed by villagers to resist the British colonial regime.

Despite these local explanations of the building's history, however, it had become commonplace for scholars to suggest that the 172 martyrs referred to in the hall's memorial plaque had actu-

province, immigrated in the tenth century during the Song dynasty, first to Guangdong, and then to what is now the New Territories in 973 A.D.[4] The present-day Tangs descended from a branch of the earliest settlers in Kam Tin. One author has described their original lands in the area as follows:

> *Ping Shan is located on fertile land in the New Territories,*
> *comprising thirty-six villages. To its east is Yuen Long Town;*
> *to the north, Deep Bay. Marked by luxuriant forests, verdant*
> *hills and clear springs, Ping Shan was a scenic spot, and its*
> *beauty has been compared to the Yang-tzu region. Rice,*
> *sweet potatoes and sugar cane were produced in abundance.[5]*

These days, of course, the landscape is very different, as Ping Shan is no longer a famous basin for paddy fields, but is surrounded by high-rise residential apartment buildings and shopping malls. But especially on Sundays and public

FIGURE 5. *Map of Ping Shan, Yuen Long. (Courtesy of Antiquities and Monuments Office, Survey and Mapping Office, Hong Kong.)*

ally died in armed conflicts between Ping Shan and other lineage groups before the beginning of the colonial regime.[7] Some brief data related to armed conflict between Ping Shan and neighboring lineage may found in different references.[8] Such references especially mention fighting with Shap Pat Heung in 1851 and frequent fighting with Ha Tsuen.[9] Two specific explanations have been given with regard to such conflicts between village alliances related to Ping Shan. Jack Potter wrote in 1968 that there were a number of armed conflicts between Ping Shan and neighboring lineages such as Shap Pat Heung and Ha Tsuen, and that the headquarters of the Ping Shan regional alliance was a communal hall in which "heroes" were memorialized.[10] Segawa Masahisa suggested in 1991 that the plaque in the flooded hall was dedicated to those who had died in a specific conflict that arose because one of Ping Shan Tang's ancestral graves (with good *fung shui*) had been excavated by Shap Pat Heung villagers in the mid-nineteenth century. As a result, a Shap Pat Heung/Ha Tsuen/San Tin alliance had been formed to fight the Ping Shan/Pat Heung alliance, a political context which might explain the large number of deaths recorded among villagers of the latter alliance.[11]

In order to obtain more details of the hall's history, I met the trustee, or manager, of the Tat Tak Tong, who was the only "owner" of the building and its related properties.[12] However, during my interview, the manager showed no interest in clarifying the communal hall's history, and repeatedly said he did not consider the plaque to be a memorial to the anti-British resistance. Rather, he said armed conflict between Ping Shan and neighboring villages was the main reason for the plaque. However, this

manager had no evidence to either prove or disprove anything. Assuming that Tat Tak Tong might have lands scattered among villages belonging to the alliance, I also asked the manager about those relationships, but failed to obtain any information from him on that topic either. By tracing the records of the Tat Tak Tong trust in the Hong Kong Land Registry,[13] I did manage to discover that the Tat Tak Tong owned a certain amount of land, but only that the land-use status of some of it had been changed from farm to factory during the past two decades.

In the face of such an ambiguous social background, I finally proposed using deduction from various materials — including articles, newspaper archives, government documents, historical village models, and various local records — to examine the above confusion and, if possible, understand the "real story" of the memorial plaque in the communal hall. I proposed writing from an anthropological perspective, even though I would use historical data extensively to investigate social change before and after 1899. I also wanted to find out whether people in Ping Shan had participated in the anti-British movement, as claimed in the brochure. If they had not been so involved, then why was there such bitterness concerning the plaque and the lack of respect given the 172 "martyrs"?

By asking these questions about the meaning of local history and this traditional monument, my study intended to create new insight into the way collective memory is created, dismantled, and re-presented for political interests, often obviating such labels as real/unreal, true/distorted, or factual/imaginary. By comparing sources and contrasting discrepancies, I hoped to

understand what the story of the martyrs memorialized in a hall had to tell about social change in the New Territories during the last century, especially how indigenous inhabitants had constructed a victimized identity that they could use in negotiations with the government during the colonial shift.

HISTORY OF THE LEASED OR NEW TERRITORIES

It may first be useful to provide some background information about villagers in the New Territories. Hong Kong, part of the previous San On County in Guangdong Province, was taken over by the British in the middle of the nineteenth century. While the southern part of the Kowloon Peninsula, Hong Kong Island, and a number of surrounding islands had been ceded to Britain by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, a large additional section of the peninsula, called the New Territories, starting from Boundary Street and extending north to the border with Shenzhen, was only leased to the British Government in 1898 for a period of 99 years. During the colonial era, the Hong Kong British Government was the highest policy-making authority for this "hinterland" area.[14]

Divided by a mountain range to the east of Pat Heung, almost in its middle, the New Territories are split into eastern and western portions that exhibit great difference in cultural traditions. While the social and political structure of the eastern side of the New Territories was centered at Taipo port, the western side is fertile and flat, inhabited largely by a few settled clans, of which the Tangs are a powerful one. The Tangs, however, like other groups residing here, were not limited to the New Territories, and their lineage network extended to many parts of the Pearl River Delta area. Thus, some settlements on the western side of the mountains were regionally aligned, as well as grouping several lineages together.

By 1899 there were already 700-800 villages, including *tsuen* (not walled) and *wai* (walled) settlements, in the New Territories. These were largely organized according to administrative units of *heung* and *yeuk*. In South China, *heung* combined *tsuen* and *wai* into an important administrative unit, while *yeuk* were alliances formed by weak lineages as a means of opposing stronger ones. As an example of this structure, Ping Shan Heung not only included villages within the Ping Shan area, but also some neighboring villages that were related to the Ping Shan Tang clan through ties of land ownership.[15] Moreover, Ping Shan Heung formed the central and important part of the Tat Tak Yeuk, though these were not equal. The foci of such multilineage alliances were not ancestral halls, but temples.[16]

Beginning with the "Convention Respecting an Extension of the Hong Kong Territories," signed on June 9, 1898, however, such traditional administrative structures were considerably weakened by colonial land policies. And from that time on concerns over land use were constantly at the core of disputes between indigenous villagers and the government. Such disputes derived ultimately from issues of land ownership and the villagers' confusion about being subjects on leased land. Ever since 1899, when the British first established police stations in the New Territories, the villagers have desired to claim back their full land rights. Hostilities over the issue of began on April 16, 1899, when a British force attempting to hoist the Union Jack on the newly named Flagstaff Hill in Taipo were attacked by villagers from across the New Territories.[17]

One might ask how much the British government knew about the area before they set out to extend their colonial regime to it. One might also ask what kinds of impacts the colonial regime had on the people there. A good place to start is by examining the anti-British movement and how it began. The resistance action against the colony's extension most likely took place from March 28 to April 18, 1899. I assume it did not start immediately upon issuance of the proclamation by the San On District Magistrate and the Viceroy of Guangdong regarding the New Territories, signed in Guangzhou on March 27, 1899. But on that same day Captain Superintendent F.H. May (the officer in charge of the Hong Kong Police Force) did visit the New Territories looking for locations for police stations. And with both the proclamation and the British Government's announcement that it intended to build a police headquarters in Taipo, a village resistance did begin to take shape, which finally led to armed conflict when British officials attempted to move into the leased territories.

One occurrence that has made Ping Shan famous, and that has caused its name to be associated with many references to this resistance, was the content of placards that were posted in the village at the time, such as that posted on March 28, 1899.[18] As the historian G.B. Endacott has written, the threats to British workmen were explicit:

> On 1 April 1899 Blake reported that British parties were threatened with death and that placards had appeared calling on the people to arm against the British. Blake hurried to Canton and induced the Viceroy to disavow the placards and guarantee protection to British parties in the New Territories, who were there to make arrangements to take over the administration from the Chinese. He threatened that if protection were not given by the following Wednesday, 5 April, he would take over the following day.[19]

In order to come to a compromise, a second proclamation was issued from the San On District Magistrate and the Viceroy of Guangdong April 4, 1899.[20] However, this proclamation did not help much. A day after the British hoisted their flag in Taipo, April 16, 1899 (one day earlier than the original schedule), villagers from all over the New Territories attacked, their numbers swelled by sympathetic fighters from other parts of South China. The village resistance forces, numbering around 2,600, were armed with cannons and rifles. However, organizational problems soon gave the well-equipped British regular army forces an overwhelming advantage, and the British successfully entered the Lam Tsuen Valley leading to the northwestern New Territories, where they launched a final assault on the rebel army in Kam Tin.

The end of resistance and the local villagers' failure was symbolized by the removal of Kat Shing Wai's iron gate by the British.[21] Once the British were in firm control of the area, they erected several police stations in the New Territories, one on top of a hill above the Ping Shan villages, overlooking the Tang ancestral hall.

PING SHAN AND THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OF APRIL 1899

According to books and articles written about the resistance, there can be little doubt that Ping Shan does have a history involving anti-British military action. Moreover, current-day residents remain aware of this local history. However, the number of people who died or were injured in this "battle" has never been mentioned. For a long period of time, people accepted that what happened in 1898-99 was merely "desultory fighting."[22] However, Robert Groves has pointed out that it would be a mistake to consider the resistance to have been a disorganized movement; in fact, he has claimed it was a well-planned and prepared action **(FIG.7)**. He has particularly pointed to the involvement of the militia unit and Ping Shan's support for the armed resistance force.[23] Yet, throughout his 1969 article "Militia, Market and Lineage: Chinese Resistance to the Occupation of Hong Kong's New Territories in 1899," Groves never revealed the sources of his data. Since no official written document exists reporting the anti-British resistance, I therefore needed to employ other methods to determine whether the plaque in Tat Tak Kung Soh bore any relation to the anti-British movement. This eventually involved collecting and comparing data from three principal sources: newspaper records,

oral history from Ping Shan Villagers, and oral history from a knowledgeable person I will call L.

By checking the record of Hong Kong's newspapers kept in the Public Record office, I found there still exist copies of English papers which can be dated as far back as 1842 (such as *Friend of China* and *Hong Kong Gazette*). Since the articles about the New Territories indigenous resistance in different newspapers seemed to be from similar sources. I eventually chose columns from the daily *China Mail* and *Hong Kong Daily Press* as a reference, largely because they contained reports from consecutive days. However, although it was reported in these columns that some Chinese were killed, injured or caught, no detailed information was given. Given the nature of these reports, I suspected no journalists had actually been present at the battlefield, and that the data rather came from government officials or other such indirect sources. Even the number of villagers killed and injured, though consistently reported as large, was vague and unclear. Nonetheless, these reports hardly allowed any conclusion other than that some New Territories villagers did die during the fighting. For example, it was mentioned that "the Chinese losses in killed and wounded are reported to be very heavy."[24] "Numbers killed are not known, but it is thought that they run into hundreds."[25] "Message was sent over from Taipohu stating that it had been discovered that the shelling of the Asiatic Artillery on Monday was most effective, and projectiles having dropped among the rebels and killed a great many of them."[26] And, finally, "not able to give the number of rebels killed, but [the villagers] suffered severely."[27]

My next step was to collect oral history from some Ping Shan villagers about relations between Tat Tak Kung Soh and the anti-British resistance. As related by such informants the follow-

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TIME	**HAPPENINGS IN THE NEW TERRITORIES**
July 1898	New Territories leased for 99 years.
August 1898 — March 1899	British government's preparation for the formal takeover.
March 27, 1899	First proclamation and May's search of location for the Police Station.
March 28, 1899	Villagers met in Ping Shan, Kam Tin and Ha Tsuen; 22 representatives from all over the New Territories gathered for the meeting in which six of them were from Ping Shan (biggest group).
March 31, 1899	Village representatives met in Yuen Long
April 1, 1899	Village representatives met in Sheung U.
April 4, 1899	Second proclamation.
March 10, 1899	Establishment of the Tai Ping Kung Kuk among all villagers participating in the resistance preparation, in Yuen Long Tai Wong Old Temple.
April 12, 1899	A group was sent to meet the Qing troops at Castle Peak Bay but without real fighting.
April 13, 1899	Ping Shan supplied pigs as food for the militia. On April 14, 1899, an advance force was in position on the hills overlooking Tai Po. It was composed of units from Fan Leng, Kam Tin, the Lan Tsuen valley, and Pat Heung.

FIGURE 7. *A brief summary of events in the New Territories preceding the village resistance.*

ing story emerged. The building, Tat Tak Kung Soh, was built during the Xianfeng reign (1851-1861) of the Qing dynasty by the Tang clan of Ping Shan. It was used for market management, in which an organization of 39 villages under the Tat Tak alliance were involved. During the anti-British movement, Tat Tak Kung Soh was used as a base for fund-raising to purchase weapons and gunpowder, and young males were gathered there to serve in the armed resistance. However, after suffering heavy casualties and finally defeat by the British, the resistance movement came to an end. Those who died during skirmishes against the British were greatly honored by their fellow villagers, and soul tablets of those from Yuen Kong, Sha Ha, Wang Chau, Ping Shan, and Sha Kong who had been killed were placed at Tat Tak Kung Soh. It was also mentioned that on the top of the plaque with the 172 martyrs' names, there is a dated 1939 engraving of "Loyalty and Faith are Honored" that gives evidence of Ping Shan's participation.

Apart from this version of events, which also could be found in the Tang clan brochure, several other explanations of the plaque in the hall also existed. As I mentioned earlier, the manager of Tat Tak Kung Soh denied that Ping Shan had been substantially involved in the anti-British resistance, and he pointed out that Ping Shan had many gentry who did not know how to fight. However, many documents do show that Ping Shan was somehow involved in the logistics of the armed resistance. One possible reason for this was offered by L, a widely respected and active authority on local history in the New Territories.

During one interview, L told me there were two memorial monuments in Kam Tin erected for those who had died during the anti-British resistance movement. He also claimed that one ancestral hall in Ping Shan did become the headquarters of the resistance movement. When I went to check L's information, however, I could find no further background on the monuments in Kam Tin. As some villagers told me, this was because local inhabitants were afraid that any relationship with people who participated in the resistance would cause them to be blacklisted and punished. Thus, no names were written on the Kam Tin monuments, which consisted of a monument in the *yi-zhong* (communal graveyard), and a memorial tablet worshipped in an ancestral hall. The only confirmation that these monuments actually related to the anti-British resistance, therefore, depended on oral history.

During April 1999, one century after it actually took place, I suggested the resistance as a feature story to a journalist working for the *South China Morning Post* (an English daily). Together, the journalist and I went to interview an elder who was reputed to be well informed about the history of Kam Tin. Even though the resistance happened before he was born, this elder told us that during his childhood, Kam Tin villagers had remained worried and fearful of talking about it. He suggested this was probably why not much information was available now.

After all these investigations, I was left with the following set of conclusions. Even though there was a resistance in 1899 and local villagers did participate, it has no "history," since the graveyard monument in Kam Tin and the tablets worshipped in the ancestral hall near Kat Shing Wai have nothing written on them.

As to why this was the case, I was only told the colonial regime "somehow" suppressed the villagers' lifeways, and that the resistance was a taboo subject that villagers were afraid to mention.[28] Despite the seemingly plausibility of this story, however, the complicated history of the New Territories led me to suspect there might be another dimension to it. For example, I suspected that changes in the socio-cultural landscape in terms of local alliances may also have played a role in the missing history.

From a study during the early 1980s of regional alliances of Pat Heung, Segawa had explained how different local armed conflicts did, in fact, arise (like the hostile relations between Pat Heung and Kam Tin, as well as between Shap Pat Heung and Kam Tin, which can be traced back to the early Qing dynasty — as plaques in the Tai Wong Temple of the Yuen Long Old Market describe). I suspected the formation of such a political alliance between Ping Shan Heung and Pat Heung provided an important clue to understanding how names of villages not belonging to Ping Shan Heung came to be combined with Ping Shan Heung villages on the Tat Tak Kung Soh plaque. These were supposed to be villages joining the Tat Tak alliance — which not only included all the villages of the Ping Shan Heung, but also some villages from Pat Heung. Thus, on the one hand, it might be possible to justify Segawa's explanation that the Tat Tak alliance was made for economic and political interests. Yet, on the other hand, it might also be possible that the local villagers' explanation would be reasonable if the former (market) alliance had been transformed into a resistance force during the anti-British movement. Moreover, this rationale would be consistent with Groves's description of Ping Shan's role as a source of food and logistics, even though there is no evidence that Ping Shan villagers actually participated in the fight.

About Ping Shan's participation, L once wrote a newspaper article explaining how the first meeting to organize the anti-British resistance was held in Kun Ting Study Hall, located in Ping Shan. The meeting followed the return of one of Ha Tsuen's representatives from Sanyuanli, where he had gone to learn how to organize a resistance force against the British. With the agreement of all village representatives, an experienced person came to give advice, and Tungkuan fighters were hired to participate (this seems consistent with newspaper references as to who the anti-British fighters were). Nonetheless, given the assumption that Tat Tak Kung Soh was built during the Xianfeng reign (1851-61), one must also consider the meaning of "Kung Soh" within a historic-political context. Here, I have tried to use F. Wakeman's study of local political formation, as well as formation of militias, to further understand the function of such regional alliances. He showed how the Sanyuanli resistance and the governor general-sanctioned *tian-lien* after the Opium War were related to Kung Soh-oriented local forces.[29] Even though he did not give details of alliances in the New Territories, one may speculate there may have been similarities. Hypothetically, Tat Tak Kung Soh might not have been involved in any foreign resistance movements. However, its establishment during the second half of the nineteenth century could still indicate it was a formal force created by villages under the umbrella of the Tat Tak alliance to manage Ping Shan Market and

oppose the Kam Tin, Shap Pat Heung, and Ha Tsuen markets. Thus, the participation of the Tat Tak alliance force during the resistance movement would be plausible.

COMMEMORATIVE SPACE FOR THE MEMORY OF RESISTANCE

In *How Societies Remember*, Connerton pointed out that the difficulty of extracting the past from the present not only stems from the fact that present factors tend to influence recollections of the past, but also that past factors tend to influence one's experience of the present. He therefore suggested that the study of the social formation of memory should be aimed at investigating those acts of transfer that make remembering in common possible.[30] In other words, social memory is not merely the recall of a common past, which may or may not have actually happened, but also the history that is "expected" for the present. Now that I have given an account of the anti-British resistance in 1899 and of the various records and descriptions of it, I would like to draw attention to how memory of the anti-British resistance is embodied by the "martyrs" memorialized in Tat Tak Kung Soh, and what makes the villagers believe in its reality even though there is no direct evidence of it.

Even if such a belief is mistaken, it is significant to find out what kinds of factors contribute to the perception of its truth. In this regard, one can draw upon Connerton's understanding of social memory as both images and recollected knowledge of the past, and how these are conveyed and sustained by rites as well as performances. Such social devices may in fact be involved in how the armed anti-British resistance has been memorialized, reconstructed and understood in the New Territories. In particular, a collective memory may not need to have been inherited from older generations. Rather, it may have been reconstructed for remembrance within the specific socio-political context of the return of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China in 1997.

Ping Shan's involvement in the anti-British movement, the placard strongly resisting the British colonial regime, and Tat Tak Kung Soh's plaque concerning "martyrs" naturally form the story-line of a local history that displays the villagers' patriotic spirit and victimized identity. Such a collective memory may be useful to the villagers as a way of indicating their resistance to the British government or reinforcing their identification with the Chinese motherland, or both, during the colonial shift. Thus, the fact of anti-British armed resistance and of Tat Tak Kung Soh as the headquarters of such a movement is not a social memory legitimized to most people of the society, but the entitlement only of a specific group with a distinctive history and traditions opposed to mainstream society. But even given such conditions, what are the reasons for the difficulty in tracing the truth about the resistance? And why has a specific "Ping Shan history" only emerged with the return of Hong Kong's sovereignty? I would propose three basic reasons, all related to the specific socio-cultural context of the New Territories: (1) the colonial system of land administration that started at the beginning of this century; (2) the intensive development that has taken place in the formerly rural areas of the New Territories since the 1970s; and (3) the emergence of an ethnic identity among indigenous residents of the New Territories during the last decade.

The coming of the colonial system of land administration brought great impacts for indigenous villagers. From a legal perspective, the lease of New Territories was never based upon clear, mutual understanding between the British and the Chinese; rather, it represented only a vague idea of a 99-year "rental agreement." As a result, there has never been a clear differentiation between land ownership rights in the New Territories and in Hong Kong and Kowloon, even though the nature of ceded and leased land would appear to establish very different precedents.[31] In addition, great differences existed between the land deed system of the Chinese and of the British. In the New Territories, until 1898, there were two kinds of land deeds — red deeds and white deeds. These conveyed bottom-soil and top-soil rights, respectively, in what people called a one-land-two-owners system. However, when land ownership was "reformed" under the colonial regime, such instruments of Chinese traditional land tenure was overlooked. In particular, the dual system of rights was abandoned, and farmers who controlled the top-soil rights became the real owners. Thus, some alliances which may have been based on relations between top-soil and bottom-soil owners may have been rendered moot.

From June 1900 to June 1903 the British also carried out an extensive land survey in the New Territories that resulted in demarcation district maps. This official record of land ownership was recorded in the Block Crown Lease — a land register numerically ordered by lot for each demarcation district, and in a Crown Rent Roll, which became the instrument for tax collection. According to this system, any nonregistered land in the New Territories could be converted into Crown Land.

In addition to land registration. British control brought great change to the infrastructure of the New Territories. In 1911 the Kowloon-Canton Railway began operation, and four years later, Tai Po Road and Castle Road were completed, opening Yuen Long to motor traffic from the city. With these changes, and in order to free themselves from the control of the Kam Tin Tangs (who used to be the key authority of Yuen Long Old Market), clan leaders from Pat Heung, Ping Shan, Shap Pat Heung, and other areas combined to collect money to build the New Market in 1915.[32]

In their previous study of the effects of development in the New Territories, Jeffrey Cody and James Richardson used the example of the changing face of the Shatin Valley to show how village conservation and redevelopment policies have now become inextricably bound up with such other issues as infrastructure development, village removal, land exchange, inheritance, the colonial government's small-house policy, and new-town planning.[33] My focus on a particular building here is aimed at furthering current understanding of the ways indigenous villagers have been affected by administrative and infrastructure developments in the New Territories. In particular, my case study provides insight into relations between district policies dealing with the indigenous rights (partly related to the New Territories Ordinance) and the British colonial government.

Today the local organization of the New Territories Village Administration comprises a three-level structure. At one level is the village representative system, which was established during the World War II when Hong Kong was under Japanese rule. This structure allows all villages to be involved in local decision-making, and it further allows representatives from each village to participate in rural committees. Such committees, the second level of local organization, were also established during Japanese rule, but they were later developed by the British to provide a representative structure in each of the 28 administrative areas into which they divided the New Territories after the war. The third level of administrative organization is the Heung Yee Kuk, which began out of successful local opposition to the government's proposal for land taxes in 1926, and which now serves is an advisory group to the government on matters related to the New Territories. With the establishment of this three-level structure, one can see how former regional as well as *heung* politics have been gradually replaced by new institutions. One result is that village matters must today be officially resolved through government-recognized channels, causing traditional linkages between villagers, part of a specific cultural landscape, to disappear, thus making it difficult to trace the history of regional alliances. Tat Tak Kung Soh and the historical background of its alliances may thus have simply faded in local people's memory as time has passed.

In examining the ethnic identity of indigenous villagers in the New Territories, Chan has pointed out that the term "indigenous inhabitants" was only formally adopted by the Executive Council as part of the small-house policy enacted in 1972. This policy defined such people as the "patrilineal descendants of ancestors who were living in the New Territories villages on 1 July 1898."[34] Since this small-house policy eventually became one of the most important invented traditions shaping the identity of indigenous inhabitants, the importance of their cultural heritage should not be overlooked.

In Hong Kong, the word "heritage" is largely associated with buildings and monuments. Apart from oral traditions, written record, images, and rituals of "commemoration" which all serve the purpose of transmitting social memory, "space" is an important factor in memory transmission.[35] Such a connection was clearly evident in the reaction of the Ping Shan villagers to the establishment of a police station on the hill behind the main ancestral hall, an action which had destroyed village *fung shui*. In particular, villagers likened the situation to a large stone crushing a crab (the police station being the large stone, and signifying colonial hegemony; and the lifeways of the villagers being the crab).

Even though there were many occasions on which the government needed to negotiate with the village over (or compensate individuals for) land taken for various development purposes, for many years none of these provided sufficient opportunity for Ping Shan villagers to ask that the police station be torn down. However, the dynamics of this relationship changed when the villagers recognized the power of "traditional monuments" as a bargaining chip. In particular, this awareness emerged with the construction of the Ping Shan Heritage Trail.

In Ping Shan, the hostility latent in this situation came to a head in 1990 when the Tang clan was asked to remove two graves of their ancestors who had been buried 240 years before which were situated in the West New Territories landfill project site **(FIG.8)**. The Tang clan refused, and chose instead to "close the Ping Shan Heritage Trail" as a protest against the government's decision. As one of their subsequent demands, they then asked that the police station be converted for use as their clan's museum, a change that would symbolize a re-establishment of control over their property, a reaffirmation of their identity, a legitimation of their lifestyle and customs, and a sign of their consistent resistance to British dominance **(FIG.9)**. Moreover, establishment of the museum in the former police station would establish the Tang's identity as freedom fighters, patriots, and descendants of the indigenous villagers who had been defeated in an early military struggle with the British regime.

The closing of the Ping Shan Heritage Trail thus reflected a variety of conflicts from the past century. But it is especially important to realize how it allowed the Tangs to (re)-internalize public heritage, resist political authority, and proclaim their indigenous identity.[36] This identity became more important as the negotiations over the return of Hong Kong to China went on, and as the history of the anti-British resistance was reconstructed in a new political context. Thus, social memory led to a historical reconstruction, and the reconstructed history assumed a new reality when monuments such as Tat Tak Kun Soh became accepted as a icons of ethnic identity.

In the end, I therefore speculate that indigenous inhabitants' reconstructed collective memory of Tat Tak Kung Soh can be interpreted either as an expression of patriotism at the return of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China, or as a response to the coming uncertainty with regard to Hong Kong's colonial legacy. The search for identification with the Chinese government through the reconstruction of a patriotic history might further be seen as a way of claiming indigenous rights that might be lost in the future.

FIGURE 8. *A local English daily reporting the contestation over the Tang clan grave site. (Photo by author from* South China Morning Post, *May 3, 1995.)*

FIGURE 9. *Notice on the study hall. The text reads: "*ANTIQUITIES TEMPORARI-*
LY CLOSED for the reason that Hong Kong government insists on forceful*
removal of our 2 ancestors' graves, over 200-year-old with good 'fung shui', from
a hillside in Nim Wan, violating the treaty signed by the Chinese & British gov-
ernments in 1899, which stated that graves on this rented-land of Hong Kong
should never be moved.—Owner of this antiquities"   (Photo by author.)

CONCLUSION

With the increased attention and legitimacy given to oral
history, archives, monumental records, and local writings,
mainstream historical narrative has been criticized for its lack
of realism. Although the historic background of monuments
in traditional villages may not always be clearly understood,
and mysteries are often encountered while conducting field
research, the interpretations given by local villagers remain
important sources, often providing insight into social changes
in the communities and the values their residents hold.

Controversies, such as those which may arise from the
presence of different memories, are an especially common
phenomenon when digging out historic-cultural traditions in
the New Territories. The political landscape here has been
greatly affected by the complex nature of the colonial regime,
the impact of extensive urban development, and the desire
for cultural preservation. This article has attempted to use a
single building in a traditional New Territories settlement as
a test case for understanding the identity of indigenous
inhabitants through their remembrances.

As shown in the case of Tat Tak Kung Soh in Ping Shan,
the reconstruction of such a memory is complicated by the
fact that the only remaining relevant documents are those of
the British government. The voices of the indigenous vil-
lagers were entirely suppressed at the beginning of the colo-
nial regime. Thus, after 99 years, when a new shift in power
was underway, martyrs were found and history was recon-
structed, but the mysteries could still not to be resolved.

Nowadays, because of ongoing preservation and develop-
ment efforts in the New Territories, traditional buildings and
settlements are particularly important to historic narrative and
identity formation. Especially at a time when enormous eco-
nomic power has swept away most regional traditions in Hong
Kong, traditional dwellings and settlements often provide the
last remaining evidence of a local cultural heritage it is essen-
tial to transmit for both educational and historical purposes.

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9. See Baker, *A Chinese Lineage Village*, pp.183,188.

10. See Potter, "The Structure of Rural Chinese Society," pp.13-14.

11. See Segawa, *Chinese Village and Lineage*.

12. In the local practice, some properties inherited from the ancestor are owned by the whole lineage, which are entitled to a trust called Tong. For some legal reasons, the manager, a position created by the British government for convenience in property matters as well as land transactions, became the one who can make decisions for the trust and act as the trustee of all those properties.

13. Tat Tak Tong was named for holding a trust based at the Tat Tak Kung Soh, which actually includes some land properties, and its details can be traced back to 1905 (from the Block Crown Lease Records for Land in the New Territories registered during 1905-7).

14. Chinese residents, more than 95 percent of the total population, were still given enough religious, academic, press and economic freedoms so that there was comparatively little hostility towards the British.

15. In most cases, Ping Shan Tangs had the bottom-soil ownership, and their neighboring villagers had the top-soil ownership.

16. As J. Brim pointed out in *Local Systems and Modernizing Change in the New Territories of Hong Kong* (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1971), village-alliance temples were actually important local-level social organizations.

17. See "The Hoisting of the Flag at Taipu," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, April 15, 1899.

18. "We hate the English barbarians, who are about to enter our boundaries and take our land and will cause us endless evil. Day and night we fear the approaching danger. Certainly people are dissatisfied at this and have determined to resist the barbarians. On the one hand we shall be helping the (Chinese) government; on the other we shall be saving ourselves from future troubles. Let all our friends and relatives bring their firearms to the ground and do what they can to extirpate the traitors. Our ancestors will be pleased and so will our neighbors. This is our sincere wish." (Translated and quoted in Chun, "The Land Revolution," p.2).

19. See Endacott, *A History of Hong Kong*, p.263.

20. According to the *Hong Kong Government Gazette*, 1899, p.1559: Whereas Kowloon was leased under instructions from the Emperor, and the boundary was defined in accordance with the original map forwarded by the Tsungli-Yamen, the following agreement was arrived at with foreign officials:

(1) The people are to be treated with exceptional kindness.

(2) There can be no forced sale of houses and lands.

(3) The graves in the leased territory are never to be removed.

(4) Local customs and habits are to remain unchanged according to the wishes of the inhabitants.

21. The gate was kept in England until 1925, when it was shipped back to Kat Shing Wai in Kam Tin.

22. See Endacott, *A History of Hong Kong*, p.265.

23. Groves's article ("Militia, Market and Lineage") has been considered an important piece about the anti-British armed resistance in 1899. In it, Ping Shan is mentioned four times. These are as follows: (1) as a potential location for the police station because the officer in charge of the Hong Kong Police Force visited Ping Shan on 27th March, and afterward three meetings were held in Ping Shan, Kam Tin and Ha Tsuen (p.43) — also because, among the 22 representatives from various districts in Yuen Long, Ping Shan had the largest group — six people (p.44); (2) as a food (pig) supplier for the militia (p.49); (3) because from Ping Shan, militia were sent to Castle Peak (another way to approach the hinterland) in order to confuse the Qing troops sent from Kowloon City (p.50); and (4) that Ping Shan was involved in the resistance movement (brief mention, p.52).

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34. See Chan, "Politicizing Tradition," pp.39-54.

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Field Report

The "Night Zone" Storyline: Boat Quay, Clarke Quay and Robertson Quay

HENG CHYE KIANG AND VIVIENNE CHAN

This article focuses on the Singapore River as the nucleus around which modern Singapore developed. While the importance of the river grew initially as a direct result of its ideal location and its role in Singapore's development as a port, its significance, in time, came to encompass far more than mere commercial functionality. The article seeks to examine the changing agendas behind the conservation and revitalization of the Singapore River and the subsequent transformation of their ideals: from providing socio-cultural cohesiveness and continuity, to becoming primarily a vehicle for tourism.

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On July 25, 1996, an article in *The Straits Times* reported that the government of Singapore had "approved an initial budget of '$600 million' to start off a plan to turn Singapore into a regional tourism capital that should attract 10 million tourists and some $16 billion in tourist revenue by the year 2000." The article went on to explain that a national tourism plan, Tourism 21, was being launched, and that among its key recommendations would be the creation of eleven distinct tourist districts, or themed zones, that would repackage existing attractions with a "unifying character or storyline."[1]

One of the themed zones is "The Night Zone," centered along what used to be the economic lifeline of Singapore, the Singapore River. This area, encompassing Boat Quay, Clark Quay, and Robertson Quay, was once the heart of a thriving port until economic success and changing naval technology rendered it obsolete. The sun has indeed set on the transshipment and warehousing activities that used to dominate the riverside. The boats and barges that were once common there have been moved to new locations, and conservation efforts, begun in earnest in the late 1980s, have given new life and character to each of the quays.

Today, while much of the physical fabric has been saved from the bulldozer, all else has changed. New forms of economic activity have moved in. Another storyline has taken over. Yet, prior to the announcement of the themed-zones program three years ago, the conservation and revitalization of the riverside areas had other goals. According to S. Rajaratnam, one of these had been to "give a sense of cohesion, continuity and identity," because "a sense of common history is what provides the links to hold together people who came from the four corners of the earth." In short, the conservation of urban heritage was to provide a "social glue."[2]

This report examines how this conservation/revitalization process has been transformed by the more recent strategy of theming the river.

THE SINGAPORE RIVER, PAST AND PRESENT

For 40 years after the initial establishment of Singapore as a trading hub of the British Empire, the Singapore River was the focal point of a flourishing commercial center that grew up around the port, with subsidiary trading areas emerging in the Rochore and Kallang Rivers.

Today the Singapore River winds through the heart of the city center much as it did in the early 1800s. But it has borne silent witness to the sequence of events that has created the modern city-state. Today, the river's visual backdrop is dominated by the soaring skyscrapers of the city's central business district and the conserved shophouses and godowns of Boat Quay, Clarke Quay, and Robertson Quay. Yet while the river may no longer be a working river, its historical significance has not waned. It serves as a physical reminder of the island nation's humble origins as an entrepôt port, founded by Sir Stamford Raffles and built up through the toil of immigrants from all reaches of Asia.[3]

In Singapore's early days, travelers customarily approached the island from the south (Peninsular Malaysia lies to the north), arriving through the mouth of the river. The focal points of activity and center of trade were thus the Singapore River estuary and the beach fronting the river plain. Merchants came from all around the region to trade, and as they approached, their impression was of a hive of activity. Scores of *twakows* and bumboats crowded the river, berthed four to five vessels deep; goods were loaded and unloaded along the riverbanks by lightermen; and godowns and warehouses hummed with activity **(FIG.1)**.[4] In the early days of the colony witnesses reported, "the port of Singapore was crammed full of shipping, ketches, sloops, frigates, two-and-a-half masters, schooners, junks from China, Annam and Siam, and Boats from Borneo."[5] The manmade banks of South Boat Quay housed the merchants' godowns and businesses, while the larger warehouses were set up by the banks at North Boat Quay (now known as Clarke Quay). Meanwhile, the North Bank of the River (now Empress Place) was reserved for gov-

ernment buildings, and a site was leveled for the creation of Commercial Square (now Raffles Place).

Many things to many people, the river had different connotations for the diverse communities of colonial Singapore. To the British and European officials, its North Bank provided a pleasant locale for work and recreation as well as the strategic locale for an imperial outpost of great significance. Raffles wrote of Singapore: "A more commanding and promising Station for the protection and improvement of all our interests in this quarter cannot be conceived. It is impossible to conceive of a place combining more advantages; it is within a week's sail to China, still closer to Siam, Cochin-China & C. in the very heart of the Archipelago."[6] Meanwhile, to the Chinese merchants living and working in the shophouses along Boat Quay, the river was a growing source of personal wealth, and the daily stream of transactions and survey of goods from the South Bank held the promise of economic prosperity. Finally, to the hundreds of immigrants and coolies working along the quays and on the berthed bumboats, the river was a source of economic livelihood as well as the stage around which their lives revolved. Such workers toiled during the day along its banks, and they ate, slept and gambled on its bridges and in the adjoining streets after work. Known as Bu Ye Tian, the river and its surrounds exhibited a frenetic pace of activity around the clock, with peddlers, storytellers, and noodle sellers gathering amidst the laborers and *twakow* people.

Buoyed by its prime geographic position, its status as a free port, and the government's policy of complete freedom for mercantile interests, within the first five years of its establishment the port had secured a position as the prime entrepôt for the region. It served as both a center of exchange for produce from Indochina, Thailand, the Malay Peninsula, and the Indonesian Archipelago, as well as a distribution center for merchandise from India, China and Europe.

A measure of the port's rapid growth can be seen in the numbers of ships that stopped to on- or off-load goods. Singapore hosted 139 square-rigged vessels in 1822; but by 1834 the total number of such vessels had increased to 517, with a recorded total tonnage of 156,513 NRT (Net Registered Tons).[7] Congestion of the river began to set in, and the lighterage of cargo became a problem. The introduction of the first steamship service in Singapore in 1845 and the subsequent opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 exacerbated the problem, as there was no existing wharfage at the river port. Additionally, coal for steam-powered vessels had to be brought in by sailing lighters, stored along the river, and brought back out to arriving ships — a tedious operation that not only held up bunkering operations, but posed a threat to the lighters when weather conditions were unfavorable.

Keppel Harbour (then known as New Harbour) was thus opened in 1849 and developed rapidly for the next 50 years. From its opening, ocean shipping favored the deep waters of the Keppel wharves, while the Singapore River continued to play host to coastal shipping.[8] By the 1970s, however, the river's role in Singapore's port activities had been mostly superseded by

technological advances and the practical benefits offered by the newer port areas, which could handle large container ships.[9]

Ultimately, the degeneration of the river's well-being came as a direct result of its importance and centrality to Singapore's trade. Yet, ironically, this physical deterioration occurred in conjunction with its waning economic importance. The early industries of Singapore, such as gambier- and sago-processing, also contributed to the pollution problem, as did the indiscriminate dumping and sewage disposal that occurred all along its length where settlements had sprung up. Used both for sewage and waste disposal and as a source for irrigation water and water for washing farm animals, the river soon became a "dreadful barrage of smells,"[10] with all manner of human, animal and vegetable waste to be found in its basins.

By the 1950s, with water reserves on the island becoming severely strained, the river had become totally untenable as a domestic water source. It was not until the 1970s, however, that the government began to attempt to alleviate the situation, spurred by the severity of the pollution, along with Singapore's exploding population, growing concerns for public health, and rising demand for a reliable supply of good water for newly built housing estates.

THE CLEAN-UP OF THE SINGAPORE RIVER

At the opening ceremony of the Upper Peirce Reservoir on February 27, 1977, then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew announced:

> *It should be a way of life to keep the water clean. To keep every stream, every culvert, every rivulet free from unnecessary pollution. . . . I think that the Ministry of Environment should make it a target. In ten years time let us have fishing in the Singapore River and fishing in the Kallang River. It can be done.*[11]

So began the rehabilitation of the Singapore River and the fundamental shift away from its role as a working river to that of a recreational waterfront. The ensuing river clean-up was therefore the result of both environmental concern and the changing economic tides of the port industry. Despite pressure from the public against moving the bumboats from the river, it was felt that their clearing away was a necessary sacrifice in the name of progress. The last *twakow* left the Singapore River in September 1983, and a Clean Rivers

Commemoration was held in September 1987. The key stated motivations of the Ministry of Environment in precipitating the river clean-up were its interests in developing the river as a public resource for general enjoyment, in "seeing rivers flowing with clean water, teeming with fish," and in the introduction of "recreation activities on the nice river banks."[12]

In celebration of the river's new lease of life, a number of events were coordinated. Boat races were held, with all manner of craft, including dragon boats, pedal-boats, rubber rafts, and speedboats plying the freshly cleaned river. A River Carnival was organized by the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board, featuring fishing competitions, street *wayangs*, and variety shows by the river and on bumboats or pontoons.[13] A mass swim across the river was even undertaken by the Telok Ayer Constituency. Nonetheless, after the noise of the initial festivities had died down, the river and its quays were again quiet. The river was clean, but empty — its former vitality departed with the trade, coolies and bumboats, and its neighboring shophouses uninhabited and destitute. New uses had to be found for the river and its surrounds.

CONSERVATION AND REVITALIZATION OF THE SINGAPORE RIVER

The clean-up of the Singapore River coincided with the deployment of a Tourism Task Force in 1984 to investigate the causes behind the sudden drop in tourist arrivals for the year 1983. The report of the Task Force indicated that the drop was due, in part, to the devastating effects of urban renewal on large parts of the old city of Singapore, with many old buildings and districts falling victim to the driving force of wholesale redevelopment. Its report stated explicitly that in the effort to modernize, Singapore had "removed aspects of our Oriental mystique and charm which are best symbolized in old buildings, traditional activities and bustling roadside activities such as the 'pasar malam.'"[14] It recommended that urgent action be taken to address the problem. The report also highlighted the fact that the recent clean-up of the Singapore River had "opened up numerous prospects to develop it into a unique tourist attraction that [would] appeal to a diverse mix of tourists of all nationalities. If properly developed, it [could] bring back romance and life into the inner city."[15]

Along with the government's disquiet over the ailing state of the tourist industry, another concern added impetus to the plans for the redevelopment of the Singapore River. In his speech on April 28, 1984, then-Second Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. S. Rajaratnam commented that,

> *A sense of history is what provides the links to hold together a people who came from the four corners of the earth. Because our history is short and because what is worth preserving from the past are not all that plentiful, we should try to save what is worthwhile from the past from the vandal-*

ism of the speculator and the developer, from a government and a bureaucracy which believes that anything that cannot be translated into cold cash is not worth investing in.[16]

The speech was a watershed for the conservation movement in Singapore and marked the beginning of an active involvement on the part of the government. As Brenda Yeoh has written, while "the 'preservation of Singapore's historical and architectural heritage' was explicitly written into policy guidelines . . . , little of these intentions were translated into actions prior to the 1980s."[17] While private (and mainly elite) groups like the Singapore Heritage Society had advocated the need for conservation from the 1980s, they had had only limited success due largely to the lack of government support for their initiatives.[18]

The move to conserve and revitalize the Singapore River (along with other historic districts) was, consequently, the result of a number of factors, both ideological and monetary. These included the emergence of nostalgia as a powerful reaction to the rapid socioeconomic changes of the 1970s and 80s; a growing awareness of the need to preserve and promote a "unique Singaporean heritage" and "traditional Asian values" (for pedagogical purposes as well as to counterbalance the influences of Westernization and globalization); and the government's concern with falling tourist arrivals and its interest in promoting tourism as a new economic base for Singapore. The conserved Singapore riverscape was therefore to serve two goals — the preservation of heritage, and the generation of tourist income. The relative weight apportioned to the two goals, however, was indicative of the prevailing attitude of the Singapore government toward conservation.

Pannell, Kerr and Forster, an American tourism consulting firm commissioned by the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board (STPB) in 1986 to develop a Tourism Product Development Plan stressed in their proposal that,

> *. . . conservation for conservation's sake is not in itself a viable endeavour. Conservation to enhance the image of a product can improve its economic viability and therefore be beneficial. Likewise, conservation to restore or maintain something that will result in national pride is also beneficial.*
>
> *Singapore needs to fill up the first class quality hotel rooms. Therefore, refined forms of entertainment that appeal to this market segment must be cultivated.*[19]

It was with these priorities in mind that the government embarked on the conservation and revitalization of the Singapore River district, dividing the area into three distinctive subzones — Boat Quay, Clarke Quay and Robertson Quay — based on the historical and architectural background of the individual areas **(FIG.2)**. The government plan comprised the conservation of not just single buildings, but of the whole critical mass of the area, with the introduction of new "historically compatible" activities such as entertainment, retail, hotels, and other cultural activities.[20]

FIGURE 2. *Singapore River Plan showing the Boat Quay Clarke Quay and Robertson Quay subzones. (Drawing by authors.)*

While economic viability and sustainability took precedence in overall planning for the redevelopment of the three quays, each evolved in a different direction in terms of image, audience appeal, and operational aspects. More importantly, the degree of success of each area as measured by its "preservation of local heritage" and "generation of tourist income" varied considerably.

THREE QUAYS, THREE APPROACHES

To date, redevelopment of Boat Quay and Clarke Quay have been completed, while the redevelopment of Robertson Quay is still underway. Boat Quay was envisioned in the 1986 Tourist Product Development Plan as a commercial zone, com-

bining riverside entertainment and new residential uses with a landscaped public promenade. The urgency to redevelop Boat Quay arose from the need to re-inject life into the Singapore River as well as repair the many old shophouses along the crescent there, which were already a major tourist attraction.

In early 1997 the Singapore River Businesses Committee commissioned two consulting firms to carry out a study on possible development directions for the river.[21] Their report, presented in February 1997, noted there were "too few places to visit and no defined beginning and end to the River," and that the river should be further developed into two zones — an entertainment zone comprising Boat Quay and Clarke Quay, and a "river garden zone" for Robertson Quay.[22]

Boat Quay, as realized today, is the focus of riverine nightlife. It comprises a dining and entertainment street that lines the south bank of the river, boasting a cosmopolitan mix of pubs and restaurants serving a variety of international and ethnic cuisines (**FIG.3**). Professionals and office workers from the central business district frequent the area by the day and by night, and the riverside promenade also draws a constant stream of expatriates and tourists.

While the attempt to revitalize Boat Quay has indisputably been successful (in terms of the new lease of life it has been granted and the bustling activities now concentrated there), a legitimate question remains concerning what has been overlooked, compromised or even sacrificed in order to regain the quay's commercial and economic health. Despite the few half-hearted, obligatory attempts at including "heritage" items such as bumboats (as river-taxis for ferrying tourists), nowhere in the current scheme is there a significant reminder of the history of the place and its laboring pioneers. Indeed, as Yeoh has pointed out, "Boat Quay has been described by one journalist as 'an unremitting row of watering holes' with a reputation for drunk-

FIGURE 3. *Boat Quay in the 1990s. (Photo by authors.)*

enness and teenage catfights with little to remind one of 'the toil and tears of the immigrant generation of Singaporeans' who used to work on the River."[23]

Clarke Quay, like Boat Quay, was planned as a commercial entertainment district. The key difference between the two projects, however, was that the former was conceptualized as a themed festival village to be developed whole by a single developer, rather than a collection of independent, privately owned businesses (FIGS.4,5). Sold through the Sale of Sites Programme in 1989 to DBS Land, and completed in 1992-93, Clarke Quay shows little of the diversity that gives Boat Quay its distinctiveness and personality.[24] Targeted primarily at mass- or package-tourist and family groups, the development has endeavored to present itself as a "waterfront marketplace." To achieve this image, it had made prolific use of period street furniture (for example, gas lamps and wrought-iron benches), and a former roundabout has been converted into a "village green" with a gazebo used for live band performances. A

FIGURE 4. (TOP) "Singapore Adventure Ride" at Clarke Quay. (Photo by authors.)

FIGURE 5. (BOTTOM) Map at Clarke Quay depicting various themed attractions. (Photo by authors of mural in the Clarke Quay development.)

Disney-style adventure ride has been constructed through refurbished, air-conditioned godowns "showcas[ing] the 100-year old history of Clarke Quay and the traditions of the Singapore River."[25] Traditional tradespeople such as clog-makers and street barbers have been placed at strategic locations to enhance the nostalgic appeal of the development. And tourists can buy tidbits, handicrafts, and various souvenirs disguised as ethnic merchandise from pushcarts. The aim of all this has ostensibly been to bring back the street life and recreate the atmosphere of the past era. But the net result has been to establish a tourist zone that has little appeal to local people either in terms of services offered or identification with the past. This is evident in the fact that the area is all but deserted most of the day, and only comes to life in the evenings and on weekends. Nevertheless, the fact that the "carnival and festival village" themes have little to do with the working history of Clarke Quay has not deterred the developer from marketing the area as the re-creation of the "Singapore of the 1930s."[26]

The third former riverside area, Robertson Quay, starts upstream of Clemenceau Road and extends to Kim Seng Road. Here, approximately 3,400 apartments are slated to be built as part of the government's bid to revitalize residential development along the river. In keeping with the river garden theme proposed by the Singapore River Businesses Committee, the mostly residential area will have a lot of greenery between buildings and will feature shaded waterside promenades along with shopping malls, hotels, condominiums and service apartments. Unlike Boat Quay (with its diverse small parcels) and Clarke Quay (with its single developer), Robertson Quay is being developed by a number of big developers, each looking to establish an individual identity and achieve product differentiation through the marketing of a specific lifestyle, image and flavor.

Overall, in relation to the conservation and the preservation of heritage as part of the redevelopment of the quay areas, the Urban Redevelopment Authority's (URA) official position is evident from the following statement by one of its former directors: "We see our heritage buildings and areas as living areas, living museums. Not as a museum-museum. Clarke Quay does a bit of that. But it cannot be expected that every conservation area become a museum-museum."[27] But the degree to which even such a limited objective is being met in present redevelopment efforts is subject to dispute. While Boat Quay is inarguably thriving, and the eventual success of Robertson Quay cannot yet be ascertained, the quality of animation in Clarke Quay is far from being either a "living museum" or a "museum-museum."

The following proclamation (from the Tourist Product Development Plan) reveals and reiterates the relative importance of the marketability of conserved areas to tourists in the overall scheme of things:

Strong emphasis has been placed in the revitalisation of our historical areas into tourist attractions. This affords Singapore the opportunity to have something unique, not easily duplicated in other countries of the world in such a

diverse and condensed form. It allows the participation of numerous small entrepreneurs who can retail unique ethnic merchandise instead of common sundry items.[28]

The irony, then, arises from the juxtaposition of conflicting notions such as "uniqueness" and "historicity" with the stage-set tourist attraction that is Clarke Quay. By encouraging the development of the area as a mass tourist attraction based on formulaic waterfront projects found elsewhere in the world, the problem of increasing homogeneity in conserved areas has inadvertently been augmented. Thus, the quay has been converted from a historically rich area to one that has the usual restaurants and souvenir shops that can be found in major waterfront developments everywhere.

THE NIGHT ZONE: THEMING OF THE SINGAPORE RIVER

Tourism 21, the national tourism plan devised by the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board (STPB, now renamed as the Singapore Tourism Board) to turn Singapore into the regional tourism capital of the twenty-first century, was officially approved in July 1996. Stating that "the attractiveness of Singapore must be packaged into a winning story that will excite its target markets," the plan has advocated the comprehensive reformulation of the "Singapore tourism product," to "offer all its visitors memorable experiences." One of the key recommendations of the plan was the introduction of strategic themed zones in Singapore for the "repackaging of existing attractions with a 'unifying character or storyline.'"[29] According to the STPB:

. . . the creation of zones of thematic development in Singapore will benefit both Singaporeans and help increase visitorship in terms of arrival figures, tourism receipts earned and extended length of stay. In reformulating the product, a thematic development approach will not only serve to 'beautify' and enhance strategic locations as attractions/products Singapore can boast of, but also add value to the myriad of experiences Singapore can offer.[30]

Under the Tourism 21 plan, Boat Quay, Clarke Quay and Robertson Quay comprise "The Night Zone" and are to be marketed as the "city that never sleeps." The possible activities to be coordinated include family-oriented entertainment (e.g., cinemas, rides, amusement centers), food outlets, festivals, riverside concerts and performances, as well as river cruises. While the activities to be highlighted remain fairly similar to what already exists along the river today, the act of theming itself has deeper implications, both for the built environment as well as for the national psyche and identity of Singaporeans. Dinesh Naidu, writing to *The Straits Times* in response to the STB's recently unveiled plans to theme Chinatown, noted that,

. . . the activities themselves are robbed of their natural and logical contexts, turning them into objects on display for visitors. People would engage with these activities as spectators and tourists, rather than as participants. . . . . [T]he nature of the Village Theatre [a newly proposed part of Chinatown] turns these daily tasks into performances for others. This changes the meaning of the activities.[31]

In theming the Singapore River, the emphasis of its conservation has shifted ever more toward the purely tangible, physical aspects of the place, rather than toward any more intrinsic, historical value it might hold, as "developers strive for accurate replications of visible details, more for the purpose of creating a historic ambiance for tourist enjoyment than for representing a true picture of the past and for increasing understanding of what is historically significant and valued in the environment."[32] This in turn results in the reduction of history to just architecture, and allows developers free reign to reuse the site for their own purposes. While adaptive reuse is an acceptable compromise between the two extremes of wholesale redevelopment and sacrosanct preservation, the manner in which it has been pursued in the context of the Singapore River has been less than ideal. In using the conserved architectural backdrop of the river as a stage-set for an easily digestible "storyline" written for tourists, a tone has inadvertently been set for the negative homogenizing influences of tourism that could well lead to the eventual destruction of local and regional features and their replacement with pseudo-places totally unrelated to the history, life and culture of the indigenous population.[33]

The proposed theming of the river has also almost certainly ensured that the end result will be biased primarily toward certain social groups and against others. From surveys conducted on public opinion toward conservation efforts in the Civic District, it can be conjectured that the locals (in particular, the aged, the lower classes, and the Chinese-educated) feel alienated from the new environments created by conservation projects, and almost half the respondents interviewed felt that the government's uppermost motive in conservation was to attract tourists.[34] This is significant, since as noted in the report by Pannell, Kerr and Forster, "local acceptance is vital to the tourism aspect as interchange among the local residents and visitors is necessary for its ultimate success."[35]

As Naidu wrote with regard to the conservation of the Chinatown district and the Tourism 21 plan:

The tendency to homogenise and unify the Chinatown product, to simplify it for packaging and consumption by visitors, is seen down to the very details of its logo, street furniture and signage. These are not trivial components distracting the public from the substance of the proposals. They point ominously to the future of Chinatown and the other 10 thematic zones under the Tourism 21 masterplan when our rich and fascinating urban districts are stripped

of their complexity for the sake of more efficient promotion. In our attempts to revitalise important urban districts, we must be careful not to distort them to the point at which they lose the very authenticity we cherish only to become sanitised and simplified theme parks. Singaporeans, with their tremendous capacity for common sense and familiarity with other similar projects, are already very sceptical of the proposals.[36]

CONCLUSION

In 1997 *The Straits Times* described the Singapore River in the following terms:

The Singapore River, on whose shores the early immigrants disembarked to begin their lives here, bears essential witness to the country's history. For that reason, if no other, it deserves to be treated with respect. There is another reason, of course. The coming generations must inherit it, not as the canal it once became, but as the repository of a water-borne history whose rhythms and ripples are cherished by Singaporeans in common.[37]

The river today is the product of the many pressures that went into both its shaping and the creation of modern Singapore. From its early days as the focus of Singapore's infant port industry, to its current projected role as "an exciting activity corridor that capitalises on the river frontage and reflects the unique historical character of the area,"[38] it has always been, and still remains, very much in the minds and hearts of the people. While it is well and good that the river should be developed with economic sustainability and viability in mind, G.J. Ashworth's admonition on the dangers of heritage commodification in the face of tourism should be heeded. He wrote that "the deliberate use of history as an economic resource in the production of the commodity heritage for sale on tourism markets" will ultimately result in the "golden hordes" of tourists leaving behind a "trail of 'cultural prostitution.'"[39]

An approach that endeavors to strike a balance between the involvement of the locals and the generation of tourist income might provide a solution that is amenable to all. Focusing on the development of the Singapore River as "a waterway which provides waterfront housing, enjoyment and fun to present and future generations of Singaporeans"[40] could ultimately result in its evolution into a national attraction that appeals both to locals as well as to a more discerning breed of tourist interested not just in prepackaged tourist products, but in the real lives and history of the local people.

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This preliminary study is the result of an ongoing research project on "Good Southeast Asian Streets (and Urban Spaces)," conducted at the School of Architecture, National University of Singapore.

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2. S. Rajaratnam, "The Uses and the Abuses of the Past," Seminar on "Adaptive Re-use: Integrating Traditional Areas into the Modern Urban Fabric," Singapore, April 1984.
3. Sir Stamford Raffles was the founder of modern Singapore. After surveying other nearby islands in search of a location to establish a new trading station for the British Empire at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, he landed on the island on January 29, 1819. A trading post was set up in Singapore the next day, after the conclusion of a preliminary treaty with Temenggong Abdul Rahman (the de facto ruler of Singapore). A formal treaty was concluded on February 6, 1819, with Sultan Hussein of Johor (the de jure ruler of Singapore) and the Temenggong.

4. *Twakows* and bumboats were lighters, or cargo boats, used to transport goods from ships anchored at the mouth of the river to the godowns, or warehouses, on the banks of the river.
5. Munshi Abdullah, as quoted in J. Hon, *Tidal Fortunes—A Story of Change: the Singapore River and Kallang Basin* (Singapore: Landmark Books, 1990), p.14. Abdullah was a scholar and dedicated chronicler of early British Singapore. He also tutored Sir Stamford Raffles (see note 3) in Malay.
6. Written by Raffles on June 10, 1819. Quoted in Hon, *Tidal Fortunes*, p.8.
7. NRT — Net Registered Tons. This tonnage is frequently shown on ship registration papers; it represents the volumetric area available for cargo at 100 cubic feet = 1 ton. It was often used by port and canal authorities as a basis for charges.
8. Records of local shipping and facts and figures for the port were obtained from the Port of Singapore Authority, " History," updated October 1, 1997, <http://www.psa.com.sg/general/history.html>, cited March 3, 2000.
9. By 1880, the ocean shipping had risen to 1.2 million NRT, with the total cumulative tonnage

of 1.5 million NRT for the port of Singapore. With the introduction of electricity in 1897, the ascendancy of Keppel Harbour grew, as working hours along the wharves doubled, while those at the river remained, at best, at up to 71/2-10 tons per daylight hour. In 1972 the opening of a container berth at Tanjong Pagar (then the only berth in Southeast Asia capable of accommodating a third-generation container vessel) marked Singapore's position as an important link in the new chain of global container ports.
10. Hon, *Tidal Fortunes*.
11. As quoted in "River Romance Comes Alive," *The Straits Times*, July 17, 1997.
12. Chiang Kok Meng, Chairman of the Clean Rivers Committee, as quoted in Hon, *Tidal Fortunes*, p.98.
13. *Wayangs* are traditional Chinese opera performances.
14. Tourism Task Force, Report of the *Tourism Task Force* (Singapore: Ministry of Trade and Industry, November 1984), p.6. A *pasar malam* is a night market set up in the street, composed mainly of makeshift stalls selling a variety of goods.
15. Ibid., p.37.
16. S. Rajaratnam, "The Uses and the Abuses of the Past."

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18. The Singapore Heritage Society was set up in 1987 by a group of professionals with a view to channeling public opinion and providing a voice for the conservation movement.

19. Pannell, Kerr and Forster, *Tourism Development in Singapore* (Singapore: Singapore Tourist Promotion Board, 1986), pp.I-3,7.

20. Singapore Tourist Promotion Board, *Tourism Product Development Plan* (Singapore: Singapore Tourist Promotion Board and Ministry of Trade and Industry, October 1986).

21. The Singapore River Businesses Committee was formed in April 1996 to carry out the upcoming Tourism 21 Plan. Members include river-cruise operators, government authorities with interests in the river (such as the Urban Redevelopment Authority and the Land Transport Authority), developers with riverside projects (Development Bank of Singapore Land, City Developments Limited and Far East Organisation), and the Boat Quay Association of Businesses.

22. "Six Hubs of Activity Proposed for River," *The Straits Times*, February 25, 1997.

23. Yeoh, "Urban Conservation and Heritage Management," p.275. The reference is to a January 24, 1996, article in *The Straits Times*.

24. The Sale of Sites Programme is a comprehensive urban redevelopment program carried out through the Urban Redevelopment Authority. Small fragmented land lots are acquired and assembled into larger parcels, which are then released by the URA for sale to private developers. The sales are carried out through a tender system offering a combination of conditions (usually urban design guidelines) and concessions which are tailored to achieve national planning objectives within the framework of a free-market economy. For more detailed information, refer to *Chronicle of Sale Sites: A Pictorial Chronology of the Sale of Sites Programme for Private Development* (Singapore: Urban Redevelopment Authority, 1983).

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26. Quoted from Clarke Quay promotional brochure.

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39. G.J. Ashworth, "Culture and Tourism: Conflict or Symbiosis in Europe?" in W. Pompl and P. Lavery, eds., *Tourism in Europe: Structures and Developments* (Wallingford, U.K.: CAB International, 1993), p.14. The term "golden horde" is from L.J. Turner and J. Ash, *The Golden Horde: International Tourism and the Pleasure Periphery* (London: Constable, 1976).

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Special Article

Writing Spaces: Cultural Translation and Critical Reflexivity in Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review

C. GREIG CRYSLER

This article explores how the "social" and the "spatial" are defined and represented in discourses on tradition in *TDSR*. I discuss some of the prominent debates in the journal since its inception, and argue that a paradigm shift is underway, in which discourses that define traditional environments as socially and geographically isolated, "nonurban," "preindustrial," or "premodern" spaces (and often located in the so-called Third World) are giving way to those which constitute "tradition" as a contested site of power relations in a global context. I suggest that this represents an important shift of emphasis away from idealist conceptions of tradition, to those which explore how it is grounded in asymmetrical relations of power that shape, and are shaped by, among others, the state, the global economy, the built environment professions, and writing on tradition itself.

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The last three decades have been defined by a series of dramatic changes in the relationship between time and space. An intensive period of social and spatial restructuring following the global recession of 1973-75 has been marked by the expansion and reorganization of world financial markets, accelerated travel times, and rapid advances in information technology. The academic context in which these changes have been studied has undergone a parallel series of transformations. Increases in world migration have resulted in demographic shifts within the Anglo-American academic system. Oppositional movements within the academy

have emerged to question Eurocentric, patriarchal forms of knowledge, and have led to counter-hegemonic analytic spaces that have in some cases become institutionalized themselves. Intellectuals are increasingly linked together in "communities of method" that span across national boundaries.[1] It is now possible to speak of the "cosmopolitics" of intellectual identity,[2] and the practices of "flexible citizenship" among a global professional-managerial class.[3] In response to these changes, critics and theorists in a wide range of disciplines have argued that space (from the virtual space of the Internet, to the "transnational" space of commodity production) has become the medium of social change, and hence political struggle. Central to these arguments is the assertion that space can no longer be regarded as a static container for "social processes" that unfold over time, but instead must be theorized as a social process in itself.[4]

It is in the context of burgeoning debates on the politics of space, not only in relation to the city but also between "spaces of knowledge" in the academy, that the study of *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review* presented here first developed. This article is part of a larger study of discourses of architecture, urbanism, and the built environment between 1960 and 1995 that I undertook in an effort to understand the changing relationship between the social and the spatial, both within and between built-environment disciplines.[5] The research was initially undertaken in the context of five English-language scholarly journals. I selected journals as the frame for the study not only because they are central to formalizing and disseminating theoretical debates within disciplines, but because of their connections to academic structures of knowledge and power. Journals are embedded in the larger institutional structures of the academy and their circuits of cultural capital. They are also institutions in themselves, and define distinctive geographical, social and historical spaces of representation. As such, journals offer an opportunity to explore the relationship between discourse, its institutional supports, and the wider social and historical context of both.

In addition to *TDSR*, the publications that composed the larger study included the *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, the oldest journal of architectural history in the U.S.; *Assemblage*, a journal of architectural theory, design and criticism; the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, concerned with the political economy of urban and regional development; and *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, a journal that has played an important role in adapting various forms of social and critical theory to the analysis of geography at various scales. When considered as a composite space, the journals bring together a wider range of theoretical positions typically isolated from each other by divisions between disciplines. Their juxtaposition in a comparative critical framework revealed their silences and limitations, while also suggesting how, in the context of emerging discourses on the politics of space, these might be overcome through transdisciplinary research practices.

TDSR is situated midway in the range of spatial scales and analytical systems encompassed by my study. Its emphasis on traditional environments exceeds the object-centered focus on individual buildings common to much architectural discourse. At the same time, its concern with ensembles of buildings and settlements means that its research is considerably less abstract than much of the writing in geography or urban studies, where urban localities, regions, and territories are often represented from an elevated, omnipotent viewpoint. While allowing an understanding of large-scale social determination in relation equally to large-scale conceptions of space, such writing often overlooks ensembles of buildings and urban space as social and historical artifacts that signify and transmit meaning.

TDSR also represents a point of mediation between different conceptions of human agency — defined on the one hand by architectural writing, which often constitutes the architect as a solitary author, and on the other by social-science discourses, which tend to represent buildings as epiphenomena of urban processes. With its stated emphasis on dwellings, settlements and environments, *TDSR* moves away from exclusive focus on professionalized architectural production and toward "cultural landscapes" produced according to the shared values of "ordinary people." At the same time, the shift in scale does not, as is sometimes the case in geography and urban studies, preclude a study of the signifying dimension of built environments: indeed, one of the primary concerns of the journal is the transmission of tradition over time through shared cultural practices.

TDSR and its publisher and parent organization, the International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments (IASTE), are also important objects of study because they attempt to construct an alternative to the ethnocentric conventions of "high" architectural scholarship, with its attention to monumental, professionally designed spaces in the metropolitan "First World." Many of the buildings and environments studied in *TDSR* are located in the newly industrializing countries of the so-called "Third World," and increasingly its contributing writers are based in institutions outside the Anglo-American academic system. *TDSR* may therefore offer insights into how to bridge between the social and the spatial; object-centered and process-oriented discourses; and between models of academic production concerned primarily with the First World and those that reflect critically on changing conditions in a globally interdependent world.

DEFINING TRADITION

Any attempt to investigate the critical limits of *TDSR*'s discourse on "traditional environments" must begin with an examination of the meanings built up around the analytical category of "tradition." Since its inception in 1989, *TDSR* has bound together competing, and in some respects incommensurable, definitions of the term. These have been intertwined with changing social conditions and the broader history of discourses on tradition. It is important to sketch a brief and partial outline of this history, because aspects of prior debates and positions continue to influence writing in the journal today.

Within the field of traditional and vernacular building, definitions of tradition have emerged historically, together with their opposite, the field of practice and knowledge that defines "Architecture." Necdet Teymur and Yasemin Aysan have suggested that two discourses have developed within this subordinate(d) field of thought.[6] Both define tradition in relation to the terms and conditions of dominant architectural practices, but distinctly different sets of values have become attached to each. The first, primarily negative in character, is the one to which all the practices that are refused or disqualified from the domain of "high" architecture are consigned. Teymur and Aysan argued that these exclusions are based on normative categories of classification that can be traced to the knowledge about "primitive societies" associated with the emergence of anthropology as a discipline and its basis in the writings of early anthropologists and explorers. Here tradition is associated with "backward" societies, thereby justifying the exclusion of non-Western buildings from the "high" architectural canon:

> . . . as far as architectural classifications are concerned, many of these explorers justified the exclusion of buildings of these people from the domain of architecture by defining them as "barbaric," "inferior forms," "ugly" and "ill" places. Even when there were attempts to look at primitive buildings as the origins of architecture, the former were either reduced to classical principles to prove the evolution of existing rules and canons or they were associated with "primitive" forms of humanity measured by the yardstick of the "civilized" societies — which mainly proved their superiority. . . .[7]

The second discourse is essentially positive and recuperative in character, and constitutes the traditional as a superior alternative to the dominant practices of architecture prevailing at a given historical moment. Here would be included not only the concepts of anti-classical "national" architecture favoring "spontaneous and natural aspects" as it emerged in France following the French Revolution, but also various national vernacular traditions that developed in response to discontent with the effects of rapid industrialization — such as the arts-and-crafts movement, the English vernacular tradition, and the Deustcher Werkbund movement.[8]

In their book on the Jurgendstil buildings of Helsinki, Moorehouse et al. interpreted late-nineteenth-century Finnish vernacular building as a national style motivated by international events, and one that drew on investigation of particular Finnish "vernacular" forms. Interestingly, the authors described how this national architecture was strategically disseminated in international contexts in order to foreground the threat to Finland's sovereignty as a nation by Russian expansionism:

> . . . Finland sought to draw attention to the encroachment of its autonomy abroad, and international exhibitions and fairs were attended, such as the Paris World exhibition in 1908. . . .[9]

The authors also interpreted the constitution of national vernacular architecture as "international" in another sense: they argued that Finnish architects and designers were inspired by the example of similar movements, particularly in France and Germany, which reached them through a rapidly expanding international media.

This international production of national architecture exchanged knowledges and drew upon sources that were limited to the industrializing nations of Europe. Teymur and Aysan have suggested that it was not until the 1960s that a recuperative, or positive discourse of tradition "outside the West" emerged in Euro-American architectural education.[10] This effort drew upon practices of building in the Third World in order to both challenge and reform the practices of design and education in the United Kingdom and the U.S., but it did so largely in terms of what the West (and immediately post-colonial architects) were helping to construct in the Third World. Furthermore, an effort was made to link the rapidly growing interest in "traditional" buildings of the Third World to two geo-cultural events: the need for academic research to inform economic aid and development programs initiated following post-World War II decolonization; and a growing dissatisfaction with the aesthetic principles and design ideologies associated with architectural modernism.

> [T]hese events converged into an ever-growing interest not only in so-called primitive societies, but also in the study of under-developed countries and cultures, rural settlements, and communities in local, regional, and national idioms of architecture. This growing interest coincided with the realization of the results of urbanization and the effects of international idioms in planning and architecture. . . .[11]

The underlying tendency in these debates has been to construct (if in a benevolent fashion) a "primitive world," that is separated both geographically and temporally from one which is "modern" and "industrialized."

My research has suggested that the dominant mode of representation in *TDSR* between its inception and 1995 extended and developed these recuperative models of investigation. In the 1989 collection of papers presented at the first IASTE conference, *TDSR*'s co-editors, Nezar AlSayyad and Jean-Paul Bourdier, stated that

> [A] thing is "traditional" if it satisfies two criteria: it is the result of a process of transmission, and it has cultural origins involving common people. Professional traditions satisfy the former, but not the latter condition . . . buildings and spaces which are deliberately non-academic . . . provide for the simple activities and enterprises of ordinary people . . . strongly relate to place through respect for local conventions, and . . . are produced by a process of personalized thought and feeling rather than utilitarian logic. . . .[12]

Here tradition was defined through the opposition to pro-
fessionalized, impersonal and "utilitarian logic." In a similar
manner, IASTE's research on tradition has been defined in oppo-
sition to the "excessive disciplinization" of the subject, as an
"open and irrevocable interdisciplinary studies arena."[13] A some-
what less pointed definition of tradition continues to be pub-
lished in the IASTE mission statement. This states that IASTE is
concerned with the comparative and cross-cultural study of "tra-
ditional habitat as expression of informal cultural conventions."[14]

Discourses that define traditional "habitats" positively, in
opposition to an advancing capitalist modernization, have played
an important role in *TDSR*, particularly in the initial stages of the
journal's development. I examine such representations in greater
detail below as "narratives of the ethnographic pastoral." At the
same time, however, a range of different, and in many respects
contradictory, positions have emerged alongside these, which I
refer to as self-reflexive narratives. They are marked by ambiva-
lence and even outright skepticism toward their "positive" coun-
terparts, and they have exerted increasing influence in the journal
since 1995. This change is underscored by the program of the
2000 IASTE conference, entitled "The End of Tradition?"

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC PASTORAL

I have borrowed the term "ethnographic pastoral" from
James Clifford, who has used it to describe the allegorical
register of academic writing that describes (often distant and
"exotic") cultures from a specific temporal distance and with
a presumption of transience or mobility on the part of the
writer. Often written from a "lovingly detailed but disen-
gaged standpoint," these discourses attempt to salvage histor-
ical worlds as textual fabrications,

> . . . disconnected from ongoing lived milieux and suitable for
> moral allegorical appropriations by individual readers. In
> the properly ethnographic pastoral this textualizing structure
> is generalized . . . to a wider capitalist topography of
> Western/non-Western, city/country oppositions. "Primitive,"
> non-literate, underdeveloped, tribal societies are constantly
> yielding to progress, "losing" their traditions . . . the most
> problematic, and politically charged aspect of this encoding is
> its relentless placement of others in a present-becoming past.[15]

As Clifford noted, one of the central characteristics of the
ethnographic pastoral is its tendency to isolate the society
studied in time and space. The first step in the abstraction of
the traditional settlement from "ongoing lived milieux" in
TDSR occurs through contextualizing descriptions that
emphasize the traditional society's geographic isolation. The
traditional settlement is initially portrayed as being surround-
ed by extensive, and largely unbroken, natural boundaries —
usually either tropical jungle, ocean, or both — which sepa-
rates the settlement from the rest of the world. These

descriptions tend to combine physical separation with social,
economic and political isolation not only from a larger world
economy, but from national, regional and local forms of social
organization that operate beyond the scale of the traditional
setting. Such settlements have been described in *TDSR* as
"elaborate compounds nestled in the foothills,"[16] or located on
plateaus "broken by valleys and entangled ravines."[17] They are
far-away and "insular," separated from the rest of the world by
deep bays, and hidden in landscapes whose "configuration is
. . . peculiar."[18] Such a condition allows them to evolve peace-
fully, untouched by outside intervention or influence. These
geographical frames not only create "natural" boundaries
around the settlements studied, but they reinforce the repre-
sentation of these societies as organic outgrowths that coexist
with the spiritualized landscape that surrounds them.

The spaces of the ethnographic pastoral are also framed by
their own, often premodern temporality, appearing as fragments
of a remote and distant past that have survived into the present.
Their very existence in a state that is largely untouched by the
outside world makes them valuable, and also adds urgency to
the need to preserve them textually. They are isolated as pure or
uncontaminated examples of tradition (and hence abstracted
from large-scale social processes), thereby making the clarity of
the transmission process one of the primary criterion for their
selection as objects of analysis. Joseph Aranha offered a paradig-
matic example of this rationale in his 1991 article on traditional
settlements in Nepal and Bali. He stated that

> The processes of colonization and modernization have
> changed the forms of traditional settlements in much of
> South and Southeast Asia. Fortunately, a few places remain
> where patterns of living and physical forms remain largely
> untouched by the forces of change. Places like these provide
> an opportunity to study architectural environments that are
> determined by factors other than functionalism and profit.[19]

The strength of a collective inner spirit also forms a powerful
protective barrier around societies of the ethnographic pastoral.
Because traditional settlements are represented as the projection
or "transmission" of shared values, each traditional society
assumes the status of a collective spiritual consciousness whose
outer limit coincides with the physical boundaries of the settle-
ment. A strong or vigorous traditional community is therefore
one that has not succumbed to outside influence. In this way the
resilience of traditional architecture is linked to the enduring pres-
ence of a common inner spirit, which may be spiritual, religious,
or even poetic in nature. Saif-Ul-Haq, for example, suggested in a
1994 article on architecture within the folk tradition that "[t]he
roots of traditional Bangladeshi architecture are dug deep into the
psyche of the common people. [Bangladesh is] a land where poet-
ry and philosophy are inherent in every person. . . ."[20]

At the same time, however, tradition can survive only if it
becomes detached, not only from its larger "lived milieux" but
from the immediate exigencies of everyday life within the tradi-

tional settlement. Although traditional environments are represented as the projection of common values, the transmission of tradition is predicated on the assumption that those values may become tacit, and so be passed down from generation to generation without question. As Maria-Christina Georgali observed:

> . . . in order for tradition to survive, certain elements and rules of composition must acquire a certain typicality independent of their time and place of generation. Such forms may be thought to have acquired an a-spatial and a-historical nature. . . .[21]

As suggested above, the journal's discourse of the ethnographic pastoral has tended to associate each side of the modern/traditional dyad with contrasting models of social organization. Thus, modern societies are represented as dynamic, constantly changing, and invasive; while traditional societies are represented as passive, assenting collectively to the discipline of tradition, changing only in response to external pressures over which they apparently have little or no control, yet remaining unified and free of internal conflict. According to this schema, the world is effectively divided into two geographical and conceptual zones, each isolated from the other. Yet because the meaning of the dyad has been produced through opposition, the interrelated meaning of the terms "traditional" and "modern" is seldom examined.

Traditional societies are also abstracted from time and space by the way in which archival sources are used in the discourses of the ethnographic pastoral. As noted above, the traditional settlement is frequently represented as a projection of shared cultural values, usually linked to religious or spiritual beliefs that are considered unique to a particular group rooted in a specific place outside historical determination. Because the documentation of such beliefs is considered to be objective or transparent to these beliefs, the documentation too is dehistoricized. Thus, existing ethnographic data compiled decades (and in some cases almost a century) earlier may be reassembled to form a composite description of the cultural traditions and belief systems of the traditional society. The seamless juxtaposition of evidence also reveals how the process of documentation and interpretation are often treated as two separate activities. Photography, sketching, field research, and notes compiled in situ are presumed to be transparent to the reality they describe, rather than constitutive of it. The logic discovered in the analysis of photographs and maps is presumed to pre-exist the process of representation, when in fact the media chosen, and the position from they are analyzed have determinate effects on how traditional settlements are understood.[22]

The documentation stage of the writing process thus reduces the traditional settlement to a series of morphological relationships that are mapped through putatively objective techniques. In this way, the traditional environment is made over into a research object that is congruent with the techniques that are used to analyze it; it is reconstituted according to the proto-

cols of the researcher before analysis can begin. The extensive critical literature on ethnography and anthropology that has emerged over the last decade has devoted considerable attention to problematizing the relations of power masked by the apparent neutrality of the ethnographic observer.[23] The most significant aspect of this critique for *TDSR* concerns the way in which the desires and values of the observer silently shape the conditions observed: the indigene and his or her inhabitation become ur-text of the observer's fantasies of the "other," as an inverted projection of his or her own "modern" subject position.[24]

THE ARCHITECTURAL TRANSLATION OF TRADITION

Although the environments studied in the research outlined above are represented as the projection of the shared cultural values of traditional societies, they can also be understood as projections of the shared professional values of the architects and academics who study them. Many of articles in *TDSR* have been presented as "case studies" that attempt to textually preserve a disappearing world heritage. However, the translation process they initiate opens the traditional environment to multiple appropriations by professionalized architectural practice. *TDSR* has published only a few examples of contemporary architectural production directly influenced by traditional "codes and maxims." It is more common for articles to imply general lessons for professional practice based on traditional cases. Thus, the traditional environment is constituted as a potential storehouse of abstract hierarchies and modes of spatial organization that, once removed from their traditional materialization, can be adapted and applied to "modern" practice.

When leading figures involved with *TDSR* and IASTE have turned their attention to defining the purposes of the journal and the association, they have suggested that the study of tradition should be developed as an interdisciplinary science that will help inform/reform professional action. For example, in papers commenting on the future direction of IASTE and *TDSR* presented at the association's 1996 conference, both Amos Rapoport and Paul Oliver linked the future of the discourse of tradition to the improvement of professional practice. According to Oliver, IASTE's scholarship should lead to "interdisciplinary action based on integrated and evaluated research."[25] Rapoport argued that the primary function of the conferences and the journal should be to influence and improve design, planning and development.[26]

For Rapoport, traditional environments provide a laboratory in which the "environment-behavior studies" (EBS) scientist might observe relations between humans and environments in their simplest, archetypal forms.[27] The EBS paradigm suggests that there are fundamental human responses to the built environment that transcend time and place. After these have been effectively isolated and studied in "simple" traditional settings, they can then be abstracted and applied to all forms of building. The goal of the journal and the society should therefore be, according to Rapoport,

the development of an "interdisciplinary science" of tradition that is concerned with "learning from the traditional domain":

> . . . the five conferences and TDSR have from the start empha-
> sized one very important goal: learning from [tradition] for the
> purpose of the design, planning and development.[28]

The suggestion that the study of tradition should form the basis of a new interdisciplinary science was also raised in Gerard Toffin's paper presented at the 1992 IASTE conference. Toffin argued that TDSR and IASTE have played an important role in beginning to redefine Euro-American architectural history and theory by studying buildings for the way they represent "cultural identity."[29] For Toffin, the purpose of studying tradition was to "decenter" Eurocentric models of architectural history and theory. However, he argued that this decentering should be undertaken in order to recenter existing structures of knowledge and power around the study of tradition. Toffin did not challenge the existence of professionalized knowledge and training located in powerful institutions in the West. Instead, his goal was to reform the canons of knowledge that define such institutions from within, and in doing so, develop a new and improved form of architectural history and theory, which he called "ethno-architecture."[30] Toffin imagined the world represented by this new "composite science" as a mosaic or patchwork of distinctive cultural identities materialized in built form, each separate and distinct from the next.[31]

Like Rapoport, Toffin claimed that the traditional environment offers a model that architects and ethnologists alike might learn from when seeking to understand how the "social, the mental, and the material" are "blended" together. While this relationship can be studied in any building, it is "particularly clear" in the traditional environment:

> This interweaving is particularly clear in non-Western, "tra-
> ditional" civilizations where all aspects of life are intercon-
> nected, and religion often controls all aspects of social life.
> Against all formalist temptations, Ethno-architecture grants
> man priority and gives privilege to the question of meaning.[32]

The textual translation of the "traditional environment" into "traditional architecture" may be seen to begin with the titles of articles such as "You Are What You Build: Architecture as Identity among the Bamileke of West Cameroon." But this process often continues in great depth, as authors classify the buildings they document as "architecture," recoding a diverse array of structures into the professionalized language and discursive tropes of Euro-American architectural design. For example, after having written that ". . . the floor plan of the Newar house is laid out to the model of the Tantric Priests," Joseph Aranha described the "layout of the plan," translating each of the spaces he described into its Euro-American equivalent: the "lowest floor" contained "a small shop"; the second floor, a "private sleeping room"; the third floor, the "main room

for public entertaining"; while the "top-most floor serves as the kitchen." The facade, which contained "exquisitely carved windows," maintained "vertical as well horizontal hierarchy."[33]

The traditional society is thus discursively constructed as a collective consciousness that materializes its common beliefs as the codes and maxims, or traditional canons, of Balinese / Samoan / West Cameroonian / Chinese / Turkish / Islamic architecture. Yet by stressing the opposition, rather than the co-implication between tradition and modernity, discourses of the ethnographic pastoral in TDSR have ironically tended to constitute a "traditional" version of the high architectural history and theory the journal has sought to challenge. The vision is of a corpus of "exquisitely crafted" ritual buildings of indigenous cultures that are physically and theoretically removed from the social and spatial processes of urban development. Such writing not only overlooks the potential of traditional buildings and modes of social organization for coping with, and even contesting, the processes of rapid urbanization, it also defers critical analysis of the global professionalization of tradition.

TRADITION AND CRITICAL REFLEXIVITY

A range of other theoretical positions have developed in TDSR that challenge those associated with narratives of the ethnographic pastoral. These first appeared as meta-critical reflections on the journal and its discourses. In these, the ironic exteriority of the participant/observer has not been entirely abandoned, but turned back on the text, making the representation of tradition and its consequences the object of study. Authors have questioned two of the primary characteristics of representations of traditional environments according to the ethnographic pastoral: their organization around dichotomies such as First World/Third World, East/West, modern/traditional, rational/intuitive, individual/collective, spiritual/capitalist etc.; and the tendency to represent societies through the viewpoint of an objective, unlocated subject. The latter concern has led to writing in which reflexivity defines a politics of intellectual identity, through the consideration of how one may position oneself in relation to an object of study.

Janet Abu-Lughod, in a 1992 article entitled "Disappearing Dichotomies," stated that it is no longer possible to assume a correspondence between social formation and spatial location due to the proliferation of "intermediate types" that have characteristics associated with both the West and the Third World. In a comment with pointed relevance for TDSR, she stated that in an increasingly hybrid world, researchers have been forced to take smaller and smaller units of analysis in order to continue to work within homogeneous contexts:

> In desperation we break off from the present globalization
> process some small pieces of relatively insulated "local" cul-
> ture or regional specificity . . . we then put them into a
> residual category we call "traditional" or "vernacular". . . .[34]

Abu-Lughod further argued that the noun "tradition," with its object-like implications, should be superseded by a verb called "traditioning." This, she suggested, would redefine tradition as "process not product" in which past practices and spaces are constantly recycled and reused to meet present needs.[35]

Dell Upton also questioned the tendency to divide the world into neatly opposed categories. In a 1993 article entitled "The Tradition of Change," he suggested the concept of traditional architecture had paralyzed the study of vernacular landscapes. He argued that researchers are "too interested in continuity and authenticity" and "tend to ignore change and ambiguity."[36] He called for an "impure" understanding of the world, in which the static is replaced with the evanescent, and narratives of spatial and temporal fixity are replaced with those of migration.

Writing in 1997, Anthony King argued that such hybridity is not new, but is narrated as such because it is written by First World academics whose societies are only now beginning to experience the "plural" forms of ethnic composition long-established in the Third World through processes of colonization:

> *Cairo and Rio manifested the same "multicultural" qualities we associate with the modern metropolis over 100 years ago. The question is, from what position do we speak and more precisely "whose modernity" do we narrate?*[37]

King questioned the very category of tradition (and any reform to its meanings), by suggesting that the use of the term is itself a mark of privilege held within a global system of knowledge and power:

> *. . . the notion of tradition as applied to buildings is temporally and spatially specific to our own, essentially global position, which assumes a knowledge of many architectures, many others (or cultures) and a hegemonic overview. The question is how much reference it pays to the positionalities of those Others themselves. . . .*[38]

These and other arguments have helped to broaden *TDSR*'s critical terrain. A small but significant indication of their impact has been the fact that the word "tradition" increasingly appears in quotation marks in the journal, a move that brackets the term in a way that simultaneously suggests critical distance from its authenticity as a singular concept, its appropriation into various ideological constructions, and even its periodization as a workable category. Though the articles described above are largely concerned with scholarship in the present, their emergence clearly suggests a larger research trajectory for *TDSR*, in which the traditions of research on "tradition" are foregrounded and studied in relation to moments of large-scale historical change, the growth of the academy, and the global diffusion of scholarly knowledge.

"Tradition" in the ironic and critically reflexive sense has a much more slippery meaning than in the recuperative models

it implicitly backs away from. There is no longer a transcendent ideal to be preserved or lost. As a consequence, the oppositional relations between inside and outside, First World and Third, West and East, masculine and feminine, past and present, which structure the interpretation of traditional societies, are also called into question. In its "de-essentialized" form, the term resists fixity, both historically and geographically, and is equally difficult to identify with a redemptive moral position.

Some of the new ambiguities attached to the term are exemplified by Jyoti Hosagrahar's 1999 article on housing extensions in New Delhi under British colonial rule.[39] She explored how, as building extensions planned between 1936 and 1941 were subsequently taken over by private real estate development, customary building practices diverged from the intentions of the colonial building codes. There is no clear divide here between capitalism and tradition — in this case, one actually serves to reinforce the other, while simultaneously undermining the authority of colonial spatial practice. Other articles have explored tradition as an ideological production of modernity, rather than an uncorrupted realm that preceded it. Thus, Laurel L. Cornell showed how what has typically been represented as the traditional Japanese house, with its sliding paper walls and *tatami* floors, was in fact a modern invention that reached its apogee at the beginning of the twentieth century.[40] Similarly, Sibel Bozdogan suggested that the national or modern dualities associated with the "traditional Turkish house" were not inherent in the form, but socially constructed by institutions and agents in particular, signifying contexts. There is, she wrote,

> *. . . nothing that automatically links "good design" with the "old" . . . tradition is a relatively autonomous preoccupation of the architects, as well as a recurrent cultural construct within the discipline. It has, however, acquired historical significance and legitimacy only in the contexts of nationalism and postmodernity. . . .*[41]

These readings of "tradition" within, rather than outside the space of capitalist modernity are perhaps at their most pointed when dealing with the "heritage industry." On the one hand, the proliferation of world heritage sites and the growing interest in historical preservation would seem to offer the chance to bring the arguments of the ethnographic pastoral to practical realization. Thus could the disappearing examples of traditional space not simply be preserved textually, but physically as well, at scales extending to that of entire neighborhoods or towns. At the same time, however, recent articles in *TDSR* have argued that the process of preservation almost inevitably forces out the occupants of the traditional environment being "saved." In a paradoxical trade-off, described in locations as diverse as Jordan and Brazil,[42] the social space of tradition is simultaneously preserved and commodifed by the intertwined processes preservation, gentrification, and global tourism.

CONCLUSION

As suggested at the outset, a concern with the relevance of tradition to architectural practice is central to those recuperative discourses which emerged out of a desire to establish counter-models to "modern" industrialized architectural production. The more recent, critically reflexive analysis of tradition as an ideological weapon, an Orientalist projection of an imperialistic state, or architectural packaging for a post-Fordist real estate industry does not immediately call forth counter-models at the level of professional practice, except by implication. Indeed, this form of writing succeeds at least in part because its intellectual agenda is not determined in advance by the need to conform to given ideas of professional practice. The attempt to investigate tradition as a socially situated practice whose meaning is not given in advance, but which is produced in social relations of power, has opened the journal to vastly different accounts of the meaning of tradition, far removed from the dream of a unitary "science of tradition" as called for by Amos Rapoport, or a pluralistic compendium of ethno-architecture as proposed by Gerard Toffin.

In what amounts to a paradigm shift, tradition has been increasingly understood as both an instrument and effect of power. The shift is underscored by the IASTE 2000 conference, "The End of Tradition?" Its planned thematic sessions will explore such topics as "the insidious revival of tradition," the "territorial implications for a placeless society," and the commodification and production of tradition by tourism. All of the above would appear to explore the production, appropriation and transformation of tradition on an unprecedented scale. The "end" of tradition is therefore intertwined with its global (re)production. It may also be associated with the eclipse of recuperative discourses on tradition.

In the context of my larger study, it is possible to see how the paradigm shift now underway within *TDSR* and IASTE has brought a number of issues into focus that have implications for the broader field of urban studies. The point can be illustrated by comparing *TDSR* with another journal that shares an international outlook but which is dramatically different in terms of its representation of space, the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (IJURR)*. This journal was founded in 1977 during a period of Marxist ferment in urban studies. It continues today as the project of Research Committee 21 of the International Sociological Association. Like the narratives of the ethnographic pastoral in *TDSR*, the discourse on international urban political econ-

omy in *IJURR* has been largely defined by a dualistic model of global space. The world city has also acquired its conceptual clarity through the opposition between the local and global; however, here the local is a passive space determined by the dynamism of metropolitan "command and control" centers. Inasmuch as the local is the inert target of hostile and exploitative global processes, it recalls the trope of the ethnographic pastoral, but in an economistic language, and at a vastly altered scale of representation.

Until recently, *TDSR* and the *IJURR* represent two opposed, and largely noncommunicating ends of a common set of global processes: thus, where the *IJURR* stressed economic flows, *TDSR* examined pockets of "traditional" time and space on the outer edges of an advancing global capitalism. Inasmuch as the discourses of the ethnographic pastoral represent hand-crafted artifacts produced by "preindustrial," nonalienated labor, they are far removed from the *IJURR's* abstract space of flows of capital, labor and ideas. In the world city of international urban political economy, space only becomes tangible through government policies, economic processes, and state ideologies. As such, it cannot signify or transmit meaning: it is either a boundary condition, a conduit, or a reflection of the processes it contains. Urban space is produced by processes rather than agents, and when professionals appear, they are "effects" of larger economic structures.

In more recent debates on issues such as the localizing of global traditions or the manufacturing of heritage, *TDSR* has moved toward the outlines of a transdisciplinary critical practice that begins to bring cultural and economic processes together in the same analytic space. In doing so, the potential exists to move beyond both the economism of urban political economy and socially abstracted interpretations of tradition. Such a formulation not only challenges the way in which analytic techniques and conceptions of space are parceled out and isolated from each other in discrete disciplinary spaces, but requires a rethinking of the "scale politics" of academic research, in which built-environment disciplines have until now addressed one scale of analysis to the exclusion of others that may overlap and occur simultaneously. In this context, the search for transdisciplinary models of spatial analysis that do not simply seek alliances between established blocks of knowledge, but question their very existence as such, becomes integral to an understanding of the symbolic and material forces involved in the politics of space.

REFERENCE NOTES

1. See E. Said, "Third World Intellectuals and Metropolitan Culture," *Raritan*, vol.9 (Winter 1990), pp.27-50.

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24. See, for example, M.L. Pratt, *The Imperial Eye/I: Writing and Transculturation* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

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27. See A. Rapoport, "On Cultural Landscapes," *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, Vol.3 No.3 (Spring, 1992), p.33-48.

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33. Aranha, "A Comparison of Traditional Settlements in Nepal and Bali," p.42.

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35. Ibid., p.11

36. D. Upton, "The Tradition of Change," *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, Vol.5 No.2 (Fall 1993), p.14.

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Book Reviews

Living Heritage: Vernacular Environment in China. Kai-Yin Lo, Puay-Peng Ho, et al. Hong Kong, Yungmingtang, 1999.

The destruction of buildings in its cities for the past fifty years to make way for large governmental offices, factories, and other politically relevant buildings, plus the recent unprecedented speed of construction both in its cities and countryside, has managed to eliminate many significant historic buildings in China. Faced with this crisis, architects worldwide have been desperately trying to figure out ways to salvage those remaining old buildings that are significant to an understanding of Chinese culture. It has also today been recognized that investigation of built heritage must emphasize both the study of large palaces and temples as well as small folk houses, villages and towns. Thus, places once deemed humble or insignificant are being visited and studied by scholars from various disciplines, including architecture. And architecture departments from universities across China are setting up summer programs and expeditions to record and document notable rural villages and folk houses.

As a companion book to the very successful exhibit in Hong Kong bearing the same title, the recent publication *Living Heritage: Vernacular Environment in China* is a visual treat. Its photographs are beautiful, enlivened by artful camera angles and beautiful lighting. Furthermore, the decision to print the book in sepia black and white to evoke the look of old prints produces an extremely poetic and romantic effect without sacrificing the clarity or intricacy of the building detail documented. Even though these pictures were taken recently, they project a feeling of the past, as if one were looking at scenes and buildings from the 1920s (which, by the way, is a bit incongruous with the title's reference to "Living Heritage").

Because this book has emerged from a photo exhibit, it places more emphasis on photographs than text. It is organized around images from five distinct areas: Shanxi Province; Wannan-South Anhui Province; Jiangnan-Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces; Minxi-West Fujian Province; and Hong Kong. Each section begins with a short introduction followed by pages of photographs with fairly detailed captions. Unfortunately, the text makes no attempt to link the five chosen places, either architecturally, historically or socially. This leads one to question why they were selected, since they are not similar in climate or geography. The book would have been much stronger if some overall relationship had been established in its main textual sections between these areas, if shared or similar historical events had been explored, or if the contrast in the local social and cultural practices had been discussed.

In view of its original nature as a photo exhibit, the captions accompanying individual images bear considerable interpretive weight. In the end this is one of the book's strengths, since the captions generally offer extensive and often insightful descriptions. Their immediacy next to the images also gives the viewer quick access to information that will help in appreciating the photos and understanding the unfamiliar construction

details they show. Since most traditional Chinese methods
of dwelling construction and architectural detail are unfamil-
iar to this generation of Chinese, such extensive captioning
will serve well to make clear the content of the photos and
the intent of the photographs.

   With this abundance of images, the book gives a won-
derful visual tour of building styles in the five chosen
regions. One would hope that, as continuing research is
inspired by books like this one, more in-depth studies of the
buildings of particular regions and the factors that influenced
their evolution will result.   ■

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Production of Culture/Cultures of Production. Edited by Paul
du Gay. London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi, SAGE
Publications, 1997.

   If "the proof is in the pudding," as the saying goes, then
Production of Culture/Cultures of Production, edited by Paul du
Gay, is a winner. My habit, before seriously reading a book, is to
browse through it several times, looking at what strikes me. As
a result of this process, by the time I was ready to engage this
book and take notes for a review, I had already shared its essays
with several graduate students and colleagues: the chapter on
advertising was helpful to M.L., who is writing a planning thesis
on the "Rhetoric and Advertising of Sustainability"; the material
on work was directly relevant to D.L., who is formulating a dis-
sertation about the impact of high-technology on the culture of
the workplace; the introduction and sections on cultural econo-
my were interesting to a colleague who is finishing a manuscript
on economy and values; the chapter on globalization helped a
colleague in geography see how that term is now being used by
cultural theorists; and the section on fashion turned out to be a
nice paradigm for A.K., since I could suggest that he try some-
thing similar after he had gotten stuck writing a thesis proposal
about preferences in the speculative housing market. Thus, by
the time I write this, my copy of the book is already fairly worn
— a good sign this is a timely and useful book.

   The essays are consistently well written, clear and engag-
ing. For example, du Gay's useful "Introduction" lays out the
direction of the collection without either belaboring or repeat-
ing the material of the contributors to follow. Indeed, as will
be clear to all who have toiled to discover the best order for
presenters on a conference panel or essays in a book, this
work is well ordered and develops its themes in a deliberate
and fruitful manner. There was a sure hand in charge, and
successful collaboration took place among the contributors.

   It should be noted that the format of the volume is
intended to be user-friendly, with the focal essays comple-
mented by readings that follow each chapter. To cite from
the book's back cover, in honest respect for what The Open
University intended: "With unique coverage of a range of
hotly debated topics, presented in an accessible form with
questions, activities, and selected readings, this book will be
essential reading for lecturers and students in cultural stud-
ies and a range of related fields." Though it would be a bit

much for me to say the volume will be "essential" reading, the content and format are very engaging.

In Chapter 1, "What in the World's Going on?" Kevin Robins makes substantial progress in clarifying and elaborating what "globalization" means. This is no small task given the way the term has at times been thoughtlessly and carelessly devalued to little more than a captivating buzzword. Robins works through the major dimensions of the theme, giving the reader something of lasting value. Especially nice is the way his essay connects the global to the local, and then places the regional in between. The result is a balanced, realistic and useful model. His development of the ideas of (and readings on) mobility across frontiers also opens the topic to other aspects of cultural studies, such as transborder and hybridity studies in literature.

Keith Negus's Chapter 2, "The Production of Culture," successfully deepens these themes and develops the treatment of the Sony Corporation begun by Robins. It is no small accomplishment for Negus to directly and clearly present the "heavy-duty" theories of Adorno and Horkheimer and apply them in a lucid manner. His analysis of the culture that produces and is produced by globalized media is both crisp and appropriately complex, especially in its sensitivity to the ways that values, meanings and practices are at the heart of production and consumption. The prolonged case study of Sony, specifically the way it worked to create synergy through hardware and software, provides an empirical description and interpretation of the relation of organization, economy and culture that is far more vivid and powerful than most abstract and quantitative treatments. And, as is often the case with essays in the book, this one also further evokes connections — for example, to the treatment of "life world" in phenomenology, or to Castells's less qualitative approach.

"Fashion: Unpacking a Cultural Production," Chapter 3, by Peter Braham, takes special care to situate itself in regard to the chapters before and after it, thus continuing the volume's integrated presentation and development of material. The essay accomplishes at least three things: it presents theory about the relation of fashion and culture; it convincingly elaborates the way fashion is a key to social history; and it undertakes a sustained analysis of the diffusion of fashion. The essay provides an unexpected bonus in its treatment of the cycles of fashion, not only because of the content presented, but because it provides an occasion to remember (perhaps with a start) how time-

sensitive and variable such cultural phenomena are — another example of how the volume, overall, opens out to the concerns of TDSR readers. Care is taken to both focus on fashion in clothing and to indicate ways in which fashion is a broader phenomena that pulses through multiple fields of human activity. Especially insightful is the chapter's emphasis on distribution, the often-overlooked but complicated set of engines that connect production with consumption.

Chapter 4 by Sean Nixon, "Circulating Culture," directly continues the development begun in the previous chapter. Its treatment of design, marketing and advertising will certainly be of interest to IASTE members, because housing and other elements of built culture can be thought of in the same way. Among the chapter's strong points are the correspondence of its ideas about marketing segments to the efforts in earlier chapters to recognize the fine-grained nature of the intersection of the global, regional and local. The analysis of both the creative and calculated quality of planning is also spot-on, indicating how the roles of environmental specialists often intertwine. Finally, the essay calls for both professionals and academics to reflect on their roles in the processes of globalization. One of Nixon's intentions (and accomplishments) is "to consider the make-up of advertising and design practitioners as cultural intermediaries and to reflect upon their cultural preferences" (p.182).

Chapter 5, "Culturing Production," by Graeme Salamon, tackles the big issues involved in assessing the meaning of work: "work activities themselves, work rhythms, schedules and time discipline, workers' relations with each other, with their employers, even with their own physical activity" (p.238). Having studied this topic for more than thirty years, I can say the chapter's examples are clear and convincing, and the meanings evoked fair and useful. The essay is especially valuable for its portrayal of corporate organization — both in terms of its characterization of the phenomena and its explanation of the use of narrative to invent identities (providing another implicit bridge to other areas of cultural studies and rhetorical-narrative analysis). Clearly, readers of this journal will be interested in what is said about the corporate character of the environment and culture.

Finally, the editor's own essay appears as Chapter 6, "Organizing Identity: Making up People at Work." Here du Gay does two things. First, he continues to develop the theme of corporations, media, and consumption activity. In this

regard, the essay nicely treats its themes in ways that both elaborate new dimensions and connect back to the previous chapters. For example, using examples from life and media, du Gay analyzes the varieties of hybrid identity people produce for themselves today. Second, du Gay successfully foregrounds the consequences of the processes the other contributors to the volume have considered, showing how, in the end, they involve matters of power, control and governance. This second accomplishment is interesting, because it is precisely correct, and because it may take the reader by surprise. The essays that have preceded this conclusion presented difficult material so well and with such good examples that this reader, at least, did not see the brute fact was so close at hand.

As a final note, I want to compliment the way the editors and publisher of this volume have provided it with a fresh and reader-friendly layout. The book features clear headings and margin notations, helpful use of color and bold type, and nice illustrations. Whereas it sometimes is the case that books produced in and for the U.K. do not do well with readers outside that sphere (largely because of the non-transferability of the examples used), that is not the case here. This book would make a fine text for a course and, beyond that, a useful précis and reference work for practitioners and researchers in environmental fields.   ∎

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The First House: Myth, Paradigm, and the Task of Architecture.
R.D. Dripps. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1997. 154 pp.

According to Paul Valery, myth is that which ". . . exists with speech as its only cause." In other words, speech creates myth; myth does no necessitate speech. In the first chapter of *The First House*, R.D. Dripps unfolds the Vitruvian myth of dwelling as that which began with the embers of a dying fire, led to gathering and to speech, and eventually to the politics of the city and the fabrics of collective residence. In this way, Dripps defines the task of architecture as that which preserves the spatial relationships that make politics and social exchange possible. Consistent with Valery's definition, dwelling as myth is not a function of the need for shelter which requires neither politics nor community, but rather the expression of shared values and shared meaning.

In the second and third chapters, Dripps addresses the formal implications of this myth — the structural paradigm that is defined by center, boundary and entrance. Paradigms are patterns, through which the meaning of architecture has consistently been expressed. Using the example of Vitruvius's stargazer who began to perceive the star-studded sky as a vault, Dripps illustrates how contemporary understanding of the paradigm can give new meaning to the retrospective study of buildings. Thus, the paradigm does not precede architecture; it follows it. The paradigm provides the underpinning of understanding; but it is pinned under only after the fact. Form follows content.

Through the first three chapters this analysis of the Vitruvian myth follows closely in the tradition of Joseph Rykwert, Christian Norberg-Schultz, and others whose phenomenological perspectives on the meaning of architecture so shaped the theoretical literature of the 1960s and 70s. It is only in the chapter called "Constructing the Paradigm," that Dripps diverges from this well-worn path, defining the paradigm itself as something structurally implicit, or "evanescent." Here Dripps stresses contingency and transformation as the characteristics that make the paradigm of continuing value. This, in turn, leads to an exciting and open-ended epilogue (the opposite of a conclusion) that takes the idea of the paradigm to its limit.

The main body of this book is really an extended essay with a strong and consistent attachment to the *Ten Books* of

Vitruvius but few references to other primary sources. The extended notes, however, which comprise a full third of the text, include some unexpected literary references, as well as the more predictable philosophical and critical ones mentioned above. Notably, T.S. Eliot's essay "Tradition and the Individual Talent" gives new perspective on the interrelationship of the timely and the historic in artistic production. And a lengthy selection from the story "The Aleph" by Borges illustrates the complexity of the paradigmatic center. In an equally complementary way to these notes, the illustrations by Celia Liu form a parallel visual essay throughout the book, tracing an evocative image of the forest through its transformation into built form that represents a collective.

The book's final conceptual premise calls out the "center" not in terms of its content — a clearing — but in terms of its opposition to what is around it. Dripps points to such atemporal constants as the rising and setting of the sun in predictable places and the inevitability of gravity as phenomenological laws to which the paradigm need still respond, and replaces the ideal of a paradigm shift with a paradigm inversion. Dripps explains that the myth of fire has exhausted its possibilities, and, in fact, has "inverted" its meaning from an emblem of invention to one of destruction. In a leap of faith, Dripps suggests that some version of the original forest might now replace the fire as paradigmatic center and play an as-yet-undiscovered role in generating new tasks for architecture.

Like much of the content of *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, Dripps builds a bridge between tradition and innovation, between the built vernacular and the collective dream of the future. In this way *The First House* opens its door to other theoretical houses that may follow. ∎

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Conferences and Events

UPCOMING CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS

Congress for the New Urbanism, 2000 Annual Meeting, "The Politics of Place," Portland, Oregon: June 15-19. For more information, contact: Congress for New Urbanism, The Hearst Building, 5 Third St., Suite 725, San Francisco, CA, 94103. Tel.: (415) 495-2255; Fax: (415) 495-1731; E-mail: cnuinfo@cnu.org; Web: http://www.cnu.org/viii/.

The School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University: 24th Summer Session, Ithaca, New York: June 19-July 28, 2000. The SCT offers professors and graduate students of literature and related social sciences a chance to work with preeminent figures in critical thought. The 2000 faculty includes Stephen Nicols, Dominick LaCapra, David Carroll, Rey Chow, Peter Novick, David Wellbery, Etienne Balibar, Suzanne Gearhart and Allen Grossman. For more information, contact: Mary Ahl or Lisa Patti, School of Criticism and Theory, Cornell University, A.D. White House, 27 East Avenue, Ithaca, NY, 14853. Tel.: (607) 255-9274; Fax: (607) 255-1422; Web: www.arts.cornell.edu/sochum/sct.

Tourism 2000: Time for Celebration?, Sheffield, U.K.: September 2-7, 2000. Conference organized by the Centre for Travel & Tourism, University of Northumbria at Newcastle; and the Centre for Tourism, Sheffield Hallam University. For more information, contact: Tourism 2000 Conference, Conference 21, Stoddart Building, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, S1 1WB, U.K. Tel.: +44(0) 114 225 5335/5336; Fax +44(0) 114 225 5337; E-mail: tourism2000@shu.ac.uk; Web: http://www.travel-tourism.com/conference

Preserving the Recent Past II, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: October 11-13, 2000. Conference sponsored by the National Park Service, the Association for Preservation Technology International, DOCOMOMO International, the Society of Architectural Historians, the Society for Commercial Archaeology, and other organizations. For more information, contact: Preserving the Recent Past II, PO Box 75207, Washington, D.C., 20013-5207. Web: http://www.2.cr.nps.gov/tps/recentpast2.html.

Second International Conference on Mosque Architecture — Future Prospect, Tehran, Iran: October 12-14, 2000. Conference sponsored by the University of Art. For more information, contact: Secretariat of the Conference on Mosque Architecture, University of Art, PO Box 14155-6434, Tehran 14146, Iran. Tel.: (98 21) 8954601-5; Fax: (98 21) 8954609; E-mail: artunida@irost-com.

Historicisms in Modernity: History as a Vehicle and Sign of Identity and Ideology in the Architecture of the Twentieth Century, Berlin, Germany: November 24-26, 2000. International Symposium at the Free University of Berlin, co-organized by the departments of Art History of the Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel and the Free University Berlin. For more information, contact: Anna Minta, Christian Albrechts-University Kiel, D-24098 Kiel, Germany. Tel.: ++49-431-880 4636; Fax: ++49-431-880 4628; E-mail: aminta@ kunst-geschichte.uni-kiel.de; Web: http://www.uni-kiel.de/kunstgeschichte/historismen.

Authenticity in Architecture, Savannah, Georgia: February 15-17, 2001. Biennial symposium sponsored by the Department of Architectural History at the Savannah College of Art and Design. For more information, contact: David W. Gobel or Robin B. Williams, Department of Architectural History, Savannah College of Art and Design, PO Box 3146, Savannah, GA, 31402-3146. Fax: (912) 525-6050; E-mail: dgobel@scad.edu or rwilli-mam@scad.edu; Web: http://www.scad.edu/archhist.

"Interactions: Regional Studies, Global Processes, and Historical Analysis, Washington, D.C.: March 1-3, 2001. Conference organized by the American Historical Association, the World History Association, the Middle East Studies Association, the African Studies Association, the Latin American Studies Association, the Conference on Latin American History, the Association for Asian Studies, the Community College Humanities Association, and the Library of Congress. For more information, contact: Debbie Doyle, American Historical Association, 400 A Street, SE, Washington, D.C., 20003-3889;. Tel. and Fax: (202) 544-8307; E-Mail: ddoyle@theaha.org.

Third National Conference on Historic Preservation Practice: Why not Now? A Critical Look at Historic Preservation Techniques and Technology: March 2001. Two-day conference sponsored by the National Council for Preservation Education, the National Parks Service, and Groucher College. For more information, contact: David L. Ames, Conference Coordinator and Director of the Center for Historic Architecture and Design, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, 19716. Tel.: 302-831-1050; Fax 302-831-4548; E-Mail: dvames@udel.edu

RECENT CONFERENCES

Twenty-Eighth World Congress on Housing: Challenges of the 21st Century, Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.: April 15-19, 2000. Conference organized by the International Association of Housing Science (IAHS) and Innovation Institute for Sciences and Management (IISM) in Abu Dhabi. For more information, contact: Dr. Ibrahim Sidawi, Congress Secretary/Main Coordinator, Al Salam Street – Opposite Etilsalat, PO Box 4644, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Tel.: +971 2 773900; Fax: +971 2 776130; E-mail: iism@emirates.net.ae; Web: http:iism.webjump.com or http:www.hdcongress.com.

Guide for Preparation of Manuscripts

1. GENERAL
The editors invite readers to submit manuscripts. Please send three copies of each manuscript, with one copy to include all original illustrations. Place the title of the manuscript, the author's name and a 50-word biographical sketch on a separate cover page. The title only should appear again on the first page of text. Manuscripts are circulated for review without identifying the author. Manuscripts are evaluated by a blind peer-review process.

2. LENGTH AND FORMAT
Manuscripts should not exceed 25 standard 8.5" x 11" [A4] double-spaced typewritten pages (about 7500 words). Leave generous margins.

3. APPROACH TO READER
Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the journal, papers should be written for an academic audience that may have either a general or a specific interest in your topic. Papers should present a clear narrative structure. They should not be compendiums of field notes. Please define specialized or technical terminology where appropriate.

4. ABSTRACT AND INTRODUCTION
Provide a one-paragraph abstract of no more than 100 words. This abstract should explain the content and structure of the paper and summarize its major findings. The abstract should be followed by a short introduction. The introduction will appear without a subheading at the beginning of the paper.

5. SUBHEADINGS
Please divide the main body of the paper with a single progression of subheadings. There need be no more than four or five of these, but they should describe the paper's main sections and reinforce the reader's sense of progress through the text.
Sample Progression: The Role of the Longhouse in Iban Culture. The Longhouse as a Building Form. Transformation of the Longhouse at the New Year. The Impact of Modern Technology. Conclusion: Endangered Form or Form in Transition?
Do not use any numbering system in subheadings. Use secondary subheadings only when absolutely essential for format or clarity.

6. REFERENCES
Do not use a general bibliography format. Use a system of numbered reference notes as indicated below.

A condensed section of text might read as follows:
> In his study of vernacular dwellings in Egypt, Edgar Regis asserted that climate was a major factor in the shaping of roof forms. Henri Lacompte, on the other hand, has argued that in the case of Upper Egypt this deterministic view is irrelevant.[1]
> An eminent architectural historian once wrote, "The roof form in general is the most indicative feature of the housing styles of North Africa."[2] Clearly, however, the matter of how these forms have evolved is a complex subject. A thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.[3]
> In my research I discovered that local people have differing notions about the origins of the roof forms on the dwellings they inhabit.[4]

The reference notes, collected at the end of the text (not at the bottom of each page), would read as follows:
1. E. Regis, *Egyptian Dwellings* (Cairo: University Press, 1979), p.179; and H. Lacompte, "New Study Stirs Old Debate," *Smithsonian* 11 (December 1983), pp.24–34.
2. B. Smithson, "Characteristic Roof Forms," in H. Jones, ed., *Architecture of North Africa* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p.123.
3. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see J. Idris, *Roofs and Man* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
4. In my interviews I found that the local people understood the full meaning of my question only when I used a more formal Egyptian word for "roof" than that in common usage.

7. DIAGRAMS, DRAWINGS AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Illustrations will be essential for most papers in the journal, however, each paper can only be accompanied by a maximum of 20 illustrations. For purposes of reproduction, please provide images as line drawings (velox, actual size), b&w photos (5" x 7" or 8"x 10" glossies), or digitized computer files. Color prints and drawings, slides, and photocopies are not acceptable.

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